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Int. J. Management Practice, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2008 1

An alternative theory of idea generation

R.M. Woodhead
Technology Management,
School of Technology,
Oxford Brookes University,
Oxford, UK E-
mail: roy.woodhead@eds.com

MA Berawi*
Faculty of Built Environment,
University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia E-
mail: maberawi@um.edu.my
*Corresponding author

Abstract: This paper seeks to stimulate further research into ‘practical’ idea
generation by challenging the current. It builds on many years of Action
Research (Argyris, 1999) in major technology projects which eventually led to a
doctoral study where formal logic was used to develop a framework to improve
invention. This paper draws on those findings that were proven statistically with
a ‘one-proportion test’ and a survey (Berawi, 2006). It argues that the field of
Innovation Management has become detached from the act of invention (i.e.
idea generation) because of an assumption brought by cognitive theories of
creativity that hold the location of ideas ‘exclusively’ within the human brain.
This ‘assumption’, grounded in cognitive theory, is believed to be the reason for
low levels of research, as it seems like a problem area already solved. This
position has caused a lack of research into idea generation, and is challenged
by way of an alternative view based on a relationship between intentionality and
causality, which is offered as a way to develop new perspectives that open the
field to further enquiry.

Keywords: idea generation; Innovation Management; function; purpose;

outcome; value; innovation.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Woodhead, R.M. and

Berawi, M.A. (2008) ‘An alternative theory of idea generation’, Int. J.
Management Practice, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.1–19.

Biographical notes: Dr. R.M. Woodhead, Senior Lecturer of Value, Technology

and Innovation Management, received his PhD in Organisational Decision
Making from the University of Leeds and is currently exploring innovation in the
field of ‘IT service management’.

Dr. M.A Berawi received his PhD in Value Management looking at the
relationship between functionality and innovation. He currently researches value
management and innovation in the context of major civil engineering projects.

Copyright © 2008 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

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2 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

1 Introduction

Central to Innovation Management is the ability to produce worthy ideas for R&D.
Surprisingly, ‘Idea Generation’ is an under-researched topic (Sowrey, 1990; Alam, 2003).
Whilst there are many idea-generating techniques, the way they are evaluated seems
serendipitous. We aim to address that situation by undermining the key constraint and
then offering an alternative theory to prove there are ways managers can influence better
idea generation, and appraise the quality of ideas.
We argue the paucity of research is a product of systemic commitment to cognitive
theories of creativity. In the main, idea generation techniques assume ideas begin in the
minds of people. Such techniques attempt to stimulate the brain’s conscious or
subconscious processing. We argue this aim excludes managers and forces them into a
trial-and-error process where they try out various idea generation techniques.
We will share findings that offer the field of Innovation Management a different lens to
view the relationship between ideas, invention and innovation. The paper distinguishes
different types of ideas and assembles them in a framework that links intentionality
(purpose and function) to causality (outcome and process).
The paper begins by explaining the research methods used before reviewing the
relationship between Innovation Management and idea generation techniques. A number
of well-known idea generation techniques are questioned. We will explain how their
founding assumption, based on cognitive theory, prevents an adequate appraisal of them.
Examples of ‘poor performance’ are seen as a weakness of individuals involved, rather
than the assumptions each technique uses. As such, under-performance of better idea
generation is unquestioned.

2 Research methodology

This paper combines the product of doctoral research with insights gained from Action
Research carried out through consulting episodes with major technological organisations,
predominantly from the oil industry. The basis for different types of ideas that will be
discussed were proven using predicate calculus logic and a survey using a statistical test
known as the one-proportion test (Berawi, 2006).
Many research methods into idea generation have been considered over the years,
but a few can overcome the main hurdle of access. Accessing idea generation in industrial
innovation settings is difficult. It has taken many years to build up levels of trust with some
major companies. Confidentiality agreements severely reduce the ability to share
experiences with other researchers but show how trust is an essential prerequisite for
research into this topic.
About seven years ago, we created artificially contrived experiments where members
of the public were invited into an oil major’s innovation workshops using a particular
innovation method called Value Engineering. Whilst they were fairly easy to set up,
members of the public lacked a sense of real consequence and commitment. They also
lacked basic engineering knowledge necessary for innovating a fairly simple chemical
plant planned for Korea. In addition, the oil major was reluctant to elaborate specific
information in a public forum.
The actual outcome did not meet our preconceived expectation and so we abandoned
this approach. This decision was made in an action research framework where we made
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An alternative theory of idea generation 3

our intentions explicit and then reviewed the ‘real’ outcome against what we had expected.

