CASE LIST

ARTS 74-81 PROPERTY RELATIONS

1. Falcis vs Civil Registrar General (GR No. 217910, 3 Sep 2019)

2. Nobleza vs Nuega (GR No. 193038, 11 March 2015)
3. Pana vs Juanite (GR No. 164201, 10 Dec 2012)
4. Quiao vs Quiao (GR No. 176556, 4 July 2012)
5. Buenaventura vs CA (GR No. 127358, 31 March 2005)
6. Homeowners Savings & Loan Asso vs Dailo (GR No. 153802, 11 March 2005)
7. Carino vs Carino (GR No. 132529, 2 Feb 2001)

ARTS 82-87 DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS

1. Arcaba vs Tabancura (GR No. 146683, 22 Nov 2001)

2. Velasquez vs CA (GR No. 126996, 15 Feb 2000)
3. Mateo vs Lagua (GR No. L-26270, 30 Oct 1969)

ARTS 88-104 ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY

ONLY CODAL PROVISIONS & COMMENTS

ARTS 105-142

1. Anastacio vs Coloma (GR No. 224572, 27 Aug 2020)

2. Malabanan vs Malabanan (GR No. 187225, 6 March 2019)
3. Villarama vs Guno (GR No. 197514, 6 Aug 2018)
4. Carlos vs Tolentino (GR No. 234533, 27 June 2018)
5. Borlongan vs BDO (GR No. 217617, 5 April 2017)
6. PNB vs Reyes (GR No. 212483, 5 Oct 2016)
7. Lavadia vs Luna (GR No. 171914, 23 July 2014)
8. Pana vs Juanite (GR No. 164201, 10 Dec 2012)
9. Dewara vs Lamela (GR No. 179010, 11 April 2011)
10. Fuentes vs Roca (GR No. 178902, 21 April 2010)
11. Inter Dimensional Realty vs Siochi (GR No. 169977, 18 March 2010)
ARTS 74-81 PROPERTY RELATIONS

1. Falcis vs Civil Registrar General (GR No. 217910, 3 Sep 2019)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/sep2019/gr_217910_2019.html

Facts:

 Falcis filed a petition to declare Art. 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional, and to
nullify Art. 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.
 Art 1 and 2, prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion and that the issues raised were
transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties. Falcis
claims that Art 1 and 2 of FC deny the existence of individuals belonging to religious
denominations that believe in same-sex marriage and that they have a right to found a
family accordance with their religious convictions.
 Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing separate opinions of various
cases saying that this Court should follow a fresh approach to the Court’s judicial power and
find petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion
 CRG prays that the Court deny due course or dismiss the petition, that the petition is no in
the nature of a class suit, but instead personal only to Falcis. Falcis failed to show injury-in-
fact and an actual case or controversy but seeking an advisory opinion that the Court can’t
issue.
LGBTS Christian Church, Reverend Agbayani, Felipe and Ibanez, counsel by Falcis, filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention, asking the court
to allow them to intervene in the proceedings, claiming that:
(1) they offer further procedural and substantive arguments;
(2) their rights will not be protected in a separate proceeding; and
(3) they have an interest in the outcome of this case.
Subsequently, Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the same
reliefs as those in Falcis’ Petition, namely: (1) declaration of unconstitutionality of Art 1 and
2 of the FC; and (2) invalidation of Art 46(4) and 55(6) of the FC.

Issue:
WON petitioner has legal standing.
WON CRG gravely abused its discretion.

Held:
1. No. Petition has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of the case,
there is no actual case or controversy. There is no legal standing to file his petition.
Legal standing is a party’s personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest in the case
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Petitioner’s desire to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationship and
to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country does not constitute
legally demandable rights that require judicial enforcement. The Court will not witlessly
indulge petitioner in blaming the FC for his admitted inability to find a partner.

2. No. Petitioner failed to show that respondent CRG exercised any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function. No grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
can be appreciated. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition require the proper allegation not
only of a breach of a constitutional provision, but more important, of an actual case or
controversy.
2. Nobleza vs Nuega (GR No. 193038, 11 March 2015)
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=317

FACTS:

From 1988-1989, as an engaged couple, Rogelio and Shirley started paying for a piece of
land, on which they plan to build their future home. They got married in 1990. Shirley works
as a domestic helper in Israel, while Rogelio is a seaman. Sometime between 1990-1992,
Shirley heard stories that her husband had brought home another woman. This news was
confirmed in 1992, when she came home to the Philippines.

In 1992-1993, Shirley filed 2 cases against Rogelio: (1) Concubinage; and, (2) Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property. In that same year, she learned that her husband sold
their property to Josefina V. Nobleza without her consent. She tried to warn the buyer about
the pending cases she filed, but still the sale was consummated.

