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Research Paper 11 Ipyana Musopole
Research Paper 11 Ipyana Musopole
Research Paper 11 Ipyana Musopole
Ipyana Musopole
Research Fellow
IACA
IACA
research paper series no. 11
February 2019
IACAre s e arch
& s cie n ce
Copyright © Ipyana Musopole/International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). All
rights reserved.
Private, non-commercial use is permitted with the scope of copyright law provided
that this work remains unaltered, due credit is given to the author, and the source is
clearly stated.
The work has been produced by the author in the framework of IACA’s r esearch
activities. The views expressed therein are the author’s views and do not necessarily
reflect the views of IACA.
1
International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA)
Muenchendorfer Str. 2
2361 Laxenburg
AUSTRIA
+43 (0)2236 710 718 100
www.iaca.int
mail@iaca.int
I want to thank IACA for giving me the opportunity to participate in the Research Fellowship
Program. I would also like to thank the Director General and Management of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau-Malawi who allowed me time off work to participate in this program and
also supported me during the data collection phase of this study which was done in Malawi. I
am indebted to Professor Michael Johnston who supervised me on this project. I am grateful
to Prof Emmanuel Breen, Prof Eduard Ivanov and Martin Zapata for their contribution in the
course of this project. Iam also grateful to IACA staff members amongst whom I worked
during the three months I was at IACA doing the data analysis and the write up of the paper
for treating me as one of their own and providing different kinds of support. I am especially
grateful to Hyojeong Kang for the organization, kindness and support she provided before
my arrival at IACA as well as during and after the research fellowship. I am also grateful to
the SME associations and their members as well as key informants who volunteered to
participate in this study and shared openly with me their experiences and views which helped
to shape this paper. Lastly but not least, am grateful to Johann Hofler and Boba Dobras who
kindly hosted me during the three months I was in Laxenburg, Finally and most important
am grateful to my beloved wife and children for their support during the period of the
program.
2
This paper is the result of a multidisciplinary study carried out thanks to the IACA Research
Fellowship. The financial support provided by the SIEMENS Integrity Initiative is gratefully
acknowledged.
3
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) contribute significantly to the economic growth
and employment creation in most underdeveloped countries. Despite their positive
contribution, they are also victims of corruption mainly in environments with pervasive
corruption levels. This situation negatively impacts their growth and operations and in turn,
affects economic development. SMEs are, however, under-engaged in national efforts to
address corruption. Besides, they do not act proactively and collaboratively in addressing
corruption which they face albeit the potential benefits of reduced corruption to their sector
which such efforts would accrue. This study seeks to identify the factors that inhibit SMEs
from engaging in Anti-corruption collective action using Malawi as a case study. The purpose
of identifying the factors is to shed light on their policy implications and what can be done to
motivate the SME sector to participate in anti-corruption efforts. A qualitative approach was
used in this study. Research participants were recruited from six associations representing
SMEs. They included leaders and members of these associations. Key informants were also
recruited. Purposive sampling was used to select the participants. Data was collected
through face to face interviews using interview guides. The results have identified that; a lack
of Anti-corruption capacity in both individual SMEs and association leadership, inadequate
resources to enable the associations effectively coordinate anti-corruption collective efforts,
Some SMEs being beneficiaries of Corruption thus undermining efforts against it, fear of
potential retaliation from public officials and agencies, lack of unity and cooperation
between SMEs and also the various associations, lack of engagement and external facilitation
from key stakeholders particularly anti-corruption authorities, lack of recognition of SMEs
and their associations and lack of collaboration between various public agencies critical to
fostering collective efforts among SMEs, as factors that are inhibiting SMEs from acting
collectively to address corruption. The study has concluded that SMEs in Malawi are willing to
engage in collective action to address corruption but require support from a range of other
stakeholders mainly Government, development partners, Civil society organization and Anti-
corruption authorities to address the range of inhibiting factors and more significantly help
their collective action efforts to take off and be sustained.
4
5
of the global workforce (The Association
of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2013).
