2023 FORECAST Remedial Law Part 2

REMEDIAL LAW (Part 2)
based on the doctrines and cases cited

during the lecture of Dean Salvador N. Moya II
on August 14, 2023
Judicial Policy of Non-interference in the Prosecutorial Prerogative of Determining Probable

Cause
The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an
information in court is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor, who directs and controls
the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint. It is executive in nature, the
correctness of which is a matter that the courts ordinarily do not, and may not be compelled to,
pass upon.
By reason of the executive nature of this prosecutorial prerogative, courts cannot compel the
prosecution of a person against whom the public prosecutor has found no sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for indictment. Courts cannot substitute their own judgment for that
which is fundamentally in the domain of the Executive branch. In the same vein, an accused may
not be permitted to file a motion with the trial court for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment
on the ground that the evidence upon which it is based is inadequate. Put simply, whether the
evidence would rise or fall on its face is the sole prerogative of the public prosecutor to assess.
This judicial policy of non-interference is anchored on the inherently factual nature of the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause, requiring the examination of the "existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he [or she] was prosecuted." Armed with the power to investigate, prosecuting officers are in a
better position to assess the strength and weakness of the evidence on hand for purposes of
filing the corresponding information in court. Necessary deference by the reviewing courts to the
factual findings of the prosecutorial bodies serves a practical, if not paramount, purpose.
Otherwise, the courts will be grievously swamped with numerous petitions compelling them to
review the prosecutor's exercise of discretion relating to the dismissal of a complaint filed by a
private complainant or to the filing of related information in court.
While the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is a prosecutorial

prerogative, judicial intrusion is justified when the exercise of such authority is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This exception on the judicial
policy of non-interference applies when it is shown that the prosecutor exercised his or her
power in an "arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law." Navarro v. Cornejo, G.R. No. 263329, [February
8, 2023]
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Prosecutors are duty-bound to make a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case during
preliminary investigation.
In Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, the Court pointed out the two-fold purpose of a preliminary
investigation: first, the paramount purpose "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from
the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial;" and second, the practical purpose "to protect
the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials."
Designed to screen cases for trial, a preliminary investigation, albeit summary in nature, must be
conducted in a scrupulous manner "to prevent material damage to a potential accused's
constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play." It is not a casual affair.
This crucial sieve in the criminal justice system "spells for an individual the difference between
months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind
and liberty, on the other." Factors such as the gravity of the crime charged and the resulting
deprivation of liberty during the pendency of the case, necessitate careful and deliberate
evaluation of evidence by the prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause before
filing the information in court. Navarro v. Cornejo, G.R. No. 263329, [February 8, 2023]
Probable cause is defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted."
A finding of probable cause requires "enough reason to believe that [the imputed crime] was
committed by the accused." Navarro v. Cornejo, G.R. No. 263329, [February 8, 2023]
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Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
In this case, the Informations were filed on July 14, 2017, for petitioner's violations of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed on
November 3, 2014 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto. While R.A. No. 10660 which took
effect on May 5, 2015 is the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, such law is

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not applicable to petitioner's cases. R.A. No. 10660 provides that the reckoning period to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 is
the time of the commission of the offense. Ampongan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 234670-71,
[August 14, 2019]
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All told, the handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of
the Information, has no connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case.
Hence, Sec. 3 (d),Rule 117, requiring a handling prosecutor to secure a prior written authority or
approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information with the
courts, may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to raise such
ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. If, at all, such deficiency is merely formal
and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.
Moreover, both the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due
process — especially when the most contentious of issues involve jurisdictional matters. A denial
of such guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy.
Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and
approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest
the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal
action, are hereby abandoned. It is sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint, as
the case may be, that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing
of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose
approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Villa Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, [November 10, 2020]

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Death of Accused Prior to Final Judgment
With respect to Gan, who died on December 4, 2016, Article 89, paragraph 1 of the RPC provides
for the consequences of such death, to wit:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.— Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
Construing the foregoing provision, the Court, in People v. Bayotas, explained that "the term final
judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as
a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him."
In the same case, the Court summarized the rules in case the accused dies prior to final
judgement:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e.,civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: xxx xxx xxx
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where, during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together

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therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Thus, applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of Gan pending the resolution
of the instant appeal extinguished his criminal liability inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused. Accordingly, the Court holds that the death of Gan results in the dismissal
of the criminal case against him. Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, [February
2, 2021]
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As held, "the trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on his or her personal
evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence.
The determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function x x x."
The term probable cause does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
It bears to stress that — a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases
due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before

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it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a
finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge
finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with x x x trial in order that
justice may be served. Kho v. Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc., G.R. No.
213400, [August 4, 2021]
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To secure a conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that "every fact necessary
to constitute [a] crime . . . be established."
While not requiring absolute certainty, this standard requires that the prosecution establish
moral certainty, "or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
The need to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt proceeds from the due process clause and
the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent.
Non-compliance with the chain of custody requirements raises doubts on the credibility of the
corpus delicti, and consequently, on the very claim that an offense penalized by the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. The prosecution's failure to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the critical elements of the offenses charged against accused-appellant
can only serve to warrant his acquittal. People v. Castillo y Maranan, G.R. No. 238339, [August
7, 2019]
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Requirements of Valid Search Warrant
The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution and in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz.: "(1) probable cause is present;
(2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine,
in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and

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(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized." The
absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrant.
There is no question that the search warrant was issued after judicial determination of probable
cause. This Court is thus confined in determining the presence or absence of the fifth requisite
element as stated above, i.e., whether the subject warrant specifically described the place to be
searched.
"A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant
which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution." The particularity of the
place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the
enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to
seize. "Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in
that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it
apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the [court] that the described items are
to be found in a particular place."
Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is

sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the
place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "[a] designation
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly
leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness."
Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is
whether the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and
descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or
community. A "place" may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence, such
as in the case at bar. Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 213875, [July 15, 2020]
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Denials of a motion to quash are improper subjects of a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Foremost in our rules of criminal procedure is that motions to quash are interlocutory orders that
are generally unreviewable by appeal or by certiorari. If the motion to quash is denied, it means

