Professional Documents
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White Collar Crime Fraud Corruption Risks Survey Utica College Protiviti
White Collar Crime Fraud Corruption Risks Survey Utica College Protiviti
Introduction....................................................................................................... 1
Methodology...................................................................................................... 3
Corruption.......................................................................................................... 20
In Closing........................................................................................................... 32
Survey Demographics......................................................................................... 33
About Protiviti.................................................................................................... 36
In September 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) put corporations on notice: When it
comes to corporate fraud, the DOJ’s top priority is not financial recovery, but rather bringing
the individuals responsible to justice. In a memorandum to federal prosecutors,1 Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates called for a more aggressive stance on holding individuals accountable
for their crimes − and holding corporate officers and directors accountable for the environment
in which those crimes occurred. To ensure adherence to this call to action, the so-called “Yates
Memo” instructed prosecutors not to give corporate defendants cooperation credit unless they first
identify the individuals responsible for the illegal conduct and not just scapegoats. As Yates stated
in her public remarks about the memo: “We’re not going to be accepting a company’s cooperation
when they just offer up the vice president in charge of going to jail.”
Given the dynamic nature of white-collar crime and fraud, it isn’t surprising that the Yates Memo
is only the latest in a series of catalysts that prompted Protiviti and the Economic Crime and Justice
Studies Department at Utica College to conduct a comprehensive survey of white-collar crime and
the fraud risk management frameworks used to combat them.
Notable Findings
While there were a number of notable findings that emerged from our research, one thing seems
quite clear: The majority of organizations are not well positioned to conduct investigations. Many
organizations conducting investigations are under-resourced and are spending more time “putting
out fires” than focusing on fraud detection and applying a consistent investigative approach. The
majority of companies that are in this situation will very likely find it extremely difficult to identify
the responsible parties and receive meaningful cooperation credit for having done so.
1
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” DOJ memorandum, September 9, 2015: www.justice.gov/dag/
file/769036/download.
2
From Cybersecurity to Collaboration: Assessing the Top Priorities for Internal Audit Functions, Protiviti, 2015:
www.protiviti.com/IAsurvey.
3
2015 Vendor Risk Management Benchmark Study, Protiviti and The Shared Assessments Program, 2015:
www.protiviti.com/vendor-risk.
Utica College and Protiviti partnered to conduct the White-Collar Crime and Fraud Risk Survey
in the second and third quarters of 2015. This global survey, conducted online, consisted of a series
of questions grouped into six categories:
• Fraud Risk Governance
• Fraud Risk Assessment
• Fraud Prevention Techniques
• Fraud Detection Techniques
• Corruption
• Reporting, Investigation and Corrective Action
Nearly 300 (n=272) executives and professionals − including board members, C-suite executives,
general counsel and chief audit executives − completed our online questionnaire. All respondents
are in a position to understand their organization’s fraud risk management capabilities. Survey
participants also were asked to provide demographic information about their titles and positions
and the nature, size and location of their businesses. We are very appreciative and grateful for the
time these individuals invested in our study.
All demographic information was provided voluntarily by our respondents.
Notes:
This report includes numerous breakdowns of the survey findings by company size, defined as follows:*
Company size:
Large = Companies with revenues of $10 billion or greater
Midsize = Companies with revenues between $100 million and $9.99 billion
Small = Companies with revenues less than $100 million
*Upon request, Protiviti can provide additional reporting in these broad categories.
Key Observations
• While 92 percent of organizations reported having a formal and documented code of
conduct, few consider their fraud risk strategy to be well-defined.
• With regard to the challenges organizations face in managing fraud risk proactively,
a plurality (47 percent) of respondents cited the lack of internal resources. “Lack
of proactive fraud risk management” (37 percent) and “lack of a unified fraud risk
management strategy” (31 percent) were the next two highest responses.
• The fourth-highest reason (29 percent) for not having a well-defined risk strategy is
the belief that fraud and misconduct do not represent significant risks. Our experts
found this to be inconsistent with the widespread incidence of financial crime across
the spectrum of industries represented by the survey participants. This misconception
often plays out when companies are performing fraud risk assessments and at
roundtable discussions in which many executives state the belief that their overall
fraud risks are low − even those operating in particularly high-risk industries and
geographies. Without the perception that fraud represents at least some degree of risk,
companies whose executives have this mindset are not likely to allocate adequate
resources or take steps to strengthen their anti-fraud programs.