Action Research involves judgement, and mistakes are inevitable. Often we were blind to
the assumptions we held and repeated. For example, at one time our ‘guiding propositions’
revolved around group psychology and the role a facilitator and facilitation skills play in idea
generation techniques. We believed anyone skilled in facilitation could help any team that
needed to invent and innovate. However, ‘evidence’ in the form of post-workshop feedback
revealed many ideas that were later seen as tame or already known. As paid facilitators
receiving positive feedback in the sessions, this was a difficult and confusing realisation. Our
theories were lacking and this led to the realisation that the facilitator’s lack of content
knowledge encouraged superficial enquiry. In an evolutionary process, another proposition
was developed to deal with the facilitator’s ‘content knowledge’ requiring substantial
background reading and unstructured interviews with managers from a particular industry
before engaging in the design of workshops and the selection of appropriate idea generation
techniques. We moved away from seeing ourselves as facilitators to innovation catalysts.

This reflective process within Action Research is based on the work of Argyris (1999,
pp.67–91):
What was the intention? For example, in the case of a chemical plant we were
trying to reduce capital expenditure and schedule, whilst at the same time reduce
downtime and increase throughput.
What was the theory of action? For example, we believed competency in
facilitation was sufficient for success.

What was the theory in action? What did we actually do?

What was the outcome? For example, we achieve the intention in part but this
was by taking the oil major’s managers off line from the public and in effect
running two workshops in parallel. We had to adapt because our theory of action
was inadequate.
What assumptions were at play? We naively thought members of the public
could bring new insights to technologically complex problems. We had heard of
people knowing little about a subject offering new ideas but had over estimated
their ability to do so. We also believed facilitation skills alone would be key to
success.
What did you learn? For example, we changed the way we selected participants
so that sufficient content knowledge was present, and revised the importance
we attached to facilitation skills.

Even though some of our earlier workshops could have produced better ideas, we were
popular and so started to work directly for companies. Using a similar action research
framework around each episode, we uncovered other assumptions that impact idea generation
such as managers needing to avoid upsetting bosses who had made investment decisions
(i.e. potentially embarrassing sunk costs), the role of peer opinion and investment constraints.
What we had still not fully grasped was that we were engaging in systems; cognitive theories
blinded us.
We doubt our insights today could have been achieved with the arm’s length approaches
to traditional research. Furthermore, academic papers and research projects are often seen
as irrelevant by people working in real projects. Action Research allowed us to be relevant
and at the same time to step back and untangle what was going on in
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4 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

order to find better ways to invent and innovate. In one project we were involved in, an oil
industry Joint Venture spent over $300,000 running 16 workshops in London, Milan and
Den Haag over a four-month period. The manager who led this innovation process was fully
absorbed in making sure that the ideas generated were far more valuable than the costs
incurred. To such managers, any research agenda not focused on ‘their’ short term
imperatives are of little importance.
Our current theory of action sees valuable ideas stemming from techniques that deepen
and widen the understanding of systemic causal processes. This is a view that accommodates
natural science and social science and is not evident in the literature related to idea
generation techniques, but is evident in other fields such as the philosophy of science.

Enquiries grounded in Action Research allowed us to develop and test our understanding.
After an episode we would generate a theory that would feed into the design of the next
episode. Here, research feeds into learning which feeds back into research and this led to
an early recognition of weaknesses in the literature associated with idea generation
techniques.

3 Why little research into idea generation?

Our founding premise is deeper research into ‘idea generation’, which is necessary for better
innovation management. Managers need better ways to generate good ideas but the
research agenda in this area is wanting (Sowrey, 1990; Alam, 2003). Stepping back and
looking at the situation systemically, we offer a causal model that, we believe, explains what
is going on. In Figure 1, we should see recognition of anomalies between theory and
practice, producing a positive correlation effect on the ‘need to ask research questions’.
The reality is anomalies are present but the number of researchers moving into this area
seems to be falling; this is the opposite of what we would expect. What seems to be
happening is rather than asking more research questions we see a profusion of new idea
generation techniques – a behaviour suggesting the fundamental research questions have
been addressed.
The outer loop (see Figure 1) forms an explanation of causal effects that lead to
generative learning, as we would expect in an active research agenda. The more we find
out, the more questions we need to answer. The inner loop reveals a different story of a
converging research agenda and a lowering need to ask questions. We believe this is what
is going on in idea generation research. It seems the fundamental questions that lead to a
productive research agenda have already been answered; we disagree with this view.
If we are to move from the inner loop of today to the generative outer loop, then we have
to understand what is causing convergence and question whether that is adequate for
Innovation Management.
A common assumption in most idea generation techniques is a singular belief that ideas
come from within the heads of people. This places the role of cognition centrally as a
dominant source of good and bad ideas. If all researchers support cognitive theories of
creativity then why would they look to rival theories? We believe this is the cause of the
current lack of research into idea generation. The commitment to cognition suggests that
further research into idea generation should be explored within the fields of psychology and
the neurosciences. Such a programme excludes managers and the subject of management.
We want to challenge this.
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An alternative theory of idea generation 5

