C.

Human Relations

Article 19-21
Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 88694
January 11, 199

In 1980, petitioner Albenson delivered to Guaranteed Inc. at Sta Mesa, mild steel plates.
As part of payment, Guaranteed issued a Pacific Banking Corporation Check amounting to
P2,575.00 drawn from E.L. Woodworks. Check was dishonored because of “Account Closed”.
Thereafter, petitioner traced origin of the check and discovered that it was from Guaranteed’s
President – “Eugenio S. Baltao”. Further inquiry reveals that E.L. Woodworks was registered in
the name of one “Eugenio Baltao”. In addition, upon verification, the subject check with
signature belongs to one “Eugenio Baltao”
After obtaining information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon private
respondent Baltao to replace and/or make good the dishonored check. But, Baltao denied
issuing a check and alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity, hence cannot transact. On
February 1983, Albenson filed with Office of Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Baltao
for violation of BP No. 22 and submitted affidavit of petitioner Mendiona, an employee of
Albenson as support. It appears, however, Baltao has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III,
who manages E.L. Woodworks.
In September 1983, Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed information against Baltao for
violation of BP No. 22. He claimed that Baltao was given opportunity to submit
controverting evidences but he failed therefore, waived his right. Baltao, immediately filed a
motion for reinvestigation, alleging it was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be
heard by Sumaway. Consequently, he stated that the check was not issued by him and
signature was not his.
In January 1984, Provincial Fiscal Castro reversed finding of Fiscal Sumaway and
exonerated Baltao and also instructed dismissal of information. Castro found signature on
PBS check is not Baltao’s signature, no showing that Baltao actually received notice of
preliminary investigation, and castigated Sumaway for failing in performance of his
duties.
Because of unjust filing of criminal case against Baltao, he filed before RTC for damages
against Albenson, Jesse Yap (Owner), and Mendiona (Employee). In its decision, lower court
stated that there was a possibility Eugenio Baltao III, son of Baltao, was the one that Albeson
was dealing with. It granted damges. On appeal, CA affirmed and modified RTC’s decision with
regards of the damages.

I: W/N the trial and appellate court is correct in granting damages to Baltao

R: SC granted petition and set aside and reversed CA’s decision. Trial and appellate court is
incorrect in granting damages to Baltao because it mistakenly lumped Article 19, 20 and
21 together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of damages in the civil
complaint filed against petitioners.

Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of
right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded the following
results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that
the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S.
Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks,
against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio
Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the
signature appearing on the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:

(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for
injuries suffered thereby.

Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements:
1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy;
3) and it is done with intent to injure.

——————————————
BDO v. Gomez
G.R. No. 199601
November 23, 2015

Facts:
• Josephine D. Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain
Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January
1985.
• The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985,
issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to
"C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants
C/C.R. Harrington.
• Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving...
from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts
reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip.
• On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew
the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who
made the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600
representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
• The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine
reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the
job. She alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving
the deposits.
• On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's
salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made.
• After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding
Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating
procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through
deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid.
• Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent
and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not
even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and
explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to January 15,
1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
• On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by
gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
• In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered
the PCIB to pay her actual damages
• The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of
Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom,
and public policy.
• In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision.

PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton
disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed
bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.

Issue: whether or not PCIB’s action against Josephine was Proper?

Ruling: NO

BASAHIN MUNA YUNG SAGOT SA BABA NA NAKA UNDERLINE:>>

• Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case.
• Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
• The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right
principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles
20[9] and 21[10] of the Civil Code.
• Article 19 known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties.
• These standards are the following:
a) to act with justice;
b) to give everyone his due;
c) and to observe honesty and good faith.
• The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself, legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality.

• When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

ETO MUNA BASAHIN SA RECIT :>>> ️⬇️

• Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19
of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to
penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and
illegally.
• In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the
investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to
Harrington's impostor.
• When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB
refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary,
allowances, and bonuses.
Wherefore, the petition for review on certiorari is Denied.

——————————————

Coca-Cola v. Spouses Bernardo

G.R. No. 190667
November 7, 2016
Facts:
Sps. Bernardo, doing business as “Jolly Beverage Enterprises”, were distributors of
petitioner’s products from 1987-1999. In their agreement, Coca Cola will extend cash
assistance and trade discount incentives to the respondent while the latter undertook to
sell petitioner's products exclusively, meet the sales quota of 7,000 cases per month,
and assist petitioner in its marketing efforts in exchange. Before the expiration of their
contract, Coca Cola required the respondents to submit a list of their customers on the
pretext that it would formulate a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City
and as a condition for the renewal of their contract. Despite their compliance, the
contract was not renewed.

Respondents later on found out that, Coca Cola started to reach out to the persons
whose names were on the list and that the respondent’s delivery trucks were being
trailed by petitioner's agents; and that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would
approach the former's customers. Further, respondents found out that petitioner had
employed a different pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors was
significantly higher than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed direct buyers and
sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in which it gave away one
free bottle for every case purchased. It further engaged a store adjacent to respondents'
warehouse to sell the former's products at a substantially lower price.

The respondents filed a case against Coca-Cola PH, for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21,
and 28 of the Civil Code and alleging that the acts of petitioner constituted dishonesty,
bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and unfair competition in commercial enterprise.

Issue: Whether the acts of the petitioner constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s right
under Articles 19, 20, 21, and 28 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The SC held that the acts of the petitioner constitutes abuse of rights and
unfair competition under the Civil Code. The SC denied the Petition and affirmed but
modified the damages awarded by the lower court, that it shall earn legal interest of 6%
per annum from the date of finality of the Decision until its full satisfaction.
According to the SC, the petitioner shall liable for damages for abuse of rights and
unfair competition under the Civil Code. Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner
had employed oppressive and high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market
coverage and diminish the investment returns of respondents. The CA
summarized its findings as follows:
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take over the
market: directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing stores at a price
substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers
suffered losses, and in [respondents'] case, laid of a number of employees and
alienated the patronage of its major customers including small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also the
manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took advantage of
the information provided by respondents to facilitate its takeover of the latter's usual
business area. Distributors like respondents, who had assisted petitioner in its
marketing efforts, suddenly found themselves with fewer customers. Other
distributors were left with no choice but to fold.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the award of
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another person commits an act in
violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though not constituting a
transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the
party aggrieved. The provisions read:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, this Court held that under any of the above
provisions of law, an act that causes injury to another may be made the basis for an
award of damages. As explained by this Court in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears; and it disappears when it
is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit
of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot
be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or
offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law
are the supreme norms of justice which the law develops and which are expressed in
three principles: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere and jus suum quique tribuere; and
he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our
rights to prejudice others.

Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in

unfair competition also gives a right of action to the injured party. Article 28 of the Civil
Code provides:

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.

Petitioner cites Tolentino, who in turn cited Colin and Capitant. According to the latter,
the act of "a merchant [who] puts up a store near the store of another and in this way
attracts some of the latter's patrons" is not an abuse of a right. The scenario in the
present case is vastly different: the merchant was also the producer who, with the use
of a list provided by its distributor, knocked on the doors of the latter's customers and
offered the products at a substantially lower price. Unsatisfied, the merchant even sold
its products at a preferential rate to another store within the vicinity. Jurisprudence holds
that when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit, but
regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a competitor out of business, in
order to take advantage of the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty of a
wanton wrong.

————————————————————————————

Article 22-23

Pacific Merchandising Corporation v. Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co.,

G.R. No. L-30204
October 29, 1976

FACTS:

In a Civil Case which was an action instituted by Pacific Merchandising

Corporation (plaintiff-appellee) to collect the sum of P2,562.88 from Consolacion
Insurance & Surety Co, Inc, (defendant-appellee) who in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Gregorio V. Pajarillo (third-party defendant-appellant), the City Court
of Manila rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering
the latter to pay the former and condemning third-party defendant to pay third-party
plaintiff for whatever sums or amounts the latter paid the plaintiff on account of this
judgment.

Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo was appointed as Receiver of all the assets, properties
and equipment of Paris Theatre, operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. The third-party
defendant Pajarillo applied for a surety bond to be posted in favor of the above-named
plaintiff in order to guarantee to said plaintiff the payment of obligations in its favor by
the Leo Enterprises, Inc.; and to protect third-party plaintiff against damage and injury,
Pajarillo executed in favor of the former an INDEMNITY AGREEMENT. (a contract
that protects one party of a transaction from the risks or liabilities created by the other party of
the transaction)

ISSUE:

Whether or not a receiver can enter into any contract without court’s approval.

RULING:

NO. A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action.

He is an officer of the court exercising his functions in the interest of neither
plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all the parties in interest. He
performs his duties "subject to the control of the Court", and every question involved
in the receivership may be determined by the court taking cognizance of the
receivership proceedings.

Thus, "a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any contract
binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the
authority or approval of the court as explained by Justice Moran, speaking for the Court
in a 1939 case. The custody of the receiver is the custody of the court. His acts and
possession are the acts and possession of the court, and his contracts and liabilities
are, in contemplation of law, the contracts and liabilities of the court. As a necessary
consequence, a receiver is subject to the control and supervision of the court at
every step in his management of the property or funds placed in his hands. He cannot
operate independently of the court, and cannot enter into any contract without its
approval.

——————————————
Republic v. Ballocanag (Judge of RTC)
G.R. No. 163794
November 28, 2008

FACTS: Danilo Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500 sq.m. at Brgy Banus,
Pimanalayan, Oriental Mindoro from Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced
improvements and planted Mangoes, Mandarin citrus, and Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land
transferred in his name. Unfortunately, It turned out that the subject land is part of the
Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and therefore, not subject to any disposition or acquisition under
any existing law and is not transferable. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of
petitioner, filed a complaint for “ Cancellation of Title and/or Revision” that the issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) is spurious, fictitious, and irregularly issued on account of the subject
title was part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro per Bureau of Forest Department (BFD)
Land Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte; that the subject land cannot
be subject of any disposition or acquisition under the law.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that Reyes TCT No. 45238 are null and void and ordered
to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the premises. Reyes then
appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeal (CA), apparently, Motion for Reconsideration
was DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should pay Reyes the value of the Improvements he
introduced on the property.

HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court resolved to deny Reyes' petition for failure to sufficiently show
that the CA had committed any reversible error in questioning the judge. The SC agreed with
the CA that Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the subject land. He titled the
land, planted fruit trees thereon and invested money from 1970. It is no longer feasible to
permit him to remove the trees he planted; the only equitable alternative would be to order
the Republic to pay Reyes.

The Supreme Court recognized the ownership of the State over the land but ordered it to pay
the person the value of the actual improvements he made. More particularly, the Supreme Court
said: To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the
State — because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable
forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable — would inequitably result
in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.

Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. This basic doctrine on unjust enrichment
simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at
another’s expense. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

————————————————————————————

Article 24
De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Company
G.R. No. L-35697-99
April 15, 1988

FACTS:

On June 3, 1958 a passenger bus of Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and a delivery
truck of Seven Up Bottling Co., Philippines collided causing the death of Petra Dela
Cruz and serious physical injuries to Eladia De Lima and Nemesio Flores. Three suits
were filed against the respondents before the Court of First Instance of Laguna (San
Pablo City)

On December 27, 1963, the court a quo rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiffs
specifying the indemnity afforded to them. However, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration on the decision by the court a quo seeking award of legal interest on the
adjudged amount in their favour from the date of the said decision but their motion was
not acted upon by the said court.

All of the plaintiffs desisted from appealing with the hope that the defendant will comply
with the indemnity. But instead, the defendant filed an appeal in contrary to the motion
for reconsideration raised by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals. This appeal was
pending for around 30 years.

