Literature Review:

An old-age Question – How does the USA perceive China's

demographic crisis?

By Lukas Becker

1. Theories of demographic change in International Relations

Mark L. Haas (2007) was the first author to attempt comprehensive theory building by linking
the Global Aging Phenomena to the behavior of states in the International System. His Theory
of Geriatric Peace postulates that due to the massive implications of demographic aging on
the capabilities of the Great Powers would shrink and that US hegemony would be secured.
He postulates that social security spending would crowd out military spending in most
countries making interstate war less likely. Others like Moller (1968), Goldenberg (2016) as
well as Kim and Sciubba (2015) have found that a high percentage of youths in a nation’s
population is conducive to interstate conflict and alliance abrogation. Combining Haas’s
Geriatric Peace Theory and the findings that youth bulges in populations are conducive to
conflict Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, and Haas (2019), in their article “The Demographic
Transition Theory of War,” theorize that demographically young societies with demographic
youth bulges are conducive to war and civil conflict while demographically older countries
tend to be more peaceful. They name higher levels of youth unemployment and lack of
opportunities, increased civil strife, and the greater availability of manpower as reasons why
demographically younger countries tend to be involved in international conflicts. As these
young countries transition away from high birth rates, they tend to benefit economically from
low labor costs and high growth rates as well as low dependent ratios, defusing generational
tension and propensity for conflict. They integrate Haas’s Geriatric Peace Theory and add that
aging societies tend to be more concerned with casualties due to shrinking labor pools and
greater family investment in offspring therefore reducing the support for armed conflict in the
societal as well as through material considerations. Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, and Haas’s
(2019) Demographic Transition Theory on War is the most comprehensive theory that deals
with the implications of demographics for International Relations to date.
The most significant weakness in the literature concerning global aging is the relative lack of
data confirming domestic foreign policy patterns predicted by the Geriatric Peace Theory and
The Demographic Transition Theory of War. While the data confirms that social security
spending is increasing in many aging countries, decreases in military spending cannot be
universally observed. Sheen (2013) found that even South Korea and Japan, some of the most
affected countries, have seen stable spending on defense, while China has seen rapid increases
in social security spending and, at the same time, rapid militarization and increases in defense
spending. The predictive nature of the theory and the weak causal link between latent
demographic trends and manifest policy action may explain this lack of universal
applicability. The relative lack of empirical proof of Haas’s Geriatric Peace Theory compared
with youth-related IR phenomena (see Kim and Sciubba, 2015; Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill,
and Haas’s, 2019) speaks to a need for further exploration of the effects of Global aging and
speaks against a monocausal explanation using demographic determinism to explain Foreign
Policy and necessitates a broader theoretical approach.

Mearsheimer (2014) predicts through his offensive neo-realist framework that a rising China
will become more assertive and aggressive towards its neighbors and the USA since it will be
more able to challenge the US as its capabilities grow. Beckley and Brands (2021) expand on
this and take an opposing view to Haas (2007); they argue that China’s loss of relative
capabilities will make China more assertive in trying to assert itself as the regional hegemon.
A closing window of opportunity as China’s rise will halt due to its demographic challenges
and resulting the resulting economic and military. This is explained with a offensive
neorealist frame work that predicts that in order to maximize its future power China will have
to be more assertive while it’s still able to challenge the US and before its demographic
situation becomes critical.

to summarize there are two dominant argumentative strands in the literature on China’s
demographic aging phenomena regarding its future disposition towards the US. One argues
that China declining capabilities due to its demographic crisis will suppress China’s ability to
challenge the US dominance as it grows economically and militarily weaker (Haas, 2007;
Brooks, Brooks, Greenhill, and Haas’s, 2019; Sheen, 2013). The other side argues (Beckley
and Brands, 2021, Mehr quellen) that China is stagnating because of or in part due to its
demographic crisis. This in turn changes the cost benefit analysis of China as it presents a
closing window of opportunity to reorient the balance of power in China’s favor promting a
more proactive and assertive foreign policy. While the inputs are the same on both sides the
projected outcomes are diametrically opposed.
 2. The role of epistemic communities in American foreign policy

There is a broad consensus in the literature that there is a connection between epistemic
communities and foreign policy. In theory, epistemic communities provide knowledge about
causal relations and alternative policy recommendations that can influence policy
implementation (Haas, 1992; Wagner, 2002; Haas, 2008). How strong the influence of
epistemic communities is compared to other factors like public opinion is challenging to say
and is mostly assessed on a case-by-case basis, although there were some attempts to gauge
how much experts, in general, affect foreign policy (Benjamin and Page, 2005).

3. Neoclassical Realism as a theoretic basis for integrating perception

To answer our research question, this research project will apply a Neoclassical realist
theoretic framework. Neoclassical Realism acknowledges the primacy of Neorealist structural
variables in foreign policy formation, but in contrast to Neorealism, it allows for the inclusion
of Unit-Level variables, more specifically in this case (Foulon, 2015; Rose, 1998), how the
perception of demographic aging shapes Chinese foreign policy as an intervening variable to
structural pressures.

Neoclassical Realism is a sub-school of Realism that tries to tackle one of the most critical
problems Neorealists in explaining foreign policy. The disconnect of reality from the
predictions both offensive Neo-Realist theoretical backgrounds make about how states
formulate their foreign policy and how they perceive the international system. Neorealists
offensive or defensive support the claim that foreign policies are defined by the state's relative
positions in the international system and how this system is constituted (see Waltz, 2010;
Mearsheimer, 2001). There are some differences in the offensive and defensive neorealist
schools about how domestic factors influence foreign policy. However, they both agree that
there can be no parsimonious theory building by looking at 'messy' domestic politics and that
domestic analysis can only be attempted with a great deal of local knowledge and not in a
theory-guided process (Rose 1998, p. 145). Nevertheless, the Neorealist focus on structure
also fails to explain that states in similar positions in the international system develop very
different foreign policy approaches (Rose 1998, p. 149).
Unlike neorealists, they do not see the state as a black box where inputs from the international
system come in, and foreign policy comes out. Neoclassical Realism sees state-level factors as
intervening variables that 'distort' foreign policy from the structural norm (Foulon, 2015, p.
37). Neoclassical Realism also accepts that the relative distribution of capabilities and power
has great influence on the on the international system and the way states behave but amends
this by contesting the exclusivity of system-level variables and adds unit-level (state-level)
variables that act as intervening variables in modifying the “output” of foreign policy
(Taliaferro, 2001). As on of those intervening Neoclassical realists highlight the importance
of perception as a intervening variable and how policymakers perceive the international
system, and how this perception guides their foreign policy formulation and also look at how
domestic interest groups modify, prevent, or promote specific foreign policy items (Rose
1998, p. 648).

By adopting a Neoclassical theoretical framework to analyze my findings about the US

governments perception of the Chinese aging crisis, it will be possible to draw tentative
inferences of the US perception of China’s aging crisis may affect the US foreign policy
towards China as an intervening variable. Another benefit of this this framework is that it
allows this thesis to engage with the existing literature on the demographic change and its
implication on International Relations as both Haas (2007) as well as Beckley and Brands
(2021) use the realist logic of capabilities in connection with demographic potential to
conduct their analysis. This is compatible with Neoclassical realisms core assumptions while
at the same time expanding on this through the use of unit-level variables.

Waltz, K.N., 2010. Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.

Taliaferro, J., 2001. Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.
International Security, 25(3), pp.128-161.