CASE LIST ARTS 19-36 PFR

Art. 19

1. Banaria vs Banaria (GR No. 217806, 28 July 2020)

Facts:

The action for damages of respondents stemmed from the alleged bad faith, malice, and
deliberate failure of Adelaida to keep her word and honor her promise to bring Pascasio to
his 90th birthday celebration. Such special event was prepared by the respondents and the
non-appearance of Pascasio during the event allegedly caused loss and injury to the
respondents.

Respondents alleged that the planning of the event started as early as February 2003 or a
year before the planned 90th birthday celebration. Respondents were in continuous contact
with Adelaida to remind her of the upcoming event. Adelaida, for her part, confirmed
Pascasio’s attendance during the event although it coincides with the death anniversary of
Adelaida’s mother. However, much to the dismay of the Banaria siblings as well as their
guests, Pascasio was nowhere to be found in his 90th birthday celebration. Respondents
continuously called Adelaida but they were not able to contact her.

Marcelino, Pascasio’s brother, told the other respondents that Pascasio and Adelaida were
at their residence in Quezon City. Respondents went to the said place to ask Adelaida her
reason why Pascasio was not able to attend the birthday celebration. Adelaida reasoned that
Pascasio did not want to go to the party. When asked why Adelaida broke her commitment
to bring Pascasio to the party, Adelaida uttered the words, “I am the wife.”

Thus, the Complaint for Damages filed by respondents against Adelaida. In response,
Adelaida rebutted the allegations of the respondents by saying that she was not privy to the
respondents’ planned birthday celebration for Pascasio.

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The RTC rendered its Decision, which ordered petitioner to pay the respondents’ travel
expenses, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA. However, it was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code

Ruling:

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the
“abuse of right principle.” The legal consequence should anyone violate this fundamental
provision is found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. The correlation between the two
provisions are showed in the case of GF EQUITY, Inc. v. Valenzona, to wit:
 Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of
conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended as a mere declaration of
principle, the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to
certain rules, e.g., that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly
or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he
opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another.

Consequently, when Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Article 20
and 21 of the New Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law.

For starters, there is no question that as legal wife and guardian of Pascasio, who is
physically and mentally infirm, Adelaida has the principal and overriding decision when it
comes to the affairs of her husband including the celebration of the latter’s 90th birthday.

However, it must be noted Adelaida’s right, as with any rights, cannot be exercised without
limitation. The exercise of this right must conform to the exacting standards of conduct
enunciated in Article 19. Adelaida was clearly remiss in this aspect.

Glaring is the fact that long before the scheduled date of Pascasio’s 90th birthday
celebration, Adelaida was already informed about the event. As early as February 2003 or a
year before the scheduled event, Adelaida was already reminded of the event by the
respondents to which she confirmed Pascasio’s attendance. Even though Adelaida alleges
that she was not privy to any birthday celebration for Pascasio, the fact remains that she was
continuously informed and reminded about the scheduled event.

All in all, the foregoing shows that Adelaida intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to the
birthday celebration prepared by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of the Civil Code
on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to observe good faith in the exercise of her
right as the wife of Pascasio caused loss and injury on the part of the respondents, for which
they must be compensated by way of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

2. Tocoms Ph vs Philips Electronics (GR No. 214046, 5 Feb 2020)

FACTS:

Tocoms was the distributor of Philips Singapore and its agent in the Philippines, PELI, by
virtue of a Distributorship Agreement that was renewed annually from 2001 to 2012.
Tocoms successfully introduced and established Philips Domestic Appliance to the Philippine
market from 2001 to 2008, and consistently delivered and even surpassed its annual sales
targets. Before the end of 2012, Tocoms revealed to Philips representatives its marketing
plans for the year and had complied with all the requirements of Philips in preparation for
the renewal of the Distributorship Agreement. However, in January 2013, without giving
Tocoms sufficient notice of a change of the distributorship, PELI did not renew the
Agreement, as it already contracted with a new distributor, Fabriano, as early as December
2012.