In Africa, a study by Muriithi, (2017, p 37)
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME's) can suggested that SMEs contribute about 50%
play a strategic role in Anti-corruption to the GNP of most countries. Sveinung
efforts. Among other ways, they can and Grünfeld, 2010, estimated that there
collaborate with other stakeholders in are over 61,000 SMEs in Malawi. Their
efforts to address specific corruption share of employment in Malawi was
issues that confront businesses in order to estimated at 39 % in 2010 (Fjose,
improve the general operating Grünfeld, Green, 2010, p13). Studies also
environment for businesses. However, suggest that SMEs contribute as much as
presently, this is not the case. There can 50% to Malawi’s GDP generating annual
be many possible factors that inhibit them revenue of about US$2 Billion (World Bank,
from collaborating or being involved in 2012).
efforts to address corruption at all. What
if, the risks which SMEs perceive as being Despite the significance of SMEs'
involved in fighting corruption undermines contribution to economic growth, they
their willingness to participate in Anti- face a range of challenges which constrain
corruption collective action? Besides, what their growth and operations. Studies
if, the paradox that though corruption is a commonly cite challenges ranging from
constraint and addressing it would accrue access to capital and markets, poor
long term benefits to them, it is also governance to capacity challenges to
beneficial in the short term in getting mention a few (Fjose, Grünfeld, Green,
things done, undermines their willingness 2010, p5). Overcoming challenges which
to collaborate in opposing corruption. This SMEs face, will likely spur the growth of
study sets out to explore factors that SMEs and further increase their
inhibit SMEs in Malawi from engaging in contribution to economic development.
Anti-corruption collective action. Corruption is one of the significant
challenges which SMEs confront. Sixty-two
percent (62%) of respondents in a global
SME survey that was done by the
Association for Chartered Certified
SMEs constitute a significant proportion of
Accountants cited corruption mainly in the
the business sector in most countries
form of bribery as a significant risk which
around the globe. Some studies have
they encounter. The Malawi Governance
suggested that SMEs constitute as much as
and Corruption Survey found that 62.9% of
99% of the sector and employ the majority
businesses which included SMEs cited
6
Corruption as a significant constraint to failure to exercise a strong influence on
growth and business operation (University government officials and institutions,
of Malawi, 2013, p33). Similar findings capital structure and the inability to shun
were established by the Business Climate corruption are some of the factors that
Survey of 2016 (Malawi Confederation of have been cited as disadvantaging them
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and make them more susceptible to
2016, p 13). corruption (UNIDO & UNODC, 2007, pp 9-
10).
1968, 68). This may be especially true for & UNODC, 2007, p14). Friedman et al.
SMEs who have to deal with Government (2000, p 481) in their study established
administrative and regulatory bureaucracy that countries with more corruption have a
in doing business which in most of the higher share of the unofficial economy
underdeveloped world is rigid and mainly because it drives SMEs out of the
governed by archaic laws and procedures. formal economy thus impacting on the
as the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, was Corruption also acts as a financial
also supported by leys (1970) and Lui limitation on SMEs and increases the cost
(1985) among others. The hypothesis has, of doing business (Kanu, 2015, p 15).
more damage especially on SMEs than their daily business operations (Egyptian
SMEs just as large businesses deal with situation where they cannot act alone to
public agencies on a range of issues from counter corruption. They are also unable
tax, business registration authorities to to secure change to the systems and the
regulatory issues. The liability of the size institutions they interface with to conduct
of SMEs, their short-term vision and their businesses which are also usually the
7
the power to tackle corruption alone can
leverage collective efforts to confront and
solve the problem (UNIDO, UNODC, 2007,
p 17). SMEs usually fall into this category
of businesses. The majority of their
owners do not want to participate in
corrupt practices, but they lack
Collective action is a collaborative and
information and support in avoiding it and
sustained process involving cooperation
view it as a necessary cost of doing
among several stakeholders, designed to
business (World Bank Institute, 2006, p
achieve a specified goal (World Bank,
37). Collective action enables businesses
2008, p 4). Acting collectively against
to collaborate with civil society and other
problems such as corruption offers a
stakeholders in addressing specific
range of benefits mainly to the SME sector.
corruption issues which are a constraint
It increases the impact and credibility of
mainly to their operations.
individual action by among other way
bringing vulnerable individual players into
Participation in Collective Action therefore
an alliance of like-minded organizations
potentially offers some specific benefits to
(UN Global Compact, 2015, p 23). It also
SMEs which range from helping them
contributes to the leveling of the playing
secure an improved business environment
field in doing business amongst the
(Egyptian Junior Business Association,
various competitors (World Bank, 2008, p
2018) to helping them overcome bribery
4). It, ensures that no business has an
tendencies by public officials and
unfair advantage through bribe giving
agencies. It also affords them the benefits
(Wehrlé, 2014).
