PART 2

POLITICAL CONCEPTS
 -133-

INTRODUCTION TO PART 2

I have chosen the central ideological concepts which were in use in the
P^®“Coup period and collected all the passages in which they were used from about
August 1964 until August 1968 in the following sample of the Indonesian press.

1964: Crawford's summaries of editorials from the Djakarta

press; pp. 515-556 of Crawford's thesis.

1965: United States Embassy Translation Unit Press Review,

Djakarta; September 29 to November 3. Medan U.S. Consulate,
Press Summary; October 7 to November 3. Surabaya U.S. Con­
sulate, Press Summary; June 24 to November 3.

First Half 1966: U.S. Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, Djakarta;
March 31 to April 8. Medan U.S. Consulate, Press Summary;
April 5 to April 12. Surabaya U.S. Consulate, Press
Summary; March 31 to April 12.

Second Half 1966: Crawford's Summaries of Editorials from the Djakarta press;
pp. 567-605 of Crawford's thesis.

1967: United States Embassy Translation Unit Press Review, Djakarta;

January 3 to January 5; October 19 to November 3. Medan U.S.
Consulate Press Summary; January 1 to January 5; October 26 to
November 3. Surabaya U.S. Consulate, Press Summary; January 1
to January 4.

1968: Editorials of 14 Djakarta dallies; February 10, March 28.

Editorials of 7 Medan dailies; March 15. Suara Pers
(Antara's weekly Press Review, containing items from Djakarta
as well as from provincial papers); from No. 23, first week
of May to No. 33, first week of August. Four lectures or
speeches:

a. Paulus. D. F. Manuputty, "The History and Future of the

Indonesian Labor Movement," mimeo, sometime in 1968.
 -134-

b. Soedjatmoko, "Sikap Nasional Dan Hubungan Luar Negetl,"

(National Posture and Foreign Relations"), mimeo.
University of Indonesia, April 6, 1968.
c. Roeslan Abdulgani, untitled, to Speakers Research
Committee for the United Nations, mimeo, June 5, 1968.
d. Soedjadmoko, "Remarks," mimeo, American-Indonesian
Chamber of'Commerce, June 13, 1968.

N.B. I realize thAt it is difficult to trace the use of concepts from translations,
especially of digests and summaries. It seems to me that all my samples are rela­
tively representative as they retain a lot of the original concepts—especially
the "untranslatable" ones which are my chief concern. Crawford states, p. 515,
"in summarizing them ... there has been a conscientious attempt to preserve the
style and spirit of the drlgirial; as well as to make precise use of key words and
phrases in the original."

The material prepared by the United States Embassy Translation Unit in

Djakarta, and by the staff of the Medan and Surabaya U.S. Consulates has all been
translated in a fairly unsophisticated manner, sometimes, fortunately, exceedingly
literally. The Djakarta material constitutes "extracts and not full^translations
of the originals." The Medan "summaries of sigplfleant news items, selected from
six Indonesian language newspapers." The Surabaya one is '}sumiftaries of significant
editorials and news items selected from twelve Surabaya newspapers." In all three
places the names and numbers of newspapers quoted are somewhat variable, and quite

representative.

Suara Pers contains the full texts of editorials and of other items from
Djakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Padau, and a few scattered smaller towns. It has
been translated into English with the intent to keep concepts intact. The Djakarta
and Medan editorials have been translated in full text.

The four speeches, although outside the press proper, have been included
as checks for the current use of the concepts in the language of political leaders
when addressing local or foreign audiences.

I have made a detailed card index of well over 1000 titles, those Include
30 prominent titles. The main ideological concepts of the pre-Coup period appear
for a shorter or a longer period into the post-Coup period, most of them disappear­
ing, often silently, some of them only in 1967. All this will be spelled out in
detail later in chapters IV and V.
 -135-

From the clusters of the uses of ideological concepts I also tried to

decide which ideological concepts have fully survived and whether they were
replaced by new Ideological concepts. As there was an obvious decline in the
use of ideological concepts as such, I have also examined several political
concepts in order to decide the extent to which they have been blown up for
ideological use (e.g., the terms "Abri" (Armed Forces), "political parties" and
"economic development"). Details appear later in this chapter, passim.

C
 -137-

CHAPTER IV

IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONCEPTS IN INDONESIAN NEWSPAPERS 1965-1968

Changes in the Indonesian Political Culture

Donald E. Weatherbee in his monograph, "Ideology in Indonesia," has

attempted to describe and evaluate the "Indonesian Ideology" and the structure of
political concepts used in Indonesian politics during the Sukarno years. Weather-
bee published his monograph after the unsuccessful coup of September 30, 1965,
the violent reactions to it, and the radical shift in leadership. He made a valiant
attempt to forecast the fate of Sukarno's "Indonesian Idology" under these changed
circumstances. Weatherbee evaluates the ideology as "coherent and relevant within
the bounds of its self—defined reality." He considered it of supreme importance
for independent Indonesia as a unifying factor, giving the new nation purpose and
legitimacy. While he claimed that flaws had weakened the ideological structure
during the final Sukarno period, he nevertheless forecast its continued use by the
post-Coup leaders and brought evidence supporting his view from the official
statements of the new leadership during the immediate post-Coup months.

In his prefatory note to Weatherbee's monograph, Harry J. Benda sums up

the conclusion from Weatherbee's evaluation and argument:

It is true, of course, that Indonesian politics have so

to speak abruptly veered away from the course for so long
charted—and "ideologized"—by Sukarno. Yet it is‘ by no ^
means certain whether this hiatus will before long be
reflected in a marked change in the style, manner, and
above all verbalization of Indonesian politics. Thus, >
though much may and perhaps will change, it is doubtful
that "verbal magic" as such will disappear from Indonesia's
political vocabulary or even decrease in frequency. A pol­
itical culture that has survived for so long is not likely
to yield too soon, whatever the specific orientation of
Individual leaders may be. Overly deterministic ... if
not pessimistic ... as this may sound. . . .

*
Donald E. Weatherbee, "Ideology in Indonesia," Southeast Asia Studies,
Monograph Series 208, 1966, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
**
Ibid., p. vi.
 -138-

Weatherbee and Benia's thesis certainly at first seemed to be correct. The

bewildering events of October and November, 1965, were overwhelmingly described by

political leaders and journalists in the terms of the old ideology* The new
leadership, and the journalists permitted to publish, spoke about the "Revolution,"
"revolutionaries" and "counter-revolutionaries" and the "dangers of deviating from
the right path of the "Revolution"; the enemies are still the old Nekplim (Neo­
colonialists and imperialists); Internal enemies necessarily must be their agents.
Both the vanquished Instigators and supporters of the abortive coup and the victorious
military leaders claimed to have as their prime purpose the safety of Sukarno, the
"Great Leader of the Revolution." For months any political statement contained
a declaration of loyalty to Sukarno. Military leaders as well as civilian, Moslem,
and Nationalist leaders identified themselves and appealed to the masses as
"progressive revolutionary people." For months the fight against Gestapu (the
September 30 Movement, i.e., the abortive Coup), is coupled with Dwikora (Sukarno's
last official "two-pronged attack" program), and "the crushing of, or confronta­
tion with Malaysia."

Sukarno, His Image, His Titles and His Teachings

In the years before the Coup, Sukarno had been accorded a veritable
Byzantine adulation. His official titles were "President for Life," "Mandator of
the M.P.R.S.," "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces," "Great Leader of the
Revolution"; his less official titles Included "Mouthpiece of the Revolution,"
"Hero of Islam," Walul Amrl," "Father of Marhaenism." This language of adulation
was used by all the political and social groups that had not been suppressed, and
by all their newspapers. Sukarno's teachings were accepted by all as the official
national Ideology. Nevertheless disagreements and the constant maneuvering for
power between the various legal political parties, the Army and the Palace Clique
were expressed behind the veil of personal adulation for the President and the
fervent declaration of loyalty t;o his teachings. As an example, Sukarno's frequent
and lengthy travels abroad were looked upon critically by some groups, but this
criticism was countered in the following formulation: "When abroad, only his body
^ it
is gone, his thoughts and spirit are always one with the Indonesian people."

Suluh Indonesia, September 19, 1964.

 -139-

As to his teaching, during 1964 there had occurred the attempt of several, political
intellectual groups to counteract the rising ideological influence of the PKI by
forming the "Body for the Propagation of Sukarnoism (BPS)." Its opponents accused the
group of usurping Sukarno's sole right of generating Sukarnoism. Another criticism
of the BPS was that it might produce heretical views not included in the Sukamolst
Codex. "Our revolution is based on the Pantja Sila, USDEK, Manipol and Indonesian
*
Socialism. . . . Sukarnoism might endanger the doctrines we already hold."

In general the press exhorted the people of Indonesia to support and follow
all Sukarno's actions and teachings. Merdeka exhorts on 12/12/^64: "It is the duty
of all Indonesians to support all the decisions of the Great Leader of the Revolution
and to do so sincerely." During the summer of 1965, when the PKI ever more success­
fully attacked political groups and political figures standing In the way of its
ascendency, it routinely accused them of not being fully loyal to Sukarno and to his
latest major slogan of Nasakom. Thus the Minister of Basic Education, Mrs.
Artati, was accused of twenty-four errors made against President Sukarno.

Immediately after the Coup both the PKI and the Army leadership accused
each other of having had designs to kidnap, depose and even murder President Sukarno
and each claimed to have saved him from the clutches of the otheir. Harlan Rkkjat
in its incriminating declaration of October 2, 1965, stated: ". . .On September 30,
actions were taken to save President Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from
a coup d'etat which was called the General's Council . . . ." (This was reprinted
in Angkatan Bersendjata on October 4, 1965.) On the same day the Army leadership
J
broadcast its' accusation: "[The September 30 Movement] . . . have even dared to
kidnap the Great Leader of the Revolution, who now has been placed in safety by
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia." The first official communiqud
of the victorious Army leadership in Djakarta addressed the Inddnesian people in
the following language: "Devotees of- the Great Leader of the Revolution . . . whom
we love" and call them to prayer for God's protection of Sukarno "that he may
consummate the Revolution ... the generals are his right hand." The same issue

Suluh Indonesia, December 5, 1964.

Harlan Rakjat, October Ij 1965.

Angkatan Bersendjata (M), October 2, 1965.

 -140-

contains also the following curiously exaggerated protestation of obedience:

"The ABRI is not afraid of one hundred percent obedience ordered by its beloved
Supreme’Commander Bung Kamo and to carry out Bung Karno's teachirtgs consistently."*

The same issue of Angkatan Bersendjata also printed a communique of the Commander
in Chief of the Siliwangi VI Military Area. This communique does not only declare
loyalty to Sukarno, but claims that only Sukarno can give ah explanation of the
situation and give directions about the handling of the Gestapu crisis. "Under
the present circumstances it is Bimg Karno who can give a clear picture of what has
happened. Not giving this opportunity to Bung Karno means that they have objectives
in contradiction with those of Bung Karno and thus do not obtain his blessings.
All our readiness and vigilance must be directed to give opportunity to Bung Karno
to give freely an explanation and command on what we have to do to crush the counter­
revolutionaries." In the differences in emphasis of these two communiques, the
first sign of the coming split in the attitude to Gestapu and the PKI is being fore­
shadowed. The Army leadership group around Soeharto uses the traditional ritual
language of loyalty to Sukarno, .but nevertheless uses its independent initiative
for a country-wide military action against the PKI, while other military leaders
as well as a number of political leaders use their protestations of loyalty in
claiming that the Army should not act independently, but should await Sukarno's
"explanation" and his guidelines for action. It soon became clear that Sukarno
■was interested in the slowing down and winding up of the "crush Gestapu" activities.
He called for "calm and order" and claimed his exclusive right of working out
"a political settlement of the Gestapu affair" in his own sweet time, As the majority
of the Army leadership and the leadership of the Moslem Groups were only too anxious
to broaden and prolong the "crush Gestapu" campaign and use it for the complete
destruction of the PKI, its affiliate mass organizations and its political and ideo­
logical influence on other political organizations, it is obvious that their stance
of complete loyalty and obedience to Sukarno was apt to become somewhat strained.
In the weeks that followed fine shades in the declarations of loyalty became an
easily recognizable sign of belonging to either of the two camps. Sometimes both
trends are expressed in one and the same newspaper. Thus we find in Berlta Yudha
of October 4 1965 the following statement: "Finally, under the wise guidance of the
President, the September 30 Movement has been liquidated'by us all." But'^on the

*
Angkatan Bersendjata, October 4, 1965.
 -141-

next day appears the following appeal: "Let all members of the Army show loyalty
by carrying out Sukarno's . . . commands in continuing to eradicate the September 30
Movement."

