CASE LIST ARTS 35-54

ART 36

1. Castillo vs Castillo (GR No. 189607, 18 April 2016)

2. Santiago vs People (GR No. 200233, 15 July 2015)
3. Tenebro vs CA (GR No. 150758, 18 Feb 2004)
4. Dytianquin vs Dytianquin (GR No. 234462, 7 Dec 2020)
5. Gantan vs Gantan (GR No. 225193, 14 Oct 2020)
6. Republic vs Calingo (GR No. 212717, 11 March 2020)
7. Tan-Andal vs Andal (GR No. 196359, 11 May 2021)
8. Santiago vs Santiago (GR No. 241144, 26 June 2019)

ART 37-38

9. Republic vs Albios (GR No. 198780, 16 Oct 2013)

ART 39-40

10. De Guzman vs People (GR No. 224742, 7 Aug 2019)

11. De Castro vs De Castro (GR No. 160172, 13 Feb 2008)

ART 41-43

12. Republic vs Fenol (GR No. 212726, 10 June 2020)

13. Republic vs Quinonez (GR No. 237412, 6 Jan 2020)
14. Matias vs Republic (GR No. 230751, 25 April 2018)

ART 45-47

15. Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy (GR No. L-53703, 19 Aug 1986)

16. Almelor vs RTC Las Pinas (GR No. 179620, 26 Aug 2008)
17. Anaya vs Palaroan (GR No. L-27930, 26 Nov 1970)
18. Hernandez vs CA (GR No. 126010, 8 Dec 1999)
CASE LIST ARTS 35-54

ART 36

1. Castillo vs Castillo (GR No. 189607, 18 April 2016)

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).

On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to
Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista
was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a
member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6
January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The
lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity
and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as
no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, RTC also said
that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to
Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the
parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the
Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED.

The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage
only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Ratio:

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the
law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles
80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph), 85 and 86.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways:
1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a
voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court;
2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation;
3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage
cannot be collaterally attacked;
4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children
by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza,
People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision
on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the
nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A
second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
considered bigamous and void.
2. Santiago vs People (GR No. 200233, 15 July 2015)
3. Tenebro vs CA (GR No. 150758, 18 Feb 2004)
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact
there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has
been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for
bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second
marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration
as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a
void marriage on account of psychological incapacity—void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. The complete
nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation on the ruling that
bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted
before th judicial declaration of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of
marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity
however, being a mental state may not be so readily evident

c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void

4. Dytianquin vs Dytianquin (GR No. 234462, 7 Dec 2020)
5. Gantan vs Gantan (GR No. 225193, 14 Oct 2020)

6. Republic vs Calingo (GR No. 212717, 11 March 2020)

7. Tan-Andal vs Andal (GR No. 196359, 11 May 2021)

FACTS:
In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. They were blessed with
one child. However, even before their marriage, Rosanna already observed Mario to be
extremely irritable and moody. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be
emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna
later learned that Mario was a drug addict. Due to his erratic behavior, Rosanna caused
Mario to be confined in a drug rehab center twice. Mario’s irresponsibility even caused the
closure of their family business. Mario also exposed their daughter to his drug use. In
December 2000, fed up with Mario, Rosanna chose to live separately from him. In August
2003, Rosanna filed a petition to have her marriage with Mario be declared void on the
ground that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.

To prove her case, she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing
Rosanna, Rosanna’s daughter, and Rosanna’s sister, concluded that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not
interview Mario as the latter, despite invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr.
Garcia found Mario to be suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder.

In May 2007, the trial court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that
Rosanna was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court
on the ground that the findings of Dr. Garcia was unscientific and unreliable because she
diagnosed Mario without interviewing him.

On appeal, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to revisit the Molina Guidelines and the
other nullity cases decided by the Supreme Court after Molina.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void.

HELD: Yes. Dr. Garcia’s expert testimony is given due weight. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court
declared, among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert testimony is NOT a
requirement.

Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in determining the existence of
psychological incapacity:

1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear
and convincing evidence which is more than preponderant evidence (ordinary civil cases)
but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (criminal cases). This is because marriage is
presumed valid and in this jurisdiction, a presumption can only be rebutted with clear and
convincing evidence.

2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that

must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s
personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more
important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of
personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in
the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that
they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner.
Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic
cause. It is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a serious
or dangerous illness BUT that “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere
“refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will.”