Shirley’s petition for legal separation and separation of property was granted in 1994.

ISSUES:

PRINCIPAL:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and Josefina Nobleza was valid

OTHER ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Nobleza bought the subject property as a buyer in good faith
2. Whether or not the property is part of the community property
3. Whether or not the property is conjugal, despite the TCT bearing the “single” civil
status of Rogelio as owner
4. Whether or not Shirley is liable for a share in the reimbursement of the buyer’s
payment

RULING:

PRINCIPAL:
NO, the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and Josefina Nobleza was void. Rogelio sold the
property in 1992, at the time when his marriage with Shirley was subsisting and that the
property was conjugal, and part of their community property. Article 96 of the Family Code
provides that
“The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.

The powers given to one spouse to administer the property in the absence of the other does
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance of the property without the latter’s
written consent or a court order. Any disposition or encumbrance made without the said
spousal consent or court authority is deemed void.
 OTHER ISSUES:
1. NO. Nobleza was not a buyer in good faith. She did not exercise due diligence in
checking if the property she was purchasing was actually ripe for selling. She did not check
the ownership details of the property. She did not heed the notice sent by Shirley in the
form of her warning to the buyer’s sister in relation to not buying the property since it is the
subject of one of her pending cases against Rogelio.

2. YES. The subject property is part of the community property of Rogelio and Shirley.
Article 91 provides “Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage
settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses
at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.” And the property was
not characterized by any one of the exceptions in Article 92: (1) Property acquired during the
marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if
any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part
of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse;
however, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before
the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.”

3. YES. The property is conjugal and is part of the community property of Rogelio and
Shirley even in it is registered only in Rogelio’s name as a single man. The property was
acquired during their marriage and all property acquired during this time is presumed to be
conjugal and part of the community property.

4. NO. Shirley is not liable for the reimbursement of the payment issued by Nobleza to
Rogelio. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only
be “liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x.” There was no
evidence that the payment given to Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family and the
absolute community property or Shirley cannot be held liable for the obligation.

3. Pana vs Juanite (GR No. 164201, 10 Dec 2012)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/gr_164201_2012.html

FACTS:
Efren Pana, his wife Melecia and another person were charged with murder before the RTC
of Surigao City. On 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of
death. The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the
heirs of the victim.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both but modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the
award of civil indemnity and damages with modification.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming
that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC
denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the petition.
Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with Melecia falls under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains; given that they were married prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
 On the other hand, the heirs of Juanite Sr and Juanite Jr argued that the regime of absolute
community of property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since the transitory
provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired
rights are impaired, and that the property relation between the couple was changed when
the Family Code took effect in 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?

HOLDINGS:
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification. The RTC of Surigao City shall first ascertain that,
in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgement on the latter
accused for crime of murder, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered.
Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife Melecia, out of
the partnership assets even before this liquidation. Indeed, it states that such indemnities
“may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
preceding article have been covered. “No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is
not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose
above-mentioned.”
Whereas, it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are
inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is
evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage. Clearly, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of marriage.

4. Quiao vs Quiao (GR No. 176556, 4 July 2012)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_176556_2012.html

FACTS:

Respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the same and custody of the
minor children were awarded to Rita. Their property as enumerated was to be divided
among the spouses equally subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.He was further ordered to
reimburse the sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P 5,000.00.

Petitioner posits that he has a vested right over his shares of the property in the conjugal
partnership which was violated by the Court’s order of the forfeiture of the same to his
children.
 ISSUE:

What is “vested right” from the perspective of the due process clause? Was petitioner’s
“vested right” over half of the common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when
the trial court forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Article 63 (2) and 129 of the
Family Code?

RULING:

No.

In the en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer
Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,it was held
that:

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement
of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.

Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. From the foregoing, it is clear that while
one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.

First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her.

Second, when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial
court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to
due process.

5. Buenaventura vs CA (GR No. 127358, 31 March 2005)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_127358_2005.html

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount
of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and
custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

 Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for
the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is
that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear
to have been included or involved in said distribution.

6. Homeowners Savings & Loan Asso vs Dailo (GR No. 153802, 11 March 2005)
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_153802_2005.html

FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in
the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo, Marcelino

obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank, secured by the
property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property in favor of petitioner without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
The loan matured and remained outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no knowledge of
it. She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so she consequently filed
for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages
against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her
knowledge was valid.
2.) Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo.

HELD:
The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is
silent on the matter.
 Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed by the system of Conjugal
Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void. The
Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino without his wife’s consent and,
thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court
held that for failure to present clear proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit
of the family which under Article 121 of the Family Code, the subject property could not be
held liable.

