References Kant, Immanuel. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Bthics, Translated by ‘Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Whitefish, NY: Kessinger, 2007. Loude, Robert. Kant’s Impure Bthies. Oxford: Oxford ‘University Press, 2000. Reyes, Ramon. Ground ond Norm of Morality. Manila ‘Ateneo Press, 1980 Savater, Fernando. Apéstates Razonables. Barcelone: Mandragora, 2007, Savater, Femando. Btica per un Figo. Roma: Latersa, 2007. CHAPTER IV Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill Learning Outcomes At the end of this chapter, you should be able to 1. articulate the meaning of a consequentialist ethics; 2. analyze the Greatest Happiness Principle; 3, examine the objections to Mill's position and is responses to each of them; and 4. evaluate ethical decisions from the point of view of tltariania, Introduction Human decisions always have consequences. Whenever fone decides to do something, one’s actions affect other people in ways beyond how one thought it would. Decisions ‘continually affect the configuration and integrity of various forms of human relationships because in deciding to do something, for instance, one actually brings something new Into the world that has never existed before. Decisions being forth new jdeas, objects, and relationships into play in the realm of action and thought. Because one decides in a certain vray, one affects others and the world in a particular way, differently from how one would have if one decided diferent, In other words, particular decisions have particular ‘consequences that correspond to how one's motives translated Into action through # decision.In making decisions, one either lok to one's motives and to the foreseeable consequences of one's actions. Oftentimes, decisions are judged as good if they are brought about by ‘good and just motives and result in good consoquences. On the contrary, decisions are considered bad if they are motivated by anything most of society deems as malicious, ‘such a selfishness, spite or envy, and if they have destructive consequences However, as one knows, real life i lot more complicated than this, “One's motives are not always pure, and consequences vary in kind and severity depending on those affected. In this case, how does one judge the morality of a decision of an act? Does one examine the motivation behind the decision and see whether the act is mostly motivated by goodness or does one look at the results of the act? If one judges the morality of an action based on its consequences, what categories can he/she use to judge whethor tho act did produce good consequences? How can one say that an action did produce desirable consequences? Does the end justify the ‘means? Does the goodness of the consequences, for instance, Ihave more bearing than the way, the method, or modus operandi, with which such consequences are delivered? In other words, even if ane were to say that morality Is « matter of producing the best consequences, how do we understand its moral value in relation to motive and action? Are motives fnrelevant so Jong as an action or decision produces favorable ‘consequences? Is the method by which a decision is carried ‘out immaterial in assessing the rightness or wrongness of an act (fr instance, the act Itself is considered wrong, such as ‘ying)? ‘Usltarianism ie « moral theory that tries to grapple with these questions. Among the famous proponents ofthis way of thinking, Jobn Stuart Mill [1806-1873], s considered by many to be the most influential, His utilitarian theory of morality is a development and clarification of the earlier form of the 7” theory authored by Jeremy Bentham [1718-1882] and espoused by his father, James Mill (1773-1836). James Mill mmeschooled John Stuart on the Beathamite doctrine, which essentially ates that it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong. Happiness in this context is understood as the predominance of pleasure over pala. Jolin Stuart later on revises this doctrine by highlighting a Alistinetion between qualities and quantities of pleasures and ins Mill's moral theory is considered as consequentialist in that it judges the rightness and wrongness of actions based ‘on their consequences, As opposed to deontological theories enthom’s Fete Hedonic Cole ie 1 methodlguide to balance the ros and ors of proposed course of octon Ih ‘elton to the bolonce of plsutes and ons kpotentoty produces. These re ene gue questions toeasureit Intonety: How strong athe leosurer urate How lng doe the losurelos? Certain or uncertainty: How aly rly hot hs Plage wiloceu? Fecundity Whats the pobabity thatthe oevon floes by sensotors of hezometind? ‘Pury: What the probity tots folowed by ‘sensations ofthe opposing? Extn Howmany people ae ofecte?Fearne er ee eee Pager earns, en ee ree aes oe errs coca res Sas HBB The Greatest Happiness Principle | In Mills ethics, actons are understood right with rempect to thelr copacty to promote bappines and rong | hea they tend to promote the oppo of heprners Happier, a5 defined by Mil is pleasure and the absence of pain, wile unheppines is pain or the absence of pleasure | For im, the Principe of Ulity or the Greatest Happiness Principe is the supreme measure of morality, Pleasure and ' the freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, fand all destabe things are desired either because they are inherently pleasurable or because they contribute to the evention of pin One ofthe foremost objection to such a doctrine x that | seems to degrade the natre ofthe huan person by reducing | tmoalty to peagure-driven activity, not unite that ofan nial te that sees ely to multiply pleasure and avid Dain, Objector point tothe fact that i sa doctrine suited \ fe tho flowers ofthe