5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

6. Essential marital obligations are not limited to those between spouses. Hence, those
covered by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

7. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the
Philippines has persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts. Canonical
decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical
decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage, but ultimately,
the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.

SUMMARY: Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a

lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations
due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically
identified; hence, expert opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the
psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that
was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present
clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that in voiding ill-equipped marriages, courts are not
really violating the inviolability of marriage as a social institution which is enshrined in no
less than the Constitution. Courts should not hesitate to declare such marriages void solely
for the sake of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing so destroyed the sanctity
afforded to marriage. In declaring ill-equipped marriages as void ab initio, the courts really
assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong.
8. Santiago vs Santiago (GR No. 241144, 26 June 2019)
Facts:
The RTC and the Court of Appeals, in declaring the marriage between Juanita and James Paul
void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code, ruled that
James’s Dependent Personality Disorder, as stated in the report and testimony of clinical
psychologist Ms. Shiela Marie O. Montefalcon rendered him incapable of performing his
essential obligations on marriage, characterised by a) difficulty in making everyday decisions
without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own
mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of
support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-
confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his own
mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to substance use and abuse.

Juanita appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be annulled on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it bears stressing that the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, already ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the root cause or juridical
antecedence of petitioner’s alleged NPD. Finding no cogent reason to disturb the same, the
resolution of this case shall, thus, revolve on whether or not, on the other hand,
respondent’s psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD, was proven.

Jurisprudence states that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in
our Constitution and statutory laws; hence, any doubts attending the same are to be
resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of
proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. The policy of the
Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.

Under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended,psychological incapacity is a valid ground

to nullify a marriage. However, in deference to the State’s policy on marriage, psychological
incapacity does not merely pertain to any psychological condition; otherwise, it would be
fairly easy to circumvent our laws on marriage so much so that we would be practically
condoning a legal subterfuge for divorce.

According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the most serious cases
of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help
and support.
In this accord, psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that – contrary to the rulings of the courts
a quo – the totality of evidence presented failed to sufficiently establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity based on his DPD.

In this case, respondent relied heavily on the testimony of and psychological examination by
the clinical psychologist, Ms. Montefalcon, to establish his psychological incapacity. In her
report, she enumerated several clinical features indicative of respondent’s DPD, to wit: (a)
difficulty in making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and
reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement
with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects
on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive
dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e)
inclination to substance use and abuse. However, the report leaves much to be desired as it
did not even identify specific actions or incidents that could amply demonstrate his alleged
psychological incapacity. As the petitioner aptly points out, “[i]n the [p]sychological [r]eport,
there is nothing in [respondent’s] acts that is indicative of his ‘chronic condition in which he
depends too much on others to meet his emotional and physical needs.’ In fact, the report
failed to show ‘who’ are those other that [respondent] depended [on] too much x x x.”Also,
as petitioner emphasizes, respondent’s alleged DPD appears to be even contrary to his
personality since the report actually states, among others, that respondent’s “common
capacities and strengths” are “being friendly, energetic, resourceful, and having negotiating
skills.”Moreover, the report states that respondent “is best in situations that need sound
common sense and practical ability with things [as] he relies on his ability to improvise
instead of preparing in advance.”

More importantly, the link between respondent’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity
was not established. Even if it is assumed that respondent truly had difficulties in making
everyday decisions without excessive advice or reassurance coming from other people, such
as petitioner and his own mother, the report fails to prove that the said difficulties were
tantamount to serious psychological disorder that would render him incapable of
performing the essential marital obligations. As case law holds, “[i]n determining the
existence of psychological incapacity, a clear and understandable causation between the
party’s condition and the party’s inability to perform the essential marital covenants must be
shown. A psychological report that is essentially comprised of mere platitudes, however
speckled with technical jargon, would not cut the marriage tie.”

Similarly, Ms. Montefalcon’s report merely provided general characterizations of the parties’
illnesses as deeply-rooted, grave, and incurable. In her report, she stated that the root cause
of the parties’ flawed personality patterns was attributable to genetic factors and/or
dysfunctional factors involved in their childhood milieu. She also declared that their illnesses
were grave, since the parties were not able to carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
 marriage and family, and incurable, as they have no psychological insight that they have
character problems. However, no evidence was presented to substantiate these conclusions.
In fact, as petitioner demonstrates, the report seems to contradict the foregoing
characterizations since it was observed that respondent “was awaken and decided x x x to fix
his life” and that “[h]e admitted that he is weak but he was able to resist drugs and [is now]
helping his mother run their business.” As such, it cannot be concluded that respondent’s
DPD is imbued with the required quality of permanence or incurability.