7. Carino vs Carino (GR No. 132529, 2 Feb 2001)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/feb2001/gr_132529_2001.html

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children
in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City
the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total
of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.

RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages,
adulterous or concubinage relationships.

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party
 belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to
the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been
solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would
be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary.

ARTS 82-87 DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS

1. Arcaba vs Tabancura (GR No. 146683, 22 Nov 2001)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2001novemberdecisions.php?id=1223

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting
of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take
care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and
Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as
well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On
the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told
her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper
who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was
too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got
married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75
year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family
was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became
bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from
his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his
house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his
 name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.
Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s
favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public
assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.

2. Velasquez vs CA (GR No. 126996, 15 Feb 2000)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/feb2000/gr_126996_2000.html

Facts:

Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate were childless. Leoncia de
Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and
Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). The heirs of Anatalia de Guzman
all surnamed Meneses [Respondent herein] filed a complaint for annulment, partition and
damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the
latters' refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino.

The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman stated that documents of donation and
partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de
Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support.

Defendants [Petitioners herein] filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging
among others that during the lifetime of spouses Aquino had already disposed of their
properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, by virtue of Donation Propter
Nuptias to defendants parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and other
evidences.

RTC rendered in favor of the respondent herein. CA affirmed RCT's decision.

Issue:
 Whether or not the allegation that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their
properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's sister) had several children to support is a ground for the
revocation of donation.

Held:

No.
Ratio:

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. The donation of the first parcel made
by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen
(19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez,
and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made
part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery
and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and
765 of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila
de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became
the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias
can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in
article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that
the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's
sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation
either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

3. Mateo vs Lagua (GR No. L-26270, 30 Oct 1969)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/oct1969/gr_l-26270_1969.html

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated
on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of
title remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on
the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in
1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to
initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his
younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when
Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to
 petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the
donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was
dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the
CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of
11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that
Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein
petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any
convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias
for being inofficious.

HELD:

Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of

dismissal sustained.

Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from
the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus
determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter
can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in
order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the
value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s
share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen
that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the
inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance
of the deducted portion to the respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death
of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by
the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

ARTS 88-104 ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY

ONLY CODAL PROVISIONS & COMMENTS

ARTS 105-142

1. Anastacio vs Coloma (GR No. 224572, 27 Aug 2020)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/aug2020/gr_224572_2020.html

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land located at San Jose Tarlac covered by a
TCT showing Juan as the registered owner with inscription of his marriage to Juliana
whom are both deceased, leaving respondents as their legitimate heirs. Respondents
contend that the petitioners were in possession of the subject property by mere
tolerance of their parents and upon their death, they demanded its surrender which is
left unheeded. Thus, respondent filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Title
against petitioners. Petitioners countered respondents alleging that their possession was
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Juan. The MTC dismissed the case
which prompted respondents to file for Annulment of Document, Recovery of
Ownership and Possession before the RTC claiming that no conformity or consent was
given by Juliana to the alleged sale and forgery on the signature of Juan.

The RTC dismissed the case ruling that the subject property was the exclusive property
of Juan, thus, Juliana’s consent is not required. The CA, however, reversed the RTC
holding that the lower court erred in declaring that the subject property was owned
exclusively by Juan based on the stipulation that the subject property was presumed
conjugal as it was acquired by virtue of sale during the subsistence of his marriage with
Juliana as evidenced by the inscription on the TCT, thus, the sale between petitioners
and Juan is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal property of Juan and Juliana which
requires both spouses consent for valid conveyance?

RULING:

Yes.

Article 105 of the Family Code provides that the provisions of Chapter 4, Conjugal
Partnership of Gains (CPG), shall also apply to CPG already established before the
effectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. It will be recalled that based on the
stipulations of the parties, the subject property was acquired in 1965 during the lifetime
of Juan and Juliana while they were married, and it was registered in the name of Juan
married to Juliana.

In 1965, the prevailing property regime between husband and wife was the CPG. There
being no evidence to the contrary, the property regime between Juan and Juliana was
the CPG.

Article 116 of the Family Code is explicit as to who has the burden to prove that property
acquired during the marriage is not conjugal, to wit:

ART. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.(160a)

A rebuttable presumption is established in Article 116 and the party who invokes that
presumption must first establish that the property was acquired during the marriage
because the proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. It is not necessary to
prove that the property was acquired with conjugal funds and the presumption still
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
 Once the condition sine qua non is established, then the presumption that all properties
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one spouse or both spouses, are conjugal,
remains until the contrary is proved.

Given the very stipulations made during the Pre-Trial and TCT No. 56899, respondents
had laid the predicate for the presumption under Article 116 to be invoked. They had
established that the property was acquired during the marriage of their parents. To
overcome the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership, petitioners were
required to prove the contrary.

