Safavid Conversion Propaganda in Ottoman Anatolia and the Ottoman Reaction,

1440s-1630s

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by

Ayse Baltacioglu-Brammer, M.A.

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2016

Dissertation Committee:

Jane Hathaway, Advisor

Carter V. Findley

Scott Levi

 Copyright by

Ayse Baltacioglu-Brammer

2016

 Abstract

This dissertation explores the Sunni-Shi‘ite divergence in the early modern

period, not merely as religiously derived, but as a meticulously carried out geo-political

battle that formed the base of the sectarian conflict in the region today. One of the few

studies to utilize both Safavid and Ottoman primary sources within the framework of

identity formation and propaganda, my study argues that the “religious dichotomy”

between “Ottoman Sunnism” and “Safavid Shi‘ism” was a product of the Safavid-

Ottoman geo-political and fiscal rivalry rather than its cause; it further holds that

examining the Shiitization of Safavid Iran and Ottoman Anatolia within a larger geo-

political framework is critical to understanding early modern Middle Eastern states and

societies. At the time, the Shi‘ite population of Anatolia – called Kızılbaş (“red heads”

in Turkish) – constituted the largest Muslim minority group in the Ottoman Empire

and was the principal catalyst for conflict between the Ottoman and Safavid empires.

Yet it was only after the politicization of the Safaviyya Sufi movement that

Istanbul perceived its Kızılbaş subjects as a threat to its geo-political legitimacy and

security in the volatile regions of central and eastern Anatolia, as well as the frontier

regions of Iraq. The Ottoman central authority therefore shifted its attention to pro-

Safavid propaganda activities in Anatolia, which were conducted not only to recruit

new followers for the Shi‘ite Islam, but also to find soldiers and taxpayers for the

newly established Safavid state. Breaking away from traditional sectarian narratives,

ii

this dissertation examines the wildly varying policies of the Ottoman state toward

its Kızılbaş subjects and the importance of pro-Safavid religious and political

propaganda in the context of state and identity formation and confessionalization.

iii

 Acknowledgments

The preparation and writing of this dissertation would not have been possible without the

help, encouragement, and advice of many individuals and institutions, and I would like to express

my deepest appreciation to all of them.

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Jane Hathaway,

who nurtured me and helped me to grow as a historian. Her continuous support and guidance in

my graduate study and research, as well as her patience, motivation, immense knowledge, and

meticulousness have helped me tremendously throughout the last seven years as a graduate

student and ultimately as a successful candidate in the harsh academic job market. I could not

have imagined having a better advisor and mentor.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the other members of my thesis committee,

Prof. Carter Findley and Prof. Scott Levi, for their insightful comments and encouragement, but

also for their thought-provoking comments and questions, which led me to widen my research

from various perspectives. I also greatly appreciate their support throughout the long period of

job applications and interviews, when they graciously provided reference letters and interview

tips and suggestions.

My sincere thanks also go to Prof. Geoffrey Parker, Prof. Theodora Dragostinova, Prof.

Thomas “Dodie” McDow, Prof. Randolph Roth, Prof. David Staley, and Prof. Alan Beyerchen,

who contributed to this project and my improvement as a graduate student through either

stimulating suggestions or encouragements. I also would like to thank Dr. Saeed Honarmand and

Dr. Javad Abbasi for teaching me Persian, the most beautiful language in my opinion. In terms of

iv

learning Persian, I would also like to thank my Iranian roommates, who became my lifelong

friends –Akram, Sareh, Sepideh, Zahra, Mahernaz, and Soma- who, whenever I am in Iran, listen

to me patiently and answer my silly questions.

Furthermore I would also like to acknowledge the crucial role of the staff of the Office of

Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, Malek Manuscript Library in Tehran, and

University of Isfahan Manuscript Library in Isfahan. Their permission and help to locate, use, and

decipher many archival documents and manuscripts made this work possible. Among many

people, I would like to mention Dr. Mustafa Küçük in Istanbul and Shohreh Ziaee in Tehran,

whose expertise and patience helped me tremendously. I would also like to mention my dear

friend Hamidreza Taravat, who not only spent hours with me at the manuscript library at the

University of Isfahan to deal with many unexpected bureaucratic problems, but also guided me to

many beautiful neighborhoods of Isfahan that I would not have seen otherwise.

I gratefully acknowledge the generous support of the Bradley Foundation, Mershon

Center for International Security Studies, Sydney N. Fisher Endowment, and the Department of

History at OSU. Their support enabled me to conduct research in Turkey and Iran for over a year.

In the last year, the Ohio State University Graduate School’s Presidential Fellowship made it

possible for me to focus on writing, and I am extremely grateful for this opportunity. I would like

to thank Prof. Rudi Matthee, whose support as an external faculty referee made my application

for this prestigious fellowship more competitive.

My time at OSU has been enjoyable in large part due to the many friends and groups that

became a part of my life. I am grateful for the time I spent and the memories that I collected with

classmates, friends, and many other people on and around campus. Special thanks goes to my

“partners in crime,” Yeliz Çavuş, Ayşenur Dal, Aşkın Güler Yiğitoğlu, and Deniz Ay, whose

friendship filled this long and often painful journey with unforgettable memories that I will carry

v

with me wherever I go. Among many others, I would also like to name Patrick Scharfe, Gibran

Siddiqui, Isacar Bolaños, Saba Nasseri, Catalina Hunt, Sanja Kadrić, Stephanie Honchell, Ehsan

Estiri, Yiğit Akın, Vefa Erginbaş, Libby Marvel, Cameron Jones, Liz Perego, James and Nurcan

Helicke, who made my graduate life easier and more enjoyable with their friendship and help.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all their love and encouragement. My parents,

Mustafa and Zeynep Baltacıoğlu, raised me with a love for education and supported me in all my

pursuits, even when it meant changing my career, getting a second college degree, and moving to

another country. My sisters, Melike and Nur, encouraged me and made me laugh whenever I

needed them from thousands of miles away. My mother-in-law, Kate Bracken, and late father-in-

law, Chris Bracken, opened their arms and home and made me feel loved and cared for during all

these years that I have spent away from my parents.

The best outcome from these past seven years has been finding my best friend, soul mate,

and husband, Beau J. Brammer. Beau’m, no words can convey what your unconditional love and

support mean to me. These past years have not been an easy ride for us, both professionally and

personally. I, however, feel that we both learned a lot about life and strengthened our

commitment and determination to each other and to live life to the fullest. We not only grew as a

couple, but we also embarked on our greatest ongoing “project,” the joy of our lives, and the

biggest challenge and reward that one can ever imagine, to be parents to our daughter Ipek

Nicole. All these years, you have been there to instill confidence in me whenever I questioned my

potential and intellect, whenever I felt hopeless and miserable, and whenever I thought there

would be no end for this often-times painful adventure called Ph.D. Without your faithful support

and encouragement –and editing, of course- I would not have accomplished this degree. Hence, I

dedicate this work to you. I love you.

vi

 Vita

June 1999 .............................................Nene Hatun High School, Ankara, Turkey

June 2003 ..............................................B.A., Communications, Ankara University,

Ankara, Turkey

June 2009 ..............................................B.A., History, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

2009 to present ......................................Graduate Student & Graduate Teaching

Associate, History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

Publications

“The Emergence of the Safavids as a Mystical Order and Their Subsequent Rise to
Power in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries.” In The Safavids, ed. Rudi Matthee.
London: Routledge, forthcoming 2016.

“The Formation of Kızılbaş Communities in Anatolia and Ottoman Responses, 1450s-

1630s.”International Journal of Turkish Studies Vol 20, Nos. 1&2 (2014): 21-48.

“The Origins of Alawites and the Alawite Capture of Power in Syria.” In Origins:
Current Events in Historical Perspective, November 2013.

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

Area of Special Interest: Islamic History
Minor Fields: Central Asian History, Early Modern European History

vii

 Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. .ii

Acknowledgments ................................................................................................................. iv

Vita ........................................................................................................................................ vii

Table of Contents: ................................................................................................................. viii

Introduction: .......................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Shi‘ite Propaganda before the Safavids ......................................................... 20

Chapter 2: The Origins, Establishment, and Shi‘itization of the Safaviyya Order and Its

First Followers in Ottoman Anatolia .............................................................................. 54

Chapter 3: Pro-Safavid Propaganda: Initiation, Legitimization, and Methods .......... 98

Chapter 4: Reasons for Anatolian Conversion to Kızılbaş Islam .................................. 152

Chapter 5: Ottoman Reaction(s) against Safavid Propaganda and the “Sunnification" of

the Empire............................................................................................................................ 202

Conclusion: ........................................................................................................................... 253

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 257

viii

 Introduction

A storm of disorder erupted in the East and shook the earth.

Peace abandoned the land of the Arab and the Persian, and
the Turk and the Daylamite. A pervert suddenly emerging
from Erzincan climbed the castle of ungodliness and
reached the peak, and at the heart of Azerbaijan the
Kızılbaş blossomed like tulips. The head of this group of
the wicked, Shah Ismail the sheikh of Ardabil, followed the
path of ungodliness, declared the forbidden allowed and
invited masses overtly to his heresy. He spread the Shi‘ite
sect’s tainted belief and fooled the common people with his
tricks. He went too far in loving Ali and too far in hating
the first [three] caliphs.1

Kemalpaşazade (d. 1536), a famous Ottoman şeyhülislam and historian, describes

the advent of the Safavids as a heretical group’s declaration of war against “true Islam”

(i.e., Sunnism) and its legitimate representative, the Ottoman Empire. In his depiction of

the nature of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry he was not alone, as many other primary

sources – both chronicles and imperial documents- describe the tension between the two

sides as a religious conflict between the two dominant sects of Islam. This approach to

the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, which posits sectarianism at its core, has been perpetuated

into the modern era as many Turkish, Iranian, and Western scholars have viewed these

primary sources in an isolationist, as well as a reductionist, manner.

1
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Ali Osman, IX. Defter, No. 2447, verses 123b-125b, cited in Sayın Dalkıran,
“İran Safavi Devletini’nin Kuruluşuna Şii İnançların Etkisi ve Osmanlı’nın İran’a Bakışı,” Atatürk

1


 As an attempt to break away from the sectarian interpretation, this study explores

the Sunni-Shi‘ite divergence in the early modern period, not merely as religiously

derived, but as a meticulously carried out geo-political and fiscal battle that shaped the

religio-political landscape in the region. Analyzing both Safavid and Ottoman primary

sources through the interpretive frameworks of identity formation and propaganda, I

argue that the “religious dichotomy” between “Ottoman Sunnism” and “Safavid Shi‘ism”

was in fact a product of the Ottoman-Safavid geo-political and fiscal rivalry rather than

its cause. In this context, pro-Safavid propaganda, conducted both to recruit followers for

the Shi‘ite Safaviyya Sufi order and to recruit tax-payers, soldiers, and subjects for the

political Safavid movement, was a critical aspect of this transition.

During this period the Twelver Shi‘ite population of Anatolia constituted the

largest Muslim minority group in the Ottoman Empire and was the principal catalyst for

conflict between the Ottoman and Safavid empires. Almost of all them supported the

Safaviyya Sufi order and were called Kızılbaş (“red heads” in Turkish) because they

wore a distinctive twelve-gored crimson headpiece symbolizing the Safaviyya order’s

allegiance to the Twelve Shi‘ite Imams and to the Safavid sheikhs / shahs as their

spiritual leaders. It was, however, only after the politicization of the Safaviyya Sufi

movement that Istanbul began to perceive its Kızılbaş subjects as a threat to its geo-

political legitimacy in the volatile region of Anatolia. In other words, the Kızılbaş

population, and Twelver Shi‘ism more generally, became a “major threat” for the

Ottoman Empire when the Safavids emerged as a political actor in the region, not when

2


they existed solely as a Sufi order proselytizing in Anatolia during the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries.

Coercive measures against the Kızılbaş population taken by the Ottomans,

therefore, did not follow a straightforward path with the emergence of the first followers

of the Safaviyya Sufi order, or tariqa, in Anatolia. Nor did repressive policies continue in

a straightforward manner after the order transformed itself into a militant Shi'ite

movement in the second half of the fifteenth century. Instead, the tolerance level of the

Ottoman central authority for its Kızılbaş subjects fluctuated based on three major issues:

(1) Istanbul’s relationship with the Safavid state; (2) the intensity of pro-Safavid

propaganda for conversion; (3) the issues of tax evasion and migration. While the level of

acceptance and accommodation shown to the Safaviyya order and its followers in

Ottoman territories was quite high until the last quarter of the fifteenth century, a policy

of close surveillance, suppression, and persecution replaced this more casual attitude

beginning in the early sixteenth century, particularly during the major Ottoman

campaigns against Safavid Iran (1514, 1532-1555, 1578-1590, and 1623-1639), which

corresponded to periods of intense pro-Safavid propaganda in Ottoman Anatolia. Even

though the main motivation behind the Ottoman policy of persecution towards the

Anatolian Kızılbaş was presented in terms of the struggle against “rebellious heretics,”

the persecutions in fact reflected far more than purely religious concerns.

As a close examination of both Ottoman and Safavid sources proves, the Ottoman

authorities were mainly concerned about the issues of legitimacy, their subjects’ loyalty,

and a possible loss in taxes and work force through migration. Both the Ottoman and the

3


Safavid empire saw tax-collection and battle-ready subjects as key indicators of

legitimacy, and therefore access to revenues and access to subjects were the main

underlying factors in policy-making at both the Ottoman and the Safavid court. While the

Safavids exerted great efforts to recruit new subjects for their newly established religio-

political movement, the Ottomans persecuted or suppressed those whom they could not

tax, those who publicly challenged Ottoman legitimacy, and those who attempted to

migrate to Safavid Iran. Simultaneously, in response to increasing pro-Safavid

propaganda activities, the Ottoman state adopted measures to stop the proselytism while

forging an alternative Sunni identity of its own. Particularly after the second half of the

sixteenth century, pro-Safavid propaganda intensified to such an extent that the Ottoman

central authority switched its emphasis from those who were born into the Twelver

Shi‘ite sect to those who “became Kızılbaş” in response to propaganda. These “converts,”

according to the Ottoman state’s logic, encouraged further Anatolian participation in the

Kızılbaş religious movement and also legitimized and strengthened Anatolians’

identification with the Safavid state.

Breaking away from the traditional sectarian narratives mentioned above, this

study expands upon these main arguments by examining the crystallization of the

Safaviyya Sufi order into a religio-political establishment, the formation of Kızılbaş

communities in Anatolia, the Ottomans’ wildly varying policies toward their Kızılbaş

subjects, and the importance of pro-Safavid religious and political propaganda in the

context of state and identity formation and confessionalization. My overall goal is

twofold: while I aim to shed light on the often-neglected socio-political and fiscal aspects

4


of religious policies and decisions, I also examine the applicability of the notions of

confessionalization and social disciplining to Ottoman and Safavid state formation from

the mid-fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. I ask the following questions: What

were the main reasons for conversion to/from Kızılbaş Islam in early modern Anatolia?

What forms did Safavid propaganda take in Anatolia? What type of policies did the

Ottoman central authority follow against Safavid propaganda and conversions? What was

the importance of non-religious issues, such as taxation, migration, and trade, in Ottoman

policy-making with regard to Kızılbaş subjects? What were the main reasons for the

Ottomans’ fear of the Kızılbaş? How did the Safavid interpretation of Shi‘ite Islam

evolve over time, and in what ways did the Safavid state’s relationships with the

Anatolian Kızılbaş, as well as with the Ottoman central authority, affect this

transformation? How did the converts perceive their role? How did they adjust to the

differences between their expectations and the realities they faced after conversion? Can

we speak of mass conversion to or from Kızılbaş Islam? How are Kızılbaş converts

portrayed in Ottoman primary sources, and what does this portrayal tell us about the

Ottoman self-understanding, as well as the relationship between the Ottomans and the

Safavids? And last but not least, what did it mean to be a “good Muslim” in an age of

growing polarization between Sunnis and Shi‘ites and the increasing complexity of social

relations in the bureaucratizing and expanding Ottoman and Safavid empires?

5


a. Historiography

The early modern Ottoman state’s reactions to its Kızılbaş subjects have been a

topic of sustained scholarly interest. Scholarship from the 1960s through the 1980s

explained Ottoman policies against the Kızılbaş within artificial Turkish nationalist

frameworks. According to the representatives of this approach, some of whom held high-

ranking administrative positions in various Turkish governments, the Shi‘ite Safavids and

their followers in Ottoman territory were the greatest enemy of the Ottomans because of

their “betrayal” of the Ottoman state and its goal of creating one great Turkish empire

that would have encompassed an area from Central Asia to the Balkans.2 On the Iranian

side, the approach has been similar. Iranian historians up until the twenty-first century

depicted the Safaviyya order as a Shi‘ite movement from its inception in an attempt to

portray Twelver Shi‘ite identity as the core of Iranian civilizations in the Islamic era,

despite a clear crystallization from a confessionally ambiguous past to militant Shi‘ism

that took more than a century and half (and despite the fact that Iran was majority Sunni

until the Safavid takeover in 1501). Both of these arguments have repeatedly been

articulated to serve later pro- and anti-Safavid political and/or religious agendas. Apart

from a few exceptions, Turkish and Iranian historians, most of whom have been the

products of a rigidly sectarian worldview, have placed the major actors of the region (i.e.,

the Ottoman and Safavid states and the Kızılbaş community in-between the two) within

the borders of an uncompromising sectarian identity, either Sunni or Shi‘ite.

2
For an example, see Mehmet Saray, Türk – İran Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü
Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1990), 24.

6


 Revisionist historians, who have dominated the field since the 1990s, have

approached the topic from new, yet still problematic, angles. The first of two distinct

groups who have challenged the nationalist historiography, which attributes early modern

Ottoman policies against the Kızılbaş to mere security concerns, are the followers of the

“Köprülü-Ocak tradition.”3 Focused solely on the Ottoman state-building process, a key

component of which was the creation of an “orthodox” Sunni religious identity for the

Muslim subjects of the empire, these historians have assumed that the Seljuk and early

Ottoman authorities adhered to a homogeneous Sunni Islam, even though they endorsed

the existence of a “low” or “folk” interpretation of it that accommodated pre-Islamic

conceptions beneath a “Sufi façade.” Accordingly, these scholars have argued that in the

sixteenth century the Shi‘ite Safavids emerged as a political power from the East that

attracted the loyalty of certain discontented elements among the Ottoman Sunni

population, inaugurating an unbroken period of confrontation between the Ottoman and

Safavid Empires, and between the Ottomans and their Kızılbaş subjects. This approach,

however, has reinforced an essentialist stance concerning the relationships among these

groups by depicting a clear-cut bifurcation between “high” and “low” Islam, as well as by

overlooking the geographical and ethnic diversity within the Kızılbaş populations in the

region.

The second wave of revisionist historians, in their attempt to criticize the

compartmentalization of the “Köprülü-Ocak tradition,” have focused on the formation of

Kızılbaş communities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as an “umbrella movement”

3
Derin Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,” in The Ottoman World, ed.
Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 87.

7


against the Ottoman central authority, which, according to them, positioned itself as the

champion of Sunni Islam. This approach, albeit providing a new direction, has reduced

Ottoman policy toward the Kızılbaş to one of oppression and persecution while also

neglecting the fact that Kızılbaş Islam was more than a frontier phenomenon, as not only

the frontier regions but also the interiors of the Ottoman Empire witnessed various

degrees of propaganda and polarization. Furthermore, it has presented the Ottoman

state’s adoption of an uncompromising Sunni identity for its subjects, beginning in the

early sixteenth century, as the reason for the repressive policies, rather than as the result

of the “Kızılbaş threat.”

The first decade and a half of the twenty-first century has seen a plethora of

advanced discussions and new approaches concerning the formation and history of early

modern Ottoman Shi‘ism. Among many, the works of Marcus Dressler, Stefan Winter,

and Rıza Yıldırım have provided a much-needed new framework that emphasizes

continuities instead of ruptures in regional religiosities of the late medieval and early

modern eras, as well as accommodation instead of constant confrontation. As an

extension of these scholars’ efforts, I aim to complete the picture by relying on a critical

reading of both Ottoman and Safavid sources, an aspect missing from these historians’

works, as well as an integrative methodology bringing various sides of the story into one

coherent narrative. Delineating what it meant to be Sunni, Shi‘ite, Kızılbaş, Ottoman, and

Safavid in the early modern Ottoman and Safavid realms broadens the perspective of the

historical study of Ottoman and Safavid society while including necessary discussions of

empire building, confessional polarization, and inter-imperial rivalries and legitimation. I

8


am inspired in this endeavor by Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s “connected histories” approach,

which examines the multi-faceted interactions between local and global developments

and actors, and connectedness taking place on several levels. My ultimate aim is to

document the intricacies of socio-political and religious identity formation in this volatile

region and period. Examining the origins of pro-Safavid propaganda and its effect on

both the formation of the Kızılbaş communities in Anatolia and their relationship with the

Ottoman central authority is crucial to understanding why Kızılbaş Islam spread “like

wild fire” among Anatolians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

b. Theoretical Framework

The examination of “religiously motivated sociopolitical transformations,” in

Weberian terms, is also a central component of this study. This approach puts the utmost

importance on changing social and religious dynamics from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-

seventeenth century in Anatolia, as well as cultural conceptions of religious identity,

states of belonging, and notions of obedience among the populations of early-modern

Ottoman Anatolia, as a means of understanding the true nature of the relationship

between the Ottoman Empire and its Kızılbaş subjects, as well as between the Ottoman

and Safavid empires. Moreover, by emphasizing Weber’s empirically valid and

politically realistic approach to examining religion and its space in early modern

societies, this study rejects the prevalent monocausal explanations, whether idealist or

materialist, and reductionist approaches to religious decisions and conversions at the

9


individual and group level. It also seeks a deeper understanding of the religious

transformations of the Ottoman and Safavid polities during the early modern era.4

This study also presents the formation of Kızılbaş communities in central and

eastern Anatolia as a complex mixture of centrifugal and centripetal forces, in which the

mobilizing power of the Ottoman and Safavid states was significant in appearance but

limited in practice due to the existence of decentralizing factors, including the influence

of tribal identities, geographical dynamics, and environmental factors. Therefore, within

the context of inter-imperial and trans-regional tensions, a study of conversion to/from

Kızılbaş Islam provides theoretical insight into the multi-layered and often ambivalent

religious identities developed by both the Ottomans and the Safavids in response to the

shifting dynamics of the given period and region.

c. Methodology and Sources

Reading primary source materials, with respect not only to their contents but also

to their status as products of their time and environment, is at the core of this historical

inquiry. My interpretations aim to show that critical engagement with primary sources

provides us with a fresh understanding of historical dynamics and their role in

constructing long-term continuities.

In terms of the Ottoman-Safavid relationship, which was largely conflictual,

mainstream scholarship has so far drawn its conclusions from working solely within the

4
For further information on Weber’s approach to examining religion and religious policies, see Max
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich
(New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

10


narrative of one side or the other. This approach has, however, perpetuated many

essentialist and simplistic explanations to explain the status of the Kızılbaş population of

the Ottoman Empire and the sectarian nature of the conflict between the two empires. To

avoid falling into the same mistake, this dissertation relies on Ottoman, Safavid, and

European primary sources consulted at several archives and manuscript collections in

Turkey, Iran, and the United States. In over a year of research in Iran and Turkey, I

collected primary sources from various archives, official and private libraries, and

manuscript collections, most notably the Malek Manuscript Library in Tehran, the

National Library of Iran in Tehran, the University of Isfahan Manuscript Library, the

Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, and the National Library of Turkey in

Ankara. These sources include imperial decrees and orders, legal opinions, treaties, court

chronicles, polemical literature, hagiographical works, and poems. I have also gained

access to valuable online databases, as well as European travelers’ and merchants’

accounts to create a narrative that utilizes the technique of cross-examination of sources.

By synthesizing Safavid, Ottoman, and European primary sources that are rarely

used in combination, my research reveals the long-neglected effects of pro-Safavid

propaganda on the formation of Kızılbaş communities in Anatolia and the subsequent

Ottoman reaction. This approach breaks away from mainstream scholarship, traditionally

built upon analyzing Iranian or Turkish primary sources in isolation, and attempts to

bridge the divide between Safavid and Ottoman scholarship by highlighting the

complexity of the religious transformations of both the Safavid and the Ottoman states

and societies in the context of the geopolitical and demographic make-up of the region. In

11


order to achieve this balance among sources, I apply intra-textual, inter-textual, and

socio-historical examinations to both Ottoman and Safavid primary sources, as well as to

European accounts, to create a more nuanced picture. My results clearly show that

conversions to/from Kızılbaş Islam were not driven by religious concerns alone, but were

rather a complex process with significant socio-cultural, political, and financial

dimensions.

d. Periodization and Terminology

While the term “early modern” is used in this study to contextualize socio-

political and historical occurrences during the period studied, I reject the blanket 1500-

1800 periodization. Instead of conventional chronological breakdowns, which do not

suffice for understanding the Ottoman central authority’s relationship to its Kızılbaş

subjects and its neighbor, the Safavid Empire, I offer a different periodization, the 1440s

to the 1630s, which is necessary for a better understanding of the Ottoman-Safavid

rivalry and the formation of the Kızılbaş communities in Ottoman Anatolia.

Despite mainstream scholarship’s overemphasis of the year 1501, the date of Shah

Ismail’s conquest of Iran and thus the canonical terminus a quo for the Ottoman-Safavid

conflict, this study begins with the 1440s, which corresponds with the politicization of

the Safaviyya order under the leadership of Sheikh Junayd. While a complex network of

interaction between the Ottoman Empire and the Safaviyya Sufi order began as early as

the fourteenth century, it was after the 1440s that a distinct change occurred in the nature

of interaction as the politicization of the Safaviyya order became more pronounced as a

result of Sheikh Junayd’s policies. During this period, religious propaganda activities

12


conducted by the Safaviyya Sufi order became a concern for the Ottomans, specifically

after the Safaviyya intensified their efforts to transform into a political and ideological

entity.

Existing scholarship also overemphasizes the year 1514, when Ismail was

humiliated by the Ottoman sultan Selim I at the Battle of Chaldiran, which, according to

the conventional interpretation, marks the end of Safavid popularity among Anatolians.

Despite this setback, pro-Safavid propaganda gained momentum after 1514 and

constituted a significant threat to Istanbul for more than a century due to a well-

established network of missionary activities, marriage alliances, and trade between the

Anatolian and Iranian Kızılbaş.

On the other hand, over the course of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, Kızılbaş tribal leaders at the Safavid court suffered a gradual decline in their

political relevance, so that conversion to and from Kızılbaş Islam lost its political

significance for both the Ottoman and Safavid central authorities, particularly after the

1630s. The gradual incorporation of Georgian and Circassian ghulams, or slave soldiers,

along with Persian bureaucrats, into the Safavid military-administrative hierarchy under

Shah Abbas (r. 1588-1629) weakened the influence of Kızılbaş emirs at the Safavid

court, as did Safavid Shi‘ite Islam’s divergence from Anatolian Kızılbaş Islam, as Iranian

Shi‘ism shifted toward a purist version of Imamism. As the Safavid Empire stabilized

under Shah Abbas, Anatolian Kızılbaş elements ceased to play a significant role as a

buffer between the two empires, and Safavid and Ottoman propaganda activities in

central and southeastern Anatolia decreased significantly. Over the following decades,

13


this led to the marginalization of the Kızılbaş population across Anatolia, transforming a

once openly militant population into a closed and isolated mystical movement in “the sea

of Ottoman Sunnism.”

In order to delve into the details of the formation of the Kızılbaş population of

Anatolia and their relationships with both the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, we must

define key terms encountered in the primary documents in order to prevent any confusion

or misunderstanding. Ottoman primary sources, specifically official documents, use the

terms zındıka and zındık frequently for both the non-Sunni Muslim population and some

elements of the non-Muslim population. The same primary sources use the terms mulhid

(disbeliever) and ışık (literally, “light”) specifically for the Shi‘ite subjects of the empire.

In addition to the aforementioned names, Ottoman sources also use two names for

heterodox sheikhs and their followers: harici and rafizi. While harici (Kharijite) was a

blanket term for someone who did not follow normative Sunni Islam, particularly if that

person was engaged in military struggle with the Ottomans, the term rafizi referred to a

heterogeneous but interconnected group of Shi‘ite religious leaders and their followers.5

The term Kızılbaş (literally, “red head”) also appears in the various sources used

in this study. The use of a red headdress as an identifying marker among the Safavids

dates back to the leadership of Sheikh Haydar (1460-1488), who was Shah Ismail I’s

father. He asked his followers to wear a distinctive twelve-folded crimson headpiece

indicating their adherence to the twelve Imams and to Sheikh Haydar (d. 1488) as their

5
Ottoman chroniclers called the Zaydi Shi‘ites of Yemen harici, as well. As used in Ottoman sources, the
term does not imply affiliation with the Kharijite sect of Islam, which emerged during the civil wars of the
original Muslim community and rejects both Sunni and Shi‘ite claims to the caliphate.

14


spiritual leader. This twelve-folded piece of felt, which formed a sort of stiff baton

around which the turban was wound, was called tac (literally, “crown”), and, as this study

will elaborate, the kızıl tac (“red crown”) became a symbol for the adherence to the

religio-political Safavid movement up until the 1630s.

f. Chapters

This study is divided into five chapters, each shedding light on a different topic

related to the advent of the Safavids, pro-Safavid propaganda efforts, and the Ottoman-

Safavid rivalry. The first chapter, “Shi‘ite Propaganda before the Safavids,” provides a

survey of pre-Safavid Shi‘ite movements and their propaganda activities. The main

argument of the chapter is that the idea of proselytizing Shi‘ite tenets of Islam with

political undertones dates back to the formative period of the schism within the original

Muslim community, or ummah, and the following centuries similarly witnessed

numerous “Shi‘ite adventurers” who struggled to promote various forms of the imamate

by challenging contemporary political establishments, as well as religious authorities,

through meticulous propaganda campaigns. Therefore, it is critical to emphasize that

while the Safavids were the champions of dissemination of Imami Shi‘ite doctrine, with

heavy political undertones, across vast territories through a variety of methods, pro-

Shi‘ite propaganda was not unique to them. An examination of earlier Shi‘ite

communities reveals that many Shi‘ite actors promoted pro-Shi‘ite narratives within the

context of the institutionalization of Shi‘ite religious and political identities, the

15


codification of Shi‘ite doctrine, and the formation of Shi‘ite communities before the

Safaviyya Sufi order’s emergence.

The second chapter, “The Origins, Establishment, and Shi‘itization of the

Safaviyya Order and Its First Followers in Ottoman Anatolia,” explores how the

Safaviyya family metamorphosed from a mystical order into a ruling state between the

1330s and the 1490s. The chapter, based on extensive research in Persian, Ottoman

Turkish, and Italian sources, concerns the Safaviyya order’s adoption of Twelver Shi‘ism

and politicization in the fifteenth century, and argues that in a religio-political

environment characterized by multilayered and heterogeneous confessional identities,

Twelver Shi‘ism provided a holy cause for the Safaviyya leaders of the period to fight

for. At the same time that the Safavids’ Shi‘ite identity crystallized, a strong political

identity emerged, and the nascent Safavid state built a complex network of social,

political, and economic interactions with surrounding political actors, including the

Ottomans, triggering a long-term political, religious, and fiscal struggle in the region.

The third chapter, “Pro-Safavid Propaganda: Initiation, Legitimization, and

Methods,” documents pro-Safavid propaganda’s inception, institutionalization, and

methods, which are crucial to understanding the formation and transformation of Safavid

and Ottoman religious identities over almost two centuries. This chapter argues that as

the Safaviyya Sufi order crystallized into a nascent state, Safavid sheikhs and shahs

implemented a complex yet successful propaganda program to strengthen their position

in the region by offering a religio-political identity for the discontented inhabitants of the

surrounding regions, particularly Anatolia, where pro-Alid and pro-Shi‘ite tendencies

16


were already prevalent. Ultimately, a significant portion of the early modern Anatolian

population converted to Kızılbaş Islam in response to semi-organized pro-Safavid

propaganda between the 1440s and 1630s. I call these propaganda efforts semi-organized

-and sophisticated- due to their assiduousness in seeking to replace Sunnism with Shi‘ism

and, more importantly, to transform the latter from a sectarian devotion into a source of

political and ideological loyalty under the Safavid banner. In other words, these activities

were neither spontaneous nor unorganized acts of enthusiastic individuals, but constituted

the calculated political acts of the Safavid rulers as they provided a religio-political and

fiscal platform that was so wide in scope that it contained something for everyone. While

missionaries, or halifes, dispatched into Ottoman territory were the main agents of

proselytism, the Safavids also circulated sacred books and objects, made marriage

alliances, supported political and social upheavals, and encouraged migration to Safavid

Iran with the lure of lands and titles.

The fourth chapter, “Reasons for Anatolian Conversion to Kızılbaş Islam,” deals

with the main, yet underemphasized, motivations for conversion to Kızılbaş Islam,

including profound sympathy for the Alid cause, pecuniary reasons, and the alienation of

the Anatolian population due to various Ottoman policies. Conversion was always loaded

with deep social, political, and fiscal meanings for individuals, grups, and institutions.

When an early modern Anatolian converted between Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite and Sunni Islam,

he/she switched not only his/her religious identity, but also his/her subjecthood between

the Ottoman sultan and the Safavid shah through fiscal loyalties (taxes) and political

loyalties (military service and habitation of land). This chapter, therefore, also

17


problematizes mainstream scholarship and its compartmentalization of conversion

to/from Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite Islam. Rather than overemphasizing intrinsic or extrinsic

variables, or attributing the decisions of thousands of Anatolians to switch sides to a

single motivation, I try to integrate various underemphasized motivations. Particularly

important in the process of conversion was migration from Anatolia to Iran, which was

inextricably linked to “becoming a Kızılbaş.”

The fifth and last chapter, “Ottoman Reaction(s) against Safavid Propaganda and

the ‘Sunnification’ of the Empire,” documents the Ottoman central authority’s attempts to

stop Safavid proselytism while forging an alternative Sunni identity of its own. This

chapter challenges the generally accepted argument that the Ottoman- Safavid/Kızılbaş

conflict had its roots in religious antagonism. While religion played a significant role in

determining the nature of the relationships among the three main subjects of this study,

the Ottoman Empire’s geo-political and fiscal legitimacy - its ability to collect taxes - in

the region was the primary concern dictating its policies, rather than the confessional

identities of individual subjects for the period studied. In this chapter I perform a word

analysis of the terms and phrases - including zındıka/ zındık (atheist or unbeliever),

mulhid (heretic), ışık/ışık taifesi, (literally “people of light,” the adherents of a sub-branch

of Kızılbaş Islam), binemaz/bednemaz (one who does not practice the daily prayer

requirement of Islam), harici, rafizi, rafz-u ilhad ile müte‘arrif olmak (to become

notorious by turning godless or impious), dönmek (to convert), Kızılbaş olmak (to turn

Kızılbaş), ehl-i fesad olmak (to become a fomenter of rebellion), kızıl tac giymek (to wear

a crimson tac), taife-i evbaş-i bed-ma‘aşdan yüz döndürüp Astâne-i İslam-penaha itaa‘at

18


eylemek, (turning away from the group of low-lifes [Kızılbaş] and obeying the house of

Islam in Istanbul), and kendi halinde sulh üzere Kızılbaş olmak (being a peaceful

Kızılbaş) - that the Ottoman state applied to its Kızılbaş subjects, a mode of research

unique for this subject. This examination concludes that the Ottoman state’s behavior

toward its Kızılbaş population fluctuated according to its relationship with the Safaviyya

order, and later the Safavid Empire, as well as the intensity and the success of the pro-

Safavid propaganda, precluding a single religious or political explanation for policy shifts

by either the Ottomans or the Safavids.

19


 Chapter 1
Shi‘ite Propaganda before the Safavids

I. Introduction: The Formative Period of Shi'ite Islam and Its First Propagandists

While the Safavids, as the following chapters will elaborate, were successful at

initiating, legitimizing, and spreading their pro-Shi‘ite religious and political doctrines

across vast territories, the idea of proselytizing Shi‘ite tenets of Islam with political

undertones dates back to the formative period of the schism within the original Muslim

community, or ummah. As many scholars attest, Shi‘ism began and remained a political

movement for over a century before becoming one of the two main sectarian divisions

within Islam in the eighth century.6 The following centuries witnessed numerous “Shi‘ite

adventurers” who struggled to promote and spread various forms of the imamate by

challenging contemporary political establishments, as well as religious authorities, by

conducting meticulous propaganda campaigns. Ultimately many succeeded.7 For

instance, while being persecuted by the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Seljuks, various Shi‘ite

groups managed to persuade large numbers of adherents not only to convert to Shi‘ite

Islam but also to form ideological and highly-motivated movements against these ruling

dynasties.

6
Hossein Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam: Abu Ja‘far ibn
Qiba al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1993), 4.
7
Michel Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: Shi’ism, Sufism, and the Gulat (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1972), 3.

20


 Scholarly work on Shi‘ite propaganda, however, is still incomplete and is largely

preliminary in nature. While historians have been cognizant of the pro-Shi‘ite activities

within early Muslim communities, they generally overemphasize the religious aspects

and rarely examine the social and political dimensions of these movements, thus creating

a lacuna in the field.8 Studying the initial pro-Shi‘ite groups as “ideological

communities” and their efforts to spread specific interpretations of Shi‘ism as both

religious and political alternatives provides essential background to how the pro-Safavid

efforts emerged in the fifteenth century. Moreover, exploring pro-Shi‘ite narratives and

efforts from earlier periods helps us understand the interplay of political rivalries,

economic interests, and competing visions of Shi‘ite culture(s) and governance within

various regions and communities of the broader Middle East. This chapter will therefore

examine early examples of pro-Shi‘ite propaganda efforts and narratives within the

context of the institutionalization of Shi‘ite religious and political identities, the

development of authoritative organizations, and the intellectual formulations of doctrines

and communities up until the Safaviyya Sufi order’s emergence as the main propagator of

Shi‘ite Islam in the mid-fifteenth century.

The divergence between Sunnism and Shi‘ism stemmed from the issue of the

succession to the Prophet Muhammad, a question that was not only about who should

have been his successor, but also about the nature of that role. Following Muhammad’s

death in 632, an ad hoc group elected his father-in-law and one of his closest friends, Abu

Bakr (d. 634), to be the caliph, or the temporal leader, of the Muslim community.

8
For an informative discussion on this topic, see Nimrod Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone? A
Critique of Medieval Islamic Historiography,” in Society, Law, and Culture in the Middle East:
“Modernities in the Making,” eds. Dror Ze’evi and Ehud R. Toledano (Warsaw and Berlin: De Gruyter
Open Ltd., 2015), 37-50.

21


Conspicuously absent from this meeting was Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661), Muhammad’s

cousin and son-in-law, and one of the first members of the Muslim community. Ali was

supported by a group of people who argued that he should have occupied the leading

position after the Prophet died, not only as the caliph but also as a spiritual leader with

access to esoteric knowledge, i.e., the Imam.9 As Jacob Lassner argues, “legitimacy was

always derived by invoking memories of the past,”10 and the supporters of the Alid cause

invoked an incident at a salt pool (ghadir khumm) when Muhammad, returning from his

final pilgrimage, had chosen Ali for the general guardianship, or walāyat al-‘āmma, of

the people, a status that Muhammad himself had possessed before he died. This,

according to the Alids, was the central evidence of Ali’s legitimacy as the successor to

the Prophet.11

Ali was finally selected as caliph by the community leadership in 656. During his

five-year tenure, the struggle for power within the Muslim community turned violent.

Conflicts between Ali and Aisha (d.678), the last wife of the Prophet Muhammad and the

daughter of the first caliph Abu Bakr, and between Ali and Mu‘awiya (d.680), the

governor of Syria and the head of the Umayyad family, which became the first dynasty in

9
For further information concerning the question of the succession to Prophet Muhammad, see Moojan
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1985), 11-22. Many scholars have emphasized the strictly political nature
of the initial conflict. For two seminal examples, see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shi‘a
Become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955): 1-133; Hossein Modarressi,
Crisis and Consolidation, 4-6.
10
Jacob Lassner, “Responses to Unwanted Authority in Early Islam: Models for Current Shi‘i and Sunni
Activists,” in The Sunna and Shi‘a in History: Division and Ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East, eds.
Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 18.
11
‘Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba‘i, Shi‘ite Islam, trans. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Albany,
NY: SUNY Press, 1975), 40.

22


Islamic history (661-750), were at the center of these disputes.12 While initially beneficial

for Ali, his continual refusal to allow political expediency to dictate his role ultimately

led to an increase in the number of powerful and influential enemies who increasingly

sided with Mu‘awiya, leading to an irrevocable split within the community.

At the same time, conscientious efforts to spread the righteousness of Ali as the

legitimate successor to the Prophet and the spiritual leader of the Muslim community

began. The two major camps of the schism (i.e., the supporters of the family of the

Prophet Muhammad, or ahl al-bayt, through Ali’s sons Hasan and Husayn, and the

supporters of the Umayyad dynasty) embarked on a political conflict after Ali’s demise.

Propaganda efforts to spread the righteousness of the Alid cause simultaneously

increased the number of eager followers who fervently claimed that the leadership of the

Muslim community should remain in the family. For instance, Abd Allah ibn Saba al-

Himyari, a semi-legendary seventh-century figure known as Ibn as-Sawd, who some

believe started extremist, or ghuluww,13 tendencies among Shi‘ites,14 is described as a

devout adherent of the cause who traveled from place to place to convert individuals and

12
For further information concerning the nature of the conflict(s), as well as the turning points, including
the Battle of Karbala (680), see Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 23-35.
13
The notion of ghuluww, or exaggerations / extremism, in the history of Shi‘ite Islam in fact stemmed
from the deification of the Imams or considering them as prophets or angels; according to this view, Ali b.
Abi Talib and his descendants were supernatural beings and therefore did not die but went into occultation
and would return to “cut off the hands and feet of those who alleged that [they were dead].” Tabari, cited in
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 19. Subsequently, various individuals and/or groups who believed
that certain members of the ahl al-bayt, including Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya and Ja‘far al-Sadiq, were
manifestations of God, took this idea to another level.
14
According to some Sunni writers, during Ali’s caliphate, Ibn as-Sawd’s activities were banned, and Ali
ordered some of his followers burned. Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 46. A comprehensive
polemical treatise by the eleventh-century jurist Ibn Hazm against the ghuluww, Al-Fasl fī al-milal wa-
lahwā’ wa-l-nihal (The Discernment of Sects, Trends, and Beliefs) reflects this mentality: the author makes
a clear distinction between the Twelvers (Ithna-‘Ashariyya or Imamiyya), whom he still considered
Muslim, and the extremist ghulat sects, which he excluded from the Muslim community. Israel Friedlander,
“The Heterodoxies of the Shiites in the Presentations of Ibn Hazm,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 28 (1907): 34, 39-40, 48, 55.

23


groups to Ali’s side.15 Following these initial efforts, pro-Alid rhetoric was incorporated

into a complex array of theological beliefs articulated by Shi‘ite religious scholars during

the following centuries. Ultimately, with both political and religious claims, pro-

Ali/Shi‘ite movements focused on two main fronts to carry out their agenda: spreading

certain interpretations of Shi‘ite Islam within the Shi‘ite community and spreading Shi‘ite

Islam among non-Shi‘ites Muslims (and non-Muslims). By the early eighth century,

Hossein Modarressi argues, the Shi‘ite community held the belief that at some future

time, “a revolutionary leader from the House of the Prophet would rise up, overthrow the

unjust government, and establish the rule of justice and truth.”16 They used this claim to

initiate numerous efforts to spread pro-Shi‘ite beliefs into larger territories.17

The Alid cause witnessed numerous factions from the early days of the conflict.18

Each served a unique constituency within the “genealogical aristocracy of Islam” (i.e.,

the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), whose frustration largely stemmed from

being eliminated from leadership positions within the ummah.19 These proto-Shi‘ite

groups initiated their own propaganda to disseminate the “truth” among their rivals in the

region. For instance, following the death of Husayn (d. 680), the son of Ali b. Abi Talib

and the third Shi‘ite Imam, a group, later called the Kaysanites/Kaysaniyya,20 began to

claim religious and political legitimacy under the leadership of Mukhtar al-Thaqafi (d.

15
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 46. In fact, for some Sunni writers, Ibn as-Sawd was the
originator of Shi‘ite Islam, even though later Shi‘ite theologians have considered this claim an insult due to
his association with extremism. Ibid., 46. On the other hand, a number of Western scholars have argued
that the Shi‘ite ghuluww ideas did indeed originate with Yemeni (South Arabian Peninsula) religious
traditions.
16
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 6.
17
Ibid. This millenarian figure was called the qa’im, the one who rises up.
18
For further information concerning the early divisions among the Shi‘ites, see Momen, An Introduction
to Shi‘i Islam, 45-60.
19
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 62.
20
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 4-5.

24


687), who was disseminating propaganda among Shi‘ites in favor of Muhammad ibn al-

Hanafiyya (d. 700), Ali b. Abi Talib’s third son by a woman of the Hanifa tribe (i.e., not

by Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet). The name of the group, Kaysaniyya, is derived

from Abu Amra Kaysan, the leader of the mawali, or clients of the Arab tribes, under al-

Mukhtar.21 According to Wilferd Madelung, Kaysan was more extreme than al-Mukhtar

as he accused the caliphs preceding Ali of infidelity while the latter only condemned

Ali’s opponents in the Battles of the Camel (656) and Ṣiffin (657), Aisha, Talhah, and

Zubeir, and Muawiyah.22

According to Moojan Momen, the followers of Ibn al-Hanafiyya were the first

Shi‘ite group to initiate organized propaganda, which included a strong network of

disciples and missionaries.23 As a nascent Shi‘ite community, the Kaysanites targeted

similarly oppressed masses in their attempts to spread their teachings, and in 686,

Mukhtar was strong enough to capture Kufa, a symbolic city on the Euphrates in southern

Iraq, for the Shi‘ite community.24 In these missions, he emphasized the role of Ibn al-

Hanafiyya as the Mahdi, or the prophesied redeemer of Islam, who would rescue

Muslims, particularly the Iranian mawali, from oppression and restore justice on the Day

of Judgment. Even though his revolt was suppressed within several months,25 Mukhtar

was the first prominent Shi‘ite to initiate relatively complex propaganda strategies and to

mobilize large numbers of Iranians who, in the social and political structure, held inferior

statuses. Mukhtar’s uprising was eradicated by the Umayyads in 687 and Mukhtar

21
For further information on the Kaysanites, see EI2, s.v. “Kaysaniyya,” by Wilferd Madelung.
22
For further information on the al-Mukhtar, see EI2, s.v. “al-Muk̲ h̲ tar b. Abi ʿUbayd,” by G. R. Hawting.
23
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 68
24
Ibid., 35-36.
25
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 64-65.

25


himself was killed, but the propaganda on behalf of Ibn al-Hanafiyya was so influential

that when the latter died in 700, a group of his followers claimed that he had in fact not

died but gone into occultation and would ultimately return.26 Mukhtar and the supporters

of Ibn al-Hanafiyya are thus considered to be the first proponents of two key concepts:

Mahdism and occultation / resurrection, or ghayba / qiyama, which were crucial in the

development of Shi‘ite thought and movements in the upcoming centuries.27

Pro-Alid efforts grew in the eighth century as the fifth Imam, Muhammad al-

Baqir (d. 732), and the sixth Imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765), took the first concrete steps

toward making Shi‘ism a distinctive sect within Islam.28 Al-Baqir is credited with

introducing a unique system of jurisprudence and expanding the Shi‘ite body

significantly both in number and in influence of notable adherents, which resulted in its

emergence as a major religious community.29 Al-Sadiq, meanwhile, is known for

initiating and developing various key Shi‘ite notions and concepts, including

dissimulation, or taqiyya, which were effectively used by Shi‘ite propagandists in adverse

environments in the following centuries. He was also popular among the masses; al-

Kulayni, a tenth-century scholar, pointed out that “half of the world” became his

followers and believed that he was the qa’im (“the one who rises”), one of the titles of the

26
Farhad Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 38.
27
As other possible origins of these notions, scholars have mentioned Zoroastrian and Judeo-Christian
traditions. For a discussion on this issue, see Ismail K. Poonawala, “Some Thoughts on the Origins of
Mahdism (Islamic Messianism) and its Socio-Political Function,” in Proceedings of the International
Conference of Mahdism Doctrine, August 14-15, 2008, Tehran, Iran. http://www.mahdaviat-
conference.com/vdchtznwd23ni.102.html.
28
The fourth Imam, Zayn al-Abidin (d. 714), refrained from any form of political activity and pursued an
isolated life dedicated to spiritual deeds and prayer. Hence, in his lifetime the pro-Alid efforts did not
attract significant numbers of adherents.
29
Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 45-47. Al-Kashshi, a tenth-century Shi‘ite traditionist, compiled a
detailed list of Shi‘ite notables converted by al-Baqir and his immediate successors. Several other Shi‘ite
scholars, including al-Najashi (d. 1058) and al-Tusi (d. 1067), followed in al-Kashshi’s footsteps to create
the first bio-bibliographical works of the Shi‘ite community.

26


Mahdi.30 Interestingly enough, pro-Shi‘ite propaganda efforts came to a standstill during

his imamate as he forbade his followers to conduct Shi‘ite propaganda or to join any

political or armed group.31

Following the death of the Kaysanite leader Abu Hashim in 716, al-Abbas, the

great-grandson of the Prophet’s, uncle assumed the guidance of the Alid group and

successfully transferred the leadership of the imamate to the Abbasid family. The

Abbasid da‘wa, or mission, cleverly did not mention any specific person for the Imam

other than an unidentified member of the Prophet’s family, al-rida min al Muhammad, as

an attempt to maximize support from various Shi‘ite groups. Whereas earlier supporters

of the Alid cause lost their battle against the Umayyads in the late seventh century, the

newly established Abbasid movement, carrying their distinctive black banners, easily

toppled the regime in 750.32 For many Shi‘ites, the success of the Abbasid missionary

Abu Muslim, who successfully integrated Arab and non-Arab Muslims within his army

for the first time since al-Mukhtar’s earlier attempts, meant the fulfillment of their

religious and political aspirations, even though the aftermath of the revolution quickly

proved that the center of power had shifted from a broader pro-Shi‘ite coalition to the

Abbasid family in Iraq and their clientele.

The Shi‘ite community’s disappointment with the Abbasids further worsened

when the latter renounced their own Alid past and associated themselves with the

mainstream Sunni narrative. The following section will cover the significant details

30
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 7.
31
Ibid., 8. Adamant Shi‘ites, as a response, turned to the more active and politically ambitious Hasanid
branch of Shi‘ism and joined the revolt of Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (d. 762), who was
defeated and killed by the Abbasids shortly after. Ibid.
32
Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 39.

27


concerning the advance of pro-Shi‘ite propaganda under Abbasid rule with various

Shi‘ite groups; the Zaydis, the Isma‘ilis and the Twelvers.

II. First Split in the Community: The Zaydis

The ongoing tension between the supporters of the Alid cause and the Umayyad

dynasty peaked in 680 with the Umayyad caliph Yazid b. Mu‘awiya’s (r. 680-683) brutal

suppression of the rebellion in favor of Husayn b. Ali, culminating in the massacre of

Husayn and his followers at Karbala. Sixty years later, the Alid cause found another

outlet in an uprising organized by Zayd b. Ali (d. 740), Husayn’s grandson, against the

Umayyad caliph Hisham b. Abd al-Malik (r. 724-743) in 740. As the Umayyads were

regarded as illegitimate proprietors of political power who favored tribal elites over the

early converts of Islam and/or the ahl al-bayt, a “pious opposition” formed around Zayd

that included not only the members of the nascent Shi‘ite community but also others,

including scholars, who were later associated with Sunni Islam.33 While Zayd attracted

admirers from numerous social and religious groups in a short period, the ad hoc nature

of his movement ultimately worked against him, as only his core supporters stayed to

fight the superior Umayyad army.

Although Zayd’s rebellion ended with his execution, it marked the first substantial

split within the Shi‘ite community. After initially recognizing Zayd, instead of

Muhammad al-Baqir, as the fifth Shi‘ite Imam, the Zaydis developed a distinctive theory

of the imamate, whereby the Imam must be present in the Muslim community and must

seize power militarily to defend the community (Imam al-difa‘a). Unlike later Isma‘ili

33
Najam Haider, Shi‘i Islam: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 85-86.

28


and Imami Shi‘ite theologians, furthermore, Zayd b. Ali refused to condemn the first two

Sunni caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, and argued that non-Alid scholars could be

recognized as legitimate religious authorities.34

The scarce primary sources available indicate that the Zaydis propagated their

ideas by promoting education and inciting military campaigns to overthrow the ruling

power(s).35 Early biographical works written by Zaydis repeatedly mention the

importance of the Imam’s political and scholarly qualifications, whereas Isma‘ilis and

Imamis stress descent rather than the actual exercise of power.36 In the following

centuries, however, the Zaydi community went through some transformations as the old

beliefs on the status of Abu Bakr and Umar were reconsidered and an increasing desire to

declare Ali’s opponents as apostates surfaced. Within this internal divergence, the early

views, mainly ascribed to Zayd, became associated with “Batri” Zaydism. Batris tended

to favor a significant degree of Zaydi integration with the Sunni majority; they called for

Alids to study with non-Alid scholars when necessary and opposed taqiyya, or

dissimulation.37 In contrast, according to later Zaydism, which were referred to as

“Jarudi” Zaydism by contemporary heresiographers and later historians, the Prophet’s

designation of Ali as his successor was evident and therefore companions who actively

opposed his right to rule committed an act of kufr, or disbelief, as well as apostasy.38

34
Haider, Shi‘i Islam, 103-105.
35
For further details on the Zaydis, see Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 145-174.
36
Haider, Shi‘i Islam, 87-88.
37
Ibid., 90, 106. For more information on the Batri vs. Jarudi debate, see Ibid.,169-181.
38
Ibid., 107-108.

29


III. The Isma‘ilis

The next major sub-sect of Shi‘ite Islam took shape under Abbasid rule and

centered on the towering figure of Ja‘far al-Sadiq, the sixth imam recognized by the

majority of the Shi‘ite community. Al-Sadiq articulated the doctrine of nass, or

designation, whereby the current Imam formally designated a successor based on his

recognition of that person’s knowledge of the bātin, the authentic or esoteric meaning of

the Qur’an. Al-Sadiq, following this principle, designated his oldest son, Ismail. Ismail,

however, died in 760, five years before his father, yet al-Sadiq never formally designated

an alternative successor. While Imami Shi‘ites came to believe that the nass had passed

to al-Sadiq’s third son, Musa al-Kazim (d. 799), the Isma‘ilis believed that it remained

with Ismail, who passed it to his own son Muhammad (d. before 809). Muhammad b.

Isma‘il apparently died in battle as a young man, and early Isma‘ilis believed that he had

gone into occultation.39

Because the Abbasid caliphs, who tolerated the non-Zaydi Shi‘ite imams living

under their rule, endorsed Musa al-Kazim and his descendants as al-Sadiq’s successors,

the Isma‘ilis rebelled against them. Inspired by the Abbasids’ own decades-long

underground proselytizing effort, they, unlike the Zaydis, worked through underground

networks and missionary activities to spread the Shi‘ite doctrine.40 They used a rapidly

expanding network of da‘is41 (religio-political missionaries or propagandists), aimed to

39
Daftary, “Intellectual Life among the Ismailis,” 92.
40
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 38. On Abbasid inspiration for the Isma‘ili da‘wa, see
Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 48.
41
They were meticulously selected and appointed with the Imam’s permission and dispatched to various
regions with a certain degree of autonomy after going through a complex and multilayered training,
including acquiring sufficient knowledge of shari‘a and Islamic jurisprudence, as well as the necessary
languages and cultures of the regions to which they were sent. Therefore da‘is, according to Daftary,

30


summon Muslims (and non-Muslims) to the allegiance of the Isma‘ili Imam/Mahdi and

his da‘wa (mission or call) or al-da‘wa al-hadiya (the rightly guiding mission or call).

This mission, whose main purpose was to restore the caliphate to the descendants of Ali

and Fatima, guaranteed salvation and deliverance from injustice to its followers, and was

disseminated to broad audiences in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula,

Yemen, and North Africa. One of the main reasons for the Ismaili da‘wa’s success at

spreading its message and recruiting new followers from diverse backgrounds and locales

was the belief that Isma‘il’s son Muhammad, who had gone into occultation, would come

back as the Mahdi in a victorious campaign and would topple the false caliphs (i.e., the

Abbasids), and rule in justice before the physical world ended.42

Beginning in the middle of the ninth century, influential -- and usually clandestine

-- Isma‘ili religio-political movements organized and threatened the rule of the Abbasids,

who were accused of having usurped the legitimate rights of the Alids in governing the

ummah. The first of these religio-political Isma‘ili establishments were the Qarmatians,

who formed various communities in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain, each led by a da‘i.

According to al-Tabari (d. 923), Hamdan Qarmat, after whom the Qarmatians were

named, converted to Isma‘ili Shi‘ism through a “foreign” missionary and led the Isma‘ili

community first in Iraq and later in Bahrain as the chief da‘i.43 From the outset, the

consisted of “… persons of high educational qualifications combined with the required intellectual and
moral attributes, and organizational abilities….” Daftary, “Intellectual Life among the Ismailis: An
Overview,” in Intellectual Traditions in Islam, ed. Farhad Daftary (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 98.
42
Daftary, “Intellectual Life among the Ismailis,” 92; Heinz Halm, The Empire of the Mahdi: The Rise of
the Fatimids, trans. Michael Bonner (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 21.
43
Wilferd Madelung, “The Fatimids and the Qarmatis of Bahrayn,” in Medieval Isma‘ili History and
Thought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 24. According to Halm, this
“foreigner” was none other than al-Husayn al-Ahwazi, Abdallah the Elder’s “closest confidant and
companion in fight.” Halm, The Empire of the Mahdi, 26-27.

31


Qarmatians battled the Abbasid regime and succeeded in converting a large number of

tribes in the Syrian Desert to Shi‘ite Islam. According to Wilferd Madelung, Abdan,

Hamdan Qarmat’s brother-in-law, was “the master of missionary propaganda.”44 The

Qarmati movement reached its peak as a religio-political movement in the early tenth

century, when the community in Bahrain transformed into a state-like establishment and

succeeded in stealing the Black Stone from the Ka‘ba in Mecca.45 Ultimately, however,

the Abbasid authorities subdued the Qarmatian revolt, and the Black Stone was returned

in 930. 46

According to Isma‘ili doctrine, as long as the Mahdi Muhammad b. Isma‘il

remains in occultation, he needs a deputy, or hujja, whose main responsibility is to lead

the community during the occultation, to spread Isma‘ili teachings, and to prepare

followers for the Mahdi’s return. By the late ninth century, Abdallah al-Akbar, a

prosperous merchant originally from Khuzestan in southern Iran who had helped to

establish the Basra Qarmatian community, claimed to be fulfilling this role from Syria.

He augmented his legitimacy by claiming to be a descendant of Ali ibn Abi Talib and

Fatima.47 His actions paved the way for his purported grandson, Abu Muhammad

Abdallah (d. 934), to claim to be the Mahdi himself. His assertion of Mahdi status

signified a major break with previous Isma‘ili/Qarmatian doctrine and communities, as

they believed in waiting for the occulted Imam, Muhammad b. Ismail. Under pressure

from both the Abbasids and the Qarmatians of Syria and Iraq, who did not accept his

Mahdist claims, Abu Muhammad Abdallah fled to the North African town of Sijilmasa

44
Madelung, “The Fatimids and the Qarmatis,” 22.
45
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 66.
46
For a detailed discussion on the Qarmatis, see Wilferd Madelung, “The Fatimids and the Qarmatis.”
47
Ibid., 22-23.

32


(modern-day Morocco) in 904 under the guise of being a merchant. With the help of a

dedicated Isma‘ili da’i, Abu Abdallah al-Shi‘i (d. 911), the pro-Isma‘ili momentum

further accelerated and an openly Isma‘ili Shi‘ite dynasty, the Fatimids (909-1171),

established a state in Tunisia in 909 to challenge Abbasid authority through their complex

propaganda system. As an Isma‘ili movement with a different understanding of the

notion of Mahdi and the final millenarian age, the Fatimids conquered Egypt, Syria, and

the Hijaz from the Abbasids and founded Cairo as their new capital in 969, as well as al-

Azhar as the main Isma‘ili mosque and center of Isma‘ili learning in 972.

The Fatimid caliphate presented itself as an alternative to the Sunni Abbasid

caliphate in Baghdad48 and further elaborated the da‘wa by utilizing texts, objects, and

punitive actions to spread the Isma‘ili interpretation of Islam not only among non-Ismaili

Shi‘ites (mostly Zaydis), but also among the non-Shi‘ite Muslim and non-Muslim

communities. Throughout the North African period of the Fatimid rule, the chief qadi

was simultaneously the supreme da‘i.49 Furthermore, pro-Isma‘ili literary works,

particularly theological treatises and polemical literature, were produced and copied,50

leading to a significant increase in the number of pro-Isma‘ili individuals and groups.51

Since the main indication of success for da‘is was the conversion of rulers, high-ranking

48
As a response, the Abbasid caliphs not only formulated their doctrines very much in response to the
Fatimid challenges in the region, but also sought temporary rapprochements with various other Shi‘ite
groups against the Fatimids. For instance, the Abbasid Caliphs al-Qadir (d.1031) and al-Qa’im (d. 1075)
initiated joint manifestos signed by Sunni and Twelver Shi‘ite jurists condemning the Fatimids. Bengio and
Litvak, The Sunna and Shi‘a in History, 5. The polemics composed against the Fatimids by Sunni ulama
became an important influence on present-day anti-Shi‘ite polemics.
49
Halm, “The Isma‘ili Oath,” 100.
50
Al-Qadi Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man b. Muhammad (d. 974)’s Da‘a’im al-Islam (The Pillars of Islam), for
instance, served as the official legal code of the Fatimid state and ideology. Daftary, “Intellectual Life
among the Ismailis,” 99-100.
51
Ibid., 93-94.

33


officials, and other members of the elite, the complexity of the pro-Isma‘ili corpus

increased accordingly.52

Until quite recently, historians knew little about the Fatimid da‘wa and its

methods as the only sources available were Mamluk-era Sunni accounts and anti-Isma‘ili

propaganda travesties according to which Isma‘ili doctrine amounted to absolute

“unbelief and atheism.” In recent years, however, scholars have uncovered the

defamatory purpose of these texts while also uncovering new primary sources that shed

light on the meticulous Fatimid propaganda. Among the key actors was al-Qadi al-

Nu‘man (d. 974), the most illustrious Fatimid jurist and the founder of Isma‘ili

jurisprudence, who not only set the rules for the Isma‘ili da‘wa but also served as the

chief da‘i, directing religious (and often political) affairs within and outside the Fatimid

Empire, particularly during the reign of the fourth Fatimid caliph al-Mu‘izz (r. 953-975),

under whom the Fatimids conquered Egypt from the Abbasids.53 His work entitled Iftitah

al-da‘wa wa-ibtida’ al-dawla, or The Beginning of the Da‘wa and the Establishment of

the Dynasty, is considered the official text commemorating the initiation of Fatimid

missionary activities, first in Yemen around 881 and then in North Africa around 893,

which culminated in the establishment of the Fatimid dynasty in 909. In his Da‘a’im al-

Islam, or The Pillars of Islam,54 al-Nu‘man, while laying out the official history of the

Fatimids, emphasized that the main goal of the Fatimid court and the caliph was to spread

52
Ibid., 95.
53
Ismail K. Poonawala, “The Beginning of the Ismaili Da‘wa and the Establishment of the Fatimid
Dynasty as Commemorated by al-Qadi al-Nu ‘man,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in
Honour of Wilferd Madelung, eds. Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri (London and New York: I. B. Tauris,
2003), 338.
54
To the established five pillars of Islam, al-Nu‘man added walaya (devotion to the Imam) and tahara
(both physical and spiritual purification). Ismail K. Poonawala, “Al-Qadi al-Nu‘man,” in Medieval Isma‘ili
History and Thought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 127.

34


the Isma‘ili faith into larger territories through officially appointed missionaries.55 As a

result, many Fatimid da‘is and their successors, after going through extensive training in

theology, jurisprudence, and philosophy, preached the da‘wa in the name of the Fatimid

Imams and coupled it with an elevated discourse in their attempts to convert the rulers

and/or high-ranking state officials, particularly in Iran and Central Asia.

Authentic Isma‘ili texts describe the rituals and requirements of conversion in

great detail. Majalis, or gatherings, were a significant part of the Isma‘ili da‘wa, and the

chief da‘i planned the content of these gatherings for audiences that ranged from

common people (‘awamm al-nas), to travelers, to high-ranking officials and women.

According to Isma‘ili sources, individual meetings with potential converts followed the

majalis. The Book of the Teacher and the Pupil (Kitab al-‘alim wa’l-ghulam),56 one of

the earliest Isma‘ili texts, mentions an act of pledge or promise (‘ahd) that formed the

beginning of the instruction.57 The pupil vowed to believe in God, in his angels, and in

his pure Imams; to adhere to the exoteric (zahir) and esoteric (batin) meanings of the

Qur’an; to stand up for the Imam and not to betray him; to be a friend of the Imams and

an enemy to their enemies.58 The revelation of the secrets followed, and here the social

55
Poonawala, “The Beginning of the Ismaili Da‘wa,” 339. Nu‘man states “… After I submitted [my books
to al-Mu‘izz], he approved both of them equally with satisfaction and said, ‘As for the history of the dawla
[dynasty], those du‘at [missionaries] who took upon themselves to carry out the task of establishing a
dawla, … I like that their deeds be immortalized for the succeeding generations so that their names will
endure in the chronicles of the bygone people, and that [praise and] prayers will reach them….” Ibid., 339.
56
This text is attributed to Ibn Hawsha Mansur al-Yamani or to his son Ja‘far. Halm, “The Isma‘ili Oath,”
92.
57
Other authentic Isma‘ili sources initiate the process with breaking the convert’s former faith, “so that he
will be left without an argument.” Risala al-mujaza al-kafiya fi adab al-du‘at of Ahmad al-Nisaburi, an
active da‘i during the reigns of the Fatimid caliphs al-‘Aziz (d. 996) and al-Hakim (d. 1021), cited in Halm,
“The Isma‘ili Oath,” 93. Also see, The Advent of the Fatimids, A Contemporary Shi‘i Witness: An Edition
and English Translation of Ibn al-Haytham’s Kitab al-Munazarat, ed. and trans. Wilferd Madelung and
Paul E. Walker (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
58
Halm, “The Ismaili Oath,” 93.

