PCIB ( now BDO ) vs Gomez

Facts:
 Josephine D. Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain
Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January
1985.
 The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985,
issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to
"C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to
"Servants C/C.R. Harrington.
 Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after
receiving... from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion
of the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip.
 On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew
the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person
who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600
representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
 The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine
reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the
job. She alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to
receiving the deposits.
 On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made.
 After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding
Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established
operating procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-
50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the
amount is fully paid.
 Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent
and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did
not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter,
and explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to January 15,
1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
 On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by
gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
 In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered
the PCIB to pay her actual damages
 The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of
Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and
public policy.
 In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision.
Issues:
PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton disregard
of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how
it had treated Josephine.
Ruling:

 Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19
in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor tribunals) have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
 Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
 The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right
principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in
Articles 20[9] and 21[10] of the Civil Code.
 Article 19 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties.
 These standards are the following:
a) to act with justice;
b) to give everyone his due;
c) and to observe honesty and good faith.
 The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself,
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of some illegality.
 When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
 Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of
the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize
employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally.
 In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation
was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to
Harrington's impostor.
 When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB
refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary,
allowances, and bonuses.
Wherefore, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED
Spouses Hing vs Choachuy

Facts:

The petitioner spouses Bill and Victoria Hing are the owners of Lot 1900-B and
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy are the owners of Lots 1901
and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners.

Respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot

1900-C.

In April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) , owned by respondents, filed
a case against petitioner spouses for Injunction and Damages claimimg that petitioners
were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would
destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property. The court
denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations.

According to the spouses Hing, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two
video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Respondents, through their
employees and without the consent of the spouses Hing, also took pictures of the
spouses Hing’ on-going construction.

The spouses Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for Injunction
and Damages with application for a TRO claiming that the acts of respondents violate
their right to privacy and prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

The RTC granted the application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)/injunction
and directed respondents to immediately remove the revolving camera that they
installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners' lot and to
transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer
be viewed.

However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the respondents. The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was
not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.
The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could
not have installed video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of
Aldo,which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they are not the proper parties

Hence, this petition. The issues are (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right
to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Held:

Right to privacy is the right to be let alone

1. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as
“the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to
live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”

2. The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against
the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people
to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them
in the privacy of their homes.

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business
offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter

3. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

4. This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy
cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into,
peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the
latter.”

5. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not
mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar
acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in (Tolentino)

6. Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not
be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence” covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals
may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is used to determine whether

there is a violation of the right to privacy
7. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test determines whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

8. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation

of privacy depends on a two-part test:

(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

9. Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an

individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on
the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

Installation of video surveillance cameras should not cover places where there
is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual
affected is obtained

10. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of
privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected,
was obtained.

11. Nor should these [video surveillance] cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping,
which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti- Wiretapping Law.

12. Petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether

they use it as a business office or as a residence and the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.
Hence, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.

Lim vs Ponce de Leon

Facts: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of
Palawan a
motor launch. A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CF of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery
with Force
and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon.
upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial
Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to
impound
and take custody of the motor launch. On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated
his request
to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent
sale to a
third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same.
Consequently, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-
appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor launch
from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed
with the
CF of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against defendants-
appellees Fiscal
Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962, Maddela entered the
premises of
Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch
without his
consent.

Ruling : To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith.

To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their
duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea
of good faith.

The power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other
officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time
the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the
authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant.

5. But there was nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscals the
authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732
has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but
said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing
the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.

6. The SC reiterated that: (1) in the seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still
necessary; and (2) in issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines whether or
not there is a probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does
not justify its seizure without a warrant.

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damage XXX (9)
the rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Article 32, New Civil Code)

8. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: XXX (6)
Illegal searches. (Article 2219, New Civil Code)

9. A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to

actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded

There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has
the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search
and seizure. 6 And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor
launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-
appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.