On December 1971, the petitioners filed a motion before the court of Appeals seeking
the grant of legal interest from the date of the decision of the Court a quo(RTC) and
increasing the civil indemnity for the death of Petra Dela Cruz. The appelatte court
denied the motion on the contention that the petitioners failed to make an appeal on the
error on lower court’s ruling for not awarding the legal interest and damages. The
Supreme Court after thorough review and analysis of the case GRANTED the petition
of the petitioners with modifications on the amounts previously specified by the court a
quo.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court’s decision through its liberal stance manifested vigilance in
favor of the indigent litigants

HELD:

YES. Article 24 provides that “In all contractual, property and other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on the account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
for his protection.” The petitioners were litigating as paupers(very poor person). By
reason of their indigence, they failed to appeal but petitioners De Lima and Requijo
had filed their manifestation making reference to the law and jurisprudence upon which
they base their prayer for relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief.

In the liberal stance of the Supreme Court seeing the case pending for 30 years, it shall
an exemption to the rule that it should not be entertained because of its failure to make
an appeal on the lower court’s decision. The heirs though they failed to do such should
be afforded with equitable relief by the courts as it must be vigilant for their
protection. The claim for legal interest and increase in indemnity should be
entertained in spite of the claimant’s failure to appeal the judgement. Pleadings as
well as remedial laws should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to pursue their respective claims and that a possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided.

——————————————

Sps. Domingo v. Astorga

G.R. No. 130982
September 16, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners, Spouses Domingo Paguyo and Lourdes Paguyo were the owners of a 5-
storey building located at corner Makati Avenue and Valdez Streets, Makati City. Armas Family
is the third party owner of the lot where the Paguyo Building stand was subject for civil case
which had been decided by the RTC Makati Branch 57 settling in a compromise agreement with
a prescribed amount for the consideration of its ownership in favour of the Paguyo spouses.

On November 29 1988, Lourdes Paguyo entered in an agreement with Pierre Astorga for the
sale of the former’s property (5 storey building) including the lot to be purchase from the
Armases. This move was done in order to raise fund needed to be paid for the Armases’ lot. On
the same date, the petitioner received P50,000 as earnest money for the sale of her property.
Unfortunately, despite of the full financial support given by the respondents, the petitioner failed
to acquire the lot in question. On December 12 1988, the petitioner asked for and were given
another P50,000 by the respondents to which was badly needed by the former to finance their
construction business. Eventually, proposed the separate sale of the building in question while
the effort to purchase the lot is on-going and the respondents were assured of its success.

On January 5, 1989, the parties executed four documents namely; Deed of Absolute Sale, Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage, Mutual Understanding, and Deed of Assignment of Rights and
Interest. Pursuant to their agreement particularly in Mutual understanding, the respondent filed
for the ejectment case before the MTC where they obtained favourable decision.
On October 1989, petitioners filed for the recession of their agreement on the contention that
the respondents led them to the wrong belief the respondents will advance the amount needed
by the petitioner to be paid for the Armases but instead the respondents stopped the said
payment. Respondents in their answer as gleaned from the agreements that their original
purpose was the purchase of the building and the lot which it stands. They added that at that
time , the petitioners are in dire need of the amount to finance their construction business and
the balance to the Armases. It was on July 1989 when the petitioner asked the respondents to
execute the check amounting to P917,470.00 for the final execution of the Deed of Conveyance
of the lot. However, the respondent stopped the payment of check upon knowing that the
petitioners have no rights over the lot in question which was already transferred to the Bacani
spouses.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of the petitioners dated April 21 1994. The CA also affirmed
the decision of the lower court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court
with modifications on the amounts of damages and attorney’s fee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners could rescind the agreement by claiming as the injured
party or party on a disadvantage.

RULING: Neither does the fact that the subject contracts have been prepared by respondents
ipso facto entail that their validity and legality be strictly interpreted against them. Petitioner
Lourdes Paguyo’s insinuation that she was disadvantaged will not hold. True, Article 24 of
the New Civil Code provides that “(i)n all contractual, property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”
Thus, the validity and/or enforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by
the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of the parties concerned.
Here, petitioner Lourdes Paguyo, being not only cultured but a person with great
business acumen as well, cannot claim to be the weaker or disadvantaged party in the
subject contract so as to call for a strict interpretation against respondents. More importantly,
the parties herein went through a series of negotiations before the documents were signed and
executed.

————————————————————————————

Article 26
RCPI v. Verchez
G.R. No. 164349
January 31, 2006

F: In January 1991, Editha Verchez was confined at Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an
ailment. Her daughter Grace immediately hied to RCPI – Sorsogon Branch to send a telegram
to her sister Zenaida reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." After 3 days, no response
was received so Grace sent a letter thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding Zenaida for not
sending any financial aid. Immediately after she received letter, Zenaida and husband Fortunato
left for Sorsogon. On her arrival, she disclaimed having received any telegram. After, Zenaida
and her husband transferred Editha to Veterans Memorial Hospital in QC where she was
confined. Telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later, when asked why it took so
long, the messenger said that its not his fault because the address could not be located.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez demanded an explanation from RCPI manager Fabian. As a
reply, “occurrence of circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI.
Among others, during the transmission process, the radio link connecting the points of
communication involved encountered radio noise and interferences such that subject telegram
did not initially registered in the receiving teleprinter machine.” In April 1992, Editha died. After
few months, Verchez with his daughters, filed a complaint against RCPI before RTC for
damages. They alleged that the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise
of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice for which they prayed for award. For RCPI, it
alleged that only Grace has contract with them, any delay in the sending of the telegram was
due to force majeure, Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved it from liability for
any damage arising from the transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls, and it
observed due diligence in selection and supervision of its employees at all events. RTC held
that the negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of the employer and rendered P100,000 moral damages, P20,000 as attorney’s fee,
and to pay costs to plaintiffs. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Hence, this present petition
for review on certiorari.

I: W/N the award of moral damages is proper even if the trial court found that there was no
direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts

R: Petition is denied and CA’s decision is affirmed. The award of moral damages is proper
even if the trial court found that there was no direct connection between the injury and
the alleged negligent acts. Article 26 of the Civil Code provides: Every person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of
mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it
disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are,
therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the
instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.

In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in order, as is the
award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to protect their rights.