Tocoms found that PELI has been selling to Fabriano the products subject of the Distribution
Agreement at a much lower price, to the great prejudice of Tocoms. Fabriano prodded
Western Marketing, one of Tocoms’ strongest clients, to return its existing inventory
amounting to P5 million with a promise to deliver the same at a much lower price. PELI
demanded to buy-back all inventory that remain in possession of Tocoms under
unreasonable, unfair and one-sided terms. It even coerced Tocoms into accepting the terms
by recalling the Import Commodity Clearance (ICC) stickers that allow the selling of the items
to the public. Tocoms sent a buy-back counter-offer which PELI refused to heed.

Hence, this suit for damages and preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Tocoms, averring
that PELI violated its rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code on
account of PELI’s acts that are clearly tainted with bad faith, in view of the significant
investments made by Tocoms during the effectivity of the Distribution Agreement and in the
run-up to the expiration thereof in 2012. PELI filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by
the RTC. On appeal, the CA granted PELI’s petition. It held that Tocoms has no cause of
action because its essential thrust was a prayer for damages, resulting from the non-renewal
of the Distributorship Agreement, that was nonexclusive and already expired.

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ISSUE:

Did the non-renewal of the Distributorship Agreement constitute a violation of Article 19 of

the New Civil Code?

RULING:

Yes.

[T]he principle [of abuse of rights] may be invoked if it is proven that a right or duty was
exercised in bad faith, regardless of whether it was for the sole intent of injuring another.
Thus, it is the absence of good faith which is essential for the application of this principle.

The foregoing discussion highlights bad faith as the crucial element to a violation of Article
19. The mala fide exercise of a legal right in accordance with Article 19 is penalized by Article
21, under which “[a]ny person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.” Stated differently, Article 19 imposes upon all persons exercising their legal rights
the duty to act with justice, give everyone his due, and to observe honesty and good faith.
Failure to discharge such duties is compensable under Article 20 if the act is “contrary to
law”; and under Article 21 if the act is legal but “contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy.”
In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the test is, whether or not, admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the court may
validly grant the relief prayed for in the complaint. x x x , if the allegations in Tocoms’
complaint are hypothetically admitted, these acts constitute bad faith on the part of
respondent PELI in the exercise of its rights under the Distributorship Agreement, in
violation of Article 19, and as punished by Article 21. Consequently, the court may validly
award damages in favor of Tocoms as prayed for in its Complaint. While it has submitted
voluminous documents to show that its actions were justified by the terms of the
Distributorship Agreement, PELI has not had the opportunity to prove that the foregoing
acts mentioned in the Complaint were indeed made without malice and bad faith, since it
was not even able to file an answer to Tocoms’ complaint. x x x Bad faith under the law
cannot be presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. As such, the
case must be reinstated so that PELI may once and for all prove its bona fides in its dealings
with Tocoms, in connection with the expiration of their Distribution Agreement.
3. Chevron vs Mendoza (GR No. 211533, 19 June 2019)
Art. 20

4. Lomarda vs Fudalan (GR No. 246012, 17 June 2020)

5. Baksh vs CA (GR No. 97336, 19 Feb 1993)

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Facts:

Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of good moral character and
reputation, duly respected in her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987, against
Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen, and an exchange student taking up a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. The complaint for damages is
due to Baksh’s violation of their agreement to get married.

Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou and proposed to marry her. She
accepted his love on the condition that they will get married. They agreed to get married at
 the end of the semester, which was October of that year. They also visited Marilou’s
parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.

Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live with him in Guilig, Dagupan City. It
should be noted that she was a virgin before she lived with him and not a woman of loose
morals. A few weeks after she begun living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, which
result to injuries. A confrontation with the barangay captain of Guilig ensued and Gashem
repudiated their marriage agreement and said that he is already married to a girl in Bacolod
City.

On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of the New Civil Code in its decision
favoring Marilou Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay PhP 20,000 moral damges, PhP
3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP 2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.

Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court seeking for the review of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said decision which was also
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Held:

The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, the Court rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our laws. It was
evident from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry
Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”

In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith and honest motive
when he proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou Gonzales. He was merely
motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”

The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Aticle 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise to marry, but due the
fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that wilfully caused injury to the honor and
reputation of the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the morals, good
customs or public policy.