35


and intellectual status of the pupil determined the nature and amount of secrets revealed

to him/her.59 These sessions were not devoted solely to readings, recitations, discussions,

and conversions; they also served as opportunities to collect dues for the Imam, which

had been customary since the earliest Qarmatian communities in Iraq and Yemen.

According to Heinz Halm, Abdan, the brother-in-law of Hamdan Qarmat, introduced

these duties under the names fitra, hijra, bulgha, khums, and ulfa,60 and the practice

became an integral part of the community during the next centuries.

Furthermore, physical objectification was a significant part of the Fatimid da‘wa

from its inception.61 Certain objects loaded with spiritual and political significance were

circulated both to spread the Isma‘ili faith and to provide legitimacy against the Fatimids’

religious and geopolitical rivals. These objects ranged from clay seals (khawatim)

containing Ismai‘li messages, which were found in Abbasid mosques in the 920s-930s, 62

to the fabled sword of Ali b. Abi Talib, Dhu’l-Faqar, which was stolen from the Abbasid

capital in 932 by an Isma‘ili da‘i as “the work of God [to] restore this sacred symbol to

its rightful owners.”63 Through these and many other objects, the Fatimid da‘wa

manipulated the religious rhetoric in its favor, claiming superiority through possession of

59
“… just as a child is ruined if he is given too much food at the beginning of his existence, … he [the
pupil] ought not to be burdened with too much.” Risala of al-Nisaburi, cited in Halm, “The Isma‘ili Oath,”
93.
60
Ibid., 103. For a striking similarity between this practice and the pro-Safavid propaganda’s efforts to
collect duties from its Anatolian adherents, see Chapters IV and V.
61
For a detailed discussion concerning the utilization of certain objects for pro-Safavid propaganda in
Ottoman Anatolia, see Chapter III.
62
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 43.
63
This story is mentioned only in Fatimid sources, suggesting manipulation of the historical event. Paul E.
Walker, “Purloined Symbols of the Past: The Theft of Souvenirs and Sacred Relics in the Rivalry between
the Abbasids and Fatimids,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd
Madelung, eds. Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 365. The
main narrator of this event, the Qadi al-Nu‘man, mentions a female member of the Abbasid caliph al-
Muqtadir’s (d. 932) court telling the Fatimid da‘i the location of the sword and converting to Isma‘ili
Shi‘ism immediately afterward. It is also important to note that this alleged theft took place in the chaotic
atmosphere following the coup that deposed al-Muqtadir.

36


symbolic objects, winning new followers for the sect, and ultimately spreading Fatimid

political power into remote territories, where the legendary stories of da‘is circulated

before the da‘is themselves arrived. The fact that the Fatimid da‘is could infiltrate

Abbasid mosques and, more importantly, the Abbasid court, to place objects with Isma‘ili

messages or to steal a highly symbolic object served as a propaganda tool to emphasize

the waning power of those who had once controlled these mosques or possessed these

objects.

As previously mentioned, the Isma‘ili da‘wa was successful at spreading Shi‘ite

Islam not only among lay people but also among rulers and political elites. For instance,

the ruler of the autonomous Samanid regime in Transoxiana, Nasr b. Ahmad, known as

al-Sa‘id (r. 914-943), converted to Isma‘ili Shi‘ism at the hands of the missionaries of the

eastern da‘wa.64 According to the famous eleventh-century Sunni littérateur al-

Tha‘alibi’s Adab al-muluk, Isma‘ili “innovators and heretics” were able to deceive the

Samanid ruler with their “mellifluous charms, their gilded sophistry and their spurious

doctrines … [that liberated them] from the shackles of religious observance, giving them

license to abandon prayer and other acts of worship and to indulge their desires.”65

Isma‘ilis dominated the Samanid court for the next seven years, as following al-Sa‘id’s

conversion many leading generals and “the headmen of the towns, potentates, squires,

and leading scribes of the bureau”66 converted to the Isma‘ili creed.67 As the interest in

64
Luke Treadwell, “Shahanshah and al-Malik al-Mu’ayyad: The Legitimation of Power in Samanid and
Buyid Iran,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd Madelung, eds. Josef
Meri and Farhad Daftary (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 319.
65
Patricia Crone and Luke Treadwell, “A New Text on Ismailism at the Samanid Court,” in Texts,
Documents and Artifacts: Islamic Studies in Honour of D. S. Richards, ed. Chase F. Robinson (Leiden:
Brill, 2003), 38.
66
Al-Tha‘alibi (d. 1038), Adab al-muluk, cited in ibid., 52.

37


Shi‘ism grew, the scattered pockets of influential Isma‘ili sympathizers increased in

number, particularly in Iran and Central Asia. The da‘is of Isfahan and Tabaristan, for

instance, converted Ahmad b. Ali, the governor of Rayy in northern Iran in the 920s, and

Mardawij (d. 935), the founder of the short-lived Ziyarid state in northern Iran.68 The

Isma‘ili presence in the Abbasid heartland contributed to the Abbasid caliph’s relegation

to a relatively ineffective figurehead for the next two centuries. Due to the advance of

these Isma‘ili political movements and the increasing popularity of Isma‘ili religious

identity, the tenth century has been rightfully called the “Shi‘ite century” or “Isma‘ili

century” by scholars of the period.69

The pro-Isma‘ili efforts continued in various parts of the broader Middle East

throughout the following centuries. By the mid-twelfth century Isma‘ili Shi‘ism had a

considerable impact on greater Iran and became established in several parts of the region.

Following the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir’s death in 1094, Egyptian Isma‘ilis accepted

his younger son, al-Musta‘li, as his successor while the da‘is in the Seljuk territories,

however, recognized his older son Nizar. Nizar was murdered soon afterward by the

Fatimids’ Armenian vizier, and the Nizari da‘is came to believe that he had gone into

occultation. As a result of this split with the Fatimids, numerous Nizari fortresses

emerged in Greater Syria and Iran, each led by a da‘i, in a short period.70 Hasan-i Sabbah

67
While al-Tha‘alibi does not mention the names of other high-ranking officials who converted with al-
Sa‘id, Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092)’s Siyasatnamah provides us with several names, including Yaqub b. Layth,
the governor of the central Iranian region of Sistan. Siyasetname, ed. and trans. Mehmet Altay Köymen
(Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1982), 19.
68
Newman, The Formative Period of Twelver Shi‘ism, 35.
69
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 66.
70
For further details on the Persian Isma‘ili movement and Nizari Shi‘ism in general, see Daftary, “Hasan-i
Sabbah,” in Medieval Isma‘ili History and Thought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 183- 204.

38


(d. 1124), the famous leader of the Persian Isma‘ilis at the fortress of Alamut in northern

Iran, was himself a convert from Twelver Shi‘ism whose conversion was overseen by a

Fatimid da‘i in 1072.71 Hasan-i Sabbah and his immediate successors at Alamut

successfully combined their deep-rooted discontent with Sunni Seljuk rule in Iran (1016-

1194) with their desire to spread Nizari Isma‘ili Shi‘ism. The new sub-sect spread into

various parts of Iran, including Daylam and Quhistan, as well as into different segments

of Iranian society, in a significantly short period.72

IV. From Quietism to Revolution: Twelver Shi‘ites

Initially Twelver, or Imami, Shi‘ites were the smallest and the most quietist of the

Shi‘ite sub-sects. As mentioned above, the death of the sixth Imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq, in

765 triggered a crisis over the identity of his successor. While the Isma‘ilis came to

believe that the designation had passed from his eldest son, Isma‘il, who predeceased his

father in 760, to Isma‘il’s son Muhammad, the future Twelvers recognized al-Sadiq’s

youngest son, Musa al-Kazim, as the seventh Imam. This community, unlike the

Isma‘ilis, followed Imam al-Sadiq’s ruling that the Imam was not required to seize power

if circumstances did not allow, and therefore refrained from proselytizing for the next few

centuries. Despite their political quietism, Musa al-Kazim and several of his descendants

71
Ibid., 185.
72
Historians of the Nizaris base their argument on the accounts of two twelfth-century Sunni chroniclers,
Ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn al-Athir, and argue that the Seljuk ruler Barkiyaruq (r. 1094-1105) had Nizari Isma‘ili
leanings. For a brief debate concerning this topic, see Carole Hillenbrand, “The Power Struggle between
the Saljuqs and the Isma‘ilis of Alamut, 487-518/1094-124: The Saljuq Perspective,” in Medieval Isma‘ili
History and Thought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 207-210.

39


displayed charismatic leadership skills in standing up to certain authoritarian Abbasid

caliphs and thus won converts to their sect.73

As a result, the ninth century was a period when Twelver Shi‘ism expanded in

Greater Syria, Iraq, and Iran as an expression of political opposition to the Abbasid

caliphate of Baghdad. For instance, among the Syrian Muslims who became and remain

Twelver Shi‘ite were the people of Jamal ‘Amil and Kisrawan, and those from the

Baalbek and Biqa’ regions in what is now Lebanon. As Shi‘ite Islam splintered into

different sects, many of the present-day Lebanese Shi‘ites opted for Twelver Shi‘ism.74

Originally based in Kufa, the Twelvers quickly spread their follower base into Baghdad

and Qom in the ninth century. According to Wilferd Madelung, Qom became “the chief

center of orthodox Imami traditionalism,” whereas Kufa remained mainly Zaydi. In this

period, Twelver Shi‘ism also established small communities in several other Iranian

cities. Modern scholars have observed that within these newly founded communities, the

Twelver Shi‘ites managed to establish financial and ideological networks through which

they sent large sums of money to their Imams.75 A special tax of twenty percent levied on

the incomes of all Shi‘ites, called khums, was instituted in the 830s as a means of

financially supporting the Imamate and sponsoring pro-Shi‘ite propaganda efforts.76

Regular letters were also dispatched to local Shi‘ite communities asking for financial

73
Modaressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 10. Musa al-Kazim was arrested in Medina and brought to Iraq,
where he was imprisoned for several years before his execution.
74
Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn. “The Shiites in Lebanon and the Ottomans in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” in
Convegno sul tema: La Shī‘a nell’Impero ottomano (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1993), 107.
75
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 39
76
Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 12. The amount of money collected by the Shi‘ites often alarmed
the Abbasid caliphs, who on occasion summoned the Imams to their court and accused them of collecting
kharaj, the land tax, from their followers. Ibid,. 13.

40


support, which was “an obedience to God that guaranteed lawfulness and cleanliness for

their wealth and the protection of God for their lives.”77

While various Shi‘ite groups were furthering their legitimacy by invoking ties to

Ali’s lineage, the sectarian narrative, as well as the propaganda efforts, dividing the Sunni

and Shi‘ite camps continued to take shape within a complex theological framework. In

theory, mainstream ulama on both the Sunni and the Shi‘ite sides regarded the adherents

of each group as Muslims who had strayed from the path of “true Islam,” but still

remained members of the Islamic community based on their acceptance of the Qur’an as

the word of God and Muhammad as His last prophet. On the popular level, however,

sectarianism, or ta’ifiyya, was prevalent since the members of each sect often viewed

their rivals as infidels, or kuffar.78 The famous hadith reported from the sixth Imam al-

Sadiq, “Whoever dies without having acknowledged the true Imam of his time dies as a

kafir [unbeliever],” became an integral part of the pro-Shi‘ite discourse.79

Several influential Imami scholars regarded these offenders as ahl al-khilaf, or

people of division, the worst of whom were called nasiba, or people who reject the notion

of Ali’s superiority to Abu Bakr and Umar (d. 644) and deny his right to succeed the

Prophet, or who hate Ali or the entire ahl al-bayt. Imami jurists considered the nasiba as

people in a state of actual unbelief (kufr waqi‘i) who were to be treated accordingly.80

The nasiba, according to some earlier Imami jurists, were worse than “bastards and more

77
Modarressi cites Abu ‘Amr Muhammad b. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Kashshi’s (d. early tenth-century)
Kitab ma‘rifat al-naqilin. Ibid., 14.
78
Bengio and Litvak, The Sunna and Shi‘a in History, 7.
79
Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 55.
80
Etan Kohlberg, “Non- Imami Muslims in Imami Fiqh,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 6 (1985):
99. For instance, it was forbidden to use water from a hammam, or bathhouse, if a nasibi had touched it; it
was also forbidden to pray behind a nasibi, or to marry nasiba women. Ibid., 99-103.

41


despicable than dogs,” and some jurists added that a member of the nasiba “possessed

both an outward impurity, which pertains to members of his body, and inner impurity,

which clings to his spirit.”81 Yet even the nasiba could be targets of Shi‘ite conversion

efforts due to the possibility that they would “see the light and adopt the Imami faith” in

order to protect themselves from remaining forever “impure unbelievers.”82 In response

to these conversion efforts, a strong opposition was organized and/or bolstered by the

Abbasid and Seljuk rulers, who initiated harsher policies against pro-Shi‘ite actors. As a

result of these clandestine and often successful Imami activities, the Abbasid rulers put

Shi‘ite Imams under house arrest83 and commissioned many anti-Shi‘ite polemics.84

Imami Shi‘ite tradition, beginning in the tenth century, also made a clear

distinction between “believers” (mu’minun) and “Muslims” (muslimun) that shaped the

propagandist narratives spreading Shi‘ite Islam into wider territories. While this

distinction was a concern of Muslim theology in general, what sets the Imami Shi‘ites

apart is the assertion, articulated by the Imami theologian al-Mufid (d. 1022), that the

muslimun, as opposed to the mu’minun, are those who acknowledge God’s unity and

Muhammad’s message without adhering to the principle of devotion to an Imam,

81
Ibid., 104.
82
Muhammad ibn Ya‘qub al-Kulayni (d. 941), Al-Usul min al-kafi, ed. Ali Akbar al-Ghaffari (Tehran: np,
1388/1967), cited in Kohlberg, “Non- Imami Muslims in Imami Fiqh,” 100-101.
83
Hurvitz, “Where Have All the People Gone?,” 39. The Shi‘ite Imams who were confined to large palaces
and not allowed to leave died at relatively young ages. According to Momen, the ninth Imam, Muhammad
al-Taqi, died in Baghdad at the age of twenty-five, while the tenth Imam, ‘Ali al-Hadi, died in Samarra at
the age of forty-two, and the eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari, died in Samarra at the age of twenty-eight.
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 42-45.
84
The main examples of this genre are the works of Ibn Rizam (d. tenth century), al-Baghdadi (d. 1037),
and al-Ghazali (d. 1111), which not only depicted Shi‘ism, particularly the Isma‘ili branch of it, as the
“arch-enemy of Islam” but also provided major reference points for later Sunni heresiographers and rulers
in their attempt to stigmatize Shi‘ite individuals and communities.

42


walaya.85 Only those who follow a Shi‘ite Imam, accordingly, can be mu’minun. This

elitist approach was reflected in contemporary Twelver Shi‘ite terminology, in which the

Imamis distinguished themselves as the elite (al-khassa), while all others, especially the

Sunnis, were the masses (al-‘amma).86 Furthermore, al-Mufid famously argued that the

traditional dichotomy between the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and the dar al-harb

(abode of war) does not suffice and thus a third realm, the dar al-iman (abode of faith),

representing the Imami Shi‘ites, should be added. Shi‘ite interpretation of the doctrine of

jihad, which also follows al-Mufid’s argument, further emphasizes that the “abode of

Islam” should be converted into the “abode of faith.” 87 During later periods of political

chaos and social unrest, Shi‘ite theologians often referred to the consensus of medieval

Shi‘ite jurists, which emphasized obedience to the Imam, to strengthen their stance. It

was incumbent upon the believers, they asserted, to follow the orders of the Imams (and

their representatives) because it was God’s will that the Imam should hold office even

when he behaved like a tyrant, because tyranny was preferable to anarchy.88

Despite these theological discussions and justifications, Twelver Shi‘ism

remained politically weak89 until the Persian Buyid family, who had overt Shi‘ite

sympathies, occupied Baghdad in 945 and became the practical rulers of the Muslim

community. Under Buyid rule (934-1062) there was a significant increase in conversion

85
Kohlberg, “The Evolution of the Shi‘a,” 10.
86
Ibid.
87
Kohlberg, “The Development of the Imami Shi‘i Doctrine of Jihad,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 126 (1976), 78; idem, “The Evolution of the Shi‘a,” 10.
88
Roger Savory, “The Safawid State and Polity,” 186-187. Bengio and Litvak, The Sunna and Shi‘a in
History, 6. It should, however, be noted that this point was not unique to Shi‘ites as Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn
Muhammad Ibn Habib al-Mawardi (d. 1058), the Sunni author of the famous Al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya wa-
lwilayat al-diniyya (The Ordinances of Government and Religious Authority), pointed out the same
necessity for the ummah.
89
At no time during this period was the majority of a significant city of the Muslim world Imami Shi‘ite
with the exceptions of Kufa, Rayy, and Qom.

43


to Twelver Shi‘ite Islam. Shi‘ites freely commemorated the martyrdom of Imam Husayn

at Karbala for the first time, and the main Shi‘ite shrines, including the ones in Iraq and

Iran, were reconstructed or repaired and given generous endowments. Members of the

Alid families (ashraf) were treated as an aristocracy, and seminal works of Twelver

Shi‘ite theology, which became the cornerstones of pro-Imami propaganda narratives in

the following centuries, were produced.90

Twelver Shi‘ism grew significantly in numbers and influence in the region. By

the tenth century, cities such as Baghdad, Samarra, Kufa, and Basra contained significant

numbers of Twelvers as one of several religious minorities under Sunni religio-political

domination. Moreover, the Iranian city of Qom became a Twelver Shi‘ite “haven” in the

tenth century.91 The original Shi‘ite population of the city, Andrew Newman argues, were

Arab Shi‘ites speaking Persian, who moved to the city in the late eighth century and

converted its entire populace by the tenth century.92 It was also in this period that the

famous Twelver theologian al-Saffar al-Qummi (d. 903) compiled his Basa’ir al-darajat,

a collection of traditions dealing with issues of Twelver Shi‘ite theology, which has been

regarded as the first Twelver Shi‘ite propaganda text. The main goal of this liturgical

work was to portray the Imams as the sole possessors of knowledge, or ‘ilm, and instruct

every Muslim concerning his or her obligation to seek it.93

90
Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam, 68-70. Among these works were compilations of traditions and works
on the doctrine of the Twelve Imams and the ghayba, or occultation, of the hidden Imam. Moreover, apart
from the Buyids, several other petty Imami Shi‘ite dynasties formed in northern Iraq (the ‘Uqaylids of
Mosul), northern Syria (the Hamdanids of Aleppo), and on the Lebanese coast (the Principality of the Banu
‘Ammar). For further details see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. II (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977), 12-61.
91
Ibid., 38.
92
Ibid., 39.
93
For further details concerning this collection and its content, see Newman, The Formative Period of
Twelver Shi‘ism, 67-93.

44


V. Pro-Shi‘ite Efforts in the Medieval Middle East under Seljuk and Mongol Rule

Pro-Shi‘ite movements entered a new phase following the Mongol invasions of

the thirteenth century, taking advantage of the politically catastrophic but culturally and

religiously fluid post-invasion atmosphere to spread their influence into relatively large

territories. The immediate force of the Mongol invasions destroyed the Nizari fortress at

Alamut in 1256, creating a vacuum that facilitated the expansion of Twelver Shi‘ism by

eliminating one of the major strongholds of the Isma‘ili doctrine.94 Soon after, the

Mongols dealt a severe blow to the Sunni establishment, with the destruction of many

cities in the eastern Islamic world and, of course, the sack of Baghdad and the murder of

the Abbasid royal family in 1258. Judith Pfeiffer rightfully calls the period between the

Mongol invasions and the emergence of the Ottomans and Safavids as the two major

regional powers an era of “confessional ambiguity.”95 In this atmosphere, the boundaries

between Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam blurred to the extent that major Sufi orders incorporated

various aspects of once-conflicting sectarian narratives into cohesive doctrines.

Generally, as the core of the anti-Shi‘ite narrative lost its power and prestige,

Imami Shi‘ism gained momentum in the region. Contemporary sources, particularly

biographical dictionaries, show that the Imami Shi‘ite community grew significantly in

the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, especially in Greater Syria, Iran, and Anatolia.96

94
For a detailed discussion of Nizari Isma‘ilism of the Alamut period, see Daftary, The Isma‘ilis, 324-434.
95
Judith Pfeiffer, “Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization: Politics and the Negotiation of
Religious Boundaries in the Ilkhanate,” in Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th-
15th Century Tabriz, ed. Judith Pfeiffer (Leiden : Brill, 2014), 129-168.
96
Said Amir Arjomand, “Conceptions of Authority and the Transitions of Shi‘ism from Sectarian to
National Religion in Iran,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd
Madelung, eds. Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 391.

45


While the destruction of the major centers of Sunni political power enabled Imami

Shi‘ism to spread in the Middle East more rapidly than ever before, the post-Mongol era

rulers’ religious syncretism and occasional sympathy for Imami Shi‘ism created a milieu

in which Imami scholars produced and circulated many of the seminal works of the

Imami literary corpus. For instance, it was during this tumultuous period that Nasir al-

Din al-Tusi (d. 1274),97 still considered one of the most prominent Twelver Shi‘ite

scholars in history, and his student Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli (d. 1324), attached

themselves to the court of the Mongol Ilkhanids. With the emergence of these and other

Imami intellectual figures, Imami theology was definitively established, and the first

examples of Imami theology (ilm al-kalam), which were used in the following centuries

as the basis of establishing and disseminating the tenets of Shi‘ite Islam, were produced.

In this environment pro-Shi‘ite efforts expanded to target both the common

people and the ruling elite. As a primary example, the Ilkhanid sultan Muhammad

Khodabandeh, also known as Uljaytu (d. 1316), established Twelver Shi‘ism as the state

religion, albeit for a brief period, under the heavy influence of al-Mutahhar al-Hilli.98

Shi‘ite scholars and propagandists, following al-Hilli, pursued their efforts to convert

ruling dynasties to Imami Shi‘ism in the following decades. For a prominent example,

Imami Shi‘ite Sarbadari rule (1335-1405) in Sabzawar in what is now western

97
Al-Tusi, better known as an astronomer and ethical philosopher rather than as a religious thinker, held
significant positions at the Mongol court in Baghdad and the Nizari court in Alamut. Even though he was
implicated in the destruction of Nizari power at Alamut, several historians have argued that he actually
converted to Isma‘ili Shi‘ism prior to that event. For details, see Hamid Dabashi, “ The Philosopher/Vizier:
Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and the Isma‘ilis,” in Medieval Isma‘ili History and Thought, ed. Farhad
Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 233-234. Al-Tusi’s treatise Tajrid is regarded as
the first systematic treatise on Shi‘ite theology (kalam) and became an important part of the pro-Shi‘ite
propaganda corpus in the following centuries.
98
H. A. R. Gibb, Ibn Battuta A.D. 1325-1354, ed. and trans. C. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti (London:
Hakluyt Society, 1962), II: 304.

46


Afghanistan and Nishapur in northeastern Iran, led to a significant increase in Persian

works, commissioned particularly by Sultan Nizam al-Din Yahya Kurabi (r. 1352-1357),

who called upon Muslims and non-Muslims alike to find “the true path” shown by the

Twelve Imams.99 A similar attempt was carried out by the leading Imami scholar Ahmad

ibn Fahd al-Hilli (d.1457), who entered into a religious contest with Sunni scholars at the

court of Ispand, son of the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Qara Yusuf, governor of Iraq from 1433-

1445. He ultimately won them over, as the governor adopted Imami Shi‘ism as the

provincial state religion.100

Pro-Twelver movements and propagandists heavily altered the religious

configuration of medieval Anatolia, as well. Before the eleventh century, the peninsula

was inhabited primarily by Greek- and Armenian-speaking Christians, with many sub-

sectarian groups, as well as a relatively small Jewish population.101 After the eleventh

century, Islam penetrated the region as large waves of migrations from Central Asia and

Iran led to conversion of the locals in high numbers. Recent scholarship has revealed that

by the end of the thirteenth century, Imami Shi‘ism was already well-rooted in Anatolia

as a result of prominent missionary efforts and the spread of futuwwa organizations

permeated by Shi‘ite tenets.102 However, instead of direct propagation of any particular

99
Abbas Amanat, “Meadow of the Martyrs: Kashifi’s Persianization of the Shi‘i Martyrdom Narrative in
Late Timurid Herat,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honour of Wilferd Madelung,
eds. Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 252.
100
Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 64; Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 98-99.
101
Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization
from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 63-68.
102
Ocak lists the Kalenderis, Haydaris, and Yesevis, who collectively constituted a majority among the
Anatolian Turcomans, as the main examples of this phenomenon, though he considers the Yesevis an
Ismaili-influenced movement. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Babailer İsyanı (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1980), 52.
Futuwwa refers to socio-economic groups that coalesced around specific occupations and paid allegiance to
virtues such as nobility, generosity, and bravery. See Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, 396-
402. Also see EI2, s.v. “Futuwwa,” by Claude Cahen.

47


form of Shi‘ism, Anatolians tended to adhere to Shi‘ite-infused ahl al-bayt-ism, or

generalized Alid loyalty. In this milieu, many Sufi orders spreading through the region

pronounced their love for the ahl al-bayt and the Twelve Imams while still revering the

first three caliphs recognized by Sunnis. Moreover, many of the leaders of these Sufi

orders, some of which were crystallizing into social, financial, and, in some cases,

political institutions, claimed to be descendants of Ali. According to Jawbari, a

thirteenth-century Arab traveler to Anatolia, many inhabitants of the peninsula identified

themselves as reincarnations of Ali, an example of the belief in repeated reincarnation or

metempsychosis.103 Furthermore, the earliest copies of the Turkish translation of the Abu

Muslimname, a pro-Shi‘ite epic glorifying the Abbasid missionary Abu Muslim’s

struggle against the Umayyads, date to this era, underlining the presence of pro-Shi‘ite

tendencies among the inhabitants of the peninsula.104

Alid loyalty shaped the religious outlook of the peninsula more definitively than

in neighboring regions since these Alid Sufi orders were among the first to bring Islam to

the region.105 According to Speros Vryonis, the dervishes’ desire to convert local

Christians to Islam was the main reason for this syncretistic approach since it supposedly

made conversion easier by stressing Islamic equivalents to certain Christian practices and

saints.106 The tendencies of Sufi orders that spread in Anatolia during the post-Mongol

era seem to bear out Vryonis’ argument. The Khalwatiyya, a Sufi order that originated in

103
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 259.
104
For further details on Abu Muslimnames and their importance for pro-Shi‘ite propaganda in Anatolia,
see Chapter III.
105
While Claude Cahen called this situation the “Shi‘itization of Sunnism,” I prefer ahl al-bayt-ism or
confessional ambiguity. Claude Cahen, “Le problème du Shi‘isme dans l’Asie Mineure turque
préottomane,” in Le Shi‘isme imamate: Colloque de Strasbourg (6-9 Mai 1968) (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1970), 118.
106
Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, 358-359.

48


Azerbaijan in the thirteenth century and spread into Anatolia in the following century,

had strong Shi‘ite inclinations, as indicated by the institution of a twelve-day fast for the

Twelve Shi‘ite Imams.107 The contemporary Babai order, allegedly originating in

Khurasan, was more profoundly influenced by ghuluww and spread its teachings into

remote parts of the peninsula with a complex network of missionaries, one of whom was

Sheikh Edebali, the father-in-law of Osman Gazi, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty.108

Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, who wrote extensively about the Babai Revolt of the 1230s,

mentions the possibility of Isma‘ili influence on the Babai order and the use of Isma‘ili

methods to spread the order among the nomadic Turcomans, who contacted Isma‘ili da‘is

in their regular travels to northern Syria and northwestern Iran.109 According to Elvan

Çelebi, a fourteenth-century Anatolian chronicler, Babai disciples reached every corner

of Anatolia and converted large numbers into their order.110 With strong Shi‘ite

undertones, including elements of Mahdism, the Babai order became the foundation of

the later Bektashi order, which found a strong base in the Ottoman Janissary corps.

According to Ömer Lütfi Barkan, Babai propagandists helped the founders of the

Ottoman dynasty, Osman and Orhan, as well as the Qaramanids, to establish new

107
Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, 96-97. For further information on the Khalwatis, see John J.
Curry, The Transformation of Muslim Mystical Thought in the Ottoman Empire: The Rise of the Halveti
Order, 1350-1650 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).
108
Ocak, Babailer İsyanı, 162-164.
109
Ibid., 73-74.
110
Ibid., 59-160. Ocak, however, attributes the pervasiveness of pro-Shi‘ite tendencies in medieval
Anatolia to the dominance of shamanistic beliefs and, more importantly, to the inhabitants’ lack of
intelligence: “… Büyük bir çoğunluğu okuma yazmadan yoksun bu sade insanların kafa yapıları İslam
dininin yüksek birtakım inanç ve esaslarını ve abdest alarak günde beş vakit namaz kılmak gibi bir intizam
gerektiren dini ibadetlerini kavramaya musait değildi. Bu sebepledir ki çoğu zaten İslamiyetin inceliklerini
kavrayacak durumda olmayan cahil Türkmen babalarının hurafelerle karışık, kendilerine daha uygun
gelen tasavvufun basitlestirilmiş fikirleriyle yorumlanmış, müslümanlığı tercih ediyorlardı.” Ibid., 71-72.

49


political entities in northwestern and southern Anatolia, respectively.111 Similarly, the

Qalandariyya/Kalenderis, a Sufi order that began in Iran in the eleventh century with a

heavy emphasis on the Twelve Shi‘ite Imams, and the Hurufis, founded by a Twelver

Shi‘ite Sufi, Fadlallah Astarabadi (d. 1394) in Iran, quickly spread into Anatolia, attracted

large numbers of followers, and became one of the major components of Bektashism in

the following centuries.112

Spiritual life in medieval Anatolia was heavily influenced by scholars of the

Hanafi legal rite of Sunni Islam, many of whom were also Sufis. Furthermore, the

seeming indifference of the Mongol rulers to promoting Sunni Islam, the relative lack of

an influential class of ulama in medieval Anatolia, and the political fragmentation of the

peninsula among various principalities and/or powerful tribes following the Rum Seljuks’

fall in the first decade of the fourteenth century provided ample opportunities for pro-

Imami Shi‘ite tendencies and their enthusiastic adherents to spread Shi‘ite teachings.

Several historians date the expansion of Imami Shi‘ism among the Kurds of the peninsula

to the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, rather than to later Safavid missionary

efforts in the region.113 While, as the following chapters will demonstrate, Safavid efforts

to spread Twelver Shi‘ism among the Kurdish tribes of eastern and southeastern Anatolia

were quite successful, pre-Safavid Twelver Shi‘ite networks, particularly the Bektashis,

111
Ömer Lütfü Barkan, Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri (Istanbul: Hamle Yayınları, n.d.), 12-14. Uruç Bey,
Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 11, cited in Gülağ Öz, Özkaynaklarından Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Istanbul:
Can Yayınları, 1999), 182.
112
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 259.
113
According to Martin Van Bruinessen, “… a considerable part of the ancestors of the present Alevi Kurds
neither were Turcoman nor belonged to the followers of Shah Ismail, but rather were Kurdish- and Zaza-
speaking adherents of other syncretistic, ghulat-infused sects.” “‘Aslını İnkar Eden Haramzadedir!’ The
Debate on the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevis,” in Syncrenistic Religious Communities in the Near
East: Collected Papers of the International Symposium “Alevism in Turkey and Comparable Syncretistic
Religious Communities in the Near East in the Past and Present,” Berlin, 14-17 April 1995, eds. Kristina
Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, and Anke Otter-Beaujean (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 7.

50


were active among the Kurdish population, both urban and rural, by the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries.114

In his Ravzetu-s Safaviyya (1614-1626), Mirza Beg Junabadi,115 a chronicler at

the court of Shah Abbas I (r. 1587-1629), lists pre-Safavid Shi‘ite rulers and their

unsuccessful attempts to spread Imami Shi‘ism into large territories. After mentioning the

Abbasid caliph al-Mu‘tadid (r. 892-902), the Buyid ruler Ahmad (also known as Rukn al-

Dawla) (r. 935-976), the Ilkhanid ruler Uljaytu, the Timurid sultan Husayn Bayqara (r.

1469-1506) and their continuous failures to establish Imami Shi‘ite rule at their courts,

Junabadi states that Shah Ismail was the “first Alawi/Alevi” sultan who was able to

establish a long-lasting Shi‘ite empire to rule the world and was also able to get rid of

bid‘at (literally “innovations,” but here indicating Sunni Islam), which “had become

prevalent among the followers of the Prophet.”116 Even though some of these rulers’

adherence to Shi‘ite Islam is now a topic of debate, Junabadi was correct in mentioning

previous attempts to spread Imami Shi‘ism across large territories and establish it as a

state religion. As shown in this chapter, earlier pro-Imami efforts laid the groundwork for

groups such as the Safavids, as they implemented complex propaganda methods and

punitive actions developed by the Ismailis and Zaydis. By the end of the sixteenth

century, the Safavids were able to establish Imami Shi‘ite rule in Iran, as well as a large

follower base extending from Anatolia to Central Asia.

114
See Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Les Bektaši à la lumière des recensements ottomans (XVe-XVIe
siècles),” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 81 (1991): 21-79.
115
Junabadi’s main work has not been translated. Various manuscripts of his chronicle are preserved in
libraries in Iran (Malek Library, MS No.8327) and Turkey (Süleymaniye Library, MS Lala Ismail 00346).
For further details on this chronicler, see Chapter II.
116
Mirza Beg Junabadi, Ravzetu-s Safaviyya (1614-1626), ed. Mahmud Afshar Yazdee (Tehran: Gulam
Reza Tabatabaî Mecd, 1378/2000), 23-26 (hereafter Junabadi).

51


VI. Conclusion: A New Era Begins with the Safavids

Anthony Giddens asserts that religion results from both the “ideas and intentions

of individuals and from the institutions and circumstances that constrain and routinize the

world in which people act, often outside their full awareness.”117 Imami Shi‘ism followed

this pattern in its gradual spread from its inception in the eighth century through the

fourteenth century. While, as the following chapters will demonstrate, the Safavids

successfully disseminated Imami Shi‘ite doctrine, with heavy political undertones, across

vast territories through a variety of multifaceted methods, pro-Shi‘ite propaganda was not

unique to them. This introductory chapter has provided a survey of earlier pro-Shi‘ite

movements from the original schism in the Muslim community. The following chapters

will delve into the origins of the Safavids as a Sufi order that gradually crystallized into a

religio-political movement in the late medieval era; the meticulousness of the Safavid

propaganda efforts in this process; major factors determining Safavid success in early

modern Ottoman Anatolia; and the Ottomans’ wildly varying reactions to the formation

of Kızılbaş communities resulting from Safavid religio-political propaganda.

117
Robert W. Hefner, “World Building and the Rationality of Conversion,” in Conversion to Christianity:
Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993), 27. See also Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline
of a Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

52


 Chapter 2
The Origins, Establishment, and Shi‘itization of the Safaviyya Order and Its First
Followers in Ottoman Anatolia

I. Introduction

The story of how the Safaviyya family metamorphosed from a mystical order118

into a ruling state, and its subsequent rise to power in early modern Iran, has been the

subject of sustained interest among historians. Pro-Safavid chronicles and their followers,

up until the twentieth century, depicted the Safaviyya order as a Shi‘ite movement from

its inception in an attempt to portray Twelver Shi‘ite identity as the core of Iranian

civilization(s) in the Islamic era. This attitude stands in contrast to mainstream

scholarship, which defines the Shi‘itization of the order as a sudden, pragmatic change in

the mid-fifteenth century. In an attempt to repudiate this approach, both premodern anti-

Safavid scholarship and its modern-day exponents, who have dominated the field since

the 1930s, developed a new yet still problematic approach claiming that the founder and

the early leaders of the order were staunch Sunnis who rigorously adhered to the Shafi‘i

madhhab/mezhep, or school of Islamic law, until Sheikh Junayd (d. 1460), as the head of

the order, abruptly converted to Shi‘ite Islam. Thus, prominent historians of the Aq-

Qoyunlu, Ottoman, and modern Turkish states have focused on specific parts of primary

sources that justify their efforts to de-legitimize the Shi‘ite ideology of the Safavids, as

118
Several scholars have been recently critical about historians’ use of the term “order” due to the
“Christian baggage” that it insinuates. For a brief discussion on this topic, see Shahzad Bashir, Sufi Bodies,
Religion and Society in Medieval Islam, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 11-12.

53


well as post-Safavid Iranian governments, by stressing the allegedly fervent Sunni

background of the Safaviyya family.

While Junayd’s reign signifies a turning point in the transformation of the order, it

was certainly far from being so sharp or incontestable. An examination of pro- and anti-

Safavid chronicles, as well as various European accounts, points to a religiously and

culturally syncretistic milieu in Anatolia and Iran during the fourteenth and much of the

fifteenth century, when confessional identities at the public level were not as well-defined

as they would be in the following centuries.119 Depicting a clear bifurcation between

“Sunni” and “Shi‘ite” during this period not only overlooks the period-specific socio-

political and religious dynamics of the region, but also reinforces an essentialist stance

concerning the origins and rise of the Savafiyya order.120 A strict “border” between Sunni

119
This does not necessarily mean that every resident of the region observed a syncretistic version of Islam.
This period was also marked by intense religious controversies and polarizing theological works authored
by both Sunni and Shi’ite scholars. Moreover, isolated instances of violence, usually instigated by the
people in power (i.e., local governors, religious authorities, or tribal leaders), also erupted between
members of the two sects. For instance, the famous traveler Ibn Battuta (d.1368/9), who visited Isfahan in
1326, describes its beauty but states “… but nowadays most of it lies in ruins as a result of the fitna [civil
war] between the Sunnis and Rafidis [Shi‘ites]. The fighting is still going on among them.” H.A.R. Gibb,
trans., The Travels of Ibn Battuta (London: Hakluyt Society, Syndics of the Cambridge University Press,
1956), II, 294-295. Contemporary historian ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Ali Qashani (d. 1335) reports a similar incident
for the year 1302, when an “Alawi” was murdered and burned while he was performing his prayer by local
Sunnis because he once asserted that “performing my prayer behind this [Sunni] imam is illicit for me.”
‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Ali Qashani, Tarikh-i Uljaytu: Tārīkh-i Padshah-i Saʻid Ghiyas al-Dunya va al-Din Uljaytu
Sultan Muḥammad Tayyib Allah marqadahu, ed. Mahn Hambali (Tehran: Intisharat-i Bungah-i Tarjumah
va Nashr-i Kitab, 1969), 90-91. For further details on medieval Anatolia and Iran, see Judith Pfeiffer, ed.,
Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th-15th Century Tabriz (Leiden and Boston:
Brill, 2014); A. C. S. Peacock and Sara Nur Yıldız, eds., The Seljuks of Anatolia: Court and Society in the
Medieval Middle East (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Vladimir Minorsky, Medieval Iran and
Its Neighbors (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982); Maria Subtelny, Timurids in Transition: Turco-Persian
Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran (Leiden: Brill, 2007); David Morgan, Medieval Persia, 1040-
1797 (London: Longman, 1988); and Aptin Khanbaghi, The Fire, the Star, and the Cross: Minority
Religions in Medieval and Early Modern Iran (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
120
While a group of historians stress the confessional fluidity of the era, with the Mongol rulers’ lack of
confessional zeal before and after they converted to Islam (with some exceptions), other historians draw
attention to the lack of strong political powers, and thus hiearachies, to explain this phenomenon. For the
first group of historians, see Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011). For the second group of historians, see Judith Pfeiffer, “Confessional

54


and Shi‘ite Islam in the region was in fact a latter-day product of the conflict between the

Ottomans and the Safavids. In contrast, the co-existence of various religious beliefs and a

relative reciprocal tolerance were among the main features of the late medieval/early

modern era before and during the advent of the Safaviyya order and its transformation

into a significant religious/political actor in the region. Therefore, claiming a deep-rooted

Sunni background for the Safaviyya order is as dubious as attributing to it a long Shi‘ite

past. Both of these arguments have repeatedly been articulated to serve later pro- and

anti-Safavid political and/or religious agendas. For instance, from the pro-Safavid

perspective, the consolidation of Shi‘ite power in greater Iran created a long history of

Shi‘ism for the ruling family; by the same token, religious discrepancies between the

earlier and later leaders of the Safaviyya family facilitated the attempts of anti-Safavid

authors to discredit the increasing power of the Shi‘ite Safavids, as well as their

successors in the region.121

As opposed to these politically driven explanations and anachronistic distortions,

I argue that the division between Sunni and Shi‘ite Islam in late medieval/early modern

Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization: Politics and the Negotiation of Religious Boundaries in the
Ilkhanate,” in Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge, 129-168.
121
Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji (d. 1519), whose well-known anti-Safavid feelings influenced many
scholars and political actors in the following centuries, emphasizes this “ill-intended transformation” of the
order from its strict Sunni (and therefore righteous) roots into a heresy under the name of Shi‘ite Islam. He,
for instance, states, “Indeed Haydar [Shah Ismail’s father] belonged to the family of venerable shaykhs, for
Ardabil was a refuge of sanctity and the place of circumambulation of the righteous. The first who raised
the ensign of excellence in this family [the Safavids] was the unique of the world Shaykh Safi al-Din Ishaq
[the eponymous founder of the order, who] finished his days in Ardabil, … and great men of Rum
honoured him.” He, however, makes a distinct separation between the early founders and the later sheikhs
(i.e. the Shi‘ite ones) and adds that “then the boon of succession reached Junayd; he altered the way of life
of his ancestors.” Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, Tarikh-i ‘Alam-ara-yi Amini, trans. Vladimir Minorsky
(London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1957), 62-63 (hereafter Khunji). For later examples of this approach, see
Mehmet Saray, Türk-İran İlişkileri (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk
Araştırma Merkezi, 1999); Shams ad-Din Parwizi, Kitab-e tadkirat al-awliyaʼ (Tabriz: Chapkhane-i Ridai,
1953).

55


Iran and Anatolia was not definitive and binary,122 though the schism ultimately became

the defining characteristic of the religious athmosphere by the late fifteenth century.

More specifically, the transformation of the Safaviyya order respresented a gradual

crystallization of a non-sectarian mystical order into a Shi‘ite political entity as a product

of specific socio-political and religious dynamics of the “age of confessionalization.”

Apart from a few exceptions, historians, most of whom are the products of a rigidly

sectarian worldview, have placed the founders of the order within the borders of an

uncompromising madhhab/mezhep, either Sunni or Shi‘ite,123 while depicting a clear-cut

transformation from a mystical order into a military movement that happened

“overnight.”124 A new approach is, therefore, needed to connect this era to recent

studies125 that emphasize continuities instead of ruptures in the religiosity of the late

medieval/early modern Islamic period.126 Examining the origins of the Safaviyya order,

122
Claude Cahen cogently argues the non-sectarian nature of the era for the Asia Minor in his well-known
book The Formation of Turkey: The Seljukid Sultanate of Rūm: Eleventh to Fourteenth Century, trans. and
ed. P. M. Holt (London and New York: Longman, 2001), 165.
123
For examples, see Mirza Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” Belleten 40, No. 158 (April 1976): 287-
329; Ahmad Kasrawi, Shaykh Safî va Tabarash (Tehran: n.p., 1976); Michael Mazzaoui, The Origins of the
Safawids (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972).
124
“Overnight they [the Safavids] have become gazis fighting the unbelievers along the Muslim frontiers of
the north.” Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 74.
125
Rıza Yıldırım, “Sunni Orthodoxy vs. Shi‘ite Heteredoxy?: A Reappraisal of Islamic Piety in Medieval
Anatolia,” in Islam and Christianity in Medieval Anatolia, eds. A. C. S. Peacock, Bruno De Nicola and
Sara Nur Yıldız (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2015), 287-307; Derin Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize
Ottoman Sunnitization: A Historiographical Discussion,” in Turcica 44 (2012-2013): 301-338; eadem.
“Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,”; Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The
Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Tijana Kristić,
Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).
126
A similar approach has been taken to examine the career of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi (d. 1273) and the
birth of the Mawlawi/Mevlevi order, as well as Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (d. 1271) and Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-
Tusi (d. 1274). Even though they have been historically framed within strict Sunni and/or Shi‘ite sectarian
narratives, recent studies suggest a less sectarian nature for their belief structure than what later historians
assumed. For further details on Rumi’s Sufism and his relations with Shi‘ite Islam, see Annemarie
Schimmel, The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalāloddin Rumi (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1993); eadem, Deciphering the Signs of God: A Phenomenological Approach to Islam
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Fatemeh Keshavarz, Reading Mystical Lyric:

56


as well as its leaders up until the sixteenth century, from this angle is crucial to

understanding not only the contemporary socio-political and religious characteristics of

the era and their influence on this process, but also the spread of Safaviyya doctrine

among Anatolians “like wild fire” in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

II. Sheikh Safi ad-Din (d. 1334), Establishment of the Order, and Discussions of the
Safavid Family’s Lineage and Religious Background

The exact date of the establishment of the Safaviyya order and the circumstances

surrounding its foundation are difficult to pinpoint due to the scarcity of written material

from this period and the distorted border between the historical facts and the pietistic

legends of later pro- and anti-Safavid ideologists. With the exception of Saffetu’s-Safa,

written by Ibn Bazzaz (d. 1391/2), a devout follower of the order, around 1356/7, there

are no surviving sources composed by either the sheikhs or the followers of the order

during its infancy.127 Safavid chronicles authored during or after Shah Ismail’s reign

The Case of Jalal al-Din Rumi (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998); Wheeler M.
Thackston, Signs of the Unseen: The Discourses of Jalaluddin Rumi (Putney, VT: Threshold Books, 1994).
For further details on Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli’s Sufism and its place in the religious fluidity of medieval
Anatolia, see Yıldırım, “Sunni Orthodoxy vs. Shi‘ite Heteredoxy?” 295-296. For futher details on Tusi’s
religious identity(ies), see Hamid Dabashi, “The Philosopher/Vizier: Khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and the
Isma‘ilis,” in Medieval Isma‘ili History and Thought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 231-245.
127
The original copy of Saffetu’s-Safa is lost, and the earliest known copy, dated 1485, is held at the
University of Leiden. Even though Mirza Abbaslı, in his well-known article, mentions that he had access to
the author’s copy on microfilm, he does not give any further information about the location of the
manuscript. Abbaslı, “Safevîlerin Kökenine Dair,” 289. However, the fourth chapter of Saffetu’s-Safa was
translated into Ottoman Turkish a year after it was written, in 1358, and this copy is preserved at the
Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul as Terceme-i Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Safî (MS Kemankeş 247) (hereafter
Kemankeş). It is transliterated and edited by Sönmez Kutlu and Nizamettin Parlak as Makālāt: Şeyh Safı
Buyruğu (Istanbul: Horasan Yayınları, 2008). In 1995 Ghulam Riza Tabataba’i Majd published a new
edition originating from a lithograph copy of Saffetu’s-Safa that appeared in Bombay in 1911. There are
various other publications based on individual chapters of Saffetu’s-Safa, including Halat-u Makamat-u
Keramat-i Sheikh Safi al-Din Ishak-e Ardabili (Shiraz: n.p., 1973) and Heidi Zirke’s Ein agiographisches
Zeugnis zur persischen Geschichte aus der Mittel des 14. Jahrhunderts: Das achte Kapitel des Safwat as-
safa in kritischer Bearbeitung (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987). Two complete copies of the book

57


(1499-1524), collectively using Saffetu‘s-Safa as their main reference point,128 praise

Sheikh Safi, the eponymous founder of the order, as a respected Shi‘ite seyyid, a

descendant of Prophet Muhammad through Fatima and Ali.129 This connection to the

Prophet’s family, according to the chroniclers, was the only true sign of being the rightful

ruler of the ummah, or the Muslim community.130 The seyyidhood of the Safaviyya

dated 1490 and 1509 are also located at the Süleymaniye Library (MS Ayasofya 3099 and MS Ayasofya
2123). Aside from these earlier copies, there are numerous Persian and Turkish copies written after the
establishment of the Safavid state and held in various public libraries and private collections in Turkey,
Iran, India, and England. For a list and a short discussion on various available copies of the book, see
Michel M. Mazzaoui, “A ‘New’ Edition of the Safvat al-Safā,” in History and Historiography of Post-
Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East: Studies in Honor of John E. Woods, eds. Judith Pfeiffer, Sholeh
A. Quinn, and Ernest Tucker (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006): 303-310. On the other hand,
historians have recently pointed out a few manuscipts allegedly written by Sheikh Safi, such as Mesnevi
Şerhi (Turkish), Kara Mecmua (Turkish), Fanâ (Persian), Silat al-faqīh (Arabic), and Maqāmāt wa-l-
maqālāt (Arabic). The main source for this argument is a seventeenth-century Safavid chronicle, Efzalu’t-
Tevârîh, that provides specific information about some of these works. The authenticity of these literary
works, however, is still an ongoing debate among historians since information about their author is
quitescarce and sporadic. For further details, see Kutlu and Parlak, Makalat, 22-33 and A. H. Morton, “The
Early Years of Shah Isma‘il in the Afzal al-tavarikh and Elsewhere,” in Safavid Persia: The History and
Politics of an Islamic Society, ed. Charles Melville (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 30-32.
128
Saffetus’s-Safa consists of an introduction and twelve chapters, which might not be an arbitrary number
due to the importance of the number twelve for Shi‘ites or the sympathizers of ahl al-bayt. Most of the
chapters are devoted to Sheikh Safi’s biography and the miracles that he performed. Despite radical
differences among various copies, the edition compiled by Ahmad Kasravi (d. 1945), a prominent historian
and linguist of Pahlavi-era Iran, is still the only critical edition of Saffetus’s-Safa. This edition was
published in 1944 as a revision of his earlier articles from the 1920s and 1930s. His important work, which
has been unfortunately overlooked by many historians, examines various copies of Saffetu’s-Safa, dating to
as early as the late fourteenth century, in terms of Sheikh Safi’s religious and genealogical background.
Kutlu and Parlak’s work on the fourth chapter of Saffetu’s-Safa, Makālāt: Şeyh Safı Buyruğu, cannot be
categorized as a ciritical edition of the chapter since the editors merely compare various manuscripts
without providing a thorough discussion of possible explanations for differences among them.
129
“It is obvious for wise minds that Shah Ismail’s genealogy goes back to Sheikh Safi and through him to
the seventh Imam [Musa ibn Ja‘far al-Kazim].” (All translations are mine unless otherwise mentioned.)
Mirza Beg Junabadi, Ravzetu-s Safaviyya (1614-1626), ed. Mahmud Afshar Yazdee (Tehran: Gulam Reza
Tabatabaî Mecd, 1378/2000), 67-69 (hereafter Junabadi). Junabadi (d. 1626) was a significant chronicler at
the court of Shah Abbas I (r. 1587-1629), and his main work has not been translated. Various manuscripts
of his chronicle are preserved in libraries in Iran (Malek Library, No.8327) and Turkey (Süleymaniye
Library, MS Lala Ismail 00346).
130
Junabadi, 59, 67-68. Several court historians of the Safavid Empire even extended this genealogy to
Adam, who, according to the creation myths of all Abrahamic religions, was the first man. For examples,
see Eskandar Beg Monshi, Tārīkh-e ‘Ālamārā-ye ‘Abbāsī (1616-1629), trans. and ed. Roger M. Savory as
History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978) (hereafter Monshi). The idea of
descent from a significant religious figure by no means began with the Safavids. The privileges and
immunities accorded to descendants of important historical figures were attributed by court historians to
many rulers, including the pre-Islamic Turkic dynasties; the ancient Roman, Byzantine, and Chinese
emperors; African kings, and the Timurids, Aq-Qoyunlus, and Ottomans. Such claims were intended as

58


family, as well as its deep-rooted and narrowly defined Shi‘ite background, however, was

a carefully tailored and monitored post-facto fabrication of the original work of Ibn

Bazzaz, which depicted a distinctly different picture regarding Sheikh Safi and his

religious and genealogical attributes. A meticulous examination of the few available

contemporary sources131 reveals that Sheikh Safi was a prime example of what Judith

Pfeiffer calls “confessional ambiguity.”132 As a Sufi dervish with no clear (or conflicting)

sectarian inclinations, he incorporated both Sunni and Shi‘ite tenets into his interpration

of Islam. The Ottoman Turkish translation of Saffetu’s-Safa’s fourth chapter (1358), as

the earliest known partial copy of the book, provides us with a clear picture not only of

the founder of the order, but also of the era.133 Throughout the book, Sheikh Safi

mentions his reverence for the first three Sunni caliphs, as well as the founders of the

mainstream schools of Sunni law, even though in other parts of the book, he uses

noticeable Shi‘ite jargon, such as the term aʼimmah-ye ma‘sumin, or the infallible or

immaculate Imams, a key concept of Shi‘ite doctrine that conflicts with mainstream

Sunni theology.134

propaganda glorifying a royal patron by trumpeting the antiquity and nobility of his ancestry. These descent
lines included mythical and fantastic figures, such as the she-wolf of the pre-Islamic Turkish ethnogenic
myth, which is still disseminated by nationalist groups in modern Turkey. For the Safavid dynasty, on the
other hand, the Prophetic genealogy was a plausible effort considering its geopolitical and religious rivals,
the well-established Sunni Ottomans to the West and the Sunni Uzbeks to the East.
131
The post-Mongol, pre-Timurid period of Iranian history left remarkably few written sources. While
there cannot be one single reason for the lack of authorship in the era, absence of a strong central political
authority and the intermittent struggles among various local dynasties can be given as possible
explanations. Information about this tempestuous period, therefore, is usually obtained from later
chronicles, geographical histories, hagiographical works, and/or Euroean accounts. For several examples of
geographical histories of the era, see Michel M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 16, n. 4. For
several examples of hagiographical works of the era, see John Renard, ed., Tales of God’s Friends: Islamic
Hagiography in Translation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009).
132
Pfeiffer, “Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization,” 129-133.
133
Kemankeş, 1a-1b.
134
Kemankeş, 17b-18b. Here Sheikh Safi is reported to narrate a story in which a king leaves his will to his
trusted vizier and tells him that whenever his sons reach puberty, he should select the best one to be the

59


 On the other hand, a rather famous part of the book, in which Sheikh Safi’s son,

Sadr al-Din Musa (d. 1391), asks his father about his religion, is narrated in radically

different ways in various manuscripts from different periods, leading later historians to

come up with various and conflicting hypotheses concerning his madhhab.135

Manuscripts prepared during or after Shah Ismail’s reign narrate his answer as “I follow

the madhhab of someone of whom the Prophet said, ‘You are for me like Harun for

Musa’ and we are the friends of Ali and his family, and enemy of his enemies and we

love the Imams,”136 which was seen as a direct statement of his Shi‘ite identity.

According to manuscripts of the mid- to late fifteenth century, in contrast, his answer was

“[I am the] follower of the madhhab-i sahabe (companions of the Prophet Muhammad)

and I choose strict parts of all madhhabs and practice them.”137 This version, with the

help of several contemporary sources,138 has been used to reinforce the idea that Sheikh

Safi was a Sunni scholar adhering to the Shafi‘i madhhab/mezhep.139

sultan and should give the sultan’s money and property to the others. The vizier keeps the will for years,
until the oldest son comes of age. This son, however, blames the vizier for manipulating the will and
acquires both the title of sultan and his father’s wealth, leaving nothing to his younger brothers. Ibn Bezzaz
explains that “here the sultan represents God, the vizier represents the twelve infallible Imams, and the will
represents the Qur’an.” For further details on the notion of infallibility, or ‘ismah, in Shi‘ite Islam, see
Farhad Daftary, A History of Shi‘i Islam (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), and Kemal Faruki,
“Tawhīd and the Doctrine of ‘Ismah,” Islamic Studies Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1965): 31-43.
135
Kasravi, Shayh Safi va Tabarash, 8-15.
136
Ibid., 12.
137
Ibid., 11.
138
For instance, Hamd-Allah Mostawfi al-Qazvini’s (d. 1344), Nuzhat al-Qolūb, which is only partially
translated into English by Guy Le Strange as The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulūb (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1915), states that most of the people of Ardabil were Shafi‘is and followers of Sheikh Safi. Guy Le
Strange, The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulūb, 83-84. For other contemporary sources, see
Rashid ad-Din Hamadani’s (d. 1318) Jami‘ al-tawārīkh, which was translated into Turkish by Zeki Velidi
Togan as Oğuz Destanı: Reşideddin Oğuznamesi, Tercüme ve Tahlili (Istanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1972); and
Hamd-Allah Mostawfi al-Qazvini’s (d. 1344) Tarekh-e Gozideh, ed. Abd al-Husayn Nava‘i (Tehran:
Zarrin, 1989).
139
For examples, see Abbaslı, “Safavilerin Kökenine Dair;” Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids. In a
parallel fashion, but this time for late medieval Anatolia, Claude Cahen and Rıza Yıldırım argue that the
main interpration of Islam and its practice among the inhabitants of the region should be positioned within
the boundaries of the Sunni madhhabs/mezheps, even though profound symphaty for the ahl al-bayt was an

60


 Sheikh Safi’s confessionally fluid and heterogeneous doctrine as the founder of

the order quite likely attracted both Sunni and Shi‘ite sympathizers, as well as

nonsectarian Sufis, to become his followers.140 The earlier versions of Saffetu’s-Safa, as

well as various other contemporary sources, describe the order’s congregation as a

“nonsectarian” community rather than a shari‘a- centered assembly defined by strict

sectarian beliefs and values. For instance, Hamadani, a self-claimed devotee of Sheikh

Safi, does not use either Sunni or Shi‘ite descriptive words to explain his love for and

devotion to his master and the order.141 Interestingly, mainstream historians have

interpreted Hamadani’s self-consciously non-sectarian descriptions of Sheikh Safi and his

order as indicative of the Sunni nature of the movement, rather than as a sign of potential

confessional plurality and of the dynamism of the era. In contrast, pro-Shi‘ite scholars

have explained this orthodox explanation as a common Shi‘ite practice of the time,

referred to as taqiyya, or religious dissimulation under hostile rule.142

While the earliest available primary sources from the fourteenth century leave

room for further discussions concerning the sectarian roots of Sheikh Safi, the very same

sources give a clear narrative about his lack of ancestral connections to the Prophet’s

family. Earlier copies of Saffetu’s-Safa specifically mention Sheikh Safi’s grandfather as

integral part of the religious discourse of the time. Claude Cahen, “Le problem du Shi‘isme dans l’Asie
Mineure turque préottomane,” in Le Shî‘sme imâmite: Colloque de Strasbourg (6-9 Mai 1968), eds. R.
Brunschvig and T. Fahd (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 115-129; Yıldırım, “Sunni
Orthodox vs. Shi‘ite Heterodox?” 301.
140
Abbaslı, for instance, argues that even the original version of Saffetu’s-Safa mentiones that Sheikh Safi
had followers among Shi‘ites, particularly the Ismailis.
141
Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, 266-272, cited in Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 300-301. For other
examples, see Hamd- Allah Mostawfi’s Tarekh-e Gozideh (1330) and Rashid ad-Din’s Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh
(1307-1316).
142
On taqiyya, see Etan Kohlberg, “Some Imami-Shiʿi Views on Taqiyya,” Journal of the American
Oriental Society 95, No. 3 (1975): 395-402; idem, “Taqiyya in Shiʻi Theology and Religion,” in Secrecy
and Concealment: Studies in the History of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions, eds. Hans G.
Kippenberg and Guy G. Stroumsa (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), 345-360.

61


someone who “wore the white turban,” as opposed to the black one worn by the

seyyids.143 Furthermore, the original copy to which Abbaslı claims to have access, as well

as later copies, gives Sheikh Safi’s maternal grandfather’s name as Omar and his paternal

grandfather’s name as Abu Bakr, the names of the first two caliphs recognized by Sunnis;

seyyids historically refrained from using these names for their sons.144 In contrast, later

pro-Safavid chroniclers either deleted or replaced these names with less politically

charged ones to promote a consistent narrative of the Shi‘ite background of the family.

The facts of Sheikh Safiyuddin’s early life, in contrast to his lineage and religious

background, are more or less clear. He was born in 1252 in Ardabil in northwestern Iran

at the pinnacle of Mongol Ilkhanid power as the fifth and youngest son of a respected

family.145 Even though he is considered the founder of the order, primary sources

143
Kasravi, Shayh Safi va Tabarash, 13-14. Interestingly enough, Mahmud ibn Khvand Mir, the son of
famous historian Ghiyās al-Dīn ibn Humām al-Dīn Khvānd Mīr (known as Khwandamir), in his Tarikh-e
Jengname-ye Shah Ismail va Shah Tahmasb (1548) (hereafter Ibn Khwandamir), questions Sheikh Safi’s
relation to the ahl al-bayt, as well. The author, right before beginning the section on Sheikh Safi’s life and
accomplishments, concedes that there are plenty of unknowns concerning the period preceding Sheikh Safi
and he is therefore not comfortable writing about it. He continues, “I [therefore] preferred to omit that part
of the history of the Safavids.” Ibn Khwandamir, 8a.
144
Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 290-297; Mazzoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 51, n. 1. For
further details on the seyyidhood of the Safaviyya family, see Vladimir Minorsky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi on
the Safavids,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 20, No.1 (1957): 439; idem, Tadhkirat
al-Mulūk: A Manual of Safavid Administration (London: E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, 1943; reprinted
1980), 125; Walther Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd: XV. Yüzyılda İran’ın Millî Bir Devlet Haline
Yükselişi, trans. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), 15; Jean Aubin, “Études
Safavides I: Šah Ismail et les notables de l’Iraq persan,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient 2, No.1 (1959): 9. Moreover, close examination of the earlier copies of Saffetu‘s-Safa allows us to
refute the widely-accepted argument that the fabricated parts concerning Sheikh Safi’s religious and
genealogical backround were inserted into the text by Abu’l-Fath al-Ḥusayni, who revised Saffetu’s-Safa at
the order of the Safavid shah Tahmasp I (d.1576). For an example, see C. A. Storey, Persian Literature: A
Bio-biographical Survey (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1970), Vol. I, Nos. 1-2. Manipulation of the
original text goes back as early as Sheikh Junayd (d. 1460), whose leadership marked the high point of
Shi‘itization of the order, and it is possible that he started the manipulation and alteration of Ibn Bezzaz’s
Saffetu’s-Safa to strengthen the process of Shi‘itization.
145
The surrounding area was under the control of a local family, the Shirwan Shahs, some of whose
members spread their influence and controlled cities, including Ardabil. The geographical location and
importance of Ardabil (and Tabriz as the capital of the Azerbaijan province) in late medieval/early modern
Iran, and the Middle East in general, is crucial to understanding certain peculiarities of the era during which

62


mention his grandfather Sheikh Salih, his father Jebrail, and his brother Sheikh Salah ad-

Din Rashid as prominent religious figures of their time, or people who “devoted their

lives to pious worshipping.”146 While Kasravi argues that the Safavids were indigenous

inhabitants of Iran (i.e., Indo-European rather than Turkic),147 various early editions of

Saffetu’s-Safa call Sheikh Safiyuddin “Pîr-i Turk,” or “Master/Guide of the Turks.”148

Later scholars, on the other hand, postulate various other possibilities for the family’s

ethnic and linguistic background, including Arab and Kurdish.149

the Safaviyya order originated. The entire region began to assume an increasing role, both financially and
politically, after the collapse of Baghdad in 1258. The importance of Ardabil, Mazzaoui argues, lies in its
proximity to the Caspian Sea and its control over the Talish/Gilan region in the coastal plain. Mazzoui, The
Origins of the Safavids, 44. In addition to being a vibrant market for a wide variety of merchandise, the
region was known for its religious diversity. For a contemporary source, see Marco Polo, The Description
of the World, eds. A. C. Moulé and Paul Pelliot (London: Routledge, 1938). He says, for instance, “For
many Christians of every sect may be there, there are Armenians, Nestorians, and Jacobites, and Giorgiens
[sic], and Persians, and there are also men who worship Mahomet; and these are the common people of the
city, who are called Taurisin, and they have different speech among them.” Marco Polo, The Description of
the World, 104.
146
For his grandfather, see Khwandamir, Habibu’s-Siyar, Tome Three: The Reign of the Mongol and the
Turk, Part Two: Shahrukh Mirza – Shah Ismail, ed. and trans. W. M. Thackston (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994), 554-555 (hereafter Khwandamir); for his father, see Khwandamir, 412-413; for his
brother, see Junabadi, 71-72.
147
According to Kasravi, the language that Shah Ismail used was different from his ancestor Sheikh Safi’s
language, which was Azari. Kasravi, who himself was an Azari, did not consider Azari a Turkic language
and argued that the Turkification of the language of the dynasty happened sometime between Sheikh Safi
and Ismail and it was not a part of the original family background. Kasravi, Shayh Safi va Tabarash, 4. His
theory, however, was refuted by various later historians, who argued that what Kasravi calls Azari was
basically a local dialect called Gilani, or Gilaki, and Sheikh Safi composed several poems in this language
when he was in Gilan, a city south of Ardabil.
148
Saffetu’s-Safa, ed. Gulam Reza Tabatabai Mecd (Tehran: n.p., 1994), 100, 105. Riza Nur, a famous
Turkish historian of the early Republican era, and David Ayalon (d. 1998), an historian of the Mamluk
Sultanate, also firmly believed that the Safavids were ethnically Turkish due to the fact that Shah Ismail
spoke Turkish and their main supporters were Turcoman tribes from eastern Anatolia and Northwestern
Iran. Rıza Nur, Türk Tarihi (Istanbul: Maarif Vekaleti, 1923) Vol V, 114; David Ayalon, Gunpowder and
Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom (London: Frank Cass, 1956), 109.
149
For instance, Hinz underlines the alleged migration of Feyruz/Firoz Shah, who was Sheikh Safi’s great-
grandfather, to Azerbaijan from Yemen as an indication of the Arab origin of the family. Walter Hinz,
Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 5-6. For further details on Feyruz/Firoz Shah, see Khwandamir, 555. On the
other hand, Roger Savory argues that the Safavids moved to northwestern Iran from Iranian Kurdistan in
the eleventh century when the Kurdish Prince Mamlan conquered the region. Roger Savory, Iran under the
Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2. Junabadi, while not mentioning any Kurdish
background for Sheikh Safi, asserts that Sheikh Zahed-i Gilani, whose daughter married Sheikh Safi,
descended from Sheikh Bendar al-Kurdi from Sinjar. Junabadi, 73. One can see this as an indication of the
Kurdish background of the family, at least after Sheikh Safi.