SC awarded damages on the basis of Article 26(2) of the Civil Code, considering the act
or omission of the telegraph company disturbed the peace of mind of the family.

——————————————

Hing v. Choachuy
G.R. No. 179736
 June 26, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner spouses Bill and Victoria Hing are the owners of Lot 1900-B and respondents
Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy are the owners of Lots 1901 and 1900-C,
adjacent to the property of petitioners.

Respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C.

In April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) , owned by respondents, filed a case
against petitioner spouses for Injunction and Damages claiming that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy
the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property. The court denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations.

According to the spouses Hing, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s property. Respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of the spouses Hing, also took pictures of the spouses Hing’ on-going
construction.

The spouses Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for Injunction and
Damages with application for a TRO claiming that the acts of respondents violate their right
to privacy and prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

The RTC granted the application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)/injunction and
directed respondents to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at
the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners' lot and to transfer and
operate it elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed.

However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the respondents. The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA also
said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed
video surveillance cameras. They are mere stockholders of Aldo,which has a separate juridical
personality. Thus, they are not the proper parties

Hence, this petition.

Issue:
whether or not there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy

Held: Yes

Right to privacy is the right to be let alone

Petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it
as a business office or as a residence and the installation of video surveillance cameras
directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. Hence, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was justified.

[The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean that
only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and
only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in (Tolentino)]

1. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right
of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.” Simply
put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”

2. The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the
State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure
in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then
only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter

3. Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

4. This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot
be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter.”

5. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does not mean
that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and
only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in (Tolentino)

6. Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude
the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence”
covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on
his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.

The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is used to determine whether there is a violation of
the right to privacy

7. The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test determines whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

8. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of

privacy depends on a two-part test:

(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.

9. Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.

Installation of video surveillance cameras should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual affected is
obtained

10. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere
for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however,
should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained.

11. Nor should these [video surveillance] cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti- Wiretapping Law.

————————————————————————————

Article 27
Vda. De Laig v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-26882
April 5, 1978

Facts:

o In 1939, Petre Galero obtained a Homestead Patent covering 219,949

sq. m. of land located at Barrio Pinagtambangan, Labo, Camarines
Norte, for which an original certificate of title (OCT) was issued in his
name.
o Galero sold the said land. But through proper court action, with Atty.
Benito K. Laig, the deceased husband of petitioner Rosario Vda. de
Laig, as counsel, was able to recover the land, the court having been
convinced that its alienation violated Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years
and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the secretary of agriculture and commerce, which approval
shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds (sec. 118,
ca no. 141, as amended by ca no. 456).
o In 1948, a deed of sale (first dos) was executed by Petre Galero in
favor of Atty. Benito Laig, selling the land to Atty. Laig. This deed of sale
was executed in the house of private respondent Carmen Verzo.
Thereafter, the OCT of the land was delivered by Galero to Atty. Laig.
o Unfortunately, Atty. Benito K. Laig failed to solicit the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by
Section 118 of the Public Land Act. It was only after Atty. Laig's death
in 1951 that his wife noticed the deficiency.
o As such, Rosario Vda. de Laig wrote the then Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte, respondent Baldomero M. Lapak, stating that the
disputed parcel of land had been sold to her late husband, requesting
that she be informed of any claim of ownership by other parties so
that she could take the necessary steps, and serving notice of her
claim over the said property as surviving spouse of the late Atty. Laig and
as natural guardian of their children.
o She then filed with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit together with copy
of the deed of sale. Said affidavit stated that she wanted to have the
ownership over the land transferred to her husband's name.
o The Bureau of Lands forwarded the affidavit to the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On the same day, the
Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, thru then
Undersecretary Jose S. Camus, approved the deed of sale.
o In July 1952, Petre Galero, with the assistance of Atty. Jose L. Lapak,
son of respondent Register of Deeds Baldomero M. Lapak sought in
court the issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of OCT No.
1097, claiming that his first duplicate of said OCT was lost during
World War 2.
o In a span of only four days - a second owner's duplicate copy of the
OCT was issued by Register of Deeds Baldomero M. Lapak in favor of
Galero. And right on that same day, Galero executed in favor of
respondent Carmen Verzo a deed of sale of the land in issue.
o The sale was later on approved by the Secretary of Agriculture Jose S.
Camus. Subsequently, Verzo declared that she owned the land for
purposes of taxation and a TCT was issued in her name.
o Upon knowing that a TCT over the land was issued in favor of another
person, petitioners called the attention of the Director of Lands to the
 existence of two deeds of sale, one in favor of Atty. Benito Laig, and
another in favor of Carmen Verzo.
o During the investigation, Petre Galero denied having sold the land in
issue to Atty. Benito K. Laig.
o Petitioner Vda. de Laig, together with her minor children, filed then the
present action against respondents praying for the annulment of the
sale in favor of Carmen Verzo and the cancellation of the second
owner's duplicate of the OCT and TCT and for the payment of
damages.
o RTC- dismissed the complaint and declared that the land described in
TCT No. 1055 to be rightfully owned by Carmen Verzo. The lower court
also found Baldomero M. Lapak, then the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte, guilty of negligence, but exempted him from any liability; found
the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources likewise guilty of negligence, but exempted them from any
liability on the theory that they are not responsible for the acts of
their subordinates; held that the approval of two deeds of sale in favor of
two different vendees in a space of less than one month is but a
ministerial duty which exculpates the Director of Lands and the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources from liability, and that plaintiffs-
appellants slept on their rights in not having the first deed of sale in favor
of Atty. Laig registered in the Registry of property, and therefore, have
only themselves to blame for losing the land; and exempted Galero from
liability.
o CA affirmed the said decision.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Jose Lapak should be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for his involvement in this case.
Ruling: YES. As heretofore indicated, the malicious participation of respondent register
of deeds Baldomero Lapak and his son Atty. Lapak is evident.
Atty. Lapak (along with his father) is liable for violating Section 117 of Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act), for which he should be, not only prosecuted but also, disciplined as a
member of the Bar.
Petre Galero was able to procure another copy of the duplicate of the OCT covering the
disputed land through the aid of Atty. Jose Lapak who is the son of the respondent
register of deeds, Baldomero Lapak, under clearly dubious circumstances. For one, it
was done without observing the required formalities of notice and hearing. Secondly, it
was an over in a record-setting period of ONLY four days. Add to this the fact that
respondent register of deeds Baldomero Lapak issued said duplicate of OCT 1097
despite his having received about eight months earlier and taken note on November 12,
1951 of the letter of petitioner Rosario Vda. de Laig inquiring about the status of the title
to the questioned land which was purchased by her husband from Petre Galero; and the
process, indeed, reeks with an unpleasant scent.If Atty. Jose Lapak were not the son of
respondent Baldomero Lapak, the latter as register of deeds would not have facilitated
the issuance of the duplicate copy of the title with such "scandalous haste." He should
have informed his son,Atty. Lapak, and Petre Galero about the previous inquiry of
petitioner as early as November 5, 1951, to which he replied on November 12, 1951
that OCT No. 1097 was still intact.
Moreover, the expeditious disposal of the land in litigation by Petre Galero to Carmen
Verzo was done immediately after the death of Atty. Benito Laig, and during the time
that his wife Rosario Vda. de Laig, who was residing in faraway Manila,was seeking all
legal means to have the title over the property transferred to her name.
Such bad faith on the part of respondent Carmen Verzo and Baldomero Lapak is further
underscored by the fact that Atty. Jose Lapak himself (a) was the notary public before
whom the deed of sale executed by and between Petre Galeroand Carmen Verzo was
acknowledged, and (b) was the same lawyer who assisted Carmen Verzo in writing the
Director Of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, enclosing
therewith an affidavit also sworn before said Atty. Lapak, praying that the deed of sale
be approved.
This conspiracy among Petre Galero, register of deeds Baldomero Lapak, his son Atty.
Jose Lapak, and Carmen Verzo,could not have been known to petitioner Rosario Vda.
de Laig, who was then as now, residing in Manila.
Moreover, both Baldomero Lapak and his son Atty. Jose Lapak are likewise civilly liable
for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public
officer and as a member of the Bar (Art. 19, New Civil Code) or for wilfully or negligently
causing damage to another (Art. 20, New Civil Code), or for wilfully causing loss or
injury to anotherin a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public
policy (Art. 21, New Civil Code).RULINGWHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED
FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED AND I. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAMARINES
NORTE IS HEREBY DIRECTED
(A) TO CANCEL TCT NO. T-1055; AND
(B) TO ISSUE IN LIEU THEREOF A NEW TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN
FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE BENITO K. LAIG; AND
II. ALL THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN, EXCEPT THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ARE HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY PETITIONERS IN THE AMOUNT OF
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS AS MORAL DAMAGES; THE SUM OF FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES; AND THE COSTS.NOTES
· Petre Galero was also charged before the Court of First Instance of Camarines with
estafa thru falsification of public documents in connection with the sale in favor of
Carmen Verzo of the land in point. Galero was convicted on October 29, 1953, which
conviction was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in People vs. Petre Galero (CA-
G.R. No. 12043-R, December 2, 1954). He died while serving his sentence.
Baldomero Lapak likewise stands liable under Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which
states:

Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.

For in essence, his refusal to follow the directive of law (Act No. 496) was a conduct
injurious to the petitioner. Thus a chief of police is liable under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code for refusal to give assistance to the complainants which was his official duty
as an officer of the law (Amarro, et al. vs. Sumanggit, L-14986, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
707, 708-9). Similarly, a municipal mayor incurs the same liability for neglecting to
perform his official functions (Javellana vs. Tayo, L-18919, Dec. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA
1042, 1051).

——————————————

Correa v. CFI of Bulacan

G.R. No. L-46096
July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312

Facts

On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs (private respondents herein) and adversely against
therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein). The pertinent portions of the
decision read as follows: "This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and
Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan
respectively, should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed
to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated.

The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 22, 1976,
and the motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision was denied on May
11, 1976. On August 24, 1976, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory. It is in connection with the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of
execution issued to enforce the aforestated final judgment that the present proceedings
arose. Bulacan.

Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered against an officer
of the municipal corporation who is sued in his official capacity for the payment of back
salaries of officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation,
whether or not the same is included as party to the action. Petitioner contends that it is
the municipality of Norzagaray that is liable.

Issue:

The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the
Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of discretion or with lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Held:

In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are

responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent
that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the
requirements thereof." A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done
in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is
personally liable therefor like any private individual.

This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public
officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the
reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of
law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official
authority. Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The writ was strictly in
accordance with the terms of the judgment.

——————————————

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-54598
April 15, 1988

Facts: An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the
West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity,
Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school.
“the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus,
appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decision:

…. Appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved
in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are
otherwise entitled thereto.

On the day of graduation, the petitioner, however, let her graduate as a plain student
instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude and her award as Magna
Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the receipt by the
president of the decision and after the graduation.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of
the student’s rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty
without just cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s parents went through a painful ordeal brought
about by such neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under Article 27 are proper.

RELIEF AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS. A public official is supposed to be an agent or at least

a representation of the government and, therefore, the law exacts on him or her an obligation to
be very vigilant and just so that the public can be assured that the government is truly effective
in servicing their needs. Any person, suffering from the refusal or neglect of any government
employee or public servant to perform his duties, is entitled to damages.

————————————————————————————

Article 29
Mendoza v. Alcala
G.R. No. L-14305
August 29, 1961

FACTS:
Maximo Alcala was charged with the crime of Estafa. The charge was predicated upon a
receipt which reads as follows:

Tinanggap ko kay Gng. Gaudencio T. Mendoza ang halagang ISANG LIBO AT ISANG DAANG
piso (1,100) kualtang pilipino bilang paunang bayad ng ISANG DAANG (Wagwag) kabang palay
sa 56 kilos bawa't kaban, puesto sa kanyang kamalig.

Ipinangako kong ihahatid ang palay na ito sa o bago dumating ang ika-5 ng Septiembre, 1953,
dito sa San Jose, Nueva Ecija.