During these first post-Coup days the Djakarta Army leadership formulated
its accusation against the perpetrators of the September 30 Movement in the
following way: "It is obvious that the September 30 Movement, which openly staged
a coup d'etat and set up a so-called Revolutionary Council, by eliminating the role
of the President/Supreme Commander of ABRI, is a terroristic act of treason
it
unequalled before." From the provincial press it becomes obvious that such an
extreme view was by no means shared by all administrators and political groups.
Thus the following curiously Impartial statement: "The North Sumatran Youth Front
has issued a statement condemning all forms of coup d'etat by any group which directly
or indirectly forces its will on the President.." The Statement pledges the Youth
Front's loyalty to Bung Karno and expresses the Youth Front's readiness to carry out
Bung Kamo's orders. On the same day the regional chief administrator based his
moderate and go-slow attitude to Gestapu on Sukarno's own statement: "Governor
Sltepu quoted a statement by Bung Kamo that the so-called September 30 affair was
a political issue which would be settled by him personally . . . [so] the Governor
urged the political parties and organizations to await Bung Kamo's decision and
itisis
to observe whatever decision it may be. . . ." In the flood of protestations
of loyalty which poured in from provincial Institutions and organizations we frequently
meet the formulation of condemning the attempted Coup because of its attempt to force
its will on the President. Other statements of full support for Sukarno tried
completely to avoid the Gestapu issue and continued to repeat the unch|inged pre-Coup
slogans. "The North Simiatran SOBSI [the largest Indonesian federation of labor
unions which was controlled by PKI] in a statement has expressed its full support
for the President's speech on settling the September 30 affair. SOBSI is ready,
along with the NASAKOM progressive revolutionary groups to carry out Bung Kamo's
command to make the DWIKORA campaign a success. . . . SARBUPRI and regional IPPI

Angkatan Bersendjata, October 4, 1965.

Patriot (M), October 7, 1965.

Bendera Revolusi (M), October 7, 1965.

Patriot (M), October 8, 1965.

 -142-

[in North Siomatra] . . . support the President's policy on settling the September
30 affair. . . . IPPI takes orders only from Bung Kamo and stands behind him.
... On October 9 the same Governor Sitepu urges Ills department chiefs
"... to obey Bung Kamo's orders and to heighten their vigilance in order to
. . . crush the Nekolim," without mentioning Gesfapu at all. On October 12 the
Governor came out with a warning to the' public: "Touching on the September 30 terror
acts the Governor [Sitepu of North Sumatra] said that Bung Kamo has given his
directives for the settlement of the September 30 affair. Therefore, the public
should restrain themselves and not aggravate the-situation. Bung Kamo's policy
and teachings should serve as a guideline and no Individual interpretations should
be made."

Another group which does not mention the Gestapu, but concentrates on
Sukarno's position, was the Medan PNI Youth Organization, PEMUDA MARHAENIS:
"It expressed its determination to safeguard the leadership of Bung Karno, the Father
of Marhaenism. ..." However, statements which contain a little Impatience with
Sukarno's hesitant and reluctant condemnation of the PKI become ever more frequent.
One of the earliest uses a curious circular reasoning. "Yesterday, Sjamsul Bilal,
of the Medan City Youth Front, told press men that Bung Kamo's stand of condemning
the murderers of the Army officers in the September 30 Movement, and of denouncing
the Revolutionary Council was most appropriate and in line with the stand of
Indonesian people who stand behind Bung Karno. ..." The following editorial
declarations reveal the beginning of a certain impatient attitude of nudging Sukarno
into action. *'We support our beloved President who wants to settle the betrayal

of the counterrevolutionary September 30 Movement speedily. And "We are fully

convinced that Bung Karno will take actions and dissolve the PKI. We know Bung
Kamo: He always considers the interest of the State and Nation more important
than that of groups.
And in the following report written in the old adulatory language there
seems to lurk a hint of criticism of Sukarno's curious inactivity: "The people's

*
Angin Timur (M), October 7, 1965.

Bukit Barisan. October 10, 1965.

Harlan Takari (M), October 12, 1965).

Patriot (M), October 8, 1965.

^'^Mimbar Revolusi. editorial, October 8, 1965.

##
Ibid., editorial, October 11, 1965.
 143-

faces, in the streets as well as those seen in the alleys, they're beaming and
radiant, reflecting their belief and joy that their beloved Bung Kamo was back in
their midst, after having stayed at the Bogor Place since the occurrence of the
so-called September 30 Movement." Sukarno's reaction to the growing demand for
the banning of the PKI was non-committal. In his Tamari Speech he pointed out that
"Everybody, every mass organization, every political party that deviated from the
II**
revolutionary path would be dissolved by Bung Kamo.

In the meantime the Army leadership had undertaken its- first interrogations
of those military persons directly involved in the September 30 Coup attempt. It
now used the alleged confessions for its radical condemnation of Gestapu. "In
an examination made by Armed Forces Operation Command, one middle-ranking officer
of the Gestapu gang explained clearly what he was instructed to do. Of numerous
facts, the most important thing is that 'he and his unit were Instructed to kill
President Sukarno.' ... At that time, Aidit was waiting at the Maospatl Airfield,
Madiun. If Bung Karno would not sign Untung's Decree, he was to be killed."
Sukarno quickly took advantage of this story and tried at the same time to ally
himself with ’the martyred generals—the victims of' Gestapu--while subtly shifting
the biame to Nekolim: "Brig. Gen. Darjatmo in his speech said, among other things,
that President Sukarno had mentioned that the Nekolim had plotted to take the life of
Bung Kamo, Dr. Subandrlo, and Lt. Gen. A. Jani. He pointed out that the September
30 Movement accomplished what had been planned by the Nekolim." Sukarno s ,
Minister of Inf oration, Maj. Gen. Achmadl, pursued the policy of pointing out as
Gestapu's main misdemeanor its slight to Sukarno: "In statements Issued by the
Gestapu, the counterrevolutionary September 30 Movement did not mention the President/
Supreme Commander/Great Leader Bung Kamo; the Indonesian people must fully be
convinced of the leadership and policy of the President.
♦
Behind all these attempts to shore up the personal power and authority of
Sukarno, a most momentous change in the political power situation had in fact taken
place: Under pressure, Sukarno had appointed Maj. Gen. Soeharto to direct military

Pelopor, October 11, 1965.

Mimbar Revolusi, editorial, October 11, 1965.

Suara Islam, October 12, 1965.

Duta Rakjat (M), October 13, 1965.

^'^Pelopor, October 14, 1965.
 -144-

operations. The Army leadership announced this victory in cautious and deferential
language: "We thank God and the President'for Maj. Gen. Soeharto's appointment.
Viewed from his character and personality and also from the present situation his
appointment as Minister/Army Commander is right and -correct. He is certainly the
right man in the right job as the Father of the members of the Army." With
Soeharto's appointment the anti-J*KI forces considered it possible to declare the
destruction campaign against the buildings belonging to the PKI and its affiliated
organizations as legitimate—i.e., in the spirit of Bung Kamo, notwithstanding the
fact that Sukarno had rather ineffectively tried to prevent it. "The action taken by
Manipolistic officials Imbued with the Five Talism^ans of the Revolution ^re now
considered proper and correct, in accordance with their devotion to- the people and
their loyalty to Bung Kamo. Indeed, guided by a conscience and an intuition
sharpened by Bung Kamo's teachings, the people have always known how to act in
times of crisis and danger. Therefore, the people, both pupil and teacher to Bung
Kamo, and to every genuine leader, have taken action, destroying the decision
centers of the Gestapu, namely the PKI headquarters throughout Indonesia because
the people have found it to be the origin of the counterrevolution." Here opponents
of Sukarno's political position successfully used his declared populism in making
their actions- seem to be loyal to him. The editorial of Api Pantjasila, October 17,
1965, continues its tongue^rin-cheek populistic adulation of Sukarno as follows:
"It is not revenge and,hate that cause the people's- masses to take- action, but that
they are urged by a wisdom guided by a sense of responsibility to God, Bung Karno,
Revolution and Country.
"It is this systematic -yet immediate response of the people in accomplishing
the tasks of the Revolution that Bung Kamo admires so, this great politician and
aesthete who is always praising, the people as being the leading element, the final
decider of its own destiny.
"The people have always been aware of the presence of their Teacher and
Supreme Commander Bung Kamo in their midst."

In one of the raids of PKI offices,, Angkatan Bersendjata, on October 18,

1965, reports in all seriousness that among the embroidered pictures that were found
were those of Lenin, Mao, Aidit and Njoto, but none of Sukarno. All through the
second half of October 1965 the old-style declarations of happiness at Sukarno's
safety and of support and loyalty to him continue to flow in from the provinces.
Nevertheless the slightly different use of Sukarno's name and the slightly different
attitude to his role in the Gestapu crisis mark the emergent opposing political
 -145-

camps. The influential organization of the "Generation of *45" declare that' they
*
"leave the settlement to the wisdom and policy of the Supreme Commander etc.
It becomes obvious that the PKI and organizations near to it try to protect them­
selves behind a shield of declarations of loyalty to Sukarno. Manifesto (S),
October 21, 1965, describes an attempt by members of PKI mass organizations to save
their building from being ransacked by putting up posters declaring "Long live
Bung Kamo!"

About this time a clandestine publication was seized which claimed that the
President was being pressed so that he could not decide freely on the September 30
Movement. The tension between Sukarno and the Army command had become more obvious.
Followers of Sukarno tried desperately to shore up his declining authority. Thus
a provincial police commander exhorted his policemen that they "should not doubt the
President's authority, should be convinced that the President .is capable of settling
the affair . . . should not despair in the face of the present situation.

Others try to credit Sukarno with successful handling of the affair:

"The Indonesian people are grieved by the September 30 affair. The adventure
conducted by PKI leaders by plunging in it millions of ignorant members would have
led to a civil war had it not been for the President's tactful'^action and policy."
Some local bodies made statements, such as the Surabaya City Council, which stated
explicitly that they backed the President in his efforts to settle the September 30
affair.

On the other hand, during these last days of October the criticism and
hostility towards Subandrio was rising and the Djakarta students started a new
political tactic of presenting "requests" to Sukarno. On the 26th demonstrators
"implore Sukarno to comply with their demands about Subandrio ,and not appoint him
as Acting President when Sukarno goes to the A-A (Afro-Aslan) Conference, and not
to send Subandrio as a substitute.

Angkatan Bersendjata, October 21, 1965,

**k
Berita Yudha, October 23, 1965.
k
Harlan Umum (S), October 26, 1965.
****
Suara Rakjat (S), October 26, 1965.
# Indonesian Daily News (S), October 26, 1965.

Karya Bhakti, October 27, 1965.

 -146-

Students started the flood of requests to Sukarno to take away the "Maha Putera'
it
Award from Aidit and to fire him dishonorably from all his state offices. An article
by Deas in Api Pantjasila, October 26, 1965, against Subandrio also contains a
slightly disparaging description of the Sukarno loyalty routine: "After the explosion
of the counterrevolutionary September 30 Movement, the public has put out its
statements. The theme of these statements was on the whole the same, namely loyal
to President without reserve, and did not know apything about the dirty affair."
Subandrio and other high-level assistants of Sukarno are now being accused in the,
press "for their high-level maneuver to soften the crushing of the Gestapu."
Still the same critic piously states his hope "that the people will not fall into
II**
the trap—since Bung Kamo’s teachings have been deeply engrained into them.
However, soon the President is being included in the still mild criticism about the
inactivity of the Cabinet: "The President, the Cabinet Praesidlum and several
ministers discussed for the umpteenth time the present national situation.
Or, "A part of the President's assistants both sitting in the Cabinet and in the
****
other State institutions are no longer trusted by the people.

Instead of the traditional declaration of loyalty to Sukarno alone, there

appears now the new formulation of "full support to President and Armed Forces."^**

During these days there appears for the first time the formula of the new Indonesian
leadership which became customary during the following months—the so-called
Triimivirate Formula: "Long Live Bung Karno, Armed Forces, and political parties
which represent the Indonesian people.By May 1966 the formula, in good old world
magic style ran: "Three-in-one unit, servant of the Message of the People's
Suffering: Bung Kamo, Armed Forces and the People.

The PKI activists still at large were now accused of pursuing the tactic of
trying to separate Bung Karno from the Armed Services. The Djakarta press continues

Api Pantjasila, October 26, 1965.

Ibid., October 27, 1965.

Angkatan Bersendjata, October 29, 1965.

Karva Bhakti, October 30, 1965.

^'^Dinamika, October 27, 1965.

Pantjasila, November 1, 1965.

^'^^'^^'^Kompas, April 5, 1966.
 -147-

"Its curious exhortations to the President in which overtones of threat mingle with
the traditional formulations of loyalty and obedience: "The Political settlement
to be formulated by the President will be the highest decision regarding the demand
of the progressive masses . . . who want the dissolution of PKI and its mass
organizations....We will have to accept and obey the President's decision as we
. . . pledged. We believe that the President will be careful . . . keeping in mind
the demand of the masses and factor^ existing in the Armed Forces. . . .We await
the final verdict of the President, mouthpiece of the people. ..."