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 Safavid chronicles begin their narrations of the origins of the Safavids with Safi,

who “was burning with the love of God” even at a young age and was known for his

inquisitive nature.150 He was not only wise and fluent in six languages,151 but also showed

signs of “blessedness” as the ancestor of a dynasty that would rule the “entire time and

place.”152 The main indication of his “sanctified blood” was the recurring dreams that he

had from his childhood, where the sun shone down on him when he was either sitting on

the dome of the congregational mosque in Ardabil or on top of a mountain with a sword

and a sable crown.153 His mother, Devlet Khanum, interpreted these roya-ye siddiqa, or

righteous dreams, to signify that “very soon from the sign of your shining nature,

leadership will shine to such an extent that all of the world will be affected by the light

and there will not be any place that will not hear of it.”154 These types of dreams and

dream narratives function at the historical level; their target is often public rather than

150
Junabadi 70.
151
Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 325, ft. 128. Abbaslı, from examining various contemporary
sources, argues that Sheikh Safi was fluent in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Mongolian, Kurdish, and Gilani.
152
Junabadi 71; Ibn Khwandamir, 9a-9b.
153
“He said to himself, ‘You are the son of a sheikh. What are you doing with a sword and a crown?’
Junabadi, 71; Ibn Khwandamir, 9b; Khwandamir, 556-557. Roger Savory also mentions that from his
childhood, Sheikh Safi experienced visions of angels in the form of birds that communicated with him, as
well as dervishes approaching him to tell him about his bright future as the focus of the hopes of the world.
Savory, Iran Under the Safavids, 5.
154
Junabadi 70-71. Ibn Khwandamir narrates this story in a very similar fashion in his chronicle written
around seventy years before Junabadi’s account. Ibn Khwandamir, 10a-10b. This dream narrative is quite
interesting considering the fact that the foundation myth of the Safavid’s main rival, the Ottomans, is a
similar dream that Osman, the founder of the empire, had at a young age. The dream was interpreted in a
similar fashion by his spiritual leader and father-in-law, signaling Osman’s future as the ruler of long-
lasting empire. For further details on Osman’s dream, as well as the origins of the Ottoman Empire, see
Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede b. Lütfullah, Camiü‘d-Düvel (Sahaifül-ahbar fî vekayiül-a‘sâr), trans. İsmail
Erünsal (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi Yayınları, 1974) (hereafter Müneccimbaşı I); Caroline Finkel,
Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Colin Imber, The
Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power (New York: Palgrave, 2009); Cemal Kafadar,
Between Two Worlds.

64


private, to express the envisioned and inevitable course of the events and their

sacredness.155

In 1276/7, before establishing his own order, Sheikh Safi became a murid, or

disciple, of Sheikh Zahed-i Gilani, one of the most influential and highly favored

Khalwati/Halveti sheikhs of the Ilkhanid period in Iran (1256-1335).156 In a short time,

Sheikh Safi attracted his murshid’s, or spiritual leader’s, attention with his passion for

religious knowledge and aptitude, to the point that he not only married his daughter Bibi

Fatima to Sheikh Safi, but also appointed him his successor as leader of the order.157

Shortly afterward, Sheikh Zahid asked Sheikh Safi not only to leave Gilan to “remove the

rust of ignorance from the hearts of people with his advice and friendship,” but also to

assign halifes, or missionaries, to fulfill the same obligation in other regions.158

155
For further details on dream narratives in Islamic historical writing, see Özgen Felek and Alexander D.
Knysh, eds., Dreams and Visions in Islamic Societies (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).
156
Junabadi, 71-72. Junabadi and Khwandamir assert that before becoming a follower of Sheikh Zahid-i
Gilani, Safi joined various other orders and had conversations with renowned dervishes and literary men
including Ruzbihan Baqli (d. 1209) and Sa‘di Shirazi (d. 1291) for guidance. However, he “could not find
the spriritual fulfillment” that he was seeking with any of them (Junabadi, 72; Ibn Khwandamir, 10a-10b),
“because he considered himself superior to them all” (Khwandamir, 557). It is worh mentioning that his
encounter with Baqli is an anachronistic mistake since Baqli died in 1209, well before Sheikh Safi was
born. One can, however, speculate that this is an example of manipulation of the origin narrative of the
Safavids to attribute even more significance to Sheikh Safi through his personal relationships with
prominent people of his period. For further information on the Khalwatiyya/Halveti order, see Alexander
Knysh, Islamic Mysticism: A Short History (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Nathalie Clayer, Mystiques, état et société:
Les Halvetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XVe siècle à nos jours (Leiden: Brill, 1994); and John J.
Curry, The Transformation of Muslim Mystical Thought in the Ottoman Empire: The Rise of the Halveti
Order, 1350-1650 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).
157
Junabadi, 74-75. Gilani’s decision caused some “jealousy” among his followers, who argued that the
position of Grand Master should belong to Gilani’s biological son, not to an outsider. After carefully
listening to his murids, Gilani called both his son and Safi, but his son never showed up even though he
lived within walking distance of the sheikh’s khalwatkhane/halvethane. Gilani told his followers that this
was a sign from God, who clearly knew who would be the genuine possessor of the position, and pursued
his decision. “The followers were ashamed and they confessed the superiority of Sheikh Safi and
abandoned their initial belief.” See also Khwandamir, 557-559.
158
Junabadi, 76. While the accuracy of the second demand is open to debate, it is quite important to see
Shah Abbas-era efforts not only to tie the main tool of pro-Safavid religious propaganda to an earlier era,
but also to give this propaganda further legitimacy by making it a demand of Sheikh Safi’s spiritual guide.

65


 After traveling to various cities to spread “God’s word,” and arranging for his

master, who died in 1301, to be buried according to the “requirements of Twelver Shi‘ite

Islam,”159 Sheikh Safi settled in his hometown, Ardabil, to inaugurate his own order,

which was a synthesis of the Khalwati/Halveti order and various indigenous Sufi

movements in the early fourteenth century.160 Soon after, his fame and teachings spread

to “numerous localities,” and his followers “increased immensely.”161 Mostawfi, a

financial officer, historian, poet, and geographer of the Ilkhanid era, describes 1320s

Ardabil as a city filled with Sheikh Safi’s devout followers, some of whom were high-

ranking Mongol officials.162 Saffetu’s-Safa mentions waves of people from the

surrounding regions of Azerbaijan, Khurasan, Anatolia (particularly the Diyarbakir,

Tokat, Amasya, and Teke regions),163 Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Georgia164 who came to

Moreover, Junabadi adds that Zahed-i Gilani told Sheikh Safi, “… [I]t is your duty to lead the ummah
according to the teachings of Ali b. Abi Talib and his followers [Imams],” Junabadi, 76.
159
While Amir Mahmud b. Khwandamir and Junabadi emphasize this detail, Khwandamir has only “the
Propthet’s religion.” Junabadi, 77; Ibn Khwandamir, 12a; Khwandamir, 558. I believe this difference is
neither incidental nor trivial. As Khwandamir’s account is the oldest among the three (written in 1524,
compared to Ibn Khwandamir, written in 1548, and Junabadi, written in 1614), this shows the gradual
evolution of the narrative concerning the Shi‘ite roots of the Safavid family. As discussed in the
introduction of the dissertation, the Shi‘itization of the Safavid dynasty was a relatively late effort
promoted by Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas I.
160
Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, Tarih Boyunca İslam Mezhepleri ve Şiilik (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1979), 172.
161
Junabadi, 78.
162
For the relationship between the early Safaviyya leaders/order and the Mongol rulers, see Jean Aubin,
“Shakyh Ibrahim Zahid Gilani (1218?-1301),” Turcica 21-23 (1991): 39-53; Tarekh-e Gozideh, 675, cited
in Abbaslı. “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 302; Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 46 n. 2;
Khwandamir, 558-559.
163
Bekir Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Munasebetleri (Istanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993), 18, 131;
Andrew Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 2-3.
164
Among the few references to Sheikh Safi’s attempts to converts Christians to Islam, Saffetu’s-Safa
mentions a Georgian village whose inhabitants “embraced” Islam in response to his teachings. Cited in
Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 45. On the other hand, Marco Polo narrates a story from his visit to
Tabriz in 1328(?) that Christians of the city were asked either to move a mountain (in reference to Matthew
17:20) or convert to Islam. Marco Polo, The Description of the World, 105-109.

66


“repent” and join the sheikh’s order.165 According to contemporary and near-

contemporary narratives, the Ilkhanid rulers of Azerbaijan, including Muhammad

Khodabandah Uljaytu (d. 1316) and Abu Sa‘id Bahadur Khan (d. 1335), as well as other

high-ranking military officials, such as Amir Chuban (d. 1327), became adherents, as

well.166 Sheikh Safi’s new order primarily attracted followers from the semi-nomadic and

nomadic “Turkan” [i.e. Turcoman] tribes167 of Anatolia and northwestern Iran. According

165
Saffetu’s-Safa, cited in Abbaslı, “Safavilerin Kökenine Dair,” 290. Also, “… so many people came to
Ardabil that all schools, dorms, and [other] plaees became full of the order’s followers not only in Ardabil,
but also around Ardabil.” Junabadi, 78.
166
Hamd Allah Mostawfi, in his Tarekh-e Gozideh (1330), mentions the highly esteemed status of Sheikh
Safi, as well as the Mongol rulers’ deep sympathy for him. Kutlu and Parlak, Makalat: Şeyh Safı Buyruğu,
19. “Once Amir Chuban asked Sheikh Safi, ‘How many followers do you have?’ He answered, ‘For each
of your men I have a hundred followers’,” Junabadi, 78-79. On the other hand, Khunji, in order to
emphasize the significance of the Safaviyya order for the Mongol rulers, mentions a feast organized by
Uljaytu to celebrate the establishment of Sultaniya as the new capital in 1305 and continues, “The wish of
the Sultan [Uljaytu] was that the shaykh of Ardabil by his presence should complete the necklace of the
company.” Khunji, 62. The nature of these leaders’ devotion to the Safaviyya order, however, is an ongoing
debate among historians. There is no doubt that Uljaytu, even if for a short period, converted to Shi‘ite
Islam and tried to Shi‘itize his state officially by adding the symbols of Shi‘ite Islam (such as the names of
the Twelve Imams) to the coins and hutbe, or Friday sermon. However, there is no historical source
connecting Uljaytu’s short-lived conversion to Shi‘ite Islam with his relation to the Safaviyya order and its
leader. However, as mentioned above, the order and its leader’s syncrenistic nature may have fostered a
relation between the two. For further details on Uljaytu’s conversion to Shi‘ite Islam and the circumstances
surrounding his decision, see Javad Abbasi, “Salshomar-e Rasmi Shodan-e Tashayyo dar Asr-e Hokumat-e
Ilkhanan,” Human Sciences 51-52 (2006/2007): 201-234; Judith Pfeiffer, “Conversion Versions: Sultan
Öljeytü’s Conversion to Shi’ism (709/1309) in Muslim Narrative Sources,” Mongolian Studies XXII
(1999): 35-67. One can also speculate that the Safaviyya order may have received some sort of support
from the Ilkhanid rulers, because it was not uncommon for Mongol rulers and generals to send money or
gifts to various Sufi orders to receive “spiritual protection” even before their conversion to Islam. Pfeiffer,
“Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization,” 136. For instance, the Ilkhanid vizier and
historian Rashid al-Din (d. 1318), in one of his letters to his son, who was the governor of Ardabil,
mentions that he sent various kinds of food and other necessities, including oil, sugar, wine, and animals,
each year to the Safaviyya order on the Prophet’s birthday as a gift. In another letter, he asks his son to
show the utmost respect to the sheikh, as well as his order. Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 6. For
further information on Rashid al-Din’s letters and the debate on their authenticity, see Zeki Velidi Togan,
“References to Economic and Cultural Life in Anatolia in the Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn,” trans. Gary Leiser,
in History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of John
E. Woods, Judith Pfeiffer, Sholeh A. Quinn, and Ernest Tucker (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006):
84-111. The Ottoman sultans became a part of this tradition, as well. Each year a certain amount of cash,
called çerağ akçesi, or “stipend of light,” was sent to the center of the order with various other gifts. Franz
Babinger, Der Islam in Kleinasien (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1922), 136-137.
167
Junabadi, 79.

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to Junabadi, this was in response to a miraculous event in which Sheikh Safi saved Amir

Chuban’s son’s life, leading his father to spread the story to his people.168

One of the few contemporary European sources of the era, the Diario, or Diary,

of Marino Sanuto Torsello (d. 1338), a Venetian statesman and geographer known as “the

elder,” provides a vivid account of Sheikh Safi and his emerging order. Sanuto visited

Ardabil in 1312 and was impressed by how “well-established” and respected the order

was in the city. After emphasizing the adherents’ sincere devotion to God and their

sheikh -- without any reference to his being Sunni or Shi‘ite-- Sanuto lists “Persia,

Turchia, Siria e Barbaria” (i.e., Iran, Anatolia, Greater Syria, and North Africa) as the

regions from which Sheikh Safi’s followers traveled to join the order.169 After

establishing a substantial congregation in Ardabil, Sheikh Safi left the city in the early

1330s for the hajj and assigned his son Sheikh Sadr al-Din Musa (d. 1391/2) as the head

168
Junabadi, 80. Sheikh Husayn ibn Sheikh Abd al-Zahidi, in Silsilatu’n-nasab-iSafawiyya (hereafter
Silsila) states that the number of people who traveled to Ardabil from Anatolia and Iraq to listen to his
sermons exceeded 3,000. Cited in Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cuneyd, 7-8. On the other hand, Rida Quli
Khan Hidayat (d. 1871) mentions 100,000 followers of the Safaviyya order during Sheikh Safi’s leadership.
Tadhkira-yi riyad al-‘arifin, ed. Sayyid Ahmad Muhadhdhab (Tehran: Kitabkhana-yi Mahdiyya, 1937),
101.
169
Mario Sanuto, The Diaries of Marino Sanuto, ed. Nicolò Barozzi (Venice: n.p., 1880), Vol. IV, 500.
Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, in his translation of Hinz’s well-known book, asserts that he could not find any sign of
Anatolian participation in the Safaviyya order during Sheikh Safi’s leadership. Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh
Cüneyd, xi-xiii. However, in addition to Sanuto the elder, Saffetu’s-Safa specifically mentions Asia Minor
(i.e., Anatolia) as a main source of followers for Sheikh Safi. Cited in Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine
Dair,” 290. Moreover, Safavid chronicles mention a specific town called Pirnig/Birnig where the followers
of Sheikh Safi, right before he died, were “countless.” Junabadi, 87; Ibn Khwandamir, 13a-13b;
Khwandamir, 559. Even though Thackston argues that the town’s location is unknown, I was able to find a
town called Pirnig (Purnak or Burnak in modern Turkish) located in northeastern Anatolia, near Trabzon.
Its name was Turkified to Taştepe in 1963. The town’s history, however, goes back to the Burnaks, who
were a small Turcoman tribe in the Aq-qoyunlu era. It is noteworthy that while the number of Safaviyya
followers from this town is 13,000 in Amir Mahmud’s and Khwandamir’s accounts, Junabadi mentions
300,000 followers who joined Sheikh Safi’s order in just one year. Junabadi’s addition of an improbable
number of followers can be seen as a deliberate attempt to prove the significance and prevalence of the
order for his contemporary (seventeenth-century) audience as part of ongoing political and religious
propaganda. Junabadi adds Serendib (i.e., Sri Lanka) to the locales where the order spread, and cites Ibn
Bezzaz’s Saffetu’s-Safa for this information, implying that he questioned the veracity of the account,
considering the distance between Ardabil and Sri Lanka, a distance that, according to Junabadi, takes three
years to cover. Junabadi, 78-80.

68


of the order. Immediately following his return in 1334, he passed away and was buried in

the cemetery of the lodge.170

III. Sheikh Sadr al-Din Musa (d. 1391) and the Increasing Influence of the Tariqa

The positive correlation between a religio-political group’s increasing access to

political and economic power and its efforts to accentuatate confessional boundaries is

not a unique phenomenon for the Ottomans and the Safavids. Pfeiffer examines this

dynamic in the context of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid rivalry and argues that as the political

enmity between the two empires intensified at the beginning of the fourteenth century,

the Shi‘itization of the Ilkhanid rulers, as well as their state, in contradistinction to the

Sunni Mamluks, became more perceptible.171 This approach, specifically an examination

of the mutuality between the politicization and confessionalization of a religious group,

can also be applied to the Safaviyya order and its development. Even though the

institutionalization and politicization of the order are usually associated with Sheikh

Junayd (d. 1460), Safavid and Ottoman chronicles shed light upon attempts as early as

the first half of the fourteenth century, when Sheikh Safi’s son Sadr al-Din led the order,

to initiate this process by engaging in contemporary political and military conflicts and

170
Junabadi again makes sure to specify that Sheikh Safi, just like his master, was buried according to the
rules of Twelver Shi‘ite Islam. Junabadi, 81. This detail, however, is absent from Khwandamir’s account.
He simply says “that night [they] washed his body, turning it from side to side as it customary.”
Khwandamir, 559.
171
Pfeiffer, “Confessional Ambiguity vs. Confessional Polarization,” 129-133, 154-156. In other words, the
same aims that caused the Ottomans and the Safavids to sharpen their confessional identities against each
other (i.e., pursuing political and fiscal legitimacy in the region) resulted in the same outcome for the two
previous regional powers. As the Mongol rulers positioned themselves against the Sunni Mamluks in the
region, they not only accentuated confessional boundaries by embracing tenets of Shi‘ite Islam to various
degrees but also let prominent Shi‘ite figures play prominent roles in the court.

69


creating a complex network of “followers and disciples”172 to reach remote regions. 173

Sadr al-Din’s influence, as detailed by the Ottoman historian Müneccimbaşı Ahmed b.

Lütfullah (d. 1702), grew considerably and reached the ruling elite, notably the Golden

Horde leader Cani Beg (d.1357) and Timur/Tamerlane (d. 1405).174

Local rulers, however, did not always welcome Sadr al-Din’s power. For a

notable example, Malek Ashraf (d. 1357), commander-in-chief of Anushirwan Khan (d.

1357), the last Ilkhanid ruler of Azerbaijan, became suspicious of Sadr al-Din’s

increasing influence and summoned him to Tabriz. After keeping him in confinement,

Malek Ashraf was allegedly warned in a dream by Sheikh Safi to release his son and

“filled with fear and trepidation, Ashraf invited Sheikh Sadr al-Din to a private meeting,

apologized, and gave him leave to depart.”175 Following his release, Sadr al-Din

continued to engage in local conflicts and affairs. In response to the collapse of the

Ilkhanid dynasty in the 1330s,176 he ordered his followers to be cautious about the

dangers of a politically unstable environment.177 According to Saffetu’s-Safa, Sadr al-Din

172
Junabadi, 86, 90.
173
According to Khwandamir, when Sadr al-Din was born, “the light of guidance shone from his
forehead.” Khwandamir, 559.
174
Müneccimbaşı I, 180. Timur’s interest in the Safaviyya order and its leader(s) appears as a general
tendency of his state to patronize or protect religious institutions or as an example of his personal interest in
“learned debate and religious questions.” Khwandamir, in his long account on Timur, states, “While
traveling and when in residence he [Timur] always kept a group of that exalted class with him, and in royal
assemblies he engaged in learned debate and made inquiry into religious questions in favor of the learned,
and much he learned from them. During his days of power this generous padishah settled favors and grants
upon great men of religion….” Khwandamir, 230.
175
Khwandamir, 560; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, 10-11. Ibn Bezzaz carries the tension between the
two to another dimension as he claims that Sheikh Sadr al-Din was informed about several assassination
attempts plotted by Malek Ashraf and moved to Gilan until the threat was eradicated in 1354-6. Saffetu‘s-
Safa, 309-311, cited in Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 294 nn. 21, 22.
176
For futher details on the collapse of the Ilkhanids, see David Morgan, The Mongols (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2007); C. P. Melville, The Fall of Amir Chupan and the Decline of the Ilkhanate, 1327-1337: A
Decade of Discord in Mongol Iran (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).
177
Junabadi, 86-90. Junabadi also narrates how Sadr al-Din refrained from intervening in the ongoing
tension between Cani Beg and Malek Ashraf. When Malek Ashraf asked Sheikh Sadr al-Din to convey his

70


even ordered some of his followers to take up arms to protect Ardabil from possible

attacks, and he was personally involved in several armed conflicts across the region.178

His relationship with the two post-Ilkhanid dynastic rulers, the Chobanids (or Chupanids)

(r. 1335-1357) and the Jalayirids (r. 1335-1432), was strained, only perpetuating the need

to develop armed support for the order.179

It was during this period that Sheikh Sadr al-Din established relationships not

only with various local Shi‘ite political movements, including the Sarbadars (r. 1332-

1386) in Khurasan and the Mar‘ashis (r. 1359-1596) in Mazandaran,180 but also the

Turcoman and Kurdish tribes of Anatolia.181 Through his connections with the rulers of

these dynasties/tribes and the protection provided by Cani Beg, Sadr al-Din spread his

teachings into Anatolia and, to a lesser extent, parts of Eastern Europe. In response,

historian Franz Babinger points out how the southern parts of the Anatolian peninsula,

message asking Cani Beg for forgiveness, the sheikh’s ultimate decision was to stay away from the
conflict, which resulted in the execution of Malek Ashraf by Cani Beg. Junabadi, 86-87. For further
discussion of the lack of a central political power in greater Iran and the concomitant political conflicts
among various local rulers of the fourteenth century, see Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 7-21.
178
Ibn Bezzaz, Saffetu’s-Safa, 286-289, 300-303, 382-383, cited in Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,”
293-294 nn. 13-15. According to al-Zahidi, when the Georgians stole the door of the mosque of Ardabil,
Sheikh Sadr ad-Din and his followers brought it back to the city. See Silsila, 43-44, cited in Mazzoui, The
Origins of the Safavids, 54.
179
Junabadi, 89-90; Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 294-295.
180
For more information concerning the Mar‘ashis, see Khwandamir, 198-201 and for more information
concerning the Sarbadars, see H. R. Roemer, “The Jalayirids, Muzaffarids, and Sarbadars,” in The
Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. VI, 1-40.
181
Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 66-71; C. E. Bosworth, “Al-e Afrasiab,” Encyclopædia Iranica
Vol. I, Part 7, 742-743. Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 295. The political situation in Anatolia
helped Sheikh Sadr al-Din foster these relations. The rule of the Anatolian Seljuks was brought to a formal
end in the early fourteenth century. Following the death of Ala ad-Din Kaikubad III in 1307/8, they became
a Mongol vassal, and Mongol governors were stationed in Sivas in central Anatolia. Various other parts of
Anatolia, particularly the parts remote from the central power of the Ilkhanids, were ruled by local beyliks,
or petty states, one of which was the Ottomans in northwestern Anatolia. For further details on the
historical geography of medieval Anatolia, see A. C. S. Peacock and Sara Nur Yıldız, The Seljuks of
Anatolia: Court and Society in the Medieval Middle East (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Ahmet
Yaşar Ocak, Perspectives and Reflections on Religious and Cultural Life in Medieval Anatolia (Istanbul:
The Isis Press, 2012); Rudi Paul Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Bloomington:
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1983).

71


specifically the Teke and Hamideli regions, “became Safavid” in a short time, referencing

the movement as a political entity and not simply a mystical order.182 Followers of the

tariqa also expanded to the regions of Amasya, Tokat, and Sivas in central and northern

Anatolia and to the eastern regions of the peninsula due to the proximity of these regions

to the center of the order.183 A contemporary Venetian account points out that three-

fourths of the entire Anatolian population had become followers of the order.184

Mühimme records from the 1560s and 1570s indicate the existence of well-established

Twelver Shi‘ite populations in the Balkans, including Varna, Filibe, and Tatar Pazarı in

Bulgaria and Dimetoka in Greece.185

In addition to spiritual devotion, financial support from the followers became an

integral part of the order in the fourteenth century. Beginning with Sheikh Sadr al-Din,

the spiritual leader of the order also managed the revenues of the waqf, or pious

endowment, which was established for the shrine in Ardabil. While we do not know the

exact date of the establishment of the waqf, it was as early as the time of Sheikh Sadr al-

Din that the shrine served as a “community center” with a well-functioning financial

system. These revenues were collected from various villages, farmlands, and/or

individuals (including neighboring political leaders) in the form of donations and taxes.

182
Babinger and Köprülü, Anadolu’da İslamiyet (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2000), 20. Khunji also
mentions how Sadr al-Din “tamed the people of Rum with riches” that he amassed as the glory of the order
spread into vast territories in Anatolia. Khunji, 63.
183
Faruk Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü: Şah İsmail ile
Halefleri ve Anadolu Türkleri (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1976), 79. For further details on the Sivas-Tokat-
Amasya region in the late medieval/early modern period, see Yaşar Yücel, Kadı Burhaneddin Ahmed ve
Devleti (1344-1398) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970).
184
Babinger and Köprülü, Anadolu’da İslamiyet, 20. While the figure is a clear exaggeration, it still
signifies how widespread the Safaviyya order became in a relatively short period.
185
For an example, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Mühimme Defteri (hereafter BOA, MD) Vol. 21,
No. 502 (21 Zilkade 980/March 25, 1573).

72


Furthermore, archival documents from the Sarih al-Milk186 collection located at the

University of Tehran indicate that the shrine kept a cash reserve as early as 1305, and a

significant portion of the endowment was ensured by donations sent from the order’s

Anatolian followers for the remainder of the century.187 Considering that the official

Shi‘itization of the order did not take place until the 1440s and 1450s, financial

contributions from the Anatolians, which were used mainly for charitable activities or

purchasing large tracks of land in Ardabil and greater Azerbaijan,188 can be seen as a

significant manifestation of the bond between the center of the order and Anatolian

disciples before the latter were officially called (or called themselves) Kızılbaş.

By the end of the fourteenth century, the Safaviyya order had not only become a

significant religious actor in the region around Ardabil with a complex network of

followers and missionaries, but also had developed critical connections with

contemporary rulers and military leaders of surrounding political powers.189 Sheikh Sadr

al-Din’s leadership came to an end with his death in 1391. Following his father’s

practice, he appointed his son, Hoca Ali (d. 1427), to succeed him as the leader of the

order; the latter continued the process of Shi‘itization and politicization of the order.

186
As an important source concerning the shrine of Shaykh Safi during his lifetime and later periods, the
court poet and chronicler Abdi Beg Shirazi compiled Sarih al-Milk collection under the order of Shah
Tahmasb in 1570. The earliest document in the collection is dated 1305. While the original documents are
located in the University of Tehran Library, microfilms of the collection are held at the University of
Chicago Library. See Microfilms Nos. 275 and 276, Sarih al-Milk Collection, University of Chicago. They
were first utilized by A. H. Morton to examine the physical and administrative structure of the Safaviyya
movement. For further details, see A.H. Morton, “The Ardabīl Shrine in the Reign of Shāh Tahmāsp I,”
Iran Vol. 12 (1974): 31-64; idem, “The Ardabīl Shrine in the Reign of Shāh Tahmāsp I (Concluded),” Iran
Vol. 13 (1975): 39-58. More recently, Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr has used several documents from the
collection in her article surveying the financial activities of Safavid women at the center of the order:
“Economic Activities of Safavid Women in the Shrine-City of Ardabil,” Iranian Studies 31, no. 2 (1998):
247-261.
187
Silsila, 113, cited in Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 10.
188
Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Economic Activities of Safavid Women,“ 256-257.
189
When Sheikh Safi al-Din died, Junabadi narrates, numerous political leaders, including Cani Beg and
Timur, came to his tomb to pay their respects to him and the order. Junabadi, 91.

73


IV. Sheikh Hoca/Hacı Ali (d. 1427) and His “Relationship” with Timur

Albeit Hoca Ali is not as revered and celebrated as his grandfather or grandson in

Safavid court chronicles,190 under his leadership, the Safavid order took the first

unequivocal steps toward evolving into a Shi‘ite movement, even though the final

transformation did not take place until the tenures of his son Junayd and grandson

Haydar.191 Indeed, several historians argue that the order converted to Shi‘ite Islam while

Hoca Ali was the head.192 As a Sufi leader, he diligently embraced the Twelver Shi‘ite

doctrine and spread the teachings of the order farther into Anatolia and Greater Syria.193

Specific names and detailed information regarding Safaviyya halifes dispatched to

Anatolia during Hoca Ali’s lifetime can be found in various Ottoman-era primary

sources.194 On the other hand, leading anti-Safavid scholarship of the late fifteenth

190
Junabadi, for instance, spends only a page (in his roughly thousand-page chronicle) on Hoca Ali, where
he briefly mentions how he relentlessly fought agasint bid‘a, or religious innovation. Junabadi, 91-92.
191
Some historians argue that because of Hoca Ali’s Shi‘ite tendencies , a split began to emerge between a
group of followers who insisted on the Sunni interpretation of Islam for the order and another group who
put sympathy for ahl al-bayt and Shi‘ite tenets at the core of the order. Bilal Dedeyev, “Safevi Tarikatı ve
Osmanlı Devleti İlişkileri,” Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi Vol. I, No. 5 (2008): 209.
192
Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Societal
Change in Shi‘ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 78;
Savory, Iran under the Safavids, 8-13. Hinz and Minosrky see Hoca Ali’s efforts to convert the inhabitants
of Dizful in Syria, who were mainly Yazidis, as “the earliest sign of strong and decided Shi‘a
propagandism on the part of the Safawis.” Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 15-17; Edward G. Browne,
“Note on an Apparently Unique Manuscript History of the Safavi Dynasty in Persia,” Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society (1921): 407. On the other hand, Matti Moosa bases his argument on a rarely used
Portuguese account from the early seventeenth century in which the author argues that Haydar was not only
a Shi‘ite but was also the one who ordered his followers to wear a new cap with twelve pleats representing
the Twelve Imams. João de Barros, Segunda Década da Ásia (Lisbon: Impressa par Iorge Rodrigues,
1628), cited in Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1987), 28.
193
Hinz and Minosrky, for instance, argue that Hoca Ali displayed strong Shi‘ite characteristics throughout
his leadership of the order.
194
For instance, Mecdi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1591), in his Şakaik-i Nümaniye, mentions Hamid b. Musa
Hoca, known as Somuncu Baba, as a halife sent by Hoca Ali to Anatolia. Interestingly, according to Mecdi,
Somuncu Baba, after realizing his sheikh’s Shi‘ite tendencies, left his side and became a follower of Hacı
Bayram-ı Veli (d. 1430), who founded the Bayrami Sufi order in Ankara as a synthesis of the

74


century, in an attempt to demonstrate that the “malevolent conversion” of the order to

Shi‘ite Islam was not only a sudden, but also a later, phenomenon, postulates that Hoca

Ali was not a Shi‘ite but was the Sheikh al-Sufiyya, or head of the Sufis, who was loved

and respected by his followers.195

A point, on which both pro- and anti-Safavid historians agree, however, is the

close relationship that Hoca Ali fostered with contemporary political leaders, particularly

Timur. Eskander Monshi (d. 1632), the court scribe for Shah Abbas I (r. 1587-1629),

mentions Timurid stamps and documents that either depicted or described Hoca Ali’s

miracles, as well as his first encounter with Timur.196 Traditional Safavid accounts relate

that the relationship began one day when Timur gave Hoca Ali a poisoned cup to

drink.197 After Hoca Ali drank from the cup, a number of his followers at the meeting

began to chant rhythmically, and as they grew louder, Hoca Ali went into a trance, stood

up to dance, and sweated the poison out of his body.198 Timur was so impressed by this

miracle that he not only became a follower himself, but also released thousands of

Turcomans who had been taken captive after his victory over the Ottoman Sultan

Khalwati/Halveti, Naqshbandi/Nakşibendi, and Akbari Sufi orders. Mecdi Mehmed Efendi, Şakaik-i
Nümaniye, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), Vol. I, 74-76.
195
For an example, see the biographical dictionary of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sakhawi (d. 1497), a Cairene
Shafi‘i hadith scholar and historian. Shams al-Din Muhammad ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sakhawi, Al-Daww al-
lāmi‘ li ahl al-qarn al-tāsi‘ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Quds, 1934-1936), Vol. IV, 29-30, cited in Matti Moosa,
Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 28.
196
Monshi, 26-27. Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun, following his encounter with Timur in 1400 in Damascus,
notes that “This king Timur is one of the greatest and mightiest of kings. Some attribute to him knowledge,
other attribute to him heresy [adherence to Shi‘ite Islam] because they note his preference for the ‘members
of the House’ [of Muhammad]; still others attribute to him the employment of magic and sorcery, but in all
this there is nothing; it is simply that he is highly intelligent and very perspicasious, addicted to debate and
argumentation about what he knows and also about what he does not know.” Walter J. Fischel, Ibn
Khaldūn and Tamerlane: Their Historic Meeting in Damascus, 1401 A.D. (803 A.H.): A Study Based on an
Arabic Manuscript of Ibn Khaldūn’s “Autobiography,” with a Translation into English and a Commentary
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952), 47.
197
The reason behind this act is open to speculation while the main explanation is Timur’s intention to test
Hoca Ali’s spiritual powers.
198
Savory, Iran under the Safavids, 13-14.

75


Bayezid I at the Battle of Ankara in 1402.199 The narrative further relates how the newly

freed men all became followers of the tariqa and stayed in the town of Ardabil under the

name “Rumlu”200 (meaning the ones who came from Rum, i.e., Anatolia) while some

became voluntary propagators of the tariqa and worked wholeheartedly to spread the

doctrines of the order in Anatolia as a way of showing their gratitude.201 While the story

199
The Battle of Ankara took place on the field of Çubuk, near Ankara, between the forces of the Ottoman
sultan Bayezid I and the Turco-Mongol forces of Timur in 1402. It was a major victory for Timur and led
to a period of crisis for the Ottoman Empire called the Fetret Devri, or the Interregnum. For further details,
see Justin Marozzi, Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World (London: HarperCollins, 2004);
and Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, 15-16, 86, 172. For an Ottoman account of the event, see
Müneccimbaşı, Camiü’d-düvel (1673), ed. and trans. Ahmed Ağırakça (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995),
140-146 (hereafter Müneccimbaşı II). Müneccimbaşı blames Yıldırım Bayezid and his impious behavior
for the defeat. For a Safavid account of the event, see Khwandamir, 229, 272-274, 280-286.
200
One of the main Turcoman Kızılbaş tribes that played a significant role in the establishment of the
Safavid state was the Rumlu. According to the anonymous author of Tarekh-e Qizilbashan, they were
originally from north central Anatolia (Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya). However, he does not mention a
possible connection between the two groups. Tarekh-e Qizilbashan, 9a-9b. For further information on the
Rumlu tribe, see Sümer, Safavi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 43, 85-87, 143-144, 158-160.
201
Silsila, 48 cited in Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 8-9; Bekir Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-İran Siyasi
Munasebetleri (Istanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993), 2-3. One of the few European sources to mention
this story is João de Barros’s Segunda Década da Ásia, cited in Moosa, Extremist Shiites, 28. Junabadi,
despite spending numerous pages on the interactions and personal relationships between the sheikhs of the
order and contemporary political and military leaders, including Timur, does not mention this story. On the
other hand, Eskandar Beg Monshi, as the first Safavid chronicler who speaks about it, confesses that his
main sources are anecdotes circulating orally in public because court decrees or official documents do not
have any supporting information for the claim. Monshi, 28. The authenticity of this story is still a matter of
debate among historians. While some, including the present author, see this as another example of distorted
historical narrative as a tool of propaganda; other historians refer to this event as a historical reality. For an
example of the former group, see Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin
Rolü, 6-7; for the latter group, see Babinger and Köprülü, Anadolu’da İslamiyet, 22-27; Hinz, Uzun Hasan
ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 8-9; Saray, Türk – İran Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü, 12; and Mazzaoui, The Origins of
the Safawids, 54. The main primary source for the second group is the Ross Anonymous, a British Library
manuscript dating to the 1680s. There it is related that Hoca Ali told these released Anatolian captives, “Let
your comings and goings be not infrequent, for the advent of the righteous Duodeciman (Twelver Shi‘ite)
religion is nigh and you must be ready to sacrifice your lives.” Cited in Mazzaoui, The Origins of the
Safawids, 54. However, none of the Timurid, post-Timurid, or early Safavid sources examined for this
study mentions the story of Timur forgiving the Anatolians in Ardabil upon Hoca Ali’s request. These
sources include Hafiz-i Abru’s Zubdat al-tawarikh (1426), ‘Abd ar-Razzaq Samarqandi’s Matla‘ as-
Sa‘dain (1468/9), Mu‘in Isfazari’s Raudat al-jannat (1470/1471), Fasihi-yi Khafī’s Mujmal-i Fasihi (1442),
and Khwandamir’s Habibu‘s-Siyar (1524). I thank Dr. Javad Abbasi for bringing this quite interesting and
important point to my attention. Nevertheless, Khwandamir and Hoca Sadeddin Efendi (d. 1599), an
Ottoman scholar, official, and historian, mention a group of Tatars, the Qara-Tatars, who had been taken
captive by Timur at Bayezid’s request (this detail is mentioned only by Hoca Saadeddin) due to being “so
evil” and “causing disorder” in cities including Amasya, Malatya, Sivas, and Kayseri. Khwandamir 286.
Sadeddin Efendi and Müneccimbaşı further add that following Timur’s death in 1405, some of them moved

76


is a late Safavid fabrication that was added to the narrative of the founders and early

leaders of the order, this does not diminish the order’s influence in the eyes of Timur or

the Anatolians. In fact, Timur allegedly bestowed numerous villages and various other

properties on the order in Ardabil as a sign of his affection and respect for Hoca Ali. 202

In 1427, while on his way to make the hajj, Hoca Ali died in the “Mamluk

territory [Palestine],” “where he had been making converts,” and thus was buried there.203

Sheikh Ibrahim succeeded his father and remained the head of the order for the next

thirteen years.204 His story, however, is even sparser than his father’s, on the evidence of

both pro- and anti-Safavid chronicles. In a few sentences devoted to him, Safavid

chroniclers hastily mention how he guided “countless followers” from numerous places

and helped “many wrongdoers” find the truth. 205 Upon his death, his son Junayd became

the leader and took prominent steps to accelerate the process of Shi‘itization and

politicization of the order.206

V. Sheikh/Sultan Junayd (d. 1460) and the Shi‘itization and Politicization of the
Order
While both the pro- and anti-Safavid narratives depict a decisive break between

the pre- and post-Junayd periods, merging the teachings of the mystical order with the

back to Anatolia. Hoca Sadeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-tevarih (1584), ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu (Ankara: T. C.
Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999), Vol. II, 214; Müneccimbaşı I, 150.
202
Monshi refers to alleged archival documents found in Balkh in what is now northern Afghanistan in
1602 to support this argument. Monshi, 28. For further information on Timur’s engagements with the
political powers of Iran and Anatolia, see Yaşar Yücel, Timur’un Dış Politikasında Türkiye ve Yakın-Doğu,
1393-1402 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1980).
203
Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 54.
204
Mazzaoui argues that he died in 1447, not in 1440. The Origins of the Safavids, 74.
205
As an example, see Junabadi, 92 and Khwandamir, 561.
206
On the other hand, Sheikh Ibrahim’s leadership corresponded with the era of the Timurid ruler Shahrukh
Mirza (d. 1447) and the early Qara-Qoyunlus in Azerbaijan and Iraq. Both these regimes implemented
strong centralizing and expansionist policies towards the region encompassing Ardabil. This might have
consequently diminished the power of the Safaviyya order during Sheikh Ibrahim’s tenure as the order had
customarily increased its influence by taking advantage of the lack of a strong central authority in the
region.

77


actions of a political movement was an ongoing process that pre-dated Junayd’s reign.207

The anti-Safavid narrative of this period, perfected by hostile Sunnis in the sixteenth

century, such as jurist and historian Khunji (d. 1519), was one of the primary initiators of

the effort to highlight the suddenness of the transformation of the order. To do so, these

scholars perpetuated the notion of a sharp binary between a Sunni – and therefore good -

past and a Shi‘ite – and therefore evil- present. Khunji, for instance, lamented:

What a pity that, while Safi al-Din preserved his being

from a doubtful repast [luqma-yi shubba], he did not
restrain his children from the vanities of this world [hutām].
As a result, his progeny forsook poverty and humility
[khāksārī] for the throne of a kingdom … [and] when the
boon [navāla] of succession reached Junayd, he altered the
way of life of his ancestors: the bird of anxiety laid an egg
of longing for power in the nest of his imagination. Every
moment he strove to conquer a land or a region.208

On the other hand, the Safavid chroniclers’ depiction of Junayd’s role in this

transformation is not as clear-cut as that of the anti-Safavid accounts. Though Junabadi

uses the title sultan for the first time when detailing Junayd’s leadership, Junayd is not

the first leader to be referred to as sultan, as an anonymous chronicle composed during

Shah Abbas’ reign uses the term for the order’s founder, Safi.209 While this author does

207
Michel Mazzaoui, for instance, argues that “Overnight they [the Safaviyya order] have become gazis
fighting the unbelievers along the Muslim frontiers of the north.” The Origins of the Safawids, 74. Primary
sources, as shown previously, are replete with details indicating the pre-Junayd political involvement of the
order, particularly with the non-Muslim northern tribes.
208
Khunji, 63. Ottoman historian Nişancı Mehmed Paşa (d. 1571) also provides a rigid pre-/post-Junayd
narration. According to him, “The followers of Ardabil, whose adherence to the right path has been
eminent until now [1460s], deviated from devotion because of the deviltry [of Junayd], who entered the
world of corruption and left the path of his ancestors [tarika-i eslafdan ihrac ve izlal eyledi].” Hadisat
(Nişancı Mehmed Paşa Tarihi ve Osmanlı Tarihi Zeyli), ed. Enver Yaşarbaş (Istanbul: Kamer Neşriat ve
Dağıtım, 1983), 124.
209
For an example, see Junabadi, 92. Tarekh-e Qizilbashan was written between 1598 and 1602. Tehran,
Malek Manuscript Library, MS 6284, fol. 24a.

78


not provide a reason for his preference, we can speculate that it was part of an ongoing

effort by the Safavid court to create a sense of political continuity in the history of the

movement.

Even if we cannot identify an exact date for the Safaviyya order’s emergence as a

militant Shi‘ite political entity, Junayd’s reign marks a crucial milestone as the socio-

political dynamics of the era enabled him to accelerate the Shi‘itization and politicization

of the order.210 When he assumed power, an internal conflict took place within the

Safaviyya family that led to a split between Junayd and his uncle Sheikh Jafar, who was

referred to as “the most cultivated and learned of the Safavid Sheikhs.”211 Jafar, in

contrast to his nephew, resisted the militarization of the order, including war against non-

Muslims. With the goal of maintaining a Sufi missionary tradition as the sole motivation

of the order, Sheikh Jafar installed himself in Ardabil as the city’s Sheikh al-Islam, an

honorific title used for outstanding scholars of the Islamic sciences. He enjoyed the

support of the Qara-Qoyunlu monarch Jahan Shah (d. 1467).212

Jahan Shah’s increasing concern over Junayd’s aggressive nature led him not only

to patronize the less militarily- and more spiritually- minded member of the Safaviyya

210
Hamdullah Mostawfi, however, in his Nuzhetu’l-kulub (1339-1340), states that the majority of the order
was still Sunni during the time of Junayd. Abbaslı, “Safavilerin Kökenine Dair,” 306-308. Also see Sümer,
Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 2-3; Baha Said, “Bektaşiler,” Türk Yurdu 28, No. 5 (1927): 305-307; Reşat
Öngören, “Sünni Bir Tarikattan Şii Bir Devlete: Safeviyye Tarikatı ve İran Safevi Devleti,” Bilgi ve Hikmet
11 (1995): 83.
211
Silsila, 50, cited by J. Aubin, “Shah Isma‘il et les notables de l’Iraq persan,” Journal of the Economic
and Social History of the Orient 2 (1959): 46. Furthermore, an endowment registry from 1453 refers to
Sheikh Jafar as the “rectifier of truth and the sacred law and religion.” Kasravi, Shaykh Safi va Tabarash,
40-41. On the other hand, according to the pro-Safavid chronicles, Jafar was not only an akrab, or relative,
but also an akreb, a scorpion, for the Safaviyya family. Junabadi, 93.
212
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 79. As another indicator of the close relationship
between Jahan Shah and Jafar, Jahan Shah married his daughter to Jafar’s son. Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh
Cüneyd, 16.

79


family, but also to exile Junayd from Ardabil around 1448.213 Leaving the city with a

group of followers, Junayd went to Aleppo and then Diyarbakir, the capital of the Aq-

Qoyunlu dynasty, where Uzun Hasan (d. 1478), its ruler and an enemy of Jahan Shah, not

only welcomed Junayd into his realm but also married his sister to him as a sign of

alliance between the two families.214 As the leader of the Anatolian branch of the order,

Junayd put the utmost emphasis on intense millenarian and religio-political activities, as

well as military attacks not only on kuffar, or non-Muslim, communities located north of

Ardabil and Anatolia, such as the Circassians, the Georgians, and the Byzantine kingdom

of Trebizond, but also on neighboring Muslim political entities.215 He had, according to

Junabadi, “the personality and the nature of a political leader and day by day more people

joined him because of this.”216 In this context, the military conflict between Junayd’s

followers and the Shirwan Shah Khalil’s (d.1465) army in 1455 serves as an indicator of

the changing nature of the order217 as it is considered “the first battle fought by this

family [Safaviyya] in the cause of religion.”218

213
According to Müneccimbaşı, Junayd “left his ancestors’ clothing [i.e., the Sufi cloak] and wore the
clothing of sultans.” Müneccimbaşı I, 180.
214
Junabadi and various other Safavid chroniclers attest that Uzun Hasan became a devout adherent of
Sheikh Junayd. Junabadi further adds, “When Jahan Shah heard about this friendship [between Junayd and
Uzun Hasan] and Junayd’s military intentions, a flame of jealousy burnt his heart more than ever.”
Junabadi, 93-94; Khunji, 63-64; Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 71.
215
Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 75. For another secondary source on the conflict between
Junayd and his uncle Jafar, see Saray, Türk – İran Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü, 12-13.
216
Junabadi, 92-94.
217
Ghulam Sarwar, History of Shah Isma‘il Safavi (Aligarh: Muslim University, 1939), 21-24.
218
Junabadi, 95. Junabadi’s main reason for labeling Junayd’s fight against the Shirwan Shah Halil, a
member of an ancient dynasty that had ruled Shirvan, in present-day Azerbaijan, since the ninth century
C.E., a religious war is his habit of seeing the conflict as a Sunni-Shi‘te encounter.

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 The catastrophic post-Timurid socio-political climate in Iran219 contributed to the

era of “great experimentation and innovation in political thought”220 by spawning

numerous mystical orders, which combined spiritual and secular power with Shi‘ite

tenets. The movement of Muhammad ibn Falah (d. 1462), known as al-Mushasha, was

one manifestation of this trend. He began his career as a Sufi disciple of Ahmad ibn Fahd

al-Hilli (d. 1438) but became the leader of a Shi‘ite political movement in the second half

of the fifteenth century, claiming to be the long awaited Mahdi, or the prophesied

messianic figure.221 In this politically hectic atmosphere, many people who were not only

“seeking a spiritual salvation, but also worldly security”222 found refuge in Ardabil.

Providing shelter and protection for the wounded victims of the region motivated Junayd

to expedite the process of Shi‘itization and politicization. As the order further gained

legitimacy as a political entity, the increasing material gains resulting from military

incursions provided the financial foundation for its politicization.223

219
The Damascene encyclopedist Ibn Fadl Allah al-‘Umari (d. 1349) describes this era as “dark, disunited,
and corrupt.”Masālik al-absār, cited in Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids, 56. For futher details on the
post-Timurid era and the increasing number and importance of mystical orders, see Abbas Iqbal Ashtiyani,
Tarikh-i mufassal-i Iran az istila-yi Mughul to i‘lan-i Mashrutiyat (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1977). Ashtiyani
cogently argues that almost all of these mystical orders revered Ali b. Abi Talib and the ahl al- bayt.
According to Mazzaoui, among the post-Ilkhanid dynasties there were signs of favoring Shi‘ite Islam that
extended from revering the Prophet’s family to openly supporting Shi‘ite doctrines. Jahan Shah’s coinage,
for instance, had the Shi‘ite formula “Ali is the wali of Allah.” Mazzoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 66.
For a similar discussion of contemporary Anatolia, see Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, Türk Edebiyatı’nda İlk
Mutasavvıflar (Ankara: Gaye Matbaacılık, 1981).
220
John E. Woods, The Aqqoyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,
1999), 9.
221
Moosa, Extremist Shiites, 29.
222
Junabadi, 93.
223
Twelver Shi‘ite scholars and historians produced many of the seminal works on Shi‘ite theology and
history supported by the Chubanids, Jalayirids, Sarbadars, and to some extent Qara-qoyunlus. Mazzaoui,
The Origins of the Safawids, 63. Some scholars also attributed the rapid spread of Shi‘ism in the region to
the destruction of the political power of the Ismailis that, in the long run, helped Twelver Shi‘ite
communites gain influence over large groups of people. For an example, see W. Ivanow, “An Ismailitic
Work by Nasiru’d-din Tusi,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1931): 527-537. For further details on
the Ismaili affiliation and writings of Tusi, see Nasir ad-Din Tusi, The Nasirean Ethics, trans. G. M.
Wickens (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964).

81


 At the same time, Anatolia was experiencing widespread instability, both

religiously and politically, as Ottoman rule in the entire peninsula became absolute only

after the victory of Sultan Selim (d. 1520) over Shah Ismail (d. 1524) at the Battle of

Chaldiran in 1514 and the subsequent conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1516-17.224

This instability led to a blurriness of the political borders in the region, creating a ripe

environment for Junayd to disseminate his religious doctrine and political ideology. This

marked the beginning of the intense relationship between the order and the Ottoman state.

Junayd’s travels to Anatolia between 1448 and 1459 resulted in a substantial increase in

Anatolian Turcoman and Kurdish followers.225 Large groups of nomads and semi-

nomads, particularly from the regions of Sivas, Tokat, and Amasya, joined the order as

fervent followers of the sheikh.226 Junayd enlisted them in ghaza, or frontier holy war, by

imbuing his followers with a sense of the prestige of his family, which was allegedly

graced with divinity. According to Khunji, the Anatolian followers of the tariqa were

extremely devoted to the leaders of the order to the extent that they abandoned their

224
Before the establishment of Ottoman dominance, various petty emirates ruled over various parts of the
peninsula, including the Eretnid dynasty (1335-1381) and Kadi Burhan al-Din’s (d. 1398) rule as its
extention in a large region between Kayseri, Sivas, and Amasya; the principality of the Karamanids (1250-
1487), centered in south-central Anatolia; the principality of Erzincan (1379-1410) in eastern Anatolia; the
Qara-Qoyunlus (1375-1468), ruling a vast territory compromising eastern Turkey and Iraq, as well as
western Iran; the beylik of Dulkadir (1337-1522), a Mamluk client in southeastern Anatolia; and the Aq-
Qoyunlu tribal federation (1378-1501), whose realm extended to southeastern Anatolia, northwestern Iran,
and Armenia, as well as northern Iraq.
225
For a detailed discussion on the past and present of the Kurdish Kızılbaş tribes of Anatolia see Van
Bruinessen, “’Aslını İnkar Eden Haramzadedir!’ 1-23.
226
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 7-10; Mustafa Ekinci, Şah İsmail ve İnanç Dünyası (Istanbul: Beyan
Yayınları, 2010), 33-34.

82


religious duties, such as fasting and daily prayer, and believed that Junayd was God and

Haydar, his son, was the son of God.227

The Ottoman authorities therefore turned their attention to the order and its

activities within various Anatolian tribes, both pro-Ottoman and anti-Ottoman. A

fifteenth-century Ottoman historian, Derviş Ahmet Aşıki (a.k.a. Aşıkpaşazade), indicated

that even though the motivation for Junayd’s travels to Anatolia was a power struggle

between him and his uncle Sheikh Jafar for the leadership of the tariqa, he assiduously

attempted to convert the local population, including the son of Sheikh Bedreddin, who

led a notorious rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1416.228 The Ottoman

authorities’ uneasiness with the situation is shown in Aṣıkpaṣazade’s narration:

Sheikh Junayd, from the generation of Sheikh Safi, …

during the reign of Sultan Murad [r. 1421-1444, 1446-
1451]… came to Rum [Anatolia] and sent gifts with one of
his followers to the sultan, including a prayer rug, a copy of
the Qur’an, and prayer beads [tesbih]. He said, “He shall
give me the Kurtbeli [southern Anatolia] so that I can settle
down and pray for him” …. The sultan accepted the gifts
and consulted with his vizier Halil Pasha. He [ultimately]
responded that there cannot be two sultans on one throne.
He sent two hundred filori to the sheikh with his follower,
as well as a thousand akcha for the other adherents of the

227
Khunji, 83. This must have been the reason for the sightings of pseudo-Junayds in different towns in
Anatolia after his death. For a particular example from the Tokat region, see Mukrimin Yinanç, “Cüneyd,”
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Islam Ansiklopedisi (hereafter DİA).
228
Aşıkpaşaoğlu Ahmet Aşık (known as Aşıkpaşazade), Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Nihal Atsız, Osmanlı
Tarihleri I (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985), 249. According to Babinger, the
notorious Sheikh Bedreddin rebellion was supported by the Safaviyya movement, which was positioning
itself against the Ottomans from the beginning of the fifteenth century. Babinger and Köprülü, Anadolu’da
İslamiyet, 21. Considering that the initial steps in the politicization of the Safaviyya order had been taken in
the fourteenth century, a connection between the rebellion and the Safaviyya order is not unlikely, although
it was probably not as direct as Babinger believes.

83


 order [who were in the presence of the sultan]. He [Sheikh
Junayd] left the land of Osman [i.e., Anatolia].229

The increase in Junayd’s political power also corresponds with an increase in the

production and circulation of key Safavid texts in various parts of Anatolia. Most of the

Ottoman Turkish translations of Saffetu’s-Safa, particularly the fourth chapter of the

book,230 date to the second half of the fifteenth century with various titles, including

Buyruk, Menakıb, and Şeyh Safı Buyruğu.231

Junayd conducted intensive propaganda efforts in non-Ottoman Anatolian towns,

as well. During his travels to Konya, which was under the control of the Karamanids, he

stayed at a Sufi lodge whose historical leader was Sheikh Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi/Konevi

(d. 1274). Junayd’s trip, however, did not last long, for their conversations displeased the

sheikh of the lodge, and he was forced to leave the region.232 He then visited, in

chronological order, the Varsak Turcomans in the Taurus Mountains of southern

Anatolia, Iskenderun, 233 Samsun, Diyarbakir,234 and Trabzon.235 Sultan Murad II’s son,

229
Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 249; Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 17, 68; Sümer,
Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 12, 25.
230
While it is unclear why the fourth chapter of Saffetus’s-Safa was more popular than the other chapters of
the book, one can speculate that the content of the chapter, the life of Sheikh Safi, including his religious
background and miracles, made that chapter the main text that was recited in gatherings.
231
Kutlu and Parlak, Makālāt: Şeyh Safı Buyruğu, 57-58. For futher discussion on the circulation of texts
and objects as tools of Safavid propaganda, see chapter V.
232
Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Seyh Cuneyd, 17-18. According to one narrative, in one of these discussions,
Junayd used a pejorative term for the Qur’an and claimed that the followers of ‘Uthman, the third caliph of
Sunni Islam, had deliberately deleted a significant number of verses concerning Ali and his household.
Mükrimin H. Yinanc, “Cüneyd,” DİA, 242-243. Following Junayd’s departure from Konya, a local sheikh,
whose name is given as Abdüllatif by Aşıkpaşazade, wrote a letter to the Karamanid ruler to warn him
about Junayd’s “profane” activities. Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 266. This type of argument
concerning the “corrupt ‘Uthmanic codex” is associated with ghulat Shi‘ism. For further information on
early ghulat beliefs, see William F. Tucker, Mahdis and Millenerians: Shi‘ite Extremists in early Muslim
Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Said Amir Arjomand, “Religious Extremism
(ghuluww), Sufism and Sunnism in Safavid Iran: 1501-1722,” Journal of Asian History 15/1 (1981): 1-35;
and Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites.
233
Aşıkpaşazade explains that “[t]hey [the locals of Iskenderun and Aleppo] sent Mamluk ruler Jaqmaq (d.
1453) a letter that warned him about the dajjal who had emerged in his territories. Jaqmaq then sent his

84


Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446, 1451-1481), continued his father’s plan to diminish Sheikh

Junayd’s influence in the region by interfering in his attempt to take the castle of

Trabzon. As the castle was about to fall in 1456, Mehmed II intervened, causing Sheikh

Junayd to withdraw his men without defeating the local Byzantine ruler Ioannes IV

Comnenus (r. 1429-1459).236

With Junayd’s ambitious strategies and increasing network of followers and

disciples, the Safaviyya order gradually became a semi-political movement, and shifted

its recruitment from the urban setting of Ardabil and its surroundings to rural Anatolia,

giving the order a new outlook.237 “The fools of Rum,” Khunji claims, gathered around

Junayd to spread “their own trinity” [composed of God, Muhammad, and Ali] as a crown

of “devilish imagination.”238 However, even with this expansion the order did not pose a

real threat to the Ottoman central authority at first as, primary accounts indicate, the

Safaviyya leaders continued receiving their annual payment, çerağ akçesi, from the

Ottoman sultans during Junayd’s leadership. While the reason for the Ottomans’

payments to the Safaviyya order is unknown, we can speculate that the sultan’s affinity

for the order or his desire to patronize a newly emerged religio-political movement was

army to Aleppo to catch Junayd. Seventy of Junayd’s men died and he escaped to [the Ottoman city of]
Canik [in northern Anatolia].” Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 266.
234
Junayd’s stay at the Aq-Qoyunlu court lasted three years,1456-59, during which his halifes attracted
many new followers to the Safaviyya. Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 267.
235
Faruk Sümer, “Çukurova Tarihine Dair Araştırmalar,” Tarih Araştırmaları 1 (1963): 70-98. Historians
also mention an ongoing tension between the Varsak Turcomans and the Ottomans. For instance, Sadeddin
Efendi, when he discusses Bayezid’s attacks on the Varsaks, repeatedly mentions what a large threat they
constituted for the sultan. Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, III, 164-165.
236
For a detailed account of Junayd’s attack on Trabzon, see Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 20-22.
237
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 78.
238
Khunji, 66. The term “trinity” here is used to insinuate the Safavid claim to being “incarnations” of the
Imams and, consequently of God. “They openly called Shaykh Junayd ‘God (ilah)’ and his son ‘Son of God
(ibn-Allah)’.” Ibid.

85


the main motivation.239 Leading contemporary Ottoman Sufis mention the Safaviyya and

its founder Sheikh Safi in their works as highly respected figures. In his famous work

Müzekki‘n-nüfûs (1448), Eşrefoğlu Rumi, the founder of the Eşrefiye branch of the Kadiri

Sufi order in Anatolia, on multiple occasions refers to Sheik Safi’s sayings and counts

him among the greatest names in Sufism.240 Furthermore, in early modern Islamic

societies it was common for a number of prominent sheikhs who enjoyed political

support through their role as religious leaders to dispense blessings on local rulers,

gaining tax exemptions and material support in return.241 Financial support for the order

lasted until 1492, when their military intentions superseded the Ottomans’ initial

motivations in supporting them. According to the anonymous Haniwaldanus chronicle,

towards the end of Junayd’s leadership, the Ottomans stopped sending their annual çerağ

akçesi to the order. Junayd, not pleased by this situation, dispatched one of his close

followers to the Ottoman capital to inquire about the reason, and the answer that he

received was an indication of an Ottoman policy change towards the Safavids, as Sultan

Mehmed II allegedly said “Vallahi, tekkenin koçi olmıştur,” which can be translated as

“By God, the lodge has become too powerful,” with a sarcastic note underneath.242

Junayd’s religious zeal, political ambitions, and military activities, as well as the

political fragmentation of the region caused by the disintegration of Timur’s empire, not

239
As mentioned above, Anatolia was not yet under full Ottoman control when Junayd was the leader of
the order, and it is probable that the Ottomans saw the Safaviyya order as a buffer against the Kingdom of
Trabzon, the Mamluks, the Karamanids, the Isfendiyaroğulları, et al.
240
See Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, Müzekki‘n-nüfûs, ed. Abdullah Uçman (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2013), 179, 303,
382, and 478.
241
According to Arjomand, some of these orders, including the Safavids, indeed accumulated great
fortunes. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 67.
242
Richard F. Kreutel, Haniwaldanus Anonimi’ne Göre Sultan Bayezid-i Velî (1481-1512), trans. Necdet
Öztürk (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997), 35-36. This situation confirms one of the main
arguments of this study: that the order’s politicization was a bigger threat to the Ottoman central authority
than its Shi‘itization. Also see Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 68, 131.

86


only encouraged him to build a political authority and carve out a state-like entity for

himself but also paved the way for the Safaviyya order’s future dominance in the region

as a Shi‘ite movement. When Junayd died in 1460, in a battle against the Shirwan Shah

Khalil,243 he left a well-established political movement with a strong sectarian outlook to

his son Haydar, whose main contribution to the order and the future Safavid Empire was

to invent and disseminate the main identity-marker of the group, a red headdress called

kızıl tac.

VI. Haydar (d. 1488) and Introducing the “Kızılbaş”

The transformation of ideological and military identity within the Safaviyya

movement was further advanced under Junayd’s son, Haydar (d. 1488), who developed a

well-articulated political identity for the order. Under his leadership, the order established

its new identity as a military movement with a vernacular tradition of Islam practiced by

the backbone of the movement, the tribesmen who were called Kızılbaş after he ordered

them to wear a distinctive twelve-gored crimson headpiece symbolizing the order’s

allegiance to the Twelve Shi‘ite Imams and to him as their spiritual leader.244 This

243
Junabadi describes this scene in a dramatic way: “The sound of the fight from the two sides and the dust
from this situation closed the ways of prayers for the Alaviyan [i.e., Alevis] to reach out to God.” Junabadi
95. Bolding mine. For further details on Junayd’s death in battle against the Shirwan Shah, see Hinz, Uzun
Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 33-36; and Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü‘t-Tevârîh, trans. Mürsel Öztürk (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006) 393-396.
244
According to Ross Anoynmous, one night Ali b. Abi Talib appeared in Haydar’s dream and said to him,
“Oh my son, the time is now at hand when my child from among your descendants will sweep infidelity
from the face of the earth. It now behooves you to fashion a cap for the Sufis and your disciples, and you
must make it of scarlet cloth.’”
Ross E. Dennison, “The Early Years of Shā h Isma‘īl, Founder of the Safavi Dynasty,” The Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 2 (1896): 254-255. Besides this gross fabrication, the
origin of the red headdress is still a matter of debate for scholars. While some argue that Sheikh Safi’s
great-grandfather Feyruz/Firoz Shah’s nickname was Zerrin Kolah, or reddish-gold hat, others argue that
wearing a red headdress dates back to much earlier periods in Islamic history, notably Ali b. Abi Talib’s

87


twelve-folded piece of felt, called taj/tac, formed a sort of stiff baton around which the

turban was wound.245 The Italian traveler Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi (d. 1615) reports,

“Afterwards the Persians were called Cheselbas [Kızılbaş] because of a certain red mark

which they carried on their heads, by an ordinance that was instituted for them by

Arduelle [Ardabil], who was esteemed a very holy man, which name was confirmed

afterwards in the succession of Isma‘il.”246 This red headdress gradually became a source

of pride and honor, and a mark of religious zeal among the followers of the Safaviyya

order, Shi‘ite nobles, and later the Ottoman subjects who were devotees of the state.

wearing one during the conquest of Khaybar from the Jews in 629. On the other hand, in Farhadnama,
written by Arif Ardabili in the fourteenth century, the author mentions a group of Shi‘ites who wore a type
of red headdress with twelve gores because Ali ordered his followers, “Tie red upon your heads, so that ye
slay not your own comrades in the thick of battle.” Moosa, Extremist Shiites, 33; Hossein Mirjafari,
“Sufism and Gradual Transformation in the Meaning of Sufi in Safavid Period,” in İstanbul Üniversitesi
Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, Ord. Prof. Dr. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı Hatıra Sayısı 32 (1979): 159-160;
Ziya Şakir, Mezhepler Tarihi ve Şah İsmail: Sünnilik-Şiilik Alevilik-Kızılbaşlık Nedir ve Nasıl Çıktı
(Istanbul: Istanbul Maarif Kitaphanesi ve Matbaası, 1938), 53-54; Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 5.
On the other hand Kathryn Babayan locates the origins of red headgear in pre-Islamic Iranian patterns that
continued into the Islamic period in Iran. Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs: Cultural
Landscapes of Early Modern Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), xxviii-xxxvi. The
twelve folds are also believed to signify the twelve major sins that Sheikh Haydar allegedly requested his
followers to avoid: envy, vengefulness, anger, holding grudges, egocentrism, complaining, selfishness, lust,
gluttony, sloth, wrath, and cruelty. Yenişehirli Ni‘metullah b. Abdülkadir (d. 1659), Risâle-i Tâc ve Kisve,
İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Atatürk Kitaplığı, MS Osman Ergin 926/3, 130-158, cited in Mirjafari,
“Sufism,” 160-161. For further details on the Sufi taj/tac and its significance, see Semih Ceyhan, “Osmanlı
Tââme Literatürüne Göre Derviş Tacı ve Abdullah Salâhaddin-i Uşşâkî‘nin Cevâhir-i Tâc-ı Hilâfet
Risâlesi,” İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi 25 (2012): 113-172.
245
Later Safavid leaders promoted the idea of using this kızıl taj/tac as an identity marker, as well.
Khwandamir, for instance, states that when Sultan Ali Padishah (d. 1494), Ismail’s older brother, realized
that he was about to die, “he summoned the Sufi amirs to the shrine, informed them of his impending
demise, gave them hopes of the increase of royal fortune (irtifa-i rāyat-i dawlat-i shāhī), and put his crown
(tāj) on Ismail’s head.” Khwandamir, 567. Ismail I later emphasized the importance of wearing it in his
divan, or collection of poems: “Whoever recognizes the Twelve Imams/It is proper for [him] to wear the
red/crimson taj,” cited in İbrahim Arslanoğlu, Şah İsmail Hatayî: Divan, Dehname, Nasihatname ve
Anadolu Hatayîleri (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1992), 115. For a recent study on the origins and the
evolution of the term Kızılbaş, see Shahzad Bashir, “The Origins and Rhetorical Evolution of the term
Qizilbāsh in Persianate Literature,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 57 (2014):
364-391. Bashir cogently argues that the term Kızılbaş had varying connotations during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and was not the sole marker of Safavid identity.
246
Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi, The History of the Warres between the Turkes and Persians, trans.
Abraham Harthwell (Tehran: Islamic Revolution Publications and Educational Organization, 1976), 45. It
should be mentioned that Minadoi confused the place name Ardabil with the leader of the Safavids.