Sa katunayan ng lahat ay lumagda ako sa ibaba nito ngayong ika-2 ng Septiembre, 1953.
(Sgd.) MAXIMO M. ALCALA

The court acquitted the defendant of the offense charged after the ff findings; The
prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had in fact
represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay stored in his sister's
bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00. The Court can not believe that Gaudencio T.
Mendoza would pay to the defendant the sum of P1,100.00 on the mere representation of the
defendant that the palay was in the bodega of his sister, and on his request to pay him first as
he was going to Manila.

In acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa, the Court expressly made a finding as follows:

"The Court does not expressly pass upon the defense that the receipt signed by him arose from
a usurious loan, as there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that there had been no deceit
or misrepresentation and that Exh. B. is not what it purports to be."
In effect, the Court did not believe that the accused received the amount of P1,100.00 as
advance payment of the 100 cavans of palay weighing 46 kilos a cavan. Since the Court did
not find this to be a fact, it cannot serve as basis for a criminal action under the provisions of
the rule above-cited. The reason for the rule is that, once the court makes a definite finding as to
the non-existence of a fact, non-existence should be final and conclusive against the party
claiming the existence of the same, otherwise there would be no stability in the decision of the
courts.

The only possibility, therefore, of filing a civil action against the same defendant is to work out a
theory entirely different from the theory followed in the criminal action, which was, that the
defendant received the amount of P1,100.00 as advance payment for palay for as to any other
theory, the Court did not make any express finding that the same did not exist.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed error in dismissing the present action. It is
claimed that as in its decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 the trial court did not make any
express finding that the fact on which the action was predicated did not exist, but merely found
that "the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had in fact
represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay stored in his sister's
bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00," that "there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that there had been no deceit or misrepresentation and that Exhibit B is not what it
purports to be," and that "any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of
Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character, and not criminal," which findings amount to a
declaration that the defendant was acquitted on reasonable doubt, a civil action based on the
same transaction may still be instituted.

The appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the judgment appealed from is correct. It is
urged that the findings made in the said decision, particularly those quoted above, amount to a
declaration that the transaction which was the subject matter of that criminal case did not exist
and so no civil action based on that same transaction would lie.

WON: A civil case may be instituted against Alcala

RULING: The pertinent provisions of law are Article 29 of the new Civil Code and Rule 107,
Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Rules of Court. Article 29 of the new Civil Code provides:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

It that appellant's contention is not without will be noted that nowhere in the decision rendered in
Criminal Case No. 3219 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija is found an express
declaration that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. It is true that said
decision likewise contains no express declaration that the acquittal of the defendant was based
upon reasonable doubt. Whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground may, under the above
quoted provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, be inferred from the text of the decision, and a
close consideration of the language used in said decision, particularly the findings quoted
above, which are of similar import as the phrase "that the guilt of the defendant has not been
satisfactorily established," held in Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, supra, to be equivalent
to a declaration that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, convinces us that the
acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case in question was predicated on the conclusion that
his guilt of the crime charged has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and does not
preclude a suit to enforce the civil liability arising from the same transaction which was
the subject-matter of said criminal action. The right, therefore, of the appellant to bring the
present action cannot be questioned, the fact that he did not reserve his right to file an
independent civil action, and that this action has been instituted before final judgment in
the criminal case was rendered notwithstanding.

————————————————————————————

Article 31

Bernaldes Sr. v. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc.,

G.R. No. L-18193,
February 27, 1963

FACTS:

Plaintiff-Appellants, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's
passenger trucks(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on
the way to Tagbilaran. However, the bus fell off a deep and high cliff in barrio Balitbiton,
municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical
injuries to Jovito.

Hence, a complaint for damages against appellee, Bohol LandTransportation Co. was filed. On
the other hand, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds: (1) that
the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and (2) that it did not state a
cause of action.

Subsequently, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court at the
hearing on the motion to dismiss that the driver of the bus involved in the accident, was charged
with double homicide thru reckless imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that his guilt
had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Further, appellees, through their attorneys,
intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve the right to file a separate action
for damages.

The motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment and dismissal of the case were sustained by
the lower court. The offended party appeals.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on
breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the driver
has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a
separate action.
2. Whether or not the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted.

RULING: YES. The Court found the appeal interposed by appellants to be meritorious
as pursuant to Article 31 of the Civil Code which provides that “when the civil action is based
upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

Thus, the Court held the following grounds for finding the appeal meritorious:

1. The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and
his brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted
against appellee's driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter
arising from his criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's action concerned the
civil liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who
was charged in the criminal case.

2. True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene — whether

properly or improperly we do not here decide — in the criminal action against appellee's
driver, but if that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil
indemnity, the claim could have been only against the driver but not against appellee
who was not a party therein.

3. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil
liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that the
criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity.

4. Appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
against him may be instituted for the same act or omission.

——————————————

Corpus v. Page
G.R. No. L-26737
July 31, 1969

F: In December 1956, passenger bus of Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo
Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in latter's death and in physical
injuries to two other persons. Information for homicide and double serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in CFI. Heirs of Marcia reserved their right
to institute a separate civil action for damages. In November 1960, accused was found guilty
and convicted of the crime charged. Paje appealed to CA. In November 1961, while Paje’s
appeal was pending decision in CA, Marcia’s heirs, Laura his widow and minor children,
instituted in CFI a separate civil action for damages based upon criminal act of reckless
imprudence against Paje and Victory Liner, praying that defendants to pay amounts of damages
claimed by plaintiffs. In November 1962, CA promulgated its decision in Paje’s appeal reversing
and acquitting appellant after finding reckless imprudence charged does not exist and collision
was a case of pure accident. In December 1962, defendants filed motion to dismiss civil action
because of their acquittal in criminal action. Motion was denied. At pre-trial of civil case,
defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based
upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and
eleven months after the collision and according to Article 1144 action based upon quasi-delict
must be instituted within four years. Lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. Thus, this appeal.