2. Malabanan vs Malabanan (GR No. 187225, 6 March 2019)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019marchdecisions.php?id=174

FACTS: Melinda Malabanan (Melinda) is the widow of Jose Malabanan (Jose) In a

December 18, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale, they acquired a 310-square meter lot, a
portion of a 2,000-square meter land registered under Maria Cristina Rodriguez
(Rodriguez). Subsequently, on February 21, 1985, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
188590 was issued to Jose, married to Melinda covering the disputed property. The
spouses built a house on the lot which the family had possessed since 1984. On October
13, 1984, Melinda left the Philippines to work in Libya. Unfortunately, Jose was
murdered on June 12, 1985, prompting her to return home on June 25, 1985. She then
returned to Libya on August 19, 1985, and only came home on November 8, 1990. Later
on, Melinda discovered that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T188590 had long been
canceled through a string of transactions, and that the property was registered under
the name of Spouses Dominador III and Guia Montano (the Montano Spouses). When
Melinda's mother-in-law, Adelfina Mendoza (Adelfina) died, her family executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of her estate. The property, then covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-198039, was adjudicated to Ramon Malabanan (Ramon), who was Jose's
brother. June 1, 1994, Melinda filed before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint about
Annulment of Title with Damages against Spouses Ramon and Prescila Malabanan (the
Malabanan Spouses) and Francisco Malabanan (Francisco). On June 17, 1994, Ramon
sold the property to the Montano Spouses, with whom Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T467540 was issued. Melinda later filed an Amended Complaint to implement the
Montano Spouses. She argued that the Special Power of Attorney was void as her
signature in it was forged, and that she and Jose remained the real owners of the
property. Further, she averred that she spent her earnings as an overseas worker in
Libya to remodel their family home, all of which Francisco and the Malabanan Spouses
had fully known. She prayed for the nullification of the documents, which she claimed to
have been illegally executed to dispossess her of her property. Francisco and the
Malabanan Spouses, in their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, countered that
Francisco and Adelfina bought the property for their son, Jose, and Melinda as an
advance on Jose's legitime.Francisco, they added, paid for the construction of the house
on the property. They contended that Melinda consented when Francisco reacquired
the property upon his son's death. He sold the property to his brother-in-law, Benjamin
Lopez (Lopez) because he was short on cash; he later bought it back with his hard-
earned money. Francisco and the Malabanan Spouses further claimed that the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Adelfina's estate was legally executed. Melinda and her
children, they argued, were excluded because they had already received their share of
inheritance from Adelfina. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Melinda. It found
that she has proved her ownership over the property, which was fraudulently
transferred through Francisco's clever scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-188590 was conjugal, and thus rendered its sale without the wife's consent void.