Figure 1 Systemic overview of research dynamics

We believe a cognitive theory is incomplete. Innovation managers, using techniques founded on a

commitment to cognition, are forced to think of ‘creative individuals’ and ‘individual ability’. As for
the neurosciences, it remains unclear how knowing which cognitive processes happen in one part
of the brain rather than another helps managers tasked with developing R&D ideas. Idea generation
is thus a mystical process outside the reach of managers. We disagree and believe there is a way
to help managers improve their ability to produce better ideas. However, this requires a weakening
of the commitment to cognitive theories.

4 The weakness of the current paradigm

To stimulate more research into idea generation, we have to explain the inadequacy of the current
perspectives. The literature portrays a history of reductionism and detachment which we believe is
a critical factor as to why research in this area is wanting. For example, Cumming (1998) separates
creativity and innovation:
“Most authors now agree that the process of idea generation is ‘creativity’. And
although creativity is an important precursor to innovation the two terms are not
synonymous.”
“Since the late 1960s the meaning of the term innovation has seemingly been
refined. The implication that a new concept had to be brought into use before
innovation could be said to have taken place became widely accepted.”
(Cumming, 1998, p.22)
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6 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

That ‘most authors now agree’ suggests the convergent commitment shown in the inner loop
of Figure 1.
The detachment of ‘idea’ from ‘innovation’ is an important choice from a management
perspective. Cumming (1998) examines innovation as a process and cites Marquis (1969)
who defined innovation as ‘a unit of technological change’. So, idea generation leads to
technological change. Howells (2005) sees innovation as the process by which ideas are
brought to the market. Idea generation leads to technological change that is valued in a
market. This becomes more useful to managers, as we view idea generation in terms of ‘how
to do things’; how to improve the way things are achieved.
Ahmed (1998) states that:
“‘Innovation is holistic in nature’ and that it ‘covers the entire range of
activities necessary to provide value to customers and a satisfactory return
to the Business’.” (Ahmed, 1998, p.30)

Ahmed’s paper discusses how the outputs of idea generation are managed through a life-
cycle framework. Many authors describe idea generation within an overarching innovation
process (e.g. Schmidt-Tiedemann, 1982; Udwadia, 1990; Pavia, 1991; Twiss, 1992; Ragatz
et al., 1997; Ahmed, 1998; Amabile, 1988; Cumming, 1998; Urabe, 1998; Man, 2001; Tidd et
al., 2001; Trott, 2002; Oetinger, 2004; Birdi, 2005; Muller et al., 2005). It is seen in terms of:

• idea generation in the creativity stage

• innovation processes and

• the successful application of concepts in terms of output or product.

Viewing innovation as an overarching process may diminish the importance attached to idea
generation as a research topic. Perhaps the reason we have so many idea generation
techniques is because it is seen as a trial-and-error process (i.e. we do not really understand
the mechanisms by which ideas originate). However, to separate ‘how we get ideas’ from
‘what we do with ideas once we have them’ is to sever developmental stages that are
inextricably joined. It also assumes a strict life-cycle model where ideas are generated at a
specific point in the overarching innovation management process; organisation procedures
often force this to be the case but ideas do emerge out of sequence and often struggle to win
support. We argue Innovation Management needs a theory of idea generation that enquires
into a way we can systematically increase the capability to generate new ideas and develop
them into real-world phenomena, into real solutions.

5 Idea generation techniques

The origins of idea generation processes can be traced back many years. Wallas (1926)
argued that the stages of idea generation included:
1 preparation stage
2 incubation stage
3 inspiration stage
4 verification stage.
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An alternative theory of idea generation 7

These steps locate the source of idea generation within cognitive processes (Perkins,
1981). The dominance of the psychology lens feeds into theories of personality and notions
of a ‘creative individual’ (Vernon, 1975) or ‘creative champion’ (Getzels and Jackson, 1962;
Belbin, 1981). Goodman (1995) argued that ‘creativity’ was an inherent characteristic of
people, and he said:
“So the question is not so much how did it happen but rather one of how it is
used? It is not a chance happening, a piece of sheer serendipity, although it
can sometimes appear as such. It originates from natural expression
unrepresented by conventional rules or social norms. It is a manifestation that
is usually accompanied by sheer joy.” (Goodman, 1995, p.87)

That he says it is not a ‘chance happening’ implies there is a mechanism at work.