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that the criminal Information remains pending with the court, which then must proceed with the
trial to determine whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged against him.
Only when the court promulgates a final judgment of conviction can the accused question the
deficiencies of the Information by raising them as errors by the trial court and as an additional
ground for his exoneration in his appeal.
Jurisprudence explains the reason for the rule:
The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not
from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action,
which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during
the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the
case should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as
many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court.
More importantly, certiorari is a remedy of last resort. The special civil action of certiorari will
not lie unless its petitioner has no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. The fact that another remedy — to proceed to trial — is ready, available, and at the full
disposal of the accused herein post-denial of his motion to quash already bars his remedial refuge
in certiorari.
Certiorari corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
The Court shall not tire in calling out the usual propensity of some litigants in confounding errors
of judgment for errors of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is an error committed by a court
within its jurisdiction that is reviewable by appeal. Mere allegations of wrongful conclusions
based on the facts and the law or supposed misappreciation of evidence do not, by themselves,
rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion against the trial court. This is since —
The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.
On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those done outside and in excess of a trial court's
jurisdiction and committed in grave abuse of discretion that are properly reversible by certiorari.

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The abuse of discretion should clearly be grave, following the definition long-formulated by
jurisprudence:
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a
petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of
the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is
clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down
for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly
show that such act was patent and gross. Radaza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380,
[August 4, 2021]
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The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry is the ascertainment of
the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily the accused that he
faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that
he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. The searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient treatment, or upon bad
advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused
has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and that his guilty plea has not
therefore been given improvidently — either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent
quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.

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Further, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of
Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment,
the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and
detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are
relevant since they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea
of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the crime he was charged
with and its respective penalties and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to
defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any
showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.
Simply, the requirement ensures that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the
accused comprehends the severe consequences of his plea. This means asking a myriad of
questions which would solicit any indication of coercion, misunderstanding, error, or fraud that
may have influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to a capital offense.
Thus, in every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially when
he is ignorant with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such
evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information,
including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance, and consequences of his plea. xxx
Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the benefit of a searching
inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules, results
to an improvident plea of guilty. It has even been held that the failure of the court to inquire into
whether the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the
elements of the crime constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be informed
of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
This requirement is a reminder that judges must be cautioned against the demands of sheer
speed in disposing of cases for their mission, after all, and as has been time and again put, is to
see that justice is done. People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, [September 29, 2020]

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The plea of guilt made by the accused does not relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
It is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to
enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused
in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.
The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to
produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a
supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be
conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve
the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room
for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime
which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the
prescribed penalties.
Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but
rather on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257,
[September 29, 2020]
In People v. Pagal, the Supreme Court provided for the guidelines concerning please of guilty
to capital offenses, which shall then be applied prospectively.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, this Court adopts the following guidelines concerning
pleas of guilty to capital offenses:
1. AT THE TRIAL STAGE. When the accused makes a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the
trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, it must afford the prosecution an opportunity
to present evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability.
Failure to comply with these mandates constitute grave abuse of discretion.
a. In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense is supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of conviction.

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b. In case the prosecution presents evidence but fails to prove the accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in
favor of the accused.
c. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite opportunity to do

so, the trial court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused. In the
above instance, the trial court shall require the prosecution to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from receipt its failure to present evidence. Any instance of
collusion between the prosecution and the accused shall be dealt with to the full
extent of the law.
2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:
a. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense on the basis of his plea of
guilty, whether improvident or not, and proof beyond reasonable doubt was
established, the judgment of conviction shall be sustained.
b. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of his plea
of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond reasonable doubt
because the prosecution was not given an opportunity to present its evidence, or
was given the opportunity to present evidence but the improvident plea of guilt
resulted to an undue prejudice to either the prosecution or the accused, the
judgment of conviction shall be set aside and the case remanded for re-
arraignment and for reception of evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
c. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of a plea
of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond reasonable doubt
because the prosecution failed to prove the accused's guilt despite opportunity to
do so, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and the accused acquitted.
Said guidelines shall be applied prospectively. People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257,
[September 29, 2020]

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The Court, in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, laid down the guidelines for determining if there is a
violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the
rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal
prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be
invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases
to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a
preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and
nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period
taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be
included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked
within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and
the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time
period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by
malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second,
that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it
followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the
prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence
made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of
the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire
context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity
of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely
motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of
the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and

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substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis
of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases
or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the
constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid
out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised.
The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory
or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy
disposition of cases.
Applying the guidelines in Cagang, the Court finds that there is a violation of respondents' right
to speedy disposition of cases. People v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. No. 239878,
[February 28, 2022]
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Absence of probable cause is not a ground of a motion to quash Information.
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides for the prosecution of offenses. A criminal action is
instituted upon the filing of a complaint with the prosecutor's office for the purpose of
conducting a preliminary investigation, as may be required. Upon the filing of the Information
before the trial court, the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest. At that
stage, the judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. However, the judge cannot reverse the findings of the prosecutor
during preliminary investigation and motu proprio quash the Information for lack of probable
cause. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may simply order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence.
Corollary thereto, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of a party
aggrieved by the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, i.e., to file a petition for review before
the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Plainly, at the stage of the proceedings in RTC