KEY FACT
Organizations with a formal and documented code of conduct
All
92%
97%
Large
94% 80%
Small
Midsize
Which of the following challenges does your organization face in managing its fraud
risk proactively? (Multiple responses permitted.)
Other 12%
No senior management
professional is designated 14%
with ownership
Don’t know 5%
4
Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse – 2014 Global Fraud Study, Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, Inc., 2014: www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf.
Risk management
29%
committee
No active and
13%
defined oversight
Other 8%
Don’t know 5%
Does your organization have a formal and documented fraud control policy?
Key Observations
• An effective fraud risk assessment process should be conducted in alignment with
the organization’s objectives and thoroughly consider potential vulnerabilities
arising from fraud and misconduct. Overall, less than half of respondents reported
that they conduct an annual fraud risk assessment, and a troubling one in four said
“never” or “don’t know.”
• A fraud risk assessment methodology should include one or more of the following
techniques in order to identify potential fraud risk: document review and analysis,
interviews with designated managers and process or control owners, electronic data
analysis, surveys, and facilitated brainstorming sessions and workshops. While a
majority of respondents said they review prior audits, complaints and assessments, less
than half (48 percent) conduct interviews. And only a little more than a third (36 percent)
use data analytics.
• Some companies consider a fraud risk assessment to be part of their SOX compliance
process. This narrow focus fails to address the systemic nature of fraud risk and instead
focuses on internal control over financial reporting, which is a mere fraction of an
organization’s overall fraud risk.
How often does your organization conduct a formal fraud risk assessment?
Quarterly 0% 4% 3%
Annually 57% 51% 34%
As needed 13% 21% 24%
Never 17% 15% 21%
Don’t know 13% 9% 18%
General counsel/legal 5%
Other 18%
Don’t know 3%
Accounting/finance 82%
Legal 68%
Operations 58%
Compliance 54%
Interviews 48%
Surveys 28%
Industry-accepted fraud
taxonomies, such as the
Association of Certified Fraud 19%
Examiners’ Occupational Fraud and
Abuse Classification System
Workshops 15%
Other 5%
Incorporated into
our internal audit 26% 31% 38%
planning process
Incorporated into
our enterprise risk
32% 22% 15%
management (ERM)
process
Incorporated into
our SOX compliance 12% 21% 8%
process
Stand-alone 12% 9% 10%
None of these 12% 12% 18%
Don’t know 6% 5% 11%
Commentary
An effective fraud risk assessment is tailored to an organization’s industry and unique operations.
It should be performed on an annual basis and refreshed when a change in the internal or external
environment occurs, including such things as actual fraud or corruption incidents that have
occurred and subsequent efforts to apply the lessons learned.
Key components are risk objectives, identification, assessment of inherent and residual fraud risk
(measured by likelihood and significance), evaluation of anti-fraud controls and management’s risk
response. It is important to obtain this information from a variety of internal and external sources,
including data analysis and personal interviews.
As with any internal investigation, a fraud risk assessment may include sensitive matters that poten-
tially involve litigation or damage to a company’s reputation. There are often compelling reasons
for an organization’s assessment team to report to legal counsel. Some things to consider include:
• In the United States, conversations between an attorney and a client seeking legal advice are
considered “privileged and confidential” and “attorney-client privileged.” Once privilege is
established, the information shared between a client and attorney is largely protected from
disclosure to other parties.
• Attorney-client privilege allows companies and their lawyers to discuss findings and potential
solutions without fear of inappropriate disclosure of the privileged discussions and material.
If other providers, such as forensic accountants or investigators, participate in the fraud risk
assessment or an investigation, their work should be performed at the direction of lawyers so
that their findings are considered attorney work product and are privileged as well.
• It should be made clear that the risk assessment is being conducted to assist legal counsel
in providing legal advice. This includes marking materials as “Privileged and Confidential”
and informing interviewees of the legal purpose of the fraud risk assessment or investigation.