Goodman then goes on to talk of Sperry’s (1975) right brain and left brain, and in doing so,
firmly positions the source of ideas in cognition.
Divergent and convergent thinking are often discussed in relation to idea generation
and again it focuses on what happens inside our heads (Razoumnikova, 2000). Jensen
(1978) argued for five key categories of metaphor, Restoration, Journey, Unification,
Creational and Nature, and here we see a theory of conceptual associations, but it still
places cognition as the critical cause of ideas.
The use of innovation techniques to generate new ideas such as brainstorming, mind-
mapping, morphological analysis or lateral thinking (e.g. Allen, 1962; Parnes et al., 1977;
Rawlinson, 1981; De Bono, 1984; Proctor, 1995; Buzan and Buzan, 1995) cannot estimate
the quality of ideas they yield, since they assume ideas emerge out of cognitive processes.
There is no basis to assess the ‘worth’ of an idea with cognitive theories. They have to be
evaluated in terms of ‘fit’ with external measures such as investment appraisal, legislation,
technical feasibility, etc.
An additional approach built around a core cognitive theory seeks to create the ‘right’
context for people. Some techniques play around with contextual perspectives, thinking
that a change in the way we view a situation will unlock latent insights (Perry and Shalley,
2003). If we examine these techniques in terms of ‘learning about something’ then we
believe there is merit. However, learning is more than a singular focus on cognitive
processing, as it involves a relationship with a world outside our heads.
De Bono (1984) called for “Lateral Thinking” and again holds a theory of ideas as
springing from random connections and associations in the mind. Buzan and Buzan (1995)
echo this core theory and offer the technique of Mind-Mapping as a means to arrange
associated concepts drawn out of the mysterious black box of the human brain.
Most idea generation techniques are directed at some aspect of cognition as the cause
of new ideas. Psychologists have anchored the origin of idea generation within the mind
(Koestler, 1964; Sternberg, 1988; Garnham and Oakhill, 1994; Mukerjea, 1997), and there
is little investigation outside such a ‘paradigm’. Research into an objective theory of idea
generation seems unnecessary, as the core puzzle is already solved. However, we believe
otherwise.
The ‘cognitive’ view separates the act of idea generation from the act of managing
ideas in an innovation process. Can idea generation and idea management be separated
in the day-to-day working of organisation? We do not hold with this singular ‘mind location’
view, as our work sees ideas and innovation combining a theory of (1) what goes on in the
world and (2) knowledge as a measure of how well any individual is equipped to understand
and improve mechanisms such as ‘how to improve traffic flows’ or ‘how to defeat a new
virus’ or ‘how to create healthy sweets children will like’.
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8 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

Accepting the cognitive theory has led to a proliferation of idea-generating techniques,

and the notion of ‘fads’ is the evidence of their inadequacy. The innovation manager’s role
is now one of selecting techniques in a ‘blind’ cafeteria-type process; cognitive theory
disconnects invention, innovation and management and promotes a ‘trial-and-error’ attitude
amongst managers. Furthermore, if a particular idea generation technique is used and it
fails to deliver ‘great ideas’, the cognitive theories point to individual ability, and/or the need
to try yet another technique. What it does not do is demand deep reflection (Schön, 1983)
on the assumptions that may have caused poor idea generation. If we have an answer,
why do we need to ask a question? And so, we search for the next fad.

Given the importance attached to innovation and a company’s prosperity (Man, 2001;
Oetinger, 2004; Muller et al., 2005), we see idea generation as a central concern of
Innovation Management. We have to search deeper than technique. Research should be
looking for ways to help managers improve the means to achieve great ideas.