of a group approach and thereby
increasing their clout and bargaining
Anti-corruption Collective action is often
power (Wehrlé, 2014).
flaunted as one of the most effective
approaches which businesses can use to
help them address some of the variants of
corruption they face. Promoting it is
therefore considered as a crucial element
in the broader strategy of combating
corruption (Pieth, 2012, p14). Anti-
Existing literature mostly discuss general
corruption Collective action in the
factors that constrain anti-corruption
business sector can serve as a platform
collective action from happening across a
through which businesses that do not have
range of groups without specifically
8
addressing factors that may be unique to
SMEs. Wheatland and Chene (2015, p 3-4) Applying this argument to the case of
for example highlights factors such as lack SMEs, it can be argued that collective
of political will, lack of incentives, high action among SMEs would seek to realize
costs, limited benefits, uncertain the public good of securing a corruption-
outcomes, patron-client relationships, free business environment. This public
obstructing political environment and good would promote the growth of SMEs
funding issues (lack of resources, and their overall contribution to national
sustainability, and independence from economic growth and job creation. While
donors) as barriers to Anti-corruption this is desirable, the failure by SMEs to
collective action in most groups. Vanni collaborate despite this potential benefit
(2014, p 24), cites higher transaction costs may result from among other factors,
associated with collective action as a SMEs being a latent group and thus
constraint. lacking the capacity to constitute a
structure that can effectively bring them
together and coordinate as well as sustain
their collective efforts over time. Also,
even if they can organize such a structure,
they may need to have well-defined and
Mancur Olson (1965) in his logic of
credible incentive structures that can
collective action discuss some of the
appeal to participants and induce
factors that also constrain collective
contribution towards the realization of the
action. He begins by arguing that where
public good.
shared purpose exists and individuals can
benefit from cooperating, some
The Prisoner's Dilemma is also a widely
individuals will be inclined to free ride and
used application in explaining when
leave others to contribute to the
collective action would occur. It also offers
realization of the public good where those
some perspective on what can inhibit Anti-
individuals feel they can still benefit from
corruption collective action amongst SMEs.
the public good without incurring costs.
It explains why rational individuals do not
He argues that this is often the case in
always cooperate in a situation where
latent groups which require complex
cooperation would be beneficial. It
organizational structures to mobilize for
demonstrates that in certain
collective action. He then argues that
circumstances, individuals will opt for a
collective action can be achieved in such
course of action that will bring an outcome
groups if they are provided with incentives
that benefits the group but when they do
to induce participation (Olson, 1965, p71).
not trust each other, each will opt for their
9
best personal outcome which can be worse
for the whole group. SMEs may be aware
of the benefits of acting against
corruption, but they may not trust that
Evidence from the UN Global Compact
others especially those benefiting from it
2015 publication among other sources,
in their sector will also desist from
which profiled some fifteen different Anti-
corruption. The lack of trust may,
corruption collective action initiatives on
therefore, undermine any chances of them
the African continent, show an extremely
coming together to collaborate in
low uptake of collective action by SMEs as
opposing corruption.
a tool to address corruption (UN Global
Compact, 2015, p 23). The publication
Bauhr (2016, p 1), also offers a hypothesis
which mapped and profiled Anti-
that explains what can inhibit or induce
corruption collective action initiatives on
anti-corruption collective action. She
the African continent only identified and
distinguishes between ‘need' and ‘greed'
profiled one initiative which was SME
corruption and argues that what influences
driven out of the fifteen initiatives at
citizens to fight corruption is what
various levels. This observation is also
motivates them to indulge in it in the first
corroborated by the database of collective
place. She further argues that ‘greed
action initiatives published by the
corruption' can be associated with reduced
International Centre for Collective Action
civic engagement because they benefit
of the Basel Institute on Governance (B20
from it while ‘need corruption' on the
Collective action hub, 2018). The Integrity
other hand influences citizens' willingness
Network Initiative advanced by the
to fight corruption because they feel
Egyptian Junior Business Association is the
victimized by it (Bauhr, 2016, p 2). For
only SME-led Anti-corruption collective
SMEs, it can be argued that their
action in Africa which is widely cited as an
willingness to act against corruption
initiative that took off and has so far been
collectively or not will depend on whether
sustained.