By the beginning of March 1966, the combined pressure of the Army command,
the students, and especially the Moslem organizations, resulted in Sukarno's belated
decree of dissolving the PKI and placing several ministers under arrest. This
decision of March 11 is still politely being called "the will of God." Or in
the Home Minister, Maj. Gen. Basukl Rachmat's, words: "President Sukarno's order
to General Soeharto of March 11 was a blessing in disguise, an unparalleled blessing
from God who does not want the President surrounded with dirt." however in the
informal, rather disrespectful forum of the "Corner Column," the Surabaya Post of
March 31, 1966 seems to hint that Sukarno might haVe something in common with his
''dirty" assistants: "'I am an open book,' Bung Kamo said. He is unlike some
leaders whose books are open only after they have been placed under protective custody
And whose books prove to be horror books." An interesting note appears in the speech
of an East Java Army commander: "We have to safeguard and carry out Bung Kamo's
teachings as well as religious teachings. ..." Here the universal sufficiency
and validity of ^ukarno's teachings is no longer taken for granted. Religious
teachings are not Identical or subsumed under them.

Soeharto now orders "in the name of Sukarno that the Gestapu/PKI purge
of the apparatus of the Revolution be intensified."* And on the same day Berita

Yudha reports Soeharto as having said;."The Great Leader of the Revolution and the
people will"always trust the Armed Forces in every issue endangering the safety of
our State and Revolution." This official stickling for Sukarno's position and
titles is carried so far that Berita Yudha, on April 7, 1966, accuses Radio Peking of
"referring to President Sukarno merely as Sukarno, without any of his other positions
or titles such as 'Great Leader of the Revolution.'"

Obor Revolusl (S), November 3, 1965.

Angkatan Bersendjata, April 4, 1966.

A**
Ibid., April 6, 1966.
 -148

A new political front organization, the "Pantja Sila Front," is being

organized all over the country for this purpose. The PNI frantically uses the
remaining authority of Sukarno in order to prevent this shift in political power:
"^e know that PNI will only recognize I’ront Pantja Sila if Bung Kamo recognizes
and blesses Front Pantja Sila. To date we recognize the National Front as the only
national institution blessed and led by Bung Karno." As the PNI was having increas­
ing internal difficulties because of its left-pro-PKI wing, the Army leadership could
now poke fun at these declared unity seekers and at the same time start to undermine
the teachings of Bung Karno: "Marhaen masses, supposed to be the foremost imple­
mentors of Bung Kamo's teachings, which so very much clamored for unity, are now
busy getting into one anbther's hair."

Rumors of the imminent ouster of Sukarno were in the Djakarta air. Sukarno's
reaction as reported hardly improved his image: Touching on rumors of ouster, the
President said 'I am still the MPRS (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara -
Provisional People's Deliberative Council), Mandatgry/Great Leader of the Revolu­
tion. . .!" And in a plaintive tone complained about "unfounded slanders."***

The MPRS had expressed the by now popular view of the advisability of Indo­
nesia's establishing normal relations with Malaysia and of returning to the United
Nations. Sukarno had disregarded it and publicly repeated his hostile slogans in
regard to both. The conflict within Indonesia's political leadership, the so-called
dualism of State authority, had become obvious. Part of the press now for the first
time dared to come out with open disagreement of Sukarno's policies: "We disagree
with Sukarno that Indonesia should stay outside the United Nations. It would be
better to change the structure from within." Trisakti editorial of April 8,
1966 PNI papers however accept Sukarno's position. From this time onwards the
unreserved acceptance of Sukarno's pronouncements and declarations of fervent
loyalty, such as the declaration of "Dying defending Bung Karno [would be] to die
a hero's death" continue to appear practically only in the PNI press, Duta Swasta
and El Bahar. The long suppressed resentment of newsmen at Sukarno's policy of

Suluh Indonesia "Corner Column," April 5, 1966.

Angkatan Bersendjata editorial, April 6, 1966.

Berita Yudha, April 8, 1966.

TrisaktJ editorial, April 8, 1966.

 -149-

censorship and repression now comes out into the open. (It should be remembered
of course that a considerable number, of pro-PKI newsmen and Antara staff members
had been fired from their positions and some had been arrested in the meantime.) Now
the newsmen who had been -suspended due to their Involvement with the BPS were
rehabillted and the journalists did not miss the opportunity "to welcome warmly
this decision," and to point out that this unjust suspension had been made "by ^
Sukarno himself."

How much the respect for Sukarno and his utterances had declined became
clear on the pccasion of his Presidential Address on Independence Day, August 15:
"Many members of student political groups walked off the field during President
Sukarno's Independence Day Speech. They said it was out of keeping with the New
Order....Sukarno did not condemn the PKI, which people now regard as Satan. Before
Gestapu, he was quick to condemn anti-Communist movements such as the BPS and
Manikebu. . . furthermore [Sukarno] did not mention .the Old Order, much less curse
It**
it. , This reaction was not confined to the student activists. Merdeka,
in an editorial on August 19, 1966, reacts as follows: "President Sukarno's
Independence Day Speech brought sharp reactions. Sukarno's speech was out of step
with the New Order." And on August 29, 1966 Merdeka uses an even sharper formulation^
"With Sukarno's slogans from previous years it was an anachronism that doesn't fit
the age."

By this time an important ideological shift had taken place. Until recently
only one new concept, the negative'concept of Gestapu or Gestapu/PKI. had been in use.
By now a new conceptual dichotomy, that of Old Order versus N^w Order, was coming
more and more into use. Sukarno had no part in the formulation of the positive and
hopeful concept of the New Order and it became ever clearer that he himself was going
to be declared a part of that negative concept, the Old Order, which in fact
became the new negative connotation of the years of his near-dictatorial rule.
Sukarno is no longer accepted as the infallible fountainhead of ideology, but is
exhorted in the following words: "Without regard to personality, we must say that
Sukarno needs to correct his own ideology accordingly. Doubts were now voiced

*
Api Pantjasila (M), April 8, 1966.
A*
Angkatan Bersendjata, August 19, 1966.
AAA
Merdeka editorial, September 14, 1966.
 -150-

as to Sukarno's past slogans and past judgments: "President Sukarno himself used
to say that the Communists are always 'Progressive-Revolutionary,' and the PKI
has made much of this statement. People wondered if the President had forgotten the
PKI rebellion at Madiun in 1948. . . ." On the occasion of Sukarno's speech on
Armed Forces Day the press remarked: "Sukarno's position in regard to the Gestapu
affair is still uncertain."

At the end of 1966 the split in the attitude towards Sukarno's ideology
is being openly expressed in critical pronouncements by Christian and Moslem
leaders, on the one hand, while PNI leaders are attempting to organize the defense
of Sukarno's authority and his ideology: "Darius Marpaung, National Chairman of
Kespekrl, said that Sukarno's concepts were a complete failure." Suara Rakjat in its
editorial of December 31, 1966 comments on this rather extreme statement: "Sukarno's
concepts have to be tested further to determine whether they have completely failed
as Darius Marpaung has stated." On the same day Operas! reports a Moslem leader,
the General Chairman of ISMI, an Adenausi, to state in Bandjarmasin: "It is now
high time for the Muslims to determine their attitude concerning the honorable titles
'Waliul Amri' and 'The Hero of Islam' given to Sukarno.
/

At the time we heard of the explosion of the Chinese nuclear test, we

remembered the bombastic speech of President Sukarno last year, saying that Indonesia
would be able in 1966 to explode its first atom bomb. It is therefore evidently
proved that President Sukarno uttered empty words." Sukarno's continuous obstruc­
tion to the foreign policy decisions of the MPRS was now explained as the result of
his mistaken basic ideological position in the past which he had not changed.
"How sincere Sukarno was as Mandatory of the Congress [i.e., the MPRS) could be
evaluated a long, long time ago by his expressions of 'in my heaft I am a Marxist,'
'first CONEFO then the UN,' and 'Confrontation must continue until a plebescite
has been held in Sabah—Sarawak,' all of which were contrary to the wish of the
***
Congress.

In 1966 the MPRS had accepted a resolution which required President Sukarno
to account to it for Gestapu/PKI economic deterioration and moral decline. These

*
Angkatan Bersendjata editorial, August 29, 1966.

Merdeka editorial, October 6, 1966.

Mimbar Umum (M), January 3, 1967.

 -151-

three were now named the "Three National Tragedies" and its implementation was
A
vociferously demanded by the students and part of the press. The newly appointed
General Chairman of Persahi, Mashuri, made his famous "Declaration of Justice and
Truth" in this spirit.

The pro-Sukamo forces now began to organize and to react more strongly.
They declared that Mashuri's declaration "constitutes a continuation of efforts
to topple Bung Kamo as President/ABRI Supreme Commander/Great Leader of the
Revolution, or at least, to discredit him in the public eye.... Groups of
youngsters calling themselves "APES" (standing for Aku PEnderkung ^ukamo, or
"I am a Sukamolst"), started roaming Djakarta streets yelling "Sukarno Djaya"
(Sukarno is glorious). Kami on December 31, 1966 gleefully reported evidence that
these people had been imported especially from Central and East Java foi; this purpose,
which meant that there was no mass support for their views in the Capitol.

Sukarno himself tried to use his remaining position of power as head of

state to counteract the attacks on his reputation. "In his message after
inaugurating four new R.I. ambassadors at the Bogor Palace, Saturday, President
Sukarno said, 'If in the countries you are assigned there are "groups or news­
papers which attack the Indonesian Revolution, and slander President Sukarno,
you must resist and you must not remain idle.'" As to the complaints of his
counteracting popular desires and MPRS decisions he stated rather plaintively,
"'If not, then this means that Bung Kamo does not perform his task as Great Leader
of the Revolution, a task I have not asked for, but which was given to me by the
****
Indonesian people themselves, the President stressed.

The PNI leadership and press tried hard to rally the people to the defense
of Sukarno, appealing to their well-established feelings of trust and loyalty by
such declarations as; "Because Bung Karno is right, everywhere in the Nation the
people stand up to defend t(ie rightnesfe of Bung Kamo as President, as Armed
Forces Supreme Conmander, as Great Leader of the Revolution. „# They commented

k
Merdeka editorial, December 24, 1966, and Revolusloner, January 3, 1967.

Duta Swasta, January 2, 1967.

Suluh Marhaen, January 2, 1967.

'ibid.

# Ibid., January 3, 1967.

 -152-

uncompreheridlngly on the anti-Sukarnosm of the Moslem leaders: "The Paritjasila

Front statement showed the tendency to overthrow President Sukarno. In the speeches
during the observance of Nuzulul Qur'an, the speakers invariably condemned President
Sukarno. Will they hate Bung Kamo for seven generations?" The PNI leadership
and press also moved to the attack against Sukarno's critics: "East Java G.P.
Marhaenst’-s (PNI's Youth Movement) says in a statement that the negative activity
of a certain group to topple President Sukarno has disturbed political stability
in this country. They .demanded stem action against the ever more critical
press: "We demand that the authorities enforce the laws and take measures against
anybody who violates the press limitations and Insults President Sukarno as the
lawful president of the Republic of Indonesia.." They even claimed that this
ctitlcism originated from abroad, "Diplomatic sources in Indonesia point out that
the intensive subversive intervention mounted by the U.S. imperialists through
their stooges in the country has so far failed to topple Sukarno as President and
1
^*
Chief of State of the Republic of Indonesia."

They also began actively to defend Sukarno's teachings: "PNI's sacred

duty has always been to safeguard Bung .Kamo's teachings. Nothing is more
pleasant for the Revolutionary Forces than to defend Bung Kamo's teachings,
said Sundoro." To shore up the cracking structure of Sukarno's Ideology, the PNI
initiated a special effort to defend and consolidate -the Codex: "Osa Maliki dis­
closed that in addition to the Committee for the Examination of Bung Kamo's Teach­
ings, there is a team of scientists, formed in the middle of December 1966.-
This team is assigned to assist the Committee and collect the works of the Great
Leader of the Revolution and the works of others on Bung Karno.

As Pantjasila had become since the Coup the central surviving ideological
criterion accepted by all, the PNI stressed the fact of this concept's origins,
(Sukarno claimed to have received this concept in 19.45 through a kind of divine

*
Suluh Marhaen, January 3, 1967.

Ibid., January 4, 1967.

Ibid., editorial, January 2, 1967.

Duta Swasta. January 2, 1967.