6 Changing perspective

The case for something more than ‘cognitive theory’ is evident. The history of technology
provides examples of simultaneous invention by unconnected actors (e.g.
Swann and Edison’s invention of the light bulb). This suggests that common sets of
circumstances exist in different locations, and as such cannot reside in the heads of
individuals. There is an external systemic mechanism at play and this realisation allows the
possibility of a management system.
We believe our potential to generate new possibilities has been reduced by the view
that ideas originate within an individual. We would not expect ten-year-old children to be
capable of designing a nuclear power station. Here, then, is a clue to what makes for better
idea generation. It is something to do with the way external systems work, our knowledge
of their workings and an ability to conceive of alternative ways to make things happen. For
us, the mind is where an idea is codified into language but its origin is found within a
relationship between mind and world. Cognitive theory needs to be extended to
accommodate this relationship.
The intent of new ideas is directed towards a notion of progress. Intentional action is
purposive action, and purposes can originate either inside or outside of an agent’s will
(Searle, 1995). Intentional facts may become social facts by collective intentionality such
as society’s agreement on a particular price for a barrel of oil. What we need to take into
account is that the agent’s intention exists within boundaries and constraints given by
causal mechanisms from nature and/or socially constructed systems such as the economy.
The mind does not exist independently of nature’s mechanisms. The background of
everyday life is a systemic interaction between functioning and the outcome of such
functioning. Attempts to theorise this background in the act of model-building by a team
enables better understanding and better team-knowledge. Ideas come from recognition of
causal mechanisms (Bunge, 1997) from which informed understanding follows. Ideas begin
outside our heads.
To change the way we view idea generation requires a more precise schema. If we
cannot distinguish between types of ideas then our ability to articulate new perspectives is
limited. For example, given the phenomenon of global warming, many people would offer
the idea of ‘save the environment’ but such an ‘idea as outcome’ tells us little about
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An alternative theory of idea generation 9

how to actually achieve it. We have to distinguish between types of ideas in order to improve
the way we manage idea generation.
Polanyi (1958) stated:
“It has been authoritatively stated that the moments of greatest creative
advancement in science frequently coincide with the introduction of new
notions by means of a definition.” (Polanyi, 1958, p.189)

We argue the word idea (I) in usage can mean purpose (P), outcome (O), process (Ps) or
function (F). For the sake of clear communication, it should only take one of the meanings at
any one time.

I = vvv
P O Ps F
This distinction aids an ability to manage idea generation. Let us show how this word has
different meanings with different consequences for innovation managers. Alexander Fleming
understood the bacteriological mechanisms he observed and this led him to discover
‘penicillium’ which killed staphylococcus. He had an ‘idea as outcome’ in mind but could not
move beyond this stage. It was a further ten-year period before this could be manufactured
as ‘penicillin’, and the work of Howard Walter Florey and Ernst Boris Chain involved many
other types of ideas (e.g. ideas as purposes related to mass production, ideas as processes
related to the means of production and ideas as functions related to the way the processes
were arranged in order to make the penicillin).

Distinguishing idea types leads to deeper and wider understanding and enables old
solutions to be swapped for new ones. Clearer meaning drawn from deeper understanding
also allows us to anticipate outcomes not already in existence. In our action research, we
distinguished types of ideas in order to unlock idea generation. In one episode with R&D
managers, engineers and scientists put forward the idea of accessing some technically
difficult to access oil and gas reservoirs (idea as outcome to achieve idea as purpose). We
had to coach them towards defining the means to achieve an outcome (idea as process that
performs idea as function). Our theory views ideas in terms of humans rearranging
phenomena in response to some kind of systemic theory of value. New ideas are only
adopted if they add more value than old ones.

7 Idea types and idea generation

Central to a richer understanding is that essential functions (Baird, 2002) need to be

performed in order to achieve selected outcomes. Functions are not the same as processes.
Functions exist in a conceptual sense (Price, 2001; Woodhead et al., 2004b), whereas
processes are recognisable phenomena in the real-world. A function is performed by a
process. For example, a car engine’s function of ‘Transmit Torque’ is performed by the
processes of a particular engine type. By differentiating between different idea types, we can
consider alternative types of engine such as a petrol engine, a diesel engine or a hybrid
engine, all of which perform the same function of ‘Transmit Torque’. The source of ‘new’
ideas can result in two ways. Firstly, a search for additional functions that differentiates
products and services, and secondly, an improvement of the processes currently used to
perform a desired function or removal of unwanted by products such as car pollution.
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10 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

Processes are a naturally occurring, or designed, sequence of operations or events, possibly

taking up time, space, expertise or other resource, which produces an outcome (Whitehead, 1929;
Sperry, 1975; Pannenberg, 1984; Rescher, 1991). A process exists in the observable ‘real-world’
and may be identified by the changes it creates in the properties of one or more artefacts or systems
under its influence (Nevins and Whitney, 1989; Gatchel and Tanik, 2001). Whitehead (1929) looks
into the nature of all things as an ongoing process. Whitehead describes actual entities as the
atomic units (or essential constituents) of reality. From atom to organism, the physical world unfolds
a synthetic reality containing processes within processes. From organism to organisation, modern
society has attempted to replicate nature and create a social order, in which the firms and institutions
vie for survival of the fittest (e.g. Woodhead et al., 2004a).