88


 Haydar, in fact, was not the first contemporary figure who created “a religiously

conditioned political movement … using the mahdistic tenet as a tool to motivate

political action.”247 The main difference, however, between other Shi‘ite movements and

the Safaviyya order was the missionary activities conducted by the latter.248 Haydar’s

teachings were a synthesis of Sufism, Alid loyalty, and ghuluww, or extreme Shi‘ite249

beliefs that bound the Kızılbaş to their Safavid pirs, or Sufi guides. Accordingly, an

increase in pro-Safavid propaganda began in central and eastern Anatolia, as well as in

northwestern Iran, with the goal of spiritual and ideological conversion to the Safaviyya

order. Haydar, seeking revenge for his father’s death, marched against the “infidels” of

Shirvan in order to strengthen the military’s role in the order.250 “So great was his

success,” says a contemporary Italian traveler, “that he was considered by all a Saint, and

a man almost divine.”251 These incursions, in addition to yielding impressive spoils of

war, spread his reputation in a short period to the extent that he soon began to lead a large

army of roughly 6,000, “all … brave [and] well-trained soldiers.”252

247
For instance, Ali Mu‘ayyad, the leader of the Persian Sarbadar Dynasty (1336-1381), used this strategy
about a century before. For further details, see Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 71.
248
According to Arjomand, there is no evidence of missionary activity for the spread of Imami Shi‘ism in
Iran in the period preceding the establishment of the Safavid Empire. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and
the Hidden Imam, 105.
249
Ghulat, “extremist,” is a term of disapproval for individuals accused of exaggeration (ghuluww) in
religion. It was historically applied to a group of Shi‘ite Muslims whose doctrines were regarded as
exaggerated in reverence for the Imams, and sometimes to Ismai‘ilis. According to Kathryn Babayn,
however, translating ghulāt (plural) as “extremist” is incorrect and “exaggerator” is more accurate. For
further details see Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Ghulāt,” by Marshall G. S. Hodgson; Babayan,
Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiah, xv-xvi; and Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites, 50-65.
250
Rula Judi Abisaab, Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London: I. B. Tauris,
2004), 9. Khunji describes Ardabil as a city dominated by “swords, not pens as it was previously.” Khunji,
65.
251
A Narrative of Italian Travelers in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, ed. and trans. Charles
Grey (London: Hakluyt Society, 1873), 43.
252
A Narrative of Italian Travelers, 43-44.

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 The politicization of the movement continued, and to some extent accelerated,

under Haydar as the order engaged in alliances with regional and European powers

against the rising influence of the Ottomans.253 After the fall of Constantinople to the

Ottomans in 1453, Christian Europe, alarmed by the possibility of an Ottoman advance

into western Europe, initiated an anti-Ottoman league which soon included the Safaviyya

movement. Following the loss of the Byzantine kingdom of Trebizond to the Ottomans in

1461, the Austrians and Venetians pursued a more intensive policy of collaboration with

the Ottomans’ rivals to the East, first the Aq-Qoyunlu rulers Uzun Hasan and Rüstem,

and later the Safavid leader Haydar. A number of ambassadors were exchanged, promises

were made, and treaties were signed in an attempt to isolate the Ottomans from both the

East and the West.254 At the end of these efforts, Khunji narrates, “The lord of the Rum

[Bayezid II], despite all his army and dominions, was afraid of the turbulence (bī-bākī) of

the subjects of the shaykh.”255 Another step in the Safavids’ politicization was the

minting of seals with an official tuğra, or calligraphic signature. The earliest known

documents with Haydar’s seal date to his return from a campaign in Circassia in the

1480s, when he distributed land grants to Sheikh Zahed-i Gilani, Sheikh Safi’s spiritual

master’s offspring, as a form of inheritance.256

Haydar’s increasing spiritual and political influence, with a more pronounced

Shi‘ite emphasis, in eastern Anatolia and northwestern Iran ultimately jeopardized his

253
According to Khunji, Haydar, whom he calls the devil (shaytān/şeytan), was the one who changed the
“[dervish] cap of poverty (kulah-i gada’i) for a crown of world domination” and his main followers were
the “idolators of Rum.” Khunji, 61. Emphasis mine.
254
Rudi Matthee, “Iran’s Ottoman Diplomacy During the Reign of Shāh Sulaymān I (1077-1105/1666-
94),” in Iran and Iranian Studies: Essays in Honor of Iraj Afshar, ed. Kambiz Eslami (Princeton, NJ:
Zagros, 1998), 151.
255
Khunji, 69.
256
Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 69.

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relationship with neighboring political actors, including the Aq-Qoyunlus. When Haydar

assumed the leadership of the order after his father’s death, according to Khunji,

[H]is father’s lieutenants [khulafa] came from every

direction and foolishly announced the glad tidings of his
divinity [ulūhiyat]. The excessive obedience of the people
of Rum moved the shaykh-zāda to acquire bad habits and
manners…. Instead of exercising his pen on the sacred
book, he exercised his sword on the dogs of Ardabil… who
never prayed and never gave zakāt (alms), who never fasted
nor knew the road to ‘Arafat [at Mecca] …. Many people
from Rum, Tālish [Northern Iran], and Siyah-kuh [eastern
Anatolia] gathered to him, and it is reported that they
considered him their god (ma‘būd) and, neglecting the
duties of prayer [namāz] and fulfilling religious duties
[‘ibadāt], looked upon the shakyh as their qibla and the
being to whom prostration (sajda) was due.257

While the Aq-Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan deeply respected Haydar and hence married his

daughter to him,258 upon Uzun Hasan’s death in 1478, the relationship between the two

families started to dissolve. The new Aq-Qoyunlu ruler, Yakub (d. 1490), not only called

Haydar “the leader of the people of error,”259 but also considered him a threat to his rule

and sought regional alliances against him. As a result of this initiative, in 1488, Yakub

sent one of his emirs, Süleyman Beg, with 4,000 soldiers to help the ruler of Shirvan,

Ferruh Yesar, who was fighting against Haydar.260 With many of his followers alongside

257
Khunji, 66-68. Emphasis mine.
258
“Because of this marriage,” Junabadi argues, “the door of victory and friendship opened to Haydar day
by day.” Jundabadi, 97.
259
Letter from the Aq-Qoyunlu ruler Yakub to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II, in Feridun Ahmed Bey,
Mecmua-yı Münşeat-i Feridun Bey (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1848-1849), Vol. I, 302-303.
260
Sharaf al-Din Bitlîsî, The Sharafnâne, or the History of the Kurdish Nation. Book One, ed. and trans.
M. R. Izady (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2005), 129; Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 310.
In his letter to Yakub, Ferruh Yesar pleads, “Sultan Haydar is headed for Shirvan on a military campaign
with a huge army of Qizilbash. There is no doubt that if he subdues this province he will crave more
territory, and that will be to your detriment. It wold be better for you to send an army to assist me to keep
the Qizilbash from entering this region and diminish their might in battle.” Khwandamir, 563.

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him, Haydar fought “courageously” against the coalition of Aq-Qoyunlu and the Shirvan

Shah, but ultimately “a fatal arrow loosed by the hand of destiny ended his life.”261 His

followers buried him at the site of the battle, in Tabaristan, south of the Caspian Sea, and

returned to Ardabil. Haydar’s untimely death happened before he was able to establish

the tradition of the khutbah/hutbe, the Friday public sermon featuring his name as ruler.

This would prove crucial, as it was the last indicator needed for the Safaviyya order to be

officially recognized as an Islamic state.

Haydar’s three sons, Ali, Ibrahim, and Ismail, were imprisoned on a small island

in Lake Van on the Aq-Qoyunlu ruler Yakub’s orders until they were transferred to the

castle of Istakhr in southwestern Iran.262 Upon their return to Ardabil after Yakub’s death

in 1490, followers of the order gathered and chose Ali, the oldest brother, as the spiritual

and political guide of the order. His short-lived leadership corresponded with a struggle

between the Aq-Qoyunlu princes Baysungur and Rüstem to succeed Yakub.263 The

Safaviyya order, which was acting more like a political movement than a religious order

at this point, became involved in the conflict when many of Ali’s followers joined

Rüstem’s army at his request to help fight against his brother. As the head of the order,

Ali personally fought alongside Rüstem to establish his rule.

Ali’s short leadership represents a significant turning point in the relationship

between the Ottomans and the Safaviyya order as an assassination attempt against

Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), organized by a meczup derviş (“crazy dervish”) in 1492, was

interpreted by the Ottoman authorities as a Safaviyya-supported plot and resulted in the

261
Khwandamir, 564.
262
Bitlîsî, Sharafnâne, 135-136; A Narrative of Italian Travelers in Persia, 101.
263
For further details on this conflict, see Khwandamir, 562-563.

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cessation of the çerağ akçesi to the center in Ardabil and suppression of the order’s

followers. The chief judge (qadi) of Edirne, in response to a decree sent from Istanbul

immediately after the assassination attempt, executed most of the followers of

Osman/Otman Baba (d. 1478), a Kızılbaş religious leader in the city, and forced the rest

of the community to move to different parts of Anatolia.264 Khunji also claims that Sultan

Bayezid II was cautious about the Safavids’ increasing influence and growing body of

supporters before this assassination attempt even though “he had a massive army under

his command.”265 As a result, Bayezid II did not allow the Kızılbaş to serve in his army

and ordered his commanders to expel any Kızılbaş whom they might find among their

troops.266 Additional suppressive policies, such as being exiled to the Balkans and the

Aegean islands, were implemented, adding to the tension between the two groups.267

The Ottomans were not the only threat to the Safaviyya order and its leader at this

time, as Rüstem ultimately saw Ali as a potential risk and plotted to eliminate him from

the political scene. In 1494, in an effort to prevent a reunion between Ali and the large

number of Safavid followers residing in Ardabil, Rüstem’s army ambushed Ali on his

way there and killed him.268 Leadership of the order passed to Ali’s young brother Ismail,

who was only nine years old.269 With the help of a small group of Kızılbaş tribal leaders,

264
Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-tevarih, III, 274.
265
Khunji, 69; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu,12-13.
266
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 80. This policy did not end with Bayezid II; subsequent sultans
followed the same strategy, even though it was not always successful.
267
Müneccimbaşı I, 417; Baki Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri (Istanbul: Can Yayınları, 1995), 122;
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 36.
268
Munshi, 39.
269
Khwandamir, 564-566. Before the ambush, Ali “placed his own tac on Ismail’s head and placed him in
the charge of his trusted companions and addressed him at length regarding his mission.” Munshi, 39. The
question why Ismail, rather than Ibrahim, who was three years older, was Ali’s successor has puzzled a
number of l historians. Morton provides a possible explanation by examining the only contemporary
Safavid source, Fazli’s Afzal al-tavarikh, which narrates that Ali in fact divided the succession between

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called ahl-i ikhtisas (or people on special duty),270 Ismail stayed hidden in Lahijan, south

of the Caspian Sea, until 1498, when he decided to establish an empire from the ashes of

the Safaviyya order and his grandfather Uzun Hasan’s Aq-Qoyunlu state, which had been

obliterated by the Ottomans.271

VII. Conclusion

Another son of Haydar emerged, whose name was Ismail.

His followers greeted each other by saying “Shah” instead
of “Selamun Aleykum.” They recited “Shah” whenever
they prayed for their sick ones. When the Anatolian
followers were asked why they are going all the way to
Ardabil, instead of Mecca, they would say, “We wish to see
the Living [i.e., Ismail], not the dead [i.e., Muhammad,
who in any case is buried in Medina].272

The history of late medieval/early modern Iran, as Michel Mazzaoui describes it,

is “perhaps the most confused part of the long history of this region.”273 It was during this

era of political instability that the metamorphosis of the Safaviyya mystical order into a

millenarian Shi‘ite movement gained momentum under Junayd, attained a well-defined

Shi‘ite framework under Haydar, and culminated with the establishment of the Safavid

state under Ismail. The present chapter has examined the order’s transformation into a

Ibrahim and Ismail before he died. Morton then concludes that later historians, depicted a “new picture,” in
which Ibrahim became a “source of shame” for the dynasty due to his incompetence in fighting and his
collaboration with the Aq-Qoyunlu dynasty. According to Morton, the real reason behind this choice was
Ibrahim’s quietist Sufism as opposed to Ismail’s militant approach, which was favored by eminent Kızılbaş
emirs of the time. Morton, “The Early Years of Shah Isma‘il,” 32-39. Interestingly, Aşıkpaşazade, who was
a contemporary of Ismail, narrates that after Ali died Ibrahim was the head of the family until he also died
on the battlefield. Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 268.
270
Roger Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 7, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1974):
189-190.
271
Ibid., 567; Ross Anonymous, 35-37.
272
Müneccimbaşı, Camiü’d-Düvel (Selçuklular Tarihi I: Horasan-Irak, Kirman ve Suriye Selçukluları), ed.
and trans. Ali Öngül (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 2000), 268. (hereafter Müneccimbaşı III).
273
Mazzaoui, “A ‘New’ Edition of the Safvat al-safā,” 304.

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ruling dynasty, not from the traditional starting point, the tenure of Junayd, but beginning

with the founder Sheikh Safi and earlier leaders of the order. As the emergence of the

Safaviyya order took place in a religio-political environment shaped by multilayered and

heteregeneous confessional identities, Twelver Shi‘ism, in the process of politicization,

began to provide a sublime cause for the post-Junayd Safaviyya leaders to fight for. This

cause centered on the Imams, the descendants of the Prophet, and governance of the

Muslim community, and aimed to fulfill the religious duty of jihad, or the expansion of

Islam. As this transformation crystallized, not only was a strong political and religious

identity shaped, but a complex network of social, political, and economic interactions

between the Safavids and the surrounding political actors, including the Ottomans,

emerged, opening a long-term political and religious struggle in the region.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Muslim world was partitioned

among five major regional powers: the Ottomans in Anatolia and the Balkans; the

Mamluks in Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz; the Safavids in Iran; the Uzbeks in Transoxiana;

and the Mughals in India. Ismail, as the newest member in this political arena, inherited a

powerful network of Anatolian followers from his ancestors, though his base in Iran was

still relatively weak. In response, he developed the connections that his grandfather and

father had established with the Anatolian Turcoman tribes as the Ottomans and his local

rivals in the region proved to be a threat to his power. The establishment of a religio-

political Safavid identity forced the Ottoman central authority to confront the “Kızılbaş

problem” along its eastern border, as well as in its inner regions. While an increasing

number of Anatolian Kızılbaş were being exiled by Sultan Bayezid II to remote areas of

the empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the ever-growing Safaviyya tariqa

95


had become a geopolitical power under the leadership of Ismail, who continued to spread

not only his Shi‘ite beliefs but also his political ideology with more brutal tactics than his

predecessors.274 In southern and eastern Anatolia, an area inhabited mostly by nomadic

and semi-nomadic tribes, the centralizing policies of the Ottoman Empire created an

environment ripe for Safavid religious propaganda and a subsequent response by the

leaders in Istanbul to the increasing number of “heretics” within the empire’s borders.

274
After Ismail assumed power in 1499 one of his first moves was to initiate a counter-massacre in Isfahan,
where a century before a Sunni group had massacred the Shi‘ite locals after Sunni ulema issued a fatwa
calling upon their fellow Sunnis to kill the Shi‘ites of the town. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids, 33.

96


 Chapter 3
Pro-Safavid Propaganda: Initiation, Legitimization, and Methods

I. Introduction

By the beginning of the sixteenth century, as noted above, the Muslim world was

partitioned among five major regional powers: the Ottomans in Anatolia and the Balkans;

the Mamluks in Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz; the Uzbeks in Transoxiana; the Mughals in

the Indian subcontinent; and the recently formed Safavids in Iran. Shah Ismail’s entry

into this political arena was officially marked when he stood in front of the

minbar/minber, or pulpit, in Tabriz, holding the unsheathed sword of the Lord of the Age

(i.e., the Twelfth Imam), in 1501 to declare Shi‘ism the state religion of his domains.275

The Safavid regime was well aware of the difficulty of creating a strong and loyal base to

develop its religious ideology and state. Although Ismail inherited a powerful network of

Anatolian followers from his ancestors, his base in Iran was still relatively weak since the

region was still predominantly Sunni.276 Furthermore, most of his sympathizers were

located in Anatolia, where the Ottomans were gradually strengthening their political

authority. In response, Ismail enhanced the connections that his grandfather, Junayd, and

275
The unknown author of Ross Anonymous decribes this moment as "the prelude to the reign of the Lord
of the Age, and Ismail [as] the wielder of the sword.” Sir Denison E. Ross, “The Early Years of Shah
Ismail, Founder of the Safavi Dynasty,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (April1896): 249-340.
276
In pre-Safavid Iran, Shi‘ites were limited in number and clustered in a small number of cities such as
Qom, Kashan, Sava, and Rayy. According to many scholars, the conversion of the majority to Shi‘ism did
not take place until the eighteenth century. See Alesandro Bausani, The Persians from the Earliest Days to
the Twentieth Century (London: Elek Books, 1971), 139. However, Junabadi, an early seventeenth-century
Safavid chronicler, states that “by the time I started writing this book [the 1610s], there was no sign of
those bid‘at [wrongful innovations] and deviation [i.e., Sunni Islam] in Iran.” Junabadi, 24.

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father, Haydar, had established with the Anatolian Turcoman (and in some cases

Kurdish) tribes by developing a multi-faceted pro-Safavid propaganda machine with

officially approved religious and political authorities, including local notables in the

region. As a newly established dynasty sharing striking similarities with its neighbors

(ethnically Turkic but with an Arabophone religious structure), the Safavids used their

propaganda to legitimize their newly acquired position in Iran and Anatolia by

encouraging and facilitating conversion to Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite Islam, and thus inculcating

Safavid sympathy and subject-hood. They followed this practice for more than a century.

While religious propaganda in general has been a topic of sustained scholarly

interest, its existence within Islam has not drawn much attention outside of the

Fatimid/Ismaili da‘wa.277 Negligence of the role of pro-Safavid propaganda in spreading

Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite Islam in Anatolia has stemmed from a long-held argument according to

which the Kızılbaş identity dovetailed with ethnicity and that, therefore, conversion

to/from Kızılbaş Islam was simply impossible. The main advocates of this narrative were

Turkish nationalist historians of the 1930s. For instance, according to Abdülbaki

Gölpınarlı, while anyone could join the Bektaşi order, no one could become Kızılbaş,

277
For further details on religious propaganda within Islam up until the Safavids, see Chapter II of this
dissertation. According to Junabadi, rulers before Ismail who wanted to curse the first three caliphs and/or
the Umayyads were not able to do so. Junabadi gives a list of four allegedly Twelver Shi‘ite rulers: the
Abbasid caliph al-Mu‘tadid (r.892-902), the Buyid ruler Ahmad [ibn Buya] (r. 945-967), Muhammad
Khodabandeh [i.e., Uljaytu] of the Ilkhanids (r. 1304-1316), and the Timurid ruler Husayn Bayqara (r.
1469-1506), and adds that “Ismail was the first Alawi who, from the time of Ali b. Abi Talib until now, has
been able to establish a [Shi‘ite] world order, and he was also the one who was able to destroy the wrongful
innovations, bid‘at, which became prevalent among the followers of Muhammad.” Junabadi, 22-30.
Junabadi’s argument concerning the pre-Safavid Shi‘ite polities is inaccurate because two of the rulers
whom he mentions, al-Mu‘tadid and Husayn Bayqara, were not Shi‘ite. For the Isma‘ilis and Fatimid
da‘wa, see Farhad Daftary, The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990, Second Edition 2007); idem The Assasin Legends: Myths of the Isma‘ilis (London: I. B.
Tauris, 1994).

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because, he argued, being Kızılbaş was about genealogy, not conversion.278 For a second

group of historians, in contrast, conversion to Kızılbaş Islam occurred only in isolated

incidents that involved “insignificant” people and their “insignificant” stories rather than

a meticulously planned and implemented policy with momentous popularity in late

medieval/early modern Anatolia.279

Existing scholarship also overemphasizes 1514, when Ismail was humiliated by

the Ottoman sultan Selim I at the Battle of Çaldıran, which, according to the conventional

interpretation, marks the end of Safavid popularity among Anatolians shaped, in part, by

the charismatic nature of the Safavid shahs.280 Despite this setback, semi-organized pro-

Safavid propaganda gained momentum after 1514 and constituted a significant threat to

Istanbul for more than a century due to a well-established network of missionary

activities, marriage alliances, and trade between the Anatolian and Safavid Kızılbaş. I call

these propaganda efforts semi-organized and sophisticated due to their assiduousness in

seeking to replace Sunnism with Shi‘ism and, more importantly, to transform the latter

from a sectarian devotion into a source of political and ideological loyalty under the

Safavid banner. These activities were not spontaneous and unorganized acts of

enthusiastic individuals but more closely resembled the meticulously organized Fatimid

da‘wa of the tenth and eleventh centuries C.E. As Said Arjomand once argued, these

278
“… her isteyen bu tarikate [Bektaşilik] girebilir ise de Kızılbaşlığa giremez. Kızılbaş, erkek olsun kadın
olsun, mutlaka Kızılbaş soyundan gelir.” Abdulbaki Gölpınarlı, “Kızılbaş,” in Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam
Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları), Vol. VI, 789. Hereafter TDV İslam
Ansiklopedisi .
279
For an example, see Ali Haydar Avcı, Osmanlı Gizli Tarihinde Pir Sultan Abdal ve Bütün Deyişleri
(Istanbul: Nokta Kitap, 2006). While this approach can be seen as an effort to give agency to the Anatolian
Kızılbaş, it perpetuates an erroneous picture in which pro-Safavid propaganda is never mentioned.
280
For examples, see Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid
Theocracy,” in Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson, Professor of
Persian Studies, Princeton University, eds. Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen (Salt Lake City, UT:
University of Utah Press, 1990), 32-33; and Yıldırım, “Turcomans between Two Empires.”

99


efforts “constituted the single most momentous series of ‘religiously relevant’ political

acts of the Safavid rulers”281 as they provided a religio-political platform that was “so

[wide] in scope that it contained something for everyone.”282 By the mid-sixteenth

century, a Venetian report estimated that the number of Kızılbaş in Anatolia constituted

four-fifths of the population of the entire peninsula.283 Within this framework, this

chapter examines the inception, institutionalization, and methods of pro-Safavid

propaganda, a central step in the formation and transformation of the Safavid religious

identity(ies) and development of the Safavid state.

II. Initiation and Legitimization of Pro-Safavid Propaganda

“It is hard to imagine,” writes Roger Savory, “a ruling institution more

preoccupied with the question of legitimacy than the Safavids.”284 As the emergence of

the Safaviyya order took place in a religio-political environment shaped by multilayered

and heterogeneous confessional and political identities, the spread of Twelver Shi‘ism

provided a messianic cause for the post-Junayd Safaviyya leaders. This cause centered on

the descendants of the Prophet, the Twelve Imams, and governance of the Muslim

community and aimed to fulfill the religious duty of jihad, or the expansion of Shi‘ite

Islam. As this transformation from a mystical order into a political movement

crystallized, a complex network of social, political, and economic interactions between

281
Said A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 107.
282
Roger Savory, “The Safawid State and Polity,” Iranian Studies 7/1-2 (1974): 191.
283
Vladimir Minosrky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi on the Safavids,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 20 (1957): 438, n. 4. According to Baha Sait Bey (d. 1939), one of the first researchers of
Alevi/Kızılbaş culture in Anatolia in the early Republican Turkish era, half of the Anatolian population was
Kızılbaş in the first quarter of the twentieth century. “Türkiye’de Alevi Zümreleri,’ in Türk Yurdu Dergisi
23 (1926): 404-406.
284
Savory, The Safawid State and Polity,” 186.

100


the Safavids and the surrounding political actors, including the Ottomans, emerged, and

ultimately developing into a long-term political and religious struggle in the region. With

this as the backdrop, maintaining close contact with Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite subjects of the

neighboring political entities was another mission that the Safavid court embraced, for, as

Shah Tahmasb stated, “The honor of the Shi‘ites is the honor of the shah” (namus-u

Shi‘iyan namus-u shah ast).285

The Safavid sheikhs/shahs, the carriers of this “brilliantly effective

propaganda,”286 were not, as noted above in relation to Haydar, the first late

medieval/early modern Shi‘ite leaders to use messianism as a spur to political action.287

Before and during the expansion of the Safaviyya order into a Shi‘ite movement, there

were several centuries of extensive developments in Shi‘ite theology and jurisprudence

such as the Isma‘ilis and the Fatimid da‘wa.288 Unlike earlier Twelver Shi‘ite

movements, however, the Safavid Empire used extensive propaganda activities to export

its religious and political movement in an attempt to influence populations far beyond its

borders.289

The initiation of pro-Safavid propaganda predates Ismail’s declaration of Shi‘ite

Islam as the official creed of the Safavid court. Following the Safaviyya movement’s

inception, Safavid sheikhs, to varying degrees, worked fervently to formulate and

legitimize a religious identity for Safaviyya followers, while simultaneously developing a

285
Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, 46.
286
Savory, “The Safawid State and Polity,” 191.
287
Arjomand, Shadow of God, 71.
288
For a detailed discussion on the Fatimid da‘wa, as well as the pro-Shi‘ite propaganda conducted by
religious and political actors up until the Safavids, see Chapter I.
289
According to Arjomand, there is no evidence of missionary activity for the spread of Imami Shi‘ism in
Iran in the period preceding the establishment of the Safavid Empire. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and
the Hidden Imam, 105.

101


political ideology through political and military victories, the use of charismatic leaders

and a new message in response to ongoing problems in the region. For instance, as a

powerful orator, Sheikh Junayd successfully used local grievances in the cause of

spreading his religio-political ideology in Anatolia. His famous conversation with a local

sheikh, Abd al-Latif, about the importance of evlad, or offspring, over ashab, or

companions – referring to the dispute over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad in

the original Muslim community -- sheds light upon Junayd’s ability to manipulate

discourse in his favor. Ziya Gökalp (d. 1924) argued that Junayd’s position in this debate

was meant to appeal to Anatolian Turks (Oğuz Han’ın çocukları ve Kayıların

amcazadeleri), whose position had been jeopardized by the growing influence of the

devşirme recruits (padişahın Enderun’dan çıkan devşirmelerinden mürekkep olan

sahabeleri).290 In this context, the Turks were evlad of the rulers, since they were

ethnically related to them, while the devşirme recruits were ashab.

Putting aside rare anecdotal references from contemporary and near-contemporary

accounts about the earlier leaders of the Safaviyya order and their activities in Anatolia,

there are no surviving sources composed by either the sheikhs or the followers of the

order that enlighten us concerning the initiation and early days of pro-Safavid

propaganda. What historians know, mainly based on Saffetu’s-Safa, is that the

justification of pro-Safavid activities began with Sheikh Sadr al-Din, who emphasized his

family’s connection to the family of the Prophet Muhammad as a means of spreading his

father’s teachings. Emphasizing the sacredness of the Safaviyya family was a tactic used

in later periods, as well. For instance, while narrating his four years in the Ottoman

290
Ziya Gökalp, Türkçülüğün Esasları (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976), 38.

102


realm, an anonymous Spanish captive notes that “according to Sofi [the Safavid shah

Tahmasb], the [courtiers of the] Great Turk [the Ottoman sultan] are half Christians

because most of them are the children of Christians. Sofi, on the other hand, claims that

he is the legitimate heir of Muslim territories since his Muslim background goes further

back in history.”291 Since this captive did not travel to Safavid Iran, his knowledge of

Safavid claims stems from his interactions with either Anatolian Kızılbaş individuals or

Safavid disciples.

At the same time, Safavid chronicles authored during or after Shah Ismail’s reign

do not deliver a complete picture of Safavid self-justification since most were written as

part of pro-Safavid propaganda during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For

instance, Junabadi, while detailing the life of Sheikh Safi, narrates a conversation

between the sheikh and his spiritual guide, Zahid-i Gilani, in which the latter asks Sheikh

Safi to leave Gilan, in northern Iran, to lead the ummah according to the teachings of Ali

b. Abi Talib, and to assign halifes, or missionaries, to spread the faith to.292 While it may

seem plausible that Sheikh Safi himself started the practice of sending out missionaries to

spread the faith, the later Safavid movement would have wished to legitimize their

propaganda by linking it to the movement’s founder.

Repeated references by Junayd and his immediate successors to certain Shi‘ite

religious scholars, particularly al-Mufid (d. 1022), further facilitated the efforts to

legitimize pro-Safavid propaganda. As discussed in Chapter I, Twelver Shi‘ite tradition

makes a clear distinction between “believers” (mu’minūn) and “Muslims” (muslimūn).

291
Manuel Serrano y Sanz, Türkiye’nin Dört Yılı, trans. A. Kurutluoğlu (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, n.d.),
121-122.
292
Junabadi, 75- 76.

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This is a concern of Muslim theology in general, but what sets the Twelver Shi‘ites apart

is the assertion, articulated by al-Mufid, that the muslimūn, as opposed to the mu’minūn,

are those who acknowledge God’s unity and Muhammad’s message without adhering to

the principle of devotion to an Imam, walāya.293 Only those who follow a Shi‘ite Imam

can be mu’minūn. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, al-Mufid famously argued that

the traditional dichotomy between the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb

(abode of war) does not suffice but that a third realm, dar al-iman (abode of faith),

representing the Twelver Shi‘ites, should be added. Twelver Shi‘ite interpretation of the

doctrine of jihad, which also follows al-Mufid’s argument in the eyes of the Safavid

sheikhs and shahs, emphasizes the duty of the “abode of faith” to convert the “abode of

Islam.” 294

While some historians argue that Safavid efforts to spread Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam

into larger territories, including Anatolia, failed,295 the pro-Safavid propaganda

campaigns culminated in increasing numbers of conversions to Kızılbaş Islam and

migrations to Safavid Iran beginning in the second half of the fifteenth century.

According to an anonymous Italian merchant from the 1510s who traveled in Safavid

Iran, “… men were continually flocking to his [the shah’s] side from all parts of the

country, but especially from Natolia [Anatolia], Turkey,296 and Caramania [southern

293
Etan Kohlberg, “The Evolution of the Shi‘a,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 27 (1983): 10.
294
Etan Kohlberg, “The Development of the Imami Shi‘i Doctrine of Jihad,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 126 (1976), 78; idem., “The Evolution of the Shi‘a,” 10.
295
For an example, see Michael M. Mazzaoui, “The Religious Policy of Safavid Shah Isma‘il II,” in
Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson, Professor of Persian Studies,
Princeton University, eds. Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen (Salt Lake City, UT: University of
Utah Press, 1990), 50-51.
296
Charles Grey, in his translation of the text into English, does not explain his choice of the word “Turkey
It can be speculated, however, “Turkey” refers to other parts of Anatolia or to the Ottoman Balkans.

104


Anatolia]. … Ismail presented gifts to all of them according to their ranks and

conditions.”297 After the second half of the sixteenth century, pro-Safavid propaganda

intensified to such an extent that the Ottoman central authority switched its focus from

those who were born into this sect to those who “became Kızılbaş” in response. These

melahide, or heretic, subjects of the empire, according to the Ottoman state’s logic,

encouraged further Anatolian participation in the Kızılbaş religious movement and also

legitimized and strengthened Anatolians’ identification with the Safavid state. According

to an imperial order sent to Erzurum in 1577, the situation in the region had become

impossible to handle, leading Istanbul to order the deportation of all Kızılbaş converts to

Cyprus.298 The complexity of the pro-Safavid propaganda that elicited such a response

from the Ottomans is the focal point of this chapter.

III. Main Methods of Pro-Safavid Propaganda

The relationship of “pir va murid,” or master and disciple, that the Safavids

forged with their subjects was at the center of Safavid attempts to establish their

legitimacy against other Muslim rulers in the region. As the Ottomans gained strength

relative to their rivals to the east, particularly after the Battle of Chaldiran (1514), the

Safavids increased the intensity of their religious and ideological propaganda in Ottoman

territories, which proved to be a more subtle, penetrating, and effective attempt to

297
A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, ed. and trans. Charles
Grey (London: Hakluyt Society, 1873), 194.
298
MD, Vol. 34, No. 413 (8 Zilkade 985/ January 16, 1578). The lack of orders mentioning any action
taken to implement this order implies that the order was not carried out. One should also mention that the
Otoman central authority was trying to repopulate Cyprus. An order from around the same time to send the
Jews of Safed to Cyrpus was revoked after the governorof Safed complained. Uriel Heyd, trans., Ottoman
Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman according to the Mühimme Defteri (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1960), 167-68.

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manipulate public opinion compared to their previous military attempts. The increasing

influence of pro-Safavid propaganda, which penetrated not only into rural Anatolia but

also into the inner circles of the Ottoman court, eventually drew the attention of the

Ottoman political and religious elite. In a letter to the grand vizier Rüstem Pasha in the

1550s, Sheikh Bali Efendi (d. 1572),299 a prominent member of the Ottoman ulema,

advised Rüstem to exterminate the entire Kızılbaş population, sparing only children:

Now, my son, … the requirement … is that it is necessary

to defeat by the sword and to destroy by force (qahr) that
tribe [the Kızılbaş], its great and its small (ulusuni
kiçkisini), its property and women, with the exception of
the children (sibyan). There is no other way, for it is
impossible to reform (ıslah) this tribe by kindness and
mercy.300

It was the complexity of the pro-Safavid propaganda efforts, as well as the tenacity of

those in charge, that ultimately led to its success.

While missionaries, or halifes, dispatched into Ottoman territory were the main

agents of proselytism, the Safavids also circulated books and objects, made marriage

alliances, supported political and social upheavals, and encouraged migration to Safavid

Iran with the lure of lands and titles.

III. a. Dispatching religious agents, halifes

At the core of pro-Safavid propaganda in Anatolia was a meticulously selected

group of people, called khalifa/halife in the singular, who reached out to the Turcoman

299
According to Taşköprülüzade, Sheikh Bali Efendi was a learned and pious man who strongly supported
the shari‘a. He died in Sofia in 1552. Mejdi Mehmed Efendi added that the sheikh enjoyed Süleyman’s
favor and accompanied him on several campaigns where he recited prayers for the sultan’s victories.
Minosrky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi on the Safavids,” 441-448.
300
Cited in Minorsky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi,” 445.

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(and in some cases Kurdish) tribes to increase the number of followers for the order, to

encourage them to migrate to Safavid Iran, to collect money and soldiers for the newly

established state, and, most importantly, to instigate rebellions against the Ottoman

authorities.301 The halifes were generally chosen from the Kızılbaş tribes themselves and

then taken to Ardabil for training before being sent back to propagate the doctrine of the

order. Of the six ranks that a Kızılbaş could attain within the Safaviyya Sufi structure,

halife was the highest.302 The title itself was also associated with the leader of a Kızılbaş

tribe or the ruler of a small Kızılbaş village or town.303 Michele Membré, who visited

Tabriz in the winter of 1539-1540, observed:

When he [the shah] passes by some village, the villagers

arrive, a hundred or two hundred, with their women; and
they come to meet the shah with their instruments and sing
praises of God … and perform other ceremonies …
together with their khalifa, that is village headman and
priest.304

In addition, the khalifetu’l-khulafa/halifetü’l-hulefa, or head halife, was a member

of the Safavid court whose main responsibility was to oversee Kızılbaş tribes by

controlling the activities of halifes dispatched to various parts of Safavid Iran and

301
Disciples of the Safaviyya order and the Safavid state were not the first ones to be called halifes in the
context of religious propaganda. Oruç Bey and Aşıkpaşazade, the famous authors of the fourteenth- and
fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicles known as Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, mention Babai halifes who actively
spread their Shi‘ite-oriented interpretation of Islam in Anatolia in the thirteenth century. Oruç Bey,
Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, ed. Nihal Atsız (Istanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1972); Aşıkpaşazade,
Osmanoğullarının Tarihi ve Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, eds. Kemal Yavuz and Yekta Saraç (Istanbul: Gökkubbe
Yayınları, 2007). For more details on religious propaganda in Anatolia prior to the advance of the
Safaviyya order, see Chapter II of this dissertation.
302
The other five were dede, mürebbi, rehber, müsahip, and talip. Gölpınarlı, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi,
“Kızılbaş.”
303
The anonymous author of Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb (1670s) gives numerous examples for this use of
the term halife. For an example, see 26-28: “A young man from Rumlu tribe, whose name was Sufiyan
Halife, and he was married to Sufi Halife’s daughter. His daughter had a son from this marriage whose
name was Safi Halife. Behram Mirza, on behalf of his brother, Shah Tahmasb, gave the governorship of
Mashhad to Sufiyan Halife.”
304
Michele Membré, Relazione di Persia (1542), ed. and trans. by A.H. Morton as Mission to the Lord
Sophy of Persia (London: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1999), 25.

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Anatolia.305 As the Shah’s waqil/vekil, or agent, the halifetü’l-hulefa was highly revered,

both as a spiritual guide and as a political actor.306 The prominence of the halifes and

halifetü’l-hulefa, therefore, demonstrates the thoroughness of the semi-organized state

propaganda in the form of missionary activities. In addition to the halifetü’l-hulefa, a

court official called the sadr supervised qadi-ships, mosques, madrasas, and religious

endowments. However, according to Andrew Newman, although the Safavid sadr was

supposed to be the head of the religious classes, he was not particularly associated with

the propagation of Shi‘ism.307

Although the halife was a critical part of the Safavid political apparatus, the

origins of individual halifes are unknown due to the secretive nature of their work, as

well as the nature of Safavid chronicles, which fabricated or distorted historical facts to

justify certain religious and/or political standpoints. For instance, the Safavid chronicler

Junabadi mentions Sheikh Safi as the first Safavid sheikh who dispatched disciples to

spread the teachings of the Safaviyya order and adds that with these halifes, his fame and

teachings spread quickly and the number of his followers who came to Ardabil increased

305
Hossein Mirjafari, “Sufism and Gradual Transformation in the Meaning of Sufi in Safavid Period,”
İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, Ord. Prof. Dr. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı Hatıra Sayısı
32 (March 1979): 162.
306
Mirjafari, “Sufism and Gradual Transformation,” 162; Ragor Savory, “The Office of Khalifat al-
Khulafa' Under the Safavids,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 85 (1965): 497. Among various
Kızılbaş tribes, the leaders of the Rumlu tribe were the main holders of the title. Two of them, Nur Ali
Halife Rumlu and Şahkuli/Şahkulu Halife Rumlu, will be discussed later as the main instigators of serious
rebellions against the Ottoman central authority in Anatolia. Despite his role at the Safavid court, the
halifetü’l-hulefa was not immune to close scrutiny. Those who did not obey the shah could be punished
and/or executed. Munshi, , 153; Rumlu Hasan. Ahsenu’t-Tevarih (History of Shah Ismail), trans. Cevat
Cevan (Istanbul: Ardıç Yayınları, 2004), 486-487; Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam,
110-111.
307
Andrew Newman, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ʿAlī
al-Karakī and Safawid Shiism,”Die Welt des Islams 33/1 (April 1993): 75-77.

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immensely.308 Despite the uncertainty surrounding their origins and early efforts, the

importance and meticulousness of the halife organization provides a historical backdrop

to pro-Safavid efforts prior to Shah Ismail, whose reign marked their peak.309 Marino

Sanuto, a Venetian traveler who visited Ardabil in the early sixteenth century, points out

that halifes had been around since the inception of the order in the late thirteenth

century.310

The extensive influence of the halifes was repeatedly mentioned in Safavid

chronicles. Junabadi, for instance, cites Saffetu’s-Safa, according to which, in a

conversation with the high-ranking Ilkhanid military official Amir Chuban (d. 1327),

Sheikh Safi claimed that each of his halifes had a hundred followers.311 Junabadi also

embellishes the leaderships of Sheikh Sadr al-Din and Sheikh Junayd, during which the

Safaviyya order “flourished with the halifes and the followers.”312 While the details of the

leadership of Sheikh Sadr al-Din are still widely unknown, historians do agree that

Sheikh Junayd intensified the deployment of disciples to both mediate and facilitate

conversions to Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite Islam and to recruit followers and supporters for his

political movement. Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji (d. 1519), in his account, points out

that Sheikh Junayd had disciples in the farthest corners of Rum [Anatolia] and Syria.313

As mentioned earlier, the number of halifes peaked during Shah Ismail’s reign. A

308
Junabadi, 77-78.
309
Faruk Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü (Şah İsmail ile
Halifeleri ve Anadolu Türkleri) (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1976), 12, 82.
310
Marino Sanuto, I Diarii, ed. Nicolò Barozzi (Venice: A Spese degli Editori, 1880), Vol. IV, 500.
311
Junabadi ,78-79.
312
Ibid., 88-89.
313
Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, Tarikh-i ‘Alam-ara-yi Amini, abridged translation by Vladimir Minorsky
as Persia in A. D. 1478-1490 (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1957), 64.

109


contemporary Italian traveler, who visited Tabriz in Shah Ismail’s early years, sheds

lights on their significance at the Safavid court:

I will say no more about this, but will go on to mention two

enormous elm-trees, beneath each of which more than a
hundred and fifty men can stand; and here they preach,
declaring and setting forth the new faith or Suffevean
[Safavid] doctrine. The preachers are two doctors of this
sect; and one of them, as many people say, taught Sultan
Sciech [Shah] Ismail, and the other is required to attend
with care to preaching and converting people to their
sect.314

While decreasing in number after Shah Ismail’s reign, Safavid halifes maintained their

prominent position in charge of pro-Safavid propaganda for the next century and a half.

Ottoman chronicles, on the other hand, emphasize the “Sunni” background of the

pre-Junayd halifes as a part of an ongoing effort to justify the alleged dichotomy between

the “Sunni past” (pre-Junayd) and Shi‘ite present (post-Junayd) of the order. According

to Taşköprülüzade Ahmed (d. 1561), the well-known author of the biographical

dictionary al-Shaqā’iq al-nu‘maniyya fī ‘ulamā’ al-dawlat al-‘Uthmaniyya, Hoca Ali (d.

1427) dispatched several “Sunni” halifes to Anatolia, the most famous of whom was

Hamid ibn Musa Aksarayi, known as Somuncu Baba.315 The sixteenth-century translator

of Taşköprülüzade’s work into Ottoman Turkish, Mecdi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1590), adds

that Somuncu Baba, after being trained at the Ardabil lodge as a murid of Hoca Ali, came

to Anatolia to spread the teachings of the Safaviyya order, though after some time, he

314
Cited in Sir John (Jean) Chardin, Travels in Persia, 1673-1677 (Mineola, NY: Dover Books, 1988;
reprint 1988), 168-169.
315
Ahmed ibn Mustafa Taşköprülüzade, Şakaik-ı Nu'maniye ve zeyilleri: Hadaiku’ş-şakaik, trans. Mecdi
Mehmed Efendi (d. 1590), ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), Vol. I, 74-76.

110


became a murid of the Halveti sheikh Hacı Bayram-ı Veli (d. 1430).316 While some

historians use Somuncu Baba’s alleged discontent with the Shi‘itization of the Safaviyya

order to explain this dynamic,317 the lack of primary sources makes it difficult to form a

concrete conclusion. According to Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, Sheikh Erzincanlı

Abdurrahman Efendi (d. 1432) was another Safavid halife who opposed the Shi‘itization

of the order. As an influential disciple of Sheikh Safi in the district of Amasya, Hoca

Saadeddin notes,

[Sheikh Erzincanlı Abdurrahman Efendi]… one day left his

halvethane with grief and sorrow and when he was asked,
he said: “… until now the followers of Ardabil (Erdebil
sofuları) … avoided improper behaviors and wrongful
innovations (bid‘at) … but the devil found a way to
mislead them….” In fact, soon after, Sheikh Junayd and his
son, Haydar, with the ambition of the sultanate, went astray
and left the doctrine of Sheikh Safi.318

Hoca Saadeddin’s account represents the official Ottoman stance of delegitimizing the

Safavid movement by emphasizing its alleged Sunni, and therefore doctrinally correct,

past.

The Ottoman central authority, as chronicles and official documents make clear,

was well aware of the “threat” that the halifes posed, particularly after Sheikh Junayd and

his son, Sheikh Haydar, intensified the Shi‘itization of the Safaviyya order. The halifes’

activities were seen as the Safavid court’s never-ending effort to undermine Istanbul’s

already limited authority over its Anatolian population. Furthermore, the halifes

316
Ibid. For further details on Mecdi Mehmed Efendi, see Ayşe Derya Eskimen, “16. Yüzyıl Divan
Edebiyatında Çok Yönlü Bir İsim: Mecdî Mehmed Efendi,” Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler
Dergisi 24 (2009): 1-9.
317
Bilal Dedeyev, “Safevi Tarikatı ve Osmanlı Devleti İlişkileri,” Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi
1/5 (Fall 2008): 210.
318
Hoca Saaddeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları,
1999), Vol. V, 52-53.

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undermined the Ottoman state’s geo-political and fiscal legitimacy in the region by

encouraging locals to support the Safavid cause financially, by sending money and gifts,

and personally, by serving in the Safavid army or migrating to Safavid Iran. In response,

Bayezid II, after seeing the steady rise in propaganda activities in southern Anatolia,

ordered all Safavid halifes exiled to the Balkans.319 Hoca Saadeddin Efendi (d. 1599)

points out that as they spread into Anatolia (diyar-ı Rum), their followers reached

innumerable levels.320 Accordingly, “Those ignorant Turks in the province of Anatolia

(Anadolu vilayetinde olan etrak-i bi-idrak), who are in close relationship with the

abominable faction [the Safavid sheikhs/shahs], … have been sending money (nüzur)

with wrongful disciples (hulefa-yi dalalet intiması ile) to the center of the order….”321

For more detailed cases, the seventeenth-century Ottoman provincial historian İbrahim

Peçevi (d. 1650) mentions Veli Halife, “known for being a Rafizi refuting the oneness of

God,”322 and Kalender Şah, who lured sympathizers of the ahl al-bayt.323 Peçevi adds that

these halifes not only surrounded themselves with large groups of “worthless people”

319
“… ve ümerayı hududa ahkam tebliğ olundu ki min ba‘d Sofi [Safavid] namına hiç kimesne Anadolu’ya
geçmeyüb yollar zabtoluna...” Saim Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik (Istanbul: Vadi Yayınları.
2002), 47-48.
320
Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, Vol. III, 345.
321
“Anadolu vilayetinde olan etrak-i bi-idrak ol güruh-i mekruhla iṣtirak üzre olup, gayibane ol dalalet
insana iktida ve ehl-ü iyal ve mal-u menallerin yoluna feda ederler ve iktidarı olanlar nüzur ve hedaya-yi
mevfure ile ziyaretine giderler ve hulefa-yi dalalet intiması ile her sal nuzur-i na-mahsur risal idüp, ol
menahiler ile mubahi olan mübahinin dergahta bahi penahın haşa kıble-i hacat ve Kabe-i münacat bilürler
ve dusize duhterlerin belki hemṣirelerinin huddam-i liamına pişkeş idüp namın işitseler secde kulurlar.”
Cited in Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 242
322
“… Rafiziliği ve Tanrı’nın birliğini inkar etmesi ile tanınan…” Peçevi İbrahim Efendi, Peçevi Tarihi,
ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1981), Vol. I, 92.
323
Peçevi Tarihi, Vol. I, 120. He refers to Kalender’s followers as ışık and abdal namına akidesi napak
bedmezheb.

112


(hayırsız kimesneler) while singing the praises (şan) of the Safavid Shah, but also caused

serious disturbances and attacks in Ottoman towns.324

Istanbul responded quickly by implementing a series of policies, particularly in

central and eastern/southeastern Anatolia, where the infiltration of Safavid agents into the

Ottoman territories was of greatest concern. First, official orders were sent to local

authorities, warning them about Safavid agents who entered the region disguised as

merchants or pilgrims heading to the holy land.325 In response to this increasing fear,

periodical closures of the hajj, or pilgrimage, routes, including the Basra-Lahsa-Arabian

desert route, attempted to keep halifes out of Anatolia.326 Several orders specifically

warned local authorities to prevent Safavid pilgrims from interacting with the locals.327

Harsher precautions, including the rejection of Iranian pilgrims’ entrance to Ottoman

lands328 and the expulsion of all Iranian pilgrims from Mecca, were also taken, especially

during periods of wars between the two empires.329

Halifes were able to mobilize adherents among both the rural population and

professional soldiers in frontier regions of the empire, including remote parts of Anatolia.

Shah Ismail would ultimately use these new followers in his campaigns in Iran. In a letter

sent to Selim I in 1514, Ismail pointed out that the reason the Safavids “neglected Turkey

324
Ibid.
325
Uriel Heyd, “Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615: A Study of the Firman according to the
Mühimme Defteri,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies I (1962): 134. MD, Vol. 30, No.
658 (28 Ramazan 985/ December 8, 1577). In another case, a member of the Harfush family from Lebanon
who fled to Safavid Iran disguised as an obscure cloth merchant was uncovered. Abu Husayn , “The
Shiites in Lebanon and the Ottomans in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” 117-118.
326
Jon E. Mandaville, “The Ottoman Province of al-Hasa in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” Journal of the
American Oriental Society 90 (1970): 498.
327
MD, Vol. 24, No. 124 (29 Zilkade 981/ March 23, 1574).
328
MD, Vol. 42, No. 554 (28 Zilhicce 989/ January 23, 1582).
329
Marco Salati, “Toleration, Persecution and Local Realities: Observations on the Shiism in the Holy
Places and the Bilād al-Shām (16th-17th centuries),” in Convegno sul Tema: La Shī‘a nell’Impero
Ottomano (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1993), 124.

113


[prior to the Çaldıran war]” was that “most of the Turcomans are already our subjects,

being the disciples of our illustrious ancestors.”330 In order to counter this threat, Istanbul

sent numerous orders to the districts of Yozgat, Çorum, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, Balıkesir,

Tarsus, Malatya, Erzurum, Antep, and Diyarbakır -- districts where a significant portion -

sometimes the majority - of the population was Kızılbaş. These orders directed local

authorities to identify and capture halifes in their districts,331 to confiscate their property

and goods, including their money, while also investigating their connections with the

Safavid court.332 If a halife was an Ottoman subject, he usually ended up imprisoned or

exiled to the Balkans or Cyprus.333 If, however, the halife was a Safavid agent, the local

authority usually executed him.334 Interestingly, several orders from the 1560s and 1570s

describe Safavid disciples who claimed to be Shah Ismail himself; their followers

regarded them as examples of tanassukh, or transmigration of the soul, which increased

their influence among the local population.335 These orders are particularly important for

revealing the popularity of Shah Ismail, even decades after his death, as an inspirational

force for local Anatolians who supported a Kızılbaş/Safavid disciple.336

330
Feridun Ahmed Bey, Mecmua-yı Münşeat-i Feridun Bey (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1848-1849),
Vol. I, 356-357.
331
In several cases, Istanbul emphasized that the local authority should capture the halifes and those who
converted to Kızılbaş Islam (rafzi sabit olanlar) in response to their activities, not those who had been
living in the region “peacefully.” For an example, see MD, Vol. 35, No. 931 (17 Ramazan 986/ November
17, 1578).
332
MD, Vol. 59, No. 150 (993/1585); MD, Vol. 43, No. 495 (26 Şaban 988/ October 6, 1580); MD, Vol.
43, No. 178 (5 Cemaziyülahir 988/ July 17, 1580).
333
MD, Vol. 36, No. 185 (17 Zilkade 986). In an order sent to Cyprus, the governor is asked to give the
exiled halifes land and positions based on their qualifications. MD, Vol. 24, No. 892 (3 Sefer 982/ May 24,
1574).
334
MD, Vol. 30, No. 707 (8 Rebiülahir 985/ June 25, 1577).
335
MD, Vol. 36, No. 128 (28 Zilkade 986/ January 26, 1579); MD, Vol. 35, No. 444 (20 Cemaziyelevvel
986/ July 25, 1578); MD, Vol. 35, No. 583 (16 Recep 986/ September 18, 1578); MD, Vol. 35, No. 802 (21
Şaban 986/ October 23, 1578).
336
MD, Vol. 35, No. 511 (2 Recep 986/ September 4, 1578).

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 The story of Şah Kulu (d. 1512) provides striking details of the influence of

Safavid disciples in Ottoman Anatolia in the early sixteenth century. A native of

southwestern Anatolia, he took advantage of the disorder during the last years of Sultan

Bayezid II’s reign (1488-1512), to attract a significant number of people to the Safavid

cause. According to Hoca Saadeddin, he traveled from town to town preaching that he

was the disciple and deputy (halifesi ve vekili) of Shah Ismail the sahib-i zuhur, or the

manifest one, and therefore it fell to him and his supporters to rule the state and own the

sultanate.337 First, he and his followers attacked towns, killing locals and high-ranking

statesmen, including Karagöz Ahmed Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Anadolu. For his partisans,

the killing of high-ranking state officials and raiding caravans made Şah Kulu invincible.

However, he was killed by Ottoman authorities in 1512 while attempting to escape to the

Safavid realm to serve Ismail. After his death, Şah Kulu’s vizier took his followers to

Iran.338 According to Ross Anonymous, Şah Kulu’s father had tried in vain to persuade

Junayd and Haydar to launch an attack against the much larger Ottoman forces. Şah Kulu,

however, decided to attack anyway and even though the Ottoman forces crushed his

followers, the Safavid devotees’ numbers rose to ten thousand.339

The case of Nur Halife, meanwhile, shows the impact of Safavid propaganda in

Anatolia at the individual level. Following Selim I’s accession to the Ottoman throne in

1512, Nur Halife led an uprising in the region of Karahisar and Niksar in northern

Anatolia. On Shah Ismail’s orders, more than twenty thousand Kızılbaş attacked and

defeated the forces of Ahmed, Selim’s brother, in Amasya. With growing support as a

337
Refik, Onaltıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik, 25.
338
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 32-33.
339
Ross Anonymous, fol. 202b.

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result of this victory, Nur Halife took advantage of the power struggle between Selim I

and his brother to take control of Tokat and Amasya.340 Tension arose between the

Ottoman and Safavid courts in response, which peaked when Ahmed’s son, Murad,

converted to Shi‘ite Islam, “became a Kızılbaş,” and donned a crimson tac in an

ostentatious ceremony. When his father dispatched soldiers to Karaman, where his son

lived, Murad took refuge at Shah Ismail’s court.341

Mühimmes from later decades indicate that the halifes continued to gather

considerable numbers of soldiers for the shah’s army. This became a major concern for

the Ottoman central authority, particularly during periods of war with the Safavids. For

instance, an order from 1585, sent to the qadi, or judge, and bey of Çorum, in central

Anatolia, states that Halife Haydar, who had previously left the region to settle in Safavid

Iran, had reappeared with 40,000 followers who were willing to revolt against the

Ottoman authorities.342 In another instance, an order from 1570 asks the governor of

Baghdad not to assign mukataas, a type of tax farm, to Burç Ali and his peers in Mosul

since they had been active on the frontier as Shi‘ite disciples (rafizi serdar halifeleri).343

The order points out that allowing them access to the public treasury, beyt’ül- mal, was

unlawful (caiz olmaya) and, therefore, should be absolutely prevented (kat‘i surette).

Another order from 1579 details Istanbul’s concern over a transaction of 500 filori

(Venetian ducats) between the Safavid state, here called Yukarı Canib (literally, “the

upper side”) and Mansur Halife of Tokat.344 The qadis of nearby Zile and Artıkabad were

340
Refik, Onaltıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik, 27.
341
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 34-35; Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 174.
342
MD, Vol. 58, No. 683 (13 Ramazan 993/ September 7, 1585).
343
MD, Vol. 9, No. 79 (29 Ramazan 977/ March 7, 1570).
344
MD, Vol. 40, No. 479 (28 Şaban 987/ October 19, 1579).

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sent to investigate this transaction and confiscate the money for the treasury. Another

decree sent to the governor of Divriği district (sancak), Mehmed Bey, in August 1568

mentions three halifes who were collecting money and goods for the Safavid shah. While

one of them was caught and executed, the other two escaped to Safavid Iran.345

The Safavid halifes gradually lost their prestigious position as the relationship

between the Safavid court and the Anatolian Kızılbaş strained. By the early seventeenth

century, a local group, the dedes, who had previously served under the halifes, had

replaced them. Unlike halifes, dedes were usually the oldest members of a Kızılbaş ocak

(troop) and/or family, and the position was heritable. Moreover, dedes did not travel, like

halifes, to spread Kızılbaş Islam and Safavid ideology. Instead, a dede served as the head

of a Kızılbaş family or community and led Kızılbaş prayers, rituals, and ceremonies. The

last Kızılbaş/Alevi with the symbolic title halife was a Bektaşi, Ahmet Cemalettin Çelebi

(d. 1921), who sided with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during the Turkish War of

Independence.346

III. b. Circulation of literary texts

Another common propaganda method utilized by the Safavid halifes was writing,

circulating, and reciting specific literary texts. Orality was a core aspect of medieval

Anatolian culture since very few people were literate. Even while the sedentarization

process and the transition from illiteracy to increasing literacy gained momentum in the

early modern era, the reciprocity between orality and literacy retained its role in society.

345
MD, Vol. 7, No. 1988 (10 Safer 976/ August 4, 1568).
346
Gölpınarlı, TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, “Kızılbaş.” The disparity between the Alevi/Kızılbaş and Bektaşi
identities gradually diminished to the point that since the late eighteenth century they have been used
interchangably.

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While several historians have argued that increasing literacy undermined the importance

of oral communication, and that orality and the memory of the elderly consequently lost

prestige in the early modern period,347 in the context of pro-Safavid propaganda in late

medieval/early modern Anatolia, oral and written culture interacted and complemented

each other. The clandestine nature of Kızılbaş gatherings, in part due to the fear of

persecution, and the prevalence of semi-literacy further strengthened the symbiosis

between the two modes of communication, so that they operated in tandem as vehicles of

pro-Safavid propaganda in Anatolia and the frontier regions of Ottoman Iraq.348 Oral

communication also complemented written texts that were commissioned by the Safavid

court or produced by Anatolian Kızılbaş in the form of hagiographies, chronicles, epic

tales, and poems, and were circulated by Safavid disciples and their Anatolian followers

in an attempt to emphasize the significance of adherence to Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam and

loyalty to the Safavid sheikhs/shahs. For instance, the aforementioned account of Michele

Membré and that of João de Barros, who visited Tabriz in 1502, point out that the city

had a wide variety of entertainers and among them, according to Membré, were men

“with books in their hands, reading of the battles of Ali and the combats of the princes of

old, and of Shah Ismail.”349 An examination of the corpus of pro-Safavid texts produced

within this particular religious and political context – showing stylistic differences among

347
For an example, see István György Tóth, Literacy and Written Culture in Early Modern Central Europe
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 1-3.
348
As the following pages will demonstrate, many of the pro-Safavid texts were liturgical in nature, which
meant that the readers repeatedly perused a single, highly appreciated text and probably learned it at least in
part by heart.
349
Membré, Relazione di Persia, 52. De Barros’ comments show that written versions of such popular
accounts existed by the middle of the reign of Tahmasb. According to Morton, they were from the
Shahnamah of Firdawsi, the Rausat al-Shuhada of Kashifi, the Khavarannamah of Ibn Husam al-Din, or
the Shahnamah-ye Ismail of Junabadi. A. H. Morton, “The Early Years of Shah Isma‘il in the Afzal al-
tavarikh and Elsewhere,” in Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed. Charles
Melville (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 44-45.

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colloquial, popular, and elevated speech, and among conversational dialogue,

proselytizng sermons, and storytelling - is crucial for an understanding of the various

degrees of interplay between orality and literacy and the relationship of this interplay to

the complexity of pro-Safavid propaganda efforts.

The Safavids are usually thought not to have presided over a great deal of literary

production because of their Shi‘itization efforts, which were followed by similar attempts

to Shi‘itize literature and centralize literary production while dogmatizing and leveling

public opinion.350 Defenders of this argument insist that as the Shi‘itization of Iran

became the primary concern of the Safavid court, literature not only decreased in quantity

but also ceased to be interregional and became an isolated, purely regional concern.351

Though there is some truth to this, the early Safavids produced a series of literary works

aimed at facilitating the consolidation of the state religion; these works were mainly

commissioned by the Safavid court and clergy and partly influenced by the demands of

the Kızılbaş from surrounding regions.352 While scholars have focused on various aspects

of these texts, including the issues of patronage, production, and content, much less

attention has been paid to their use in the context of pro-Safavid propaganda in Ottoman

Anatolia and Iraq. In some cases, literary texts were produced for the sole purpose of

350
Jan Rypka calls this effort “ the Shi‘ite standardization of literature”: History of Iranian Literature
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1968), 292-293. On the other hand, there has
been no extensive study of literary texts commissioned, produced, and copied by the Safaviyya order in
Ardabil. While this study sheds lights on several texts utilized for pro-Safavid propaganda, it does not delve
into the details of Ardabil’s patronage of liturgical texts.
351
Allah Dotta Maztar, in his introduction to the edited volume of Jahanqusha-ye Khaqan, an account
attributed to the reign of Shah Ismail, argues that the decrease in the number and quality of Safavid literary
works can be explained by the multilingual environment of the Safavid empire, which was dominated by
two groups: Turkic-speaking Kızılbaş subjects and Arabic-speaking subjects of the empire, and their lack
of interest in producing literary works (Islamabad: np. 1986), 8-9. While certainly prejudiced, Maztar’s
argument provides another angle for understanding the limited number of literary works produced in this
era.
352
Rypka, History of Iranian Literature, 292.

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articulating the Safavid religious and political identity, while in others their utilization for

propaganda was an unforeseen outcome. In either case, this corpus of texts is especially

informative concerning the discussions and conflicts among the early Safavids, as well as

popular religious practices in Safavid domains and their importance to the formation of

the Safavid state, where adherence to a specific doctrine was a testament to political

loyalty.

Pro-Safavid/Kızılbaş texts fall into six main categories: buyruks / velayetnames /

maqtalnames (hagiographies); şecerenames (genealogical accounts of the main Kızılbaş

families); faziletnames/cenknames (the life stories of the ahl al-bayt or other heroic

figures of Islamic history); fütüvvetnames (descriptions of ideal behavior and the way of

life in Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam); kisvetnames/taçnames (accounts of the symbols of Kızılbaş

Islam); and cönknames/divans (collections of Kızılbaş sayings and poems). It must be

emphasized, however, that this list is not intended to be exhaustive or all-inclusive.