HELD: On one hand, the petitioner's claim rests on the Deed of Absolute Sale her
husband Jose executed with Rodriguez, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
188590 issued during their marriage. On the other hand, respondent Francisco
maintained that he paid for the land and the house construction on the property. The
Court of Appeals' finding that the property was exclusively owned by Jose was premised
on: (1) the Deed of Conditional Sale between Jose and Rodriguez, which do not appear
on record; and (2) Jose's statement in the Special Power of Attorney. The circumstances
here transpired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Thus,
petitioner and Jose's marriage and property relations are governed by the Civil Code.
Under the Civil Code, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal.
There is no need to prove that the money used to purchase a property came from the
conjugal fund. What must be established is that the property was acquired during
marriage. Only through "clear, categorical, and convincing" proof to the contrary will it
be considered the paraphernal property of one (1) of the spouses. Here, the pieces of
evidence presented by respondents, who had the burden of proving that the property
was not conjugal were insufficient to overturn this presumption. To recall, on September
20, 1984, Jose executed a Deed of Conditional Sale with Rodriguez, where respondent
Francisco's down payment was allegedly reflected. The following month, on October 13,
1984, Melinda left for Libya. On December 18, 1984, the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Jose and Rodriguez was executed The house underwent construction while Melinda was
in Libya, and before Jose's death on June 12, 1985. These events refute Francisco's claim
that the petitioner and Jose had no means to purchase the lot as they were jobless. The
petitioner was then working in Libya, presumably earning income when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed and the house was constructed. These circumstances
sufficiently show that the property was, indeed, conjugal. While respondent Francisco
did not waiver in his claim that he and Adelfina bought the lot for the petitioner and
Jose, we sustain the trial court in deeming this as self-serving. It does not escape this
Court that respondent Francisco's characterization of the property changed throughout
the trial and on appeal. A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. The certificate
of title is the best evidence of ownership of a property. Respondents neither alleged
fraud nor assailed the issuance of the title in Jose's favor. This certificate of title, when
taken with the Deed of Absolute Sale between Jose and Rodriguez, as well as the tax
declarations in petitioner's name, weigh more heavily than the respondents' bare claims
in establishing petitioner and Jose's ownership of the property. Respondent Francisco,
on the contrary, failed to present any evidence to prove that he paid for the kind and
the construction of the house on the property The Court ruled in a number of cases that
the sale of conjugal property by a spouse without the other's consent is void. All
subsequent transferees of the conjugal property acquire no rights whatsoever from the
conjugal property's unauthorized sale. A contract conveying conjugal properties entered
into by the husband without the wife's consent may be annulled entirely. Here, Jose had
no right to either unilaterally dispose of the conjugal property or grant respondent
Francisco this authority through the supposed Special Power of Attorney. In his attempt
to disavow knowledge of or participation in the petitioner's forged signature in the
 Special Power of Attorney, respondent Francisco claimed that Jose handed him the
document with the petitioner's signature affixed in it. However, he was resolute in his
account that the petitioner was in Libya when the house was being constructed.In the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger of said document. If a person had in his possession a falsified
document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear
presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. Here, it was through
the Special Power of Attorney, where the petitioner's signature was forged, that
respondent Fernando was able to sell the property to his brother-in-law. A presumption
that he was the author of the falsification arose. Without contrary evidence, which he
did not even attempt to adduce, the presumption stands. This Court cannot allow
respondent Fernando, the presumed perpetrator of the forgery in the Special Power of
Attorney, to benefit from his nefarious acts. Finally, we agree with the trial court's
finding that the Montano Spouses were not buyers in good faith. A person is a buyer in
good faith or an "innocent purchaser for value, when he or she purchases and pays the
fair price for a property, absent any notice that another has a right over it. If the
property is covered by a certificate of title, the buyer may rely on it and is not obliged to
go beyond its four (4) corners. Sigaya v. Mayuga, however, provides for situations where
this rule does not apply: This rule shall not apply when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor
or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. To justify good faith in merely relying on the certificate
of title, the following must be present: First, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the
buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of
any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property. Here, the land has always been possessed by the petitioner, and not
respondent Ramon Malabanan who sold it. Respondent Dominador should have
inquired about this before he purchased the property. Verifying the status of the
property would not have been difficult for a seasoned businessman like him, who
incidentally lives in the same neighborhood where the property is located. The Petition
for Review for Certiorari was granted.

3. Villarama vs Guno (GR No. 197514, 6 Aug 2018)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018augustdecisions.php?id=772
4. Carlos vs Tolentino (GR No. 234533, 27 June 2018)
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018junedecisions.php?id=425

FACTS:

The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of 1,000 square meters
and all the improvements thereon located in Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-90746 (116229) and registered in the name of
Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes Tolentino.

Without Juan’s knowledge and consent, Mercedes and Kristoff, who were then residing
in the subject property, allegedly forged a Deed of Donation, thereby making it appear
that Juan and Mercedes donated the subject property to Kristoff. Thus, by virtue of the
alleged forged Deed of Donation, Kristoff caused the cancellation of TCT No. RT-90764
(116229), and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 004-20110033208 was issued in his name.

Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property to Julieta’s brother, Felix Bacal. When
Felix informed Julieta of the availability of the subject property, Spouses Carlos then
asked him to negotiate for its purchase with Kristoff. Thereafter, Kristoff surrendered to
Felix copies of the title and tax declaration covering the said property. Kristoff and
Julieta executed a Memorandum of Agreement stating that Kristoff is selling the subject
property to Julieta in the amount of P2,300,000.00, payable in two (2) installments.
Julieta made the first payment in the amount of P2,000,000.00 while the second
payment in the amount of Pesos P300,000.00 was made on June 30, 2011.13 On the
same day, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta.

Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
which was annotated on TCT No. 004-2011003320 on July 15, 2011. Juan also filed a
criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City against Kristoff.

Accordingly, an Information was filed against him.

Meanwhile, Kristoff and Julieta executed another Deed of Absolute Sale dated
September 12, 2011 over the subject property and, by virtue thereof, the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City cancelled TCT No. 004- 2011003320 and issued TCT No. 004-
201101350219 on December 5, 2011 in favor of Spouses Carlos. The affidavit of adverse
claim executed by Juan was duly carried over to the title of Spouses Carlos.

Juan filed a complaint for annulment of title with damages against Mercedes, Kristoff,
Spouses Carlos, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the RTC of Quezon City.

RTC found that Juan’s signature in the Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 was a
forgery. Despite such finding, however, it dismissed Juan’s complaint. CA ruled that Juan
has a better right over the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether Spouses Carlos has the better to right to claim ownership over the subject
property.