the corruption they face is more of the
‘greed’ variant and therefore beneficial to
them or of the ‘need’ variant in which case
it victimizes them. The relevance and
applicability of this hypothesis will be
briefly explored and applied later on in
this paper. Despite the pervasiveness of corruption
and its impact on business, SMEs in
Malawi have not been actively involved in
10
Anti-Corruption efforts in general cases, an impediment to business
including collective action. Since 2005 operations is a hindrance to SME
when Anti-corruption collective action attempts to mobilize and engage in
started in Malawi with the formation of the Anti-corruption collective action?
Business Action Against Corruption,
representation of the business sector in 2. Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in
collective efforts has not involved SMEs or Malawi are dissuaded by the risks
their respective associations. Despite the associated with fighting corruption
existence of SME associations, the focus of from engaging in Anti-corruption
their efforts has not included anti- collective action.
corruption. No study has explored the
factors that are influencing this.
16
corruption in their association meetings, to collaborate with law enforcement
not much follow up action has been done. agencies in reporting cases without fear.
They also cited cultural influences as a The responses indicated that fear also
factor. They argued that corruption had stemmed from a lack of trust in the justice
become part of the business culture in system. One participant in their comment
that it is ingrained in the mindset of a said "They fear that even if they report
significant number of SMEs that corruption they will end up being losers, i.e., corrupt
is the only way they can get business and people even when tried in court will be let
things done by public agencies. They off" (Participant no Q3A, 3rd August 2018).
argue that with such as mindset it is Another association member said, "There
impossible for the same people to support is no evidence of businesses involved in
efforts against it. corruption being jailed" (Participant no
Q8A, 13th August 2018).
They further stated that fear stems from a Some of the participants cited that there is
lack of an effective whistleblowing system naturally always asymmetry in the power
which SMEs can easily access. In their and information which public officials hold
contention, they said that existence of compared to SMEs. This situation they
effective whistleblowing mechanisms argue has perpetuated a master-slave
coupled with strong follow up action on culture between the SMEs and public
reported cases would motivate SME officials in which case SMEs feel they are at
associations to mobilize their membership the mercy of public officials and are
dependent on them. Thus, it becomes
17
difficult to challenge or hold public Some participants cited the tendency by
officials to account. One participant said individual SMEs to act alone on some
"Individual associations do not feel they critical issues which require collaboration
have the clout to deal with corruption, to with fellow SMEs even if they belong to an
speak and be listened to by public officials" association. They cited a lack of mutual
(Participant no Q3A, 3rd August 2018). trust which is also exacerbated by other
This situation is exacerbated by an factors discussed earlier mainly fear of
ineffective system of accountability retaliation when seen to be active in
characterized by, among other elements, efforts against corruption. Others argued
lack of adequate protection of whistle- that since the SMEs naturally compete with
blowers in the law and the unreliability of each other for business opportunities to
the justice system which was cited earlier. survive often from the same sources, it
partly undermines their capacity to have
strong collaboration on a range of issues
despite benefits that would accrue to them
from collaboration. One participant, for
Some participants also cited the low
example, stated that “some traders feel
education levels amongst most SMEs as a
they benefit more acting alone than
contributing factor. They argue that it
collaborating with others” (Participant no
undermines SMEs capacity to understand
Q14B, 8th August 2018). The tendency to
and appreciate issues but also claim their
act alone also stems from a mistrust of
rights or challenge public officials even
each other but also from the failure to
where they are out of line. It also
appreciate the benefits of cooperating with
undermines their capacity to effectively
other SEMs in addressing corruption. One
lobby for policies that would contribute to
of the key informants, for instance, stated
creating a corruption-free business
that "Some SMEs do not see the bigger
environment. One of the participants also
picture and so do not appreciate the
argued that “low education levels means
importance of coming together to be part
SMEs lack the capacity to document what
of anti-corruption efforts" (Participant no
is happening (such as corruption) and act
Q1K, 31st August 2018). Others raised the
on it” (Participant no Q5A, 5 th
August
issue of SMEs not feeling that they have a
20118).