• Distribution of privileged materials must be limited. Company representatives must not be
allowed to discuss the review with anyone who is not involved in the project, so as not to inad-
vertently waive the privilege by sharing information outside of the attorney-client relationship.
• The attorney-client privilege varies widely outside of the United States. For any investigations,
fraud risk assessments or other projects that the client and counsel feel should be performed
under the privilege and involve foreign jurisdictions, the rules of those jurisdictions would apply.
Note that while attorney-client privilege generally applies to in-house counsel (at least in the United
States), internal lawyers serve in a dual business and legal capacity, and privilege could be challenged
on the grounds that discussions were of a business, and not a legal, nature.
Does your company conduct its fraud risk assessment under attorney-client privilege?
31% 4% 5%
If YES: Who in your organization is responsible for the fraud risk management
(mitigation) program?
Chief compliance
21% 29% 18%
officer
Chief audit
7% 27% 18%
executive
Chief financial
21% 12% 36%
officer
Other 43% 29% 27%
Don’t know 8% 3% 1%
Key Observations
• Most respondents gave their organizations high marks for fraud prevention. Many
utilize “old school” basics, including a formal code of ethics, spending approval
limits and segregation of duties (SoD).
• Most conduct ethics and fraud awareness training, although overall, less than half do so
at least annually, which is the desired frequency.
Which of the following primary controls does your organization utilize to prevent fraud?
(Multiple responses permitted.)
Code of conduct/
100% 91% 76%
code of ethics
Authority or
93% 89% 82%
approval limits
Segregation of
93% 89% 71%
duties
Information
87% 88% 68%
technology controls
Employee
77% 83% 68%
background checks
Ethics or fraud risk
83% 59% 37%
awareness training
Competitive bidding 67% 56% 39%
Third-party due
63% 41% 24%
diligence
None of these 0% 1% 5%
Other 7% 3% 5%
4%
Semiannually 8%
3%
6%
Don’t know 3%
7%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Commentary
Fraud prevention is the baseline of fraud risk management and has traditionally consisted of
simple controls designed to set an ethical and moral tone and limit the opportunity for fraud.
Such measures are a good start, but they need to be part of a comprehensive and ongoing fraud
risk management strategy that includes third-party due diligence, fraud auditing, brainstorming
sessions and data analytics.
Key Observations
• Tellingly, more than half of all organizations lack a fraud detection program (though
the numbers are better for large companies). It is one thing to have a program that is
not fully developed, but this suggests a majority of companies aren’t doing anything
proactive to look for fraud.
• While most respondents indicated that their companies have a telephone hotline,
website or electronic mailbox for employees to report fraud, only 13 percent regularly
conduct surprise audits at least annually. And relatively few organizations have evolved
to a point where they are using ongoing data analysis – the equivalent of a red-light
camera – to catch fraud in progress.
Chief audit
24% 45% 25%
executive
Chief compliance
18% 21% 25%
officer
Chief financial
18% 17% 13%
officer
Other 40% 13% 37%
Don’t know 0% 4% 0%
Don’t know. 4% 8%
How often does your organization conduct surprise audits within the organization?
7% 6% 39%
38% 10%
Commentary
Fraud detection techniques look for fraud in progress. Consistent with our other findings, our
survey results suggest that most companies are putting forth minimal effort – relying on passive
tools like hotlines, websites and email reporting mechanisms, which provide a means for individuals
to report fraud – and not actively searching for fraud with surprise audits and ongoing or periodic
forensic data analysis.
This reactive stance is consistent with the results of Protiviti’s 2015 Finance Priorities Survey,5 which
ranked enterprise risk reporting significantly below profitability reporting and other operational and
revenue-generating priorities.
5
The Rising Tide of Finance Challenges, Protiviti and the Financial Executives Research Foundation, 2015:
www.protiviti.com/en-US/Documents/Surveys/2015-Finance-Priorities-Survey-FERF-Protiviti.pdf.
