I. EFFECT AND
This Code
APPLICATION OF LAWS
Effectivity of Laws
Tañada v. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915,
December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause
the publication of various Presidential Decrees
(PDs), letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders, in the
Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The
government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided,” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the
necessity of the publication of the presidential
issuances which are of general application.
Petitioners then moved for
reconsideration/clarification asserting that the
clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant that
the publication required therein was not always
imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances in question.
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is
an indispensable requirement for their effectivity
despite the special provisions as to the date they are
to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
shall take effect one year after such publication.”
The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity. On the other hand, interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all laws
aforementioned shall be published in full in the
Official Gazette to become effective in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 147387, December 10, 2003
FACTS:
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election
Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section
67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election
Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. –
Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of
the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office
or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Respondents contends that there is no violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while
Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A
substantial distinction exists between these two sets
of officials; elective officials occupy their office by
virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will,
while the appointive officials are not elected by
popular will. Equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated are treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
ISSUE:
WON the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives
undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones.
HELD:
No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions.On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure
of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two
sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except
to vote. Under the same provision, elective
officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to
pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. Hence, equal protection is not
infringed.
De Roy v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
80718, January 29, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Feliza De Roy was the respondent in a
civil case for damages filed by Luis Bernal.
In the civil case, the RTC found De Roy grossly
negligent and awarded damages to Bernal for the
injuries he sustained and for the death of his
daughter caused by the collapse of a burned- out
building’s firewall owned by De Roy. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. On the last day of the
15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The CA denied the motion by
applying the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises v. Japzon that said period cannot be
extended.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-- publication of the
decision in the Official Gazette when the CA
decision was promulgated.
ISSUE:
Is publication in the Official Gazette required
before SC decisions can become binding and
effective?
HELD:
No, publication is not required.
There is no law requiring the publication of SC
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the SC particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of SC decisions
and in such publications as the SCRA (Supreme
Court Reports Annotated. This is a collection of
rulings made by the Supreme Court since the
beginning of its existence.) and law journals.
In this case, petitioner’s contention that the SC
decision was not binding and effective because it
lacks publication is without merit.
Since publication is not required, the SC decision is
binding and effective even without being published
in the Official Gazette.
People v. Que Po Lay G.R. No. L-
6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS:
Que Po Lay was charged for violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 when he failed to sell foreign
exchange amounting to $7000. Because of this, he
was sentenced to spend six months in prison and
pay a Php1000 fine. Circular No. 20 was issued in
the year 1949, but it was not published until
November 1951, three months after Que Po Lay’s
conviction of its violation.
ISSUE:
Can Que Po Lay be justly convicted of violating
Circular No. 20 before its publication?
RULING:
No. The circular prescribes a penalty in the event of
its violation. Thus, it has the force and effect of law
and therefore should be published before it could
have a binding effect. Before publication, “in the
eyes of the law, there was no circular to be
violated.” Que Po Lay therefore
did not violate Circular No. 20 and was acquitted.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in
question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned
in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions,
decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to
be of no force and effect.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take
effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the
Official Gazette.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386)
equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20
of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being
issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect
of law according to settled jurisprudence.
In the present case, although Circular No. 20 of the;
Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3
months after appellant's conviction of its violation.
It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal
provision, did not have any legal effect and bound
no one until its publication in the Official Gazette
or after November 1951.
Principles:
If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been
published as required by law before its violation,
then in the eyes of the law there was no such
circular to be violated and consequently appellant
committed no violation of the circular or committed
any offense, and the trial court may be said to have
had no jurisdiction.
National Power Corporation v.
Pinatubo Commercial G.R. No.
176006, March 26, 2010
FACTS:
NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set
the guidelines in the “disposal of scrap aluminum
conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to
decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC
installations and to generate additional income for
NPC.” Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
materials specially viewed in the light of RA
7832.13 According to NPC, by limiting the
prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could
easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs.
There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires.
NPC likewise maintains that traders were not
prohibited from participating in the pre-
qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a
manufacturer.

3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this

circular are partnerships or corporations that
ISSUE:
directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products either purely or
Whether National Power Corporation (NPC)
partly out of aluminum, or their duly appointed
Circular No. 99-75 had to be published?
representatives. These bidders may be based
locally or overseas.
Principles/HELD:
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the
pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its 1. National Power Corporation
scrap ACSR7 cables. Respondent Pinatubo (NPC) Circular No. 99-75 did
Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as not have to be published.
copper, aluminum, steel and other ferrous and non-
ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification
form to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was informed in In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have
a letter dated April 29, 2003 that its application for to be published since it was merely an internal rule
pre- qualification had been denied. Petitioner asked or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or
for reconsideration but NPC denied it. implement an existing law but was merely a
directive issued by the NPC President to his
The RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared
subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient
items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional. The
disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus,
RTC ruled that it was violative of substantive due
NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities
process because, while it created rights in favor of
of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-
third parties, the circular had not been published. It
qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.
also pronounced that the circular violated the equal
protection clause since it favored manufacturers
and processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis
It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond
dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR
to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the
cables from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the
award, mode of payment and release of awarded
circular denied traders the right to exercise their
scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed
business and restrained free competition inasmuch
to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and
as it allowed only a certain sector to participate in
award of scrap ACSRs.
the bidding.