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Branches 112 and 114, the filing of a motion to quash and before arraignment, the spouses Wu
have already been arrested and taken into custody to answer for their alleged commission of
Estafa against HTI.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the filing of a motion to
quash which should distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. Spouses Wu's belated
argument on lack of probable cause as the RTC's additional ground in quashing the Informations
against them fails in light of Section 2, Rule 117 which precludes the court from considering
grounds not stated in the motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Further on this point, the failure to allege any grounds in their motion to quash is deemed a
waiver of their objection. On the whole, the Wus' unsubstantiated claim that the RTC Branches
112 and 114 dismissed the cases, likewise for lack of probable cause, is decimated by specific
provisions of the Rules of Court. Wu v. People, G.R. Nos. 207220-21, [March 16, 2022]
The ground of duplicity of offenses is different from the ground of double jeopardy; no duplicity
of offenses.
At the outset, we note that the sparse petition did not contain a discussion on duplicity of
offenses. It obliquely referred to duplicity of actions, insisting that the prior prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 03-1293 before the RTC, Branch 195, Parañaque City, barred their subsequent
prosecution in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1263-CFM and 07-0254-CFM before the RTC Branches 112
and 114, Pasay City.
The spouses Wu's argument is a fish that will not fly. Duplicity of actions is not the same as
duplicity of offenses as a ground for a motion to dismiss. Certainly, duplicity of offenses is not the
same as the rule on double jeopardy.
The Rules of Court do not proscribe the filing of dual or even multiple actions against a
respondent or accused. The Wus prior prosecution in Criminal Case No. 03-1293 where they were
not arraigned is not a bar to another or subsequent prosecution.
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates the "complaint or Information to charge only
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." Wu v.
People, G.R. Nos. 207220-21, [March 16, 2022]

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On Chain of Custody Covered by Republic Act No. 9165, as Amended
RA 10640 which amended Section 21 of RA 9165 on July 15, 2014, expounded that the
photography and inventory of the illicit items should, immediately after seizure, be conducted
"in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media AND the Department of
Justice (DOJ), AND any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640 an elected public official AND a representative of the National Prosecution Service OR the
media." In this case, the directives of RA 9165 prior to its amendment by RA 10640 should apply
since the incident transpired on March 8, 2006.
To stress, the presence of the key witnesses is required to ensure the preservation of the corpus
delicti and remove suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. If the presence
of the required witnesses could not be obtained, "the prosecution must establish not only the
reasons for their absence, but also the fact that serious and sincere efforts were exerted in
securing their presence. Failure to disclose the justification for non-compliance with the
requirements and the lack of evidence of serious attempts to secure the presence of the
necessary witnesses result in a substantial gap in the chain of custody of evidence that shall
adversely affect the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented in court." Hence, apart
from the finding that no marking, photography, and inventory were performed in this case, no
insulating witnesses were likewise present to affirm the proper confiscation and recording of the
illegal drugs and paraphernalia.
The prosecution should sufficiently justify its non-compliance with the procedure based on
meritorious grounds, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have
been properly preserved. "The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the
drugs' 'seizure and confiscation' — that the presence of the witnesses is most needed, as it is
their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence." The same logic applies to the directives to perform an inventory
and photography of the marked or confiscated items. However, the police officers did not bother
to explain their failure to follow the protocol, even if such crucial measures were placed to
guarantee the preservation of the corpus delicti.
Based on the chain of custody rule, the following links should also be established: "first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court." xxx

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As aptly pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe during the deliberations, the
accused should be acquitted from the charge of Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under
Section 12, Article II of RA 9165. To explain this better, We opted to highlight the similarities in
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 as well as Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165, as follows:
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition
Confiscated, Seized, and/or of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia Chemicals,
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
PDEA shall take charge and have Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant shall take charge and have custody of
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
precursors and essential chemicals, as dangerous drugs, controlled
well as instruments/paraphernalia precursors and essential chemicals, as
and/or laboratory equipment so well as instruments/paraphernalia
confiscated, seized and/or and/or laboratory equipment so
surrendered, for proper disposition in confiscated, seized and/or
the following manner: surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having (a) The apprehending officer/team
initial custody and control of the having initial custody and control
drugs shall, immediately after of the drugs shall, immediately
seizure and confiscation, physically after seizure and confiscation,
inventory and photograph the physically inventory and
same in the presence of the photograph the same in the
accused or the person/s from presence of the accused or the
whom such items were person/s from whom such items
confiscated and/or seized, or were confiscated and/or seized,
his/her representative or counsel, or his/her representative or
a representative from the media counsel, a representative from
and the Department of Justice the media and the Department of
(DOJ), and any elected public Justice (DOJ), and any elected
official who shall be required to public official who shall be
sign the copies of the inventory required to sign the copies of the
and be given a copy thereof; inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the
physical inventory and

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photograph shall be conducted at

the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said
items;
Based on the quoted provisions, it is expressly stated that the drugs shall be subjected to marking,
inventory, and photography by the apprehending officer/team. Yet, this should not be strictly
interpreted to mean that only the seized illegal drugs should undergo the said procedure, to the
exclusion of the other items in the list, specifically "plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment."
We have to consider that:
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
interpreted together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be
read in relation to the whole law. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not
be studied as detached and isolated expression, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order to
ascertain its meaning. We have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole
act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the
statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious, sensible.

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Except for Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 and Section 21 (a) of the IRR, the other paragraphs
concerning this provision discuss the proper procedure in handling all of the items listed, and not
just the drugs confiscated. This lapse might have been an oversight on the part of the framers of
RA 9165 and its IRR, which was eventually rectified when RA 10640 was enacted. Besides, it
would be irrational to not include the whole list of items from the conduct of marking, inventory,
and photography, as anything seized from the accused should undergo the procedure for
documentation purposes and more importantly, to ensure that the confiscated items would not
be tampered or contaminated.
Indeed, "'Section 21 spells out matters that are imperative.' Strict conformity with it is warranted
considering 'that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in
favor of the accused.' Accordingly, '[c]ompliance cannot give way to a facsimile; otherwise, the
purpose of guarding against tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence is defeated.'"
Simply put, where there is doubt, the provisions of the applicable penal law should be construed
in favor of the accused, in order to safeguard his or her legal rights. CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No.
230964, [March 2, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines what is burden of proof:
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defenses by the amount of
evidence required by law.
Further, it is a basic principle that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
Meanwhile, burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular
time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created
against him." Similarly, it is elementary that the burden of evidence shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case.
In the present case, and guided by the foregoing, it is clear that the burden of proof is not shifted
to Ante. Contrary to his assertions, only the burden of evidence is shifted, which requires him to
present evidence that weighs in his favor to counteract the findings of SDT. This, nevertheless,