RULING:

Yes. Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. There being no indication that they have adopted a different
property regime, the presumption is that their property relations is governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Likewise, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that
supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article
105 of the Family Code states:

Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage,
the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.

Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 1967 during the marriage of Juan
and Mercedes, it formed part of their conjugal partnership. It follows then that Juan and
Mercedes are the absolute owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively,
over the subject property.

Meanwhile, as in any other property relations between husband and wife, the conjugal
partnership is terminated upon the death of either of the spouses. In respondent Juan’s
Comment filed before the Court, the Verification which he executed on February 9, 2018
states that he is already a widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of the fact of
Mercedes’ death which inevitably results in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

In retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property then covered by TCT No. RT-
90746 (116229), Juan and Mercedes may validly exercise rights of ownership by
executing deeds which transfer title thereto such as, in this case, the Deed of Donation
dated February 15, 2011 in favor of their grandson, Kristoff.

With regard to Juan’s consent to the afore-stated donation, the RTC, however, found
that such was lacking since his signature therein was forged. Notably, the CA did not
overturn such finding, and in fact, no longer touched upon the issue of forgery. On the
other hand, it must be pointed out that the signature of Mercedes in the Deed of
Donation was never contested and is, therefore, deemed admitted.
Furthermore, Mercedes’ knowledge of and acquiescence to the subsequent sale of the
subject property to Spouses Carlos is evidenced by her signature appearing in the MOA
dated April 12, 2011 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 12, 2011. We are
also mindful of the fact that Spouses Carlos had already paid a valuable consideration in
the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the subject property before Juan’s adverse claim was
annotated on Kristoffs title. The said purchase and acquisition for valuable consideration
deserves a certain degree of legal protection.

Given the foregoing, the Court is disinclined to rule that the Deed of Donation is wholly
void ab initio and that the Spouses Carlos should be totally stripped of their right over
the subject property. In consonance with justice and equity, We deem it proper to
uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation dated February 15, 2011 but only to the
extent of Mercedes’ one- half share in the subject property.

Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one- half undivided
portion that Mercedes owned. The Deed of Donation insofar as it covered the remaining
one-half undivided portion of the subject property is null and void, Juan not having
consented to the donation of his undivided half.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Spouses Carlos’ right, as vendees in the subsequent sale
of the subject property, is confined only to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The
other undivided half still belongs to Juan. As owners pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in
question, either Spouses Carlos or Juan may ask for the partition of the lot and their
property rights shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. This disposition is in line with the
well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far
 as it is legally possible to do so—quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest.

Lastly, as a matter of fairness and in line with the principle that no person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, Kristoff should be liable to reimburse
Spouses Carlos of the amount corresponding to one-half of the purchase price of the
subject property.

5. Borlongan vs BDO (GR No. 217617, 5 April 2017)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/apr2017/gr_217617_2017.html

FACTS: Sometime in 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired
a real property located at No. 111, Sampaguita St., Valle Verde II, Pasig City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). In 2012, they went to
the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a
prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an
annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in
Civil Case (CC) No. 03-0713 pending before Branch 134 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Makati RTC).

Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records of CC No. 03-0713 and found out
that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for
sum of money against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations
obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita,
who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements totaling P13,500,000 to guarantee
the obligations of Tancho Corporation.

It appears from the records of CC No. 03-0713 that on July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC
issued an Order directing the service of summons to all the defendants at the business
address of Tancho Corporation provided by BDO: Fumakilla Compound, Amang
Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City (Fumakilla Compound).

Parenthetically, the records of CC No. 03-0713 show that respondent BDO already
foreclosed the Fumakilla Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following Tancho
Corporation’s failure to pay its obligation, and BDO already consolidated its ownership of
the property on November 16, 2001.

Understandably, on July 31, 2003, the process server filed an Officer’s Return stating
that summons remained unserved as the “defendants are no longer holding office at
[Fumakilla Compound].”

On October 27, 2003, after the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita and her
co-defendants, BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by publication. On October
28, 2003, the RTC granted the motion.

On August 10, 2004, BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment against the defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing on the
motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of the subject property. The Makati RTC
thereafter granted BDO’s motion and a Writ of Attachment was issued against the
defendants in CC No. 03-0713, effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of
BDO.
On December 20, 2005, BDO filed an ex-parte motion praying, among others, that the
summons and the complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject property. The
Makati RTC granted the motion. On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return stating
that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita “is no longer residing at the given
address and the said address is for ‘rent,’ as per information gathered from the security
guard on duty.”

On May 30, 2006, however, BDO filed a manifestation stating that it had complied with
the October 28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the publication of the alias
summons and the complaint in People’s Taliba on May 15, 2006.