I: W/N lower court erred in dismissing the civil case of Marcia’s heirs

R: No, the lower court did not err in dismissing the civil case of Marcia’s heirs.

The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the
ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist
and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for
the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of
which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.

Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is,
of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said
article mentions only the crimes of defamation, fraud (estafa) and physical injuries.

It is, therefore, clear that the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide but for reckless
imprudence, that is, criminal negligence resulting in homicide and double physical injuries
suffered by two other persons. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the
three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for
damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of
the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act
notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action.

————————————————————————————

Article 32

Lim v. Ponce de Leon

G.R. No. L-22554
 August 29, 1975

Facts:
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor
launch. A year later, Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with
Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch
was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to
direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound and take custody of the motor
launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a
third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the
same.
Consequently, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, who was in
turn ordered by the Fiscal De Leon, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment
Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim and impounded it.
Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a
complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962, Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a
search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his
consent.

Fiscal contended he was in good faith and without malice in seizing the stolen boat while
the detachment commander contended he was obeying the order of superior officer.

Issue: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense under Article 32 of the New Civil Code

Ruling : NO

GOOD FAITH NOT A DEFENSE

1.To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith.

2. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights.

3. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

4. The power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer
and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act
complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of
Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant.
5. But there was nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial fiscals the authority to
issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a personal property even if it is
the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial
fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate
of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable
cause exists therefor.

6. The SC reiterated that: (1) in the seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still necessary;
and (2) in issuing a search warrant the judge alone determines whether or not there is a
probable cause. The fact that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its seizure
without a warrant.

7. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damage XXX (9) the rights to be secure in one's
person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Article 32,
New Civil Code)

8. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: XXX (6) Illegal
searches. (Article 2219, New Civil Code)

9. A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and
moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded

There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right
to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. And
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they
have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.

——————————————

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

G.R. No. 141309
June 19, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Fortune Tobacco manufactures “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”
cigarettes. Before the effectivity of RA 7654, thebrands were considered local brands
subject to an ad valorem tax at 20-45%.
Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654 the petitioner, as CIR, issued RMC 37-93
reclassifying the 3 brands as locallymanufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
Fortune filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. CTA ruled that RMC
37-93 is defective, invalid, andunenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from
collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93(not
unconstitutional)
Fortune filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended thatthe latter should be held liable for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the
right to equal protection ofthe laws.
Petitioner Vinzons-Chato filed a motion to dismiss contending that, in issuing the RMC
as CIR, she acted merely as an agent ofthe Republic and therefore she cannot be held
liable in her personal capacity.
RTC denied motion, CA affirmed. Petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that
the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functionsas a public
officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be
applied. Under this provision,liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the CivilCode,
specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights, is a general law on theliability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’liability, such that, if
the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence, the same isdismissible for failure to state a cause of action
ISSUE/S:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functionsof his/her office? (Y)
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determiningwhether the instant complaint states a
cause of action? Art 32 NCC

Ruling:
1. General rule: a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
Exception: a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal
capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.
And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA,
a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may
be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the CivilCode even if his acts were not
so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the
office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2)
where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
2. SC held that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code
Commission, as follows:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite
would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual
rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the
Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States
this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of
their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith,
malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a
particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public
officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the
special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers.
Also, special law prevails over a general law:
Compared thus with Section 38 of the Admin Code, which broadly deals with civil
liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, NCC 32 is the specific provision
which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of
constitutional rights.

——————————————

•Esguerra v. Gonzales-Asdala
G.R. No. 168906
December 4, 2008

FACTS:

Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently employed as the Chief

Dietitian of the Philippine Heart Center (PHC). On 15 May 2000, AB Food and
Beverages Philippines (AB Food) entered into a contract with JWT whereby the latter
would handle the advertising, marketing, promotional and general publicity requirements
of the former. on 14 May 2003, AGL, thru its Director/General Manager Nicanor G.
Aguirre (Aguirre), wrote a letter to the PHC, inviting nutritionists from the said hospital to
participate in a study it was conducting. Aguirre gave the assurance that "all information
that would be generated from this study would be kept completely confidential," and the
AGL representative bearing the letter made it understood that, among other things, a
talent fee of P20,000.00.
 On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine commercial was aired on
television with Esguerra appearing therein. According to Esguerra, there was absolutely
no advice from either JWT or AGL prior to the airing of the commercial that she had
been chosen to so appear therein.

Neither did JWT and AGL secure the required clearance from the PHC Director
nor did they pay Esguerra any talent fee for the commercial. After almost three weeks of
waiting without her application for injunctive relief being set for hearing, Esguerra filed
on 26 August 2003 an Urgent Motion for Inhibition of RTC Judge Asdala, asserting
therein that "by failing to act swiftly on her application for TRO as mandated under the
law, [RTC Judge Asdala] has already displayed partiality and bias against her and in
favor of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL], whether or not for `valuable’
consideration."

RTC-Branch 87, however, subsequently issued an Order dated 28 August

2003 ;From an overall judicious examination of [Eguerra’s] allegation in support of her
application for injunction, this Court finds that issuance of an injunctive relief based on
the facts obtaining is not warranted. WHEREFORE, [Esguerra’s] application for
injunction is DENIED for lack of merit. This led Esguerra to file another Urgent Motion
which sought, among other reliefs, reconsideration of the Order dated 28 August 2003
of RTC-Branch 87 and resolution of her Motion for Inhibition.

She averred in her Urgent Motion that the denial of her application for injunctive
relief was highly irregular, having been issued without a summary hearing, in violation of
the provisions of Section 4(d), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On 3
September 2003, Judge Asdala issued an Order explaining why no hearing was
conducted on the prayer for TRO filed by Esguerra. (Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure—see blue highlight) In the meantime, during the pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 before the Court of Appeals, Judge Asdala issued an Order
dated 18 September 2003, inhibiting herself from Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 then re-
raffled on 2 October 200313 to the Quezon City RTC-Branch 215. Since Esguerra did
not withdraw her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, the Court of Appeals also
proceeded with the same.