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does not require him to prove his innocence; i.e., that he did not do the infractions charged. The
distinction between the two lies in the subtle but important detail that Ante may successfully
overthrow SDT's prima facie case against him, without necessarily proving his innocence. In other
words, Ante may adduce defenses or exculpatory evidence on his behalf; and if sufficient, would
defeat the case against him. However, does this automatically mean that he did not commit the
acts and omissions charged against him? Certainly not. Needless to say, Ante need not prove his
innocence, for he has in his favor such presumption.
Instead, the burden of proof logically lies with SDT, since it is the party alleging a fact — that Ante
participated in the hazing activities which led to the death of Mendez. Thus, in conducting its
preliminary inquiry which resulted to a finding of a prima facie evidence against Ante, SDT merely
found evidence good and sufficient on its face, enough to support the filing of the formal charges
against Ante. However, we emphasize that this prima facie evidence is in no way conclusive of
the truth or falsity of the allegations sought to be established — a determination which is best
attained after an exhaustive trial. Ante v. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary
Tribunal, G.R. No. 227911, [March 14, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the ROC allows the presentation of secondary evidence when the original
document has been lost or destroyed and its unavailability has been duly established. In such a
case, a party "may prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated."
In this case, respondents presented as witness the Registrar of Deeds of South Cotabato to testify
that the original of OCT No. V-2423 as well as the copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anastacio
in favor of Eliseo had been lost and could no longer be produced, to identify the Primary Entry
Book as secondary evidence, and to prove that the Deed of Sale was executed on November 28,
1956.
To refute the date of execution stated in the Primary Entry Book, petitioners presented
testimonies declaring that the Deed of Sale was notarized by Judge Rendon on November 28,
1958 and that purchase price was used by Anastacio to defray the wedding expenses of his son,
respondent Meregildo, in June 1958. To corroborate these testimonies, petitioners submitted as
evidence the Marriage Contract of respondent Meregildo to show that his marriage was

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celebrated on June 6, 1958 and the bio-data of Judge Rendon to show that he was admitted to
the bar only in 1957, and thus, could not have notarized the document in 1956.
Regrettably, the testimonial evidence of petitioners cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by respondents. As a rule, documentary evidence takes precedence over
testimonial evidence as the latter can easily be fabricated. It also cannot be denied that the
human memory on dates is frail and thus, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness
unless the date is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness.
In this case, as aptly observed by the CA, the testimonies of petitioner Anecita and Anastacia with
respect to the date of execution cannot be relied upon considering their age and the fact that
they could not even remember their own birthdays.
As to petitioners' claim that it was Judge Rendon who notarized the Deed of Sale, the CA correctly
pointed out that such allegation not only lacks material corroboration but is even self-serving. In
fact, except for the bare allegation of petitioners and their witnesses, no other evidence was
presented to show that it was indeed Judge Rendon who notarized the said document.
Neither can petitioners rely on the date of marriage of respondent Meregildo to prove their claim
that the sale took place on November 28, 1958 because assuming that Anastacio indeed sold the
land to defray the expenses for the wedding of his son, this would mean that Anastacio sold the
land to Eliseo before June 6, 1958, the wedding day of his son, which is still within the five-year
prohibitory period.
In contrast, respondents presented as evidence the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds
of South Cotabato, which is an official record of all instruments filed with the Register of Deeds.
As a public document, it is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein
pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the ROC, which provides that "entries in official records made
the performance of duty by a public officer x x x are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
therein stated."
Thus, in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity, the evidentiary nature
of such document must be sustained. For unless there is evidence to the contrary, it is presumed
that official duty has been regularly performed by the officer who entered the details of the Deed
of Sale pursuant to Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the ROC. Here, no sufficient evidence was presented
by petitioners to overcome the presumption. Thus, the Court finds no error on the part of the CA
in upholding the date of execution of the Deed of Sale as appearing on the Primary Entry Book.
Heirs of Bagaygay v. Heirs of Paciente, G.R. No. 212126, [August 4, 2021]

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Guidelines in appreciating the age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance
As to the failure of the prosecution to present the original or certified true copy of AAA's birth
certificate, we have laid down in People v. Pruna the guidelines in appreciating age as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, thus:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime
or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be

proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be

proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.

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6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Granting that the prosecution failed to offer the original or certified true copy of AAA's birth
certificate, the latter's testimony as to her age, i.e., 14 years old at the time of the incident, and
XXX's express and clear admission of her age during the pre-trial in the stipulation of facts,
sufficiently established AAA's minority. These stipulations are binding on the court because they
are considered judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court. XXX and her counsel, as well as the prosecutor, signed the stipulation of facts which is
therefore recognized as a declaration constituting judicial admission, a waiver of her right to
present evidence to the contrary and binding upon the parties. "Although the right to present
evidence is guaranteed by the Constitution, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly."
People v. XXX, G.R. No. 244048, [February 14, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A private document must be authenticated in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court
before its acceptance as evidence in court.
The October 22, 1990 and January 23, 1991 receipts are private documents executed by
petitioner herself. Before they can be admitted in evidence, they must be authenticated in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Accordingly, "before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either

by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof."

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Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, thus, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his/her case by a preponderance of evidence.
The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature
is theorized upon to have been forged.
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. Seming v. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284, [March 17, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
For a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce to prosper, the party pleading it must
prove the fact of divorce and the national law of the foreign spouse.
Under Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209, series of 1987, as amended, or The Family Code of
the Philippines, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines
as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law, viz.:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her

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to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must first
prove the fact of divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. As both of these purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, the required proof are their official publications or
copies attested by the officers having legal custody thereof, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
Jocelyn was able to establish the fact of divorce. To prove the fact of divorce, Jocelyn submitted
the Acceptance Certificate stating that her and Fumio's written notification of divorce had been
accepted, as certified by Kiyoshi Ishikawa, Mayor of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. The
Acceptance Certificate was accompanied by an Authentication from the Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan.
In Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, which involves a similarly-worded Authentication from the Embassy
of the Philippines in Japan, the Court held that the document was sufficient, viz.:
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an

Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in
Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified
that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and
that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce
between petitioner and respondent.
As in Racho, We rule that the Authentication submitted by Jocelyn is also sufficient.
Nevertheless, Jocelyn was unable to establish the law of Japan on divorce. To prove that the
divorce was valid under Japanese laws, Jocelyn submitted a photocopy of the English translation
of the Civil Code of Japan, published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. and stamped with "LIBRARY, Japan
Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City." The
Republic assails the document for being insufficient to prove the law of Japan on divorce.
We agree with the Republic. Following jurisprudence, the document is devoid of any probative
value.
In Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila, the Court held that the submission of the same document
does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce, viz.:

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Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy
of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and
Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300. This clearly
does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan's law on
divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to
resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and
reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered
by the Court. (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
Further, in Arreza v. Toyo, the Court noted that the translations by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. (the
publisher of the document submitted by Jocelyn) are not advertised as a source of official
translations of Japanese laws.
Not being an official translation, the document submitted by Jocelyn does not prove the existing
law on divorce in Japan. Unfortunately, without such evidence, there is nothing on record to
establish that the divorce between Jocelyn and Fumio was validly obtained and is consistent with
the Japanese law on divorce.
Given that Jocelyn was able to prove the fact of divorce but not the Japanese law on divorce, a
remand of the case rather than its outright dismissal is proper. This is consistent with the policy
of liberality that the Court has adopted in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to
Filipinos in mixed marriages. Republic v. Kikuchi, G.R. No. 243646, [June 22, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
The Court may review the factual findings of the lower courts when the same are conflicting.
A reading of the Petition reveals that it raises a question of fact, which is generally not allowed
in a Rule 45 petition. The Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of
questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rule admits of exceptions,
including when the factual findings of the lower courts are conflicting. Since the factual findings
of the RTC and the CA are conflicting in this case, We find that a factual review is proper. Cathay
Pacific Steel Corp. v. Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317, [June 28, 2021]

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In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish its cause of action by a
preponderance of evidence, or that "evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing
than that which is in opposition to it."
Preponderance of evidence "does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony
of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on
one side than on the other." The guidelines in the determination of preponderance of evidence
are provided under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party

having the burden of proof must establish his [or her] case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
Thus, the determination of preponderance of evidence depends greatly on the credibility of the
witnesses. Hence, in the evaluation of their testimonies, We must be guided by the well-settled
doctrine that "[w]hen it comes to [the witnesses'] credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, unless the same is tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence." Cathay Pacific
Steel Corp. v. Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317, [June 28, 2021]
X----------------------------------------------------------------------X
This Court has adopted two mechanisms to enforce the principle of estoppel and bar the
relitigation of issues between the same parties or their privies regarding a right, fact or matter
that have been fully and finally adjudicated upon.
The doctrine of res judicata under Section 47 (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court bars a second case on
the basis of a former final judgment if the following elements are present: there is a former final
judgment that was rendered on the merits; the court in the former judgment had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause

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of action between the first and second cases. Conclusiveness of judgment under Section 47 (c)
operates under the same element, except that there is identity only of issues and parties, but not
of causes of action. For this reason, except in those instances allowed under the law or rules of
court, a former final judgment rendered by a competent court in another action between the
same parties based on a different claim or cause of action will not bar a second case; however,
as said former final judgment is conclusive, "any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same."
Res judicata applies to civil cases while conclusiveness of judgment has been applied also to
criminal cases and administrative cases. However, neither is an appropriate device for grafting
this Court's findings and conclusions in Napoles v. Sandiganbayan unto SB-14-CRM-0238,
whether in the main proceedings or incidental proceedings. Our decision in Napoles v.
Sandiganbayan attained finality but it is not the final say on the matter of conspiracy or
commission of plunder by Napoles or her co-accused. Our decision pertained to an interlocutory
order denying the bail application of Napoles. Being interlocutory, the order is not immutable for
it remains under the control of the Sandiganbayan to maintain or change, depending on new
developments in the presentation of evidence before it. Reyes v. Sandiganbayan Third Division,
G.R. No. 243411, [August 19, 2020]
X----------------------------------------------------------------------X
On Petition for Change of Name under Rule 103
Republic v. Hernandez (Hernandez) discussed the nature of Rule 103 petitions for change of name
in this wise:
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.

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Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of
the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring the name to be changed or by some other person in his
behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which
the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of
hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial
or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It is only upon
satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness
of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be
changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil
registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register. xxx xxx xxx
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination

of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The
name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The
official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes
of the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article
376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on
the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an
application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the
requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure
therein renders the proceedings a nullity.

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It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege not a matter
of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty
reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his
true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil
register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may
justify such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to
warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of
legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware
of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
Rule 103 petitions for change of name based on the foregoing jurisprudential grounds is a
separate and distinct remedy from that provided under Rule 108, which involves cancellations
and corrections of entries in the civil registry. The Court explained the difference between Rule
103 and Rule 108 in Republic v. Mercadera, as follows:
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or
both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an
independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the
community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the
"designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known." When granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears
a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him,
or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to
prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the
order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose
the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but
the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make

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an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family
relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal
capacity or civil status. However, "there could be instances where the change applied for
may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the
applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but
because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind."
Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the
event of its grant x x x."
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.Entries
in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be
corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. xxx xxx xxx
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar
as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which
are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as
well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character
and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified
or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and
proof to the contrary admitted x x x." "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not
be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in
the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law
embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution. xxx xxx
xxx

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It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope
and application of [Rule] 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be
reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both
rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under
either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the
two rules with respect to alterations in a person's registered name can effectively clear
the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged
in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the
relief prayed for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be
granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of
the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2,
Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name
is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are
confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As
explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in
other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108
provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108
is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Notably, the foregoing rules were modified by the enactment of R.A. 9048, which amended
Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code and vested primary jurisdiction over the correction of
certain clerical or typographical errors and changes of first name with the civil registrar. In 2012,
R.A. 10172 expanded the coverage of the summary administrative procedure provided under
R.A. 9048 to include clerical corrections in the day and/or month in the date of birth, or in the
sex of the person, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry. Presently therefore, when an entry falls within the coverage of R.A. 9048 as
amended by R.A. 10172, a person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule
103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is first filed and later denied.