Processes that have no essential contribution (i.e. do not perform a function such as the human
appendix) can be removed because they have no value. Value results from the efficient and effective
working of a system that also exists within other nested systems.
The television set functions in the home and is supported by the functioning of the power plant and
TV stations. The interconnected relations between ‘Function’, ‘Process’ and ‘Outcome’ are designed
to achieve intended ‘Purpose’. The value of a process can be measured in terms of how well it
performs essential functions and achieves the desired
purpose.
Every function provides an essential contribution to a system, or ipso facto, it is not a function
(Berawi, 2006). All processes should have at least one function that justifies their inclusion. The
proper function of an artefact is what it ‘does’ in order to achieve purposes and goals (Wright, 1973;
Cummins, 1975; Nelson, 1976; Bigelow and Pargetter, 1987; Plantinga, 1988; Millikan, 1989;
Neander, 1991; Griffiths, 1993; Elder, 1998; Preston, 1998, Schwartz, 1999). So the proper function
of a car is ‘Transport People’ and that is why cars are primarily needed. The technological system
in which an artefact exists determines its proper function (Kroes, 2001; Vermaas and Houkes, 2003).

However, the ‘purpose’ is determined by the user and so the role of customer needs to be considered
within an idea-generating schema.
Customers buy things in order to access functions, for what ‘things’ do or cause.
Ideas as functions can be broken down further. There are ‘use functions’ that perform mechanical
roles and there are ‘aesthetic functions’ that increase desirability (Miles, 1961). Therefore, the study
and articulation of function is central to idea generation for commercial products and services
(Vermaas and Houkes, 2003). Identifying functions enables a search for alternative ways (i.e.
processes) to perform those functions (Mahner and Bunge, 2001). The ‘idea as function’ also
enables us to consider adding a new function to an existing product or service (Berawi and
Woodhead, 2005) in order to add more value for customers.

A television is a series of processes that perform functions such as displaying moving pictures
with sound. This partially explains the existence and causal history of the invention and improvement
of television. Naming the functions in a television allows us to innovate further and produce hand-
held mobile televisions, video-enabled mobile phones, etc. The transformation of function-directed
causal relations into manufacturing makes it possible to bridge the gap between physical structure
and intentional function in a technological design. Understanding this relationship is the source of
ideas. However, this process is often left implicit within the minds of designers and engineers and is
why an advantage is afforded to those that make it explicit and testable (Woodhead and
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An alternative theory of idea generation 11

Downs, 2001; Woodhead and McCuish, 2002; Berawi, 2004). This is why we need to look for
more than cognitive theories of idea generation.

8 Emphasising function

Most idea generation techniques fail to recognise functional theories. Miles (1961) argues that
the first step in product engineering is to identify the functions at play. In doing so, the
relationship between mind and world is developed as insight and understanding. But how can
managers achieve this?

Figure 2 Relationship between functions, processes, outcomes and purpose

We need a reliable method of modelling functions in relation to purpose, outcome and process.
Such a model would make hypothesised thinking explicit and enable deeper understanding to
stimulate innovation (Kaufman and Woodhead, 2006). The act of building such models
facilitates a union of scientific knowledge and practical knowledge in an objective and auditable
way through the act of articulating information and building shared knowledge. The approach
to idea generation can become closer to inductive logic, as used in science, but we have to
relax the constraining effect cognitive theories have.
All these types of ideas have to happen in a synthesised way. What an artefact brings
about in a system needs to serve the purposes and goals of the system in order to be called
a ‘function’. To lose sight of this synthesis may lead to ideas that seek to optimise at the
detailed level which may undermine value at the purpose level, for example, ideas related to
myopic cost-cutting. The challenge for various idea generation techniques is to link
intentionality, made explicit within a model, to the causal way reality works (Woodhead et al.,
2004a). This schema is shown in Figure 2. If one of the links is broken, such as a process that
does not yield an outcome that links to the overall purpose, there
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12 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

will be no value derived from that system. The emergence of ideas resides within
contemplation of this set of relationships but its origin is external to the mind.