Examining the creators of these works and their intended audience is essential to

determining the significance of written texts in pro-Safavid propaganda. For Safavid

disciples and the Kızılbaş population of Anatolia, the liturgical practice of chanting a

written text aloud was a main tool of communication and, accordingly, producing,

carrying, and owning certain literary texts became important symbols of their adherence

to Shi‘ite Islam and their loyalty to previous Safavid sheikhs/shahs. Buyruks, the largest

genre produced, were circulated for the purpose of spreading and maintaining pro-

Safavid/pro-Kızılbaş identity in Anatolia and, to a lesser extent, in the Balkans, up to the

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present day.353 As either single documents or collections, known as mecmuas, buyruks

were mainly written in Ardabil and sent to local Kızılbaş families and/or dedes to be kept

as a type of sacred trust and to promulgate Shi‘ite identity while spreading pro-Safavid

loyalty. While, due to their scattered nature, it is difficult to categorize them according to

specific literary criteria, it is clear that they were used to transmit knowledge from

generation to generation. As the main source of these buyruks,354 historians have pointed

out several texts attributed to Sheikh Safi, including Mesnevi Şerhi (Turkish), Kara

Mecmua (Turkish), Fanâ (Persian), Silat al-Faqīh (Arabic), and Maqāmāt wa’l-maqālāt

(Arabic). Efzalu’t-Tevârîh, a seventeenth century Safavid chronicle, names Sheikh Safi as

the author of these works; however, their authenticity is the subject of an ongoing debate

among historians as information is quite scarce and sporadic.355

While buyruks are numerous and diverse in nature, making it difficult to examine

them individually, one main account, Menakıbu’l-Esrar Behcetü’l-Ahrar, or Risale-i Şeyh

Safi, was very influential in Anatolia.356 The author of the account is a mystery, though

353
For a study of the popularity of buyruk texts among Kızılbaş in the Balkans, see Frederick de Jong,
“Problems Concerning the Origins of the Qizilbāş in Bulgaria: Remnants of the Safaviyya?” in Convegno
sul Tema: La Shī‘a nell’Impero Ottomano (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1993), 203-215.
354
They were titled Makalat, Menakıb, Menakıbname, Nasihatname, Fütüvvetname, Tezkire,
Fütüvvetname-i Cafer Sadık, Şeyh Safi Buyruğu, Vasiyetname, Sualname, and Risale-i Şeyh Safi. For an
example, see Imam Cafer Buyruğu, ed. Sefer Aytekin (Ankara: Emek Yayınevi, 1958).
355
For further details, see Sönmez Kutlu and Nizamettin Parlak, Makālāt: Şeyh Safı Buyruğu (Istanbul:
Horasan Yayınları, 2008), 22-33; and Morton, “The Early Years of Shah Isma‘il in the Afzal al-Tavarikh
and Elsewhere,” 30-32. Recent studies by Rıza Yıldırım, Doğan Kaplan, and Ayfer Karakaya-Stump
transmit these narratives while examining the circumstances in which they were written: Doğan Kaplan,
Yazılı Kaynaklara Göre Alevilik (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2012); Ayfer Karakaya-
Stump, “Documents and Buyruk Manuscripts in the Private Archives of Alevi Dede Families: An
Overview,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37, No.3 (2010): 273-286; eadem, “Alevi Dede
Ailelerine Ait Buyruk Mecmuaları,” in Eski Türk Edebiyatı Çalışmaları VII, Mecmua: Osmanlı
Edebiyatının Kırkambarı, ed. Hatice Aynur, et al. (Istanbul: Mas Matbaacılık, 2012), 361-379; Rıza
Yıldırım, “Turcomans between Two Empires.”
356
While Ahmet Taşğın cites this manuscript as Menakıbu’l-Esrar Behcetü’l-Ahrar based on Abdülbaki
Gölpınarlı’s catalogue of his personal collection, Sönmez Kutlu argues that Taşğın was in error because the
authentic copy of Menakıbu’l-Esrar Behcetü'l-Ahrar is located in the Mevlana Manuscript Library in

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some historians, based on the work’s epilogue, wherein the author dedicates the work to

Shah Tahmasb I, argue that Tahmasb commissioned it.357 This work, along with later

copies that were recited and circulated throughout Anatolia, addresses the core aspects of

the Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş faith and lists its obligations (sünnetler ve farzlar), one of which is to

receive the kızıl tac from the halife and wear it.358 The work also details punishments for

violating any of these requirements, including sending payments to the halife and/or the

shah, showing a clear connection between the audience of the account and the Safavid

court.359 It is important to note that buyruk copies from later periods do not mention

sending payments to the shahs after a violation since during later centuries, there was no

large-scale pro-Safavid or pro-Shi‘ite propaganda. Instead, payment is to be sent to the

dede and/or the Hacı Bektaş shrine, if a recipient is specified at all.360

Aside from buyruks, the epic Abu Muslimnamah/ Ebu Müslimname, an account of

the exploits of Abu Muslim (d. 755), the Abbasid missionary (dā‘ī) who led the

proselytizing campaign that culminated in the 750 Abbasid revolution that toppled the

Umayyad dynasty, was also used as a pro-Safavid propaganda tool. Abu Muslim’s

Konya, Turkey. For further details on this debate, see Ahmet Taşğın, Şeyh Safi Buyruğu (Bisati,
Menakıbu’l-Esrar Behçetü’l-Ahrar) (Ankara: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003); Sönmez Kutlu, “Alevi-
Bektaşi Yazılı (Arap Harfli) Kaynakların Neşri ve Ortaya Çıkan Sorunlar,” in Alevi ve Bektaşi Yayınlarının
Temel Sorunları, Çözüm Önerileri, eds. Gıyasettin Aktaş and Derya Sümer (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi
Yayınları, 2010): 64-73.
357
Later the account was attributed to Hatayi (Shah Ismail).
358
Gölpınarlı, “Kızılbaş,” TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi. These obligations, known as Yedi Sünnet ve Üç Farz,
are central to various Shi‘ite-oriented Sufi orders, including the Bektaşis and Kalenderis. The remaining
obligations are remembering the unity (tawhid/tevhid) of God; getting rid of feelings of hatred and
arrogance towards others; not holding grudges against others and being friendly to everyone; being discreet
and spending time with fellow adherents of the faith and caring about them; avoiding lies and slander;
serving others; and obeying one’s leader/master (the halife or dede).
359
Taşğın, Şeyh Safi Buyruğu, 41-42. Other punishments include physical beatings and expulsion from the
order. Gölpınarlı, “Kızılbaş,” TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi.
360
For instance, a buyruk copied in 1820, while listing required punishments for violations, simply
mentions the collection of money without mentioning to whom the money should be sent. Gülağ Öz,
Özkaynaklarından Alevilik Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Istanbul: Can Yayınları, 1999), 371.

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popularity reached such a degree that, according to al-Tabari (d. 839), “in just one day

sixty villages joined his movement.”361 The account of his life, ostensibly authored by

Abu Tahir al-Tusi, a storyteller at the court of sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (d. 1030),362

became a significant text utilized by the Safavid leaders and followers, particularly by

Sheikh Junayd and Haydar, in the ghulat- inspired phase of the Safavid movement (1447-

1501).363 “The Sufis of Ardabil” recited stories from this epic tale to draw parallels

between the nature of Abu Muslim’s struggle against the “unjust” Umayyads and the

Safavid sheikhs’/shahs’ fight against surrounding political and religious enemies.364

Moreover, miracles later associated with Abu Muslim, including belief in his soul’s

tanassukh,365 increased his popularity among the Kızılbaş as the similarities between him

and Ismail were accentuated.366 The Abu Muslimnamah, with its various Ottoman

Turkish copies, served as a tool to encourage the Turcomans of Anatolia not only to

convert to Kızılbaş Islam, but also to take up arms and fıght for Kızılbaş political and

ideological identity in the region.367 Even though Sheikh Mohaqqeq al-Karaki (d. 1533),

361
Cited in Şah İsmail Hata’i Külliyatı, eds. Ekber N. Necef and Babek Cavanşir (Istanbul: Kaknüs
Yayınları, 2006), 65. For further details on the Abbasid Revolution, see Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy
Muhammad Shaban, The ‘Abbasid Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), and
Roberto Marìn-Guzmán, Popular Dimensions of the ‘Abbasid Revolution: A Case Study of Medieval
Islamic Social History (Cambridge, MA: Fulbright-LASPAU, 1990).
362
Babayan, “Sufis, Dervishes, and Mullas,” 122.
363
Ibid., 121.
364
Ibid.
365
When Abu Muslim died, some of his followers, called Abu Muslimiyya, claimed that he had gone into
occultation (ghayba). According to his followers, Abu Muslim would return soon to establish justice on
earth. Ibid., 122.
366
Mehmet Azimli, Abbasiler Dönemi Babek İsyanı (Ankara: İlahiyat Yayınları, 2004), 65.
367
For further details, see Irène Mélikoff, Abu Muslim, le “Porte-Hache” du Khorassan dans la tradition
epique turco-iranienne (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1962); and eadem, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe,
trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999). According to Mélikoff, the first translation of
the account into Turkish took place under the Ghaznavids, and Turkish translations increased during the
following centuries. Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş, 44.

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a leading Shi‘ite theologian and jurist at the Safavid court,368 banned the recitation of Abu

Muslimnamahs, claiming that they promoted bid‘at, or wrongful innovation, and issued a

fatwa endorsing the cursing of Abu Muslim, the work remained popular both in Anatolia

and in Iran. In fact, many of the Ottoman Turkish copies of the Abu Muslimnamahs were

produced after al-Karaki’s era,369 while in the Safavid realm it remained as a staple of

storytellers (qissa-khwans).370

An in-depth analysis of Safavid literary texts, taking into account linguistic,

stylistic, and discursive details, following Arzu Öztürkmen’s approach to late

medieval/early modern sources, provides clues concerning the historical ethnography of

the communities in which they were produced and consumed.371 A sixteenth-century

polemic, Hadiqat-ul Shi‘a, written by Moqaddas Arbabili (d. 1585), an eminent Shi‘ite

theologian at the Safavid court, serves as a prime example. While the first volume,

containing the biography of the Prophet Muhammad and his ancestors, is lost,372 the

second volume, which includes the biographies of the Twelve Imams and the issue of the

imamate, has been repeatedly printed in Iran and India. Several historians, citing the

“unscholarly character of the book,” as opposed to Ardabili’s other known works, have

368
For further information on al-Karaki see, Encyclopedia Iranica, s. v. “Karaki.”
369
An Ottoman Turkish translation of Saffatus’s-Safa from 1612 also mentions Abu Muslim as the
Seyfullah and rehber-i Mürşidullah. Kutlu and Sonmez, Makalat, 25.
370
Babayan, “Sufis, Dervishes, and Mullas,” 124. Various other epic tales played a significant part in the
pro-Safavid narrative during the period in question. The Junaydnamah/ Cüneydname, an epic revolving
around Ismail’s grandfather Junayd (d. 1466), was another popular literary work that was copied and
circulated in Anatolia for pro-Safavid propaganda purposes. An Ottoman Turkish copy compiled in 1562 is
located in the Süleymaniye Manuscript Library; the compiler notes that it was translated from Persian in
1518. According to Ahmet Karamustafa, the translator was a Sufi named Vahidi, who probably belonged to
the Halveti or Zaini order. Ahmet Karamustafa, Vāhīdī’s Menākıb-i Hvoca-i Cihān ve Netīce-i Cān:
Critical Edition and Historical Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 43-47.
371
Arzu Öztürkmen, “Orality and Performance in Late Medieval Turkish Texts: Epic Tales, Hagiographies,
and Chronicles,” Text and Performance Quarterly 29/4 (October 2009): 329.
372
We have this information from Ardabili’s introduction to the second volume of the book. Hadiqat-ul
Shi‘a, Tehran, National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, MS 1181689, 3.

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questioned its authenticity.373 Regardless, the colloquial language in which the work is

composed indicates that the author is targeting a large, popular audience, as opposed to a

small elite circle. Along the same lines, the author translates and explains basic concepts

of Islam and Islamic history in detail, seemingly for the benefit of the average Muslim

living in Safavid Iran and neighboring regions at that time. For instance, after discussing

how the believer, “without questioning,” should accept the Imam of his/her own time (i.e.,

the Safavid shah), as opposed to the first twelve Imams, as a guide, the author likens

those who do not accept the authority of the contemporary imam to those who died

during the “age of jahiliyya (ignorance),” meaning those who died before the rise of

Islam.374

Another literary approach that helps explain the power of pro-Safavid propaganda

is an analysis of what each text reveals about its intended audience. In the geo-political

setting of the time, a person’s relationship with a written text and with those who

produced it depended on his/her social and economic status and gender, as each literary

work strategically targeted a particular audience. The authors of these texts sometimes

give details about the audience they have in mind and such statements, if made at all, are

usually found in the prologue. For instance, the author of Hadiqat’ul-Shi‘a, after noting

his goal of refuting “false claims” uttered in “wrongful books” circulated by Sunnis,375

373
For further details concerning this controversy, see Wilferd Madelung, “Ardabili,” Encyclopædia
Iranica, Vol. II, Part 4, 368-370. Some historians also point out the work’s derisive condemnation of Sufi
doctrine and philosophy to prove this point, because in another work Ardabili clearly embraces the Sufi
doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd. Ibid, 2.
374
“… jahiliyye yani kesi ke …. mordan-e u mesle morden-i anha ast ke pish az zuhur-u Islam morde
bashand.” Hadiqat’ul-Shi‘a, 5. Hadiqat’ul- Shi‘a is replete with pejorative nicknames for the leaders of
the Prophet’s companions, and especially the first three Sunni caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, who
are depicted as unjust and ignorant despots. A considerable part of the text is also devoted to refuting Sunni
claims concerning these caliphs’ virtues and to underscoring their shortcomings.
375
Ibid. 3.

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points out how he hopes his work is “hearable and readable” by the masses.376 To

emphasize this point, the author insists that not only reading but also circulating, listening

to a reading of, and even touching his book is crucial to spreading the “true faith” and to

guaranteeing salvation by God.377 Likewise in his Turkish work Akaid’ul- Islam

(Principles of Islam), Ardabili points out that he has switched languages in an attempt to

reach an even larger number of people:

Egerçi bu babda risale-yi Arabi ve Farisi çok idi ve amma

Türki dilince kitab-i aka‘id-i isbat-i zat-i vacibü’l-vücud
yok idi. Fe-lehaza bu bende-yi bi-beza‘et ve hati Ahmed
Erdebili... hatirine fa‘iz oldı kim, imam ve İslam kardaşları
ve din ü mezheb yoldaşları için bir kitab-i aka‘id yazayım
ki nef ‘i amm ve fa’idesi tam olsun.378

While it is possible that he has a more specific audience in mind, these details indicate

Ardabili’s intention of reaching non-Persian-speaking or illiterate individuals, at least if

they knew Turkish.

For polemical reasons, it was significant for pro-Shi‘ite and pro-Sunni narratives

to quote each other’s theological sources to gain further credibility and legitimacy against

the claims made by the other. Ardabili, for instance, attests that he uses sources that have

been accepted and respected by “them” (i.e., Sunnis) or by the “two sides” (i.e., Shi‘ites

and Sunnis), so that the adversaries of the Shi‘ite Imams and the Safavid shahs, as

representatives of the faith, cannot refute his arguments.379 The most popular source that

he cites is a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad asserts “There will be twelve

successors (s. khalifa) or commanders (s. amir) after my death, all of them from

376
“… gabul-u shanedan va khandan….” Ibid., 2.
377
Ibid., 3-4.
378
Moqaddas Ardabili, Akaidul-Islam, ed. Mirza Rasul Ismailzadeh (Tehran: n.p., 1380/2001), 2-3, cited in
Şah İsmail Hata’i Külliyatı, 117.
379
Hadiqat’ul- Shi‘a, 6-8.

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Quraysh.”380 The conclusion drawn by the tenth-century Shi‘ite writers was that the

authority of all twelve Imams derived from a direct delegation of power by the Prophet

Muhammad. A pro-Safavid narrative, such as that of Ardabili, argues that every era has a

representative of the Imamate and the Safavid shahs are the representatives for the era in

which he lives.381

The authors of pro-Safavid texts rarely specify how their works were expected to

reach the intended audience and, as a result, it is unclear whether a given text was meant

to be read aloud or to serve as an inspiration for preaching. The famous menakıbname, or

hagiographical work, Saffetus’s-Safa (1356), the only account written by a devout

follower of the Safaviyya order in the fourteenth century, provides clues as to how texts

of this kind were used as a tool of communication among the author(s), the readers, and

the listeners. Menakıbnames served not only as textbooks for followers of a Sufi order or

similar social grouping, but also as works for propagating the teachings to possible

recruits. Therefore, these texts were read aloud, memorized in part, and used as an

inspiration for meditation.382 While the original copy of Saffetus’s-Safa is lost, there were

380
This hadith, which exists in several variants, is usually quoted on the authority of Jabir b. Samura (d.
686), while Abdallah b. Umar (d. 693) and other companions have also been cited. Etan Kohlberg, “From
Imamiya to Ithna-‘ashariyya,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 49 (1976): 530.
381
Hadiqat’ul- Shi‘a, 7. Sunni polemical literature, in its attempts to refute the Shi‘ite interpretation of this
hadith, suggests that the reference might have been to twelve respectable rulers from the tribe of Quraysh
who did not necessarily succeed each other. Khunji argued that these comprise the five rightly guided
caliphs (perhaps including al-Hasan b. Ali), Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, Umar b. Abd al-‘Aziz, and five Abbasid
caliphs whom he does not indentify by name. Kohlberg argues that according to a different Shi‘ite
tradition, the Prophet declared that after his death the Muslim community, ummah, would be ruled by
twelve erring leaders (imam dalala), two of them from the Quraysh tribe (probably referring to Abu Bakr
and Umar) and ten from the Banu Umayya, including Uthman, Abu Sufyan, Muawiya, and Yazid.
Kohlberg, “From Imamiya to Ithna-‘ashariyya,” 526-530. One should, however, mention that Abu Sufyan
(d. 650), one of the leaders of the Quraysh tribe, did not rule the Muslim community. He served the early
Islamic State as the ruler of Najran, a city in the southern Arabian Peninsula.
382
Öztürkmen, “Orality and Performance,” 330; Halil İnalcik, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography,” in
Historians of the Middle East, eds. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press,
1962), 152-167.

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multiple complete copies produced in Iran and Anatolia as early as the 1480s.383

Moreover, the fourth chapter384 of the book was repeatedly translated into Ottoman

Turkish, beginning in 1358, a year after the original work was completed, with the title

Terceme-i Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Safî.385

Saffetus’s-Safa consists of an introduction and twelve chapters, possibly in

reference to the twelve Shi‘ite Imams. Most of the chapters are devoted to Sheikh Safi’s

biography and the miracles that he performed. As a sign of orality and references to oral

performances, Saffetus’s-Safa begins by introducing the main characters to the audience

and continues with dialogue between Sheikh Safi and his son Sheikh Sadr al-Din. The

narrator, Sadr al-Din, often takes the lead by adding further details on a particular topic or

reemphasizing what Sheikh Safi had previously covered. Furthermore, like many other

hagiographical texts, Saffetus’s-Safa contains repetitions, which are usually references to

religious content already mentioned in previous sections of the book. It is likely that these

repetitions were the result of storytelling sessions belonging to different gatherings where

these parts were read aloud.386

Contextualization of historical texts according to the demands of time and

audience is another crucial consideration when examining pro-Safavid propaganda in late

medieval/early modern Anatolia. According to Suraiya Faroqhi, comparing multiple

versions of any manuscript will show what parts have been reshaped to conform to time-

383
See n. 131, above.
384
See n. 234, above.
385
See n. 131, above.
386
Arzu Öztürkmen suggests this approach for Vilayetname-i Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli, a hagiographical
biography of the eponym of the Bektaşiye Sufi order in late medieval Anatolia. Öztürkmen, “Orality and
Performance,” 335.

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and area-specific exigencies.387 In his in-depth analysis of divergences among various

copies of the fifteenth-century Ottoman chronicler Oruç Bey’s History of the Ottomans,

V. L. Ménage argues that different versions were “written for the edification and

entertainment of the ordinary man, so that a ‘copyist’ served as a redactor or author,

freely paraphrasing each model, adding new stories or alternative forms of older versions,

and occasionally stitching together two rescensions to make a newer, fuller edition.”388

While Ménage limited himself to one early Ottoman text, this observation certainly

applies to pro-Safavid manuscripts circulated in Anatolia in the period in question. The

examination of the existing copies of Saffetus’s-Safa, for instance, provides a perfect

example of the distortion of historical narratives by pro-Safavid propaganda during the

early modern period.

A case in point is the figure of Aisha/Ayşe (d. 678), the daughter of the first Sunni

caliph Abu Bakr and the last wife of the Prophet Muhammad. While the earliest known

partial copy of the book, Terceme-i Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Safî, mentions her as a respected

figure from whom Muslims will request şefaat, or intercession, on the Day of Judgment,

copies produced after the Shi‘itization and politicization of the Safavid order either omit

her completely or depict her in a negative light, similar to the mainstream Shi‘ite

narrative’s view of her as one of the enemies of Ali b. Abi Talib.389 By the 1650s, toward

387
Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 147.
388
V. L. Ménage, “On the Recensions of Uruj’s History of the Ottomans,” Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies 30 (1967): 314.
389
Abbaslı, “Safevilerin Kökenine Dair,” 298.

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the end of the pro-Safavid propaganda campaign, however, copies of Saffetus’s-Safa

mention her again in a positive manner.390

Another important consideration in analyzing the use of these propagandistic texts

is who knew Persian at the time and when, how, and by whom these Persian texts were

translated into Ottoman Turkish. According to conventional wisdom at the time, since

Turkish was the predominant language in Anatolia, Persian texts had to be translated if

they were to be understood by the non-Persian speakers in the region, which led to an

increase in the number of translations from Persian and Arabic into Ottoman Turkish in

the fourteenth century.391 While some texts, such as Saffetus’s-Safa and particular

chapters of it were repeatedly translated into Ottoman Turkish, other texts served as the

bases for oral delivery, requiring knowledge of Persian on the part of the audience. As

Sara Nur Yıldız aptly argues, Ottoman historiography of the early and classical periods

was an “amalgamation of both Perso-Islamic forms and stylistic elements with the

Turkish narrative and epic elements.”392 In this milieu, where “different languages,

scripts, and genres competed with one another,”393 not every pro-Safavid work was

translated into a vernacular language since various literary sources written in Persian, and

in some cases Arabic, were circulated in their original forms as crucial liturgical works or

symbolic objects among the Anatolian Kızılbaş population, as will be noted in the next

section.394 All the while, however, Turkish kept its prominent position at the Safavid

court and in Safavid literary circles during the high period of pro-Safavid/Shi‘ite

390
Kutlu and Parlak, Makalat, 92-96.
391
Kutlu, “Alevi-Bektaşi Yazılı (Arap Harfli) Kaynakların Neşri,” 42.
392
Sara Nur Yıldız, “Historiography: The Ottoman Empire,” Encyclopedia Iranica Vol. 12, fasc. 4, 403.
393
Öztürkmen, “Orality and Performance,” 327.
394
Kutlu and Sönmez, Makalat, 10-11; Mecdut Mansuroğlu, “The Rise and Devolopment of Written
Turkish in Anatolia,” Oriens 7 (1954): 250-264.

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propaganda. For instance, according to Adam Olearius (d. 1671), the ambassador of the

duke of Holstein-Gottorp to the Safavid court in the late 1630s, throughout Iran, Turkish,

albeit a different dialect from the one “spoken in Istanbul,” was the dominant language of

communication.395

Available Ottoman Turkish versions of Saffetus’s-Safa provide clues to the

motives for translating pro-Safavid propaganda texts. For instance, one anonymous

translator of the work’s fourth chapter, writing in 1358, briefly explains that “[in order

to] explain the teachings of Islam (ahkām-ı İslamı beyan etmek içün) I translated [this

book] so that the common people would benefit from it (ki faydası ammeye ola).” The

author adds that he has simplified the ulema’s statements for the uneducated (zayıf), thus

indicating the intended audience of the book.396 This very early Ottoman Turkish

translation of Saffetu’s-Safa was written in Manisa in western Anatolia, which verifies

the high reputation of the Safaviyya order and its teachings not only in central and eastern

Anatolia, but also in the western parts of the peninsula only a half century after the death

of its founder, Sheikh Safi, and not only among rural Anatolians but also among multi-

lingual and learned members of the society.397

Another anonymous translator of the fourth chapter, working in the 1450s,

emphasizes his duty to spread Sheikh Safi’s biography and teachings to Anatolians while

395
Cited in Şah İsmail Hata’i Külliyatı, 119.
396
Kemankeş, 1a-1b.
397
In the same vein, Rıza Yıldırım notes respectful references to the sayings and deeds of Sheikh Safī in the
works of some leading Ottoman Sufis, including Eşrefoğlu Rumi (d. 1469), who is known as the second
great pir of the Kadiri order in Anatolia. According to Eşrefoğlu, Sheikh Safî was among the greatest saints
of Sufism. See Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, Müzekki’n-Nüfûs, eds. Nezihi Ferhun and Ali Ayağ (Istanbul: np., 1976).

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recruiting them to the Ardabil lodge.398 The author ends his translation with a detailed

epilogue in which he dedicates his work to Sheikh Junayd, whom he calls Sultanu’l-

Evliya Burhanü’l-Etkıya Mürşidü’l-Aktab Mükemmilü’t-Tullab Sultan Şeyh Cüneyd. In

another anonymous Ottoman Turkish copy of the entire account from 1612, the translator

ends by announcing that he has repented for his sins – that is, converted -- at the hands of

Shah Abbas, the son of Shah Tahmasb, and if he returns to the old way (i.e., Sunni

Islam), his life and property should be taken away.399

During this period, the popularity of secular panegyric and lyric poetry among

Shi‘ite sympathizers was surpassed by that of hymns, called deyiş or nefes, in honor of

the Prophet Muhammad, Ali b. Abi Talib, the Twelve Imams, and the Safavid

sheikhs/shahs. Composing poetry was not an activity limited to the upper classes in late

medieval/early modern societies400 and, in fact, was often used as a tool for spreading

religious and political ideologies since poetry could be memorized and and circulated

orally. For instance, the Safavid halifes, who considered Shah Ismail a reincarnation of

Ali, used his divan, or collection of poems, to convince Anatolians of the messianic

nature of his rise to power and to call them to convert and accept him and his descendants

398
Konya Bölge Yazma Eserler Kütüphanesi, MS 3344; Gaziantep İl Halk Kütüphanesi, MS 223, cited in
Sönmez and Kutlu, Makalat, 56-57.
399
“… tövbe kıldım cem-i menahiden haza Şah Abbas ibn Şah Tahmasb elinden tövbe ettim. Bu hazır
erenler tanıklığıyla eğer dönersem malım, tenem ve can ve başım cümle erenler meydanındadır.” Kutlu
and Sönmez, Ibn Bezzaz, Kâşifu’l-Kulûb, 30. While there is no clear explanation for why these translations
were done anonymously, we might suggest fear of persecution, the widespread nature of the practice, and
the custom of not taking credit for work that many Safavid sympathizers would consider sacred.
400
R. D. McChesney, “The Anthology of Poets: Muzakkir al-Ashab as a Source for the History of
Seventeenth-Century Central Asia,” in Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B.
Dickson, Professor of Persian Studies, Princeton University, eds. Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B.
Moreen (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1990), 67.

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as their spiritual and political guides.401 The divan of Khata’i/Hatayi, Ismail’s penname,

meaning “the Sinner,” became a liturgical work for the Kızılbaş tribes402 as it reached the

most remote villages and towns of Anatolia, where the poems were memorized and sung

to the accompaniment of the saz, a traditional stringed instrument. Hatayi’s intended

audience can be deciphered by the language of the poems, Azeri Turkish, which was fully

intelligible to the Anatolian Turcoman population, unlike Persian, in which he was also

fluent.403 In his divan, Shah Ismail constructed a distinctly heterogeneous narrative, in

which his multi-confessional messianic mission was the heart of his spiritual discourse,

along with the theme of deification, first of Ali, 404 and then of Ismail himself.

Furthermore, Ali is exalted above the Prophet as the Demiurge (kardigar) and the creator

of heaven and earth. In one of these poems, Ismail says:

The heroic ghazis have come forth with “crowns of

happiness” on their heads.
The Mahdi’s era has begun.
The light of eternal life has dawned [upon] the world.
With your entire hearth, accept the scion of Imam Shah
Haydar.
My Imams Ja‘far al-Sadiq and Ali [ibn] Musa al-Rida have
come.405

401
Ismail I was not the first Safavid leader to make messianic claims. Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan, in his Tarih-i
alemara-yi emini, argues that the followers of the Safaviyya order in Anatolia believed that Sheikh Junayd
was God and that his son Haydar was the son of God. Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan, Tarih-i alem ara-yi emini,
trans. Vladimir Minorsky as Persia in A.D. 1478-1490 (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1957), 69.
402
For further details see Jean Calmard, “Popular Literature under the Safavids,” in Society and Culture in
the Early Modern Middle East: Studies on Iran in the Safavid Period, ed. Andrew Newman (Leiden: Brill.
2003); Vladimir Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies 10 (1942): 1006a-1053a. Shah Ismail’s mystical poetry was strongly influenced by the Hurufi poet
Nesimi (d. 1417). According to Minorsky, there are three levels on which Ismail identifies himself. On the
uppermost level, Ismail proclaims his divine nature; this pretension reflects the adoration of his disciples,
who considered him a reincarnation of Ali, the latter being the mazhar (place of manifestation) of God in
human form. At the intermediate level, Ismail is a body whose soul is Ali, but he is “a water drop compared
to him.” At the lowest level, the “Sinner,” Khata’i, is the slave of the shah (i.e., Ali).
403
Ismail’s son Sam Mirza mentions that his father also wrote in Persian, and some traces of Persian poetry
are found in several manuscripts of his divan. Minorksy, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I,” 1008a.
404
Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I,” 1026a.
405
Ibid., 1049a.

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 The Hatayi Divanı further provides a colorful picture of Ismail’s religious persona,

endowed with the qualities of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali alike. He identifies

himself with Ali and the Imams through the possession of esoteric knowledge.406

Furthermore, Ismail claims to be the “seal of the prophets” (khatem-i enbiya) and the

“perfect guide,”407 and stresses the notions of tajalli or hulul (God’s manifestation in

human form), and tanassukh (metempsychosis), according to which he himself is a

reincarnation of Ali and a manifestation of God on earth.408

According to Ismail, conversion to Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam was the core

responsibility of an individual to guarantee his/her salvation, and “those who do not

recognize Ali as truth are absolute unbelievers, … have no creed, no faith, and are not

Muslims.”409 Continuing in this vein, Hatayi emphasizes the importance of accepting

Sheikh Safi and his preaching for winning respect in one’s own community:

Her kim Şeyh Safi’nin emrin tutmaz

Yorulur bu yolda menzile çatmaz
Ğayrı millet ana itibar etmaz
Cümle ibadetin başıdır tevhid.410

Throughout the divan, Ismail calls his followers gazis, akhis,411 Kızılbaş,412 and

ehl-i din (people of religion),413 with the one unifying feature of adherence being the kızıl

406
Babayan, “Sufis, Dervishes, and Mullas,” 118.
407
Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail,” 1049a.
408
Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans, 30; Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Isma'il,” 1049a.
409
“Ali’yi hak bilmeyenler kafir(-i) mutlak olur/ Dini yok, imanı yok, ol na-müslümandır.” Minorsky, “The
Poetry of Shah Ismail,” 1047a.
410
Şah İsmail Hata’i Külliyatı, 129.
411
Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail,” 1042a.
412
Ibid., 1038a.
413
Ibid., 1038a.

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tac: “Whoever recognizes the Twelve Imams, he/she should wear the kızıl tac.”414 The

red headgear introduced by his father, Haydar, is also frequently referred to as kırmızı /

kızıl tac, tac-ı sa‘adet (the crown of happiness), and tac-ı devlet (the crown of fortune).415

On the other hand, the enemies of Ismail, his faith, and his followers are called

monafiq/münafık (hypocrites), gabr (infidel), and khavarij (Kharijites, i.e., heretics),416

and müşrikin (heretics/polytheists), as well as the names of Umayyad caliphs despised by

Shi‘ites such as Yazid, Marwan, and Muawiya. 417 This dichotomous rhetoric was used to

distinguish the Safavids from the rival Ottomans, a point reinforced by the Italian traveler

Constantino Lascari (d. 1501), who notes that “this religion of the sufi [Ismail] ... always

bore great hatred towards the Ottoman house, and counts them as heretics.”418 The Hatayi

Divanı maintained its importance for the Anatolian Kızılbaş/Alevi population for

centuries, long after the Safavids had distanced themselves from Kızılbaş Islam. Various

parts of the collection were incorporated into Kızılbaş rituals as a main aspect of

gatherings and/or recitations. For instance, Cafer-i Sadık Buyruğu mentions recitating

three Hatayi poems, or nefes, as a requirement of becoming a müsahip, or companion.419

414
“Ki her kim on iki imamı bildi / Ana kırmızı tac giymek revadur.” Şah İsmail Hata’i Külliyatı, 138-139.
In other parts of his divan, Ismail says, “Nişanı ol güneş tal‘atlı şahın/ Başında tac u belinde kemerdür.”
“Tac geyeni gezersen sufiyem deye revan/ Sufi oldur hak yoluna, göstere dinden beyan.“ ”Kızıl alem, kızıl
bayrak, kızıl tac/ Geyinse gaziler, ol gün hazerdür.” Ibid., 139-140. Based on this information, we can
speculate that women could also wear (or carry) the kızıl tac.
415
Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Isma'il,” 1027.
416
Ibid., 1042a.
417
Ibid., 1027a, 1036a.
418
Palmira Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kingship,” in
Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam, ed. John V. Tolan (New York: Garland, 1996), 326-352. It is,
however, clear from several of Hatayi’s couplets that not everyone responsed to his call to wear the tac and
became a Kızılbaş. He openly criticizes those who “turned their backs” to Shi‘ite, and therefore Safavid,
ideology: “Varıb bir kötüye sen olma nöker/ Çarnıha değer de dölünü döker/ Ne Hüda’dan korkar ne hicab
eder/ Bir kötüde namus ar olmayınca.” Ziya Şakir, Mezhepler Tarihi ve Şah İsmail: Sünnilik-Şiilik Alevilik-
Kızılbaşlık Nedir ve Nasıl Çıktı (Istanbul: Istanbul Maarif Kitaphanesi ve Matbaası, 1938), 202.
419
Buyruk, ed. Sefer Aytekin, 44. The editor does not mention the date of composition of the copy that he
transliterated into modern Turkish. However, he states that he mainly used a manuscript copy found in

135


According to Ziya Şakir and Baha Said Bey, two important researchers on Anatolian

Kızılbaş identity in the 1920s and 1930s, the Hatayi Divanı retained its vital role as a

liturgical text not only in rural parts of Anatolia, but also in urban centers, including

Istanbul.420

The Spanish captive referenced above, who lived in Ottoman Anatolia and the

Balkans between 1552 and 1556, also noticed the prominence of poetry in the daily life

of early modern Anatolians. In detailing his encounters with Anatolians, he noted, “If the

Turks were serious about reading, there would have been great scholars among them.

They [however] do not read, but they all have several couplets memorized.”421 This gross

overgeneralization notwithstanding, the captive’s comments confirm the importance of

poetry in the region. For instance, the story of Pir Sultan Abdal (d. ca. 1560s), a

contemporary who produced many deyiş/nefes that circulated for centuries following his

death, vividly reflects the social, cultural, and religious dynamics of early modern

Anatolia. As the leader of a Kızılbaş rebellion in north central Anatolia, he became a

heroic figure after the Ottomans executed him in Sivas in 1550.422 While his connection

to the Safavid court is a topic of ongoing debate, his poetry reveals his support for pro-

Safavid propaganda in Anatolia. In one of his most popular works, he depicts the spread

of Kızılbaş Islam as a way to take revenge for the Imams:

Izmir. This manuscript was possessed by the Yan Yatır ocağı, which is known as a main ocak for one of the
sub-groups of the larger Anatolian Kızılbaş community, called the Tahtacılar. For futher details on the
notion of müsahip and its importance for the Kızılbaş communities, see Mehmet Naci Önal, “Muğla’da
Alevi-Tahtacı Kültürü,” in Turkish Studies - International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and
History of Turkish or Turkic 8/9 (Summer 2013): 351-353,
420
Şakir, Mezhepler Tarihi ve Şah İsmail, 221; Baha Said Bey, “Tekke Aleviliği – İçtimai Alevilik,” in
Türk Yurdu Dergisi 4/21 (September 1926): 193-210.
421
Serrano y Sanz , “Türkiye’nin Dört Yılı,” 82.
422
Pir Sultan Abdal is still an important figure for the contemporary Alevi/Kızılbaş population of Anatolia.
His village, Banaz in the district of Sivas, attracts large numbers of visitors each year from the surrounding
region. A statue of Pir Sultan Abdal was erected in Yıldızeli, Sivas province, to commemorate hıs legacy.

136


 Hazret-i Ali devri yürüye, Ali kim olduğu bilinmelidir,
Alay alay gelen gaziler ile, İmamların öcü alınmalıdır,
Yeryüzünü kırmızı taclar bürüye, münafık olanların bağrı
deline,
Sahib-i zamanın emri yürüye, Sultan kim olduğu
bilinmelidir.423

His poems, which were chanted and recited by both official Safavid disciples and local

Kızılbaş in Anatolia, glorified the heroic actions of Safavid sheikhs/shahs on the

battlefield, and emphasized the significance of adherence to Shi‘ite Islam and obedience

to the Safavid shahs, not only as spiritual guides but also as political leaders:

Hızır Paşa bizi berdar etmeden, açılın kapılar şaha gidelim,

Siyaset günleri gelip yetmeden, açılın kapılar şaha gidelim,
Gönül çıkmak ister, şahın köşküne, can boyanmak ister Ali
müşküne,
Pirim Ali on iki imam aşkına, açılın kapılar şaha gidelim.424

In his later poems, however, Pir Sultan conveys his displeasure with the Anatolians. In

one example, he complains about their lack of loyalty to the Safavid shah:

Benden selam söyle o güzel şaha, kurduğu yollara gitmiyor

talip,
Herkes kendisine bir yol sürüyor, mürşit buyruğunu
tutmuyor talip,
İçeri girilen ikrar hak diyor, dışarı çıkılan ikrar yok diyor,
Senden gayrı bana mürşit çok diyor, verdiği ikrardan
dönüyor talip.425

423
Sadeddin Nüzhet Ergün, XVII. Asır Saz Şairlerinden Pir Sultan Abdal (Istanbul: Türkiyat Enstitüsü
Yayınları, 1929), 60.
424
Pir Sultan Abdal Şiirleri, poem no. 1/214 www.antoloji.com. According to Ali Haydar Avcı, a
researcher on Kızılbaş identity and rebellions in the early modern era, the word şah in Pir Sultan Abdal’s
nefes/deyişs symbolizes the concept of reaching an ideal world ruled by justice, rather than the Safavid
shah. Ali Haydar Avcı, Osmanlı Gizli Tarihinde Pir Sultan Abdal ve Bütün Deyişleri (Istanbul: Nokta
Kitap, 2006), 63. However, we should not dismiss the possibility that the poems can also connote literally
reaching the Safavid shah or spreading Safavid rule into Anatolia, especially since Pir Sultan mentions
Ismail as his spiritual guide in the same poem: Şah’a giden ben bir bezirgan gördüm / Ayrılmam katardan
ben şimden geri / Hemen tutmuş hakikatin yolunu / Ayrılmam katardan ben şimden geri // Bezirganın yükü
ilm-i hamail / Yolun cefasına olmuşum kail / Bezirganlar başı pirim İsmail / Ayrılmam katardan ben
şimden geri. Ibid., 63-64. Avcı claims, implausibly, that the Ismail mentioned in the poem is not the
Safavid shah but might be a halife of the Ardabil shrine
425
Pir Sultan Abdal Şiirleri, poem no. 23/214 www.antoloji.com.

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 Derviş Muhammed Yemini’s Faziletname (1519) likewise points to the

importance of poetry for Anatolians. Although he was one of the Seven Great Bards (yedi

ulu ozan)426 of the Kızılbaş, we do not have any information about Yemini’s life other

than he translated Sheikh Rükneddin’s (d. 1323) heroic prose biography of Ali b. Abi

Talib into versified Ottoman Turkish, adding a eulogy on the Twelve Imams. 427 The

simplicity of Yemini’s language and his emphasis on proselytizing to a large number of

people explains both the intended audience and the importance of poetry. More than forty

surviving copies of the Faziletname attest to its widespread popularity among Safavid

missionaries, as well as the Kızılbaş population in Anatolia.428 Even though the text does

not include direct references to the Safavid state or the sheiksh/shahs –due to the fact that

the original Faziletname was written before the Safavids established themselves- many

couplets emphasize the importance of believing in Ali b. Abi Talib’s cause, recognizing

the twelve Imams, and wearing a red caftan and the kızıl tac; these last stipulations must

have been added to the text by Yemini. In recounting the battle between the forces of Ali

b. Abi Talib and Mu‘awiya, Yemini describes Ali as

Mu‘aviye leşkerilen çünki irdi / ‘Ali’nün leşkeri hem bakdı

gördi
At arkasına geldiler seraser / Mu‘aviye karşuda turdı
beraber
Kızıl geymişdi ol dem şah-ı merdan / Şeker rengidi
dülbendi hem i can

426
The other six were Fuzuli, Pir Sultan Abdal, Nesimi, Hatayi, Virani, and Kul Himmet.
427
Other than a minor detail, such as his grandfather’s immigration from Samarkand to Anatolia. Derviş
Muhammed Yemini, Fazilet-name (1519), ed. Yusuf Küpeli (Ankara, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. 2002),
4.
428
Tepeli lists over forty copies of the account in various libraries in Turkey, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and theVatican. Küpeli, Faziletname, 16-28.

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 Kızıl geymiş mübarek başına hem / Kuşanmış bır kızılreng
cübbe muhkem.429

In another section, Yemini explains why Ali wore the Kızıl tac initially:

Mu‘aviye didi Mervan beni dinle / Benüm söyledüğüm

fehm idüp anla
Şehadet idicek ashab yekser / Elinde bir ağaç dutardı
Haydar
Ki bir gün Mustafa [the Prophet Muhammad] didi bilün siz
/ ‘Aliden ihtiraz ol gün kılun siz
Kaçan geyse kızıl tacı serine / Şeker renginde bir dülbend
sarına
Geye hem arkasına surh-came / Ya kırk adım yedi ya üç
tamame.430

Pir Sultan Abdal’s and Yemini’s popular poetry were not the only literary works

produced and/or circulated in Ottoman Anatolia for the purpose of pro-Safavid/pro-

Shi‘ite propaganda. The poetry of Seyyid ‘Imad al-Din, known as Nesimi (d. 1417), and

Pir Ali Sultan (d. 1537-8) were also widely recited, circulated, and copied to spread pro-

Safavid/pro-Shi‘ite identity among Anatolians. Nesimi, who was brutally executed by the

Sunni ulema of Aleppo due to his “heretic beliefs,” became one of the most influential

figures for later poets of Iran and Anatolia, including Hatayi and Pir Sultan Abdal, and

was repeatedly honored at Kızılbaş gatherings. Pir Ali’s poetry also provided inspiration

and motivation for Kızılbaş individuals and groups in Anatolia.

As pro-Safavid gatherings, most of which were clandestine and included reciting

and listening to literary texts, became a main concern for the Ottoman central authority,

Istanbul started inquiring about these texts and their use. Possessing any of them was now

deemed a threat in Istanbul’s attempt to quell the increasing influence of pro-Safavid

429
Ibid., 562.
430
Ibid., 563.

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propaganda and the popularity of Kızılbaş identity in Anatolia. Ottoman official orders,

however, while revealing a cautious mindset, do not mention specific names or details in

their condemnations. To judge from imperial orders, Istanbul emphasized the reading of

these texts aloud in small, mostly secret, gatherings, as this was the most common way of

propagating these literary works. Two specific decrees sent to the qadi of Ortapare, a

town near Sivas, mention multiple copies of a forty-volume book sent to the Anatolian

towns by the Safavid Shah through his halifes and spies.431 The Ottoman central authority,

in response, asks the local governors to collect these volumes immediately and imprison

the carriers and owners.432 In other decrees, Istanbul warned local authorities about the

existence of books that were either “against the common creed”433 or “pertain[ed] to

heresy and impiety.”434 Each order ended by asking the local authority to find whoever

was reading, listening to, and circulating these books and to either imprison these people

or send them to the capital.

In several cases, the problematic text was not a book or booklet, but a collection

of papers allegedly signed and/or blessed by the Safavid shahs. Since the spiritual leaders,

or sheikhs, of the Kızılbaş were also the political leaders of the Safavids, any papers

issued by them were viewed with respect by their followers, even when these followers

could not themselves decipher their content. For instance, an order sent to the governor of

431
Even though the decrees do not give any further details concerning the nature of these books, it is
difficult to believe that there were actually forty volumes. They must have been booklets that were read by
the halifes at gatherings since most of the rural population at the time was illiterate.
432
MD, Vol. 27, Nos. 956-957 (8 Zilhicce 983/ March 3, 1576).
433
“... umumi itikada mugayir...”: MD, Vol. 28, No. 883 (19 Şaban 984/ November 10, 1576).
434
“… rafz ve ilhada müteallik...”: MD, Vol. 30, No. 658 (28 Ramazan 985/ December 8, 1577).

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Zulkadiriye, a region in southeastern Anatolia, mentions letters sent by Shah Tahmasb.435

After conveying displeasure with individuals becoming Kızılbaş, Istanbul asks the

governor to confiscate the letters and execute those who are circulating or hiding them.436

Not everyone had access to pro-Safavid texts, and Istanbul was aware of this fact,

as well. Central and local authorities were, therefore, particularly cautious about

recitation sessions led by Safavid disciples that served as inspiration for Safavid

sympathizers since numerous “pious” Muslims were easily persuaded to convert in these

gatherings. Several orders also warn local authorities about the “ignorance” of the

population in regard to the religious topics that “led them to leave the right path” and

become “rafizis” or “mulhids.”437

Pro-Safavid references in Kızılbaş texts continued until the mid-seventeenth

century, when a significant decrease occurred. A gülbang, or prayer, for Shah Safi II (r.

1666-1694) in the epilogue of several Ottoman Turkish copies of a buyruk text is one of

the increasingly rare examples of such references.438

III.c. Circulation of objects

While the transmission of knowledge through literary texts was a key tool of

Safavid propaganda efforts, non-literary forms of communication, including the

circulation of objects and rituals that had been in use long before the rise of the Safavids,

also played a critical role as transmitters of knowledge and messages. A mühimme decree

435
Even though Shah Tahmasb died a year before this order was issued, we can assume that the letters in
question were signed/sent by him, not his son, Shah Ismail II.
436
MD, Vol. 31, No. 335 (17 Cumayezulahir 985/ August 2, 1577).
437
MD, Vol. 6, No. 897 (23 Şaban 972/ March 26, 1565).
438
Gölpınarlı, “Kızılbaş,” TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi.

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of November 1593 instructs the governor of Rum, Mehmed Pasha, to capture the halifes

appointed by the Safavid shah to the regions of Çorum, Kastamonu, and Sivas. According

to the decree, these halifes contributed to the Celali Rebellions because, as their main

strategy, they encouraged people to revolt against the Ottoman authorities, who were

busy with military activities in Europe, specifically the Long War against the

Habsburgs.439 The decree also describes a raid organized by local authorities to arrest the

perpetrators in which one halife was caught with several letters from the shah, the shah’s

seal, and a pair of paşmak (slippers), boots and a cloak. The Ottoman imperial registry

contains numerous orders similar to the one described above that reveal that pro-Safavid

messages came in many forms, not just in writing, and they were transmitted and

received at multiple levels. Despite the increasing rate of literacy, non-verbal forms of

communication were still central to early modern Anatolian society since they directly

engaged an individual’s feelings through the physical senses. Powerful forms of non-

literary communication, including the smell of incense and the visual impact of wall

paintings, carpets, clothing, jeweled or un-jeweled taces, and swords were all associated

with a Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş figure or event and utilized not only to nurture affinity for an

identity, ideology, and sect, but also to promote pro-Safavid sympathy among non-

Kızılbaş populations since visual communication was more effective than writing and/or

reciting.

Objects were central aspects of Safavid religious and political identity during the

leadership of Sheikh Haydar, who invented and disseminated the main identity-marker of

the group, the red headdress called the kızıl tac. Shortly after its introduction, the kızıl tac

439
Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 40.

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became the primary symbol of Kızılbaş/Safavid identity. For instance, according to Ross

Anonymous:

When Hasan Padishah [the Aq-Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan]

heard [the news circulating] he sent a messenger to Sultan
Haidar, saying: “Oh my son, send me one of the caps which
thou hast made that I may see it.” Thereupon, Sultan Haidar
sent him a cap, and when Hasan Padishah saw it he was
pleased with it; taking it up, he kissed it and placed it on his
own head, after which he bade each of his children do
likewise.440

The kızıl tac gradually became a source of pride and honor, the main indicator of

Safavid identity and a mark of religious zeal among the followers of the Safaviyya order,

Shi‘ite nobles, and later the Ottoman subjects who were devotees of the Safavid state.

The story of the famous Kızılbaş convert Sultan Tekelu Ulama Han, who joined the Shah

Kulu Rebellion against the Ottomans in 1511 and ultimately escaped to Iran,441 provides

an example of how the two sides viewed the kızıl tac. After the death of Shah Ismail in

1524, Ulama Khan’s status at the Safavid court began to diminish, and while serving as

governor of Azerbaijan under Shah Tahmasb I, he lost his status after being involved in

internecine disputes with various Kızılbaş emirs.442 Fearing execution, he sent a message

to Istanbul in 1531 via the governor of Diyarbekir, offering his services to the Ottoman

sultan. Receiving a favorable response, he fled and took refuge in the fortress of Van in

1534.443 According to Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, when Ulama Sultan was in the

440
Ross Anonymous, 255. See also n. 250, above.
441
Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Tabakâtu’l-memâlik ve derecâtü’l-mesâlik, ed. Ayhan Yılmaz as Kanunî’nin
Tarihçisinden Muhteşem Çağ: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman (Istanbul: Kariyer Yayıncılık, 2011), 195-197.
442
Muhammad Amin Riyahi, Sefaratnameha-i Iran: Gezareşha-i mesaferat ve ma’muriyeti sefiran der
Iran. (Tehran: Shirket-i Efsat, 1368/1989), 28-29.
443
Monshi, Vol. I, 80-83. According to Solakzade, Sultan Tekelu Ulama rendered valuable service to
Süleyman I during the 1530s and 1540s. Solakzade Tarihi, 113. According to Peçevi, he held the

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majlis/meclis, or assembly, of the Ottoman sultan Süleyman, the conversation turned to

the issues of “harf-e din va mazhab,” or religion and sect, whereupon Ulama destroyed

his kızıl tac with his sword to show his obedience to the Ottoman sultan and his new

creed.444

Ottoman official sources confirm the significance of owning, circulating, and

wearing the kızıl tac as the main identity marker and conversion tool for the pro-Safavid

Kızılbaş in Anatolia. A specific order sent to Baghdad, for instance, asks the governor to

thoroughly investigate the claims that a certain Mehmed, a resident of Baghdad, donned

the tac and became a Kızılbaş.445 Another order sent to the governor of Şehrizor (Kirkuk)

accuses the commander of a frontier fortress, Hasan, of not being trustworthy and

wearing the kızıl tac, claiming that he had turned Kızılbaş after he was dispatched to the

Safavid shah several times. The order further asks the governor not to trust Hasan again,

to remove him from his official position, and to confiscate the tac.446 As the Ottoman

central authority witnessed the power that objects sent by the Safavid shahs represented,

they tried to suppress their use in an attempt to counter the threat. Distribution and

circulation of these objects during a period of peace between the two empires was

regarded as a violation of their treaty and, accordingly, several envoys and letters were

governorships of Bosnia, Hasankeyf, and Erzurum before he was killed during the siege of Budin in 1551.
Peçevi , Peçevi Tarihi, 289-290. According to Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, however, the Kızılbaş Safavid
army in Tabriz killed Ulama Sultan. Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, 96-100.
444
Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, 36-37. Interestingly enough, the author of the account later adds that
Süleyman considered this behavior very disrespectful and wanted to execute Ulama Sultan, but his men
convinced him not to do so. Ibid.
445
MD, Vol. 9, No. 230 (22 Şaban 977/ January 29, 1570).
446
MD, Vol. 35, No. 816 (26 Şaban 986/ October 28, 1578).

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sent to the Safavid court asking the political authorities to take this issue seriously if they

wished to keep the peace between the two sides.447

In addition to the kızıl tac various other objects, including swords, clothing, and

carpets, signified adherence to the Safavid religious and political identity and, therefore,

were sanctified both by the leaders and the followers of the Safavids. An Italian traveler

who visited Tabriz in 1499 describes the atmosphere of the city in this way:

… On his [Shah Ismail’s] entry he used great cruelty

towards the opposing faction, as he cut to pieces many
people, doctors, women, and children; wherefore, all the
surrounding places sent in their allegiance, and all the city
wore his ensign, that is, the red caftan….448

Michele Membré also mentions that Kızılbaş devotees made the long and dangerous

journey from Anatolia to purchase objects blessed by contact with their shah.449

Furthermore, an order sent by the Ottoman sultan to the governor of Rum and the qadis

of Sivas and Tokat, major Kızılbaş cities in north central Anatolia, in 1565 mentions a

pair of yellow slippers, allegedly belonging to Shah Ismail, that a certain Mehmed, who

has been in contact with the Safavids, was circulating, as people believed they helped

women to have children.450 Various other orders mention pieces of papers with the shah’s

seal on them;451 precious and semi-precious stones, as well as horses and weapons;452

chandeliers and censers;453 and clothing worn or blessed by the shah.454

447
MD, Vol. 14, No. 712 (Gurre-i Ramazan 978/ January 27, 1571).
448
Chardin, Travels in Persia 1673-1677, 105.
449
Membré, Relazione di Persia, xviii.
450
“… bir sarı paşmağın doğurmayan hatunlara şifadur deyü...”: MD, Vol. 5, No. 205 (8 Sefer 973/
September 3, 1565).
451
MD, Vol. 19, No. 11 (2 Muharrem 980/May 14, 1572); MD, Vol. 31, No. 335 (17 Cemaziyülahir 985/
August 31, 1577).
452
MD, Vol. 22, No. 461 (14 Rebiyülahir 981/ August 12, 1573).
453
MD, Vol. 24, No. 234 (14 Zilhicce 981/ April 6, 1574).

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 The war of geo-political and religious legitimacy between the Ottomans and

Safavids was, on numerous occasions, fought over material objects. Carpets and furniture

were used to promulgate Safavid political and religious identity for both their own

subjects and their sympathizers living in Anatolia and the frontier regions of Iraq. Sultan

Selim II, in an order sent to Baghdad in 1572, firmly orders the governor to remove

carpets sent by the Safavid shah to the shrines of Ali b. Abi Talib and his son Husayn in

Najaf and Karbala. The order points out the importance of such objects for converts to

Shi‘ism (melahide) and asks the governor to send the necessary measurements for new

carpets as soon as possible.455

IV. Conclusion: The Cessation of Pro-Safavid Propaganda in Ottoman Anatolia

World religions, in Weberian terms, arrive with the most remarkable of appeals:

“They proclaim a truth that stands above others and assert that its recognition is essential

for a meaningful life.”456 As the Safaviyya Sufi order crystallized into a nascent state, the

Safavid sheikhs and shahs implemented a complex yet successful propaganda program to

strengthen their position in the region by offering a religio-political identity for the

discontented inhabitants of the surrounding regions.457 According to Kemalpaşazade, as a

response to the Safavid activities in Anatolia, unemployed people who “had not achieved

454
MD, Vol. 53, No. 753 (23 Sefer 983/ June 3, 1575).
455
MD, Vol. 14, No. 1474 (25 Ramazan 979/ February 10, 1572).
456
Hefner, “World Building and the Rationality of Conversion,”, 29.
457
While pro-Safavid propaganda mainly targeted Muslims of the region, various cases reveal that non-
Muslims were also approached. For instance, according to the anonymous author of Alam Ara-yi Shah
Tahmasb, when Tahmasb left for Georgia to settle ongoing conflicts among local rulers, he expressed a
desire to spread Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam among the Georgians. Ultimately, “after seeing how much flattering
[the Georgian leader] Samayan Khan received upon his conversion to Shi‘ite Islam, many local rulers
converted to Shi‘ite Islam with their subjects.” Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, 88-89.

146


anything in their entire lives and who had no timars” left their villages to join them with

the false hope of becoming a district governor in the Safavid realm.458Accentuating the

success of pro-Safavid propaganda, an anonymous Italian traveler points out that the

shahs convinced great numbers that they were not only the representatives or agents of

the Hidden Imam, but were themselves the actual Hidden Imams.459 The present chapter

has documented the pro-Safavid propaganda’s inception, institutionalization, and

methods, which are crucial to understanding the formation and transformation of Safavid

and Ottoman religious identities for almost two centuries.

Current scholarship argues that the erosion of Kızılbaş influence at the Safavid

court resulted from the gradual incorporation of Georgian and Circassian ghulams, or

slave soldiers, along with Persian bureaucrats, into the system by Shah Abbas (r. 1588-

1629). Yet internecine conflicts among various Kızılbaş tribes had already damaged their

influence at the court as early as the 1530s460 as aligning with the Safavid court became

more difficult for Kızılbaş tribes, both Anatolian and Iranian. As this gradual decline

extended to their political relevance, conversion to and from Kızılbaş Islam lost its

political significance for both the Ottoman and Safavid central authorities, specifically

458
“... ‘ömrinde timar yimeyen, diyarinda kimse kendüye adem dimeyen bi-karlar tümen beğleri olub,
hadden ziyade i’tibar buldılar.... Yurdun terk idüb, çiftin çubuğun tağıtdı, evin ocağın yıkdı, yakdı harab
itdi. ‘Anda varan begler olurmuş’ diyü zikr olan ta’ife-i halife kalanları dahi keman-ı intikam
kurmuşlardır.” Kemalpaşazade further adds that “… sonra, Terâkime’nün devri âhir oldu; mülkün
bedeninde Kızılbaş zahir oldu. Tetavül elin uzatmaduk el ve boy, şehir ve köy komadı. Mezkûr civarında bir
diyâr kalmadı ki, ol ana el sokamadı. Mezkûr bed-fi’âl çok ma’mûreyi çiğnetti, paymâl etti....”
Kemalpaşazade, Defter VIII, 43.
459
A Narrative of Italian Travels, 49.
460
The anonymous author of Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb provides a detailed account of the declining status
of the Kızılbaş emirs at the Safavid court in which the tension dates back to the beginning of Shah
Tahmasb’s reign, when the four Kızılbaş tribes – Tekelu, Aramlu, Rumlu, and Turkman – lost the favor of
the shah because they supported his brothers, Elkas and Sam Mirza, for the throne after Ismail I died in
1524. Alam Ara-yi Shah Tahmasb, 22-38.

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after the 1630s.461 Safavid Shi‘ite Islam’s divergence from Anatolian Kızılbaş Islam

toward a more purist version of Imamism, and the decreasing influence of the Kızılbaş

emirs at the Safavid court, led to the stabilization of the Safavid Empire under Abbas, on

the one hand, and the cessation of the pivotal role of the Kızılbaş, on the other.

Consequently, Anatolian Kızılbaş subjects ceased to play a significant role as a buffer

between the two empires, and Safavid and Ottoman propaganda activities in central and

southeastern Anatolia decreased significantly.462

The diminishing influence of the Kızılbaş emirs at the Safavid court and the

divergence of Safavid Islam from a loose interpretation of Shi‘ism, an attractive

alternative to Ottoman Sunnism for the Anatolia population, to Imamism, was affected by

the Ottoman-Safavid relationship, as well. The Treaty of Zuhab/Kasr-ı Şirin (1639) ended

the intermittent conflicts of more than 150 years between the two sides as well as the era

of active pro-Safavid propaganda and pro-Ottoman counter- propaganda in the region.

Over the following decades, this led to the marginalization of the Kızılbaş population

across Anatolia, transforming a once openly militant population into a closed and isolated

461
Trade between the Ottomans and Safavids was equally important in shaping the relationship between the
Safavid court and the Kızılbaş emirs, as well as between the Ottomans and the Kızılbaş. Rudi Matthee
cogently argues that the Treaty of Zuhab, signed in 1639, ended a century and a half of intermittent
Safavid-Ottoman hostility and revitalized the Anatolian overland trade route, which was no longer
threatened by warfare and commercial boycotts. Moreover, improving maritime contacts between the two
empires, as well as the abolition of restrictions on travel and trade across Ottoman borders caused the
Kızılbaş emirs of the Safavid court to lose leverage. Rudolph P. Matthee, The Politics of Trade in Safavid
Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 75-85.
462
For further details, see Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs; eadem, “The Safavid Synthesis:
From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi’ism,” Iranian Studies 27 (1994): 135-161; and Abisaab, Converting
Persia. Babayan argues that the tension between the spiritual landscape of Kızılbaş Islam and that of the
newly adopted imperial religion, Imami Shi‘ism, intensified in the seventeenth century, even though it had
existed from the very beginning of Safavid rule. With the gradual establishment of Twelver Shi‘ite dogma,
Kızılbaş belief became increasingly marginalized and was finally condemned as heresy in the Safavid
court. While Safavid conversion efforts continued in Anatolia in the following decades, imperial orders
after the 1630s do not refer to them with the same frequency. Either the number of halifes sent to Anatolia
by the Safavid central authority declined, or the Ottoman central authority began to pay less attention to
them.

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mystical movement in “the sea of Ottoman Sunnism,” and, as Marcus Dressler argues,

while millenarian expectations waned, Twelver Shi‘ite “quietism” replaced the political

activism of the Kızılbaş.463

463
Marcus Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy: Competing Claims for Authority and Legitimacy in the
Ottoman-Safavid Conflict,” in Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power, eds. Hakan
T. Karateke and Maurius Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 151-173. On the other hand, a few sources
show Safavid conversion activities continuing after the 1630s. In one document, Çeşmi Efendi, the qadi, or
judge, of Constantinople in the late 1620s and the kadıasker, or supreme judge, of Anadolu for sultan
Murad IV (r. 1623-1640), reports some mülahide, or heretics, living in Constantinople. While Çeşmi Efendi
does not mention the word Safavid or Kızılbaş in his report, it is clear whom he means: “When they were
asked about their mürşid [spiritual guide], they all said Shah Abbas.” Moreover, Çeşmi Efendi, after
mentioning that these “heretics” recite the manis, or couplets, of Shah Ismail Hatayi in their secret
gatherings, ends his short report with prayers for their extermination. Vladimir Minorsky, “Shaykh Bali-
Efendi on the Safavids,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 20 (1957): 448-450.

149


 Chapter 4
Reasons for Anatolian Conversion to Kızılbaş Islam

I. Introduction: Shamanist Influence vs. Spiritual Fulfillment

The Safaviyya order, beginning with its founder Sheikh Safi and his son Sadr al-

Din, emphasized the recruitment of Anatolian supporters to the order. By the second half

of the fifteenth century, as the movement completed its crystallization into a Shi‘ite

political group under the leadership of Sheikh Junayd and Sheikh Haydar, pro-Safavid

propaganda for conversion evolved from efforts to recruit followers to the Sufi order to

attempts to make Anatolians full-fledged adherents of the Kızılbaş movement, which

meant paying taxes to the Safavid religio-political establishment, possibly serving as

soldiers in the shah’s army, and in many cases migrating to the Safavid realm. A limited

number of Kızılbaş/Shi‘ites in greater Iran, where most of the population remained Sunni

until the late sixteenth century, made Anatolia even more attractive for the Safavid

leaders in their attempts to find a loyal base.464 As a result of the complex yet successful

propaganda program initiated by the early leaders of the order and perfected by their

successors, the Safavids strengthened their position in Anatolia by offering a religio-

political identity for the discontented inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and surrounding

small states. The end result, as examined in the previous chapter, was that by the mid-

sixteenth century, according to Ottoman, Safavid, and European sources, the Kızılbaş

464
According to Feridun Beg, a chancellor at Murad III’s (r. 1574-1595) court, the locals hated the
Safavids, whom they saw as strangers. Feridun Beg, Münşeatu’s-selatin (Istanbul: n.p., 1274/1857), I: 584-
598.

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communities in Anatolia constituted the majority of the population of the entire

peninsula.465

Ottoman archival documents and chronicles attribute the success of pro-Safavid

propaganda efforts primarily to the ignorance of the local populations, the zealotry of the

Safavid missionaries, and the lack of Sunni religious authorities and instutions in rural

parts of the empire. Leading modern Turkish historians problematized this approach

beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century with detailed discussions on why

and how the majority of the peninsula embraced the Kızılbaş religio-political identity en

masse. While rightfully drawing attention to the limitations of Ottoman primary sources,

however, these historians overemphasized two motivations: the profound (and

“inevitable”) influence of pre-Islamic shamanist belief structures in Anatolia and the

incomplete nature of Islamization in the region before the late fourteenth century. Ahmet

Yaşar Ocak, for instance, argues that the long-lasting influence of shamanism created a

ripe environment in Anatolia for “heterodox interpretations” (namely, Kızılbaş) of Islam

and corresponding religious structures to emerge and eventually became dominant.466 He

adds that the Anatolians kept their pre-Islamic beliefs for centuries after they had

465
Minorsky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi on the Safavids,” 438, n. 4. According to Baha Sait Bey (d. 1939), one
of the first researchers of Alevi/Kızılbaş culture in Anatolia in the early Turkish Republic, half of the
Anatolian population was Kızılbaş in the first quarter of the twentieth century. “Türkiye’de Alevi
Zümreleri,” Türk Yurdu Dergisi 23 (1926): 404-406.
466
Ocak, Babailer İsyanı, 81; idem, Alevi ve Bektaşi İnançlarının İslam Öncesi Temelleri, 42. Ocak, while
acknowledging the importance of financial factors in conversions to Kızılbaş Islam, still stresses pre-
existing shamanist tendencies: “… Kızıbaşlık İslami ve mistik bir cila altında eski inançlarını koyu bir
tutuculukla koruyan konargöçer ve yarı göçebe halk kesimi içinde kendisini vergiye bağlayıp, yerleşik
hayata geçirmeye zorlayan Osmanlı yönetimine karşı yaşadığı sosyo-ekonomik bunalımı kullanmak
suretiyle tahrik eden Şii propagandanın etkisiyle oluşan yeni bir siyasi, dini ve sosyo-kültürel yapılanıştır.”
Ocak, “Din ve Düşünce,” in Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Istanbul:
IRCICA Yayınları, 1998), I: 141. For another example of this approach, see Mehmet Eröz, Türkiye’de
Alevilik Bektaşilik (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990).