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Failure to comply with the administrative procedure generally renders the petition dismissible
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to comply with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
The Court, in Bartolome v. Republic, summarized the rules as follows:
1. A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct clerical or

typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to change/correct the day and/or month of his
or her date of birth, and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear
that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought
to be corrected or changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding
provided under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172. A person may only avail of the
appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the aforementioned entries
after the petition in the administrative proceedings is filed and later denied.
2. A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both his or her first
name and surname may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided that
the jurisprudential grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present.
3. A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in the civil registry

may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed
in Lee v. Court of Appeals and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan, R.A. 9048
"removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register."
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy
under Rule 103 in order to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." Contrary to the findings
of the CA, Rule 108 is inapplicable as petitioner does not allege or identify any erroneous entry
that requires substantial rectification or cancellation.
It is a threshold principle that the nature of a proceeding is determined by the allegations in the
petition and the ultimate reliefs sought. In the instant case, it is apparent that petitioner does
not seek to correct any clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate or to effect any changes
in his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos. As such, neither Rule 108 nor R.A. 9048 as
amended applies. Rather, the petition is unequivocal that petitioner merely desires to change
and replace his surname "Santos" with the surname "Revilla" in accordance with Hernandez in
order to "avoid confusion," "to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to
[Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, and to show that he accepts and embraces his true
identity." He alleges that while he grew up close to his biological father and his family and was

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purportedly publicly known as "Bong Revilla's son," "there is nothing in his name that would
associate him and identify him as one of the Revillas." These allegations show that petitioner
ultimately seeks to "alter the 'designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known'" and not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections. Thus,
he properly availed himself of the procedure prescribed under Rule 103.
In this regard, the CA gravely erred in holding that petitioner should have availed himself of the
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 instead of the "summary proceeding" under Rule 103 as
allowing petitioner to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" would constitute a change
in his status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
First. While a change in status may legally result in a change of name, such as in marriages,
annulments, legitimations, or adoptions, et al., the reverse is not equally true. In Yu v. Republic,
the Court already held that a change of surname under Rule 103 does not necessarily result in a
change of petitioner's status, i.e., from legitimate to illegitimate, viz.:
x x x [A] change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect
a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom;
nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does
not alter one's legal capacity, civil status[,] or citizenship. What is altered is only the name,
which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). x x x
To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to
objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because
he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such
ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose
of the judicial application — to determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause
for the change of name. As held by this Court in several cases, in which pertinently enough
the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely
follow x x x.
Indeed, petitioner cannot change his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos to an
"illegitimate" child of Bong Revilla by the mere expedient of changing his name as an adoption
may only be rescinded in accordance with law. In any event, petitioner was unequivocal that he
does not seek to change his status or to rescind his adoption:
x x x [H]e is an adoptee of Patrick Santos and an illegitimate son of Bong Revilla. He seeks
to alter his last name from "Santos" to "Revilla," the designation by which he is known

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and called in the community in which he lives and is best known to avoid confusion.
Changing Luigi's last name from "Santos" to "Revilla" will not affect his civil status, as the
decision in the matter of his adoption is included and registered in the official record file
of OLC-QC. He does not seek to change his status from legitimate to illegitimate. Patrick
Santos remains to be the named father in his birth certificate, being his adoptive father
Second. Contrary to the statement of the CA, both Rule 108 and Rule 103 involve substantial
matters and require adversarial proceedings. As explained, "[a] change of one's name under Rule
103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of
name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the
grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings." It is an action in rem which
requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State, through the OSG, and
all other interested parties to oppose the petition.
In relation thereto, the Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the instant proceedings were
void under Section 3, Rule 108 as petitioner failed to implead both his adoptive father and his
biological father as indispensable parties. Notably, while Rule 108 expressly requires that the
petitioner implead all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected, no such
requirement appears in Rule 103. The relevant sections provide:
RULE 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.

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RULE 103
CHANGE OF NAME
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. — Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf
of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are
true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
Notably, unlike Rule 108, Rule 103 only requires that the order reciting the purpose of the
petition and the date and place of the hearing be published and that any interested person be
allowed to appear and oppose the petition. By virtue of the publication, "all interested parties
were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein."
In sum, the Court holds that petitioner correctly availed himself of a Rule 103 petition. Further,
the failure to implead petitioner's biological father and adoptive father did not render the
proceedings void as said requirement does not apply to Rule 103.
However, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that petitioner failed to prove that there is
any compelling reason to justify a change of surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." Santos v.
Republic, G.R. No. 250520, [May 5, 2021]

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Need of compelling reason to grant the change of surname.
It has long been settled that "the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter
of right x x x." In In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (Wang), the Court held:
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. xxx xxx xxx
A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant at this point. We

quote, thus:
"x x x For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which
he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished
from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons;
they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in,
or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given
to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and
is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to

protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in
certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable,
or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and
by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,

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inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is

imprescriptible."
To emphasize, the surname identifies the family to which a person belongs. While the first name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child, the surname to which the child is entitled is
fixed by law.
This rule, however, is not absolute. Precisely, Article 376 of the Civil Code as implemented by
Rule 103 is a remedy allowed by way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code
on the use of surnames. To justify a change of name however, a person "must show not only
some proper or compelling reason x x x but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name." The following have been considered as valid grounds for change of name: "(a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest."
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, there can be no question that petitioner, as
the legally adopted child of Patrick Santos, properly bears the surname "Santos." Notably, the
Civil Code provides:
TITLE XIII
Use of Surnames (n)
ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
ARTICLE 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Consistent therewith, Article 189 of the Family Code states that "the adopted shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopter." The Family Code provisions on Adoption were superseded by R.A. 8552,
which now provides:

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ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. — Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. — The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
R.A. 8552 likewise states that upon adoption, "[a]n amended certificate of birth shall be issued
by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is
the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname." As held therefore in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, it may be inferred from the very wording of the law "that the use
of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right." Upon
issuance of the decree of adoption, the change of the adoptee's surname shall follow that of the
adopter as a natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption, even if not specifically
prayed for.
Although properly surnamed "Santos," petitioner prays that he be allowed to change his surname
from "Santos" to "Revilla" to "avoid confusion, x x x to show [his] sincere and genuine desire to
associate himself to [Bong] Revilla[,] Jr. and to the Revillas, x x x to show that he accepts and
embraces his true identity," and "to show his true and genuine love to his biological father."
Unfortunately, none of these reasons justify, in law, the desired change. Santos v. Republic, G.R.
No. 250520, [May 5, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Rule 108 governs the proceedings for the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry.
Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa aptly pointed out the Court's pronouncement in
Miller v. Miller (Miller). In that case, the Court, speaking through Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen and relying on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occ.,

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categorically ruled that the legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in
a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth, the action filed in that case. The
Court ruled:
Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth
certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother's
surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged
illegitimate child of John.
What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting
a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private
respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from Miller to
Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her
successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack[.]" Moreover,
impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Article 164 of the Family Code provides that "children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parties are legitimate." Here, petitioner admitted to being in a valid and subsisting marriage
with Ariel when she conceived and gave birth to Alrich Paul. Thus, Alrich Paul is presumed to be
a legitimate child of petitioner and Ariel. However, looking at the Rule 108 petition in this case,
petitioner, mother of Alrich Paul, in effect declared against her child's legitimacy when she
alleged that Alrich Paul was the child of Allan.
Following the pronouncement in Miller, petitioner's collateral attack of Alrich Paul's filiation
cannot be allowed in a Rule 108 proceeding. Thus, on this ground alone, the RTC should have
dismissed the Rule 108 petition.
Further, assuming arguendo that the Rule 108 petition filed in the case is considered as the direct
action to impugn Alrich Paul's presumed legitimacy, the Rule 108 petition must still fail.
It must be emphasized that the direct action to impugn the legitimacy of a child must be brought
by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Here, as correctly opined by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, petitioner is barred from
impugning Alrich Paul's presumed legitimacy considering the prohibition under Article 167 of the

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Family Code. Article 167 provides that "[t]he child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress."
To elucidate, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code is not
conclusive. It may be disputed based on the grounds and manner provided under Articles 166,
170, and 171 of the same law. Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370,
[November 9, 2021]
In Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the presumption of legitimacy is "quasi-
conclusive" and may be rebutted or overthrown.
The Court ruled:
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly
during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article
166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was
no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is
to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child.
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make
marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in
different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it
appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.
Still, the rule is that the mother is barred from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of
her child, and only the father, or in exceptional instances, his heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife based on any of the grounds enumerated under
Article 166 of the Family Code.
The pertinent rules provide:
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

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(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of
Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in
a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth
took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined
in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they
should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his
action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. xxx

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Here, petitioner's declaration in the birth certificate and in the Rule 108 petition that Alrich Paul
is illegitimate cannot be countenanced as it runs counter to Article 167 of the Family Code. The
presumption that Alrich Paul is legitimate stands in the absence of a direct action timely filed by
the proper party.
Further, even assuming arguendo that petitioner may effectively declare against or impugn Alrich
Paul's legitimacy and that she may do so in a Rule 108 petition, her petition before the trial court
must still fail for failure to satisfy the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. This is considering that what petitioner seeks are substantial corrections, i.e.,
corrections in the entries pertaining to Alrich Paul's father as well as Alrich Paul's surname; hence,
an adversarial proceeding is required.
Section 3, Rule 108 requires that "all persons who stand to be affected by a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registrar must be impleaded as indispensable parties" and
"failure to implead the indispensable parties renders all proceedings subsequent to the filing of
the complaint including the judgment ineffectual."
Section 4, Rule 108 also provides for the requirement of publication and notice.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 108 state:
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
In the case, Ariel, the presumed father of Alrich Paul was not impleaded as a party. Being the
presumed father of Alrich Paul, Ariel has an interest that would be affected if the trial court were
to grant the reliefs sought by petitioner. His hereditary rights would be adversely affected if the
Court were to declare that Alrich Paul is not his legitimate child but Allan's illegitimate child.
Admittedly, there are instances where failure to implead and to notify the affected or interested
parties are cured by the publication of the notice of hearing. These special circumstances are
"when earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested

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parties; the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; there was no
actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when the party
was inadvertently left out."
However, petitioner failed to establish the presence of any of the above exceptions. There is
likewise no indication in the records that Ariel, although not impleaded, was made aware of the
petition and the status of the proceedings.
Given the foregoing, the Court must ultimately dismiss the Rule 108 petition filed by petitioner
and need not discuss the sufficiency of her evidence to justify the corrections sought in Alrich
Paul's birth certificate. Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370, [November
9, 2021]
As a result, there is now an absurd and unremedied situation that Alrich Paul remains to be
illegitimate in the birth certificate and will use the surname of Allan while possessing, at the
same time, a legitimate status, one that is conferred on him by law.
Giving clarity to Alrich Paul's situation is attended by a scarcity of remedies.
First, the mother who was in a valid and subsisting marriage at the time of conception or giving
birth to her child is prohibited under Article 167 of the Family Code from impugning the
legitimacy of her child. The proscription remains even if the mother is an estranged wife.
Second, the child who was conceived or born during a valid and existing marriage has no right to
impugn his own legitimacy under the Family Code. He cannot choose his own filiation.
Third, it is only the father, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, who may impugn the child's
legitimacy on grounds provided under Article 166 of the Family Code within the periods provided
under Article 170 in relation to Article 171 of the Family Code. Upon the expiration of the periods,
the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and can no longer be questioned.
Noted civilist Arturo M. Tolentino discussed:
The prescriptive period begins to run either from the knowledge of the plaintiffs of the
birth of the child, or from the date of the registration of such birth, whichever is earlier.
The period of prescription is one year if the husband or anyone of the heirs resides in the
city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

