CASE LIST ARTS 1-34 FAMILY CODE

ARTS 1-8

1. Tilar vs Tilar (GR No. 214529, 12 July 2017)

2. Perfecto vs Esidera (GR No. AM No. RTJ-15-2417, 22 July 2015)
3. Republic vs Albios (GR No. 198780, 16 Oct 2013)
4. Abbas vs Abbas (GR No. 183896, 30 Jan 2013)
5. OCA vs Tormis (AC No. 9920, 30 Aug 2016)
6. Navarro vs Domagtoy (AM No. MTJ-96-1088, 19 July 1996)

ART 9

7. Kho vs Republic (GR No. 187462, 1 June 2016)

8. Dayot vs Dayot (GR No. 175581, 28 March 2008)

ART 26

9. Morana vs Republic (GR No. 227605, 5 Dec 2019)

10. Sakai vs Republic (GR No. 224015, 23 July 2018)
11. OCA Circular No. 157-2022-A
12. Galapon vs Republic (GR No. 243722, 22 Jan 2020)

ARTS 27-34

13. Salgado vs Salgado (GR No. 204494, 27 July 2016)

CASE LIST ARTS 1-34 FAMILY CODE

ARTS 1-8

1. Tilar vs Tilar (GR No. 214529, 12 July 2017)

2. Perfecto vs Esidera (GR No. AM No. RTJ-15-2417, 22 July 2015)
3. Republic vs Albios (GR No. 198780, 16 Oct 2013)

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC
a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the
marriage was a marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship
and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state and complying with their marital
obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio
for lack of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within
the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally consented to enter into a real
and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and
valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in

consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability
to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage.
 Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

4. Abbas vs Abbas (GR No. 183896, 30 Jan 2013)

Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided
for in Article 4 of the Family Code.

Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the
Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by
Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also
is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a
document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him
that it was a marriage.

In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the
Family Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).

Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that
those marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in
exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.

Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and
testimonies to prove the existence of the said license.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

 5. OCA vs Tormis (AC No. 9920, 30 Aug 2016)

Facts:

The Case is a disbarment complaint, an offshoot to Court’s decision in the case Office of
Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al.

On July 3, 2007. Atty. Rulyn Garcia, Region 7, Judicial Supervisor led the judicial audit team
created by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to investigate branches 2, 3, 4, and 8
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of
marriages. OCA found respondent judges connived with court personnel who acted as
“fixers” and judges heedlessly kept solemnizing marriage despite irregularities in the
requirements provided under law. A Memorandum and Supplemental Report filed by Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaῆo dated August 29, 2007 was submitted with
the following details:

   Out of 643 marriage certificates, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34
of Family Code.
   Logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized
marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody

 An unusual number of marriage license obtained from the local civil registrars of
towns Barili and Liloan, Cebu

 There were marriages solemnized at 9AM with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.

Tormis together with Judge Edgemelo Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for
Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. Court LIFTED the
suspension of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages. Both judges moved
for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further investigation and to dismiss. Court
noted the Motion, AFFIRMED the relief they sought and allowed payment of judges’ salaries
and befits from July 9, 2007.

Office of the Court Administrator found Tormis guilty of:

1. Gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with

questionable documents

2. Failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid
3. Solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner

who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required

certificate from the embassy

4. Solemnizing a marriage with expired license

Tormis denied charges, on her comment:

1. claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator was an “entrapment.”
2. There was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date marriage
license was issued
 3. In view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of
regularity.

4. Asserted that she could not be blamed for assuming that affidavits were true since
judges are not handwriting experts

5. Claimed that Baguio-Manera’s affidavit was hearsay

6. Blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages

solemnized in her sala

Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator and noted the individual
liability of the judges:

1. Tormis solemnized 181 marriages from 2003 and 2007 based on marriage certificates
examined but monthly report showed that she solemnized 305 mariages from 2004 to
2007
2. It was only on July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track of
marriages

3. Tormis solemnized 37 marriages with incomplete or missing documents

4. Tormis solemnized 13 marriages despite the questionable character of the

validity of required documents particularly the marriage license

5. Tormis solemnized 47 marriages under Article 34 of Family Code with doubtful

authenticity on marriage requirements due to circumstances of

cohabitation of parties and given address of parties

Court ruled that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municiapl Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross
ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled
corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service...