^'^Suluh Marhaen, January 3, 1967.
 -153-

Inspiration) and gave Sukarno yet another title, that of "Excavator of the
Pantjasila." All those belittling Bung Kamo's part in the creation of the Pant-
jasila, or even suggesting a possible "reform" of the concept, were dubbed
"Pantjasila Revisionists" by the PNI press. The PNI made great efforts to indoctrin­
ate its cadres with the supreme and unique importance of Bung Kamo. "At a PNI
'up-grading course' in Klaten, Central Java, . . . Hadisubno Sosrowereojo stated
that Bung Kamo, the Father of Marhaenism and Excavator of the Pantjasila, is a
great man in the world, in this twentieth century. . . . Bung Kamo's greatness is
ordained by God . . . this is not a cult of the individual, but God's will. . .
it is proper for the PNI to defend Bung Kamo. The PNI does not follow him obed-
iently, but has always been corrective toward Bung Kamo."

In spite of all the PNI's effort, the criticism of Sukarno's actions past
and present and the debunking of his image continued fast and furious. The trial
of Jusuf Muda Dalam and P.T. Markam had revealed gross financial malpractices, if
not simple embezzlement, committed by Sukarno. "Whether he likes it or not. Bung
Kamo has to confess honestly and with a great mind (if he is still capable of doing
so) that the economic decline in Indonesia is among others the cause of [sic]
II*
***
*

mismanagement by Bung Kamo himself. ... The Action Commands demanded Sukarno s
prosecution and the Attorney General replied "that the demands for Bung Kamo to
stand trial should be given the deepest thought, because Bung Karno is an international
figure and besides the MPRS still considers Bung Karno President/Great Leader of
the Revolution and a Five Star Armed Forces Supreme Commander. He stated that in a
constitutional state we must abide by existing procedures." The Action Commands
in Djakarta retorted by demanding the MPRS to convene to "at least suspend Bung Kamo
as President." The Action Commands stated that "it cannot be denied that based on
juridicial and political facts. Bung Kamo was obviously Involved in the PKI
September 30 Movement. The charges brought against Subandrlo and Omar Dhani may
fully be brought also against Bung Karno." # In addition to these severe attacks

*
Suluh Marhaen, January 5, 1967.

Ibid., January 10, 1967.

Warta Berita, January 7, 1967.

Suluh Marhaen, January 10, 1967.

^^Merdeka, January 9, 1967.
 -154-

on Sukarno's acts in the past, the preSs now also attacked his present behavior
and his character in’general. Here is’ the Moslem view; "President Sukarno is
indeed a man of magnificent nature. Frankly and openly he demonstratively shows
how'he does not observe the fast, under the pretext of illness. But a strange
thing happened on New Year's Eve. Bung Kamo appeared together with his wife at
the Kartika Bahri and danced the whole night. Welcome and happiness to you, oh
the people of Indonesia, who have a Chief of State who pays respect to thfe holy
month of Ramadhan! As to Sukarno's capacity to deal with serious economic matters,
the following story was circulated: "Bung Kamo has another view. Jokingly ‘Bung
Kamo stated that those debts [Indonesia's enormous foreign debts] need not be
paid. If a creditor claims his money we shall challenge him to war. Even though
jokingly ... is it proper for a leader to act that way? And then this blistering
attack-in Angkatan Baru, second week of January, 1967: "The main cause of political
and economic instability is . . . to be sought ... in Bung Karno, who still
stubbornly and blockheadedly maintains his wrong standpoints ... in things in which
he is cornered. Bung Kamo as a Marxist will not hesitate to make a compromise.
As a Marxist and a Machievellianist, Bung Karno will make this compromise as a
means of consolidation of his own power for subsequent control over the situation,.
. . . Bung Karno, though cornered, will not surrender. Even though millions of
fingers are pointed at him, demanding him to account for his wrongdoings, h^, will
simply say 'Give me respite.' But Bung Karno will exploit this tactic of postpone­
ment fully, in, order to maintain his own position and to make further progress.
For this reason, we ceaselessly warn that at any event Bung Karno must account not
only to the MPRS, but also to the Extraordinary Military Tribunal (MAHMILLUB)
which should investigate- the crimes committed by Bung Karno in the political,
economic and moral fields. The people no longer want a Chief of State who plays
with the fate of one hundred and ten million taxpayers!"

In an editorial of January 6, 1967 in Harlan Kami the Student Action

Front analyses the problem of Biong Karno with a view to Indonesia's- political
future: ". . .the extraordinary situation prevailing in this country at the
present. It is none other than the campaign to establish the supremacy of the

*
Angkatan Baru, Spotlight, second week of January, 1967.

Warta Berita, January 5, 1967.

 -155-

Constitution and not the decrees, wishes or orders of a man by the name of Sukarno.
. . . Thus the problem is the problem of the future. President Sukarno's account
should not be judged as just a clarification of the blunders he made in the past,
but as a tradition to subordinate a President to the MPRS."

In January and eaUy Februairy 1967, the student demonstrations against Sukarno
assumed a new Intensity. The movement which had started in late October 1965 with
wall slogans of "Father how long will you wait?", soon had proceeded to the demand:
"Dissolve the PKI!" had part of the time been tolerated by the Amy leadership but
had at times also quite resolutely been suppressed. Early in 1966 Kami had
actually been dissolved. In summer 1966 there still had been mass demonstrations
in support of Sukarno in Bandung. Only after Sukarno's disastrous August 17
speech the students came out with the slogan; "Sukarno, we hate you!" in Bandung,
and in Madlun "Don't call yourself Great Leader of the Revolution!" In Bandung
there appeared the first obscene anti-Sukamo slogans and he was burned in effigy.
Early in October the students demonstrated again, shouting, "Sukarno, go to hell!"
and again the demonstrations were banned, and serious clashes with the police
occurred. By the end of February 1967 the long drawn out seesaw battle between the
opponents and the supporters of Bung Kamo had reached the stage where the cautious
Soeharto considered Sukarno's popularity low enough to press for a serious transfer
of authority. Sukarno had to surrender his powers to Soeharto, the MPRS was
convened in March and installed Soeharto as Acting President, while Sukarno retained
his title of President of the Republic, though "without any authority in the
political field." From April 1967 onwards Sukarno was ignored by mbst of the press.
The last sensation connected with Sukarno was his divorce of Harvati and his official
marriage to Jurivati. The prolonged period of furious attacks and sensational
revelations of the post-Coup press had come to an end.

In July 1967 his portraits were removed even in his stronghold of Central
Java. Rumors about plots for his restoration appeared from time to time but such
plots seem to have been of minor significance. On Independence Day, August 17, 1967,
Sukarno was excluded from the celebrations and reacted in the extremely childish
way of refusing to hand over the original flag of the Republic.

Now even the loyal Suluh Marhaen at last stopped its long serialization
of Bung Kamo's teachings. Subsequently Sukarno's name appeared in the press from
time to time associated with the attempts to rectify his past unfortunate policies
 - 156:-

towards Malaysia, or towards the United States and U.S. aid. Sukarno's economic
policies were held to be responsible for the Chinese preponderance in the economy,
and for the inefficient concentration of enterprises in the hands of the government.
itickic
His economic policy was labeled totalitarian.

Early in 1968 there appeared queries in the press "Will Sukarno ever be
brought to trial?"^^ While Soeharto was then and is still too cautious to accede

to these demands because of the Inherent danger of arousing the surviving feelings
of loyalty to Sukarno that persist, especially in Central Java, he decided that the
time was ripe to complete the transfer of authority. The MPRS was convened and
voted Soeharto full President for five years, leaving Sukarno a civilian without
any official title, but materially well provided for in a state of rather mild house
arrest. The press contrasted the new president's personality favorably with that
of the old one: "Sukarno has a bombastic, dictatorial personality; Soeharto is a
quieter type more prone to democratic principles and devoid of any showmaking.
While part of the press possibly was ready to fall into the old habits of personal
adulation for the new man in power, Soeharto indeed seems to have successfully
discouraged this aspect of the Indonesian "political culture."

Doctor Engineer Sukarno declined to the status of a near non-person, leading

a comfortable but strictly supervised and restricted existence on the outskirts of
Djakarta, completely removed from the political life of Indonesia. Contrary to
the prognosis of Weatherbee and Denis Warner the Republic has been doing reason­
ably well without its "symbol of unity," and is not disintegrating even after the
removal of its "linchpin."

Nusantara, November 3, 1967.

**
Ibid.

Ibid., June 21, 1968.

Suara Rakjat (S), July 10, 1968.

^'^Mimbar Umum (M) , March 15, 1968.

^'^^'^Operasi editorial. May 31, 1968.

Denis Warner, "Indonesia: The Generals Who Got Away," Reporter,

October 21, 1965, p. 40: "As long as he lives, Sukarno is an Indispensable asset
to any Indonesian regime. He is much more than a symbol of Indonesian unity.
He is the linchpin of the republic."
 -157-

The Concept of NASAKOM Is Questioned

I shall first describe the earliest cracks in the "coherent" structure of

the ideology: Nasakom (nationalism, religion, conmuinism) had been the central
concept of the last two pre-Coup years. Within a week of the Coup, the first
discussions about this concept started in the press, including arguments in favor
of its continued validity as well as arguments for its abandonment. The PKI
is rapidly being identified as the "mastermind" responsible for the coup and its
atrocities. Necessarily Communism becomes discredited; (Marxism, Leninism, Maoism,
and, somewhat later, also Marxism-^-la-Indonesia or Socialism-h-la-Indonesia,
i.e., Marhaenism, are being branded because of their connections with Communism
and with the PKI.

The prevalent Ideological argiments against Communism were that it is

a) an atheistic ideology contrary tb Pantjasila (the 5 principles of the state
philosophy) ; b) connected with a foreign power; c) anti'^-nationalist, having
stabbed the Indonesian Revolution, or the legal government, or the state, twice in ^
the back; d) immoral, inhuman, murderous, kidnapping, torturing, planning mass
murders and kidnappings (of religious leaders, etc.)', because of its being atheistic;
4) attempting to take over the country.

This condemnation of the Communist Party and of Communism was

rapidly extended to all the mass organizations of the PKI. Political organizations
following its line (Parkindo, PSII, the left wing of PNI, parts of the leadership
of NU); the PWI (journalists’ association), many institutions of higher education.
Antara, branches of Hansip (the militia), and the National Front—all became suspect
because of heavy infiltration or domination by PKI.

The early contentions that it was possible to condemn the PKI but not
Communism, that Communism would retain its lasting place in Indonesian national
life, and that therefore the concept of Nasakom was still valid, became more and more
incongruous. The abandonment of Nasakom started the process of disintegration of
Sukarno's ideological structure.

However only after Sukarno's image had been seriously damaged, and he had
been stripped of all real political power in March 1967, only then began the overt
struggle over the legitimacy of the entire body of his teaching. The PNI attempted
 -158-

to rescue Sukamoism, but in August 1967 its organ Suluh Marhaen ceased its
serialization of the teachings of Sukarno. By then all parts of his teaching were
suspect, and for most political groups Sukarno served as the arch villain. Even
Pant.jasila, it was sometimes argued, was not really the creation of Sukarno's mind.

The Erosion of Sukarno's Foreign Policy Ideology

During the first post-Coup month Nekolim and Malaysia remained^ the
general enemies, and were dutifully mentioned by the army command and by most mass
organizations, and especially emphasized by the organs of the PNI and other left
groups. An early sign of change, cries of "Long live the U.S.A.," that were
reported from the streets of Djakarta, were hotly denied by everybody because of
the immediate negative domestic reaction. The first change occurred in the rela­
tionship to China. Here Sukarno's position was most vulnerable as in recent months
he had based his foreign policy on a near-exclusive alliance with Peking. Peking's
reaction to Gestapu was generally seen as an Insult to Indonesian independence and
dignity. The public hostility increased with the Chinese consular personnel's
behavior, the resulting mass demonstrations and Peking's reaction to these demon­
strations, and soon China and the Chinese were identified both externally and
internally with Gestapu and therefore branded as enemies, traitors dangerous to the
nation. The first criticism of the old foreign policy ideology was that of the
famous Djakarta-Pnomhpeng-Peking-Panmunjon axis; thereupon the criticism proceeded
to include the one-sidedness, isolation, unreality, resulting damage to national
interests of the old foreign policy. Obviously the Nefo (New Emerging Forces)
concept emerged considerably weakened by this condemnation of Peking, Peking
supposedly being the prime leader of the Nefo forces. The Nefo concept had also
been considerably weakened during the long drawn out dispute about the unsuccessful
Afro-Asian conference in Algeria. This dispute had started just before Gestapu
and continued during the weeks following it. While before Gestapu, Moscow had been
accused of being the cause of all the troubles in the Nefo camp, it now became
obvious that Peking was preventing the holding of the conference.