Thereafter, upon BDO’s motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants in CC No. 03-
0713, including Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its evidence
ex-parte.

ISSUE:

A. WON THE SERVICE OF SUMMON THROUGH PUBLICATION IS PROPER.

B. WON THE DENIAL OF ISSUANCE OF TRO/WPI IS PROPER.

C. WON THE FILING OF INDEPENDENT ACTION IS PROPER.

HELD:

A. NO. As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons

cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may
be resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the
defendant’s “whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.

Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the summons on the defendants,
including petitioner Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound, i.e., at the property already
foreclosed, acquired, and possessed by the respondent bank as early as August 2001.
Immediately after this single attempt at personal service in July 2003, the respondent
bank moved in October 2003 for leave to serve the summons by publication (and not
even substituted service), which motion the RTC granted.

Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her
the summons before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible
to locate the residence of petitioner and her whereabouts.

It should be noted that the principal obligor in CC No. 03-0713 was Tancho Corporation
and petitioner Carmelita was impleaded only because she supposedly signed a surety
agreement as a director. As a juridical person, Tancho Corporation is required to file
mandatory corporate papers with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), such
as its General Information Sheet (GIS). In 1997 and 2000, the GIS filed by Tancho
Corporation with the SEC provided the names of its directors and their addresses. One of
these directors included petitioner Carmelita with her address listed at 41 Chicago St.,
Quezon City. The GIS of Tancho Corporation was readily available to the public including
the RTC’s process server and respondent bank.
Patently, it cannot be plausibly argued that it was impossible to find the petitioner and
personally serve her with summons. In like manner, it can hardly be stated that the
process server regularly performed his duty.

B. NO. Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate
court is the declaration of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC and its Decision
dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely confined to the prevention of the issuance of
the writ of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the subject property in
BDO’s name — the concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI.

Indeed, the petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was intended to
preserve the status quo ante, and not to pre-empt the appellate court’s decision on the
merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA
to deny her of this provisional remedy.

The appellate court’s error is readily apparent given the stark existence of the grounds
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On the first ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her
constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of her
property. No less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the thing in
litigation must be notified and given an opportunity to defendthat interest. Thus, as the
essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense, she must be properly
served the summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the
service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem that the Constitutional right of the
petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified has been disregarded by
the officers of the trial court.

At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a TRO
and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent bank
from continuing in the possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject
property, petitioner’s right to be afforded due process will unceasingly be violated.

It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by itself a

grave and irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.

Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and issued the TRO
and/or WPI posthaste to protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is duty-
bound to do.

C. YES. The availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision requires
only that that the claim is a third-party or a “stranger” to the case. The poser then is this:
 is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property was
executed on account of the other spouse’s debt, a “stranger” to the suit? In Buado v.
Court of Appeals, this Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it
must first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file an
independent separate action, distinct from the action in which the writ was issued.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property was attached on the
basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf of Tancho
Corporation. In our 2004 Decision in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated
that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is benefited when a spouse
enters into a contract of suretY.

Besides, BDO’s reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals (2003) is improper. In the
present case, Eliseo and his wife discovered the attachment of their conjugal property
only after the finality of the decision by the RTC Makati. There was, therefore, no
opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case before the RTC Makati which attached the
conjugal property, as a motion to intervene can only be filed “at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court.” This spells the whale of difference between the
case at bar and the earlier Spouses Ching. Unlike in the present case, the debtor in the
case cited by BDO was properly informed of the collection suit and his spouse had the
opportunity to question the attachment of their conjugal property before the court that
issued the levy on attachment, but simply refused to do so. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the
opportunity to question the attachment made by the RTC Makati in a separate and
independent action will be to, again, refuse him the due process of law before their
property is taken. As this Court is duty-bound to protect and enforce Constitutional
rights, this we cannot allow.

6. PNB vs Reyes (GR No. 212483, 5 Oct 2016)

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016octoberdecisions.php?id=864

FACTS:
Three parcels of land owned by spouses Lilia and Venancio Reyes were mortgaged to
Philippine National Bank to secure a loan. When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan
obligations, Philippine National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.

Venancio assailed the validity of the real estate mortgage and claimed that his wife
undertook the loan and the mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified
on the promissory notes and the mortgage. He averred that
since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal properties, the mortgage constituted over
them was void. The Trial Court ordered the annulment of the real estate mortgage and
directed Lilia to reimburse PNB.