The Case against respondent including sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela
Cerna were referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of disbarment
proceedings:

   Plaza claimed to be Tormis’ personal aide since 2002; claimed that after Tormis’
suspension in 2006, she was directed to find couples who wanted to get married and
direct them to Branch 4 and find Cabaῆes or “Meloy.”
   Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as Tormis’ personal aide; claimed that
during investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis’ children to bring all marriage
certificates from her office to her house

Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the disbarment case against respondent
be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. OBC ruled that the records show that
all administrative sanctions against former Judge TOrmis were all for simple gross
 inefficiency, neglect of duties, and ignorance of the law, neither of which held for
gross misconduct that would tend to affect her standing as a member of the Bar.

Issue/s:

Whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in solemnization of

marriages, where she was found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law constitute gross misconduct warranting her disbarment?

Whether respondent’s long line of administrative sanctions should affect her standing
as a member of the bar?

Decision:

Although Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance of Plaza and Dela
Cerna, disbarment case cannot be dismissed solely based on this. Affidavits are
commonly recognized as hearsay evidence since it is not prepared by the affiants but
by another person in writing the statements, so it is generally rejected unless the
affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify.

Despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court ruled (in Judge NEcessario, et.
Al.) that the findings of the judicial audit team had sufficient basis, and the
administrative case against respondent should likewise be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against her.

Respondent violated particular canons of Judicial Ethics and breached CANON 1 and
CANON 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01.- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct

CANON 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law

Respondent’s act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law ad

jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross misconduct. Repetitiveness of her act shows her clear
intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer’s oath, which mandates lawyers to
support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension
or disbarment is warranted (Rule 138, Section 27).

A judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first
to abide by the law and weave an example for the other to follow. Respondent’s conduct has
fallen short of the strict standards required by the legal profession. Her repeated failure to live
up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court renders her unfit to be a member of
the bar.

Wherefore respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice
of law and her name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
6. Navarro vs Domagtoy (AM No. MTJ-96-1088, 19 July 1996)
FACTS:

On October 27, 1994, the Judge Dumagtoy allegedly performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s
court’s jurisdiction. Such wedding was solemnized at the respondent’s residence in
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondent’s jurisdictional area of Sta.
Monica Burgos.

For his defense, Dumagtoy maintained that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo
and

Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states
that “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court’s jurisdiction.”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within
the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction.

HELD:

NO. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the
solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court’s jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of
the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death,
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
ART 9

7. Kho vs Republic (GR No. 187462, 1 June 2016)

FACTS

Petitioner Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica) on the ground that
their marriage was solemnized without the requisite marriage license. According to Raquel,
his parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon to arrange and prepare whatever necessary
papers required for the marriage of Raquel and Veronica. The couple thereafter exchanged
vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he never went to the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to
apply for a marriage license and had not seen any documents in connection thereto. Thus,
their marriage is void ab initio. Raquel presented as evidence a Certification from the LCR
that there is neither record nor copy of the marriage license issued to Raquel and Veronica.
Veronica opposed Raquel’s allegations by claiming that their marriage was celebrated with a
marriage license, though she cannot present any evidence to support her claim.

The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently
established the absence of the requisite marriage license when his marriage to Veronica
took place. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that
there is a presumption a marriage license was issued in the absence of any indication in the
marriage certificate on the contrary.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the applicable law
in the present case, provides that a marriage license is one of the requisites to be complied
with in order for a marriage to be validly solemnized, except for some instances of marriages
of exceptional character. Now, for a marriage to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that its absence must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage was issued to the parties.