.Malaysia. As I have mentioned before, Malaysia continued to appear in the

same ritual formulations as one of the chief .enemies of Indonesia for several months,
especially in the pr^ss of the border regions of North Sumatra. In Djakarta in
April 1966 Konfrontasi was still declared to be the official policy—but coupled •
 -159-

with an open door Cp peaceful settlement. Soon after both the "Crush Malaysia"
and the "Konfrontasl" slogans were quietly dropped. The old policy which served
as the focus of Sukarno's policy for the last two years was not being seriously
analyzed or criticized by the press; the press simply started reporting in. a
matter-of-fact way such activities as the exchange of delegations, neighborly
visits and plans for the nomalization of diplomatic relations (which were inter­
rupted by Sukarno's sabotage). The positive arguments for this de facto radically
new policy were national economic self-interest (resumption of trade), the need
for regional cooperation for combating subversion, the need for regional economic
cooperation for economic development and somewhat later in part of the press the
need for cooperation against the danger of Chinese Communist aggression. The out
and out hostility towards Malaysia had changed gradually into normal neighborly
relations, partnership in Asean and even some understanding for Malaysia's problems
in Sabah and even the opinion expressed in some papers that Malaysia had a stronger

claim to Sabah than the Philippines.

United Nations. Sukarno had taken Indonesia dramatically out of the United
Nations as part of his Malaysia quarrel, thereby obyiously following his Peking
orientation. The discreditatlon of Peking as friend and ally on the one hand, and
the gradual normalization of relations with Malaysia on the other, logically resulted
in suggestions for re-entry into the United Nations in spring 1966. Sukarno attempted
to prevent this serious attack on his foreign policy by declaring that Indonesia
would not rejoin the United Nations "as long as it is not reformed." Part of the
press still dutifully fell in with him but the dispute of this vital issue had
started, culminating in Indonesia's re-entry into the United Nations. With this
reorientation to the United Nations, necessarily the rival concept of Conefo, a
rival United Nations under Peking's leadership, were abandoned, as was the building
of the grandiose Peking—financed structure for the headquarters in Djakarta,
along with the rest of the prestige projects. The image of Conefo had been
impaired previously by the rumors of Chinese small arms which were supposed to have
reached Gestapu among the construction materials for the Conefo building.

There followed a gradual reorientation towards the rest of the powers,.

 -160-

Sovlet Union. The Soviet Union at first gained from the rejection, of the
exclusive Peking orientation. Attempts at normalization*of relations and a*return
to early Sukarno—period friendship wefe however interrupted by the surprisingly
strong condemnation of Moscow by the Indonesian press in consequence•of the Czech
invasion; during that period Russia had been equated With Communism and as such had
been condemned as being anti-liberty, anti-nationalism and even anti—progress.

Holland, Holland had been, in Sukarno's picture of the world, the arch
colonial enemy. Soon after Gestapu began the relatively smooth and undramatic change­
over to cordiality, Indonesian appreciation of Dutch generosity in agreeing to a
moratorium on debts and Increased aid led to public declarations in the press
that Holland' had by now fully recognized Indonesia's equality as a sovereign nation
and even that the Netherlands no longer were a colonial country.

United States of America. The United States had played the role of the arch
enemy, the "devil of the world" in Sukarno's "Indonesian Ideology." The image of
the United States as the leader of the imperialist camp, as all-powerful and danger­
ous, took somewhat longer to fade than the images of hostile and dangerous Malaysia
and hostile and colonialist Holland. Ritual anti-United States declarations by
all political and functional bodies continued to appear in the press until spring
1966. As late as December 1966, during the* PNI's last attempt to shore-up Sukarno's
position, counter-demonstrations in front of the United States Embassy in Djakarta
were organized by PNI youngsters. Nevertheless the process of eroding the old
demonological mystique around the United States had begun quite early after the
coup. When Subandrlo accused Djakarta papers of being in the pay of the CIA, a
veritable journalists' rebellion broke out. Who could ignore the fact that not
long ago the PKI had successively accused all its enemies—MaSjuml and PSI, the BPS
journalists, Murba and the HMI, of being agents of the CIA. All these people were
now gradually reappearing, many emerging from political imprisonment or economic
deprivation. The PKI, which had been the successful accuser then, was now itself
in the dock. Necessarily under such circumstances the old accusations about being
in the pay of the CIA had lost credence and the practice of such accusations was
now seen as part of Communist tactics of slander and gradually came to be class­
ified as part of the negative old-order syndrome.

However, the PNI and other "left" leaning papers continue to exhibit an
anti-United States attitude; Condemnation of United States intervention in Viet
Nam, and suspicion of United States Intentions when offering credit and investment.
 -161-

With the beginning of the great debate on the rehabilitation, of the

Indonesian economy the United States started to assume a more positive imag,e in
the bulk of the press. The United States was now appreciated as an Important
source for credit, aid, trade and investment. Sukarno's one-sided foreign policy
which had caused estrangement from the United States was now criticised as unreal­
istic and contrary to the national interest. The early history of U.S.-Indonesian
friendship, and of United States' assistance to Indonesia in her struggle for
independence tended now to appear in official pronouncements.

Viet Nam. There is no complete unanimity in the Indonesian press concerning

the United States' intentions towards Indonesia. In regard to the Viet Nam war
there exist all the shades of attitudes, from hawkish identification with the South
Vietnamese government, even advocating the invasion of North Viet Nam, through a
studious and cautious attitude of regretting the war and hoping for the success of
negotiations, to an open pro-NFL attitude and out and out condemnation of the
United States. The main factors determining these attitudes are the issue of
Communist subversion and China's support of it and the second equally delicate
issue of Western military interference in internal Asian affairs.

Japan. With the beginning of the search for economic rehabilitation,

Indonesia's attitude toward Japan, which had been rather ambivalent and suspicious,
started to take on a more positive aspect. Japan appeared as a patient creditor, as
a supplier of new credit and as an Investor. However, in the case of Japan the ready
appreciation and hopeful expectation soon changed into disappointment when Japanese
credits turned out to be much smaller than expected, and when the Japanese economic
policy was seen as excessively aggressive. In the dispute about the fishery conces­
sion to Japan strong surviving feelings of resentment towards Japan as well as
strong nationalistic suspicion of foreign economic! activity in general came to the
surface.

In general, by the beginning of 1968 the old ideological picture of the

world as divided into the camps of the Oldefos and the Nefos had faded completely.
The concept of Nekolim had disappeared and so had the exclusive identification with
the Afro-Aslan camp. Even the traditional identification with the Arab cause
was no longer monolithic. On this point obviously Sukarno's left-nationalist
ideology had had the full support of the Moslem camp. After the 1967 six-day war.
 -162-

Djakarta witnessed the novel spectacle of a pro-Israeli article written by Indo­

nesia's most respected journalist and a free though heated dispute about this issue
in the Djakarta press. Summing up the change in the role of ideology in Indonesian
foreign policy one might say that Indonesia's attitude to the outside world had
been largely de-ideologized. The argument that ideology Is’ no't the proper
yardstick for foreign policy, but that a truly patriotic and efficient foreign
policy should be based in each case on Indonesia's national self-interest and
mainly Indonesia's economic self-interest, was voiced frequently in the press.
As part of the fallings of the Old Order there appeared now the unrealistic and
boastful "beacon" policy of Sukarno. The concept of the "beacon" policy was openly
criticised and rejected. "It is not in accordance with Indonesia's economic
capability." This does not mean that old hankerings after glory such as suggestions
of offering to mediate either the Viet Nam dispute or the Sabah dispute do not
appear from time to time especially in the left nationalist pressi, However, the
bulk of the' press reflects the surprisingly radical shift of Indonesian official
circles from Sukarno's image of an Indonesia encircled by cruel enemies that aim
to dismember and destroy her, to Foreign Minister MAlik's pronouncement, "Indonesia
has no need to make defensive arrangements against external enemies." Two concepts
from the old foreign policy ideology have survived; "non-alignment"and "an active
and independent foreign policy." It has been pointed out in the press that
during the last years of the Sukarno period only lip service had still be paid to
non-alignment. The two basic principles of non-alignment: opposition to military
alliances and to all foreign military bases, are now scrupulously adhered to and a
genuine attempt is being made to maintain orderly diplomatic relations with all
nations (with the exception of China). The ideal of an "Independent foreign
policy" clearly follows and is widely accepted; the degree of "activity" in Indo­
nesia's foreign policy has been a topic of discussion in the press.

The Erosion of Sukarno's "Indonesian Revolution" Ideology

I have mentioned above the decline of Nasakom as the earliest serious

breach in the edifice of Sukarno's domestic ideology. Communism was no longer seen
as a legitimate partner of the Indonesian revolution. I have also described the
stages of the decline in Sukarno's prestige. By early 1967 his most prestigious
title, that of "Great Leader of the Revolution," had disappeared from usage. Let
 -163-

us look now at the central concept of the Indonesian Revolution. Ever since
1958 Sukarno had Insisted that the Indonesian Revolution was still In progress,
that It was a "veritable struggle," that It had not been finished with the estab­
lishment of an Independent and sovereign Indonesian state, not even after the Inclu­
sion of West Irian, that the attainment of Its end goal which on the domestic
stage was the rather vague "just and prosperous society," would be difficult and
lengthy. However, In the International sphere the Indonesian Revolution was only
a part of an even more difficult and lengthy and world-wide revolution, the struggles
of the Nefos against the Oldefos. Therefore the Indonesian Revolution would be
finally consummated only when a vague kind of International socialism had been
established—"the abolition of exploitation of nation by nation" and "the abolition
of exploitation of man by man." The concept of the Revolution as an Inevitable
and demanding phenomenon was perhaps the most generally accepted concept of Sukarno's
Indonesian Ideology. The good of the Revolution had been Sukarno's central cri­
terion: The Revolution has a proper course that nobody should be permitted to alter.
Internal enemies are those who are trying to do just that. Truly patriotic Indo­
nesians are those who become "loyal tools of the Revolution." Sukarno had success­
fully created a war mentality with campaigns, recruits, commands, unity fronts,
confrontations, struggle, "tearing down before upbuilding," and had demanded the
"romanticism of sacrificing for the Revolution." The PKI had flourished In this
war mentality and had successfully designated as domestic counter-revolutionaries
those groups which stood In the way of their planned takeover. During the first
period after Gestapu this language of "the Revolution" continued more or less
unchanged with each group calling Itself "progressive revolutionary," and Gestapu

now designated as counter-revolutionary.

The antl-Gestap'u movement used the language of Sukarno's revolutionary

campaigns with "action fronts," "united fronts," competing in the task of "crushing"
Gestapu. Nevertheless while loyalty to the Revolution had been a general ritual in
the early post-coup months, the use of the concept steadily declined and had com­
pletely disappeared by summer 1968. The weakening of the violent Image of struggle
and revolution is discernible soon after the coup. Among the journalistic attempts
to deal with the PKI-Gestapu experience we find such pronouncements as "those who
claim to be most revolutionary turned out to be really enemies," or "struggle was
their special forte," or "struggle was their plan to take over the country," or
"they smeared many innocent people as enemies of the revolution," or "the
revolutionary foreign policy led us to the choice of a false friend and the loss
of many true friends." Thus the decline of the hold of the concept of Revolution
 over the thoughts of the Indonesian,politicized public was part of the realization
of the danger of a Coifimuhist takeover. The Cbnimunists had been the most fervent
advocates of revolution and they had most benefited from the atmosphere of struggle.
r _ *
I'ho reasons for the gradual abandonment of the concept of the Indonesian
Revolution went even deeper. The Indonesian public gradually realized that
Sukarno s government had been one of mismanagement, corruption, Impoverishment,
decline of the country's economic substance, and of political isolation. It became
clear that this deplorable reality had been hidden behind a smoke screen of mili­
tant slogans. The empty and boasting nature of Sukarno's style was gradually being
condemned as part of the Old Order, one of the few new ideological concepts appear­
ing in Indonesia after Gestapu. The original advocates of the New Order no longer
used the revolutionary phraseology. Instead of the militant destructive concepts
of revolution appear now concepts that are conservative, reconstructionist, and/or
developmental and reformist. This group of concepts such as:

Rehabilitation of the economy

Political and economic reconstruction
Economic development
Political development
Modernization
Increasing production
Raising the standard of living
Five-year development plan

have not formed- parts of a hew ideological system and afe only sparingly used for
purposes of word magic.

Weatherbee had claimed that the strongest point of Suka;mo's ideological

structure was his use of specifically Indonesian native concepts such as Gotong
Rojong (cooperation), as Well as Mus.jawarah (deliberation) and Mufakat (sense hf
the meeting). Sukarno had used them respectively against such foreign western
institutions as free enterprise and parliamentary majority rule. It is inter­
esting to note that the use of these concepts has also declined gradually, although
to the best of my knowledge they have not been criticised seriously.

From the above mentioned arguments in favor of foreign aid, credit and
Investment, it is obvious that Sukarno's concept of Berdikari or "going it alone
economically," had to come up for criticism. This concept was in fact hot dropped
 -165-

surreptltiously but was openly cr'lticised as unrealistic and harmful. Last of the
specifically Indonesian conceptual underpinnings of Sukarno's Revolution that came ’
in for criticism and dropped out of fashion, was the much praised "1945 generation."
Here the young opponents of Sukarno consciously competed with Sukarno's "1945
generation" and called themselves the ''1966 generation."