Ancient Greek phiwopher Epicurs [1-270 B.C] who thought thatthe purpose of philosophy Is fo atiainheppineso and tranquiity in ie He belived that zai SS (CHAPTER IV: UTILITARIANISM: JOHN STUART MILL happiness corresponds to atarazia and aponia, the peace ‘and freedom fom fear and the absence of pain, respectively However, followers ofthe Epicurean doctrine respond that it | actually their accusers that present the human person in legrading light by implying that human beings are ineapable of experiencing any other form of pleasure other than ‘hat comparable to an animal's. Mill adds that there is no picurean or any such-related doctrine which does not assign to the pleasures ofthe intellect, feelings, and the imagination ‘higher value than pleasures that derive from mere physical sensations. In other words, Mills utilitarian doctrine makes 4 concrete distinction between higher and lower forms of plossure. It does not advocate a life of reckless abandon and non-stop partying. Some kinds of pleasures are more desirable fand valuable than others. How does one determine which Pleasures are higher than others? Mill explains: | HEI were asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures or what makes one pleasure || more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one || possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to ‘hich all oF almost all who have experience of both | ve a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. I one of the two is, by those who fare competently acquainted with both, placed #0 far above the other that they prefer it, even though knoying it to be attended with a greater amount of Aiscentent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the prefered enjoyment superiority In quality, so far outweighing quantity ax to rendor it, in comparison, of small amount.* aPART h THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS If Bentham's version of utilitarianism focuses on the potential amount or quantity of happiness thet an action ean potentially produce for it to be considered right, Mill's ethics makes a sharp and muanced division of higher and lower forms of pleasure in terms of quality. Happiness should not bbe measured solely on the basis of how long or how intense the feeling of pleasuce is for a person or to those affected by fan action as Bentham, for instance, had thought, Although both agtee that an action's rightness or wrongness must take into account the number of those that shal be affected, Mill says that even if more people benefit from an action’s consequences, but the Kind of pleasure they experience is considered lower or baser than the consequences of an faction that pleases a lot less people, but please them in a ‘more human way, then the latter course of action is deemed ‘more right, in that it promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest. umber while considering the fact that some pleasures ace more befitting of a human being than others. Mill says that the ploasurs of a higher quality are those that ‘employ our distinctively aman facatis, uch as the intellct. However, it should be noted that Millis not saying that people who have experienced both the pleasures of sensation ‘and pleasures of the intellect consistently prefer the latter fn every occasion. He is not saying that competent judges of pleasures always prefer the higher forms of pleasure, sty, reading a good book over having a night of drinks with frionds. He says that these people would 'not choose» manner of existence that includes a greater amount of lower pleasures than higher pleasures. While itis reasonable to think that someone of experience of rational competence ‘would sometimes prefer to go out and party with friends on some nights, it would go against reason for them to go out every night to party et the expense of experiencing higher forms of pleasure, albeit of a smaller quantity. Tn other words, fa wise man would not exchange his lot for that of a fool's ae ‘oven if he were promised the pleasue's bolting of a ool’ for ‘lifetime. This is precisely because a competentiy experienced human recognizes that the pleasures of wisdom, though fewer ‘in quantity far outweigh that ofa foals. Mill does not assert ‘hat the exercise of distinct human faculties like the intellect ‘nas a greater intrinsic value than the exercise of those that Dromote the pleasures of sensation. What he claims is that the pleasures derived from uniquely human activities such ts reading, conversing with others, and philosophizing have superior value than other fort of activities. For example, if one is faced with the choice of playing online games all day for a week and studying school lessons for atleast three hours a day for a week, one must ask oneself ‘which course of action fulfils one's higher faculties more. One should also ask how many people can benefit. from such a choice compered to the other, as well as the kind of happiness it can bring these people. Let us this examine the case: Ployng online games aliayforaweck + ineeclaty stsie ones ‘Starch forRn and encoment + oll onctehangout th as howr ‘saayforaweek + tidus yetallonseneto ‘Soroup ether ond Sirteat perseverance frends Teaming portant eres for + etsoneenoyonesef tie | schoo! Seapng te evencoy « thedscplingotfecuingon Dressuresotdaytotesee |” rlevonecasts eotacto one's oureholdchores et, ‘Saucon ean goaiangwoyin + sssersalysates ne Gneshinurecndeavor Srsone'sgomingtiends | + relatively soltory ‘remeditty + has the potontia beng lease to onesforiy By Sroming ones grotude for Seranoteduestion ‘When one carefully examines the Ieinds of pleasures at stake in the possible consequences of one’s decision, one realizes that studying, while seemingly “painful” relative to