Oposa vs.

Factoran Case Digest

G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

FACTS: The Respondent Judge, Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, the Secretary of the DENR, was alleged to have had
exercised a grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements which the plaintiffs, Oposa et. al.,
representative to the minors and minors who assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn, opposed as they complained that it violates their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.

FACTS: The Respondent Judge, Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, the Secretary of the DENR, was alleged to
have had exercised a grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements which the plaintiffs,
Oposa et. al., representative to the minors and minors who assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn, opposed as they complained that it violates their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), The right of the people to a balanced and healthy
ecosystem, the idea of generational genocide in criminal law, and the concept of man's intrinsic right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation reflected in natural law are all recognized in Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was
filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs
prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

In this lawsuit, the plaintiffs are all juveniles who have been adequately represented and joined by their
parents. The initial lawsuit was filed as a taxpayer's class action against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources at the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) (DENR). Plaintiffs claimed that they are entitled to the entire
benefit, use, and enjoyment of the country's virgin tropical forests, which constitute a natural resource asset.
They go on to say that they speak for their generation as well as future generations, and that prolonged
deforestation has thrown the ecological balance off, resulting in a slew of environmental disasters. Plaintiffs
requested a judgment directing the respondent, his agents, representatives, and those working on his behalf to
revoke all current Timber License Agreements (TLAs) throughout the nation and to stop receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question. On the defense of the respondents, they aver that failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary and that their complaints are
nothing but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an “environmental right” which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the “protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae.”

The defendant, on the other hand, filed a request to dismiss, claiming that the lawsuit was without merit
and that it raised a political issue. The respondents' defense is that they failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right that was violated by the respondent Secretary, and that their complaints are nothing more
than vague and nebulous allegations about an "environmental right" that allegedly entitles the petitioners to
"protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae."

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

The RTC Judge upheld the motion to dismiss, stating that providing the requested relief would result in
contract impairment, which is illegal under the Constitution. Plaintiffs (petitioners) filed the current special civil
action for certiorari, requesting that the court revoke and set aside the dismissal decision, claiming that the
respondent RTC Judge misused his authority in dismissing the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state policy concerning the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
has been violated, amongst the other allegations.

RULING: The instant Petition is hereby GRANTED by the court and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. Article
II, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides in Section 16 that “the State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

The court GRANTS the current Petition, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of July 18, 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is thus set aside. As a result, the petitioners may modify their case to name
the holders or grantees of the disputed timber licensing agreements as defendants. "The State should defend and
enhance the right of the people to a balanced and healthy ecosystem in accordance with the rhythm and
harmony of nature," says Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

It is the petitioners’ right to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Wherefore when the respondent-Judge granted the Timber License Agreements, it had been on the violation of
the said policy. Moreover, the TLA’s are not contracts and the non-impairment clause that the respondents used
as defense cannot be invoked.

It is the petitioners' right to defend and promote the aforementioned right. A cause of action arises when
someone who has the corresponding responsibility or obligation to respect or safeguard that right denies or
violates it. As a result, the respondent-Judge authorized the Timber License Agreements in breach of the
aforementioned policy. Furthermore, because the TLAs are not contracts, the respondents' non-impairment
clause cannot be utilized as a defense.
airs. -etitioner could not li9ewise e con$icted of
conspiracy to commit the offense ecause all his co:accused were ac%uitted of the charges
against them.

AQUINO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 165448, July 27, 2009

FACTS: On behalf of Teachers’ Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio
City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers’
Camp. On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the
Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an
inspection of the trees to be cut.

Sergio Guzman filed an application with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) on behalf of Teachers' Camp to chop down 14 dead Benguet pine trees in the Teachers' Camp in
Baguio City. Teachers' Camp had to be repaired with the trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters.
A team composed of members from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and
Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a forest ranger of the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent of
Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut on May 19, 1993, prior to the issuance of the permit.

Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14
trees under the following terms and conditions: That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by
the permittee; As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in an appropriate
place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to plant within forest
area duly designated by CENRO concerned which shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance
growth and development of the planted seedlings;

Following that, DENR Executive Director Sabado T. Batcagan issued a permit allowing the cutting of
14 trees under the following terms and conditions: the cut timber shall be used as lumber and fuel-wood by the
permittee; in lieu of the cut timber, the permittee shall plant 140 pine seedlings in an appropriate location within
the area. If there is no plantable land on the property, the seedlings must be planted in a forest area approved by
CENRO, which must be adequately maintained and safeguarded to ensure/enhance the growth and development
of the seedlings.

Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No.
277, Series of 1987; andt hat non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws
and regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in
accordance with existing laws and regulations. This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days
from issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first.

Any breach of the terms and restrictions set out herein is penalized under Section 68 of PD 705 as
modified by E.O. Non-compliance with any of the foregoing restrictions or breaches of forestry laws and
regulations would render this permission null and void, subject to the enforcement of fines in line with current
laws and regulations. This PERMIT is non-transferable and will expire ten (10) days after its issue or when the
volume permitted herein is depleted, whichever occurs first.

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepeña, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio
Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers’ Camp
without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest
ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto
Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing (Masing) on the site. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of
which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters
while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut
without permit was ₱182,447.20, and the forest charges were ₱11,833.25.

On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepeña, Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan,
Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers’
Camp without proper authority. They arrived at the location and saw Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a CENRO
forest warden, and Cuteng directing the tree chopping. Sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike
Masing (Masing) were also discovered on the property. Only 12 of the 23 tree stumps discovered by the forest
rangers were covered by the permit. The volume of trees chopped with a permission was 13.58 cubic meters,
compared to 16.55 cubic meters for trees cut without a licence. The forest charges were 11,833.25, while the
market value of the trees removed without a permit was 182,447.20.

Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the permit.
Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in possession of
the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit
for lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present. Petitioner alleged that
he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers’ Camp.

Masing said that because he was not provided a copy of the permit, he was unaware of the restrictions.
Masing alleged that he chopped down 10 pine trees while under the supervision of petitioner, who claimed to
have the required authorization. Three of the trees, he said, were stumps around four or five feet tall that were
unfit for lumber. He said that petitioner and Salinas were there while he was chopping trees. The petitioner
claimed that he was assigned to Teachers' Camp to monitor tree cutting.

He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit.
However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the
inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was
just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three other men.

He allegedly told his boss, Paul Apilis, that he was unaware of the permit's tree coverage. Despite this,
he continued to supervise tree cutting without obtaining a copy of the nearby map used in the inspection of the
trees to be chopped. He stated that he was unable to prevent tree overcutting since he was alone, although
Cuteng and Santiago were joined by three other workers.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

RULING: The petition has merit. The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because
petitioner only raises questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was
not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD
705.

Anyone who cuts, gathers, collects, or removes lumber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or private land, without authorization is expressly punished.
CENRO charged petitioner with overseeing the permit's execution in this case. Within the meaning of Section
68 of PD 705, he was not the one who chopped, harvested, collected, or removed the pine trees.

He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers’ Camp for repairs. Petitioner
could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused were acquitted
of the charges against them. Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705
as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or
collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.

He didn't have the chopped trees since the lumber was needed for repairs at Teachers' Camp. Because all
of his co-accused were acquitted of the counts against them, petitioner could not be convicted of conspiracy to
commit the felony. Petitioner is neither an executive of a partnership, organization, or corporation that ordered
the cutting, collecting, or collection of the pine trees, nor is he in possession of the pine trees, thus he cannot be
held guilty under the final paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705.
 Mustang Lumber vs. CA
G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996

FACTS: On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters
and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the owner’s
refusal.