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nominally converted to Islam, and as the “old kam-ozans [of Anatolia] became new

dervishes and sheikhs,” the preachers of the Safaviyya order, who took the simple

Turkish titles baba or dede, resonated with the locals and thus were able to convert large

numbers to Kızılbaş Islam.467 According to Baha Said Bey and Irène Mélikoff, similarly,

Safavid success was directly linked to the prevalence of a shamanist culture that

remained alive in Anatolia long after the process of Islamization began,468 rather than to

any possible connection between the Anatolian/Turkish Kızılbaş population and Shi‘ite

belief structures.469 Claude Cahen and Said Amir Arjomand carried this argument further

by claiming that the Islamization of the Turcoman tribes, particularly those living in

Anatolia and northwestern Iran, was superficial, and Central Asian shamanist elements

remained prominent in their religious beliefs and practices.470 In addition to these

reductionist tendencies, several historians with a Turkish nationalist agenda have argued

that conversion to Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam was never more than an “aberration” because

467
Criticizing the emphasis on pre-existing shamanistic tendencies as the overriding reason for the
popularity of Kızılbaş Islam in early modern Anatolia should not be taken to mean that there were no pre-
Islamic/shamanist traces in early modern Anatolian religious practices. Specific elements within early
modern Anatolian religious practice clearly demonstrate continuity with pre-existing shamanistic practices.
For further details on the attachment of certain early modern and modern Kızılbaş populations to inherited
pre-Islamic concepts, see Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans 27-39; Irène Mélikoff, Uyur İdik
Uyandırdılar, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1994), 23-24; Mehmet Eröz, Türkiye’de
Alevilik ve Bektaşilik (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990); Mehmet Naci Önal, “Muğla’da Alevi-
Tahtacı Kültürü,” Turkish Studies - International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of
Turkish or Turkic 8/9 (Summer 2013): 343-366. For Shamanism in Central and North Asia, see Mircea
Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. Williard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1972), 181-257.
468
Irène Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş: Efsaneden Gerçeğe, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları,
2004), 176.
469
Yahya Benekay, Yaşayan Alevilik, Kızılbaşlar Arasında (Ankara: Varlık Yayınevi, 1967), 50.
470
Said Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 79. Claude Cahen, “Le problème du
Shî’isme dans l’Asie Mineure turque préottomane,” in Le Shî’isme Imâmite: Colloque de Strasbourg (6-9
Mai 1968), eds. R. Brunschvig and T. Fahd (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 120. It should,
however, be noted that due to Anatolia’s cultural and religious diversity, its Islamization took longer
(approximately four hundred years) than that of the surrounding regions, including Syria, Egypt, North
Africa, and Iran. For further details, see Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism.

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Shi‘ite Islam and “Turkishness” have been historically incompatible with each other.

Fuad Köprülü, for instance, once stated that Shi‘ite Islam is the least suitable sect for the

soul of the Turks, and consequently, the Turks have always supported Sunnism against

Shi‘ite tendencies, which, according to him, reflect the Iranians’ reactions against the

dominance of Sunni Islam.471 Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay further asserted that Shi‘ite

Islam has always promoted “laziness and delusion” and hence became popular only

among Iranians, not Turks, “whose characteristics have been historically the opposite.”472

Revisionists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have rightfully

criticized these stances and argued that explaining the popularity of Kızılbaş Islam among

the Anatolian population solely in terms of the prevalence of shamanist tendencies and

incomplete Islamization is a case of oversimplification and essentialism. They instead

have emphasized various other motivations lying behind the high number of Kızılbaş

Anatolian supporters of the Safavids, including widespread resentment of the

Sunnitization of the Ottoman central authority, the nomadic lifestyle, and “soul-

searching” and the simple need for spiritual fulfillment. 473 While providing a much-

needed framework for further discussion, revisionist scholars have nonetheless

perpetuated the earlier generations’ compartmentalization by inaccurately depicting

religious mono-causality rather than multi-causality; neglecting the role of pecuniary and

sociological factors in conversion; and depicting conversion in early modern Anatolia as

a life-changing and irrevocable move.

471
Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, Türk Edebiyatı’nda İlk Mutasavvıflar (Ankara: Gaye Matbaacılık, 1981).
472
M. Şemsettin (Günaltay), Türk-İslam Tarihine Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım: Maziden Atiye (Ankara: Akçağ,
2003).
473
Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans,” 28.

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 Richard Bulliet, in his examination of the Islamization and Shi‘itization of Iran,

emphasizes the pre-eminence of religiously defined social identifications and coins the

term “social conversion” to denote relocation “… from one religiously defined social

community to another.”474 Human behaviors are usually the consequences of a complex

thought process, and conversion to/from Kızılbaş Islam within the context of early

modern Anatolia should be understood in this way as a combination of both conscious

and unconscious motivations. Building on this idea, this chapter aims to examine the

multifaceted dynamics of conversion in Anatolia, where vivid examples of “social

conversion” can easily be found. In this environment, conversion always carried deep

social, political, and fiscal meanings for both individuals and institutions. When an early

modern Anatolian converted between Kızılbaş/Shi‘ite and Sunni Islam, he/she not only

changed his/her religious identity, but also switched subjecthood between the Ottoman

sultan and the Safavid shah through fiscal loyalties (i.e., taxes) and political loyalties

(military service and habitation of land). This chapter, therefore, problematizes the

mainstream stances in current scholarship and their compartmentalization of conversion

to/from Kızılbaş Islam by examining the complex array of motivations behind an

individual’s or group’s decision to convert, and, in many cases, to re-convert. Rather than

overemphasizing intrinsic or extrinsic variables, or essentializing thousands of

Anatolians’ decisions to switch sides by stressing a single motivation, the following

analysis attempts to explore various underemphasized motivations in an integrative

474
Evgeni Radushev, “The Spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans: Revisiting Bulliet’s Method on
Religious Conversion,” Oriental Archive 78 (2010): 364. Bulliet formulates two axioms of religious
conversion: 1) “The convert’s expectations of his new religion will parallel his expectations of his old
religion,” and 2) “Leaving aside ecstatic converts, no one willingly converts from one religion to another if
by virtue of conversion he markedly lowers his social status.” Ibid.

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manner while also giving new attention to migration, which is closely related to

“becoming a Kızılbaş” or abandoning Kızılbaş identity in the early modern Anatolian

context.

II. Conversion for “Salvation:” Sympathy for the Alid Cause, the Messianic
Character of the Safavid Leaders, and the Notion of Charisma

According to Rodney Barker, legitimation is a process in which rulers engage

with distinguished claims concerning the monopolization of their right to rule.475 Within

the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, rulers on both sides were well aware of the risks of losing

their legitimacy - and therefore authority- as they spent an enormous amount of time and

energy in justifying their rule to their subjects, as well as to their rivals. As a part of the

legitimizing process, these ruling establishments attempted to create strong central

administrations -within the limitations of the early modern era- to collect taxes and draft

soldiers. At the same time, the Ottoman and Safavid rulers aspired to be global rulers

with messianic/charismatic personalities that were meticulously crafted and perpetuated

by their administrative apparatuses. Cult-like devotion was particularly strong for the

Safavid leaders, who, beginning with the founders and early leaders of the movement in

the early fourteenth century, emphasized mahdistic claims and divine familial lineages in

their attempt to fashion the Safaviyya Sufi order as a strong religio-political actor in the

region. As self-legitimation is “an inherent and characteristic activity”476 of a given

government, whether pre-modern or modern, the Safavid leaders utilized specific tools of

475
Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24.
476
Ibid., 30.

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legitimation in their attempts to lure Anatolians, whose support was critical for the

success of the Safavid cause. In this manner, their policies consisted of, but were not

limited to, invoking widespread sympathy among Anatolians for the family of the

Prophet Muhammad, or ahl al-bayt; benefiting from the existence of proto-Shi‘ite/pro-

Alid sentiments among the Anatolian populations dating to the pre-Safavid period; and

forging and disseminating charismatic ruler personalities to take advantage of

contemporary (and widely popular) millenarian/mahdistic tendencies.

II.a. “Ahl al-Baytism” and Sympathy for the Alid Cause

As mentioned in the second chapter, the late medieval era in Anatolia and Iran is

characterized by a religiously and culturally syncretistic milieu in which public

confessional identities were not as well defined as they would be in the following

centuries. Rather than experiencing a clear bifurcation between Sunni and Shi‘ite

interpretations of Islam, which was in fact a latter-day product of the conflict between the

Ottomans and the Safavids, the locals, many of whom were followers of various Sufi

orders, subscribed simultaneously to various religious beliefs and practices.477 One of the

main aspects of this socio-religious pluralism, which dates back to the pre-Safavid era in

Anatolia and Iran, was ahl al-baytism, or intense affection and respect for the family of

the Prophet Muhammad, particularly Fatima, Ali b. Abi Talib, and their younger son

Husayn, who was killed by the Umayyads at Karbala in 680 C.E. Pro-Alid sentiments

predicated on the righteousness of Ali’s and Husayn’s cause were particularly strong

477
Cahen referred to this phenomenon as the “Shi‘itization of Sunnism.” The reality, however, seems to
have been that the two sects co-existed. Cahen, “Le problème du Shi‘isme,” 120.

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among Sufi orders, many of which regarded Ali as their honorary founder and the

epitome of asceticism, piety, and humility, which were considered the key values of

Sufism.478 Moreover, nearly all of these Sufi orders emphasized their admiration for the

Shi‘ite Imams, displayed special reverence for their tombs, and used various religious

symbols commonly associated with Shi‘ite Islam.479 Furtermore, these orders used their

extensive urban and rural networks to spread these pro-Alid sentiments.480

In late medieval and early modern Anatolia, ahl al-baytism could take many

forms, from passionately commemorating the Battle of Karbala to developing a strong

cult-like devotion to the personalities of Ali and Husayn, portraying them as Christ-like

figures.481 These tendencies gradually coalesced into a common belief structure among

both the elite, including intellectuals, scholars, and high-level military and political

leaders, and the common people. For instance, Eşrefoğlu Rumi (d.1470s), the founder of

the Ottoman branch of the Kadiri order and an influential figure among Ottoman Sunnis,

after explicitly declaring the Sunni faith superior to Shi‘ism, asserted that the perfect

master, or şeyh-i kamil, should be a descendent of the house of Muhammad and Ali, and

478
Etan Kohlberg, “The Evolution of the Shi‘a,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 27 (1983): 18-19.
479
Derin Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,” in The Ottoman World,
ed. Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 91.
480
Biancamaria Scarcia-Amoretti, “L’Islam in Persia fra Timur e Nadir,” Anneli della Facolta di Lingue e
Letterature Straniere di Ca’Foscari 13/3 (1974): 63-98; Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 131.
481
R. D. McChesney, “The Anthology of Poets: Muzakkir al-Ashab as a Source for the History of
Seventeenth-Century Central Asia,” in Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B.
Dickson, Professor of Persian Studies, Princeton University, eds. Michael M. Mazzaoui and Vera B.
Moreen (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1990), 70. As a striking example, Shems-i Tebrizi’s
poetry can be given: “Ta sureti ve peyvendi cihan bud Ali bud / Chendanke nazar kerdem ve didem
behakikat / In kufr nebashed sahn kufr ne inest / Ser do cihan comle zepenhan ve zepidah / Ta nakshı zemin
bud ve zamanı bud Ali bud // Ez ruzi yakin ber heme mevcud Ali bud / Ta hast Ali bashed ve ta bud Ali
bud / Shems elhak Tebrızı ke benemud Ali bud. Kulliyat-ı Shemsi Tabrizi, eds. Badi al-zaman Furuzanfar
and Ali Dashti (Tehran: n.p., 1958), I: 373-74, cited in Michael Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids:
Shi‘ism, Sufism, and the Gulat (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972), 59-60.

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that those who opposed him should be considered khariji and legitimately killed.482 This

phenomenon continued to be relevant even after the conflict between the Ottoman and

Safavid empires became sectarian in nature following the Battle of Çaldıran in 1514.

Thus Hoca Sadeddin Efendi (d. 1599), a famous Ottoman scholar, official, and historian,

evinced the utmost hatred for the Umayyad caliph Yazid ibn Mu‘awiya (r. 680-83), who

gave the order for the massacre at Karbala, at the Ottoman court and, after describing a

fountain commissioned by Bayezid II in Bursa, wrote “… böylece [Bayezid II] Kerbela

Yezidi köpeğin nağmına şehidlerin önderi efendimin [i.e., Husayn] aydın ruhu için bu

tatlı suyu Müslüman hanelerine indirmiş, halkın yüreğini susuzluk ateşinin korkusundan

kurtarmıştır.”483 Moreover, various mühimme orders from as late as the 1570s refer to Ali

and Husayn as imams: “Hazret-i İmam Ali ve Hazret-i İmam Hüseyin, radiya’illahu

teala.”484

The widespread popularity of ahl al-baytism and popular sympathy for the Alid

cause among Anatolians provided a strong support base for the Safaviyya movement as

its leaders claimed to be the true descendants of the most sacred family in Islam through

Ali b. Abi Talib, whereas the Ottoman dynasty could not claim such a lineage even

though the Ottoman sultans professed to be the legitimate rulers of the ummah, or global

Muslim community. Throughout the period studied, the Safavid dynasty incorporated a

specific genealogical claim in its religio-politic rhetoric, which not only provided the

482
Eşrefoğlu Abdullah Rumi, Eşrefoğlu Rumi Divanı, ed. Mustafa Güneş (Ankara: Dumlupınar
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2000), 25. Eşrefoğlu Rumi presents Alevis, by which he means both the
descendants and the followers of Ali, in a positive light. Ibid., 13, 15. In this context the word “Khariji” is a
generic term meaning “heretic” and does not refer to the Kharijite sect of Islam.
483
Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, 195. Emphasis mine.
484
MD, Vol. 12, No. 873 (978 / 1570); MD, Vol. 14, No. 1474 (25 Ramazan 979 / February 10, 1572).

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Safavid leaders with an opportunity to cultivate special qualities (including access to the

esoteric meaning of the Qur’an) to justify their actions and keep their esteemed statuses,

but also facilitated conversions to Kızılbaş Islam, migrations to the Safavid realm, and

financial support in Anatolia for the Safavid court by Safavid missionaries, or halifes, and

sympathizers.

The connection to the Prophet’s family, according to the Safavid leaders, was one

of the true signs that they were the rightful rulers of the ummah.485 Thus, Safavid literary

sources authored before and after Shah Ismail’s reign (1499-1524) collectively used the

Saffetu’s-Safa as their main reference point486 and praised Sheikh Safi, the eponymous

founder of the order, as a respected Shi‘ite seyyid, a descendant of the Prophet

Muhammad through Fatima and Ali.487 In addition to many Safavid chronicles and

hagiographies, Shah Ismail’s own divan mentions these genealogical claims, stressing the

background of the Safaviyya family,488 which Ismail traces back to Musa al-Kazim (d.

799) and Muhammad al-Mahdi, the seventh and twelfth Imams recognized by Twelver

Shi‘ites.489 As another example, the well-known Anatolian Kızılbaş poet Pir Sultan Abdal

(d. 1550), in his highly popular poems, calls the Safavid shahs the only mediators to

reach the level of spirituality sought by those in Anatolia:

Gönül çıkmak ister Şahın köşküne,

Can boyanmak ister Ali müşküne,
Pirim Ali, on iki İmam aşkına,

485
Junabadi, 59, 67-68. See also n. 134, above.
486
For a detailed discussion on Saffetus’s-Safa, see chapters II and III.
487
Junabadi, 67-69.
488
E.g., the following verse: “Adım Şah İsmail, hakkın sırrıyem / Bu cümle gazilerin serveriyem /
Anamdur Fatıma atam Alidür / On iki imamın men dahi biriyem.” Cited in Ekinci, Şah İsmail ve İnanç
Dünyası (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 2010), 33-34.
489
Newman, Safavid Iran, 14, 67.

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 Açılın kapılar Şaha gidelim.490

Shah Tahmasb, Shah Ismail’s son, retained his father’s charismatic spiritual aura,

particularly during the first half of his reign. According to Michele Membré, a Venetian

nobleman who visited the Safavid court in the 1530s, the Anatolian Kızılbaş regarded

him “as the son of Ali, although Ali has been dead for 900 years [and] all the [Turcoman]

lords that want to render thanks to the Shah, whether in his presence or his absence, bow

their heads to the ground and say, Shah, Murtada (the chosen one) Ali.”491 As the pro-

Safavid propaganda corpus grew, with new copies of older texts and contemporary

additions commissioned by either the Safavid rulers or their followers circulating among

both Iranians and Anatolians, ahl al-baytism became an even more pronounced

cornerstone of Safavid legitimization.492

As mentioned above, spreading the claim that the Safavid leaders belonged to the

family of the Prophet Muhammad quickly became a crucial tool for cultivating pro-

Safavid loyalties in Anatolia and consequently caused serious anxiety at the Ottoman

court. The early Ottoman chronicler Aṣıkpaṣazade, for instance, recounts that Junayd was

known in Anatolia not only as a member of a significant family from Ardabil but also as

a seyyid, or descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his grandson Husayn, and was

therefore successful in attracting many followers to his cause. Furthermore, Ottoman

official documents make recurring references to pro-Safavid propaganda and its

490
Pir Sultan Abdal Şiirleri, poem no. 1/214, www.antoloji.com.
491
Membré, Relazione di Persia, 42. Al-Murtada was one of the titles of Ali, meaning “Ali the chosen
one.”
492
Zeki Velidi Togan, “Sur l’origine des Safavides,” Mélanges Louis Massignon 3 (Damascus: Institut
Français de Damas, 1957), 345-357; Sümer, Safevi Devleti'nin Kuruluşu, 1. For a detailed discussion of
pro-Safavid texts, see Chapter III.

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utilization of these claims to generate support among the Anatolians for the Safavid

movement. For instance, an imperial order sent to Sivas and Tokat in north central

Anatolia in 1565, mentions the reluctance among Ottoman soldiers to fight against the

Safavids because of their admiration for (and fear of) the Safavid shahs as the

descendants of Ali b. Abi Talib and, through Fatima, of the Prophet Muhammad.493

II. b. The Messianic Character of the Safaviyya Order and the Notion of Charisma

The concepts of the qutb, the “axis of the universe;” al-insan al-kamil, the perfect

human being; and the Mahdi, or messianic figure, are central dogmas in Twelver Shi‘ism

and in many Sufi orders, and date to well before the advent of the Safavids themselves.

After the alleged occultation of the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Mahdi, in

874, his re-appearance, which according to Twelver Shi‘ite belief will establish Twelver

rule and inaugurate the last days, became the central point of reference for Twelver

Shi‘ite historical consciousness.494 A widespread belief in the return of the Mahdi,

therefore, had direct repercussions for Twelver Shi‘ite attitudes towards temporal rulers

from the ninth century onward. It initially manifested itself in political quietism, a

tradition that Sheikh Junayd decisively rejected, and later in references to the Safavid

shah as the “shadow of God on earth,” an epithet also applied to the Abbasid caliphs and,

centuries later, to the Ottoman sultans.495 Moreover, the popular belief that the last

493
MD, Vol. 5, No. 205 (8 Sefer 973 / September 3, 1565).
494
Several scholars argue that the term qutb was first used in the tenth century by Ali Hujwiri / Hudiviri to
refer to Hakim al-Tirmidhi as the pinnacle of the hierarchy of saints in early Sufism. Tijana Kristić,
however, emphasizes that the concept of the qutb is closely related to Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Arabi’s concept
of wahdat al-wujūd, or unity of being. Wahdat al-wujūd allowed for the “encapsulation of divine attributes
in humans, who were believed to become saints.” Kristić, Contested Conversions to Islam, 40. Also see
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Syncrétism et esprit messianique,” in Syncrétism et hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide
et ottoman (XIVe- XVIIIe siècle), ed. Gilles Veinstein, Turcica IX (2005): 254.
495
Said A. Arjomand, “Religion, Political Action and Legitimate Domination in Shi‘ite Iran: Fourteenth to
Eighteenth Century, A.D.,” Archives Européennes de Sociologies 20 (1979): 64-69.

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century of the Muslim millennium began in 1495 (901H) and would end in 1591/92

(1000H) perpetuated the idea of an imminent apocalypse, which significantly intensified

the imperial competition among the Muslim rulers of the era.496

More broadly, Eurasia during the early modern era witnessed significant socio-

political and religious transformations. The end result, according to Sanjay

Subrahmanyam, was the creation of a set of new states “where the idea of suzerainty was

a crucial component of political articulation, and where the monarch was defined not

merely as king, but as ‘king over kings,’ with an explicit notion of hierarchy in which

various levels of sovereignty, both ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ were involved.”497

Early modern Anatolia, like Iran and Iraq during the same period, provides the perfect

example of what Subrahmanyam describes as a crossroads of diverse religious

movements from at least the time of the Great Seljuks (r. 1037-1194). A strong

apocalyptic fervor combined with a growing dissatisfaction with many political

authorities, particularly in the period following the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth

century, created a ripe environment for mahdistic justifications of both the Safavids and

the Ottomans.498 The inclusion of Mahdism in many interpretations of Sunni Islam, and

496
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Turning the Stones Over: Sixteenth Century Millenarianism from the Tagus to
the Ganges,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 40/2 (2003): 129-161; Kristić, “Illuminated by
the Light of Islam and the Glory of the Ottoman Sultanate: Self-Narratives of Conversion to Islam in the
Age of Confessionalization,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51/1 (2009): 39.
497
Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Written on Water: Designs and Dynamics in the Portuguese Estado da India,”
in Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History, eds. Susan E. Alcock, et al. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 43.
498
For further information on various messianic movements of the era, see Shahzad Bashir, “Deciphering
the Cosmos from Creation to Apocalypse: The Hurufiyya Movement and Medieval Islamic Esotericism,”
in Imagining the End: Visions of Apocalypse from the Ancient Middle East to Modern America, ed. Abbas
Amanat (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 168-184; idem, Messianic Hopes and Mystical Visions: The
Nurbakhshiya between Medieval and Modern Islam (Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press,
2003).

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the end of Twelver Shi‘ite quietism,499 further facilitated the dissemination of messianic

ideas to large, politically active populations. In this environment, personalities such as

Sheikh Bedreddin (d. 1420),500 a famous Sufi preacher and leader of a rebellion in the

1410s, combined spiritual charisma, through alleged descent from significant figures of

Islam, with political charisma that attracted masses and fueled aspirations to rule.

As Tijana Kristić cogently argues, an increasing desire to look for individuals

whose charismatic personalities made them candidates for the rank of qutb, and the

absence of a defined political structure, created a political vacuum from which the

Safavid leaders emerged as charismatic religio-political figures. Safavid rulers often

manipulated messianic expectations to consolidate their power and to rally people behind

their state-making projects as many Anatolians sought salvation in the Safavid leaders’

personalities.501 Furthermore, the notion of charisma, in the Weberian sense, as a personal,

familial, or divinely bestowed characteristic attached to a particular political ruler, made

Safavid leaders even more attractive among local Anatolians than some of their Ottoman

499
According to Cornell Fleischer, the increasing popularity of millenarian tendencies and the merger of
political authority and spiritual authority were not unique to the early modern Middle East but can also be
observed in contemporary European societies. Cornell Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making
of Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleyman,” in Soliman le Magnifique et son temps, ed. Gilles Veinstein
(Paris: La Documentation Française, 1992), 161.
500
Sheikh Bedreddin’s followers included both Muslims and non-Muslims, who all looked to him as a
savior who would eliminate injustice for everyone under his messianic rule. Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of
State-Building and Confessionalization,” 89-90; Kristić, Contested Conversions, 44.
501
The Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal rulers of the era all took advantage of this popular dynamic
regardless of their religious backgrounds. Subrahmanyam, “Turning the Stones Over,” 135-141.
Millenarian tendencies centered on Mahdi-like figures were shared by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike
and deployed by various political regimes, including the Ottomans, Safavids, Habsburgs, Venetians,
French, and the Vatican, each of which aspired to establish a universal monarchy with imperial claims in
messianic terms. Fleischer, “Shadows of Shadows: Prophecy and Politics in 1530s Istanbul,” International
Journal of Turkish Studies 13/1-2 (2007): 51-52; idem, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” 159-177; Robert
Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Suleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of
1533-1534,” Journal of Early Modern History 2/1 (1998): 1-31; Gülru Necipoğlu, “Suleiman the
Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of the Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry,” Art
Bulletin 71/3 (1989): 402-425. For the Safavid side of the story, see Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the
Hidden Imam; and Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs.

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counterparts.502 As religio-political leaders who best articulated qutb- and/or Mahdi-

centered religious and political prerogatives through their personalities,503 the Safavids

heavily utilized genealogical narratives of the Prophetic descent of their family, as well as

the mahdistic qualifications of their sheikhs/shahs, to spread Safavid loyalty to large

territories. In their attempt to legitimize their religio-political significance as providers of

justice, security, and prosperity, not only for Safavid subjects but also for the Kızılbaş

adherents in surrounding regions, the Safavid shahs created, refined, and standardized

particular images of the ruler and the ruled, which were heavily imbued with

mahdistic/messianic rhetoric. The ultimate outcome was to win political, religious, and

fiscal loyalty among Anatolians to strengthen the Safavid state’s position in its ongoing

competition with its main rivals, the Ottomans and Uzbeks.

Weber posits charisma and reason (or rationalism) as the fundamental forces of

social change, emphasizing the former as one of the main revolutionary forces in the

early modern period.504 He asserts that “every charisma is akin to religious powers in that

it claims at least some remnant of supernatural derivation; in one way or another,

legitimate political power therefore always claims the ‘grace of God.’”505 Moreover,

Abdulaziz Sachedina explains the importance of charisma for Shi‘ite movements in this

way: “… [T]he notion of the divinely guided savior Imam, the Mahdi, who was believed

502
For further details on Weberian charisma, see Thomas E. Dow, “An Analysis of Weber’s Work on
Charisma,” The British Journal of Sociology 29/1 (March 1978), 83-93; Susan K. Croutwater, “Weber and
Sultanism in the Light of Historical Data,” in Theory of Liberty, Legitimacy and Power: New Directions in
the Intellectual and Scientific Legacy of Max Weber, ed. Vatro Murvar (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1985), 168-174.
503
Kristić, Contested Conversions, 40-41; Newman, Safavid Iran, 13-25.
504
Max Weber, Economy and Society, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), Vol. II, 1116-1117.
505
Ibid., 1162.

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to have been equally endowed with divine knowledge as the Prophet had been, seized the

imaginations of all those who were deprived of their rights under the existing regimes.”506

Similarly, the Safavi leaders, beginning with the founder of the order, Sheikh Safi al-Din,

were credited with a saintly aura embellished with supernatural powers, or keramets.

While the earliest Safavid leaders gained influence mainly through their saintly

personalities, Sheikh Junayd and his son Haydar in the fifteenth century made this

combination of charisma and mahdistic qualities a key dimension of the Safavid dynasty,

and it became central to pro-Safavid propaganda in the following decades, particularly in

literary sources, including hagiographies, poetry, and chronicles.507 In their attempts to

transform their ancestors’ Sufi establishment into a religio-political movement in

Anatolia and Iran, Junayd and Haydar constructed a prestigious identity for the Safavid

family, often imbued with divine and saintly characteristics, to recruit followers and

encourage them to participate in military confrontations.508 As the mahdistic principle

entailed a personal relationship between the leader and his followers, Safavid leaders

utilized the need for a charismatic leader who claimed some type of hierocratic authority

in order to increase the popularity of their order in Anatolian towns.509

Evgeni Radushev, examining the spread of Islam in the Balkans in the fifteenth

and sixteenth centuries, argues that one of the main reasons for the new faith’s success

506
Abdulaziz A. Sachadina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1981), 7.
507
Historically, societies with high illiteracy rates tend to be susceptible to personal or charismatic
authority, and early modern Anatolia provides us with a vivid example of this dynamic. For details, see
Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).
508
Babayan, “Sufis, Dervishes and Mullas: the Controversy over Spiritual and Temporal Dominion in
Seventeenth-Century Iran,” in Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed. Charles
Melville (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 118.
509
According to Ocak, messianic tendencies were prevalent among pre-Islamic Turcoman tribes, as well.
Ocak, Babailer İsyanı, 79.

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was the fact that Islam “became fashionable” as a result of vast Ottoman military

successes and the establishment of a complex state system that controlled much of

southeastern Europe.510 In early modern Anatolia, in contrast, the charisma of the Safavid

shahs led to the rising popularity of the Safavid religio-political movement. Sheikh

Junayd, Sheikh Haydar, Shah Ismail, and Shah Abbas all had charismatic personalities

that aided their transformation into cult-like figures among the supporters of the Safavid

movement in Anatolia. As the Safavids conquered more and more territory and made

increasing use of messianic discourse, large populations were attracted to their cause, and

identification as Kızılbaş became “fashionable,” particularly during periods when the

Ottoman Empire followed a policy of pluralism, as described in Chapter V, as opposed to

one of aggression and oppression.

At the center of this messianic discourse was Shah Ismail as the founder of the

Safavid state and, more importantly, as the embodiment of the living godhead. From the

beginning of his reign, Shah Ismail, the self-proclaimed long-awaited Mahdi, claimed

two indivisible identities: that of the human incarnation of God, or hulul, and that of the

perfect political/mystical leader, or qutb. In 1500, a year before he took the throne at the

age of fourteen, an anonymous Venetian merchant described him as already possessing

the charisma of a great leader:

This youth, who was called Ismail, was thirteen years old,
of noble presence and a truly royal bearing, as in his eyes
and brow there was something, I know not what, so great
and commanding, which plainly showed that he would yet
some day become a great ruler. Nor did the virtues of his
mind disaccord with the beauty of his person, as he had an

510
Radushev, “The Spread of Islam in the Ottoman Balkans,” 370.

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 elevated genius, and such a lofty idea of things as seemed
incredible at such a tender age. Therefore the good priest
[the chief court astrologer, or müneccimbaşı], who
professed to be an astrologer and to know the course of
events from the aspect of the heavens, cast his horoscope,
and foresaw that he would yet become lord of all Asia. On
this account he set himself with greater solicitude to serve
him, and treated him to the extent of his power with every
sort of indulgence and courtesy, thus laying up a debt of the
greatest gratitude from him.511

Once he had become shah and launched a series of military conquests, Shah

Ismail’s popularity rapidly increased among the already disgruntled populations of

Anatolia, who saw him as a remedy to their problems in both the physical and spiritual

worlds. The level of reverence, which was similar to worship in some instances,

culminated in individual and group conversions to Kızılbaş Islam, migrations to the

Safavid realm, and transfers of money and goods to the Safavid state. New adherents

were even willing to sacrifice their lives by “entering battle fields unarmed” with a belief

that the miraculous powers of their mürşid-i kamil (“perfect guide”) would protect them.

According to Giovanni Maria Angiolello, a contemporary Italian traveler,

… The monarch [Shah Ismail] is almost, so to speak,

worshipped, more especially by his soldiers, many of
whom fight without armour, being willing to die for their
master. They go into battle with naked breasts, crying out
“Schiah schiah,” which in the Persian language signifies
“God God.” Others consider him a prophet; but it is certain
that all are of opinion that he will never die.512

511
Grey, ed. and trans., A Narrative of Italian Travelers in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,
46-47.
512
Grey, A Narrative of Italian Travels, 115.

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Similarly, another contemporary Italian traveler, Ambrogio Contarini,

describes how the supporters of the Safavids equated Ismail with God:

The name of God is forgotten throughout Persia and only

that of Ismael remembered; if any one fall when riding or
dismounted he appeals to no other god but Schiac, using
the name in two ways; first as god Schiac; secondly as
prophet; as the Mussulmans [sic] say “Laylla, laylla
Mahamet resulalla,” the Persians say “Laylla yllala Ismael
vellialla”…. 513

Shah Ismail’s supposedly miraculous powers were not limited to providing

protection for unarmed soldiers on the battlefield. He was also believed to provide cures

for the disabled, to heal the sick, and to help childless women to have children. An

imperial order from the 1560s, for instance, asks the local Anatolian authority to

investigate a rumor that local women believed that a pair of yellow slippers (bir sarı

paşmağın), allegedly belonging to Shah Ismail, could make them pregnant.514 Issued

more than four decades after Shah Ismail’s death, this order demonstrates the lasting

effect of the Safavid ruler’s charisma and its potential to threaten Ottoman control in

Anatolia.

In his poems, Shah Ismail I himself emphasized his messianic identity and his

similarity to other great charismatic historical figures while calling on both Anatolians

and Iranians to recognize him as their shah. In his poems, he claims:

I am the living Khidir515 and Jesus, son of Mary;

513
William Thomas, ed. and trans., Travels to Persia by Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini (New
York: Bart Franklin, 1873), 206.
514
MD, Vol. 5, No. 205 (8 Sefer 973 / September 3, 1565). See also n. 458, above.
515
Khidir or al-Khidr is a revered figure in Islam who is regarded as a righteous servant of God who
possessed great wisdom and mystical knowledge. He is identified with the unnamed figure in Sūra 18 of
the Qur’an, “The Cave,” who briefly accompanies Moses after making him swear an oath not to ask any

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 I am the Alexander of my contemporaries.516
…
The time of the mehdi-i zaman has begun,
The light of the eternal life has come.517

In another couplet, probably composed in his early youth,518 Ismail predicts that he will

conquer Asia Minor, Syria, Khurasan and China as the mehdi-i zaman and build the just

order, devlet-i haqq.519

While Shah Ismail is considered the most charismatic leader of the Safavid

movement, as attested by the reverence in which he is still held among modern-day

Kızılbaş/Alevi populations in Turkey, his son Shah Tahmasb (r. 1524-76) held a similar

status among his supporters in Iran and Ottoman Anatolia. The contemporary Venetian

ambassador to the Safavid court, Michele Membré (d. 1595), noted Shah Tahmasb’s

intention to follow his father’s footsteps as a charismatic leader:

In 1524 Antonio Tenreiro was with the Portuguese embassy

entertained at the Nawruz festivities by Ismail just before
he died of alcoholic excess. He saw the ten-year-old
Tahmasp drinking as hard as his father. A few days later he
heard reports that the new king had made a show of killing
with his own hands lions, bears, and men. Obviously the
boy was trying at first to fill his awesome father’s role of
charismatic leader.520

Noteworthy here, of course, is the role that alcohol apparently played in

reinforcing the shah’s charismatic public persona.

questions about Khidir’s actions. For further details, see Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Khadir/Khidr,”
by John Renard.
516
Newman, Safavid Iran, 13.
517
“Olur mehdi(-i) zaman devri, cihan nur(-i) baka geldi”: Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I,” 1039a.
518
Ibid., 1025a.
519
Ibid., 1051a; Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis,”143.
520
Membré, Relazione di Persia, xvi.

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 Shah Tahmasb enjoyed a messianic status not only among the Turcoman and

Kurdish tribal leaders at his court but also among the mass of Anatolians. Membré

describes the belief among Anatolian commoners that the shah’s clothing and other

personal effects were imbued with his spiritual aura, or baraka, which possessed healing

powers:

At that time I saw a Turk of Anatolia come to the Shah’s

court asking for one of the Shah’s turbancloths, which he is
accustomed to give for a high price; and for that cloth they
give him a horse as a gift. And this happens secretly. I
know it because there came one from Anatolia, that is from
Adana, and he came to the lord in whose house I was
staying, that is Shah Quli Khalifa, and brought a bag of fine
dried figs as a present for him, and begged him to speak to
the shah, so that he would give one of his kerchiefs... and
when the said Turk saw the cloth, he raised his hands to
heaven and praised God, and bowed his head to the ground
and said, “Shah Shah” and was overjoyed. So he took the
said cloth and went his way. I asked him what the cloth was
good for and he told me that it was a tabarruk, that is, an
object of beneficial effect; and having a sick father at
home, he had seen the said shah in a dream; and for that
reason he wished for the cloth, for his father’s contentment,
for he would be well. Every year many such people come,
but they go in secret so none can know except the man of
that court.521

This practice of sending gifts to the Safavid shah in exchange for “objects of beneficial

effect” or favors are repeatedly mentioned in the mühimmes, as well. In these orders,

Istanbul warns local authorities to find the people sending gifts from Anatolia or

personally taking them to the Safavid realm, and to confiscate the objects for the Ottoman

treasury. In an order from 1572, for instance, the governor of Erzurum is told to find the

521
Ibid., 41.

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Kızılbaş from Ardıhan/Ardahan in northeastern Anatolia who have been sending precious

gifts to the Safavid court, including an entire mihrab, or niche for a mosque indicating the

direction of Mecca.522

The reign of Shah Abbas (1588-1629), the greatest ruler of the Safavid Empire,

witnessed a diminution in stress on the shah’s messianism, as well as a decline in pro-

Safavid propaganda activities conducted in Anatolia. This was a reflection of overall

changes in the nature of Safavid rule, particularly the diminishing influence of the

Kızılbaş emirs at the Safavid court and the transformation of Safavid Islam from a loose

interpretation of Shi‘ism, an attractive alternative to the Anatolian population, to purist

Imamism. In this context, the Kızılbaş populations of both the Ottoman and Safavid

Empires were marginalized, and the new rhetoric of the Safavid shahs, beginning with

Shah Abbas, de-emphasized the ruler’s messianism. In other words, as Imamism replaced

the political activism of Kızılbaş Islam, millenarian expectations waned.523 The few

instances in which Shah Abbas cultivated a messianic image are mentioned by his chief

astrologer (müneccimbaşı), Celaleddin Muhammed, who composed a book in which he

listed the shah’s keramets, beginning with his childhood. These included enabling a

crippled five-year-old to walk by touching his feet.524

522
MD, Vol. 14, No. 195 (4 Ramazan 979 / January 20, 1572).
523
Marcus Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 151-173. On the other hand, a few sources show Safavid
conversion activities continuing after the 1630s. In one document, Çeşmi Efendi, the qadi, or judge, of
Constantinople in the late 1620s and the kadıasker, or supreme judge, of Anatolia for Murad IV (r. 1623-
1640), reports heretics (mülahide) living in Constantinople. While Çeşmi Efendi does not mention the
word Safavid or Kızılbaş in his report, it is clear whom he means. “When they were asked about their
mürşid [spiritual guide],” he notes, “they all said Shah Abbas.” After mentioning that these “heretics” recite
the manis, or couplets, of Shah Ismail Hatayi in their secret gatherings, Çeşmi ends his short report with
prayers for their extermination. Minorsky, “Shaykh Bali-Efendi on the Safavids,” 448-450.
524
Hossain Mirjafari, “Sufism and Gradual Transformation in the Meaning of Sufi in Safavid Period,”
İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, Ord. Prof. Dr. İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı Hatıra Sayısı
32 (March 1979): 163.

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 The Safavid rulers’ successful incorporation of messianic/millenarian beliefs into

their propaganda drew the Ottomans’ attention beginning in the mid-fifteenth century.525

As the de facto leader of the anti-Safavid rhetoric, Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji (d.

1519), an Isfahani Sunni jurist and historian of the Aq-Qoyunlu court, was quick to

realize the power of this combination and the effect that it had created in such a short

period in Anatolia. Describing the Safavid leader Junayd’s “charlatanism,” he writes:

… [T]he fools of Rum, who are a crowd of error and a host

of devilish imagination, struck the bell of the insane claims
of Christians on the roof of the monastery of the world ....
They openly called Sheikh Junayd “God” and his son “Son
of God.” ... Their folly and ignorance were such that, if
someone spoke of Sheikh Junayd as dead, he [Junayd] was
more [likely] to enjoy the sweet beverage of life.526

The Ottoman central authority in the following decades remained aware that many

Anatolians sought salvation through submission to the Safavid shah.527 The sixteenth-

century Ottoman chronicler Lutfi Pasha (d. 1564), in his Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, describes

Shah Ismail I’s influence over certain Ottoman subjects:

Bu acem feteratında Şah İsmail ki Şeyh Haydaroğludur,

Gilan’dan hurucedip, Erzincan’a gelip, mekan edindi.
Erzincan’a gelecek dedelerinin ve babalarının
müridlerinden muhiblerinden Rum vilayetinde nihayeti
olmamaġın varub, Erzincanda Şah İsmail’e mulaki oldular.
Kimi at getürüp, kimi yarağ getürüp, Şah İsmail dahi
bunlara kim “Benim muhimmim vardur, bana muavenet
ider misiniz?” deyicek ol gelenler dahi iki üç bin adem

525
Rıza Yıldırım, Turkomans Between Two Empires, 19-20, 170-182, 187-196.
526
Khunji, Tarih-i Alem Ara-yi Emini, 69.
527
Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 82.

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 olup, didiler kim: “Şeyhimiz oğlusun, yoluna can ve baş
terk ideriz, hidmet buyurun” dediler.528

Shah Ismail’s personality became even more captivating following his military successes

in eastern Anatolia, greater Iran, and Central Asia. Müneccimbaşı, in his Sahaif’ül-ahbar

fi vekayi’ül-a’sar, describes the level of love for Shah Ismail in detail:

Haydar’ın bir oğlu dahi zahir oldu İsmail adlı, müridleri

ana tabi oldular. O kadar ki cemi memlekette olan müridleri
birbiriyle buluşunca “selamun aleyküm” deyecek yerde
“şah” derlerdi. Hastalarını görmeye varınca dua yerine “şah”
derlerdi. Rum vilayetinde olan müridlerine sünnet ehli
bunca zahmet çekip, “Erdebil’e varacağınıza Mekke’ye
varsanız Hazret-i resulü ziyaret etseniz daha iyi olmaz mı?”
derlerdi. Sufiler de “Biz diriye varırız, ölüye varmayız”
cevabını verirlerdi.529

While the Ottoman sultans had also been credited with messianic properties after

the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, particularly by the Ottoman elite in Istanbul, Shah

Ismail’s emergence as a strong political ruler with an even stronger mahdistic personality

carried the messianic narrative much further.530 In order to compete with the increasing

popularity of the Safavid movement in Anatolia, which rose to a critical level in the

1510s, the Ottoman sultans, who had always suffered from the lack of a strong

genealogical pedigree, had to initiate a new set of political and religious agendas while

shaping the Ottoman administrative structure according to the requirements of the era.

Selim I began to equate the Ottoman imperial polity with messianism and the caliphate,

and his son, Süleyman I, expanded this claim by asserting a universal monarchy.

528
Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 198; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 26. The assertion of
divinity did not end with Ismail I’s death.
529
Müneccimbaşı, Sahaif’ül-ahbar fi vekayi’ül-a’sar, 268; Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, 86.
530
For further information concerning messianism at the fifteenth-century Ottoman court, see Kaya Şahin,
“Constantinople and the End Time: The Ottoman Conquest as a Portent of the Last Hour,” Journal of Early
Modern History 14/4 (2010): 317-354; Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” 160-164.

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According to Kaya Şahin, Selim I “was the first ruler to actively steer the Ottoman

enterprise toward a process of early modern Eurasian empire building” by explaining and

defending his aggressive expansionist policies “with reference to ideologies that

attributed to the Ottoman sultan a function of political and spiritual guidance and a world-

historical role in a fight between the forces of good and evil.”531 Süleyman I and his

administration, as pointed out in great detail by Şahin, Fleischer, and other historians,

invested an immense amount of time and energy in forging a religio-politial personality

that could counter Shah Ismail and Shah Tahmasb. Süleyman adopted the titles “the

Messiah of the end time” (mehdi-yi ahiru’z-zaman) and “the master of the auspicious

conjunction” (sahib-i kiran) while exploiting major military victories against the

Habsburgs and Venetians to perpetuate the image of an invincible ruler whom God

favored to establish global sovereignty.532

Various orders from the mid-sixteenth century onward show the rising threat that

the Safavids posed to Istanbul. According to multiple imperial orders preserved in the

mühimme registers, Safavid halifes were converting (tahvil ittüler) ever-increasing

numbers of Anatolian locals to what the orders call “infamy or ignominy” (zelalet) or the

“false sect” (batıl mezheb), and the fact that these locals were “ignorant” (cahil) and

“unintelligent” (bi idrak) played a significant role in the Safavid mission’s success.533 In

other cases, “false Ismails” stirred up local populations against the local authorities or

531
Şahin, Empire and Power in the Reign of Süleyman: Narrating the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28.
532
Ibid., 66.
533
For an example, see MD, Vol. 31, No. 298 (15 Cemaziyülahir 985 / August 29, 1577).

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simply converted them to Kızılbaş Islam by performing alleged miracles or preaching in

clandestine meetings.534

During this period, any weakness or instability at the Ottoman court strengthened

the Safavid shah’s charismatic appeal. As Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein have

pointed out, an Ottoman sultan’s illness, death, or deposition created a sense of anxiety

and crisis at the Ottoman court and in the imperial capital.535 In these circumstances, the

Safavid shahs emerged as legitimate and attractive leaders. In other words, the Safavid

leaders’ charismatic personalities became even more influential among Anatolians when

their Ottoman counterparts could not match their presence. Whereas Shah Ismail was

wildly popular among Anatolians, Sultans Bayezid II and Selim I were very unpopular

due to their lack of charisma and their aggressive policies towards local dissidents. Under

Süleyman, however, the court made serious efforts to project his status as the sahib-i

kıran. This helps to explain Shah Tahmasb’s more muted appeal to the Anatolians

compared to that of his father and grandfather. After the death of Süleyman I in 1566,

despite continuing efforts by succeeding sultans to cultivate the same sort of messianic

world-conquering aura, none of them before Murad IV (r. 1623-40) achieved military

success on a comparable scale. Meanwhile, in the early seventeenth century, the Ottoman

Empire witnessed a series of abbreviated reigns, including those of a mentally

incompetent sultan (Mustafa I, r. 1617-1618 and 1622-1623) and a victim of regicide

(Osman II, r. 1618-1622). During this period of dynastic instability, new circles of power

534
MD, Vol. 32, Nos. 392 and 393 (2 Cemaziyülahir 986 / August 6, 1578); MD, Vol. 35, No. 802 (21
Şaban 986 / October 23, 1578).
535
Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, Le Sérail ébranlé: La Succession au trône ottoman des origines au
XIXe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 2003).

175


formed within the court, featuring the Chief Harem Eunuch, the Chief Gardener

(Bostancı Başı), the Grand Vizier, and the sultan’s mother and favorite concubine.536

During the same period, in contrast, the Safavid court remained relatively stable, with

strong central figures who were able to solidify power at the court under the greatest ruler

of the Safavids, Shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629).

III. Conversion for Pecuniary Reasons

The “long sixteenth century,” which encompasses the period from the 1460s to

1620s, was an era in which a series of independent yet related socio-political and

religious developments occurred in the both the Ottoman and the Safavid realms. Victor

Lieberman describes this era, within the larger Eurasian context, as one of “territorial

consolidation; firearms-aided intensification of warfare; more expansive, routinized

administrative systems; growing commercialization … wider popular literacy, along with

novel proliferation of vernacular texts….”537 In conjunction with these multifaceted

developments, every Ottoman sultan and Safavid shah renegotiated his position vis-à-vis

the high-ranking members of his court, the local ruling elites, and the powerful tribal

leaders of the frontier regions. These rulers, concerned with the expansion of empire and

the maintenance of legitimacy, cultivated political practices that featured what can be

called “purchasing loyalty.”

536
Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 12. For further details on this period, see Emine Fetvacı,
Picturing History at the Ottoman Court (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013); Günhan
Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate
Predecessors,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010; Maria Pia Pedani, “Safiye’s
Household and Venetian Diplomacy,” Turcica 32 (2000): 9-32.
537
Victor Lieberman, “Introduction,” in Beyond Binary Histories: Re-Imagining Eurasia to c. 1830, ed.
Victor Lieberman (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 14.

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 Although the oppressive policies of the Ottoman state played a role, the

prevalence of Alid loyalties, the missionary activities of the Safavid halifes, and the

charismatic personalities of the Safavid leaders constituted the key elements motivating

both individuals and groups to become Kızılbaş. A thorough examination of primary

sources reveals that another impetus for conversion in this era was the potential for

financial and political gain by the convert-to-be.538 In order to retain the loyalty of their

subjects, both the Ottoman and Safavid rulers resorted to social disciplining mechanisms

such as favoring certain groups over others, granting financial and political incentives to

both elites and commoners, and granting and revoking grants of landed revenue. Many

Anatolians switched sides because of the lure of financial gain, in the form of receiving

either titles and land revenues or money and valuables.

During the initial era of Ottoman and Safavid expansion, many of the Anatolian

tribes positioned themselves strategically between the two political entities, contingent

upon the promise of conquest and the winning of new lands for themselves. This gave the

leaders and the members of these tribes a rationale for supporting or fighting against

either the Ottomans or the Safavids in their expansionist endeavors.539 However, after the

frontier between the two empires began to take shape following the Treaty of Amasya in

1555, the essential factor motivating these tribes to side with either empire became the

538
Eyal Ginio, “Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State,” Byzantine and
Modern Greek Studies 25 (2001): 90-119; Marc Baer, “Islamic Conversion Narratives of Women: Social
Change and Gendered Religious Hierarchy in Early Modern Ottoman Istanbul,” Gender and History 16/2
(2004): 425-448.
539
According to Fariba Zarinebaf, the main consequence of these policies was to leave many local border
communities “divided, short of strong leadership, and lacking in effective resistance.” “Rebels and
Renegades on Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Porous Frontiers and Hybrid Identities,” in Iran Facing
Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective, eds. Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 79-97.

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promise of receiving prestigious posts, titles, or money, or securing marriage alliances

with the Ottoman or Safavid dynasty.540 This section will examine the influence of these

pecuniary and other socio-cultural incentives on religio-political decisions within the

context of the early modern Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. These motivations, it should be

noted, are largely neglected in secondary scholarship.

As the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry turned into a conflict shaped by sectarian

narratives, the religious and political identities of the border region between the two

emerging empires became closely intertwined. While confessional affiliation played a

significant role in shaping these identities at both the individual and group level, in

practice often the message of salvation was less important than practical benefits. This

was particularly the case when the “new faith is perceived to be tied to a larger and more

bountiful political economy.”541 Therefore, the allocation of money, land, and titles, as

well as marriage alliances with key members of the Safavid court and the provincial

leadership, became successful Safavid conversion strategies, beginning during the reign

of Sheikh Junayd in the 1440s and continuing during the reign of his son, Sheikh Haydar,

as part of their attempts to forge a religio-political movement. Ottoman control of the

Anatolian peninsula was not complete until the 1520s, with most of the eastern and

southeastern region remaining semiautonomous to varying degrees.542 This led to a high

level of fluidity in the political allegiance of the local populations. Contemporary sources

540
Ibid., 80.
541
Hefner, “World Building and the Rationality of Conversion, 29.
542
Erzurum and Diyarbekir were two of the few provinces in the region where the tımar system was
implemented. For the rest of the region, Istanbul implemented other systems, which allowed local tribes to
remain autonomous while making them relatively dependent on the Ottoman court. The main system was
called yurtluk or ocaklık, which meant granting the land to the tribe of the region in return for a certain
amount of tax revenue. In these parts of the peninsula, most of which were Kurdish, landholdings were
transmitted from father to son.

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mention the Kurdish districts of Bitlis and Hakkari as examples of the day-to-day

competition between the Ottomans and Safavids as the local elites and tribal leaders

switched allegiance depending on their personal and tribal interests. In one striking case,

a powerful tribal leader from northern Iraq, Bazik Beg, who “had previously worn the

kızıl tac [i.e., had become Kızılbaş]” under Aq-Qoyunlu rule, changed his mind right

before the Safavid expansion into Iraq and fled his post in 1509.543

The early Safavid leaders’ efforts to forge intimate relationships with Anatolian

tribes have been meticulously examined by Faruk Sümer.544 The pro-Safavid propaganda

implemented in the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, which

emphasized control of land and title distributions, as well as the allocation of financial

help, has, however, been understudied by modern historians. Later Safavid leaders

retained this overall approach, although they shifted from recruiting large tribal

populations to the Safavid cause and encouraging them to migrate to Safavid Iran, to

targeting individuals and small groups. Particularly during the late sixteenth and early

seventeenth centuries, which saw serious domestic unrest within the Ottoman Empire, the

religio-political loyalties of small groups and individuals were used to justify political

actions, financial moves, and migrations.

Tribal participation in the Safavid cause remained an important factor after the

reign of Shah Ismail as many people changed their allegiance if their interests were

543
Sharafnamah, 145-146.
544
Faruk Sümer’s Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu still stands as the main work covering the reign of Ismail and
his predecessors. For an example of a marriage alliance connection with the Safavids, see Sümer, Safevi
Devletinin Kuruluşu, 46-47. Sheref Khan Bidlisi also mentions the Misullu tribe from Diyarbekir, whose
leader, the ruler of the city, swore allegiance to Shah Ismail in 1508. Sharaf al-Din Bidlisi, Sharafnamah
(Şerefname), trans. Mehmet Emin Bozarslan (Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1971), 144-145.

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threatened. The military and political career of the Bidlisi family, Kurdish overlords of

the southeastern Anatolian province of Bitlis, provides an example of how a frontier

family played the Ottomans and Safavids against each other during much of the sixteenth

century, specifically after the rise of the Safavids as the Ottomans’ main geo-political and

religious rival in the east. Beginning with Sharaf Beg, grandfather of Sharaf al-Din, the

author of the famous Sharafnamah, the Bidlisi family made tactical shifts of allegiance to

avoid being trapped between the two regional powers. While Sharaf Beg supplied the

Ottomans with detailed intelligence reports on events in Safavid territory,545 Shams al-

Din, Sharaf al-Din’s father, emigrated to Safavid Iran after Süleyman I appointed Ulama

Beg, a Kızılbaş from Safavid Iran who had switched sides, governor of Bitlis following

the Ottoman campaign to Iraq in 1533-1534. Shams al-Din, along with the members of

his tribe, was welcomed by Shah Ṭahmasb I and honored with the title khan and the

governorship of various districts in Safavid Iran. His son Sharaf al-Din, however, moved

back to his hometown, Bitlis, after a series of meetings with the Ottoman general Hüsrev

Pasha in 1578; as a reward, he was appointed governor.546

The story of Sultan Tekelu provides another example of prominent tribal leaders

in the region changing allegiance between the Ottomans and the Safavids for the sake of

material gain. Tekelu was an Ottoman sipahi who turned Kızılbaş and defected to the

Safavids with many members of his tribe during the Şah Kulu Rebellion in Anatolia in

1511-1512. The Safavid court welcomed his defection with high-level political/military

545
Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1st ed., s.v. “Bedlīsī, Šaraf-al-Dīn Kahn,” by Erika Glassen.
546
Even when the level of Anatolian participation in the Safavid cause was at its peak, Ottoman counter-
propaganda did not cease and often met with relative success. According to Sharaf Khan Bidlisi, for
instance, in 1535, around 3000 Kızılbaş decided to defect to the Ottoman side after Süleyman I promised to
make them rulers of Azerbaijan. Sharafnamah, 184.

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positions in the regions of Tabriz, Shirvan, and Baku.547 The Tekelu tribe, however, was

politically weakened as a result of conflicts among various Kızılbaş tribes for dominance

in Azerbaijan, and following the death of Shah Ismail in 1524,548 Sultan Tekelu marched

against the new shah’s forces. Defeated, he fled to the Ottoman fortress of Van to seek

refuge in 1534.549 Tekelu was later appointed lala, or tutor, to the Safavid prince Alkas

Mirza, who also sought refuge at the Ottoman court.550 Even though these accounts do

not specify whether the Tekelu tribe changed religious affiliation whenever they changed

geo-political allegiance, they are still significant as they reflect the fluidity of the political

and religious sympathies of the Ottoman and Safavid elites of the period.

Personal interests and intra-tribal friction could also factor into the decision to

switch sides, particularly when tribes in the frontier regions between the two empires

became aware of their ability to play the two empires off against each other. Feridun Beg

writes that Muhammad Han (d. 1528/1529), the Safavid governor of Baghdad, left the

city and escaped to Basra when he learned that his tribe was collaborating against him

with the Ottoman authorities. Feridun Beg emphasizes that the Safavid shah offered

Muhammad Han a better position in Basra.551 The Ottoman authorities responded to

Safavid propaganda in a similar manner and offered the rank of bey to three significant

members of Muhammad Han’s family in the region.552

547
Ibid., 193.
548
Mahmud Amin Riyahi, Sefaratnameha-i Iran, 28.
549
Monshi, I: 80-83.
550
Solakzade, Solakzade Tarihi, II: 214.
551
Feridun Beg, Munşeatu’s-selatin, 592.
552
Interestingly enough, Muhammad Han decided to work for the Ottomans again when Sharaf Khan
changed sides and collaborated with the Safavids. Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 21.

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 The Ottomans often utilized money and valuables to prevent individuals and

groups from “becoming Kızılbaş.” In an imperial order from 1574, the governor of

Diyarbekir is asked to honor a certain Sheikh Ebulhayr Salif Efendi with ten akçes for not

becoming Kızılbaş (Kızılbaş mezhebine girmeyib).553 At the same time, the Ottoman

central authority remained highly skeptical of tribes and large groups of people in the

border regions who returned to the Ottoman realm (tekrar avdet eyleyen) after becoming

Kızılbaş and migrating to Safavid territory. For instance, several imperial orders sent to

frontier towns in Anatolia and Iraq in 1573 repeatedly warn the local authorities to

capture those who come back from Yukarı Canib (i.e., Safavid Iran) and exile them

immediately to remote parts of the empire, above all newly-conquered Cyprus.554

In other cases, Istanbul attempted to counter the Safavid state’s efforts to lure its

subjects with money and valuable goods. For instance, an imperial order from the 1570s

warns the governor of Baghdad not to use the wheat sent by the Safavid shah even though

the city was suffering from serious drought.555 In another order from 1574, the sultan asks

the governor of Rum why the dizdar (fortress commander) of Erzincan, Müzevir

(“dishonest”) Ahmed, had donned the Safavid tac and fled to the “land of the enemy.”556

Pursuit of material interests and the struggle for power often determined the

direction that religious actions took. Safavid propaganda added to the political and

553
MD, Vol. 25, No. 1627 (17 Sefer 982 / June 7, 1574).
554
MD, Vol. 21, No. 652 (22 Zilhicce 980 / April 25, 1573). It should also be noted that Cyrups was not a
random place for exile. The Ottoman state was trying to repopulate the island. For further details on early
modern Ottoman Cyprus, see Ronald Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the
Mediterrenean World, 1571-1640 (New York: New York University Press, 1992).
555
MD, Vol. 24, No. 503 (11 Muharrem 982 / May 3, 1574).
556
MD, Vol. 28, No. 90 (8 Zilhicce 984 / February 26, 1577).

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financial dissent already present in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Ottoman Anatolia.557

The report that a certain Ali b. Abdulkerim presented to Selim I upon the latter’s

accession to the throne provides further insight into this situation. Ali complains about

widespread corruption in eastern Anatolia and lack of punishment for those guilty of the

treasonous acts, and argues that because of this, the Safavids propagate their religion

among the regional population easily and effectively. He adds that if the reign of Selim’s

father Bayezid II had continued for several more years, the whole region would have

gone over to the Safavids.558 In the following decades, Ottoman administrative policies,

including centralization efforts and overtaxation of the Anatolian population, enabled the

Safavid state to pose as a legitimate alternative for disgruntled locals. The following

section will elaborate on these policies and their role in provoking large-scale

conversions to Kızılbaş Islam and migration to the Safavid Empire.

IV. Conversion for “Reaction:” Ottoman Alienation of the Anatolian Population

and the Issue of Migration

As the Ottoman Empire extended its control over Anatolia during the “long

sixteenth century,” tensions emerged between the Ottoman central authority and the

nomadic and semi-nomadic populations of the peninsula because of Ottoman policies of

centralization, taxation, sedentarization of nomads, and displacement of populations.559

The gradual integration of Anatolia into the Ottoman Empire resulted in long-lasting

557
Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 36.
558
Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, 20-30.
559
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Politics and Socio-Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire of the Later Sixteenth
Century,” in Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World, eds.
Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 95.

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problems, including inflation, brigandage, and demographic fluctuations.560 Turcoman

and Kurdish tribes were the main losers in this process, and as a result they came to

distrust the Ottoman administration. Tension between the tribes and the Ottoman state

was especially pronounced in southeastern Anatolia due to the relative recentness of

Ottoman control over the region, and the higher level of tribal influence and power

compared to other parts of the peninsula.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all of eastern Anatolia (except

Hakkari, Cizre, and Bitlis, where the local rulers retained power) came under the control

of the Ottoman central authority, which assigned a governor-general to each province and

sent a heavy military contingent to carry out tax assessment and tımar distributions.

However, as Suraiya Faroqhi points out, when the tax assessors and the garrison soldiers

left, the local authorities (mainly tribal leaders) reasserted themselves.561 Furthermore,

the state presence was closely associated with constant military struggles, shifting

borders, and spying activities,562 which caused unrest among the dissatisfied and poorly

organized rural populations, who bore the bulk of the tax burden. The Celali Rebellions

are often understood as a consequence of the tension between the tax-collecting state and

560
For further information on the tensions between the early Ottomans and various Anatolia beylicates, see
Feridun M. Emecen, İlk Osmanlılar ve Batı Anadolu Beylikler Dünyası (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2001); Hasan
Basri Karadeniz, Osmanlılar ile Beylikler Arasında Anadolu’da Meşruiyet Mücadelesi (XIV-XVI. Yüzyıllar)
(Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2008); Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 90-117; Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age
of State-Building and Confessionalization,” 89. For further information on Ottoman methods of conquests
and the main differences between the Balkans and Anatolia, see Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of
Conquest,” Studia Islamica 2 (1954): 103-129.
561
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Politics and Socio-Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire of the Later Sixteenth
Century,” 95.
562
For more information on the Ottoman tribal policy and the tribes in the eastern frontier zone, see Tom
Sinclair, “The Ottoman Arrangements for the Tribal Principalities of the Lake Van Region in the Sixteenth
Century,” in Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes, eds. Kemal H. Karpat and
Robert W. Zens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press / Center of Turkish Studies, 2003), 119-143.

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the tax-paying subjects, tensions that accumulated in many parts of the peninsula and

shook the state authority for over a century.563

This tension, however, did not always culminate in outright rebellion, particularly

when the disgruntled taxpayers had other options available. In fact, many locals, from

both urban and rural environments, reacted to centralization, overtaxation, and corruption

by migrating to the Safavid realm either individually or as members of tribal groups, due

to the Safavids’ assurance of greater autonomy for the tribes. In general, Safavid

propaganda consistently presented Safavid subjecthood as a legitimate alternative to

Ottoman taxpayer status

IV.a. Ottoman Centralization Policies

The early modern Ottoman central government was a centralized bureaucratic

state,564 and its all-important tax-collecting function depended on the regular payment of

taxes by the mass of subjects, or reaya, who did not have the tax-exempt status of

military-administrative officials or ulema. To maximize its tax base, the Ottoman

government sought to incorporate tribes into the population of reaya. This process

563
For details on these rebellions, see Mustafa Akdağ, Celali İsyanları: Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik
Kavgası (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009 [originally published in 1963]); William Griswold, The
Great Anatolian Rebellion, 100-1020/1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); Şehabettin
Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 1/3 (1967): 36-61; Şahin, Empire
and Power in the Reign of Süleyman. The conventional scholarship has regarded these rebellions as the
result of Safavid instigation. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II: Istanbul’un Fethinden
Kanuni Sultan Süleyman’in Ölümüne Kadar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1943), 345-347; Saray, Türk –
İran Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü; idem, Türk-İran İlişkileri. While there is a certain amount of truth to
this observation (as the previous chapter noted, Safavid halifes, or disciples, were very influential among
the Anatolian population), these historians have neglected other factors that were arguably more influential
in these rebellions.
564
John Haldon, “The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Studies,” in New
Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, eds. Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi (London:
Frank Cass, 1992), 18.

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involved settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and other forms of government

control, which led to tribal dissatisfaction and, in some cases, violent and long-lasting

rebellions that killed thousands of people, including high-ranking officials and regional

overlords.565 Imperial orders preserved in the mühimme registers reveal that the Anatolian

tribes became more interested in relocating to the Safavid realm as they faced increasing

financial pressure from the Ottoman capital, primarily after the turn of the sixteenth

century, when the Safavid Empire emerged as a powerful religio-political actor in the

region.

The adverse effects of the Ottoman centralization policies and their contribution

to the success of pro-Safavid propaganda in Anatolia date to Mehmed II’s conquests in

southern Anatolia in the third quarter of the fifteenth century. The tribes of the region,

which monopolized political power and the extraction of revenues, became the main

targets of the Ottoman centralization process, which often turned violent. According to

Aşıkpaşazade, Mehmed II’s high-ranking officers, such as Rum Mehmed Pasha, in the

process of ending the rule of the Turkish Karamanid emirate in southern Anatolia,

humiliated the local tribal populations in “unprecedented ways” which included “forcing

women to walk in the streets naked and killing many innocents who sought the sultan’s

forgiveness.”566 Furthermore, according to Marcus Dressler, during the land reforms of

Mehmed II, many Turcoman settlements and properties endowed as waqf were annexed

by the state. Even though Mehmed’s successor, Bayezid II, annulled these policies, there

565
For instance, the 1511 Shah Kulu Rebellion erupted when the fief-holding provincial cavalry soldiers
claimed that their tımars had been sold to wealthy merchants, scholars, and servants of pashas. Tekindağ,
Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı, 35-40.
566
Aşıkpaşazade, Aşıkpaşaoğlu Tarihi, 172-173; Solakzade, Solakzade Tarihi, 320-321; Bilal Dedeyev,
“Safevi Tarikatı ve Osmanlı Devleti İlişkileri," Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi 1/5 (2008): 213.