It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public

In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need
in general or of any other person not involved in
to publish the circular since it was not of general
the bidding process. Assuming it affected
application. It was addressed only to particular
individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly
persons or class of persons, namely the disposal
and incidentally.
committees, heads of offices, regional and all other
officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs.
NPC also contends that there was a substantial
2. Pinatubo’s argument that
distinction between manufacturers and traders of
items 3 and 3.1 of NPC
aluminum scrap
Circular No. 99-75 deprived
it of its “right to bid” or that
these conferred such right
 in favor of a third person is
erroneous.
Bidding, in its comprehensive sense, means making
an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors
whereby the government manifests its intention to
invite proposals for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment for official business or
public use, or for public works or repair. Bidding
rules may specify other conditions or require that
the bidding process be subjected to certain
reservations or qualifications. Since a bid partakes
of the nature of an offer to contract with the
government, the government agency involved may
or may not accept it.
Moreover, being the owner of the property subject
of the bid, the government has the power to
determine who shall be its recipient, as well as
under what terms it may be awarded. In this sense,
participation in the bidding process is a privilege
inasmuch as it can only be exercised under existing
criteria imposed by the government itself. As such,
prospective bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot
claim any demandable right to take part in it if they
fail to meet these criteria. Thus, it has been stated
that under the traditional form of property
ownership, recipients of privileges or largesse from
the government cannot be said to have property
rights because they possess no traditionally
recognized proprietary interest therein.
Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to
the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri,
the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify
before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and
during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He
later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita
sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
W/N these 3 are covered by executive privilege.
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up
the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
HELD:
Yes. The communications are covered by executive
privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries
in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish
the concept of executive privilege. This is because
this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others. Several jurisprudence cited provide
the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test
is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita
premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public
officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege
and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the
grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them
at all. But petitioner made himself available to them
during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven
(11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested
his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered
by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other
right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the
Whole G.R. No. 187714, March 8,
2011
FACTS:
On Sept. 15, 2008, Senator Pimentel called to
attention the double insertion of 200 Million
appropriated separately for the construction of
Carlos P. Garcia Ave and C-5 Road which was said
to cover the same stretch.
Lacson further stated that when he investigated
on the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then
Senate President.
On October 8, 2008 Senator Madrigal introduce
P.S. Resolution 706, which states that there was
indeed double entry of said project, with
overwhelming evidence of abuse
of authority of the Senate President (Villar) to The motion was approved with ten members voting
profit from such project. in favour, none against, and five absentation.
It also stated that the acts of the Senate President ISSUES:
are indirect violation of the Constitution, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical standards of Public Officers.

Therefore it was resolved to direct the

Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate
the conduct of Senate President Villar.

On Nov. 17, 2008, Senator Enrile was elected

Senate President and the Ethics Committee was
reorganized with the Election of Lacson as
Chairperson.

On Dec. 16, 2008, Senator Lacson inquired RULING:

whether the Minority was ready to name their
representatives.

After consultation, Senator Pimentel informed

the body that there would be no members from
the Minority in the Ethics Committee

On Jan. 26, 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his

appeal to the Minority to nominate their
representative to the Ethics Committee.

Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of

the Minority not to nominate any of
their members to the Ethics Committee.

Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the

Senate Committee on the Ethics and Privileges.

On April 20, 2009, Senator Villar on a privilege

speech where he stated that he would answer the
accusations against him on the floor and not before
the Ethics Committee.

On Apr. 27, 2009, Senator Lacson stated that

the Ethics Committee is not a kangaroo court.
However, due to the accusation that the Ethics
Committee could not act with fairness on Senator
Villar’s Case, Senator Lacson moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
undertaken by Senate, acting as a whole.
Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic G.R.
No. 180705, November 27, 2012
Garcillano v. House of
Representatives G.R. No. 170338,
December 23, 2008
Villafuerte v. Cordial, Jr., G.R. No.
222450, July 7, 2020
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for
the Gubernatorial position of the province of
Camarines Sur in the May 2013 local elections.
Petitioner file a with the COMELEC a verified
Petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate
of candidacy of respondent alleging that the latter
intentionally misrepresented a false and deceptive
name/ nickname that would mislead the voters
when he declared under oath in his COC that
LRAY JR.MIGZ was his nickname or stage name
and that the name he intended to appear on the
official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY
JR.MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted
his first name MIGUEL and inserted, instead
LRAY JR., which is the nickname of his father, the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur,LRay
Villafuerte, Jr.
COMELECs First Division and COMELEC en
banc ruled that there is no reason to cancel the
COC of respondent as matters of material
misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to
qualifications of a candidate and nothing is
mentioned about a candidate’s name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents COC should be
cancelled
HELD:
No. Decision of COMELEC en banc affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: Material
misrepresentation contemplated by Sec. 78
of the Omnibus Election Code refer to
qualifications for elective office
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertains
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights ofa
candidate the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to ones
qualifications for public office. The use of surname,
when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public
as to ones identity is not within the scope of the
provision. Respondents nickname is not considered
a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence
showing that in writing the nickname LRAY JR.
MIGZ in his COC, respondent had the intention to
deceive the voters as to his identity which has an
effect on his eligibility or qualification for the
office he seeks to assume.
Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the
Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then
incumbent Governor of the province, popularly
known as LRay. Their relationship is shown by the
posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the
province with the faces of both the father and son
on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of
Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover,
it was established by the affidavits of respondents
witnesses that as the father and son have striking
similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms,
which remained unrebutted, the appellation of
LRAY JR. has been used to refer to respondent.
Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by
the name MIGZ16written as respondent’s
nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the
voters, as in fact, such name distinguishes
respondent from his father, the then incumbent
Governor LRAY, who was running for a
Congressional seat in the 2ndDistrict of Camarines
Sur.