The First Cracks in Fortress Sukarno

Nasakom

In the summer of 1965, Nasakom (Nas = nasionalisme, a = agama (religion),,

kom = koramunisme) was the central concept in Indonesian politics; it was the
central slogan used by all legal political groups and the central criterion for
political respectability used by Sukarno constantly. On October 1, the day of the
unsuccessful coup, the newspapers reported Sukarno's recent speech in which he had
made the statement that he had "kindled the idea of Nasakom already in 1926 and had,
through it, united all the revolutionary forces for attacking the enemy.. . . .
There are some who still do not adhere to the Nasakom idea—they are cockroaches
and betrayers."

The concept of Nasakom was being used by the PKI leaders and their press
in an all pervading manner.’ In the name of Nasakom unity their supporters were
exhorted to attack domestic social elements considered hostile, such as village
landlords and city "bureaucratic capitalists," as well as the external enemy,
Nekolim. Harian Rakjat. on September 29, 1965, reports youngsters carrying posters
such as "Strengthen the Nasakom unity, cut off the cancer and parasite." Members
were advised "to preserve Nasakom etiquette." The victory of a PKI man in a
local election was announced as "one of nine Nasakom candidates." Political
enemies were accused of not adhering to Nasakom. The Minister of Basic Education,

■k

Harian Rakjat. October 1, 1965.

Djalan Rakjat (S), June 25, 1965.

Ibid., June 29, 1965.

kk kk
Ibid.
 -166-

for whose "retooling" PKI organizations had been agitating strenuously, was accused
of "suffering from Nasakomphobia and work-phobia." "Mass organizations of
Nasakom scholars" suggest that their opposition to the planned technician’s
II*
**
conference proves that this conference is not "backed up by Nasakom.
The political enemies are even accused of using the concept of Nasakom in vain.
Harian Rakjat, on September 29, 1965, insinuates that "ex-PSI and Masjumi members
are arranging a so-called Nasakom Film Conference."

In the first official statements after the Coup, Nasakom is used in its
usual ritual context. Angkatan Bersend.jata, on October 4, 1965, published the text
of the following interesting document;

Praise be to God that the Armed Forces of the

R.I. which is loyal to the Pantjasila, the
Nasakom and the Sapta Marga, and which is always
loyal to the Supreme Commander of the ABRI/Grdat
Leader of the Revolution, Bung Kamo, firmly and
correctly has performed its duty in the Interest
of the nation's and country's glory and prestige
and Immediately has taken actions to crush the
September 30 counterrevolutionary movement.

In the same issue we find the following accusation against those responsible for
the attempted Cdup; "With this affair they have been unmasked; they must take off
the mask of pseudo-revolutionary, pseudo-manlpolist, their pretense as if they are
anxious for unity, anxious for Nasakom." In the provinces the PKI and its affil­
iated organizations continue for a short time to appeal in pre-Coup style to uphold
Nasakom which includes them: In Medan political leaders and among them the still-
existing PKI-led labor union, Sobsi, urged the strengthening of Nasakom unity. . .
"in order not to be provoked and in order to avert a situation that may benefit
the Nekolim." As late as October 23 a conference of local authorities and
political parties, including the PKI, which met in Madlun, the old Communist strong­
hold, "expressed readiness to preserve the Nasakom-based progressive revolutionary
national unity." Military speakers in their speeches still used the unqualified.

*
Harian Rakjat, September 28, 1965.

Ibid., September 29, 1965.

Harian Harapan (M), October 7, 1965.

Suara Rakjat (S), October 23, 1965.

 -167-

old phrase "preserve and heighten the Nasakom—based progressive, revolutionary

unity." The Gestapu/PKI was Identified as counterrevolutionary, and it was
**
also branded as anti-Pantjasila, anti-Manipol and antl-Nasakom.

However some doubts about the validity of Nasakom had appeared in the
press as early as October 11. On that date Mimbar Revolusi in its editorial
accuses the PKI as follows; "it is true that Aidit's PKI and his friends have
performed an unpardonable violation; they not only have carried out a diabolical
plan, but have committed unpardonable political crimes, split Indonesian unity,
created confusion in the Nasakom concept.in their own interest." On October 12,
Mimbar Revolusi raised the following question: "Is it still possible to maintain
Nasakom unity? This is a difficult question to answer now. The fact that the PKI
and its mass organizations participated in the Gestapu makes it clear that the
'KOM* element of Aidit’s PKI is no longer permissable." Howeyer on October 13 the
press reports an official statement which hdd as its purpose the prevention of just
such a discussion. This was Dr. Subandrio's statement; "If among the three Nasakom
elements one is ’naughty,’ it is hot its ideology that has to be killed." It turned
out later that the flippancy of this remark which belittled the crime of Gestapu
starte4 the process of making Subandrio suspect.

On October 21 Pelopor in its editorial delivers the following lecture in

answer to the nagging question:

People keep asking what will become of Nasakom if the

PKI is dissolved. It is clear that Nasakom taught
by Bung Karno becomes the first talisman of the Five
Talismans of our'Revolution, which is a Nasakom unity
as the distillation of the Pantjasila. It is like the
Pantjaslla that cannot be taken apart. Nasakom taught
by our great leader is like the Pantjasila and the
Five Talismans of the Revolution. It does not only
belong to PNI, NU or the PKI—the present PNI, NU and
PKI. It is the property of the entire Indonesian
people who are progressive and revolutionary and must be
supported by the entire progressive and revolutionary
Indonesian people with or without the PKI.

IThis is indeed the classical style of word magic!

•k
Manifesto (S), October 19, 1965.
**
Patriot (M), October 12, 1965.
 -168-

On October 25, Angkatan Bersend.jata, 'the Arrays paper, had still reported with
approval Bung Kamo's statement: "Nasakom does not depend on a party or an indi­
vidual," and had commented, "Our struggle to crush the Gestapu/PKI is not a
struggle against the KOM or against Nasakom, but a struggle to establish the
Nasakom foundation according to Bung Kamo's teachings." On the next day, Angkatan
Bersendjata finds it necessary to air the question in greater detail:

People are asking: Does destroying Gestapu/PKI mean

destroying the principle of Nasakom? Is it not
necessary for us (in this case the Great Leader of the
Revolution, Bung Kamo) to revise Nasakom as the principle
of revolution? We said yesterday: No, it is not necessary!
....Communism in its present physical principle of the PKI
must be destroyed, since it obviously has imperilled the
Indonesian Revolution by masterminding the Gestapu. How­
ever, Communism as an idea, as a spiritual form, has reason
for existence in Indonesia.
Therefore we were not joking when we say that our struggle
for destroying the Gestapu/PKI is not waged against the
principle of Communism, or for that matter, against Nasakom,
but it is precisely a struggle for upholding the principle
of Nasakom as one of the principles of our Revolution.

On October 27 Api printed an article by Dr. Suhardlman, an analysis of the

PKI's political ascendancy, and in this article the concept Nasakom appears for the
first time as a negative one.

The PKI demanded NASAKOMIZATION in every field and as such

it is the 'dirty weapon of the PKI.'* The PKI did succeed
in making ripe its social revolution. The starting point
of its political actions was the dissolution of its
rivals, the Masjumi and PSI political parties which were
Involved in the PRRI/PERMESTA rebellion....Indonesia's
bad economic situation was used by the PKI to create an
unhealthy political situation. The PKI introduced
Nasakom in every field from government agencies in the
Center, up to village administration. It demanded that'
NASAKOMIZATION be carried out in the Dwikora Cabinet.
D.N.A. Aldit said once 'The present cabinet is not a
Nasakom one; it merely has a Nasakom smell, whereas the
ministers are those who receive a distribution of
authority from Bung Karno.' In that way, the PKI in­
directly criticised in public the policy of the
President.

However, such sophisticated criticism was not immediately accepted. Api

Itself declared on October 29: "With the PKI's knockout the Nasakom idea is
saved." And the Army's Angkatan Bersendjata still declares on November 3 in its
 -169-

editorial; "It is therefore our duty to promote tlie life of political parties
which are Pantjasilist, Manipolist, and Nasakomist." It took over a year for the
more general acceptance of Dr. Suhardlman's analysis of the Nasakom concept as a
useful tool in the hands of the PKI. All during 1966 the use of the concept
declined.

Finally on December 31, 1966, Suara Rakjat (S) in its editorial stated the
view that became from then on generally accepted; "The Nasakom concept had paved
the way for PKI domination and ended in the Lubang Buaja tragedy." It is signifi­
cant that from that day onwards the concept Nasakom disappears entirely from the
pages of the press.

The Case of Dr. Subandrio

Dr. Subandrio was Foreign Minister and the most influential of Sukarno's
Cabinet ministers. His political development had been rather curious. For most
of his political career he had been known as a staunch anti-Conraumist, especially
on the internal Indonesian scene. However, during the last period before the
abortive Coup from spring 1965 onwards, he had veered sharply and in his orientation
had become an ally of the PKI in their bid for a greater share of political power.
He had become the chief architect of Indonesia's new, exclusively Peking-oriented
foreign policy. It can be assumed that the leadership of the Armed Forces bore
him a special grudge because of this about-face. The military leadership certainly
did not hinder the public and the press in their attack on Subandrio's character,
intentions and political record. This attack on Subandrio (which ended in his being
condemned' to death but not executed),certainly was instrimiental in causing early
cracks in Sukarno's perfect image as the all-powerful and infallible Leader.

An editor of the daily, Api, who had coined the word Gestapu, was also
the first to call Subandrio "Durno," casting him in the role of the famous evil
counsellor of princes in the traditional Javanese shadow play; the sobriquet was
quickly taken up by most of the press and accepted by the public.

During the two days of the abortive Coup and its relatively easy suppression
by Soeharto, Subandrio had been on a trip to North Sumatra in the company of the
Communist leader, Njoto', a not very powerful minister. His activities on this
trip later came in for some scrutiny. However, on returning hurriedly to Djakarta
 -170-

he assumed his previous position and tried to influence political developments by

belittling the seriousness of the Coup. His first .reported public statement appeared
on October 13 in Kompas; "All information must be held accouritable to the Revo­
lution." (Here Subandrio certainly speaks in the best tradition of obtuse word
magic.) "If among the three Nasakom elements pne is 'naughty,’ it is not its
ideology that has to be killed." Two days later the papers report the following
statement: "Dr. Subandrio praised'Major General Soeharto who has restored security,
law and order in this country without many victims. He appealed to the "National
Front" branches throughout Indonesia to create a calm and peaceful atmosphere and
ii
to give the facts to the Indonesian people." Subandrio's purpose clearly was,
while appearing on good terms and grateful to the Army leadership, to declare the
period of emergency which necessitated the concentration of power in the hanejs of
the Army, as concluded. It seems also to have been an attempt to halt the further
destruction of the PKI. His appeal to the "National Front" branches
reveals his attempt to use this organization, which had been established as a
political tool for Sukarno and his group and whose leadership had been heavily
infiltrated by the PKI, as a legitimate instrument to counteract the rising power
of the Army. Up to now we have had only the cautious reporting of Subandrio's
statements. The change came when Subandrio lost his temper with the Djakarta press,
which at this time started to treat the issue of Gestapu and its connections with
Peking in a more radical way. Subandrio accused an unnamed and unnumbered group
of Djakarta dallies as being in the pay of the CIA, The official Army paper,
Berita Yudha, on October 26, 1965, comments on this charge still^in the old-style,
deferential language: "To safeguard Dr. Subandrio's good name, we hope that Dr.
Subandrio, with his honesty and sincerity, in his devotion to the State and the
Revolution, will clearly and firmly state publicly which newspaper is being fin­
anced by the CIA." However on the same day Nilsa Putera already used somewhat
more critical language: ". . . if that accusation is based only on Information,
or only on rumors or slander, we think that the public accusation made by Dr.
Subandrio is an act, not only lacking discretion, but also has put all newspapers
in Djakarta in the line of the CIA accomplices and agents." On the next day,
the language becomes sharper: "Dr. Subandrio issued a very mean and d^rty slander

Duta Masjarakat, October 15, 1965.

 -171-

by accusing that American CIA has financed certain Indonesian newspapers."