6. Bunag vs CA (GR No. 101749, 10 July 1992)

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her to take their merienda at
the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which plaintiff obliged. But instead to Aristocrat he
brought plaintiff to a motel or hotel where he raped her. Later that evening, defendant
brought plaintiff to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days.
 Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. October 1,
1973 Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.

Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go
back to her parents. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against her by defendants-appellants. Petitioner filed a
complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against petitioner, but absolved his father.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure to comply with the promise of marriage of the defendant
considered contrary to morals, good custom or public policy.

Held:

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff
has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

7. Albenson Ent vs CA (GR No. 88694, 11 Jan 1993)

Doctrine:

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.

FACTS:

Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries the mild

steel plates which the latter ordered. As for payment, Albenson was given a check with a
certain amount on it however, the check was dishonored. Later on, it was discovered that
the president of Guaranteed was registered to “Eugenio S. Baltao.” Albenson, made a
demand upon respondent to replace the dishonored check. However, respondent, denied
that he issued the check and contended that Guaranteed was no longer operative. Albenson
filed a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. It was
then discovered that the said private respondent has a namesake which is his son Eugenio
Baltao III, who manages the E.L. Woodworks. Later on, Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed an
information against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 wherein he
claimed that he had given the respondent an opportunity to submit his evidence, but the
latter failed to do so. However, the respondent claimed ignorance on the complaint against
him and that he never had any dealings with Albenson, so the said check was not issued by
him.

Issue

Whether or not the private respondent’s cause of action is one based on malicious
prosecution and not one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code?
 No, there was no malicious prosecution on the part of the petitioners. Pursuant to Article 19
of the Civil Code, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. In the
case at bar, it is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Consequently, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for
damages. No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of
abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution.

Art. 22

8. Madera vs COA (GR No. 244128, 8 Sep 2020)

 9. De Guzman vs COA (GR No. 245274, 13 Oct 2020)

Art. 24

10. Regala vs Manila Hotel (GR No. 204684, 5 Oct 2020)

The Labor Code of the Philippines allows employment for a certain definite period. Among
these are casual, seasonal and project employees. These employees are not regular
employees, but they are entitled to basic labor benefits and should be accorded the
minimum labor standards. This is a balancing act between the employers, who need
workforce for a given time, and the laborers who need work. Because of the nature of
employment, the law sets a strict standard and stringent requirements for the validity of
these so-called “fixed-term contracts” in order to avoid this scheme being utilized to
circumvent labor laws and to prevent a worker from being “regularized” and attaining
security of tenure.

In the case of Allan Regala vs. Manila Hotel Corporation, G.R. No. 204684 (05 October 2020),
the petitioner, Allan Regala, was hired, according to respondent Manila Hotel Corporation,
as a freelance waiter to augment the hotel’s workforce. Regala was hired sometime in
February 2000 and was made to sign so-called “Service Agreements” only in March 2000.
Sometime in December of 2009, his usual 5-day workweek was reduced to 2 days a week.
Hence, Regala filed a case for constructive dismissal arguing he is a regular employee. Manila
Hotel claims that Regala is not a regular employee but a “fixed-term employee” covered by a
valid Service Agreements. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Regala’s complaint which was
reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (“NLRC”). On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the NLRC.

There were both procedural and substantive issues when the case reached the Supreme
Court. On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court disallowed Manila Hotel to belatedly
present Daily Time Record (DTRs) and change theory of the case. Manila Hotel attempted to
submit these DTRs to argue that he was not dismissed since he continued with his duties
despite filing a case. The Court held that it cannot change theory without impairing Regala’s
right to due process who cannot anymore submit rebuttal evidence. In this case, the
Supreme Court also held that exercising equity, it can examine the facts and evidence if
there are conflicting findings by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals.