Key Observations
• Third parties are widely considered to represent a disproportionate degree of corruption
risk to companies operating outside of the United States. The OECD recently published
the Foreign Bribery Report, a study of 427 corruption enforcement actions in countries
that are a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention enacted in 1999.6 It found that in 75
percent of those cases, bribes were paid by third parties and not the officers or company
directors themselves. However, our survey found that most companies have a long way
to go when it comes to assessing and monitoring third-party corruption risk, with few
respondents giving their organizations a high confidence rating.
• More than a third of respondents (35 percent) indicated that they were not aware
of any due diligence being performed by their companies on intermediaries prior to
onboarding. And among those conducting due diligence investigations, most perform
only the most cursory Internet and government watchlist searches.
• An equal number of respondents (35 percent) were unaware of any efforts by their
company to identify foreign government agencies, state-owned companies, public
international organizations and private enterprises among their customers. However,
these efforts are a critical success factor for an effective anti-corruption compliance
program under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Without the ability to
readily distinguish between the different categories of customers, companies risk
operating “in the blind” as to which of their customers’ employees meet the definition
of a “foreign official.” These companies therefore risk unwittingly violating the FCPA.
• An effective anti-corruption program should also extend to hiring practices,
particularly when it comes to hiring employees or interns with ties to clients, foreign
governments or state-owned companies. Overall, only a third of respondents could
say that their organizations attempt to determine whether job candidates are family
members or associates of government officials who are in a position to influence
contract awards. Recent prosecutions of U.S. companies for targeting the children of
executives of Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds and ongoing investigations of
the hiring practices of numerous investment banks operating in China make it critically
important to determine whether candidates for employment or internships have
disclosed such ties and that the company has taken appropriate steps to ensure that
candidates are qualified. There should not be even the appearance of a quid pro quo.
6
OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 2014, OECD Publishing, Paris:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264226616-en.
3.5 3.1
Large companies
Midsize companies
2.9
Small companies
Does your organization conduct due diligence on business intermediaries (e.g., agent,
distributor, consultant, subcontractor) prior to onboarding?
77% 15% 8%
Which of the following additional steps does your organization take in an effort to
mitigate the elevated risk associated with doing business with government agencies,
state-owned companies and/or public international organizations? (Multiple
responses permitted.)
Pre-approval
requirements
before paying for 63% 44% 34%
gifts, meals or
entertainment
Enhanced contract
57% 41% 29%
provisions
Advanced anti-
corruption training 57% 27% 13%
for select personnel
Prohibitions
against hiring of
family members of 40% 26% 32%
employees of this
category of customer
Small companies
Does your organization perform any of the following? (Multiple responses permitted.)
Base: Organizations that categorize third parties according to risk.
Check a variety
of watchlists
60% 38% 31%
(e.g., OFAC, PEPs,
debarments)
Perform Internet
40% 40% 39%
research
Check corporation
47% 30% 39%
registrations
Search public
47% 32% 25%
records
Search negative
33% 21% 14%
news in English
Perform site visits
33% 15% 14%
with photographs
Perform human
intelligence 23% 13% 11%
research
Search negative
news in applicable 10% 8% 8%
foreign languages
Don’t know 37% 23% 19%
None – No
investigative due
0% 18% 22%
diligence performed
in my organization
All investigative
work performed 40% 34% 31%
in-house
Watchlists, negative
media and Internet
37% 21% 25%
research performed
in-house
More
comprehensive
investigative work 20% 9% 8%
performed by
investigative firm
All investigative
3% 5% 3%
work outsourced
Other 0% 5% 6%
None – No
investigative due
0% 20% 22%
diligence performed
in my organization
Don’t know 37% 23% 25%
Commentary
Momentum is building for stronger third-party anti-corruption programs, as regulators make it
clear that companies will no longer be able to “outsource” risk by handing it off to a contractor.
Regulators are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of how certain
organizations are identifying their high-risk business intermediaries. They are holding them to
heightened standards of care and are asking those not approaching their third parties in this way,
“Why not?”
Based on our survey findings, this is a real weakness for most companies. The DOJ and U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have made their expectations clear: Corruption risk
assessment must evolve, and anti-corruption programs must be derived from a meaningful risk
assessment process in order to be truly effective.
Even those organizations that profess to be conducting vendor due diligence need to start asking
tough questions:
• How many existing relationships have we severed as a result of our anti-corruption program?