Subandrio tried to retract his statement but to no avail. Here* is Angkatan
Bersend.jata*s comment of October 27, 1965: "Subandrio contradicts himself about
newspapers aided or exploited by CIA, now saying he did not charge that." On
the same day Karva Bhakti reports a demonstration in Djakarta which shows a con­
siderable suspicion of Subandrio. The demands were "that Subandrio not be Acting
President if Sukarno goes to the A-A Conference, or if Sukarno does not go, he
should not send Subandrio," while Subandrio continued to try to use his position
as Foreign Minister in order to' save his foreign policy. Angkatan Bersendjata
reports on October 29, 1965, Subandrio's statement that "the President and the
Cabinet Praesidium discussed relations between the CPR and Indonesia and he was of
the opinion that all Incidents must be settled by Indonesia and the CPR in a
friendly way." His leading enemy among the Djakarta press, Nusa Putera, reports
a statement by the PSII Party, on October 29, 1965: "Based on the Islamic Law
. . . since Dr. Subandrio has been outrightly rejected by the people, both in the
forms of demonstrations and statements, his authority has fallen down. In order
to secure the solution of the September 30 Movement in a good manndr. Dr. Subandrio
should be dismissed from the Dwikora Cabinet." On the same day a Medan dally
opens the charge of Subandrio’s direct Involvement in Gestapu; "The formation of
a Revolutionary Council at Pangkalan Brandan on October 1 was foiled. . . . The
plot was perfected when Njoto visited Pangkalan Brandan with Subandrio on October 1."
Subandrio did not give up immediately and tried to organize a new nation­
wide organization which would defend Sukarno and his past policies and their position
of power; this was the "Inti Barisan Sukarno," the kernel of the Sukarno front.
But this rapidly ran into opposition and made little headway. Angkatan Bersendjata
on April 4, 1966 reports the organization's members "trained by Subandrio" stirring
up trouble. By spring 1966 Subandrio was seen as the person responsible for the
f ' f

recent disastrous foreign policy of Indonesia. "After Dr. Subandrio's political

actions have been disclosed, it is clear how Indonesia has become no longer active
and independent, but a satellite of the CPR. . . . The PKl played with Subandrio's
ambitions to become the most esteemed person in Indonesia and Asia." And in a

*
Harlan Kesatuan (M), October 29, 1965.
'k'k

Trisaktl, editorial, April 3, 1966.

 -172-

slmllar vein, "Dr. Subandrio’s foreign policy was. used to serve his ambitions.
Subandrio sought support of Bung Kamo by creating [the] impression he was [the]
only upbuilder of a tremendous foreign policy." In the same issue Subandrio is
firmly placed in the rogue’s gallery: "At one time our country was discomposed
by bandits such as Subandrio . . . our banks have been robbed, our girls raped
and such evil deeds." An additional charge yras made against Subandrio: that he
as the head of the BPI—the Indonesian Intelligence Agency—had built up a
frightening "all-automatic and hyper-modern system of interrogation and torture
of political prisoners." About this time too the press reports the first demands
for the arrest and trial of Dr. Subandrio. "KAPPI in its statement demands . . .
that Dr. Subandrio be brought before the special military tribunal. ..."
In the same issue Angkatan Bersend.jata reports similar demands in the provinces.
"At Djember . . . before taking over the Chinese school, the Pantjasila Front
erected posters in yarious places of the town containing these slogans: 'Support
the closing of Hsinhua News Agency in Djakarta,' 'Support the placing of Dr, .
Subandrio and I. R. Surachman in protective custody. . . .'"

The anti-Sukarno tide continued to rise. Duta Masjarakat on April 9, 1966,

reports that Subandrio had been accused of having favored rural Chinese traders
illegally: "... the regulation banning alien business activities in rural areas
which had been quietly frozen by Gestok leader Subandrio. The slogans also demandeid
the hanging of Subandrio. By the end of September Subandrio had been arrested
and was awaiting trial. The press comments as follows: "Now with the trial of
****
Dr. Subandrio opening, the whole world is watching to see what will be disclosed."
And on November 29, 1966: "The trial of former Foreign Minister Subandrio is even
more important, for he was a poli'c5miaker."

Subandrio is by now fully identified with the methods of the PKI: "We
must reject all concepts of 'meat-cleaver democracy'; 'fight terror with terror'
as Subandrio and the PKI have advocated." With the end of Subandrio's trial and
conviction his name disappears from the pages of the press, but the way had been
opened for the direct attack on his master, Sukarno.

Kompas editorial, April 5, 1966.

**
Sinar Revolusl, April 8, 1966.
AAA
Angkatan Bersendjata, April 6, 1966.
AAAA
Merdeka, editorial, September 27, 1966.
 -173-

The Erosion of Sukarno's Foreign Policy Ideology

Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Afro-Asian Conference

Since 1955 the idea 6f an Afro-Asian camp of nations had been an important
element in Sukarno's world view. The founding conference in Bandung had given
Sukarno the first taste of leadership on the 'international scene. While in the
earlier years the Afro-Asian camp was supposed to belong to the Third World,
keeping aloof from the quarrels of the two super powers, in the 1960's Sukarno saw
it as the main force of theNEFO's Involved in a worldwide struggle with the
OLDEFO's (Old Established Forces), or Nekollm. In the last period before the
Coup, Sukarno and his government worked in close alliance with Peking, helping
Peking in its attempt to get rid of Soviet influence in the Afro-Asian organization.
-The second full Afro-Asian Cpnference had been planned for June 1965 in Algiers.
The Indonesian press contained the usual greetings and expressions of support for
the coming conference, the PKI press being most active, e.g., Dj a Ian Rak.j at (S).
June 24, 1965. "SOBSI sends support to the Indonesian delegation at the Afro-Asian
Conference in Algeria," and Djalan Rakjat (S) declared on June 25, 1965 that
"countries which, arq not anti-imperialist—Malaysia and India—should not parti­
cipate in the A-A Conference."

Already at the end of June it became clear that not all was well with the
Conference. Algeria changed governments while the delegates were congregating.
The Soviet government did not recognize the new Algerian government. The traditional
explanation for difficulties in the Afro-Asian camp was subversive machinations of
Nekolim. This time, however, there appear in the Indonesian presh hints that the
culprit was not Nekolim but Soviet "revisionists." The squabblings within the
Afro-Asian camp continued and the Indonesian September 30 affair added to its
difficulties. The Conference was postponed to November 5, but as no solution was
found it then was postponed indefinitely.

For several weeks after the Coup the Indonesian press went through the
ritual declarations in favor of Afro-Asian solidarity and the holding of the
Conference which, according to' Sukarno's plans, was supposed to be an important
step in the establishment of CONEFO, a rival International body to the United

*
Obor Revolusi (S), June 30, 1965, i.e., "The second Afro-Asian Conference
has been postponed not because of the efforts of the imperialists."
 -174-

Nations. Sukarno was supposed to attend it, taking with him a delegation
including several Conmunist leaders. On October 11, 1965, Bukit Barisan (M)
reports a mass rally of Moslems "intended to support the departure of the Presi­
dent, Hero of Islam, to the second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. ..."
On October 22, 1965 the Indonesian Daily News (S), prints a statement of the Surabaya
Youtfi Front which "hopes for the success of Dwikora, Kiapna, the second Afro-Asian
Conference, and CONEFO." However, doubts about the Indonesian Delegation become
stronger. "It would certainly be strange if those involved in the Gestapu
and who supported that counterrevolutionary adventure were Invited to join the
ic
second Afro-Asian Conference."

With the gathering storm against Subandr-io there comes the objection to his
representing Indonesia at the Conference. While some papers still express the hope
of the Conference taking place: "The second Afro-Asian Conference, should be held
on November 5 as scheduled. Indonesia is capable, in spite of September 30, of
playing a major role. The existence of many problems among the Afro-Asian countries
and the intensification of the imperialist aggression in Afro-Asian countries
require the Conference,' and continue to point to the old enemy Nekollm: "A NU
leader says that postponing the Afro-Asian-Conference was helping Nekolim, who
wanted to foil it. It should lead to- CONEFO." Other papers however started to
point to the real obstacle to the holding of the Afro-Asian Conference, namely
the Peking government which had, since the Coup, expressed extreme annoyance and
hostility for the new military leadership of Indonesia. Obor Revolusi (S), on
October 26, 1965, states in an editorial entitled "China’s Strange Attitude,":
"China—which has been promoting the awakening of NEFO countries in cooperation
with Indonesia now.wants the Afro-Asian Conference indefinitely postponed."
With this indefinite postponement barely five weeks after the Cdup Afro-Asian
solidarity, one of the central concepts in Sukarno’s ideological image of the
world, virtually disappedrs from the Indonesian press.

*
Berita Yudha, October 21, 1965.

Surabaya Post (S), editorial, October-25, 1965.

Dinamika (S), October 27, 1965.

NEFOS and OLDEFOS

Sukatno's original ideological position had been that Indonesia should

belong to the neutral bloc of the "Third World." By 1964 he had changed his
position and adopted a division of the world into two camps—Nefos and Oldefos.
The camp- of the "new emerging forces" was supposed to be composed of the peoples
of the ex-colonial countries of Asia and-Africa and to a somewhat lesser degree, those
of Latin America. The progressive revolutionary forces within European and North
American countries were their allies. There were however some Afro-Asian or Latin
American governments that did not have a truly Nefo character. China and Indonesia
were supposed to be the most important spokesmen and leaders of the Nefo camp.
Oldefos, "old established forces" a concept used somewhat less than the positive
one of Nefos, were more or less identical with Nekolim; The governments and people
of the reactionary neo-colonialist imperial camp.

This dichotomy of the world had been dutifully accepted* by all the sur­
viving political and social groups and their press. Naturally, the most enthusiastic
propagandist of the concept was the PKI; it used it to the hilt in order to push
Indonesia into an extreme Peking-oriented foreign policy. Here are a few examples
of Harlan Rakjat's use of the concept in 1964: "The Indonesian delegation to the
'Non Bloc Summit Conference' in Cairo has left, led by President Sukarno.
Indonesia's position is clear. We reject the idea of dividing the world into
three blocs with the 'Non Committed' in the middle. Instead, the division is
between Nefos and Oldefos. In this conference we do not seek 'peace for the sake
of peace.' Rather, 'we love peace, but we love freedom more!'" Or, "Many times
the world has been astonished by the superiority of science in a socialist society,
as shown by Soviet space victories. This time Voskhod entered orbit with three
passengers, and returned with all safe. ■ There is another satellite up there, a
spy satellite of the imperialist Americans, that threatens the peace of the world.
So the confrontation between the Oldefos and the Nefos is also in space. ..."
Or, "China's recent explosion of an atomic bomb is a good answer to the Oldefos
from the Nefos. . . .Of course some Oldefos and their stooges object to it, but
here in Indonesia it has been warmly welcomed by many of our highest leaders."

*
Editorial, September 29, 1964. ^

Editorial, October 14, 1964.

Editorial, October 26, 1964.

 -176-

Or, " . . we condemn the bomb In the hands of the imperialists because of their
*
abhorrent policies, but we welcome it in the hands of a Nefo nation."

On the eve of the Coup the Nefo-Oldefo concept was used by non-Communlst
papers in a similar vein, i.e.. Bintang Timur declares on September 30, 1965,
"No one doubts that U.S. imperialism leades the Oldefos camp in their confrontation
against the Nefos camp. Our camp—camp of the Nefos—which has taken a firm stand
to eradicate the Oldefos from' the world should always be vigilant in this
confrontation. . . ." Or, on October 1, 1965, the day of the Coup itself, Berita
Yudha states in its Comer Column, "The rotten UN is being controlled by Oldefo
big shots."

The Nefo-Oldefo concept was immediately shaken by the obviously hostile

attitude of the Peking government towards the official Indonesian condemnation of
the September 30 Movement and its Revolutionary Council. The violent outburst of
Radio Peking against the Indonesian Army leadership and later on also against
President Sukarno greatly hurt the very sensitive national pride of the Indonesian
population. This was'obviously a prime example of foreign interference in Indo­
nesia's internal affairs, a crime which had always been associated with imperialist
and colonialist governments. While Subandrio. and Sukarno tried to shore up the
cracking relations between Indonesia and China, most of the press became ever more
critical of the Chinese government and in the process undermined the validity of
the Nefo concept: "China, a Nefo country, should not interfere with Internal and
Ideological problems of Indonesia. Indonesia and China are 'the strongest anti-
imperialist bastions in Asia.' • Nevertheless it is the duty of every country to
take firm measures to safeguard its own security, sovereignty and national identity.'"
And, "Fifty parties, mass organizations, functional groups, of the United Action
Coordinating Body to Crush the Gestapu Counterrevolutionary Movement, expressed
their deepest regret for the CPR's departure from Nefo solidarity, especially
towards the Indonesian government, which up to the present continues friendship
with the CPR. Or the following exhortation to Peking: Good relations
between the CPR and RI can be strengthened if both sides adhere to Asian methods

*
Harlan Rak.lat, editorial, October 26, 1964.
**
Surabaya Post (S), editorial, October 23, 1965.
ifk
Angkatan Bersend.jata, October 27, 1965.
 -177-

of Bung Karno, consultation and the vow of the Nefo to build a new world."*

Or the following hint to Peking that it is not the undisputed arbiter of Nefo
policies; "The CPR said that its own design is best for the-Nefos to reach
socialism but Indonesia and most of the Asian/Afro countries said NO!"