On the substantive matter, the Supreme Court held that Regala is a regular employee under
the two (2) categories of a regular employee under the Labor Code, i.e. (a) those who are
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of the employer; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service,
whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The
Supreme Court held that “being part of the hotel and food industry, MHC, as a service-
oriented business enterprise depends largely on its manpower complement to carry out or
perform services relating to food and beverage operations, event planning and hospitality.
As such, it is essential, if at all necessary, that it retains its employ waiting staff, such as
Regala, specifically tasked to attend to its guests at its various dining establishments.” The
Court also added that “the fact alone that Regala was allowed to work for MHC on several
occasions for several years under various Service Agreements is indicative of the regularity
and necessity of his functions to its business.”

On the issue of the validity of the fixed-term agreements, in this case Service Agreements,
the Supreme Court held that “the decisive determinant in term employment should not be
the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain upon by the
parties for the commencement and termination of their employment status. The Court held
that “fixed-term employment contract which otherwise fails to specify the date of effectivity
and the date of expiration of an employee’s engagement cannot, by virtue of jurisprudential
pronouncement, be regarded as such despite its nomenclature or classification given by the
parties.” In this case, the Court noted that the Service Agreements signed by Regala only
bore the dates when he was engaged to work but bereft of the dates of effectivity and
expiration.

Finally, the Court restated the requirements of a valid fixed-term employment: 1) The fixed
period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without
any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or; and 2) it satisfactorily appears that
the employer and the employee dealt with ach other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. In this case, the Court held that
these Service Agreements were deemed as “contract of adhesion”. Regala and the hotel
were not on equal footing and the former had no power to negotiate the same. It was a
“take-it-or-leave-it” contract. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals and ruled in favor of Regala.
Art 25

11. Hing vs Choachuy (GR No. 179736, 26 June 2013)

FACTS:
Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a
case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence
without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their building. The court denied
the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences for the case, on June 2005,
Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their
employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a
case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC
issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to
remove the two video surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s
then raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s
violated the Hing’s right to privacy.

HELD:

Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access.

12. Manaloto vs Veloso (GR No. 171365, 6 Oct 2010)

Facts:
This case stems from an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda Manaloto et al., who are
the lessors to of residential house, which was leased to respondent Ismael Veloso III at the
rate of Php17,000 per month. The action for unlawful detainer was instituted because of
Veloso’s failure to pay the monthly rent from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite
the petitioner’s repeated demands. Veloso, however, denied the nonpayment of rentals,
alleging that he made advance payments when he spent Php825,000 for the repairs done on
the leased property.

While the case was still on appeal, the petitioner lessors published the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, who ruled in favor of the lessors. Copies of the decision were
distributed to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, which caused Veloso to be the talk of
the town and his good name to be greatly damaged.

Issue:
Were the petitioners correct in publishing the MeTC’s decision while the case was still on
appeal?

Ruling:
No. The petitioners are obliged to respect the respondent’s good name even though they
are opposing parties in a detainer case. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such
principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also expected to
 respect Veloso’s dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind under Article 26 of the Civil
Code.

Art 27

13. Tuzon vs CA (GR No. 90107, 21 Aug 1992)

14. Nessia vs Fermin (GR No. 102918, 30 March 1993)

Art 28

15. CCBPI vs Bernardo (GR No. 190667, 7 Nov 2016)

Facts:
 Sps. Bernardo, doing business as “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”, were distributors of
petitioner’s products from 1987-1999. In their agreement, Coca Cola will extend cash
assistance and trade discount incentives to the respondent while the latter undertook to sell
petitioner's products exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist
petitioner in its marketing efforts in exchange. Before the expiration of their contract, Coca
Cola required the respondents to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it
would formulate a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City and as a condition
for the renewal of their contract. Despite their compliance, the contract was not renewed.

Respondents later on found out that, Coca Cola started to reach out to the persons whose
names were on the list and that the respondent’s delivery trucks were being trailed by
petitioner's agents; and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the
former's customers. Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a
different pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors was significantly higher
than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in
the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it gave away one free bottle for every case
purchased. It further engaged a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the
former's products at a substantially lower price.