• How many prospective vendors have we rejected?
If there is not a single relationship severed or new relationship rejected, it invites regulators to
question the validity of these programs, regardless of how much the programs cost to administer.
“WITH THE COSO 2013 UPDATE, OUR COMPANY GAVE SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHT
TO FRAUD RISK. IT’S NOT THAT WE WEREN’T THINKING ABOUT IT BEFORE; IT WAS
JUST ALWAYS EMBEDDED IN OUR SOX CONTROLS. THE UPDATE GAVE US A CHANCE
TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THINGS AND PLUCK THOSE FRAUD CONTROLS TO
ENSURE WE WERE THINKING THROUGH ALL THE APPLICABLE SCENARIOS.”
The DOJ and SEC have provided clear guidance for what they expect of companies when it
comes to complying with the FCPA. Their 10 “Hallmarks of an Effective Compliance Program”7
is essential reading for anyone responsible for overseeing a corporate anti-corruption program.
10 Hallmarks
• Commitment from Senior Management and a Clearly Articulated Policy Against
Corruption – Compliance begins with the board of directors and senior executives setting the
proper tone for the rest of the company.
• Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures – A company’s code of conduct
is often the foundation upon which an effective compliance program is built. The most effective
codes are clear, concise and accessible to all employees and to those conducting business on the
company’s behalf.
• Oversight, Autonomy and Resources – In appraising a compliance program, the DOJ and
SEC look for one or more senior executives specifically assigned to oversight and provided
with resources and board access.
• Risk Assessment – Assessment and prioritization of risk are fundamental to developing a
strong compliance program. The DOJ and SEC have said they are likely to be more forgiving
of a company with a comprehensive, risk-based compliance program, even if that program does
not prevent an infraction in a low-risk area because greater attention and resources have been
devoted to a higher-risk area.
• Training and Continuing Advice – Compliance policies cannot work unless they are
effectively communicated throughout a company.
• Incentives and Disciplinary Measures – A compliance program should apply from the
boardroom to the supply room – no one should be beyond its reach.
• Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments – Third parties, including agents, consultants
and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the payment of bribes to foreign officials in
international business transactions. Risk-based due diligence will be considered by the DOJ
and SEC in assessing the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program.
• Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigations – In addition to confidential reporting
mechanisms, there should be an efficient, reliable and properly funded process for investigating
allegations and documenting the company’s response, including any disciplinary or reme-
diation measures.
• Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and Review – Effective compliance programs
evolve. Consequently, the DOJ and SEC evaluate whether companies regularly review and
improve their compliance programs to keep them from becoming stale.
• Mergers and Acquisitions: Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition
Integration – A company that does not perform adequate FCPA due diligence prior to a
merger or acquisition may face both legal and business risks.
7
FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Criminal Division of the DOJ and Enforcement Division
of the SEC, 2012: www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf.
Key Observations
• Overall, insufficient management review and inadequate controls have accounted
for more than half of all fraud and misconduct investigated over the past three years.
Deliberate override of controls was the second-highest individually cited cause, after
insufficient management review.
• A substantial percentage of respondents said there have been no allegations of fraud
or misconduct investigated over the past three years. This raises questions about how
effective those organizations are at identifying fraud and whether this statistic is a true
picture of the absence of fraud or, rather, the inability to deter, detect, investigate and
report fraud and the absence of proactive efforts to identify fraud indicators.
More than 20
27% 11% 6%
investigations
Six to 20
17% 19% 8%
investigations
Five or fewer
7% 33% 25%
investigations
None that I am
3% 13% 39%
aware of
I’m not comfortable
disclosing this 17% 11% 3%
information
Unknown – I don’t
have visibility
into how many
29% 13% 19%
investigations
are conducted/
completed
Insufficient
management review 15% 18% 47%
or approval
Deliberate override
35% 20% 0%
of internal controls
Inadequate internal
5% 21% 27%
controls
Inadequate SoD 10% 11% 20%
Collusion with third
25% 10% 0%
parties
Internal collusion 0% 6% 0%
Lack of qualified
personnel
performing tasks/ 5% 5% 0%
responsible for
controls
Undisclosed
0% 4% 0%
conflict(s) of interest
Other 5% 5% 6%
Commentary
Not every missing laptop requires the attention of the audit committee, but there should be a
mechanism for the investigation and reporting of suspected fraud and misconduct. There also
needs to be some kind of prioritization of when and why to escalate suspected misconduct to
a higher level of scrutiny to include categories of fraud and misconduct that would warrant
reporting to the audit committee.