In its Decision dated 31 March 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed Esguerra’s
Petition. It reasoned that Judge Asdala resolved Esguerra’s application for
injunction/TRO in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 in the exercise of her judicial function.
Esguerra assailed in her Petition an official act of Judge Asdala, for which the latter
cannot be made answerable for damages. Esguerra wants us not only to reverse and
set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, but also to hold
Judge Asdala answerable for damages in the amount of P2.2 million, plus costs of suit
and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the public respondent may be held liable for damages
RULING

(No) In sum, Esguerra asserts that she suffered damages by reason of the
continued showing of the offending commercial from the time the TRO should have
been issued by Judge Asdala of RTCBranch 87. By Esguerra’s determination, Judge
Asdala could and should have issued the TRO as early as 1 August 2003, since
summons were already served on respondents on 29 July 2003 and Civil Case No. Q-
03-50205 was raffled to the RTC-Branch 87 on 31 July 2003. Under Section 4(d) of
Rule 58, Judge Asdala was obliged to already conduct a summary hearing on
Esguerra’s application by the very next day, 1 August 2003, but Judge Asdala dilly-
dallied in acting on the application too long.

From 1 August 2003 to 17 November 2003, the date when JWT and AGL
received copies of the Order dated 14 November 2003 of RTC-Branch 215 granting a
TRO in Esguerra’s favor and, when the showing of the Ovaltine commercial was
actually stopped, the said commercial was already shown 110 times more.

The Petition is not meritorious. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
Esguerra’s Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. Judges cannot be subjected to liability –
civil, criminal or administrative – for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous,
so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with
gross ignorance, may they be held criminally or administratively responsible.

The records do not show that Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill will or
malicious intent when she did not grant the TRO and preliminary injunction Esguerra
prayed for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. It is not
presumed and the party who alleges the same has the onus of proving it.

Esguerra has not, in fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended
the actions of Judge Asdala. While we have earlier ruled that the question of the
propriety of the denial of the application for preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic, still let it be stated that Judge Asdala’s ruling is not manifestly unjust nor did
it constitute gross ignorance. Her reasons for denying Esguerra’s application for
injunctive relief were clearly stated in her Order of 28 August 2003.

She had obviously applied therein the basic requirements, as laid down in
jurisprudence, for entitlement to injunctive relief and found that Esguerra’s application
failed to comply with the requisites. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31
March 2005 and its Resolution dated 12 July 2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

————————————————————————————

Article 36
Benitez v. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-14646
May 30, 1961
Facts: That on May 4, 1946 Rufino Ibanez, Ong ho and Chingsiokeng (wife of Yu bon Chiong)
executed a real estate mortgage at Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the payment of the
Debtor (Yu bon Chiong) with an amount of P50,000,00 the mortgage was amended on March
26, 19657 to secure the payment of the increase indebtedness of the petitioner which had risen
to P170,000,00. The petitioner failed to pay the debt that causes the PNB to file with the CFI of
Rizal a civil case against the petitioner and respondent (civil case 449).

On July 24, 1957 Ong ho filed a complaint in the CFI manila civil case 33251 against the PNB
and petitioners for the annulment of the two deeds of mortgage, claiming that his signature in
the said documents was forged.

On July 16, 1958 respondent Ong ho filed a Criminal case complaint before the city fiscal of
manila, charging the petitioner falsification of deeds of mortgage involved in civil case no. 994.

On July 2, 1958 Petitioner filed a motion before the respondent fiscal for the dismissal of the
criminal complaint on the ground that there’s a civil prejudicial question of which should be
resolved first.

Issue: Whether or not a civil prejudicial question exists in the said petition.

Held: No, disputes arises from the fact that both civil case no. 33251 and criminal case O.s no
15190 arose from the same transaction or fact. The general rule is that where both a civil and a
criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in court, the criminal case takes precedence.
An exception to this general rule would be if there exist prejudicial questions which should be
resolved first before action could be taken in a criminal case and when the law provides that
both civil and criminal case can be instituted simultaneously such as that provided in Article 33
of the Civil Code.

——————————————

Beltran v. People
G.R. No. 137567
June 20, 2000

FACTS:
Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who left the conjugal home, and
is now living with Milagros, his paramour.

Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City. Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan
Trial Court, saying that the pendency of the petition for nullity of his marriage with Charmaine
poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by Meynardo,
hence he filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court from trying his case. The RTC
denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial
question to a prosecution for concubinage filed by the wife?

RULING:
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question to a prosecution for concubinage.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes.

Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore,
has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that
pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.

——————————————

Te. V. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126746
November 29, 2000

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings with the Board of Civil Engineering of the
PRC on the ground of prejudicial question. Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana
Choa were married in civil rites. Later on, while his marriage with private respondent was
subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the RTC. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed in the RTC an
action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced
to marry her. Private respondent also filed with the PRC an administrative case against
petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
grounds of immorality. With respect to petitioner, she added that petitioner committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.

Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), a motion to
suspend the proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage
to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the same motion. The
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the Court ruled that the denial of
petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in
accord with law. Respondent court likewise held that no prejudicial question existed since the
action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil
case

ISSUE:

1. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and
criminal case of bigamy?

2. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and
the administrative case?

RULING:

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

1. NO. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted. The pendency of the civil case for annulment
of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their
marriage was, under the law, still valid and sudsisting.
 2. NO. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of
the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial
questions involves a civil and criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no
prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Furthemore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation

and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the
administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the
existence of criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same
facts as the administrative case.

The filing or pendency of criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an

administrative case in another judicial body against an examine or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter
case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case
shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the
courts or quasi-judicial body.

——————————————

Pimentel v. People
G.R. No. 172060
September 13, 2010

F: On 25 October 2004, Maria Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before RTC. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before RTC for pre-trial and trial for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend proceedings before RTC on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Pimentel asserted since relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him. RTC QC held that pendency of the case before RTC Antipolo is
not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. It held that
the issues in Criminal Case are injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. Therefore,
petition denied. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition. Thus, this petition for review.

I: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

R: Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.