Figure 3 Functional thinking enables innovation

9 Function and innovation

Identifying essentiality in relation to functions, processes, purposes and outcomes enables

us to articulate solutions within a framework that checks adequacy; the potential solution
must be an idea that satisfies the schema of Figure 2. The ability to consider alternative
ways or processes that could perform the same essential work with added benefit stimulates
enquiry and further exploration of the origin of ideas, as shown in Figure 3.
Whilst all types of cars perform common functions, some are ‘low frill–low cost’ whereas
others with extended functionality are ‘luxury models–high cost’. The schema of
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An alternative theory of idea generation 13

Figure 2 can be extended to become Figure 3. This is achieved by considering functions

and processes as networks designed to produce outcomes and purposes customers will
prefer to alternative offerings in the market.
We can now offer a theory which is larger than cognitive theories promoted by
psychologists. Our theory is:
“A good idea is the product of a complete functional understanding, optimal
selection of processes, and alignment between purpose and outcome.”

We can show this logically as

I = & & FPA

g c O after

where Ig = good idea, Fc = complete functional understanding, Po = optimal selection and

design of processes and Apo = alignment between purpose and outcome.
The challenge is to make this a useful theorem for innovation managers, and we offer a
Bayesian approach as starting point for more focused research.

Pr(In) Pr(
FPAI, , /)
Pr(IFPA
g c o po g
/g c , , )=
Pr(I )FPAI
Pr( , I FPA I / )+Pr(~ ) Pr( ,
of night
g c
,
o po g g c , of night /~ )
g

The above adaptation of Bayes Theorem offers a means to assess the probability of an
idea being a good one. It is not the end-product of a research agenda but offered as a
starting point, for in trying to assess the probabilities, we will find numerous research
questions arising.

10 Practical example

Given we do not really know what makes a good idea at this stage of the research project,
let us build a hypothetical case where we can demonstrate how the above model could be
used to improve organisational learning. Our aim here is to show that our alternative view
of the source of good ideas opens the way to the management of idea generation. Its value
is achieved by making our theories visible, explicit, testable and subsequently open to
improvement. That is, it empowers the management of innovation by making explicit those
causal theories that make us believe such and such is a good idea. We will assume there
is little market-data that we could use to form frequency-type probabilities. If there were
market data, then our model would become even more reliable and even more useful.
However, in the early stages of new product development such data is often missing. We
will use subjective probabilities to reflect the degree of belief we hold. A manager is faced
with a choice of developing a new product which he is assured is a good idea. The manager
begins by assigning a probability to his initial belief that it is a good idea. Let us say he
assigns a 90% likelihood because the engineering manager has backed the idea and he
has been right in the past. There is no need to wonder whether the number assigned (i.e.
90%) is precise, as it will be shown shortly that the trend which emerges is what is important.

Pr(Ig) = 0.9 and conversely the probability of it not being a good idea is Pr(~Ig) = 0.1 so
that the combined probabilities sum to one.
Machine Translated by Google

14 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

He calls the trusted engineering manager and asks how the product works and how customers
will use it. The engineering manager presents a functional model and explains the design team have
fully thought things through. However, there is a small chance customers will use the product in ways
they have not considered. The manager asks for a summary of why he should believe the functional
understanding is both adequate and complete. This ‘explicit theory’ can be used to revisit the decision-
making process and spot ‘thinking’ errors they might be making today; organisational learning is
enabled. At this stage the manager thinks there is good chance the engineering manager has it right
and cautiously assigns a value of 70% to this belief.

= 0.3.
Pr( / )c gF I = 0.7 and conversely Pr( /~ ) F Ig c

In light of this learning the manager can now recalculate his belief that it is a good idea.

Pr(I )gficgPr( / )
Pr(I /gFc)=
Pr(I )gFIcgPr(
IFI/ )+Pr(~ ) Pr( /~ ) g c g

0.9 ×0.7
Pr(I /gF)=
c =0.955 (0.9 0.7)+(0.1 0.3)
× ×

So, following this investigation he has increased his belief by around 5% that it really is a good idea.
What is more, the reasons why he has increased his belief have been made explicit and if it later
turns out this is wrong then there is a means to revisit and repair the thinking processes that misled.

The manager now looks at the specific processes proposed to design, develop and deliver the
new concept from raw materials through to invoicing and payment.
Discussions with the various managers reveal that some aspects are uncertain. For example, a key
supplier has let them down with late deliveries and poor-quality levels and a distributor they would
need to use is proving slow to pay invoices. Again, all the theories of action are made explicit so that
later they can be revisited. Given what he has found out, he believes this part of the idea is only about
40% reliable.