In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to show
that there was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Raquel
was able to present a Certification issued by the LCR attesting that neither a record nor a
copy of any marriage license was ever issued in favor of Raquel and Veronica. Thus, on the
basis of such certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of Raquel and Veronica has
been overcome and it becomes the burden of Veronica to prove that their marriage is valid
as it is she who alleges such validity.
8. Dayot vs Dayot (GR No. 175581, 28 March 2008)
FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity
and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On
June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and
that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the
foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of
valid marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper
because they started living together five months before the celebration of their marriage.
That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No
license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each
other… “ it means that a five years period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.
It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
ART 26

9. Morana vs Republic (GR No. 227605, 5 Dec 2019)

10. Sakai vs Republic (GR No. 224015, 23 July 2018)
FACTS:

Petitioner Stephen Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After 2 years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013,
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. In its
Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce
between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. On November 25, 2015,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

In an Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and
recalled and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of
the following requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. This is
because the divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties,
and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce
herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the second requisite for the application of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not present because the petitioner gave
consent to the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband.

RULING:

Yes. In Republic v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the
application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code which states that “where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.”

We observed that to interpret the word “obtained” to mean that the divorce proceeding
must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the
legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that
is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is
at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.

Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that
despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if
it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the
exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in
Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.

Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner’s Petition for
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines
before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof.
Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national
law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court applies.

Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the instant case, the OSG does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering
the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law
on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
11. OCA Circular No. 157-2022-A
12. Galapon vs Republic (GR No. 243722, 22 Jan 2020)
Facts:
Cynthia Galapon (Cynthia) married Noh Shik Park (Park), a South Korean national. They got
married in the city of Manila. However, the marriage turned sour and they filed for a divorce
agreement in South Korea which was mutually agreed upon by the parties. The Cheongju
local court in South Korea confirmed the divorce decree. Thus, Cynthia filed for recognition
of foreign divorce decree in the Philippines which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) approved,
thus the case was set for hearing.

It was Abigail Galapon (Abigail), the sister of Cynthia who testified in court. Abigail identified
and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the contents thereof and her signature and
averred that Cynthia could not personally testify because the latter’s Korean visa expired
upon her divorce with Park. It was, however, made clear that Abigail has personal
knowledge of the facts alleged in the petition and claimed that Park intended to marry his
former girlfriend, and Cynthia was forced to agree with the divorce because Park made a
threat to her life.

The RTC granted the petition which was however opposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the opposition on the grounds that the
venue was improper and that the petition could not be given due course as it was not the
foreign spouse who obtained such decree.

Issue: Whether the Court of appeals erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree
obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals is incorrect. Under Article 26 of the family code “All marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38Where a marriage between a Filipino Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

In the recent case of Manalo the Court extended the scope [of] Article 26 (2) and removed
the distinction between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instances it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

Pursuant to the majority in the Manalo case, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where
the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino
and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Hence, the divorce
decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia’s conformity, falls within the scope of
Article 26 (2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.
ARTS 27-34

13. Salgado vs Salgado (GR No. 204494, 27 July 2016)

FACTS:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision and the of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No.
69611.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-
Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on
December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. During
his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan,
Metro Manila. According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him
and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without
his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale in
favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties.10 When
Severina died on September 21, 2002, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself
as Severina's sole heir. Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of
his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of
Severina. Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother
with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which
they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement executed
in November 1980. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name
only and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband. After the
termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA),
married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left under the
guardianship and custody of Severina. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a
Certificate of No Record of Marriage (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity
of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination
that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. Luis had also
admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. The
logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned
by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to
dispose of, without the conformity of Luis. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding
that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage contract,
being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is
conclusive as to the fact of marriage. The trial court thus declared that the properties
covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be disposed
of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the marriage is valid even without the marriage license falling under
the exceptions;
2) who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage
license?

3) whether or not the properties subject of the Deed of Sale were considered conjugal
which cannot be disposed of by Severina without he consent of hher husband/partition
agreement valid
RULING:

1) The Court held that Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the
Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966. A valid
marriage license is a

requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3). The marriage is not of an exceptional character. A cursory examination of the
marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was
indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the
reason therefor. Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no
longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. The reference
to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public
document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The foregoing provision pertains to a
religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties
to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law
(civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. Applied to the
present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior
to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing
on the records.
2) Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to
Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it
is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time
of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This
presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which
on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

3) As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each
other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the
beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property
relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under this property
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co- owned by Luis and
Severina. As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
"partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x."
The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even
without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution
of the Partition Agreement.