Only very few attempts to salvage the Nefo concept after the rift with
Peking still appear in the Indonesian press. Here is one example: "Being a
leader of Nefo countries, Indonesia has the duty to save the Conference [the
Second A-A Conference] from attempts to ruin the anti-Nekolim spirit by smuggling
such Nekolim puppets as Tengku Abdurahman and South Korea into the Second A-A
Conference. ..." When Malik became Foreign Minister in spring 1966, he
thoroughly attacked and criticised Sukarno's past foreign policy, especially its
dependence on Peking. Nevertheless Malik, while advocating a radical change in
Indonesia’s, foreign policy, still made use of several concepts of the Indonesian
ideology, among them the Nefo concept: "'Rest assured,' said Malik, 'by devoting
our foreign policy to national interests, the interests of the Indonesian
Revolution in an overall sense, the Indonesian Lighthouse amid the struggle of the
New Emerging Forces front will become a lighthouse which needs not borrow the rays
from another source, but which can seriously shine its light, generating its own
power.'

Soon after the use of the concept Nefo in either a positive or a neutral
connotation disappears from the press. By the end of the year it had become
one of the harmful, deceiving concepts attributed to the Old Order.
"The Nefo concept had mortgaged Indonesia to Communist China.

Nekolim. Imperialism. Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism

Obviously the concepts of colonialism and of imperialism were much more

widely disseminated and aroused stronger feeling among Indonesians than the recent s
Nefo-Oldefo dichotomy. Since the '20s the nationalist movement had accused the

it
Angkatan Bersendjata. October 29, 1965.

Api. October 29, 1965..

D.jawa Pos (S), November 3, 1965.

****
Api Pantjasila. April 5, 1966.
^'‘suara Rakjat (S), editorial, December 31, 1966.
 -178-

colonial government of oppressing and exploiting- the Indonesian people and the
post-war clashes with the Dutch and the ^British had convinced many that there indeed
existed an imperialist camp composed mainly of colonial or ex-colonial powers,
that it pursued an imperialist policy and that it constituted a danger to Indonesia's
security. Indonesians shared this complex of ideas about the existence of powerful,
wealthy, exploitative and ill-intentioned forces in Western Europe and in North
America with considerable parts of the populations of most under-developed coun­
tries. In Indonesia the image of Western imperialism had been- fostered by several
ideological influences: Marxist Influences from Dutch sources. Sun Yat Sen's
influence on Indonesian nationalist leaders, and, later, the Japanese version of
anti-Western xenophobia.

Sukarno had shortened the concept into the acron3mi, Nekolim (neo-coloniallsm-
imperialism), the central and constant enemy of Indonesia. Nekolim were blamed
for the various rebellions and assassination attempts, Nekolim were supposed to
aim at the very destruction of the Indonesian Republic. The policies of
Indonesia's neighbors had been described as being aimed at Indonesia's encirclement"
by Nekolim. The Nekolim camp was supposed to aim at establishing "neo-colonialist
rule" over the ex-colonies by way of - intervention, foreign military bases, and
through the’use of aid, trade, and investment. According to Sukarno's Indonesian
Ideology, the Indonesian Revolution would only be concluded after Nekolim had been
defeated all over the world.

It is interesting to follow the fate of this concept which was not just
a rather arbitrary creation of Sukarno, unlike many of the other components of
his "Indonesian Ideology," but was much more widely accepted and had been in
existence for a longer time. Here are some examples of the use of the acronjnn
Nekolim and its components, neo-colonialism and imperialism, during the summers
of 1964 and of 1965. Fellow Asian countries-, whose, governments do not agree with
Sukarno's judgments and policies are declared to be creatures of Nekolim. On
July 11, 1964, Duta Masjarakat calls Malaysia and the South Arabian Federation
"ugly creatures of Nekolim—intent on encircling Indonesia and disrupting
Arab unity." Again, on November 27, 1964, a host of world events are. seen as
components of the overall policy of Nekolim. "Nekolim use intervention and
subversion in the Congo."

For over a year Indonesians had been exhorted by Sukarno, their

political leaders and their press to "crush Malaysia." Merdeka, on November 17,
 -175-

1964, quotes Sukarno's exhortation: "Close the ranks before the Nekollm threats."
And "Because of the present encirclement by Nekolim, we must strengthen our mental
and physical defenses . . . and crush neo-colonialist Malaysia. As the
President has said, 'Let us live in the spirit of vivere pericoloso.'"

While all the political groups and newspapers join in energetically in the
3-nti—Nekollm cause, the PKI nevertheless accuses its social and political enemies
of being in league with Nekolim. The Surabaya PKI paper, Djalan Rakjat, on
June 25, 1965, spreads the slogan: "Crush Nekolim and landlords!" While the
demand of the PKI to arm workers and peasants still met with considerable
resistance from the Military, Sukarno fully endorsed the^PKI's view o^ the
landlords and the "bureaucratic capitalists" being the internal enemies in village
and town respectively, both allied with Nekolim. They served as a convenient
scapegoat for Indonesia's mounting economic troubles. Harlan Rakjat on
September 29, 1965 reports Sukarno's speech on the National Peasants' Day:
"The principal reasons why our economy is not yet fully independent and free is
imperialism and feudalism ... persons in Indonesia who continue working
in the interest of Imperialists and feudalists ... are bureaiicratic capitalists,
manipulators and corruptors . . . the three city devils. In addition to
imperialism and feudalism as the principal cause in our economic difficulties
there are rats called by D. H. Aidit 'cancers'; they must be destroyed."

Into this atmosphere of anti-Nekolim frenzy erupted the unsuccessful Coup

of September 30 which was clearly aimed at the central command of the Armed
Forces. The Army Command immediately realized the very realistic threat to their
position and indeed to their lives, which the September 30 Movement constituted.
And therefore immediately appealed to the people to crush this new -enemy. Nat­
urally the new enemy had to be associated with the old established enemy, i.e.,
Nekolim. In its first communique of October 2 the following formula was used:
"The counterrevolutionary gang, calling themselves the September 30 Movement,
headed by Lt. Col. Untung, was openly masterminded by the Nekolim subversives."
On October 4, Angkatan Bersendjata. in its editorial, expounded on this theme:
". . . and in implementing the Dwikora, Lt. Gen. Yani and senior officers of the

*
Suluh Indonesia. December 23, 1964.

Angkatan Bersendjata. October 2, 1965.

 -180-

Army constitute the right hand of the President ... as the core of the forces
for destroying the Nekolim strength. But they are bru'tally kidnapped by the counter­
revolutionaries and the movement of former Lt. Untung ... an act that truly
supports the Nekolim ... it is an enemy in disguise that openly acts as the
Nekolim lackey." This formula was taken up by some provincial military commanders.

Bukit Barisan (M), reports on October 27, 1965 Maj. Gen. Mokoginta as
saying: "The aim of our present struggle to crush the Nekolim is to confront
our enemies that are partners of the Nekolim, such as the September 30 Movement.
. . ." Only a few days after the Coup, the Army Command in Djakarta started
pressing its charges that the PKI had been responsible for launching the Coup.
And therefore naturally dropped the charge of the September 30 Movement being "Nekolim
subversives" or "partners of Nekolim"; however, Mokoginta continued in Medan to
it
call the September 30 Movement "the newest ally of the Nekolim." A second formula
was somewhat more cautious: ". . . it is not impossible that the Coup was a link
in the chain of Nekolim efforts to paralyze Indonesia's Revolution. Or,
". . . the September 30 Movement is a stab in the back and possibly a link in the
chain of Nekolim and subversive efforts in cooperation with fake Manipolists
to weaken the Revolution and at the same time to change Indonesia's political
Ideology.

The aim of the Army leadership and its supporters was to pse the Nekolim
threat in order to mobilize the people to destroy the PKI; President Sukarno had
different plans. He wanted to tone down the seriousness of the entire affair
and to wind up the actions against the PKI. Naturally he too used the Nekolim
threat as his chief argument. According to Subandrio the President stated in the
plenary session of the Cabinet: "The event could weaken Indonesian unity and
solidarity and such an event could invite neo-colonialists to attack Indonesia as
they’ have planned. Neo-colonialists have been on the lookout for internal fighting
which would allow them to enter Indonesia." This theme of the possible physical
military danger from Nekolim was taken up by part of the press both in the capital
and in the provinces: "The Indonesian people must be aware that their number one

it
Bukit Barisan (M), October 29, 1965.
itit
Patriot (M), October 8, 1965.
***
Bukit Barisan (M), October 11, 1965.
 -181-

enemy is neo-colonialism, Malaysia in particular; they must not be careless of

subversion, infiltration, intervention and possible aggression from the side of neo-
colonialism." Bukit Barisan (M) reports on October 10, 1965 that Governor Sitepu
on October 9 urged departmental chiefs . . to obey Bung Kamo’s orders and to
heighten their vigilance in order to intensify the campaign to crush the Nekolim."

While some still recommend the strengthening of Nasakom unity, others

advocate continuing the struggle against Nekolim without the PKI; "Subchan, the
fourth chairman of the NU and chairman of the United Action to Cru'sh the
Gestapu, asked the following question: 'Will we become stronger in crushing
Nekolim without the PKI?' The people present answered unanimously: 'Certainly,
certainly we will become much stronger. Dissolve the PKI.'" Mlmbar Revolusi,
in its editorial on October 8, 1965, though dutifully mentioning the "confrontation
against Nekolim" advocates as a first step the elimination of the PKI and uses
the PKI's favorate demonology for the purpose: "City devils belonging to the
September 30 Movement, who roam about in Djakarta, must be eradicated. Village
devils and mass organizations of the PKI must be eliminated, sp that the pillars
of the Revolution which are laborers and peasants will be able to live peace­
fully and to increase production in the Interests of the viability of the
Revolution and bring the confrontation against neo-colonialism to a victory."
Gradually a temporary solution to the vexing problem of the relationship between
the traditional main enemy, Nekolim, and the new enemy Gestapu, was found by
mentioning them together as Indonesia's two enemies. "We now face two big enemies—
Nekolim and the September 30 Movement," said Lt. Com. Ginting;^. Or, ". . . the
present stage is to crush the counterrevolution from within [the PKI] and the Nekolim
from without, simultaneously." And curiously, "Purification is to disencumber
oneself from all sorts of Nekollmism and PKI'ism. And to replace it with tendencies
of religious and high moral principles-.

In one of, the few descriptions in the press about the actual clashes with
armed PKI members or sympathizers in Central Java, a certain doubt is thrown on

Pelop'or, October 14, 1965.

Duta Masjarakat, editorial, October .15, 1965.

Angkatan Bersendjata, October 14, 1965.

Api, editorial, October 17, 1965.

^'^Ibid., editorial, October 20, 1965.
 - 182-

the use of the concept Nekollm. Berita Yudha. October 29, 1965, prints the
pathetic story of the interrogation of a villager who had been taken prisoner in
the course of an attack organized by the Permuda Rakjat, PKI*s youth organization;
when the villager was asked why he had attacked Indonesian paratroopers he recounted
that several hours before, Permuda Rakjat members had come to his village and
called the Inhabitants to join them in their fight against >Nekolim who had
invaded Indonesia. One of the signs of the’ Nekolim enemy was supposed to be a red
beret (the head gear of the Indonesian paratroopers). Berita Yudha makes' no

comment.

During the following week the "Kiapma" Conference (against foreign military
bases) was held in Djakarta and-this occasion stimulated the outpouring of
traditional anti-Nekolm sentiments. "Althdugh the Gestapu did stab the Indonesian
Revolution in the back, the members of the Armed Forces continue aiming their
guns and cannons at neo-colonialists and their foreign military bases."* And,
"The owners of the military bases say that the aim of their bases is to stop the
spread of Communism, but in practice they are used for maintaining the domination
of the Nekolim."

The deteriorating relations with Peking put some strain, on the Nekolim '
concept. Kompas.'on October 27 1965, states: "We want to be friendly with the CPR
•in order to crush imperialism and the Nekolim. We are embarrassed by the CPR
though." The CPR had been in the past hailed as the leader of the Nefo anti-Nekolim
camp and as a staunch "comrade in arms" of Indonesia. To reconcile this positive
image of Peking as the virtuous.anti-imperialist with the new reality of power
hostile-to Indonesia and interfering in her. internal affairs, obviously put a
stress on the concept of anti-imperialism. Karya Bhakti on November 1, 1965,
attempts to find a rather curious solution: ". . . the anti-imperialist group,
principally headed by Bung Karno, will, God willing, achieve success. While the
anti-imperialist group based on its own self interest, such as the CPR, will,
God willing, be condemned by God and the whole of mankind."

While the general tenor in the press was one of accepting Sukarno's
traditional emphasis on Nekolim, Api Pantjasila on October 28, 1965, appears to

•k

Angkatan Bersendjata, editorial, October 18, 1965.

Ibid.. editorial, October 20, 1965.