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The period is two years if the husband or all of the heirs do not reside in the city or
municipality of birth or registration but somewhere else in the Philippines; and three
years if they reside abroad.
These periods apply whether the plaintiff is the husband or any of the heirs. If they acquire
knowledge of the birth at different dates before it is recorded, the period of prescription
shall be counted from the date on which the plaintiff had knowledge of such birth.
If the husband should die before the expiration of the period within which he could bring
the action, without having filed the same, an heir could bring the action. Within what
time? We believe the period applicable to him personally would apply, not the period
applicable to the husband. The plaintiff heir would not be merely representing the
predeceased husband, but would be acting in his own right.
If the husband dies after filing the action and it is pending, the action being personal, the
case may be dismissed. The heirs can file another action in their own right, subject to the
prescriptive periods applicable to them.
The hands of the Court are tied as it may only entertain the impugnation of a child's presumed
legitimacy in a direct action filed by the proper party and within the prescribed period under the
law. SDHTEC
In light of these, the Court finds the present case as an opportune moment to highlight the
absence of a remedy in favor of a mother in establishing the true filiation of her child. Ultimately,
the Court's observations are directed to the Legislature inasmuch as the Court is careful not to
tread on the realm of judicial legislation.
One of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child is that found in Article 166 (1) (b) of
the Family Code, i.e., "that it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child because of x x x" "x x x the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible."
Here, petitioner maintained that Ariel, her husband, could not have been Alrich Paul's father
considering that upon learning of the latter's illicit relationship, she separated from him and went
to Abu Dhabi, UAE to work sometime in April 2008, stayed there, and engaged in an intimate
relationship with Allan. Thereafter, she became pregnant, went back to the Philippines sometime
in September 2009, and gave birth to Alrich Paul on January 26, 2010.
However, there is no remedy under the law available to petitioner to dispute the presumption of
legitimacy accorded to Alrich Paul — not in a Rule 108 petition which must be dismissed primarily

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for being a collateral attack and not in any other action by reason of her being the mother of
Alrich Paul.
It must be emphasized that the scenario under Article 166 (1) (b) is a factual matter personally
known not only to the husband, but also the wife. And yet, Article 167 of the Family Code
prohibits the mother from impugning or declaring against the legitimacy of her child. Further, the
right to impugn belongs only to the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs. Certainly,
there is, in the words of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, "[an] apparent disparity
between the mother's and the father's legal standing in assailing the legitimacy and/or filiation
of a child." This runs counter to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to which the Philippines is a state party. The
Philippines ratified the CEDAW on August 5, 1981. Thus, it is now a part of the Philippine legal
system.
As a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines is bound by the obligations imposed therein:
Article 2.
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women, and to this end, undertake: xxx xxx xxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.
Article 16
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular, shall
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: xxx xxx xxx
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in
matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount; xxx xxx xxx
The CEDAW mandates States Parties to eliminate discrimination against women particularly in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations. Thus, consistent with the CEDAW, the States
Parties must take all the appropriate measures to ensure that all rights available to husbands
and/or fathers must, in matters involving their children, be available to wives and/or mothers.

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Further, in eliminating discrimination as to the rights and obligations of parents, the States Parties
must consider the paramount interest of the child.
Thus, consistent with the Philippines' obligations under the CEDAW, Section 14, Article II of the
1987 Constitution embodied the State's commitment to ensure gender equality, thus:
SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Here, petitioner's declaration against the legitimacy of Alrich Paul is in conformity with the
provisions of the CEDAW but is regrettably prohibited under our national law.
To be sure, matters of legitimacy and filiation involve not only rights in the child's favor, but also
obligations or burdens to which he or his estate may be subjected to. The obligations, or burdens
which translate to rights in favor of what the law considers as his or her family members include
support of family members and those arising from succession. No doubt, the child or his estate
need not be unduly and erroneously burdened by obligations in favor of persons who turn out to
be not related to him by blood. Thus, it would be to the best interest of the child if even the
mother who has personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding her pregnancy will be
allowed to prove that her husband could not have fathered her child.
However, with the current state of the laws, an illegitimate child's true filiation may never be
recognized by law because the husband, who is already living separately from the wife, may have
no interest in filing the appropriate action even if he knows that his wife gave birth to a child with
another man.
Nevertheless, while there is a lacuna in the law, this is an opportune moment to signal to the
Legislature the incongruity between our domestic law and our international obligation to
eliminate the discrimination against women particularly in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations. Ultimately, the Legislature should be given the opportunity to perform its
primordial role of lawmaking. Ordoña v. Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370,
[November 9, 2021]

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Elements Constituting Enforced Disappearance
The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act No. 9851 are
as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or

give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.
There is no question that the first and second elements are attendant in this case. However, We
agree with the RTC that the third and fourth elements are sorely lacking. While it is admitted that
Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he committed in the house of Randy, it was
sufficiently established by the respondents that he was already released from their custody on
October 14, 2015, as evidenced by the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself. In fact,
Morada neither denied nor refuted the said document of release. As opposed to the
unsubstantiated allegations of Morada that it is respondents who are responsible for Johnson's
disappearance, We accord greater weight to the documentary evidence presented by the
respondents exhibiting that Johnson was no longer in the custody of the respondents when he
disappeared. Such evidence strongly militate against Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.
Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, [February 14, 2022]

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REMEDIAL LAW (Part 2)

based on the doctrines and cases cited

Judicial Policy of Non-interference in the Prosecutorial Prerogative of Determining Probable

While the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is a prosecutorial

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Death of Accused Prior to Final Judgment

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Requirements of Valid Search Warrant

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Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is

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Jurisprudence explains the reason for the rule:

Certiorari corrects errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.

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a. In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense is supported by proof beyond

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c. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite opportunity to do

2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:

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Absence of probable cause is not a ground of a motion to quash Information.

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On Chain of Custody Covered by Republic Act No. 9165, as Amended

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Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165

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photograph shall be conducted at

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Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence

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Documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence.

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Guidelines in appreciating the age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be

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(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Accordingly, "before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either

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Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

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The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an

As in Racho, We rule that the Authentication submitted by Jocelyn is also sufficient.

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SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party

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On Petition for Change of Name under Rule 103

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