186


nevertheless emerged “a general mistrust of the Ottomans, especially amongst the

dervishes and gazis of the Anatolian and Rumelian periphery, who had been most directly

affected by it.”567 The Ottoman state consistently tried to divide these tribal groups and to

convert them into dependent peasantries, since they “represented a fundamentally ill-

fitting element in this otherwise straightforward relationship of exploitation.”568

Unsurprisingly, pro-Safavid propaganda thrived in these regions in the following decades

as the Safaviyya movement provided a legitimate socio-political and religious alternative,

beginning with Sheikh Junayd in the 1440s for the discontented tribal populations;

consequently many tribespeople migrated to Safavid territory.

Another key element of Ottoman centralization policy was the timar system,

which was implemented in the early fifteenth century in much of the Balkans and many

parts of the Anatolian peninsula. A timar was a grant of landed revenue that enabled the

holder to provide an income for providing a number of cavalry forces and additional

number of armed retainers (cebelü) depending on the value of the timar for the Ottoman

armies.569 While in principle timars were allocated based on merit, rather than family

connections and prestige, the quasi-hereditary nobility of the old Balkan regimes and the

Turkish emirates were able to dominate the system from its inception.570 In many

instances, Istanbul used the distribution of timar assignments as a tool to establish strong

ties with local tribes and “give them a stake in the Ottoman system” 571 so that they would

567
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 153.
568
Haldon, “The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy,” 55.
569
Ibid., 56.
570
Ibid., 62-63.
571
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Politics and Socio-Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire of the Later Sixteenth
Century,” 94.

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not become disloyal to the Ottoman government. Moreover, during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, control of timars shifted from the entrenched tribal elite of the

countryside, who had ties to the local population, to the urban elite. This process,

combined with the increasingly oppressive behavior of the timar assessors, led to a sharp

increase in dissidence among the rural population.572 Complaints concerning timar

assignments begin to appear in primary sources as early as the 1510s. According to an

official document from this period, the main reason for the 1511 Shah Kulu Rebellion

was the unfair allocation of timars to people from the inner circle of the palace and to

local rulers, instead of meritorious cavalrymen:

… askerin içinde sipahi taifesinden çok adem vardır ekser

fesatları eden anlardır, hisara üşüb hisara çok müzayaka
virmişlerdür, hisar cenginden çağırıb söylerler imiş ki “bir
dahi timar satarlar mı, timarımızı satun alı alı cemi rızkımız
tükendi, timar almağa deve gerek, at gerek, mal gerektir
yoldaşa timar yokdur, kande maldar etraf taifesi varsa, kadı
oğulları mütevelli oğulları varsa kadı kulları varsa
mirahorlar varsa, cümlesi ehl-i timar oldılar, paşanın ne
kadar aşçısı sayisi mehteri ve sayir hüddamı varsa, cümlesi
ehl-i timar oldular, yoldaşa dirlik kalmadı, görsünler imdi
timarına mahalle virib, sipahi taifesine zulm etmekten ne
fitneler ve ne fesadlar zahir oldu ve dahi neler zahir olsa
gerekdir” deyü dürlü dürlü mühmelatlar söylemişlerdir.573

572
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II, 333. Tribal leaders were not the only disgruntled group whose
dissatisfaction with the system culminated in serious unrest for the Ottoman capital. Beginning in the early
fifteenth century, frontier warriors (gazis) and the Sufis connected to them were similarly victimized by
Ottoman centralization efforts. The Sufis voiced their dissatisfaction with the ulema, the “agents, allies and
beneficiaries of a centralizing sate… [filling] the medreses at an unprecedented rate” and, in come cases,
sided with the Safavids. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 90-117, Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-
Building and Confessionalization,” 89.
573
TSMA, Document No. 6187, cited in Çağatay Uluçay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu?”
Tarih Dergisi 6/9 (1954): 53-90.

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According to Douglas Howard, only ten percent of timars were assigned to provincial

cavalry soldiers in 1600.574 As certain elite urban families monopolized timar allocations,

a divide grew between them, on the one hand, and tribal leaders and other members of the

rural elite, on the other, who lacked the connections to acquire such grants and therefore

felt betrayed by and alienated from the state. The sixteenth-century Ottoman statesman

Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi (d. 1567) mentions Anatolian tribes whose members migrated

to Safavid Iran when they lost their privileged status and timars in the 1510s and

1520s.575 Peçevi similarly explains how the disenfranchisement of Turcoman tribes led

them to join regional rebellions:

Çünkü Türkmen vilayeti Osmanlı padişahı tarafından feth

edildiği zaman çok kimselerin timarları ellerinden alınmış
ve bunlar padişah haslarına eklenmişti. Çoğunun sapık
inançlı Kalender’in eşkiyalarına katılmaları bu yüzden
olmuştu.576

Timar distributions were the focus of many complaints against the Ottoman central

authority during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One Ottoman chronicler after

another states that fiefs were granted not to provincial cavalry soldiers, but to well-

connected officials who associated with provincial governors and/or the elite in the

capital. As a result, according to Celalzade Mustafa, Anatolians fled to the Safavid side in

droves simply because of Bayezid II’s negligence of his rural subjects, who were heavily

oppressed by local authorities.577

574
Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 22.
575
Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 59, 156.
576
Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi, Vol. I, 94.
577
Celalzade, Selimname, fols. 48b-51a.

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 In the following decades, as more disgruntled timar-holders and tribal leaders,

both of whom Kaya Şahin aptly describes as “the perennial malcontents of Ottoman

history,”578 as well as individuals seeking material gain and spiritual fulfillment,

relocated to the Safavid realm, Istanbul began to pay increasing attention to these

migrations. The Ottoman court regarded these rebels and migrants as ignorant, lazy, or

disloyal subjects who were fighting against the state for illegitimate reasons. In

describing the influence of Kızılbaş halifes in Anatolia, the chronicler Kemalpaşazade

asserts that unemployed people who “had not achieved anything in their entire lives and

who had no timars” left their villages to join the halifes with the false hope of becoming

district governors on the Safavid side.579 Although Kemalpaşazade is obviously biased

against the Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman Empire and antagonistic toward the

Safavids, he correctly points out that the oppressive timar policies of the Ottoman central

authority and the lack of timar assignments to non-elites contributed significantly to the

success of pro-Safavid propaganda in early modern Anatolia.

In addition to witnessing “tremendous political and economic dynamism, a

pervasive pragmatism, and an important level of social mobility and mobilization,”580 the

sixteenth century also marked the peak of the monetization of the Ottoman economy,

which manifested itself in the large-scale transformation from the timar system to tax-

578
Şahin, Empire and Power, 125.
579
“... ‘ömrinde timar yimeyen, diyarinda kimse kendüye adem dimeyen bi-karlar tümen beğleri olub,
hadden ziyade i’tibar buldılar.... Yurdun terk idüb, çiftin çubuğun tağıtdı, evin ocağın yıkdı, yakdı harab
itdi. ‘Anda varan begler olurmuş’ diyü zikr olan ta’ife-i halife kalanları dahi keman-ı intikam
kurmuşlardır.” Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 43.
580
Şahin, Empire and Power, 10.

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farming.581 In response to these socio-economic transformations, “money, which had

always constituted the sinews of government, acquired an unprecedented significance for

the Ottoman administrative military apparatus, which seemed to need it more than

ever.”582 The central administration’s dire need for cash and, as a result of advances in

military technology, declining need for cavalry resulted in a sharp decline in timar

assignments and a corresponding increase in tax farms (singular, iltizam). Many

Anatolians felt cheated by this transformation due to corruption and overtaxation. They

also suffered from the effects of the general late sixteenth-century crisis, notably

population pressure and climate change.583 For many of these Ottoman subjects, moving

to Safavid Iran thus became a viable means of seeking relief.

Countless imperial orders asked the Ottoman authorities in central and eastern

Anatolia to stop these migrations. A series of orders from the 1560s, for instance, asks the

rulers of Amasya, Tokat, and Çorum, heavily Kızılbaş towns in north central Anatolia, to

investigate the large numbers of migrants, some of whom had been stopped in Erzurum

in northeastern Anatolia and barred from entering the Safavid realm.584 In another order

from the late 1560s, the ruler of Trabzon is warned about the increasing risk of the entire

Kızılbaş population migrating to Safavid Iran if their relations with the Safavid court

581
Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 11.
582
Ibid., 17.
583
Sam White convincingly argues that the suitable ecological environment of the first half of the sixteenth
century allowed the Ottoman central authority to pursue expansionist policies, to create an Ottoman elite
class, and to forge ahead with state formation. However, as the state apparatus grew, “Ottoman systems of
provisioning and settlement faced mounting problems. Just as the Ottomans proved especially precocious at
building these systems, so they became particularly dependent on their stability and susceptible to their
failures,” particularly during the critical periods of “population pressure, inflation, and diminishing returns
from agriculture” from the 1570s to the 1590s. Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern
Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 19.
584
MD, Vol. 3, Nos. 172 and 175 (Zilkade 967 / August 1560).

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were not cut off immediately.585 While many of these orders mention nameless

individuals and their attempts to migrate to Safavid Iran, others address specific local

elites and tribes, whose migration had a greater impact on both sides. For instance,

Istanbul repeatedly warned the governor of Erzurum about the Turcoman Batlu tribe from

Ardahan, whose leader fled to the “other side,” ordering him to stop the tribe members

from following their leader and to find and execute the leader himself.586

In eastern and southeastern Anatolia, where Turcoman and Kurdish tribes were

extremely powerful, the timar system was not implemented as a primary taxation tool.

Despite continuing efforts, the Ottoman central authority was not able to entirely remove

the hereditary nobility of these frontier regions. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, however, it did succeed in weakening the power of this group, which created a

new level of discontent and alienation among the Anatolian population that made

conversion to Kızılbaş Islam and migration to Safavid Iran even more attractive.587 The

leader of the Kurdish Belilhanoğulları tribe from the Van / Tabriz region, for instance,

migrated to the Safavid side and sought help from Shah Abbas I in 1602. The Ottoman

governor of Tabriz, Ali Pasha, responded by provoking a military conflict between the

two sides that resulted in the occupation of Tabriz by the Safavids in 1603.588

585
MD, Vol. 5, No. 1401 (973 / 1565).
586
MD, Vol. 21, No. 110 (19 Ramazan 980 / January 23, 1573).
587
Haldon, “The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy,” 65.
588
Saray, Türk – İran Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü, 38.

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IV. b. Overtaxation of the Population

The shift from timar to iltizam was only one of the measures that the Ottomans

implemented to deal with a decrease in revenues. Introducing new taxes and increasing

the ratios of already existing taxes for both the rural and urban populations became an

acute problem of the sixteenth and much of the seventeenth century as Ottoman financial

needs cost the empire many subjects, who migrated to its rivals in the east. This section

will elaborate on the effects of overtaxation on pro-Safavid propaganda among the

Anatolian population and migration from Anatolia to Safavid territory.

Increasing taxation, combined with growing inflation, drought, and famine,

contributed to the alienation of rural nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, as well as

rural and urban dervish orders, in Anatolia during the early sixteenth century. The

aforementioned Ali ibn Abdülkerim’s report from the 1510s clearly depicts the effects of

overtaxation in Anatolia:

… Bu sultanum gayet zulümdür, ol yetimler şöyle fakir aç

kalurlar, ağlaşa ağlaşa kırılur giderler. Kati müşkil hal
ziyade zulümdür. Lütfidüp sultanım bu zulmü kabilse
refidesiz... bennak dirler ve karı hakkı dirler bennak
hakkını otuz üç akçe alurlar. Hele hoş amma bu bennak
hakkı viren kişinin beş oğlu olsa mücerred hakkı derler her
bir oğlundan altı akçe ve on iki akçe alurlar. Kafirlerden ve
oğlancıklarından .... alurlar... imdi lütfidüp men idesiz. Bu
ne manadır kim biri tokluktan öle ve biri yokluktan öle,
bunun manası nedir, bu hod ayn-ı zulümdür. ... Bizim ey
aziz sultanımuz, bu ne hikmetir, ne revadır kim başlardan
ve yohsullardan evlenür olsa gerdek değdü elbette altmış
akçe almak revadur bu ne kitapta vardur ya nerede vardur.
Fakir vardur ömründe yüz akçeye malik olmaz. Altmış
akçeyi gerdek değdü deyu alurlar ve yirmi beş akçe resmi

193


 kadu deyu alırlar ve dört beş akçe imam hoca alur ve iki üç
akçe müezzin alur ve dört akçe mahalle kethüdası ve yirmi
akçe yiğit(başı) alur ve on akçe asesbaşı alur. Ve imdi bu
fakir bir pula malik değildir nice itsün... ve kadılar dahi hep
azmıştır azgun ve bozgun alimler kadılar ve müderrisler ve
müftiler... okuduğun tutmaz ve Kuranı işitmez alimler
elinden ve kadılar elinden ve fetvasını tutmaz müftiler
elinden ve takvasını tutmaz şeyhler ve sufiler elinden ve
müteseyyidler elinden mutaassıp şeyhler ve zahidler ve
sufiler ve müridler elinden ah ah ah kim hergiz ihlas
tevekkülleri yoktur. Ve dahi her bisaadet bedbaht, asıl ulak
değül iken ulağız deyu işler ve zulümler eyler, akçeler alır
kim demek olmaz. Asıl ulak zulmü bir ana arız zalim ulak
zulmü bir yana, bu çaresiz derde derman çare nedir
sultanım billah; her zulüm yaramazdır illa ulak zulmü ve
dahi güzel sultanım ve Selim-i cihancanım bu ne manadır...
bu zulmü yine sultanım defeder.589

As Ali points out, in many parts of Anatolia, tax assessors were regarded as the agents of

tyranny, and consequently the local population rebelled against them. The 1520s

witnessed a series of rebellions in the heavily Kızılbaş districts of central and southern

Anatolia. The first uprising took place in 1521, when Ottoman tax assessors visiting

Musa Bey, the tribal leader of the province of Bozok, were killed by a group of locals.590

Within a year, numerous disgruntled Anatolians had joined these ad hoc rebellions,

which resulted in the killing of many Ottoman local officials and military commanders,

until the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha finally organized a meeting with local notables and

tribal leaders and distributed gifts and timars. Following Ibrahim’s appeasement strategy,

589
TSMA, Document No. 3192, cited in Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, 21-25.
590
Şahin, Empire and Power, 69-70. Soon the upheaval grew, with the involvement of a group of
antinomian preachers under the leadership of Baba Zunun and, later, his son. The nature of the rebellion
changed drastically when the Bektaşi sheikh Kalender assumed leadership, directly challenging Süleyman’s
authority and presenting himself as the rightful sultan and caliph.

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the number of rebellions decreased significantly.591 Celalzade Mustafa, in his Tabakat ül-

memalik ve derecat ül-mesalik, describes this period, with his typically strong anti-

Safavid prejudice, as one in which “a band of naked dervishes, runaway Turkish

peasants, and heretics” (bir bölük çıplak ışıklar, çiftbozan Türkler, münafıklar) attacked

shari‘a and kanun and killed Sunnis under the influence of the “shari‘a-abrogating and

sedition-filled East” (şark-ı şer-fark ve fitne-gark).592

Throughout the sixteenth century, Istanbul continued its attempts to settle disputes

and mitigate tensions between the reaya and the local and central authorities. At the same

time, however, it increased the number and kinds of taxes it collected,593 and as a result,

the local populations, both urban and rural, became increasingly alienated.594 As Robert

Hefner asserts, early modern communities “burdened with a sense of oppression and

powerlessness [were] in need of … social redemption, that is, a state that provides relief

from an intolerable situation through new morality and social relations.”595 The

emergence of the Safavid Empire right next-door to Anatolia and the formation of a new

religio-political identity around Safavid subjecthood provided Anatolians with a

legitimate political and territorial alternative. The Kızılbaş were thus caught between two

591
Ibid., 71.
592
Ibid., 69-71, 90-91. The translations are Şahin’s.
593
The revenues of the state were collected under two main headings: religious taxes and customary taxes.
These included öşür (tithe), cizye or haraç (poll tax), adat and rüsumu-örfiyye (customary taxes), and
avariz (extraordinary taxes).
594
Cemal Kafadar, “The Ottomans and Europe,” in Handbook of European History, 1400-1600: Late
Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformations, Vol. I: Structure and Aserrtions, eds. Thomas A. Brady Jr.,
Heiko A. Obermand, and James D. Tracy (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 615-625. Furthermore, according to Joseph
Fletcher, rural unrest was one of the three main trends of the early modern period with the advent of urban
commercial classes and religious revival and reformations. Joseph Fletcher, “Integrative History: Parallels
and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500-1800,” in Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner
Asia, ed. Beatrice Forbes Manz (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1995), 1-46.
595
Hefner, “World Building and the Rationality of Conversion,” 29.

195


sides, and they became “an object of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry even as they actively

contributed to it.”596 Within a short period, thousands whose dissatisfaction stemmed

from financial devastation, the lack of sustainable revenues, and overtaxation, decided to

relocate as the Safavid realm promised less taxation, more autonomy, and salvation

through allegiance to a mahdistic ruler.597

On occasion various Safavid actors, disguised as merchants or travelers,

orchestrated these migrations. Istanbul warned the governor of Baghdad in 1602 about a

certain Sohrab who had entered Ottoman territory allegedly to fetch the daughter of a

Safavid regional ruler, but instead took many members of a local tribe back to Iran with

him.598 As another precaution against this type of migration, Istanbul repeatedly asked

local authorities not to let the Safavid Iranians mingle with the locals when they visited

their towns for trade or pilgrimage.599

These migrations meant not only the loss of population but also the loss of income

and goods, which in many cases were more crucial for the Ottoman court. A flurry of

imperial orders attempted to stop the outflow. In one order, the sultan asks the governor

of Van to stop the migration of the Haledi tribe, who had been paying their dues and

taxes (hukuk ve rüsumları) to the Ottomans, to what the order calls Yukarı Canib, or the

596
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 153.
597
According to Rudi Mathee, the Safavid shahs attempted to build a state on the notions of “shared
religion, a long legacy of strong personalized authority, and a governmental tradition centering on royal
justice and commercial activism.” However, decentralizing forces (“formidable mountain regions, fearsome
deserts, a harsh climate, long distances, and a thinly sread and largely nomadic population,” as well as “the
lack of an effective infrastructural state power”), prevented a strong state from materializing. Mathee, The
Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran, 232.
598
MD, Vol. 21, No. 697 (29 Zilhicce 980 / May 2, 1573).
599
MD, Vol. 23, No. 430 (29 Zilhicce 981 / April 21, 1574); MD, Vol. 24, No, 124 (29 Zilkade 981 /
March 23, 1574).

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“upper side,” meaning mountainous Safavid territory. In many other orders, Istanbul asks

the Safavid court to send back Ottoman subjects who had already migrated.600 Istanbul

justified these requests by invoking the 1555 Peace of Amasya, which banned migrations

from one side to the other.601 For instance, in an order of 1574, the sultan tells the

governor-general of Baghdad to accept those who had moved to Safavid Iran and come

back following the peace, regardless of their sect (madhhab).602

The Ottoman central authority was equally wary of migrants transporting valuable

goods to the Safavids, such as precious stones, raw materials, weapons, horses, and

money.603 In a 1570 order, the bey of İçel in southern Anatolia is warned that the deputy

commander (kethüda) of the fortress of Mut has been in close contact with the Safavids

and has delivered weapons and other valuables to them.604 In similar orders from the

1570s, the governor of Erzurum is first asked to capture migrants reported to be on their

way to the Safavid side with gold and various other valuables605 and, a year later, to

capture the troop commander (alay beği) of Tekman in eastern Anatolia, who had

reportedly taken part in banditry and the transport of horses to the Safavid side.606

600
MD, Vol. 26, No. 496 (10 Cemaziyelevvel 982 / August 27, 1574).
601
MD, Vol. 26, No. 78 (28 Sefer 982 / June 18, 1574).
602
MD, Vol. 26. No. 958 (14 Şaban 982 / November 28, 1574). The following orders warn the governor-
general of Baghdad not to send the returnees back to Iran even if the Safavid court requests it. For an
example, see MD, Vol. 26, No. 974 (15 Şaban 982 / November 29, 1574).
603
MD, Vol. 21, No. 517 (21 Zilkade 980 / March 25, 1573); MD, Vol. 22, No. 288 (15 Rebiülevvel 981/
July 15, 1573); MD, Vol. 26, No. 291 (4 Rebiyülahir 982 / July 23, 1574).
604
MD, Vol. 14, No. 797 (Selh Cemaziyelahir 978 / November 27, 1570).
605
MD, Vol. 21 No. 658 (23 Zilhicce 980 / April 26, 1573).
606
MD, Vol. 25, No. 940 (3 Zilkade 981 / February 25, 1574).

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V. Conclusion

Various worldly and other-worldly concerns – following a charismatic leader,

seeking salvation, socio-political and fiscal pressures or enticements, the lure of posts and

pensions– constituted the main motives behind conversion to Kızılbaş Islam. This chapter

has demonstrated the complex nature of this sort of conversion by examining various

motivations and their historical backgrounds. The widespread early modern trend of

politicization of religion; the heavily messianic tone of Safavid rhetoric; the widespread

sympathy for the Alid cause in Anatolia; and socio-economic dissatisfaction stemming

from Ottoman overtaxation, centralization, sedentarization, and Sunnitization ultimately

triggered a series of upheavals in Anatolia, which in turn led to an increase in the punitive

actions that the Ottomans took against the Kızılbaş populations in general.

Encouraging migration to Safavid territory was a key aspect of pro-Safavid

propaganda from its earliest days. Beginning in the late fifteenth century, the Safavids

encouraged Anatolian Turcoman and Kurdish tribes to migrate to Iran in response to their

lack of support among the local population. For instance, the Safavid chronicler Mir

Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Husayni Khwandamir, in his Habibu’s-siyar, notes that when

he took the throne in 1500, Shah Ismail had only 300 followers; thus, one of his first

decisions as shah was to send messengers to the various towns of Anatolia to call his

followers to move to the Safavid domains.607 In this way, he collected 7000 men. The

regions from which the largest number of people migrated were usually those

experiencing economic problems or political disturbances, mostly deriving from the

policies of the Ottoman central authority.

607
Khwandamir, Habibu’s-siyar, 24 cited in Sarwar, History of Shah Isma'il Safavi, 34.

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 Fiscally and religiously motivated migrations to Safavid Iran continued until the

beginning of the eighteenth century, although they decreased over time.608 In the eyes of

the Ottoman authorities, the migration of rural Anatolians to Safavid Iran represented the

loss of a critical part of the empire’s work force, and they tried to prevent them with

multilayered policies: from offering new titles and land to persecuting those caught on

their way to the Safavid realm. These measures form the subject of the next chapter.

608
Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 124.

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 Chapter 5
Ottoman Reaction(s) against Safavid Propaganda and the “Sunnification" of the
Empire

I. Introduction: The Historiography

As the Safaviyya religious order completed its transformation into a military and

political movement during the second half of the fifteenth century, the Safavid sheikhs,

and later shahs, spread pro-Safavid propaganda among the Anatolian subjects of the

Ottoman Empire not only in order to recruit new followers for the order, but also in order

to find soldiers and taxpayers for the newly established political entity. In response to this

increasing propaganda, the Ottoman state adopted measures to stop the proselytism while

forging an alternative Sunni identity of its own. After the second half of the sixteenth

century, pro-Safavid propaganda intensified to such an extent that the Ottoman central

authority switched its emphasis from those who were born into this sect to those who

“became Kızılbaş” in response. These “converts,” according to the Ottoman state’s logic,

encouraged further Anatolian participation in the Kızılbaş religious movement and also

legitimized and strengthened Anatolians’ identification with the Safavid state.

The early modern Ottoman bureaucracy’s reaction(s) to its Kızılbaş subjects has

been the topic of sustained scholarly interest. While scholarship from the 1960s through

the 1980s explained Ottoman policies against the Kızılbaş within artificial national

200


frameworks,609 revisionist historians, who have dominated the field since the 1990s, have

approached the topic from new yet problematic angles. The first of two distinct groups

who have challenged the mainstream historiography, which attributes early modern

Ottoman policies against the Kızılbaş to mere security concerns,610 can be called

followers of the “Köprülü-Ocak tradition.”611 Focused solely on the Ottoman state-

building process, a key component of which was the creation of an “orthodox” Sunni

religious identity for the Muslim subjects of the empire, these historians have assumed

that the Seljuk and early Ottoman authorities adhered to a homogeneous Sunni Islam,

even though they endorsed the existence of a “low” or “folk” Islam that accommodated

pre-Islamic conceptions beneath a Sufi façade.612 Accordingly, these scholars have

argued that in the sixteenth century, the Shi‘ite Safavids emerged as a political power

from the East and attracted the loyalty of certain discontented elements among the

Ottoman Sunni population, inaugurating an unbroken period of confrontation between the

609
For an example, see Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiye’nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi (Istanbul: Cem Yayınları,
1974), Vol. II, 68-69. According to Akdağ, “… Kızılbaşlarla Anadolu’nun köyünde, kasabasında, kapı bir
komşu taşıyan Türk kitleleriyle, kendi inancına aykırı olan bu insanlar arasında bütün tarih boyunca kayda
değer geçimsizliklerin görülmeyişi .... devletin sosyal yapısında ana kütük olan Türk halkının taassup diye
bir şey tanımadığını, ispatlayan kesin delillerdir.”
610
For further details on the classical scholarship, see Franz Babinger and Fuad Köprülü, Anadolu’da
İslamiyet, trans. Ragıp Hulusi (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2000); Cemal Bardakçı, Alevilik Bektaşilik Ahilik
(Ankara: n.p., 1970; reprint Istanbul: Postiga Yayınları, 2012); Cahen, “Le Problème du Shi‘isme dans
l'Asie mineure turque préottomane,”; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin; Ocak, Babailer İsyanı; Adel Allouche,
The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962/1500-1555 (Berlin: Klaus
Schwarz Verlag, 1983).
611
Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,”, 87.
612
For examples, see Sayın Dalkıran, “İran Safavi Devletini’nin Kuruluşuna Şii İnançların Etkisi,” Atatürk
Universitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 18 (2002): 55-102; Ahmed Yaṣar Ocak, “Islam in the Ottoman
Empire: A Sociological Framework for a New Interpretation,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 9,
Nos. 1-2 (2003): 183-197; idem, “Babailer İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da İslam Heteredoksisinin
Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış,” Belleten 64/239 (2000): 129-159. Ocak erroneously indicates
that the Ottomans began the process of creating a centrally institutionalized religious state that embraced
the doctrines of orthodox Islam in the early fifteenth century. Terzioğlu’s recent article successfully delves
into the question of Ottoman Sunnitization and problematic approaches to the topic. Terzioğlu, “How to
Conceptualize Ottoman Sunnitization. Rıza Yıldırım’s recent article, on the other hand, provides a concise
but compelling discussion of the issue of “high” and “low” Islam in the context of the late medieval/early
modern Anatolia. Rıza Yıldırım, “Sunni Orthodoxy vs. Shi‘ite Heteredoxy.

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Ottoman and Safavid Empires, and between the Ottomans and their Kızılbaş subjects.

This approach, however, not only reinforces an essentialist stance concerning the

relationships among these groups, by depicting a clear-cut bifurcation between “high”

and “low” Islam, but also overlooks the geographical and ethnic diversity of the Kızılbaş

populations in the region.

The second wave of revisionist historians, in their attempt to criticize the

compartmentalization of the “Köprülü-Ocak tradition,” have focused on the formation of

Kızılbaş communities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as an “umbrella movement”

against the Ottoman central authority, which, according to them, positioned itself as the

champion of Sunni Islam.613 This approach, albeit providing a new direction, reduces the

relationship between the Ottomans and the Kızılbaş to one of oppression and persecution,

while also neglecting the fact that not only the frontier regions but also the interiors of the

two empires witnessed various degrees of polarization.614 Furthermore, it presents the

Ottoman state’s adoption of an uncompromising Sunni identity for its subjects, beginning

in the early sixteenth century, as a reason for the repressive policies, rather than as a

result of the “Kızılbaş threat.”

613
For further details, see Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, Interview with Alişan Akpınar, Dîrok, Episode 65, IMC
TV, September 3, 2012, retrieved from dailymotion.com on August 14, 2014. Karakaya-Stump’s emphasis
on the uniformity of the Kızılbaş movement as an almost centrally organized opposition (“a coalition
movement,” in her words) against the Ottoman central authority reinforces the idea of well-defined
religious fronts (i.e., Kızılbaş Anatolians vs. the Sunni Ottoman central authority).
614
For further details, see Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Qizilbash, ‘Heresy,’ and Rebellion in Ottoman Anatolia
during the Sixteenth Century,” Anatolia Moderna 7 (1997): 1-15; eadem “Rebels and Renegades on
Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands. This polarization, in fact, dates back to Sheikh Junayd’s reign in the early
fourteenth century, when the Safaviyya order’s meticulously planned activities caused tension between the
order and the Ottoman central and local authorities; it did not, as Zarinebaf-Shahr asserts, emerge only after
the Safavids emerged as a political actor in the region in 1501. Stefan Winter provides useful counter-
examples to this approach; see his “The Kızılbaş of Syria and Ottoman Shiism,” in The Ottoman World, ed.
Christine Woodhead (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 171-183.

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 In contrast to these depictions of the Ottoman central authority’s “never-ending

struggle against rebellious heretics,” this chapter argues that a more complex relationship

between Istanbul and its Kızılbaş subjects led to wildly varying Ottoman state policies,

ranging from financial support for the Safaviyya order and the Kızılbaş subjects of the

empire to execution of the same populations. An in-depth examination of primary

sources, focused mainly on Ottoman imperial decrees (or mühimmes),615 reveals three

main dynamics that explain this complexity: the Ottomans’ relationship with the

Safavids, religious propaganda for conversion conducted by the Safavids in the region,

and the issues of Kızılbaş tax evasion and migration.

II. Three main dynamics: The Ottomans’ Relationship with the Safavids, Safavid
Religious Propaganda for Conversion, and the Issue of Kızılbaş Tax Evasion and
Migration

Before delving into the complexity of the Ottoman central authority’s policies, it

is important to problematize the arbitrary division developed by historians concerning the

empire’s response to its Arabic- and Turkish-speaking Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş subjects. Juan

Cole’s argument that the Ottoman day-to-day administration left the Arabic-speaking

Shi‘ites – not the Turkish-speaking ones– alone as long as they paid taxes regularly is

615
In addition to mühimmes, this chapter draws on other Ottoman sources, including emir ve fermanlar
(imperial decrees), fetvalar (legal opinions), polemical literature, and poems. Particularly for the period
predating the first available volume of mühimme records (1553-1554), Ottoman and Safavid narrative
chronicles, as well as the accounts of European travelers and merchants, provide a wealth of information on
the relationship between the Ottoman central authority and the Kızılbaş communities. In addition to
Ottoman and Safavid primary sources, documents held by various Kızılbaş families, under the name
buyruk, provide invaluable firsthand data. Recent studies by Rıza Yıldırım, Doğan Kaplan, and Ayfer
Karakaya-Stump transmit these narratives while examining the circumstances in which they were written.
For further details, see Doğan Kaplan, Yazılı Kaynaklara Göre Alevilik (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
Yayınları, 2012); Karakaya-Stump, “Documents and Buyruk Manuscripts in the Private Archives of Alevi
Dede Families; eadem, “Alevi Dede Ailelerine Ait Buyruk Mecmuaları; Yıldırım, “Turcomans between
Two Empires.”.

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only partially accurate.616 Even though Istanbul implemented harsher policies towards its

Turkish-speaking Shi‘ite subjects, in practice this did not mean a straightforward

approach toward them.617 On the contrary, Ottoman policy-making with regard to the

Kızılbaş communities of Anatolia fluctuated in accordance with periods of peace and war

with the neighboring Safavid Empire.618 Since the spiritual leaders, or sheikhs, of the

Kızılbaş were also the political leaders, or shahs, of the Safavids, the Ottomans did not

see their Kızılbaş subjects as merely a distinct religious group, but viewed them as

supporters of a rival political movement that, at times, posed serious threats to their

legitimacy in the frontier regions of their empire.619 Similarly, when there was peace

between the two empires, the political threat posed by the Safavids diminished, leading to

a relatively pluralistic approach from Istanbul.620 When the Ottomans’ Kızılbaş subjects

wished to show their spiritual devotion to the Safavid shahs by sending financial support

616
Juan Cole argues that “the Ottomans made a major distinction among Twelvers, reserving harshest
treatment for those who adhered to the esoteric sect of Safavid followers as Qizilbash …. The Ottoman
attitude toward quietist Twelver Shi‘ites in the Arabic-speaking provinces was often quite different….”
Juan R. I. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi‘ite Islam (London
and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 17-18.
617
As an example of this approach, see Abu Husayn, “The Shiites in Lebanon and the Ottomans in the 16th
and 17th Centuries,” 112-114. According to Abu Husayn,“mass executions and mass deportations were
standard Ottoman practices in the treatment of the Qizilbash.”
618
The main periods of war between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires were 1532-1555, 1578-1590, and
1623-1639, and the main peace agreements that they signed were the Amasya Peace Treaty (1555), Istanbul
(Constantinople) Peace Treaty (1590), and Kasr-ı Şirin (Zuhab) Peace Treaty (1639).
619
Using sectarian differences to justify political conflicts and financial clashes of interests was not unique
to the Ottoman-Safavid relationship. Another example of this dynamic is the Mughal emperor Jahangir’s (d.
1627) unusually friendly early relations with the Safavid shah Abbas. Once Abbas conquered Kandahar,
however, Jahangir denounced Shi‘ism and professed a rigid adherence to Sunni Islam. See Naimur Rahman
Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India
and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748 (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 2009), 24-25.
620
Even when the Ottomans and Safavids were at war, the Ottoman authorities dealt with “trouble-making”
Kızılbaş individuals in multi-faceted ways, executing those identified as agents (singular, halife) of the
Safavids or as converts, but subjecting others to surveillance, banishment, and a variety of lesser forms of
punishment. For further examples, see r MD, Vol. 30, No. 92 (28 Muharrem 985/April 17, 1577) and MD,
Vol. 30, No. 488 (11 Ramazan 985/November 22, 1577): “Bozok beyi Çerkes beye… Kızılbaşlıkla
müttehem olan kimesneler …şer ile teftiş olunup sabit olursa idam edilüp … şer ile sabit olmayup lakin
müttehem olduklarına kanaat gelürse Kıbrıs’a sürülmeleri….”

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to the center of the order at Ardabil or to the capital of the state, or by moving to Safavid

Iran with their families, the Ottoman central authority deemed them an economic threat to

the empire’s stability and suppressed them more forcefully than other Kızılbaş

subjects.621

As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the “religious dichotomy”

between Ottoman Sunnism and Safavid Shi‘ism was a product of the Ottoman-Safavid

political and financial rivalry rather than its cause,622 and it was the politicization of the

Safavid movement, not the Shi‘ite character of the Safaviyya order, that shifted the

Ottoman authorities’ focus to Safavid propaganda activities in Anatolia and the frontier

regions of Iraq. Accordingly, Istanbul perceived conversion to Kızılbaş Islam as a threat

to its geo-political legitimacy and thus devoted considerable attention to finding and

punishing converts as opposed to those who were Kızılbaş by birth. Thus, it is important

to examine the real meaning(s) of conversion from one side to another in this particular

period and locality,623 because political and religious loyalties were closely linked in the

Middle East before the seventeenth century, and “turning” Kızılbaş or Sunni in Ottoman

621
This argument does not confirm Ernst Werner’s rather essentialist interpretation of the minority groups’
relationship with the Ottoman central authority. According to him, “selling tolerance” to a minority group
in return for taxes was an Islamic practice dating back to the Abbasids, and the Ottomans followed it when
interacting with the ‘other.’” Ernst Werner, Büyük Bir Devletin Doğuşu – Osmanlılar, trans. Yılmaz Öner
(Istanbul: Alan Yayınları, 1988), 44.
622
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy, 151-173.
623
Keith Luria states that “loyalty to a monarch was another worldly concern or obligation imposed by
custom, law or social interest. Just as true religious feelings of the conscience were to be above such
matters, so too was political fidelity. It came from the heart.” Keith Luria, “The Politics of Protestant
Conversion to Catholicism in the Seventeenth Century,” in Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization
of Christianity, ed. Peter van der Veer (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 23-46.

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Anatolia between the 1450s and 1630s also meant publicly switching allegiance from the

Ottoman sultan to the Safavid sheikh/shah or vice versa.624

This chapter therefore challenges the generally accepted argument that the

Ottoman- Safavid/Kızılbaş conflict had its roots in religious antagonism. While religion

played a significant role in determining the nature of the relationships among the three

main subjects of this study, the Ottoman Empire’s geo-political and fiscal legitimacy - its

ability to collect taxes - in the region was the primary concern dictating its policies, rather

than the confessional identities of individual subjects for the period studied.625 Istanbul

consequently carried out a more oppressive approach toward its Kızılbaş subjects when it

viewed them as a threat to local and regional stability.

In examining the Ottoman authority’s response to its Kızılbaş subjects, this

chapter reflects on developments and debates that originated in the regions of the empire

most densely inhabited by Kızılbaş populations and in those most acutely affected by the

tension between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Although the main focus of the

chapter is central and eastern/southeastern Anatolia, it also pays attention to the frontier

regions of Ottoman Iraq (Şehrizor, or modern-day Kirkuk, Basra, and Baghdad) due to

their geographical proximity to Safavid Iran and/or the density of Safavid propaganda

activities in these regions during the period studied.

624
An official decree from 1519, for instance, lists the names of Kızılbaş Ottomans who served in the
shah’s army in his campaign to Georgia. Topkapı Palace Archive, D. 5720 (926/1519), cited in Rıza
Yıldırım, “Turcomans between Two Empires,” 560-562.
625
For a discussion of the centrality of tax-collection for the Ottoman central authority see the Introduction
to this dissertation.

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III. Importance of Periodization and Terminology for Understanding Ottoman
Reaction(s)

Generally accepted periodizations do not suffice for understanding the Ottoman

central authority’s relationship to its Kızılbaş subjects and its neighbor, the Safavid

Empire. To begin, mainstream scholarship overemphasizes the year 1501, the canonical

terminus a quo for the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, when Shah Ismail took over Iran and

declared Shi‘ite Islam the official religion of the Safavid state.626 As explained in the

third chapter, the first confrontations between the Ottomans and the Safavids date to the

1450s, when Sheikh Junayd (d.1460) accelerated the politicization and Shi‘itization of

the Safaviyya order by, among other things, disseminating propaganda in Anatolia.

Existing scholarship also overemphasizes 1514, when Ismail was humiliated at the Battle

of Çaldıran, which, according to the conventional interpretation, marks the end of Safavid

popularity among Anatolians shaped, in part, by the charismatic nature of the Safavid

shahs.627 Despite this setback, as discussed in Chapter III, pro-Safavid propaganda gained

momentum after 1514 and constituted a significant threat to Istanbul for more than a

century due to a well-established network of missionary activities.

On the other hand, the conventional wisdom maintains that the erosion of Kızılbaş

influence at the Safavid court resulted from the gradual incorporation of Georgian and

Circassian ghulams, or slave soldiers, along with Persian bureaucrats into the system by

Shah Abbas (r. 1588-1629). Yet internecine conflicts among various Kızılbaş tribes had

626
On new approaches to the periodization of early modern Ottoman history, see Jane Hathaway,
“Problems of Periodization in Ottoman History: The Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries,” Turkish
Studies Association Bulletin 20, No. 2 (Fall 1996): 25-31; and Jack Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early
Modern World,’” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41, No. 3 (1998): 249-284.
627
For examples, see Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans, 32-33;and Yıldırım, “Turcomans between Two
Empires.”

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already damaged their influence at the court as early as the 1530s628 since aligning with

the Safavid court became more difficult for Kızılbaş tribes, both Anatolian and Iranian, at

times of conflict. As the Kızılbaş tribal leaders at the Safavid court suffered a gradual

decline in their political relevance throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries, conversion to and from Kızılbaş Islam lost its political significance for both the

Ottoman and Safavid central authorities, as well.629 In other words, Safavid Shi‘ite

Islam’s divergence from Anatolian Kızılbaş Islam toward a purist version of Imamism,

and the decreasing influence of the Kızılbaş emirs at the Safavid court, led to the

stabilization of the Safavid Empire under Abbas, on one hand, and the cessation of the

pivotal role of the Kızılbaş, on the other. Consequently, Anatolian Kızılbaş elements

ceased to play a significant role as a buffer between the two empires, and Safavid and

Ottoman propaganda activities in central and southeastern Anatolia decreased

significantly.630 Over the following decades, the marginalization of the Kızılbaş

population across Anatolia took place, which meant the transformation of a once openly

militant population into a closed and isolated mystical movement.631

An examination of the terminology applied to Kızılbaş sympathizers is also

essential in understanding the complex relationship between the Ottomans and their

Kızılbaş subjects. The term “Kızılbaş” (literally, “red head”) appears in both Ottoman and

Safavid primary sources. Additionally, Ottoman sources refer to them as zındıka/ zındık

(atheist or unbeliever), mulhid (heretic), Işık/Işık taifesi (literally “people of light,” the

628
See n. 468, above.
629
See n. 469, above.
630
For further details, see Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs eadem, “The Safavid Synthesis; and
Abisaab, Converting Persia).
631
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 151-173.

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adherents of a sub-branch of Kızılbaş Islam), binemaz/bednemaz (one who does not

practice the daily prayer requirement of Islam), harici, and rafizi. While Harici

(Kharijite) originally referred to a group of supporters of Ali ibn Abi Talib who rebelled

against him for accepting arbitration at the Battle of Siffin in 657, the Ottomans used it as

a blanket term for someone who did not follow normative Sunni Islam, particularly if that

person was engaged in a military struggle with the Ottomans. The term Rafizi (literally,

“one who refuses”), on the other hand, referred to a heterogeneous but interconnected

group of Shi‘ite religious leaders and their followers.632 Despite the complexity

associated with the term Kızılbaş, often-cited academic studies633 have failed to analyze

the context of imperial orders calling for Kızılbaş to be located, exiled, punished, and/or

executed; instead, they emphasize the use of the term in these sources while assuming

that every Kızılbaş mentioned in these sources was an Ottoman subject. This approach

has reinforced the idea of continual persecution of the Anatolian Kızılbaş by the Ottoman

central authority. In fact, Ottoman mühimmes, as well as fermans and sicils, use the term

Kızılbaş for the Safavid state; its leaders, soldiers, and missionaries (halifes); and the

632
For instance, Sheikh Mahmud Hüdayi (d.1628), in his treatise Tezakir-i Hüdayi, informs the Ottoman
sultan Murad III (r.1574-1595) concerning the “Rafizi population” of his realm: “In various villages called
Docaler, they [the Rafizis] never hesitate to plot rebellion (fesat çıkardı). They are the same as the Kızılbaş
…. Sharia and sunna never exist among them.” Cited in Ahmet Refik, Onaltıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve
Bektaşilik (Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Osmanlılar’ın Aleviler Hakkında Düzenledikleri 54 Ferman) (Istanbul: Ufuk
Matbaası, 1994), 17-19. According to Ocak, the main explanations for this generalization were either the
authorities’ lack of knowledge of different interpretations of Islam, or the lack of organization and
institutionalization of these orders that culminated in generalizations by the same authorities. Ocak,
Babailer İsyanı, 42. For the term Rafida in Twelver Shi‘ite faith, see Etan Kohlberg, “The Term “Rafida”
in Imami Shi‘i Usage,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 95 (1975): 395-402.
633
Colin Imber, “The Persecution of the Ottoman Shi‘ites according to the Mühimme Defterleri, 1565-
1585,” Der Islam 56 (1979): 245-273; Ahmet Hezarfen and Cemal Şener, eds., Osmanlı Arşivinde
Mühimme ve İrade Defterlerinde Aleviler-Bektaşiler (Istanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları,
2002); Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri.

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spies it dispatched to Anatolia.634 Ottoman sources also make a clear distinction between

Kızılbaş-born subjects of the empire and Kızılbaş converts, particularly after the second

half of the sixteenth century. Phrases such as rafz-u ilhad ile müte‘arrif olmak (to become

notorious by turning godless or impious), dönmek (to convert), Kızılbaş olmak (to turn

Kızılbaş), ehl-i fesad olmak (to become a fomenter of rebellion), and kızıl tac giymek (to

wear a crimson tac) were used to emphasize that a subject was a convert. On the other

hand, conversion to Sunni Islam was usually described with the phrase taife-i evbaş-i

bed-ma‘aşdan yüz döndürüp Astâne-i İslam-penaha ita‘at eylemek (“turning away from

the group of low-lifes [Kızılbaş] and obeying the house of Islam in Istanbul”). Awareness

of the terminology that the Ottoman state very deliberately applied to its Kızılbaş subjects

is essential to understanding the state’s relationship to these subjects.

IV. Formation of Kızılbaş Communities and the Ottoman Response(s)

An examination of the Ottomans’ policies towards their Kızılbaş subjects reveals

a convoluted picture in which the central authority implemented a combination of

policies contingent upon the political, confessional, geographical, and more importantly,

fiscal dynamics of the period and region. Even though Ottomanist and Safavist

scholarship often pits the two empires against each other, the Safaviyya movement was,

in fact, not a threat to the Ottomans through the last quarter of the fifteenth century, when

it was solely a Shi‘ite Sufi order reaching out to various populations in Anatolia.

Furthermore, Ottoman coercive measures against the Kızılbaş did not follow a

634
MD, Vol. 1, Nos. 70, 86, and 409 (961-962/1553-1554); MD, Vol. 10, No. 279 (979/1571); MD, Vol.
12, Nos. 822, 832, and 833; MD, Vol. 63, No. 52 (23 Sefer 996/January 22, 1588); BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayun
(hereafter HHT), File No. 1654, Document No. 4 (1014/1605); HHT, File No. 1446, Document No. 21
(1015/1606).

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straightforward path even after the order had finalized its Shi‘itization and politicization.

Instead, Istanbul’s stance fluctuated depending on its relationships with the

headquarter(s) of the order (later the capital of the Safavid state); the intensity of Safavid

religious propaganda; the geographical location of certain Kızılbaş communities; whether

they paid their taxes; whether they engaged in banditry; and the Ottoman state’s need for

political and religious legitimacy.

A time- or area-specific policy change from “tolerance”635 to suppression and

persecution did not always signify an overall change in the Ottoman central authority’s

view of the larger Kızılbaş community. Pragmatically driven, consistent policies of the

central authority, rather than “exceptions to” or “aberrations in” the relationship, often

signal the complexity behind the policy-making procedures. Furthermore, it is important

to note that the existence of an official decree ordering the persecution of a certain

Kızılbaş individual or group in a given locale did not always mean that the order was

carried out, much less that widespread persecution occurred. Differences between the

central authority and the provincial administrations in “handling” the issues of “heresy”

and sympathy for the Safavids among the Anatolian population are widespread in the

available primary sources from the era.

IV.a. Periods of Pluralism, Acceptance, and Indifference

Pluralism, in the context of the Ottoman central authority’s relationship with its

Kızılbaş subjects, can be defined as a willingness to disregard an individual’s or group’s

confessional identity as long as that identity did not become a threat to the Ottoman

635
For a discussion of the notion of tolerance, as well as the debate over tolerance vs. pluralism and
tolerance vs. persecution in the early modern context, see the Introduction to this dissertation.

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state’s socio-political, fiscal, and/or religious legitimacy. The Ottoman state system did

not regard adherence to Shi‘ite Islam as a threat, for recognition and religious freedom

were given to Arabic-speaking Shi‘ite groups and individuals who were subjects of the

empire.636

Primary sources show that from its inception the Safaviyya order attracted

followers from the semi-nomadic and nomadic Turcoman and Kurdish637 tribes of

Anatolia.638 As Anatolians in increasing numbers began to follow the doctrines of the

Safaviyya order during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, an Ottoman reaction to this

movement emerged. Initially, Ottoman sultans showed their respect by sending an annual

payment, the çerağ akçesi, to the sheikhs of the order and providing other types of

financial and logistical support for its members and their activities.639 According to

Babinger, by the 1450s Ottoman financial support was so regular that when, for the first

636
For recent studies, see Stefan Winter, “The Kızılbaş of Syria and Ottoman Shiism;” Cole, Sacred Space
and Holy War; and Abu Husayn, “The Shiites in Lebanon.”
637
Such as the Çigani/Çegni tribe from eastern Anatolia. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans,” 29.
According to Van Bruinessen, however, there was no Kurdish Kızılbaş gülbang (invocation) or nefes
(religious song) up until the late nineteenth/early twentieth century when, with the spread of nationalism
Kurdish ones replaced the Turkish versions. Van Bruinessen, “The Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevis,”
In Ethnic groups in the Republic of Turkey, compiled and edited by Peter Alford Andrews with Rüdiger
Benninghaus [=Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, Reihe B, Nr.60]. Wiesbaden: Dr.
Ludwig Reichert, 1989, 613-621. Reprinted in: Martin van Bruinessen, Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism Versus
Nation-Building States. Collected articles. Istanbul: ISIS, 2000.
638
“… ol mülkün temelinde Kızılbaş zahir oldu ... elin uzatmaduk yir komadı....” Kemalpaşazade 32 . Also
see Newman, Safavid Iran, 2-3; Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik (, 18, 131. Baki Öz argues that
sixty percent of the Anatolian population was Alevi/Kızılbaş in the thirteenth century, and in the following
centuries, the ratio was even higher. Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 121. Öz, however, does not
delve into what he means by Alevi/Kızılbaş for this specific period. Considering that the Safaviyya order
emerged as a “non-sectarian” order in Ardabil and, in this form, spread into Anatolia before the second half
of the fifteenth century, and that red batons did not emerge as the main symbol of the order until the late
fifteenth century, labeling the majority of Anatolians Kızılbaş in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
seems anachronistic.
639
According to İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, when Junayd and his disciples visited Murad II during the
1440s, the latter gave Junayd 200 ducats, while the disciples were given 100 ducats each. Uzunçarşılı,
Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II, 226.

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time, it was delayed, Sheikh Junayd complained to Murad II.640 Although we can

speculate that either sympathy for the order or the desire to co-opt it was a primary

motivation for the Ottomans’ support in the years before Junayd completed the

transformation of the order into a political and military movement, Aşıkpaşazade (d.

1484) asserts that the Ottoman sultans Osman (d. 1326) and his son Orhan (d. 1362)

initiated the practice of financially helping descendants of the Prophet Muhammad as a

reflection of their reverence for the Prophet’s family (ahl al-bayt) and may have extended

this aid to the Safaviyya sheikhs, who claimed to be descendants of Muhammad.641 The

last Ottoman record mentioning financial support for the Safaviyya order is an official

document from 1604, during the reign of Ahmed I, that grants a cülus atiyyesi, or

enthronement gratuity, to the Sufi lodge in Ardabil where the order was originally

based.642 The date of this record is important not only because it corresponds with a

period of political peace between the two empires that began in 1590 with the Istanbul

(Constantinople) Peace Treaty, but because it shows that the Ottoman central authority

sent financial support to the order even after it became a state in 1501, contradicting the

line of thought that there was an uncompromising hostility towards the order and its

followers after it became a military entity. On the other hand, the center of the order in

Ardabil was not the only recipient of Ottoman financial support as both Hasan Halife and

his son Şahkulu Baba Tekeli received six to seven thousand akçes annually to support

religious services and other pious acts until Baba Tekeli organized and led the infamous

640
Babinger and Köprülü, Anadolu’da İslamiyet, 19.
641
Aşıkpaşazade, Tevârih -i Al-i Osman, 230-233.
642
BOA, Ali Emiri Tasnifi, I. Ahmed, File no. 1, Document no. 6 (29 Zilhicce 1012/May 1, 1604).

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Kızılbaş uprising known as the Shah Kulu Rebellion in the Tekeli region of Anatolia in

1510-1511.643

In addition to financial support, various sultans patronized Safavid intellectuals

and artists as a means of embellishing the Ottoman court in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. Even after Shah Ismail established himself as an independent sovereign in

1501, a group called Cemaat-ı Aceman, or the Iranian Community, produced poetry and

paintings at the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Indeed, from the 1520s to the 1550s, Iranian

masters dominated the nakkaşhane, or court atelier, both stylistically and numerically.644

Although not every member of the cemaat was Kızılbaş,645 primary accounts show the

existence of Kızılbaş individuals or overt Safavid sympathizers in the nakkaşhane and

elsewhere. A mühimme order from 1557, for instance, describes a nakkaş from Yukarı

Canib (literally, “the upper [or elevated] side,” meaning Safavid territory) called Shah

Kulu (“the servant of the shah”), an important name given to children of families who

supported the Safavid shah.646 As an example that goes beyond the nakkaşhane, Fuzuli

(d. 1562), a well-known Shi‘ite poet from Baghdad, stayed there under Ottoman

patronage after Süleyman I captured the city from the Safavids in 1534.647 According to

contemporary accounts, İbrahim Pasha, Süleyman I’s grand vizier from 1523-36, granted

643
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi , Vol. II, 226.
644
This form of patron-client tie is known as intisāb in Arabic. For further details, see Sinem Erdoğan,
“The Nakkaşhane,” Tarih 1 (2009): 37-69. For a useful overview of the Ottoman nakkaşhane, see Serpil
Bağcı and Zeren Tanındı, “The Ottomans, from Mehmed II to Murad III: Art of The Ottoman Court,” in
Turks: A Journey of a Thousand Years, ed. David Roxburgh (London: Royal Academy of Arts; New York:
Harry N. Abrams, 2005); for a detailed list of the nakkaşhane members of the Ottoman court from the early
1500s to late 1800s, see Rıfkı Melûl Meric, Türk Nakış Sanatı Tarihi Araştırmaları 1: Vesikalar (Ankara:
Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Türk ve İslam San‘atları Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1953).
645
The majority of the Iranian population became Shi‘ite only toward the end of the sixteenth century.
646
MD, Vol. 2, No. 1970 (Rebiülahir 964/February 1557).
647
He composed his greatest work, the epic Leyli va Mejnun, in the Azeri language. For his other well-
known works, see Jan Rypka, History of Iranian Literature (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1968), 298-300.

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Fuzuli an annual allowance from city’s budget.648 These examples provide further

evidence that the Ottoman approach to the Kızılbaş was multivalent and therefore cannot

be explained merely by definitions of “heresy.”649

Periods of peace between the two states and the peace treaties signed in the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also signify shifts from oppression toward relative

lenience for Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the Peace of Amasya,

signed in 1555 and in place until 1576, altered the negative approach that the Ottoman

state had taken against the Anatolian and Iraqi Kızılbaş population over the previous two

decades. As Ottoman sovereignty was recognized in Iraq, including the provinces of

Baghdad and Kurdistan, the decrease in Safavid power in the region led to increased

lenience towards the Kızılbaş. Furthermore, Süleyman I, as an extension of his attempts

to recover the city of Baghdad, not only personally commissioned a search to find and

restore the tomb of Abu Hanifa (d. 767), the founder of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam,

but also visited the shrine of Musa ibn Ja‘far al-Kazim (d. 799), the seventh Imam of the

Shi‘ites, “thus making both Sunnis and Shi‘ites happy.”650 Correspondingly, the thirteen

volumes of mühimmes that cover this period (1555-1576) contain a relatively low number

of orders asking local authorities to persecute Kızılbaş individuals or communities

compared to the volumes that cover the following periods of war. The orders from these

thirteen volumes focus mostly on individuals who have “turned Kızılbaş,” who were in

648
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st ed., s.v. “Fuzūlī,” by Cl. Huart.
649
Leslie Peirce provides strong evidence for the multi-dimensional nature of the Ottoman Empire’s
approach to its non-Sunni subjects. For further details, see Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman
Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). For further examples of non-Anatolian
empathy toward Shi‘ism and the diversified reaction of the Ottoman central authority, see Stefan Winter,
The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule; and Karen Kern, Imperial Citizen: Marriage and Citizenship
in the Ottoman Frontier Province of Iraq (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010).
650
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II, 339-340.

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some type of relationship with the Safavid authorities, who paid taxes to the Safavid

shah, or who tried to migrate to Safavid Iran, showing that the importance of these

individuals to the Ottomans stemmed from their political, not confessional, identities.651

Opportunities for advancement, albeit limited, were also given to the Kızılbaş. In

the sixty-seven volumes of mühimme registers for the period from 1553 to 1631, around

11,000 orders detail the distribution of timars, gediks (concessions from the central

authority), or promotions to specific individuals. In contrast, only about fifty mention the

religious backgrounds of these individuals, whether Sunni or Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş. While it is

possible that the remaining award recipients, whose confessional identities are not given,

were “Sunni,” there are strong indicators that at least some of them were either Kızılbaş

or overt sympathizers of the Safavids.652 For instance, subjects named Shah Kulu (servant

of the shah), Şah Verdi (“the Shah gave,” referring to a subject to whom the shah granted

something), Abdişah (slave of the shah), and Şahsever (admirer of the shah)653 either

received land from the central authority or were promoted to higher positions of power.654

Considering that these orders were sent to heavily Kızılbaş-populated regions of the

651
Among many similar orders, an order from 978/1570 warns the governor of Diyarbekir to find and
execute the Kızılbaş population in the Siverek region who were allegedly sending money (nüzur) to the
Safavid shah or who were in contact with the Safavid court. According to the same order, however, the
governor did not have to report the “regular” Kızılbaş, who were not involved in the two “crimes” listed
above (“...töhmetleri sicil olanların haklarından gelinip olmayanların ahvali arza muhtaç olmağın...”).
MD, Vol. 14 No. 311 (14 Safer 978/July 18, 1570). For another example, see Ali Emiri Tasnifi, I.
Süleyman, File No. 4, Document No. 237 (964/1556); MD, Vol. 4, No. 1175 (20 Zilkade 967/August 12,
1560).
652
For examples see MD, Vol. 1, No. 1632 (17 Safer 962/January 11, 1555); MD, Vol. 67, No. 427 (29
Zilhicce 999/October 17, 1591).
653
Not considered here are the names Ali, Hasan, Hüseyin, and Haydar as they were Islamic figures
revered by both Sunnis and Shi‘ites/Kızılbaş, but undoubtedly some people with these names were also
Kızılbaş. Examining names has been an often-used and well-respected method in studies of conversion
from/to Islam. For instance, “ibn Abdullah” (“son of the servant of God” in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish)
has been accepted as a common indicator of convert background in the early modern period. The same
logic can be applied to Kızılbaş background or conversion, as well.
654
Examples can be found in MD, Vol. 1, No. 464 (11 Zilkade 961/October 8, 1554) (“… Şahkulu oğlu
Şahveli’ye hünkar gediğinden verile….”), as well as in MD, Vols. 11, 13, and 14.

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empire, such as Sivas, Çorum, Amasya, Tokat, and Yozgat, and that the naming of one’s

son was an indicator of political and religious affiliation in Ottoman Anatolia, it is highly

likely that most or all of these recipients of Ottoman imperial favor were Kızılbaş.

Kızılbaş individuals and groups are also mentioned in orders that specify the

award-recipient’s confessional identity. For instance, a certain Kızılbaş subject from

Erzurum655 was given timar tevcihi (preference for a timar) in 1556, a year after the

Amasya peace treaty was signed between the two empires.656 Another mühimme order

asks Cafer Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Anatolia, to give zeamet ve timar in the frontier

region (serhad) to a group of Kızılbaş who had migrated to “this side” from Tabriz after

the Treaty of Istanbul (Constantinople) was signed in 1590.657 It is also known that Celal

(d. 1518), whose name was later applied to the /Celali Rebellions of the 1590s and early

1600s, was a Kızılbaş timar-holder from the region of Amasya-Tokat.658 These examples

show a relative continuity in the Ottoman state’s relationship with its Turkish- and

Arabic-speaking Shi‘ite subjects.

The Ottoman authorities’ willingness to overlook non-Sunni confessional identity

was closely tied to their political and fiscal concerns. Many mühimme orders portray

situations in which local authorities are warned about a Kızılbaş individual or group’s

opposition to the central authority, as well as their possible collaboration with the

655
“…Kızılbaş Behram nam Erzurum kulu….”
656
MD, Vol. 2, No. 1841 (24 Safer 964/December 26, 1556).
657
MD, Vol. 67, No. 180 (21 Rebiülevvel 999/January 21, 1591). With the Treaty of Constantinople, the
Safavids recognized Ottoman sovereignty in most of the southern Caucasus (including Georgia, Dagestan,
and Azerbaijan). One of the most important articles of the treaty, however, was about preventing migration
between the two empires. According to the treaty, each side was obliged to stop its subjects’ migration to
the neighboring state. Moreover, the Safavids agreed to cease official cursing of the first three caliphs, as
well as the persecution of Sunnis in the Safavid realm. In return, the Ottomans agreed not to attack any
Kızılbaş territory in either the Safavid or Ottoman domains. Bekir Kütükoğlu, Osmanlı-Iran Siyasi
Münasebetleri (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993), 195-196.
658
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. II, 283-284.

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Safavids, which constituted a bigger threat to Istanbul. For instance, an order from 1585

warns the qadi of Antalya and the bey of Tekeli about rebellious Kızılbaş.659 This order

and many similar ones, however, include an exit clause, asking the local authority to

leave the Kızılbaş “alone,” or kendi haline/halinde, if these allegations of collaborating

with the Safavids prove to be baseless. Furthermore, a series of orders from 1558-1560

mentions two Kızılbaş individuals, Hakkı and Sohrab, from the town of Kırşehir in

central Anatolia, who are accused of being in contact with the Safavids. Istanbul first asks

the bey of Kırşehir to confiscate their property, but then suddenly asks the bey to stop the

process because evidence had emerged that the two were not actually in contact with the

Safavids.660 Similar orders were also sent to other regions of the empire, including the

Balkans, asking district governors to differentiate between the “peaceful” Kızılbaş, or

salah üzere olanlar, and hostile Kızılbaş, or hilaf-ı şer olanlar (literally, “unlawful

ones”), and Yukarı Canib ile ittihad edenler (ones who were allied with the Safavids),

before implementing any punitive actions.661 While the first group was either left alone or

imprisoned for a short period, the second group faced harsher policies, including exile

and execution.662

659
MD, Vol. 58, No. 206 (17 Cemaziyelevvel 993/May 17, 1585). For a similar situation, see MD, Vol. 62,
No. 27 (2 Sefer 995/January 11, 1587).
660
MD, Vol. 3, No. 1295 (966-968/1558-1560).
661
MD, Vol. 3, No. 172 (10 Muharrem 967/October 12, 1559), also cited in Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da
Alevilik. 183. Savaş, however, neglects the conclusion of the order, which clearly mentions a distinction
between the two groups of Kızılbaş (Işık ahalisi in this particular order); instead, he presents this order as
another example of straightforward Ottoman brutality against non-Sunni subjects
662
MD, Vol. 29, Nos. 488 and 489 (14 Zilkade 989/ December 11, 1581) and Nos. 490, 491, and 500 (14
Zilhicce 989/ January 9, 1582); MD, Vol. 31, No. 66 (28 Ramazan 985/ December 8, 1577). These orders,
which were sent to the district governors of Dulkadir, Rum, Bozok and Baghdad, specifically ask the local
officials to find other excuses to carry out the punitive actions against those whose relationships with the
Safavids are proven.

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 Even though opportunities for advancement, patronage, and religious freedom

were given to the Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman Empire, it is important to point out

that the majority of them were unable to obtain local or central power positions compared

to the empire’s non-Kızılbaş population. As the Safaviyya order became a political and

ideological movement and as the enmity between the two empires rose to the level of

military confrontation, the policies of plurality and official indifference were replaced by

caution and eventual subjugation.

IV.b. Periods of Watchfulness and Caution

Under the leadership of Sheikh Junayd and Sheikh Haydar, the Safaviyya order

transformed itself from a religious order into a political and ideological movement. The

activities of these leaders thus created a decisive break between the Safaviyya’s original

incarnation as a traditional Sufi order and its newly formed identity as a military

movement with a vernacular tradition of Islam practiced by the Kızılbaş as its

backbone.663 Because a synthesis of Sufism, Alid loyalty, and ghuluww, or extreme,664

beliefs bound the Kızılbaş to their newly militaristic Safavid pirs, or Sufi guides, the

Safavids not only intensified conversion propaganda among the Anatolians, but also

began recruiting Turcoman and Kurdish tribesmen for the military units of the order.665

At the same time, the centralizing policies of the Ottoman Empire in southern and eastern

663
Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs.
664
See n. 253, above.
665
Several Turcoman tribes (mostly Varsak Turcomans) in the Tarsus and Adana regions moved to Safavid
Iran after becoming “Kızılbaş,” a development noted in the mühimme records in red ink due to its
significance for the central authority. Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 50; idem, “Çukurova Tarihine
Dair Araṣtırmalar,” Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 1 (1963): 33-56; Abisaab, Converting Persia, 9. Sümer
mentions only two Kurdish tribal communities, Hınıslu ve Çemişgezeklü. However, contemporary sources,
as well as the present population of Kurdish Alevis in Turkey, indicate that there were definitely more than
two relatively insignificant Kurdish tribes that became Kızılbaş in the early modern era.