If anything, Ms. Montefalcon’s evaluation only supports the allegations regarding

respondent’s infidelity, immaturity, and dependence on his mother and wife, which traits do
not, however, rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that would justify the
nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, while respondent’s purported womanizing
caused the couple’s frequent fights, such was not established to be caused by a
psychological illness. In fact, records reveal that when petitioner discovered respondent’s
affair for the first time, the latter immediately severed it. They would also eventually
reconcile and live together after their fights. Thus, respondent’s infidelity does not appear to
be a symptom of a grave and permanent psychological disorder that renders him incapable
of performing his spousal obligations. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that sexual
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage.

In fine, for failing to sufficiently prove the existence of respondent’s psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code, the petition is granted. The
contrary rulings of the courts a quo are hence, reversed and set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 6, 2018 and the Resolution
dated August 1, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109683 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.

ART 37-38

9. Republic vs Albios (GR No. 198780, 16 Oct 2013)

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a
petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the
OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC
decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in
jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
ART 39-40

10. De Guzman vs People (GR No. 224742, 7 Aug 2019)

11. De Castro vs De Castro (GR No. 160172, 13 Feb 2008)
Case Doctrines:

● The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. The Court may pass upon the
validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

● Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a

marriage an absolute nullity.

● The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage.

Facts:

Reinel and Annabelle applied for a marriage license. However, when they went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. In order to push
through with the wedding despite of absence of marriage license, they executed an affidavit
stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. They
got married on the same day before a judge. After the ceremony, however, they did not live
together as husband and wife. In 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a daughter. In 1998,
Annabelle filed a complaint for support against Reinel. In his Answer, Reinel claimed that his
marriage with Annabelle is void ab initio because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake
as they never cohabited with each other five years before their marriage. The trial court
ruled that the marriage is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support.

Issues:

1. Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between Reinel and Annabelle in an action for support

2. Is the marriage between the parties valid?

3. Whether the child is the daughter of Reinel.

Held:

1. The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between Reinel
and Annabelle. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Other than for
purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

2. No. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The false affidavit which Reinel and
Annabelle executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever;
it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

3. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists Reinel as the father. In addition, Reinel, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of Annabelle, admitted that he is the
father of the child. Reinel also admitted in court that as a result of their sexual dalliances,
Annabelle became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage.
ART 41-43

12. Republic vs Fenol (GR No. 212726, 10 June 2020)

13. Republic vs Quinonez (GR No. 237412, 6 Jan 2020)
14. Matias vs Republic (GR No. 230751, 25 April 2018)
ART 45-47

15. Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy (GR No. L-53703, 19 Aug 1986)

FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Weigel
on the ground that the latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion.

Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because she and Eduardo were forced to
enter said marital union. She likewise alleged that Eduardo was married to someone else.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:

Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is
void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on Lilia's prior marriage for then
such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before she can remarry.
Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.

16. Almelor vs RTC Las Pinas (GR No. 179620, 26 Aug 2008)
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida)
were married on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both
medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11)
years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect
husband and father but this was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described
Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent
fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish
affection Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from
her his homosexuality. She caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting
his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in
his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain
Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took
her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to
their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-
face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their
professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36,
but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due
to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
 HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the
allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s
peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and
proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.

17. Anaya vs Palaroan (GR No. L-27930, 26 Nov 1970)

Facts:

After one month of marriage, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage against Aurora Anaya on the ground that his consent was obtained through force
and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim.
While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged
that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close
relative of his.

Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages, alleging that the non-
divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
Fernando denied the allegation. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that
Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Aurora
appealed.

Issue:

Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another

woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

Held:

No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel
having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law
does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it
agrees with the rule or not.

18. Hernandez vs CA (GR No. 126010, 8 Dec 1999)

FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita
was Marcio’s teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio.
They later on became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita
supported the family as her husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first
few years of their marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-
marital relation with another student who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he
asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and
child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude
worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme
promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent
contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a
heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old.
Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and
hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition
seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations

HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of

marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of
psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the
time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the “borderline between
a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.