The respondents filed a case against Coca-Cola PH, for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28
of the Civil Code and alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith,
gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.

Issue:

Whether the acts of the petitioner constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s right under
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes. The SC held that the acts of the petitioner constitutes abuse of rights and unfair
competition under the Civil Code. The SC denied the Petition and affirmed but modified the
damages awarded by the lower court, that it shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of the Decision until its full satisfaction.

According to the SC, the petitioner shall liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had
employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and
diminish the investment returns of respondents.

16. Yu vs CA (GR No. 86683, 21 Jan 1993)

FACTS: Petitioner, the exclusive distributor of the House of Mayfair wallcovering products in
the Philippines, cried foul when his former dealer of the same goods, herein private
respondent, purchased the merchandise from the House of Mayfair in England thru FNF
Trading in West Germany and sold said merchandise in the Philippines. Both the court of
 origin and the appellate court rejected petitioner’s thesis that private respondent was
engaged in a sinister form of unfair competition within the context of Art. 28 of the Civil
Code.
In the suit for injunction which petitioner filed before the RTC of the National Capital Region
stationed in Manila, petitioner pressed the idea that he was practically by-passed and, that
private respondent acted in concert with the FNF Trading in misleading Mayfair into
believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were intended for shipment to Nigeria
although they were actually shipped to and sold in the Philippines. Private respondent
professed ignorance of the exclusive contract in favor of petitioner and asserted that
petitioner’s understanding with Mayfair is binding only between the parties thereto.

ISSUE: Is there unfair competition?

HELD: The right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the profits
resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect and which
may otherwise not be diminished, nay, rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or
interposing a person or firm to obtain goods from the supplier to defeat the very purpose for
which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole
authorized distributor.

Another circumstance which respondent court overlooked was petitioner's suggestion,

which was not disputed by herein private respondent in its comment, that the House of
Mayfair in England was duped into believing that the goods ordered through the FNF
Trading were to be shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold in
the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a third person who induces
a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other
contracting party to relief therefrom (Article 1314, New Civil Code). The breach caused by
private respondent was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the
business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused by the latter's species of unfair
competition as demonstrated no less by the sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining
order.

Art 29

17. People vs Lipata (GR No. 200302, 20 April 2016)

18. Ching vs Nicdao (GR No. 141181, 27 Apr 2007)
Art 30

19. Kane vs Roggenkamp (GR No. 214326, 6 July 2020)

20. Evangelista vs Screenex (GR No. 211564, 20 Nov 2017)
21. Manliclic vs Calaunan (GR No. 150157, 25 Jan 2007)
Art 32

22. Silahis International vs Soluta (GR No. 163087, 20 Feb 2006)

FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female
locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she
saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not
employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as
union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to
him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a
locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started
hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open
the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the
office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A
plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the
police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers
was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional
rights.

RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late
1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January
11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office
without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of
individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the
basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the
lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and
seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for

the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case,
petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal
search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein
individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among
others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
23. Aberca vs Ver (GR No. 69866, 15 April 1988)
Facts:

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses,
employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without
warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and
tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause
a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2)
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no
cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which
prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced
Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was
only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the
said complaint.

Issue:

Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the
constitution?

Ruling:

Yes, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the
constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior.
The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the
orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the
petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their officialduties”. Article 32
speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights
does not exempt them from responsibility.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming
damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by
seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek
release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights
and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.
Art 33

24. Kane vs Roggenkamp (GR No. 214326, 6 July 2020)

 25. Bernardo vs People (GR No. 182210, 5 Oct 2015)

Art 36
26. Yap vs Paras (GR No. 101236, 30 January 1992)

27. Zuzuarregui vs. Villarosa (GR No. 183788, 5 April 2010)

28. Capili vs People (GR 183805, 3 July 2013)

Facts

On June 28, 2004, petitioner, JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:

(1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the
RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;

(2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and

(3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves
as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Issue

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

Ruling

NO. The subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is NOT a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999. It is during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.

Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between the petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of
the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of the
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Conclusion

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.