responsibility to do something about
corruption. This stems from the feeling
that tackling corruption is Government’s
responsibility or from lack of the requisite
mechanisms to facilitate SME contribution
to addressing corruption through
18
collective action as one of the key One participant, for instance, stated that
informants also noted that: “there is a lack “there is no cooperation, Sometimes SME
of a policy framework that enables SMEs associations also look at each other as
to talk about corruption and discuss its rivals” (Participant no Q11A, 7th September
eradication" (Participant no Q3K, 18th 2018). Another participant stated “Because
September 2018). there has not been networking between
associations to agree on one stand on
issues” (Participant no Q7A, 7th August
2018)
The lack of cooperation and trust between stakeholders who in their view can play
the associations and makes them more this role. One of the participants said
argue that this undermines their capacity associations. Each one is doing their own
to come together and collaborate on such thing. However, if perhaps CSOs would
issues like corruption which affects them come in to unite associations, then it can
21
willing to participate in any future facilitate the creation of a platform where
collaborative effort involving SMEs to experiences and knowledge would be
address corruption. However, a few shared and encourage openness, resulting
participants (24% or 4 out of the 17 in removing fear. They also stated that it
participants) while acknowledging the could help SMEs to build evidence of what
negative impact of corruption, stated that is happening which can inform advocacy
they would only participate if the and lobbying efforts. One participant
collaborative efforts would have commented that “It can also provide an
recognition from Government and also environment where people can share
that a reporting system which allows them issues and remain neutral” (Participant no,
to report anonymously would exist. Q2A, 3rd August 2018) and another said "It
is like peers talking about corruption. They
are bound to take it seriously. They would
Over half of the corruption incidents cited heed the message" (Participant no Q3A, 3rd
23
enforcement agencies and liaise or follow partnerships with such institutions. Some
up with them to act on the reports and of the key informants also suggested that
give feedback to the association or SME associations could get organized and
concerned members. also lobby with Government to play some
role in monitoring public procurements
which touch on SMEs since Government is
They further suggested that the their most significant source of business.
association can also encourage its
members to support other efforts by
government agencies being undertaken to Key informants also suggested that
reform systems to reduce the occurrence development partners can also play a role
of corruption apart from enforcement considering that they implement some
efforts. One of the participants suggested, programs aimed at supporting the
for instance, that the association can development of the SME sector. One key
encourage and openly support, for informant suggested that “Development
instance, “Businesses who have not paid a partners should ensure that any support
bribe to speak about it apart from just to SMEs has a budget to mainstream fight
acting on it” (Participant no Q8A, 13 th
against corruption” (Participant no Q5K,
August 2018). They argued that, in doing 21st September 2018). They also
so, it would expose corruption, break a suggested that development partners can
culture of silence and encourage other even support specific stand-alone projects
members to oppose corruption as well. focused on addressing corruption
affecting SMEs. They also cited that the
Civil Society can help to mobilize SMEs and
They suggested that the association can to facilitate them to cooperate against
25
to SMEs in doing business influences SMEs
willingness to collaborate against
corruption. The results, however, show
that despite the inhibiting factors and the
The results have shown that SMEs
present lack of collective action, SMEs are
participation in Anti-corruption collective
willing to collaborate and believe that
action is inhibited by problems with the
acting collectively would be an effective
individual SMEs and their associations
way to address corruption and accrue a
(internal factors) as well as to problems
range of benefits to them.
beyond them and their associations
(external factors). The results have
identified that a lack of Anti-corruption
capacity in both SMEs and association
leadership, inadequate resources to enable
the associations effectively coordinate
anti-corruption collective efforts, some
SMEs being beneficiaries of Corruption
thus undermining efforts against it, fear of
Most of the inhibiting factors raised by
potential retaliation from public officials
this study agree with those cited in the
and agencies, lack of unity and
available literature and models analyzed
cooperation between SMEs and also the
earlier in this paper though some affect
various associations, lack of engagement
the SMEs in slightly different ways.
and external facilitation from key
Wheatland and Chene (2015) in their work
stakeholders particularly anti-corruption
discuss the role which resources, capacity,
authorities, lack of recognition of SMEs
and facilitation play in helping an Anti-
mainly by public officials and lack of
corruption collective action take off and be
collaboration between various public
sustained for example. Vanni (2014) also
agencies critical to fostering collective
discuss the issue of transaction cost which
efforts among SMEs as factors that are
relates to the lack of resources as a
inhibiting SMEs in Malawi from acting
potential barrier to collective action.
collectively to address corruption.