Aggrieved, Philippine National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was denied. A
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

In this petition, the PNB insists that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of
the trial court. It argues that the real estate mortgage is valid, that the conjugal
partnership should be held liable for the loan, and that respondent Venancio C. Reyes,
Jr.’s cause of action should be deemed barred by laches.
 ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;

2. Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted
unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes

3. Whether respondent is guilty of laches and his claim is now barred by estoppel.

RULING:

1. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in its ruling. It committed no reversible error in
affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that the real estate mortgage over the
conjugal properties is void for want of consent from respondent. The Family Code is
clear: the written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary
before any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.

2. Yes, the conjugal partnership can be held liable. The lower courts may have declared
the mortgage void, but the principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.

The Regional Trial Court found that the loan was used as additional working capital for
respondent’s printing business. As held in Ayala Investment, since the loaned money is
used in the husband’s business, there is a presumption that it redounded to the benefit
of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership may be held liable for the loan amount.

3. No, the respondent is not guilty of laches. Laches does not apply where the delay is
within the period prescribed by law.

As found by the trial court, records show that upon learning about the mortgage,
respondent immediately informed the bank about his forged signature. He filed the
Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage against
petitioner within the prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property; and since
respondent filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate
Mortgage within the period of redemption prescribed by law, petitioner fails to convince
that respondent slept on his right.

7. Lavadia vs Luna (GR No. 171914, 23 July 2014)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_171914_2014.html

FACTS:

ATTY. LUNA married Eugenia but they eventually agreed to live apart and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. ATTY. LUNA later obtained a divorce
decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the
First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic
and on the same date, contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as
husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: LUPSICON where he
was the managing partner. LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased a condominium
unit bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married
to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned
by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be
25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office.
The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz.

Soledad filed a complaint against the heirs of ATTY. Luna with the RTC alleging that the
25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment were acquired during the existence of her
marriage with ATTY. LUNA through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA.

The RTC ruled that the condominium was acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole
industry and plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit. Plaintiff was declared to be the owner of the law books.

The CA denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage. It held that EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA
until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY.
LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x
x

MR was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage.

2. Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between
the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

1. No. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.

The SC held that the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.

Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both
Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12,
1997 terminated their marriage. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.

2. No. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court
approval.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement
prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the
Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in
a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

 (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall
be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation
has been granted.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall
apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498
to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired
during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership.

The petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof.

The SC affirmed the decision of the CA.

8. Pana vs Juanite (GR No. 164201, 10 Dec 2012)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/dec2012/gr_164201_2012.html

FACTS:
Efren Pana, his wife Melecia and another person were charged with murder before the RTC
of Surigao City. On 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of
death. The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the
heirs of the victim. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court
also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and damages with modification.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming
that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC
denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the petition.
Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with Melecia falls under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains; given that they were married prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
On the other hand, the heirs of Juanite Sr and Juanite Jr argued that the regime of absolute
community of property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since the transitory
provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired
rights are impaired, and that the property relation between the couple was changed when
the Family Code took effect in 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?

HOLDINGS:
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification. The RTC of Surigao City shall first ascertain that,
in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgement on the latter
accused for crime of murder, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered. Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on
his wife Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before this liquidation. Indeed, it states
that such indemnities “may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. “No prior liquidation
of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.”
Whereas, it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are
inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is
evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage. Clearly, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of marriage.
9. Dewara vs Lamela (GR No. 179010, 11 April 2011)
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/apr2011/gr_179010_2011.html
10. Fuentes vs Roca (GR No. 178902, 21 April 2010)
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_178902_2010.html
FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son,
Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare
the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It
expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his
estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.

Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If
Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would
become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his
trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was
issued in the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot.
Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months
afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.

The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario,
did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged.
They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified
that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted,
however,that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later. All the
same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario
and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the
sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s

sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?

2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale?

HELD:
It was forged
It did not prescribe
The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:

1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the signature was forged.

While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of
forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale
of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof
of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the
sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same
without his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right
to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights.

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 256.

(n)

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not
provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s
sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract
has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
 property without the other spouse’s written consent. But, although a void contract has
no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not
prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of
sale and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s
(his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an
action.

3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,

11. Inter Dimensional Realty vs Siochi (GR No. 169977, 18 March 2010)
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/mar2010/gr_169900_2010.html

Facts:

Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation against her husband
Alfredo Gozon.

Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties, Alfredo and Mario
entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of
18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial payment of the said price and he took the
possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was
dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in
the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody
is awarded to Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. for 18
million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in full payment.

Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific performance and
damages, annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and void for their
attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts, further alienating or
disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and
void, for the absence of written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the
undivided one-half share in the conjugal property of this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal
partnership without the consent of the other spouse, and share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership.
Held:

No,

The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.
Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property,
that other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And
the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in the net
profits of the conjugal properties.

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article.