On April 1, 1990, in response to reports that a large stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs had been
discovered inside the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR assembled a team of
foresters and police officers and dispatched them to conduct surveillance at the lumberyard. During this time,
the team members noticed the petitioner's vehicle pulling out of the lumberyard, filled with lauan and almaciga
lumber of all sizes and widths. The crew confiscated the vehicle and its load at the DENR complex on Visayas
Avenue in Quezon City after the driver failed to show the appropriate invoices and transit documents. Due to
the owner's rejection, the crew was unable to get access to the property.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from
the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra
lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa.

Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
granted the team a search order on April 3, 1990. As a result, the team seized four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs from the petitioner's lumberyard on that day; a minor amount of narra lumber; and roughly
200,000 board feet of timber and shorts of diverse species, including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed
under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The team returned to the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela on April 4, 1990, and placed the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber, totaling 311,000 board feet, under administrative
seizure because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to
prove the legitimacy of the invoices.
The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not
penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of
an illegal seizure.

The petitioner challenges the seizure, claiming that possession of lumber, rather than timber, is not
punishable under Section 68 of P.D. Even if arguendo that lumber fits within the ambit of Section 705, as
modified, the same may not be used in evidence against him since they were taken as a result of an unlawful
seizure.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber
or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant." Lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or
logs after being prepared for the market."
No. The Supreme Court ruled that neither timber nor lumber are defined under the Revised Forestry
Code. While the former is included in forest products as specified in Section 3 paragraph (q), the latter is
included in Section 3 paragraph (aa) in the definition of "processing plant." A treated log or processed forest
raw material is referred to as lumber. The term lumber is used throughout the Code in its ordinary or customary
sense. Lumber is described as "timber or logs after being processed for the market" in the 1993 copyright
edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

Lumber is just a log or timber that has been treated. It is well established that terms and phrases used in
a legislation should be given their plain, ordinary, and common use interpretation in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary. In the case of timber possession without the necessary legal documentation, Section 68 of
P.D. The modified No. 705 makes no distinction between raw and treated wood. We shouldn't either.
 MERIDA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158182, June 12, 2008

Facts: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for "cutting,
gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private complainant Oscar
Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the fell narra tree, petitioner admitted
cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner,
bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out
that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violating Section 68 of the PD 705 for "cutting,
gathering, collecting, and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private complainant Oscar
Tansiongco claims ownership." When confronted during the meeting about the fell narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to
petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later
found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of
denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705.
CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor.
Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the
narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
The Trial Court convicted him guilty, but he appealed to the Court of Appeals, continuing his denial
defense. The petitioner further claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter since it was
brought by Tansiongco rather than a forest officer as required by Section 80 of PD 705. The CA upheld the
lower court's decision, but ordered the seized lumber to be forfeited in favor of the government. It also upheld
the trial court's decision that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial confessions that he chopped the narra tree
on the Mayod property without a DENR permission.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based
on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
RULING:
1. Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed by
specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases.
However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to cases concerning
Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a
complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Yes, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure identify the cases that must be launched by a complaint
filed by specific people, and failure to comply with these rules prevents the trial court from considering such
cases. These instances, however, solely address slander and other offenses against chastity, not those involving
PD 705, Section 68. Furthermore, Section 80 of PD 705 does not preclude an interested party from filing a
complaint for a violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as modified, with any qualified official.
Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who
reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who
claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." At any rate,
Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a
complaint] before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
Furthermore, Tansiongco, a private individual who claims ownership over the Mayod Property, reported
the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property to Hernandez, not forest officers or Bureau of Forest Development staff.
Thus, Hernandez cannot be blamed for failing to investigate to determine "whether there is prima facie evidence
to support the complaint or report." In any case, Tansiongco was not barred from filing a complaint] before the
Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The
court also said that the lumber or “processed log “is covered by the “forest products” term in PD 705, as the law
does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.
Yes, Petitioner is in violation of section 80, paragraph 2, which prohibits cutting, gathering, collecting,
or removing timber without authorization from alienable or disposable public land or private land. The court
further stated that because the statute does not discriminate between raw and processed timber, the lumber or
"processed log" is covered by the "forest products" word in PD 705.