26
The results have shown that, where critical
state agencies, mainly those central to
issues of corruption that affect SMEs, i.e.,
regulatory, administrative and law
enforcement bodies are not actively
cooperating to address issues that are
bottlenecks fueling corruption that affects
SMEs, it becomes a disincentive to
potential SME collaboration in addressing
corruption. Furthermore, it increases the
risk for SMEs to collaborate to address
corruption because they construe lack of
such collaboration between these public
agencies as lack of commitment on the
part of Government to address the
problem of corruption which SMEs are
facing. Such agencies
27
how they can individually and collectively
address corruption.
30
primarily centered on these factors as
discussed earlier in this paper. What the
The paradox, however, is that while
results show instead is that SMEs
involvement of Government and its
mentioned incentives more as an
agencies in the coalition offers legitimacy
influencing factor for their willingness to
and clout, how closely linked to the
participate in Anti-corruption collective
Government the coalition is seen to be can
action. The results have for instance
also beyond a certain point undermine its
shown that SMEs are motivated to address
legitimacy in the perception of other
corruption because of a range of benefits
stakeholders. It can also potentially
which they cited in the previous section
undermine the voice of SMEs.
that would accrue to them. Johnston and
Kpundeh (2002) classify these types of
benefits cited by SMEs as solidarity
The results have also shown the critical
incentives.
role that that civil society can play in
helping SMEs engage in anti-corruption
collective action. In addition to activism
The results of the study did not also raise
around issues of holding duty bearers to
the issue of the size of the membership in
account, civil society can also help to
these associations and how it can affect
address corruption by working with
the organization of an effective Anti-
constituencies in the society like SMEs
corruption collective action. This issue is
which are victims of corruption by
also not addressed much by Wheatland
mobilizing them to work with parts of
and Chene (2015). It is, however, a
government to address corruption.
potential constraint in Anti-corruption
collective action. It is a central issue in
Olson’s logic of Collective action which
was discussed at the beginning of this
paper. Despite the willingness to engage
in collective efforts amongst SMEs, the
size of these associations as well as
The results, however, did not specifically
incentive structures that would be
highlight the lack of incentives and the
established to support the collective
potential for free riding as a constraining
efforts could significantly influence
factor to Anti-corruption collective action
success. In Egypt, the Anti-collective action
amongst SMEs. These factors were
started with a small core group of SMEs
discussed by both, Wheatland and Chene
and grew from there on. The key, however,
(2015). Mancur Olson’s (1965) work is
31
was the incentive structures provided among other areas in SME collective
(Salama, 2018). action.
32
a few connected SMEs who monopolize a collective action among SMEs to take off
majority of the business opportunities and be sustained.
available. This form of corruption still
leaves a considerable section of SMEs
victimized. The results only show that
SMEs are infuriated by the status quo, but
due to some of the inhibiting factors, this
anger has not transitioned them to anti-
corruption collective action. The existence
of this form of corruption, however,
provides conditions to make a good
business case for collective action
amongst SMEs.
This study explored inhibiting factors that
are constraining SMEs in Malawi from
engaging in collective action against
corruption against a backdrop of evidence
showing that corruption is negatively
impacting their growth and operations the
potential benefits of collaborating against
The study was qualitative and therefore
it. The study has concluded that despite
limited in how many participants it
their willingness to engage in collective
engaged. While It did not sample the
action to address corruption, there is a
whole range of businesses that SMEs are
range of issues both internal to SMEs and
involved in, the range of business covered
their associations as well as external that
included key segments that draw most of
are constraining them and will require to
the SMEs. Further research would,
be addressed Anti-corruption collective
however, be required to explore deeper
action to take off and be sustained. The
some of the issues found by this study
study has also observed that support from
such as, the lack of capacity and resources
a range of other stakeholders mainly
to explore what options can be
Government, development partners, civil
recommended that can work in the Malawi
society organizations and Anti-corruption
context. It would also be ideal to probe
authorities will be crucial to unlocking
the influence of incentives on SMEs
SMEs capacity to overcome the inhibiting
participation specifically to recommend
factors and begin to collaborate against
what incentives would be ideal for the
corruption.
Malawi context to enable Anti-corruption
33
34
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