Pr( /oc, g)= 0.4PF

He can now revisit his previous beliefs and up date them.

Pr I( gc
F
/ )ocPF
Pr I
g ( / )
, )
Pr(IFP
/gc o , )=
Pr I( gc
F
/ )ocPF
Pr I
g ( / ) , )+Pr(~ / )I gcF
Pr( PF I
oc g/
, ~)
0.955 ×0.4
Pr(IFP
/gc o , )= =0.93 (0.955 0.4) (0.045 0.6)
×× ×

Even though there is room for process improvements, he still believes this is a good idea.
The view of the engineering manager is still holding a strong influence on his beliefs and that is clearly
understood in a way that can be revisited after ‘real’ data from the market place has been collected.

Finally, he discusses things with the marketing managers and the sales managers.
They seem very sceptical and suggest the idea is poor. They argue customers do not want
Machine Translated by Google

An alternative theory of idea generation 15

such a product and they are difficult to sell. The manager gets them to make their reasons
explicit so they too can later be tested. Given this conversation, he assigns a low probability
to their view of the alignment between purpose and outcome.

Pr(And
/night ofPFI c,g )=0.2
,

Before this conversation he assigned a belief of:

Pr(IFP
/gc o , )=0.93

He now updates his belief in the idea.

Pr( IFP
/co AND)PFI
Pr( / night of
, ,
,cg )
Pr( IFPA
/ , what's the point? )=
,

Pr( IFP
/ FPA )I Pr(
IFP,A PF I
g

g
,co
what after g
, / )+Pr(~ / co
, ) Pr( / , night of c , ~) g

0.93 ×0.2
Pr(IFPA
/g c , )= =0.25 (0.93 0.2)+(0.07 0.8)
of night
,
× ×

Note that this formula is logically equivalent to our theory above:

Pr(I )FPA
Pr( ,I / ) , o po g
Pr(IFPA
g c

/g c , , )=
Pr(I )FPA
Pr( ,I / )+Pr(~ ) IPr(
FPA, I
of night
g c
,
o po g g c
,
of night
/~ ) g

We have simply arrived at it by way of collecting subjective evidence (i.e. informed opinion)
and using that to test and refine our beliefs in an incremental learning process.
At this stage the manager no longer believes this is a good idea and has a list of reasons
why people thought as they did. He can present his thinking back to the departments and
start a learning process and could even set up an experiment to engage the whole team in
learning how to make better ideas. For example, why does the engineering manager believe
this to be a good idea when the managers looking after processes and the marketing and
sales manager held less favourable views. The point is, by bringing idea generation out of
the cognitive focus, managers are empowered to start improving their creative potential.

11 Conclusion

Our aim was to stimulate new research into idea generation and we offered a theory to
weaken the grip of the dominant cognitive theory. In doing so, we hope to open the door to
further research.
Given ideas are the seeds of innovation, lack of research into idea generation should
be a concern for Innovation Management. We believe the current situation exists because
the dominant premise is related to cognition and a view that ideas begin in the minds of
people. As such, few research questions have been created that look outside cognitive
explanations. Furthermore, there has been a profusion of idea-generating techniques
founded on different ways to improve cognition but none has achieved outright supremacy.
We have challenged the dominance of psychological theories and argue for a widening of
scope to include technological theories and a keener understanding of the relationship
between cognition and the way external systems work.
Machine Translated by Google

16 R.M. Woodhead and M.A. Berawi

The distinction of the word ‘idea’ into one of the four mutually exclusive categories
aids the management of idea generation:

• ideas as purposes
• ideas as outcomes

• ideas as processes
• ideas as functions.

Idea generation techniques that do not adequately explore the relationship between mind and world
make key assumptions about prior knowledge and the ability of teams to generate new ideas. We
believe this has to be questioned.
The word ‘idea’ is used ambiguously and the need for research is inhibited due to a lack of
appreciation of a deeper and richer understanding of a relationship between purpose and outcome,
as well as between function and process. We have offered a schema as one way to form systematic
approaches to idea generation, as we believe this is a desire of managers of innovation. We have
offered a line of enquiry, based on an alternative theory, that is not restricted to psychological
theories that currently underpin idea-generating techniques. We hope other researchers will follow
this call and begin more research in reliable ways to generate better ideas that are practical and
useful for
managers.
This paper has offered an alternative theory as to where ideas originate, and hopes to stimulate
further research into the act of idea generation and the exploration of why some idea generation
techniques are better than others. It has also offered one way to manage such a process using
Bayesian logic.

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