More important, from a long-term value standpoint, is the ability to drill down to the root cause
and take corrective action. Many respondents cited inadequate internal controls as a leading cause
of fraud, along with insufficient management review. These responses aren’t surprising consider-
ing that most companies don’t seem to see fraud and misconduct as significant risks. Performing
investigations in such a way as to gather evidence, expose shortcomings in the control environment
and then apply the lessons learned are of critical importance to an organization’s ability to demon-
strate forward progress on its anti-fraud and anti-corruption programs. These efforts also can help
to lower the company’s exposure to these categories of risk over time.
KEY FACT
Most common corrective actions taken by companies at the
conclusion of an investigation:
Disciplinary action
27%
23%
Termination
Companies tend to be under-resourced when it comes to financial crime investigation, fraud detec-
tion and reporting. Leadership is focused on growing revenue and delivering shareholder value.
Nobody wants to believe that the company is losing significant revenue to fraud. Nor are companies
inclined to freely expend unbudgeted monies to pursue investigations to their logical conclusions
and then remediate the deficiencies in the control environment that the investigation may have
exposed. And certainly, organizations don’t want to spend precious resources managing risks they
don’t consider legitimate.
Yet regulators and prosecutors are holding corporate executives and directors individually account-
able not only for acts of fraud or bribery they may have committed, but also increasingly for acts they
didn’t take clear action to prevent. Such pressures are raising the bar for fraud risk management and
anti-corruption compliance.
An organization’s ability to effectively manage and mitigate fraud and corruption risk begins
with the abandonment of the “no fraud here” mindset and an acknowledgement that fraud
and corruption don’t just happen to others. In fact, the law of averages suggests that fraud and
corruption risk exists in every organization to varying degrees. The conclusion that there’s “no
fraud here” is more likely a repudiation of the program’s efficacy and organizational tone than it
is a reflection of reality. A truly effective program engages all levels and departments in preven-
tion and detection. It is also aligned with a strong executive tone at the top, where the refrain
“there is no fraud here” is replaced with “not on my watch.”
We surveyed nearly 300 top senior executives, board members, audit directors and risk manag-
ers from a cross-section of industries. The following charts show the breakdown regarding the
survey respondents and their companies.
Position (Title/Role)
Corporate Controller 6%
General Counsel 1%
Other 10%
Manufacturing 12%
Education 6%
Energy 6%
Government 6%
Technology 6%
Healthcare – Provider 5%
Real Estate 4%
Services 4%
Retail 4%
Distribution 3%
Not-for-Profit 3%
Utilities 3%
Life Sciences/Biotechnology 3%
Media 3%
Healthcare – Payer 2%
Hospitality 2%
Telecommunications 1%
Other 1%
Public 49%
Private 24%
Not-for-profit 10%
Government (U.S.) 6%
Educational institution 5%
Government (non-U.S.) 2%
Other 2%
Organization Headquarters
Europe 6%
Asia-Pacific 4%
Middle East 3%
Latin America 2%
Africa 2%
India 1%
Protiviti (www.protiviti.com) is a global consulting firm that helps companies solve problems in
finance, technology, operations, governance, risk and internal audit, and has served more than 60
percent of Fortune 1000® and 35 percent of Fortune Global 500® companies. Protiviti and our inde-
pendently owned Member Firms serve clients through a network of more than 70 locations in over
20 countries. We also work with smaller, growing companies, including those looking to go public,
as well as with government agencies.
Named one of the 2015 Fortune 100 Best Companies to Work For®, Protiviti is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Robert Half (NYSE: RHI). Founded in 1948, Robert Half is a member of the S&P
500 index.
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Contacts
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drebovi@utica.edu rphilo@utica.edu