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Anatolia created a ripe environment for the Safavids to disseminate their religious and

political propaganda.666 Even with its new identity, the Safaviyya order still was not a

real “threat” to the Ottoman central authority. As primary accounts indicate, Safaviyya

leaders continued to receive their annual payment, the çerağ akçesi, from the Ottoman

sultans in the 1460s while Junayd, the leader of the order at the time, actively spread

Shi‘ite beliefs within the empire. The Ottoman authorities were, however, aware of the

changing goals and nature of the movement. Even after receiving Junayd at his court,

Aşıkpaşazade reports, Murad II (r. 1421-1444, 1446-1451) declared that “there cannot be

two sultans on one throne” and asked Junayd and his disciples to leave Ottoman

territory.667

The year 1492, in this context, represents a turning point in the relationship

between Istanbul and the Safaviyya order. The Ottoman authorities interpreted an

assassination attempt against Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512), organized by a meczup derviş

(“crazy dervish”), as a Safavid-supported plot. In response, they cut off the çerağ akçesi

to the order’s center in Ardabil and implemented a policy of caution, subjugation, and

persecution against the followers of the order. As mentioned previously, the qadi of

Edirne, in response to a decree sent from Istanbul immediately after the assassination

attempt, executed most of the followers of Osman/Otman Baba, who was a supposed

Kızılbaş leader in the city, and forced the rest of the community to move to different parts

of Anatolia.668

666
Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Rebels and Renegades in the Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands,” 81-100.
667
Aşıkpaşazade, Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman, 249; Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 17, 68; Sümer,
Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 12, 25.
668
Hoca Saadeddin Efendi , Tâcü’t-Tevârih, Vol. III, 274-275.

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 The sixteenth-century chronicler Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji claims that Sultan

Bayezid II was particularly afraid of Sheikh Haydar’s activities and his exponentially

growing body of supporters after the aforementioned assassination plot, even though

Bayezid had “a massive army under his command.”669 As a precaution, Bayezid II

ordered his commanders to expel any Kızılbaş among their troops.670 He also made a

distinction between the Kızılbaş and the similarly Ali-revering Bektaşi Sufis, who were

closely connected to the Ottoman Janissary regiment, as another strategy to reduce the

number and strength of the Kızılbaş. To this end, he depicted himself as a Bektaşi and

institutionalized the tariqa by patronizing both the writing down of oral traditions about

the founder of the order, Hacı Bektaş (d. ca. 1271), and the renovation of his lodge in

central Anatolia.671 As exemplified by his formalization and restructuring of the Bektaşi

order, Bayezid hoped to redirect any possible anti-Ottoman politico-religious movement

into an institutional setting backed and controlled by the central authority.672 His

measures could not prevent a wave of Kızılbaş conversions among the Janissaries,

669
Khunji, 69; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu,12-13.
670
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 80.
671
One group of scholars has argued that Bektaşi dervishes were initially the “agents” of Istanbul,
dispatched as missionaries to “properly” Islamize central Anatolia and the Balkans, but were soon absorbed
into the syncretistic beliefs of the rural population; another group, representing the Turkish nationalist
historical narrative, has argued that the Ottoman sultans, including Murad II, granted tax exemptions to the
Bektaşis if they would renounce their ties with the Safavid court. For the first group of historians, see Irène
Mélikoff, “Le Probleme Kızılbaş,” Turcica 6 (1975): 49-67; for the second group, see Ahmet Akgündüz
and Said Öztürk, Bilinmeyen Osmanlı (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), 70. These
arguments have been criticized by recent historians for attributing an exaggerated agency to the state and
ignoring the diversity of both the Bektaşis and the Kızılbaş in terms of geographical and ethnic background.
See Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,” 93.
672
Kristić, Contested Conversions to Islam, 47-48. According to Kristić, forced migration of the Kızılbaş
from Anatolia to the Balkans had an influence on the Bektaşi communities in the region; she notes “the
synergy between these immigrants and local Rumeli texts and interpretative [sic] communities, shaping the
heretofore loosely defined religio-political dissatisfaction more decisively in the direction of Bektaşi and/or
Shi‘ite propaganda in its various manifestations.”

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however, which culminated in Janissary reluctance to fight the Safavids under his

successor, Selim I.673

In 1510, the policy of caution and alertness gave way to a policy of surveillance.

The internal dynamics of the Ottoman dynasty, above all the conflict between Bayezid II

and his son Selim, exacerbated the political threat posed by the Safavids, evidenced in the

pro-Safavid Shah Kulu Rebellion in Anatolia in 1511 and Shah Ismail’s increasing

charisma as a result of his military victories in eastern Iran and Central Asia. According

to Hoca Saadeddin Efendi (d. 1599), Bayezid’s non-confrontational nature, as well as his

viziers’ incompetence, which led to Kızılbaş expansion as far as Karaman in south central

Anatolia, bothered Selim tremendously when he was a prince governing Trabzon.674 At

the same time, the anonymous Haniwaldanus chronicle states that the number of Safavid

supporters in Anatolia was so high that Selim’s nephew, Murad, declared his sympathy

for the order in the hope of gaining support in his struggle for the throne.675

An increased focus on Kızılbaş tax evasion under Selim I and his immediate

successors helped to shape the suppressive Ottoman policies of that era. Some Kızılbaş

subjects of the empire paid a tax, called nezir (or nüzur), to the Safavid religious and/or

673
Josef Matuz, “Vom Ubertritt osmanischer Soldaten zu den Safawiden,” in Die islamische Welt zwischen
Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Römer zum 65. Geburtstag (Beirut: Orient-Institut der
Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 1979), 402-415; and Zeynep Yürekli, Architecture and
Hagiography in the Ottoman Empire: The Politics of Bektashi Shrines in the Classical Age (Farnham, UK:
Ashgate, 2012).
674
Saadeddin, Tâcü't-Tevârih, Vol. IV, 12, 30-32, 42-44. According to Müneccimbaşı, Selim took Bayburd
and Erzincan from Shah Ismail, but Bayezid II’s viziers complained to him about his son’s disobedience to
his father’s orders. Sultan Bayezid II, “who was old and sick,” believed his viziers and sent an order to
Selim asking him to stop attacking the Safavid territories and concentrate on governing his sancak.
Müneccimbaşı I, 426-427.
675
Kreutel, Haniwaldanus Anonimine Göre Sultan Bayezid-i Veli (1481-1512). Following his uncle’s
accession to the throne, Şehzade Murad migrated to Safavid Iran and served the shah as a district governor
until he died. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II, 246.

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political authorities as a sign of sympathy and a source of support.676 Primary documents

show that Istanbul was concerned about possible revenue losses, its subjects’ loyalties,

and the presence of brigandage in the Anatolian countryside. Because the Ottoman

central authority measured its own legitimacy in terms of taxes collected, land

cultivation, and battle-ready subjects, its struggle with the Safavids escalated as it

attempted to secure its revenue sources and manpower.677 Ottoman sultans therefore tried

to differentiate between tax-paying and tax-evading Kızılbaş populations under their rule.

As Stefan Winter notes in the case of Kızılbaş families in Syria, Ottoman policy-makers

labeled Shi‘ites Kızılbaş to justify official violence, in contrast to more ordinary

situations such as brigandage and tax evasion, not on account of heretical beliefs.678

Furthermore, in the Anatolian and Iraqi provinces, if a Kızılbaş individual or group

remained peaceful and remitted their taxes, they were labeled only “Kızılbaş,” whereas if

they rebelled and/or refused to remit their taxes, additional pejorative names were

attached to them, such as mülhid, rafizi, ehl-i fesad, bi-nemaz or bed mezhep (an adherent

of a false sect).679

676
For instance, an official letter sent to Erzurum in 1553 asks the governor to collaborate with the
governors of Karaman and Anadolu to calculate the amount of nezir sent from the region of Sivas to the
öteki taraf (literally, “the other side,” i.e., the Safavids) by the mülahide and rafiza. BOA, Cevdet Tasnifi,
Document No. 922-39839 (20 Ramazan 960/August 30, 1553). Saadeddin Efendi also mentions financial
support sent by the Anatolians to the Safavid shah. “Gücü olan [Kızılbaş]lar ölçüsüz adak ve
armağanlarıyla anı [the Safavid Shah] ziyarete giderler. Sapkınlıkta pişkin halifeleriyle her yıl sayısız adak
gönderip, ol yasaklara öğünç duyan muhabinin yıkılası dergahı gölgesini haşa hacet kapısı ve dilek Kabesi
bilirler….” Sadeddin, Tâcü’t-Tevârih, Vol. IV, 171.
677
According to the mainstream Turkish narrative, however, Istanbul perceived this as the Safavids’
exploitation of Ottoman subjects and thus would not allow it. For an example, see Saray, Türk – İran
Münâsebetlerinde Şiiliğin Rolü, 31.
678
For further examples of Ottoman financial support for various Kızılbaş subjects, see Stefan Winter,
“The Kızılbaş of Syria,” 171-183; Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 147. For further information on
the Shi‘ites of Greater Syria under the Ottoman rule, see Abu Husayn, “The Shiites in Lebanon.”
679
MD, Vol. 14, No. 311 (14 Safer 978/July 18, 1570); MD, Vol. 14, No. 488 (12 Ramazan 978/February
7, 1571).

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 This concern with tax evasion and loss of manpower can also be seen in the

correspondence between the two empires. When Ismail I asked Bayezid II to let the

followers of the Safavid order visit the order’s center in Ardabil, the sultan responded

that the Anatolian Kızılbaş could not be allowed to leave the Ottoman realm since they

would not come back. Later, Bayezid expressed a willingness to allow his subjects to

travel to Ardabil only if they made a commitment not to settle permanently in Safavid

Iran.680 On the other hand, relative acceptance was shown toward the “heretical” practices

of particular Kızılbaş communities as long as the sultan could rely on local notables and

tribal and religious leaders to guarantee the communities’ taxes.681 Nearly a century later,

seventeen of the thirty-three mühimme orders from 1570-71 that mention Kızılbaş

individuals or groups detail Selim II’s orders to local authorities to catch anyone

providing financial support to either the shah’s court or to the center of the order in

Ardabil. In addition, local authorities were told to confiscate money and valuables that

the “tax evaders” were sending to the shah.682 In some cases additional taxes were

imposed on Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş pilgrims. A kanunname, or legal code, for the sancak of

680
Feridun Bey, Vol. I, 328-329. Shah Ismail’s second request, sent in 1502-1503, was, however, not
accepted by the sultan. Solakzade , Solakzade Tarihi, 429; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 26.
681
A letter preserved in the Topkapı Palace archives shows that among the first of Lebanon’s tribal leaders
to pledge loyalty to Selim I on his conquest of the region in 1516 was the Kızılbaş family of Baalbek.
Winter, “The Kızılbaş of Syria,” 172.
682
In an order from 1570, the Ottoman central authority asks the governor of Baghdad to inquire into the
nature of the communication between its Ottoman Kızılbaş subjects and the Safavid Kızılbaş who came to
the Ottoman realm to collect alms and to confiscate these alms.. “… Yukarı Canibden varanlara ne makule
kimesneler ihtilat edip ve ne söyleşirler nuzur (nesir) ve sadakat gibi nesne götürürler mi götüren ne asıl
kimesnelerdir ve Yukarı Canib adamları ne asıl kimesnelere mektuplar ve armağan götürmüşlerdir ve
bilcümle cemi ahvallarine vakıf ve muttali olup sıhhati ile defter eyleyüp sana teslim eyledikten sonra sen
dahi tehir eylemeyüp Südde-i Saadetime gönderesün.” MD, Vol. 14, No. 376 (9 Ramazan 978/ February 4,
1571).

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Homs in west central Syria, for instance, imposed a tax on pilgrims passing through the

sancak on their way to the Shi‘ite holy city of Mashhad in Iran.683

The Ottoman policy of watchfulness and caution was prevalent during the periods

of peace treaties between the two empires, as well. Istanbul reciprocated the Safavid

efforts at keeping the peace treaties intact by enforcing their articles, particularly in the

frontier regions. While Sunni Iranians were not allowed to migrate to the Ottoman realm,

official orders sent from Istanbul called for the investigation and punishment of Ottoman

individuals or groups who violated the agreement between the two empires.684 A series of

imperial orders, for instance, warn the governor of Van to pay utmost attention to and

prevent any type of infringement of the Amasya peace treaty following rumors of

Ottoman subjects attacking the Safavids and plundering their land and property. These

orders ultimately ask the governor to find and severely punish the violators harming the

Safavid frontier tribes of Brados and Lityan, after mentioning that the Safavids have been

fulfilling their responsibilities.685

While the Ottomans were able to sustain peace and relative cooperation with their

Kızılbaş subjects and neighbors during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, this

peaceful co-existence was overshadowed by their efforts to create a political and religious

unity within their borders, in response to pro-Safavid activities in Anatolia and frontier

683
Robert Mantran and Jean Sauvaget, Règlements fiscaux ottomans: Les provinces syriennes (Beirut:
Institut Français de Damas, 1951), 91-92.
684
For examples, see MD, Vol. 3, No. 1168 (966-968/1558-1560); MD, Vol.5, No. 65 (end of Muharrem
973/August 27, 1565).
685
“ … madem ki ol canibden sulh ve salaha mugayir vaz‘ sadır olmaya bu canibden bir ferde sulh ve
amana muhalif iş eylemekten ihtiyat eyleyip sulh ve salah umurun gereği gibi riayet eyleyüp….” MD, Vol.
14, No. 756 (28 Cemaziyülahır 978/November 27,1570). The same order, however, asks the governor to
keep sending “useful and civilized” (yarar ve mütemeddin) spies to Safavid Iran. See also MD, Vol. 18,
No. 57 (29 Ramazan 979/February 14, 1572).

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regions of Iraq. Ottoman counter-propaganda activities, accordingly, sought to force the

Kızılbaş subjects of the empire, directly or indirectly, to adjust to the central authority’s

prescriptions and adopt the newly emerging religious (and, therefore, political) identity

forged by the central authorities for the Muslim population of the empire.

IV.c. Periods of Counter-Propaganda: Assimilation and Sunnitization

After the Safaviyya order became a political threat on the eastern border of the

Ottoman Empire and began to use its Anatolian disciples against the Ottoman central

authority, the Ottomans adopted methods to counter these semi-organized religious

propaganda activities. At the outset, they declared any type of activity backed by the

Safavids sinful and insisted that any person who converted to Shi‘ite/Kızılbaş Islam

would be considered a /rafizi, or apostate, and that his or her property would be

confiscated.686 In addition, the notions of gaza and jihad, or holy war, were widened to

include the struggle against the Safavids.687At the request of Selim I, before the Battle of

Çaldıran in 1514, Ottoman religious scholars and officials wrote about the “awful” acts of

Shah Ismail and his followers. Accordingly, the Selimname of the famous Ottoman

statesman Celalzade Mustafa (d. 1567) claims that Shah Ismail had turned mosques into

taverns and had legalized drinking alcohol and committing adultery in the territories he

had invaded with his heretic soldiers.688

686
An official order asks the governor of Mosul to sell, without an auction, the property of a certain
Mehmed who had turned Kızılbaş. BOA, İbnülemin Tasnifi Maliye, File no. 11, Document no. 952
(1042/1632).
687
Ocak, Alevi ve Bektaşi İnançlarının İslam Öncesi Temelleri, 99-100.
688
Celalzade Mustafa, Selimname, eds. Ahmet Uğur and Mustafa Çuhadar (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı
Yayınları, 1990), 272-273. Kemalpaşazade accuses the Safavids of turning mosques into arsenals.
Kemalpaşazade, Defter IX, 119.

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 Ottoman religious and political authorities likewise attacked the Safavids’ claims

of descent from the Prophet Muhammad. The “baselessness” of this claim,

Kemalpaşazade asserted, was obvious from Shah Ismail I's attacks on the tombs of

Prophetic descendants revered by Twelver Shi‘ites, notably the tomb of Ali al-Ridā, the

eighth Shi‘ite Imam, in Mashhad. (In fact, the shrine had been damaged in the ongoing

battles between the Safavids and the Shaybanid Uzbeks of Central Asia.).689 Even if the

Safavid shahs were descended from the Prophet, he added, the Qur’anic story of the curse

of Noah’s son Ham reveals that descent from a prophet does not guarantee salvation.690

Invoking the Prophet Muhammad and his family, according to Kemalpaşazade, was the

only way the followers of Ismail were able to convert “ignorant” people to the “heretic”

Kızılbaş sect.691

The Ottoman central authority similarly sought to reshape the behavior of its

subjects by redistributing posts and benefits and granting privileged status to Safavid

subjects who “turned” Sunni and/or moved to the Ottoman realm. Aforementioned stories

of story of the famous Kızılbaş convert Sultan Tekelu Ulama Han, as well as the Bidlisi

family provide vivid examples of how the two empires “lured the subjects of the other”

with official titles from either side. While it is not always clear if these individuals and/or

tribes changed their religious identities each time they switched sides, Sharaf al-Din’s

adherence to Shi‘ite Islam is visible between the lines of his chronicle. For instance,

while narrating the events of 1401, he says, “[Timur] opened the grave of Yezid the

689
Kemalpaşazade, “Fetava-yı Kemal Paşazade der Hakk-ı Kızılbaş,” Mecmua, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi,
MS Esad Efendi 3548, fol. 46a, cited in Ahmet Uğur, “Kemal Paşazade ve Şah İsmail,” Erciyes
Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 4 (1987), 13-27.
690
Ibid.; Qur’an 11:11-43.
691
Kemalpaşazade, Tevârih -i Ali Osman, Defter IX, 83-96.

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cursed (mel‘un), the son of Mu‘awiya,” who ordered the killing of the third Imam Husayn

and his family, and burned his bones.692 On another page, while narrating the Timurid

ruler Shahrukh’s (d. 1447)’s pilgrimage to Mashhad, Sharaf al-Din states that Shahrukh

left Herat to visit “our dear Imam and his splendorous and heaven-scented tomb.”693

Two similar cases emphasize the importance of counter-propaganda activities for

various Ottoman sultans in an attempt to win the “war of legitimacy” against the Safavid

shahs. In the first case, Mehmed Sultan, the Kızılbaş governor of Kahkaha (Alamut) in

northern Iran, took refuge in Istanbul in 1587, during the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1578-

1590. In return for his loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and his help conquering Ardabil,

Mehmed Sultan and his immediate family were promised high official positions.694

Changing sides (more than once in certain cases) between the Ottomans and Safavids was

relatively common among Kızılbaş emirs of the frontier regions.695 Mehmed Sultan’s

migration to the Ottoman lands, however, was a sign of increasing Ottoman influence

among the Kızılbaş emirs from the inner parts of Iran and left no choice for Shah Abbas

but to sign a peace treaty with Istanbul in 1590.696 Official posts and titles were also

692
Sharaf al-Din Bidlisi, Sharafnamah, 78.
693
Sharafnamah, 86.
694
MD, Vol. 63, Nos. 59 and 60 (2 Sefer 995/January 11, 1587). Mühimme records mention other Kızılbaş
emirs and their families who moved to the Ottoman Empire in response to the ongoing Ottoman counter-
propaganda. For an example, see MD, Vol. 65, No. 444 (3 Sefer 998/December 11,1589); Fahrettin
Kırzıoğlu, Osmanlılar’ın Kafkas Ellerini Fethi (1451-1590) (Ankara: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları,
1976), 378-379.
695
Monshi, however, singles out the Kurdish emirs for this behavior: “As in the custom of landowners in
frontier areas, these men [“seditious Kurds”], as occasion demanded, from time to time attached themselves
to the saddle straps of one of the rulers in the area and claimed to be his retainers, but their real motive was
to stir up trouble and achieve their own ends in the ensuing confusion.” Monshi, Vol. I, 347.
696
“The presence of the Ottomans and the successful revolt of the Kurds encouraged others to rebel: among
them was a tribe which had long enjoyed the favor of the Safavid royal house, and which resided in the
Soldūz and Mīāndūāb districts of Marāga [an ethnically Turkish town in northwest Iran].” Monshi, Vol. I,
348-349.

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given to those members of the Safavid shahs’ family and court who converted to Sunni

Islam or asked to relocate to Ottoman territory.

In a second case, an official decree from Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) grants the post

of kapıcıbaşı, or chief doorkeeper, an honorary position typically given to converts, to a

musician from the shah’s court upon his conversion to Sunni Islam. Murad III (r. 1574-

1595) led several staged conversions of Kızılbaş Iranians to Sunni Islam in the official

circumcision ceremonies organized for his sons in 1582. 697 The miniatures of the court

historian, or şehnameci, Seyyid Lokman’s Şehname-i Selim Han698 and Şehname-i

Murad-i Salis, as well as İntizami’s Surname-i Hümayun, written for this occasion, depict

the public conversion of many Kızılbaş during the festival. In one of the paintings, a

member of the Ottoman ulema is depicted throwing off his Kızılbaş turban in an attempt

to gain the favor of the sultan, who is observing the scene from the balcony of the

Ibrahim Pasha Palace.699

Commissioning and circulating anti-Safavid polemical literature was another

method used by the Ottomans in their struggle against Safavid propaganda. This literature

falls into three categories. The first group targeted non-Kızılbaş subjects and “informed ”

697
BOA, Ali Emiri Tasnifi, I. Ahmed, File no. 7, Document no. 678 (1025/1616). Recently, Hülya
Canbakal has analyzed the Ottoman registers of seyyids, or descendants of the Prophet, and suggested a
link between the central authority’s attempts to regulate the allotment of seyyidhood and its policies of
containment of the Kızılbaş, for whom descent from the Prophet was particularly important. Hülya
Canbakal, Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town: ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1-
19, 61-90.
698
For a detailed study on the production process of Şehname-i Selim Han, see Emine Fetvaci, “The
Production of Şehname-i Selim Han,” Muqarnas 26 (2009): 263-315.
699
Nurhan Atasoy, 1582 Surname-i Hümayun: An Imperial Celebration (Istanbul: Koç Bank, 1997), 111.
For further details on Murad III’s circumcision ceremony, see Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Rebels and Renegades,”
and Derin Terzioğlu, “The Imperial Festival of 1582: An Interpretation,” Muqarnas 12 (1995): 84-100.
According to “Ali,” the narrator of the festivities in the Surname-i Hümayun, the Safavid convert was a
hanzade, the son of a prince, who was rewarded with an office following his conversion to Sunni Islam.
Terzioğlu, “The Imperial Festival of 1582,” 86.

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them of the “true nature” of the Kızılbaş (and to some extent Shi‘ite) belief structure with

long lists of accusations, including falsifying the Qur’an, defaming the companions and

the wives of the Prophet, and leading an immoral life (a reference to the mut‘a, literally

“pleasure marriage,” the well-known Shi‘ite practice of temporary marriage as an

alternative to frequenting prostitutes). While anti-Shi‘ite texts had been in circulation for

centuries,700 a new body of polemical literature was written in the sixteenth century as a

response to pro-Safavid propaganda. Short pamphlets written by Husayn ibn ‘Abdallah

al-Shirwani (d. 1550s) and Ibn Sayyid Sharif Mu‘in ad-Din Ashraf (known as Mirza

Mahdum) (d. 1590s) can be given as examples of this new polemical literature. Al-

Shirwani’s’ risala/risale, written during the war of 1532-1555, argues that the Kızılbaş

doctrine is based on believing that Ali is the manifestation of God on earth; the Kızılbaş,

he adds, despise the Qur’an; despise and curse the sahaba, the close companions of the

Prophet, and the imams of the four Sunni madhhabs; attribute ultimate power of

absolution to the Safavid shah; and believe in tanassukh, or transmigration of the soul

from one generation to another. 701 Amir Mahdum’s risala/risale, written during the war

of 1578-1590, on the other hand, after accusing al-Shirwani of attacking the Kızılbaş

without any evidence, argues that the only way to counter-attack the Safavid heresy is to

use the Qur’an and hadith.702 Considering the fact that these texts were heavily circulated

700
The statements of the famous traditionists and theologians Amr al-Sha‘bi (d. 721 or 728) and Ahmad b.
Hanbal (d. 855) concerning the rafizis constitute one of the earliest condemnations of proto-Shi‘ite
tendencies.
701
Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen
Handschriften (Freiburg im Breislau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970), 54-56, 65-66. Kemalpaşazade, in his
description of Shah Ismail’s “false religion,” lists similar practices. Kemalpaşazade, Defter IX, 85-86.
702
Al-Shirwānī’s original work is lost and historians’ knowledge of this risale comes from Mirza
Mahdum’s work. The original copy of Mahdum’s risale is now located in the Süleymaniye Library (MS
Ayasofya 2249). Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik, 46-47.

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in central and eastern/southeastern Anatolia, where Safavid propaganda was active and

effective, we can argue that the Ottomans authorities’ intention was to stop or slow down

the conversion to Kızılbaş Islam.

The second type of counter-propaganda texts were written to prove how Kızılbaş

Islam was different from Twelver Shi‘ite Islam. Fatwas/fetvas, Islamic religious rulings,

served this purpose due to their significance and sanction power not only at the center of

the empire but also in the provinces. While Molla Hamza (d. 1512) had asserted in one of

his fetvas that the followers of Shah Ismail and their Ottoman supporters were worse than

the Christians and Jews,703 the great Şeyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi, in a mid-sixteenth

century fetva, ruled that the Kızılbaş were not Shi‘ites and thus it was lawful to kill them

on the grounds of heresy, while the same was not true of other Shi‘ites because they were

one of the “seventy-three legitimate sects” of Islam.704 One should, however, note the

ambiguity of the statutory fetva, which in fact left it to the discretion of local Ottoman

officials to decide who fell into the category of Kızılbaş or Shi‘ite. These authorities

could thus use Ebussuud Efendi’s legal framework as an excuse to persecute known

Shi‘ites for fiscal, as opposed to ideological, reasons. In the Arab lands, Shi‘ites were

persecuted for banditry and tax evasion.705 In Anatolia, local authorities altered the status

of Kızılbaş property from legally protected to subject to confiscation. In other words,

implementation of this fetva often served not to root out theological deviance but to

pursue political and fiscal agendas.

703
Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığı Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim’in İran Seferi,” 55-56.
704
Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı (Istanbul:
Enderun, 1972), 109-111.
705
Winter, The Shiites of Lebanon, 16-17.

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 The third type of counter-propaganda texts consists of official histories. Some of

these histories attributed a sort of divinity to the Ottoman sultan in his competition with

the Safavid shah, a divine figure in the eyes of the Kızılbaş through his connection to the

Shi‘ite Imams and ahl al-bayt. While Ottomanists usually date the appearance of these

quasi-messianic histories to the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent,706 examples exist

from earlier reigns. Bayezid II, for instance, had been referred to as Mehdi-i Ahd, or

Mahdi of the Era, in the eighth volume of the Tevarih-i Al-i Osman completed in 1510 by

Kemalpaşazade, a staunch opponent of the Safavid shah and his followers in Anatolia.707

Correspondingly, a group of official histories, including the Sharafnamah and

Kemalpaşazade’s Tevârih -i Al-i Osman, not only belittle Safavid propaganda efforts

among the Anatolians, but also question the sincerity of the Kızılbaş converts. For

instance, while discussing the influence of Kızılbaş halifes in Anatolia, Kemalpaşazade

argues that unemployed people who “had not achieved anything in their entire lives and

who had no timars” left their villages to join the halifes with the false hope of becoming a

district governor on the Safavid side.708 In a similar tone Sheref Khan Bidlisi describes

the family of Dınbıli/Dümbülli/Bermeki, who became Kızılbaş and moved to the Safavid

realm in the 1560s; they were so ignorant, he claims, that when they heard the name of

Ja‘far (al-Sadiq), the sixth Shi‘ite Imam, in a Friday sermon, they assumed that the

706
For an example, see Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah. Fleischer examines Alid motifs used to
describe Süleyman the Magnificent and their importance in his rivalry against the Safavid shah, concluding
that “Süleyman … [as] the Sahib-Qiran of the current era … and as the Qutb ul-Aqtab … [represents] the
spiritual ruler of the world, thus combining in his person the supreme, exoteric, and esoteric authority….
[T]hat he should do so is astrologically and eschatologically appropriate and necessary, for he is the ruler of
the last age of history, whose regime is to precede the appearance of the Mahdi.” Ibid., 170.
707
Kemalpaşazade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, Vol. VIII, 23.
708
See n. 587, above.

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preacher was talking about the youngest brother of the family and they questioned his

intelligence and devotion.709

As the Safavid state established itself as a major political and ideological power in

the region, it employed prominent Shi‘ite theologians, such as Mohaqqeq al-Karaki

(d.1533), a leading Twelver jurist,710 to strengthen its position. The emerging conflict

between the Usuli and Akhbari interpretations of Twelver Shi‘ism provided Istanbul with

another tool for its anti-Safavid propaganda. In brief, the Usuli school recognized the

authority of living Shi‘ite ulema’s ijtihad, or legal decisions reached through independent

reasoning (the name comes from the canonical “roots of jurisprudence” [usūl al-fiqh],

among which the Shi‘ites prioritized ijtihad). In contrast, the Akhbaris eschewed ijtihad

in favor of legal decisions based on the hadith (also known as akhbār). Karaki, a leading

Usuli, favored allowing the Safavid shah to assume the role of jurist (faqih) in the

absence of the Hidden Imam.711 Meanwhile, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Qatifi (d. 1539), a

Twelver jurist from eastern Arabia, not only rejected al-Karaki’s establishmentarian form

of Usuli Shi‘ism, which the Safavids favored, but also rejected a gift sent to him by Shah

Tahmasb as a sign of patronage.712 He supported the competing Akhbari school, which,

709
Kırzıoğlu, Osmanlıların Kafkas Ellerini Fethi, 147, n. 73. Kemalpaşazade calls these new converts
“Etrâk-i bî-‘akl-ü-dîn” (unintelligent and faithless Turks), or “Etrâk-i nâ-pak” (filthy Turks).
Kemalpaşazade, Defter VIII, 49, 59. According to the mühimmes, the Dümbüllü family, which included the
prominent notables Nazar Bey and his brother Kılıç Bey, moved back to the Ottoman realm in late 1580s.
MD, Vol. 53, No. 774 (7 Ramazan 993/ September 1, 1585) and MD, Vol. 56, No. 315 (16 Zilkade 993/
November 8, 1585).
710
For further information on al-Karaki see, Encyclopedia Iranica, s. v. “Karaki.”
711
Andrew Newman, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran: Arab Shi‘i Opposition to ‘Ali
al-Karaki and Safavid Shi ism,” Die Welt des Islams 33/1 (1993): 66-112.
712
Al-Qatifi also questioned the legitimacy of Friday sermons and tax collection during the occultation of
the Twelfth Imam. Juan Cole, “Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama: Mortaza Ansari on
Emulating the Supreme Exemplar,” in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution,
ed. Nikki R. Keddie (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 38-39. Al-Qatifi’s reaction
was, in fact, not an isolated example. According to Savory, most Shi‘ite jurists, up until the establishment

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in addition to downplaying ijtihad, was less adamant about persecuting Sunnis and closer

to Sunni jurisprudence in general.713 While al-Karaki became powerful at the Safavid

court, al-Qatifi stayed in Iraq, which became Ottoman territory in 1533. Aside from the

short period when the Safavids under Shah Abbas occupied southern Iraq, al-Qatifi and

his inner circle worked freely in Ottoman-ruled Iraq, indirectly promoting the conflict

between the two groups. As Juan Cole argues, “the shrine cities [Karbala and Najaf in

southern Iraq] remained centers of a more cautious conservative type of Shi‘ism than the

liberal, establishmentarian Usulism of al-Karaki and his like,” which flourished under

Safavid rule.714 It was thus not surprising that the Ottomans at least tacitly supported the

Akhbari ulema of Iraq.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, following an increase in pro-Safavid

propaganda as well as continued inter-imperial rivalry, the belief that confessional

uniformity was essential for regional and political unity became more pronounced at the

Ottoman court. While Marcus Dressler calls these imperial attempts at confessional

of Safavid rule, regarded secular governments as illegitimate usurpers of the rights of the ulema as a whole
and of the mujtahids in particular. This ultimately caused a major problem of legitimacy for the Safavid
shahs. Roger Savory, “ The Safavid State and Polity,” Iranian Studies 7, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1974):
182-194.
713
For further details on the Usuli vs. Akhbari debate, see Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War, 58-77; idem,
“Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama,” 33-43. For the importance of the shrine cities to this
debate, see Meir Litvak, Shi‘i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The ‘Ulama’ of Najaf and Karbala’
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), particularly 11-18.
714
Ibid. The Akhbari school, however, suffered from perpetual violence at the hands of Aqa Muhammad
Baqir Bihbahani (d. 1780) and his son, Mulla Muhammad ‘Ali Bihbahani (d. 1801-1802), who were known
as the “Sufi killers,” due to their extreme hostility toward Sufi elements in the Shi‘ite community. Both
Shi‘ite religious leaders were determined to eradicate any opponents who challenged Shi’ite orthodoxy,
which was defined by the Safavid and post-Safavid mujtahids. According to Mangol Bayat, “It was not
only a matter of doctrinal disputes, but also a struggle to consolidate the mujtahids’ power that lay behind
the ruthless elimination of any form of religious dissent.” This violence initiated by the Bihbahanis
culminated in open violence in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, as well as major cities of Iran.
Many leading Akhbaris were either declared heretics or executed. Mangol Bayat, “The Usuli-Akhbari
Controversy,” in Expectation of the Millennium: Shi ‘ism in History, eds. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid
Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 280-283.

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polarization a way of “inventing orthodoxy,”715 Tijana Kristić cogently argues that the

Ottoman central authority’s efforts at confession-building in fact aimed “higher” than

simply discovering a confessional identity for its subjects, because a “tendency to

sacralize authority exercised by the ruler” was also a way of maintaining social

discipline.716 The state increasingly identified itself as a Sunni power, not only in the

highest political and scholarly circles but also among rural populations, who were

“indoctrinated” with an unprecedented number of new mosques and medreses, or

religious schools, where a new generation, who viewed its environment through the prism

of confessionalization, emerged. Accordingly, Ottoman society began to witness an

increase in the number of “heresy trials,” which were followed by the promulgation of a

new criminal code that redefined and regulated the boundaries of religious and public

morality by imposing new fines for “crimes” such as irregular attendance at Friday

sermons.717 A Spanish captive’s observation from the 1550s’ stating, “… from the

emperor to a cook’s apprentice; men and women; rich and poor, every Turk practices five

daily prayers,” therefore, does not sound like a far-fetched story.718

For the Safavids, on the other hand, winning Kızılbaş converts not only attracted

followers for Shi‘ite Islam, but also strengthened their political legitimacy in the region.

As the second wave of Safavid propaganda intensified, the Ottoman central authority

715
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 141. Dressler briefly notes the political and fiscal reasons for the
Ottomans’ anti-Kızılbaş policies, adding, “… It is doubtful whether it was in fact for religious reasons that
the Kızılbaş were so thoroughly persecuted. All of the characteristics of a Kızılbaş, as defined in an
Ottoman decree of 1581 ordering their persecution, could also be attributed to other Shi‘ite groups….”
Ibid., 154-155.
716
Kristić, Contested Conversions to Islam, 14.
717
Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law , 24-32, 93-131.
718
Manuel Serrano y Sanz, Türkiye’nin Dört Yılı, 1552-1556, trans. A. Kurutluoğlu (Istanbul: Kervan
Kitapçılık, n.d.), 72-73.

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switched its emphasis from lifelong practitioners of Kızılbaş Islam to those who “turned”

Kızılbaş.719 Istanbul repeatedly asked local authorities not only to find the converts and

punish them, but also to find the mediators who had facilitated the conversions and send

them to the capital,720 which proved to be a difficult task. The facilitators were known as

halifes, meticulously selected from the local Turcoman or, in some cases, Kurdish tribes

of Anatolia and Iraq. They worked to increase the number of followers of the shah, to

encourage followers to migrate to Safavid Iran, to collect money and soldiers for the

newly established state, and, most importantly, to instigate rebellions against the Ottoman

authorities.721

Ottoman primary sources, particularly after the second quarter of the sixteenth

century, contain a plethora of warnings to local authorities about halifes and their

influence among the Anatolian and Iraqi populations.722 A decree sent to the governor of

Rum (an administrative region encompassing central and northern Anatolia), Mehmed

Pasha, in November 1593 asks him to capture the halifes appointed to the regions of

Çorum, Kastamonu, and Sivas by the Safavid shah. A much earlier (1568) decree sent to

the governor of the Divriği district (sancak), Mehmed Bey, states that one of three halifes

who were collecting money and goods for the Safavid shah has been caught and executed,

but the other two were able to escape to Safavid Iran.723

719
MD, Vol. 12, No.1 (Zilkade 978/April 1571).
720
An order from 1570 mentions a ceremony in which an Ottoman subject wears the Safavid tac to become
a Kızılbaş. Istanbul, in its response, asks the governor of Baghdad to inquire as to the validity of the event
and inform the capital about it. MD, Vol 9, No. 230 (22 Şevval 977/March 29, 1570).
721
Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 40, 131-132. The halifes dated to the time of Sheikh Haydar,
and their number peaked during the reign of Ismail I. Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 12, 82.
722
For an example, see Peçevi Tarihi, 92; MD, Vol. 14, No. 264 (11 Safer 979/July 4, 1571) and No. 859
(14 Cemaziyelevvel 978/October 14, 1570).
723
Ibid., 40.

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 A decree sent to the qadi (judge) and bey of Çorum in September 1585 shows that

the halifes were able to collect thousands of soldiers for the shah’s army. It states that

Sheikh Haydar, who had previously left the region, had reappeared with 40,000 followers,

who were willing to revolt against the Ottoman authorities.724 Similar decrees, issued

over a seventy-year period, indicate the significance of the halifes for both the Safavid

shahs and the Ottoman sultans, although by 1593, Safavid territorial authority had

reached its greatest extent as the Safavid court continued sending halifes to various

Ottoman territories to recruit followers for the order and subjects for the empire.

Safavid propaganda aimed to create instability within the Ottoman realm.

Ottoman counter-propaganda, meanwhile, aimed to thwart these Safavid efforts by

creating religious and political unity within the empire’s borders. Rather ironically, the

two opposing forms of propaganda increased political and religious polarization in the

Ottoman-Safavid border regions while drawing an ever-sharper distinction between the

ideologies of the two rival empires. This growing polarization also led the Ottoman

central authority to take harsher and harsher measures against the Kızılbaş subjects of the

Ottoman Empire.

IV.d. Periods of Subjugation, Persecution, and “Inquisition”

Scholars have habitually viewed the early modern Ottomans as relatively lenient

toward “heterodox” religious practices and beliefs.725 The Kızılbaş, however, became

724
MD, Vol. 58, No. 683 (14 Ramazan 993/August 9, 1585).
725
Dressler, “Inventing Orthodoxy,” 151-173; Matuz, “Vom Ubertritt osmanischer,” 402-415. It is
important to note that this did not necessarily mean an all-inclusive environment provided for the “other,”
as mainstream Turkish historians have depicted in their attempts to romanticize the Ottoman past within a
nationalist framework. For examples, see Akdağ, Türkiye’nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, V.II, 68-69.
“…Sunnilik esaslarını veya Müslümanlığı kökünden inkar eden, ya da dinsel-toplumsal ahlak kurallarını
yıkıcı davranışlarda bulunan insanlara [Kızılbaş subjects of the empire] ... halktan gelen bir tecavüz veya

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“the deadliest enemy of Islam” when they promulgated their beliefs publicly as members

of a politically driven ideological movement after the 1460s; a series of millenarian

revolts shook Anatolia and challenged the Ottoman sultan’s rule and authority in 1511-

1538 and 1595-1610; the number of Kızılbaş converts increased significantly as a

response to Safavid propaganda after the second half of the sixteenth century; and the

revenue loss became a more serious problem after Istanbul’s engagement in the Long

War with the Habsburgs in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries726 In

response, the Ottoman central authority not only tried to articulate and enforce a Sunni

religious identity for itself and its Muslim subjects, but also began to subjugate and

ultimately persecute any dissenters.

Istanbul used a sort of “loophole,” the absence for Muslim minorities of the

intermediate status accorded to Christians and Jews in Islamic law, to allow itself to

fluctuate wildly in its treatment of Kızılbaş subjects of the empire. In the mainstream

interpretation of the shari‘a, a member of a Muslim minority is either accepted as a

believer (mu’min/mümin) and allowed full rights in the community, or rejected as an

unbeliever (kāfir/kâfir), which allowed political and religious authorities to confiscate

his/her property and execute him/her on the ground of heresy/apostasy.727 Istanbul

justified oppression and persecution of, and even “inquisition” against, the Kızılbaş

linç hadisesi asla görülmez. Bunun yerine, daha doğru bir yol olmak üzere, hükümete şikayetler vardır.”
İsmail Hakkı Danışmend, Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınları, 1950), Vol. III, 125. “...
Avrupa Katolik aleminde imanlarından en hafif bir şekilde bile şüphe edilen insanların diri diri yakıldıkları
bir devirde [16th century] İslam’a söz söyleyen bir şahsın [Molla Kabz, an Iranian dervish] ilmi
münakaşaya davet edilmesi, on altıncı asırda fikir hürriyetinin Avrupa’ya nispetle Türkiye’de ne kadar
esaslı olduğunu göstermesi açısından dikkat edilmesi gereken bir noktadır.”
726
MD, Vol. 86, No. 144 (1045-1046/1636-1637).
727
Devin J. Stewart, “Taqiyyah as Performance: The Travels of Bahāʼ al-Dīn al-̔Āmilī in the Ottoman
Empire,” in Law and Society in Islam, eds. Devin J. Steward, Baber Johansen, and Amy Singer (Princeton:
Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 1-2.

238


subjects of the Ottoman Empire by not only accusing them of heresy, but also accusing

them of denying Ottoman sovereignty, of not serving in the army and/or not paying

required taxes, of allegiance to the Safavid shahs, or of “turning” Kızılbaş, especially

during the major campaigns against Safavid Iran in 1532, 1555, and 1578-1590.

Ottoman surveillance and punitive action against suspected Anatolian supporters

of the Safavids began during the reign of Bayezid II (r.1481-1512). Despite being

considered a “kinder, gentler” ruler than his son Selim I, Bayezid authorized sürgün

(forced migration) and execution for the Kızılbaş, and the numbers of Kızılbaş affected

increased after the assassination attempt against him by an alleged Safavid sympathizer in

1492.728 After the Shah Kulu Rebellion was suppressed in 1511, Bayezid II exiled more

Kızılbaş to Modon/Methoni and Koron/Koroni in southern Greece.729 Although

widespread persecution of the Anatolian Kızılbaş populations did not begin until 1512,

Bayezid II’s reign laid the foundation for future sultans.

Selim I (r. 1512-1520), on the other hand, is widely regarded as the symbol of

Ottoman persecution against the Kızılbaş. The Shah Kulu and Nur Halife rebellions in

1511 and 1512,730 which demonstrated the power of politically driven Kızılbaş

personalities, led to the articulation and enforcement of Sunni orthodoxy in the Ottoman

domains, as well as the persecution of dissenters beyond individual cases.731 The tension

between the Ottoman and Safavid courts peaked when Murad, the son of Sultan Selim’s

728
Haniwaldanus Chronicle, 45. For further details on sürgün as an Ottoman policy, see Ömer Lütfü
Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler,” in Osmanlı
Devleti’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, ed. Hüseyin Özdeğer (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları,
2000), Vol. I, 509-607, particularly 557-558.
729
Şahabettin Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 1, No. 4 (1967): 34-
39.
730
For further information on the Shah Kulu and Nur Halife rebellions, see Chapter V.
731
Tijana Kristić, Contested Conversions to Islam, 12.

239


brother Ahmed, then residing in Karaman, “turned” Kızılbaş and donned a crimson tac.

After Ahmed dispatched soldiers to Karaman, , Murad took refuge at the court of Shah

Ismail, who had just completed the conquest of Iran and was rapidly expanding the

Safavid Empire,732 a grave concern for the Ottomans as more people across Anatolia

were becoming Kızılbaş. In a report that he presented to Selim I, Ali b. Abdullah, whose

identity is unclear, claimed that most of the people of Anatolia had become “infidels of

Ardabil” by the 1510s.733

To address the changing dynamics in his realm, Selim I not only adopted a brutal

policy of repression against his Kızılbaş subjects, executing thousands, but also declared

war against the Safavids on the eastern border of his empire.734 In order to justify his

actions, he requested fetvas from religious authorities labeling the Kızılbaş “infidels.”

According to one such fetva written by Molla Hamza, the Kızılbaş, and anyone else who

helped the Safavids, deserved “the keen sword of the sultan.”735 In a treatise requested by

Selim I, Kemalpaşazade wrote that a Kızılbaş should not be spared even if he repented of

his support for the Safavids because the Kızılbaş were “unreliable.” He added that the

property of Kızılbaş subjects should be confiscated since it legally belonged to the sultan,

and that Kızılbaş marriages should be considered invalid by the Ottoman local

authorities.736

732
Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 34-35; Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 174; Unknown
British Chronicle, 243a-243b, cited in Sarwar, History of Shah Ismail Safawi, 73.
733
“...Rum memleketinin halkının çoğu Erdebili olup kafir oldu. ” Selahattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim
(Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1969), 28.
734
Şehabettin Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığı Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim’in İran Seferi,”
Tarih Dergisi, 22 (1966): 49-76.
735
Ibid., 54-55; Öz, Alevilik ile İlgili Osmanlı Belgeleri, 103.
736
Ibid., 55; Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 137-138.

240


 With the support of these religious authorities, Selim left Istanbul to reclaim his

authority in Kızılbaş-majority towns throughout Anatolia. As he moved eastward, he

arrested Kızılbaş religious leaders, confiscated their properties, and executed a significant

number of them.737 He also imprisoned Iranian merchants, accusing them of transporting

weapons and people who knew how to use them to Safavid Iran. But there was also a

financial motivation behind Selim I’s suppression of the Iranian merchants. The city of

Tabriz in Iranian Azerbaijan, the capital of the early Safavids, was the most important

silk entrepôt in the eastern Mediterranean trade zone, and the Ottoman campaigns of the

sixteenth century (including the Battle of Çaldıran) were intended to take control of

Iran’s silk-producing regions (Shirvan, Ganja, and Gilan) as well as to suppress the

Kızılbaş threat.738 According to Feridun Bey, however, due to the importance of trade

between the two empires, Selim I’s son Süleyman I and his grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha

criticized Selim’s policy of intimidation toward local merchants. Süleyman I ultimately

released the merchants as soon as he ascended the throne in 1520.739

737
Defterdar Ebulfadl Mehmed Efendi, in his Selimnâme, details the policies of Selim I against the
Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman Empire: “Her şeyi bilen sultan, o kavmin etbaini kısım kısım ve isim isim
yazmak üzere memleketin her tarafına bilgiç katipler gönderdi, yedi yaşından yetmiş yaşına kadar olanlarn
divana getirilmek üzere emredildi, getirilen defterlere nazaran ihtiyar genç kırk bin kişi yazımıştı, ondan
sonra her memleketin hakimlerine memurlar defterler getirdiler, bunlarin gittikleri yerlerde kılıç
kullanılarak bu memleketlerdeki maktullerin adedi kirk bini gecti.” Ebulfadl Efendi, Selimnâme, 17-22
cited in Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 45. The number of Kızılbaş executed by Selim I is a topic
of ongoing debate among historians. Drawing on Ebulfadl Efendi’s Selimname, one group argues that
around 40,000 Kızılbaş were executed, while another group, using Solakzade’s account, asserts that the
number 40,000 represents both executed and imprisoned Kızılbaş. For the first group, see Ali Yıldırım,
Anadolu’da İnançsal Zulüm Tarihi: Osmanlı Engizisyonu (Istanbul: İtalik Kitapları, 2013), 46-51; for the
second group, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. II, and Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiye’nin
İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, 154-155.
738
Matthee, The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran, 15-33.
739
Cited in Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 41. Attempts to weaken the Safavid economy by
restricting the export of gold and silver to Iran, as well as blocking silk routes and merchants, continued
over the following decades. In fact, in 1591 the local ruler of Gilan in northern Iran, the most important
silk-producing region of the Safavid Empire, unsuccessfully tried to secede from the Safavid empire and

241


 As a result of such actions, the reign of Selim I’s son, Suleyman I (1520-1566),

initially appeared more tolerant than his father’s. Over time, however, the Ottoman

court’s counter-propaganda activities against the Safavids intensified to create a Sunni

identity for the empire’s subjects and thus increased punitive actions against the

Kızılbaş.740 The political and ideological need to portray the Safavids as “infidels”

produced a concomitant need to portray the Ottoman sultans as pious, orthodox Muslims

and the Safavids’ sympathizers in Anatolia as heretics.741 Süleyman I was thus depicted

as the “upholder of Sunni orthodoxy,”742 and sought fetvas to justify brutal actions

against his Kızılbaş subjects. Şeyhülislam Ebussuud Efendi issued several between 1537

and 1548 stating that those who called themselves Shi‘ites or Kızılbaş, or who cursed the

first three caliphs recognized by Sunnis, were “nothing but infidels,”743 and their

elimination was a “religious duty for pious Muslims.”744

Succeeding sultans continued the efforts to weaken the reputation of the Safavid

shahs among the Anatolian subjects of the empire. Selim II (r. 1566-1574), for instance,

rejected Shah Tahmasb I’s (r. 1524-76) offer to distribute alms to the poor in Anatolian

join the Ottomans. Willem Floor, “The Dutch and the Persian Silk Trade,” in Safavid Persia: The History
and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed. Charles Melville (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 324.
740
A ferman of 1548 asks Ayas Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, to vanquish the increasing number of
Kızılbaş in and around the province. BOA, Cevdet Adliye Tasnifi, File no. 30, Document No. 1823
(955/1548). See also Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden, 155-162.
741
Colin Imber, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” in Süleyman the Magnificent and His
Age, eds. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1995), 148; Ocak, Osmanlı
Toplumunda Zındıklar, 101-103.
742
Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” 167, 168, 174.
743
Ibid., 128.
744
It is worth noting the apparent dichotomy between the official discourse and its application in various
locales. Winter argues that these “draconian policies” seem to have had little or no effect on actual day-to-
day administration in the Syrian provinces of the empire. Winter, “The Kızılbaş of Syria,”173. Moreover,
Arabic-speaking Shi‘ite ulema living in Mecca in the mid-sixteenth century complained to the prayer
leaders of Isfahan about the Safavid policy of publicly cursing the first three caliphs. According to these
ulema, this was causing hostility toward Shi‘ites living outside Safavid Iran. Cole, Sacred Space and Holy
War, 40-41.

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towns as a gesture of condolence for Süleyman I’s death.745 He also ordered the governor

of Baghdad to replace the Iranian rugs covering the tombs of Ali in Najaf and Husayn in

Karbala with Anatolian ones.746 Moreover, like his grandfather Selim I, he imprisoned

Iranian merchants on charges of transporting weapons to Safavid Iran.747 Murad III (r.

1574-1595), for his part, ordered an investigation into books and booklets written and

sent by the Safavids to various Anatolian towns.748 In an official order, Murad III asked

the bey of Çorum and the qadi of Ortapare, both well-known Kızılbaş towns, to find and

imprison a certain Safavid halife, called Menaş Fakih, as well as the Kızılbaş circulating

these books and booklets.

In the following decades, subjugation and persecution of the Kızılbaş continued as

the Safavids and their spiritual and financial supporters in Anatolia challenged Ottoman

legitimacy in the region. During this period, the central authority began to appoint Sufi

sheikhs, most of whom were “equipped with religious learning and presumably the

appropriate Sunni consciousness,” to various parts of the empire, including rural

Anatolia, where the majority of the Kızılbaş lived. Most of these Sufi sheikhs belonged to

the Halveti order, which originated in Azerbaijan in the late fourteenth century. Many

Halveti sheikhs fled to Ottoman and Mamluk territory in the late fifteenth century in the

face of increasing Safavid hostility toward members of the order.749 Due to the lack of a

strong central core, in contrast to the Safaviyya order in Ardabil, the Halvetis did not

745
Refik, Onaltıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik, 68.
746
Ibid. 85; Sümer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu, 153.
747
MD, Vol. 14, No. 946 (19 Recep 978/December 17, 1570); MD, Vol. 14, No. 849 (5 Cemaziyülahır
978/November 4, 1570).
748
MD, Vol. 28, No. 883 (19 Şaban 984/November 5, 1576).
749
John J. Curry, Transforming Muslim Mystical Thought in the Ottoman Empire: The Rise of the Halveti
Order, 1350-1650 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 58.

243


pose a major threat to the Ottoman central authority, particularly after Murad III’s

accession to the throne in 1574. As the Halveti leaders occupied some of the most

prestigious and publicly visible posts in various Ottoman religious institutions, the

order’s influence became widespread throughout the empire.750 They not only preached

and promoted the “Sunnitization” campaign of the Ottoman central authority, but also

denounced those who deviated from it, whether the Kızılbaş or other “heretics,” including

the “Idrisis and Hamzevis,” derogatory terms used for Bayrami-Melamis.751

The level of tension between the two empires shaped Istanbul’s approach to its

Arabic-speaking Shi‘ite population, as well. In 1585, for instance, Ali al-Harfush, the

leading member of the Shi‘ite Harfush family in Lebanon, who had collaborated with the

Ottomans against other Syrian chieftains, was executed by the governor of Damascus on

suspicion of collaborating with the Safavids.752 Moreover, in 1625, when the Ottomans

and the Safavids were again fighting over Baghdad, another member of the family,

Yunus al-Harfush, was arrested and executed by the Ottomans. Abu Husayn argues that

even though local historians such as Istifan al-Duwayhi (d.1704) attribute his execution

to local intrigues, this still does not exclude the possibility of a connection between “the

fate of this Shi‘ite chief in Lebanon and what was going on at the same time on the

Ottoman-Safavid war front.”753

Accused of following the Safaviyya order and/or supporting the Safavid state, the

Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman Empire were also constantly blamed for fomenting

750
Ibid., 77; Madeline C. Zilfi, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-
1800) (Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 30-40.
751
Terzioğlu, “Sufis in the Age of State-Building and Confessionalization,” 96.
752
Abu Husayn, “Shiites in Lebanon,” 115-116.
753
Ibid.

244


unrest, disobedience, plunder, murder, forgery, adultery, and, incestuous relationships

during the period studied.754 After official orders warned local Ottoman administrators

about the alleged profane activities of the Kızılbaş, such as drinking alcohol, cursing the

first three caliphs, refusing to perform the religious duties of daily prayer and fasting,

and, most importantly, engaging in sexual relationships with first-degree family

members,755 neighbors and relatives began to denounce each other as “Kızılbaş heretics”

to local officials,756 demonstrating how a “culture of inquisition” emanating from Istanbul

effectively delegitimized the group by associating it with both the religious and political

“enemy.” These outlandish allegations and false rumors circulated by religious and

political authorities created an environment in which Kızılbaş individuals and groups

were subjected to persecution throughout the Ottoman-Safavid border region. Even

though, due to a lack of “inquisitorial records,” it is impossible to determine the exact

numbers of those executed or imprisoned, mühimmes shed light on the sheer extent of the

“inquisition.” For instance, while a certain Mehmed from the village of Zerito in the

southeastern Anatolian province of Ayntab was executed for cursing the first three Sunni

caliphs,757 “the keen sword of the sultan” was a hair’s breadth away for a group of north-

central Anatolian villagers who disputed a certain Kara Yakub’s denunciation of them to

754
MD, Vol. 3, No. 172 (10 Muharrem 967/October 12, 1559); MD, Vol. 3, No. 562 (Recep 968/March
1561); MD, Vol. 9, No. 102 (9 Ramazan 977/February 15, 1570); MD, Vol. 14, No. 264 (11 Safer 979/July
4, 1571); MD, Vol. 16, No. 532 (979/1571); and MD, Vol. 17, No. 20 (25 Muharrem 979/June 18, 1571).
As an example, see Sheikh Mahmud Hüdâyî’s (1541-1628) Tezakir-i Hüdayi, which informs Sultan Murad
III (r. 1574-1595) concerning the Kızılbaş population in his realm and their unruly behavior, cited in Refik,
Onaltıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik, 17-19.
755
MD, Vol. 9, No. 102 (29 Ramazan 977/March 7, 1570); Savaş, XVI. Asırda Anadolu’da Alevilik, 36-44.
756
MD, Vol. 14, No.1558 (28 Zilhicce 978/May 23, 1571); MD, Vol. 21, No. 58 (13 Ramazan 980/January
17, 1573).
757
MD, Vol. 9, No. 83 (25 Ramazan 977/ March 3, 1570).

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the local qadi as Kızılbaş.758 How the Kızılbaş survived these policies of persecution and

extermination is a topic for another study. Suffice it here to say that even in remote areas,

they practiced age-old Shi‘ite survival strategies such as dissimulation (taqiyya) and

endogamy while keeping a strong sense of vernacular language and identity.

V. Conclusion: Cessation of the “Kızılbaş Threat”

A complex network of social, political, and economic interactions between the

Ottoman Empire and the Safaviyya tariqa began as early as the fourteenth century,

opening a long-term political and religious struggle in the region. As the order

transformed itself into an ideological and military movement, its leaders shaped a strong

political identity that coincided with the foundation of the Safavid Empire and forced the

Ottoman central authority to confront the “Kızılbaş problem” not only along its eastern

border but also in its inner regions. By the sixteenth century, the ever-growing Safayiyya

tariqa had become a geopolitical power, leading both empires to manipulate religion for

their own political interests. In southern and eastern Anatolia, an area inhabited mostly by

nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the centralizing policies of the Ottoman Empire

created an environment ripe for Safavid religious propaganda and a subsequent Ottoman

response to the increase in “heretics” within the empire’s borders.

The present chapter has aimed to document the close connection between the

transformation of the Safaviyya order into a “state” and the corresponding changes in the

levels of acceptance and oppression shown to the Kızılbaş subjects of the Ottoman

Empire while also exploring the significant role that this transformation played in shaping

758
MD, Vol. 36, No. 93 (23 Muharrem 987/ March 21, 1579).

246


the religious landscapes of both empires. Using specific examples from primary sources,

I have examined both the significance of the religious propaganda employed by the

Safavid religious and political leaders in Anatolia and the frontier regions of Iraq, and the

drastically varying policies of the Ottoman central authority, from financial support for

the order to the execution of its followers. This examination concludes that the Ottoman

state’s behavior toward its Kızılbaş population fluctuated according to its relationship

with the Safaviyya order and eventually with the Safavid Empire, precluding a single

religious or political explanation for the policy shifts on the parts of both empires.

Differences between official language and actual practice are important to take

into account when examining Istanbul’s relationship with its Kızılbaş subjects. For

instance, while the long reign of Süleyman I is infamous for the fetvas issued by high

religious authorities justifying brutal actions against the Kızılbaş, actual practice may not

reflect this negative attitude.759 Although Ebussuud issued several fetvas between 1537

and 1548 supporting this approach,760 official records indicate a more benevolent

response. According to Leslie Peirce, in an analysis of the case of a Kızılbaş woman in

the province of Ayntab who was accused of heresy and unchaste behavior, the decision to

banish her from the city reflects Süleyman I’s preference for the “long-term correction of

his ordinary subjects” rather than “a desire to punish them severely.”761 In general, the

Ottoman state’s attitude toward its Kızılbaş subjects was characterized by just this kind of

complexity and nuance.

759
Derin Terzioğlu rightfully underlines the dichotomy between official language and actual practice
concerning the Kızılbaş population of the Ottoman Empire. See Terzioğlu, “Ottoman Sunnitization,” 320-
324.
760
Düzdağ, Şeyhülislam Ebussud Efendi Fetvaları, 128.
761
Peirce, Morality Tales, 272-273. For another example, see MD, Vol. 14, No. 890 (28 Recep
978/December 26, 1570).

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 Conclusion

Lewis B. Namier, a British historian, once stated, “Religion is a sixteenth-century

word for nationalism.”762 While the term “nationalism” in its modern sense did not exist

in the sixteenth century, religion -and confessionalization in particular- served as a

“cement” to mold, shape, and direct not only states but also societies in the early modern

era, functioning similarly to nationalism in the modern period. “Religiously motivated

socio-political transformations,” in Weberian terms, were prevalent as the socio-political

and religious dynamics drastically changed the cultural conceptions of religious identity,

state of belonging, and obedience among numerous populations. Early-modern Ottoman

Anatolia, as a politically and religiously vibrant milieu, was an example of this

phenomenon where many, and often conflicting, religio-political identities emerged and

co-existed. This study is devoted to one of these religio-political groups, the Kızılbaş -

the largest and best-documented Muslim minority group in the Ottoman Empire - and

their role in shaping the relationship between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. A

corresponding focus is the importance of pro-Safavid religious and political propaganda

in the context of state and identity formation and confessionalization.

As documented throughout this study, pro-Safavid propaganda, with its

multifaceted and meticulous methods and tools, was the leading factor in the formation of

the Kızılbaş communities in Ottoman Anatolia, particularly from the mid-fifteenth to the

762
Cited in Anthony Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 25.

248


early seventeenth century. Various worldly and other-worldly concerns – following a

charismatic leader, seeking salvation, socio-political and fiscal pressures, the lure of posts

and pensions– constituted the main motivations behind conversion to Kızılbaş Islam.

Therefore, Safavid religious and political authorities put their utmost effort into

addressing these particular vulnerabilities and grievances in order to convert the volatile

region of Anatolia into a strong base of religious, political, and fiscal support for the

Safavid cause. In this connection, promoting migration to Safavid territory was a key

aspect of pro-Safavid propaganda from its earliest days. Beginning in the late fifteenth

century, the Safavids encouraged Anatolian Turcoman and Kurdish tribes to migrate to

Iran in response to their lack of support among the local population. The regions from

which the largest number of people migrated, therefore, were those experiencing

economic problems or political disturbances, mostly derived from the policies of the

Ottoman central authority.

The level of geopolitical threat that the Kızılbaş and the Safavids presented in the

region determined the Ottomans’ response to their Kızılbaş subjects in Anatolia. The

Ottoman central authority developed an equally complex set of policies based on three

primary issues: the intensity of pro-Safavid propaganda, Istanbul’s relationships with the

Safavid state, and issues of taxation and migration. The level of Ottoman tolerance of or

even indifference toward the Anatolian Kızılbaş was relatively high before the emergence

of the Safavids as a military and political power and during periods of peace with the

Safavid state. A policy of close surveillance and persecution, however, dominated the

249


relationship when the Safavid state had taken shape and begun to disseminate religious

and political propaganda among the Ottoman subjects, especially during periods of war.

Furthermore, an essential aspect of the Ottoman policies, which was developed

first to stop and later to reverse pro-Safavid propaganda, was to utilize a heavily sectarian

narrative to justify the suppression of the “wicked population.” The underlying goal was

to supply the essential needs of an empire: legitimacy through taxpaying and battle-ready

subjects. The adoption of staunchly Sunni and Twelver Shi‘ite religious identities by the

Ottoman and Safavid Empires, however, should not be evaluated as isolated

developments. These two empires profoundly affected each other’s interpretation of

Islam and establishment of a state religion. Likewise, while we cannot underestimate the

significance of spirituality, pragmatism was a central motivator, not only for political and

religious authorities, but also for the population as a whole, members of groups of which

switched sides between the two political entities on multiple occasions.

The question surrounding the Sunni-Shi‘ite conflict in the early modern period

and its enmeshment with issues of political, religious, and fiscal legitimacy in inter-

confessional and inter-imperial contact zones is at the core of this study. By examining

the intricacies of pro-Safavid propaganda and Ottoman reaction in early modern Anatolia,

this dissertation aims to provide an accurate picture for a deeper understanding of both

the early modern religious transformation of the Ottoman and Safavid polities and the

current geo-political and demographic make-up of the region. The question of how the

Safavids themselves changed over time in response to these varying Ottoman policies is

the next piece to this complicated puzzle.

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 My research crosses chronological and geographical borders within the Middle

East to provide a distinctive approach to religio-political debates on early modern Iran

and a direct link to the current Sunni-Shi‘ite conflict today. The relevance of my study to

current conflicts is reflected in the fact that the term “Safavid” is used as derogatory

shorthand for Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘ites by former members of Iraq’s Ba‘ath party and by

supporters of the so called Islamic State; many additional examples of this sort of

reappropriation of early modern religious rhetoric to serve present-day agendas could

likewise be cited. Furthermore, analyzing conversion practices and rituals within Islam

provides a crucial tool to challenge Orientalist notions of definitive religious and cultural

boundaries in the modern Middle East. This study, therefore, has implications not only

for scholars of the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, but also for scholarship on Islamic

cultures and societies across the globe. The focus on conversion as a response to

propaganda also speaks to scholarship on religious and political inclusion/exclusion and

conversion, and on religious propaganda and counter-propaganda.

251


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Anonymous. Terceme-i Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Safi. Süleymaniye Manuscript Library, Istanbul,
Turkey, MS Kemankeş 247.
Anonymous. Tarikh-i Qizilbashan. Kitābkhānah-i Millī-i Malek, Tehran, Iran, MS No.
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Ardabili, Ahmad ibn Muhammad. Hadigat’ul-Shi‘a. University of Isfahan Library,
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Ibn Bezzâz et-Tevekkülî. Saffetu’s-Safa., , Süleymaniye Manuscript Library, Istanbul,
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_____, ed. Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri. Vol.3: Yavuz Sultan Selim
Devri Kanunnâmeleri. Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1990.
_____, ed. Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri. Vol.4: Kanuni Devri
Kanunnâmeleri. Istanbul: Fey Vakfı Yayınları, 1990.
Baṣbakanlık Osmanlı Arṣivi (Istanbul). 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 966-968/1558-
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Baṣbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel Müdürluğü, 1993.
_____. 5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 973/1565-1566. Eds. Necati Aktaṣ and Necati
Gültepe. Ankara: T.C. Baṣbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel Müdürluğü, 1994.
_____. 6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 972/1564-1565. Eds. Necati Aktaṣ and Necati
Gültepe. 3 volumes. Ankara: T.C. Baṣbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel
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_____. 7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 975-976/1567-1569. Eds. Necati Aktaṣ and Necati
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_____. 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 978-979/1570-1572. . Eds. Necati Aktaṣ and
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Demir, Ismet, Hacı Osman Yıldırım, eds. Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk
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Erdoğan, Ahmet. “71 No’lu Amasya Şer’iyye Sicilinin Transkripsiyonu ve
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Hezarfen, Ahmet, and Cemal Şener, eds. Osmanlı Arşivinde Mühimme ve İrade
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