Study Guide: DISEC

Topic Area A
Reducing Maritime Militarism and Tensions in the South China Sea

Introduction

The South China Sea is one of the "zone-locked" areas defined by different
nations' exclusive economic zones (EEZs). It is surrounded by China, the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan, hence some states
cannot reach the high seas or enter the South China Sea without passing
through the EEZs of at least one of these coastal states.

As a result, it is critical to clarify the maritime boundary in the South China

Sea in order to identify the rights associated with it. Conflicts in the South
China Sea are characterized by legal ambiguity regarding historic rights or
limited sovereignty in the region. Maritime entitlement associated with
territorial boundaries in the South China Sea has been disputed for a long
time, but until recently it does not seem settled. Despite the instability,
China has continued expanding its military presence in disputed areas to
enhance its maritime power. China has taken various methods to
militarize the area, including restrictions, construction of military bases,
and mobilization of maritime militia. The South China Sea is a highly
disputed area where numerous maritime boundary and entitlement
disputes remain unresolved, and such disputes seem very likely to soon
turn into warfare at any time. The major cause of the disputes is China’s
constant attempt to exercise its authority over the South China Sea. In
1948, China first issued a ‘U-shaped’ dotted line which occupied 80% of
the South China Sea, which was immediately rejected by neighboring
countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Nonetheless, China unilaterally reaffirmed the extended EEZ and its
authority by drawing so-called a “nine-dash line”. As shown in the figure
below, a nine-dash line is largely overlapped with other states’ EEZs and
China has nevertheless claimed its territorial sovereignty within the area
without reasonable legal grounds.
 ● Figure 1: China’s 9-dash line

History

The islands of the South China Sea can largely be grouped into two island chains.
The Paracel Islands are clustered in the northwest corner of the Sea, and the
Spratly Islands in the southeast corner. Reflecting the Rashomon nature of the
dispute, the claimants have argued bitterly over the “true” history of these island
chains. Some have tried to ground their modern claims by proving a long and
unbroken record of national control over claimed features. These states assert
that, for example, their nationals fished around the islands of the Sea or used them
for shelter from storms. In particular, Beijing has taken an active role in subsidizing
archeological digs to find evidence of exclusive Chinese usage of the Sea’s many
features since time immemorial.
It is hard—if not impossible—to wade through these partisan claims (many of which
constitute pure propaganda). No impartial tribunal has yet taken on that challenge.
To the extent that it is possible to draw any conclusions from the morass, though, it
seems fair to say that no claimant has conclusively demonstrated a pattern of
exclusive historical control over the South China Sea, or even over isolated parts of
it. In any case, the issue was moot for most of the region’s history. Through the first
half of the twentieth century, the Sea remained quiet as neighboring states focused
their attention on conflicts unfolding elsewhere. In fact, at the end of World War II,
no claimant occupied a single island in the entire South China Sea. Then, in 1946,
China established itself on a few features in the Spratlys, and in early 1947, it also
snapped up Woody Island, part of the Paracel Islands chain, only two weeks before
the French and Vietnamese intended to make landfall. Denied their first pick, the
French and Vietnamese settled for the nearby Pattle Island. But even at this stage,
the South China Sea was not seen as a priority by any of the claimants. For that
reason, after suffering their cataclysmic defeat at the hands of Mao’s Communists,
Chiang Kai-shek’s forces retreated to Taiwan and abandoned their stations in the
South China Sea. Even the French and Vietnamese could not be bothered to take
advantage of the lapse in Chinese control, as they were preoccupied with the
rapidly escalating war in Vietnam.

However, the next half century saw accelerating interest in the South China Sea. In
1955 and 1956, China and Taiwan established permanent presences on several key
islands, while a Philippine citizen—Thomas Cloma—claimed much of the Spratly
Island chain as his own. Once again, this phase of frenetic island occupation was
cooled off by a longer period of inertia. But by the early 1970s, the claimants were
at it once again. This time, though, the scramble was spurred by indications that oil
lurked beneath the waters of the South China Sea. The Philippines was the first to
move. China followed shortly thereafter with a carefully coordinated seaborne
invasion of several islands. In the Battle of the Paracel Islands, it wrested several
features out from under South Vietnam’s control, killing several dozen Vietnamese
and sinking a corvette in the process. In response, both South and North Vietnam
reinforced their remaining garrisons and seized several other unoccupied features.
Another decade of relative inaction was punctuated once again with violence in
1988, when Beijing moved into the Spratlys and set off another round of
occupations by the claimants. Tensions crested when Beijing forcibly occupied
Johnson Reef, killing several dozen Vietnamese sailors in the process. Once again,
though, tensions deescalated for a few years, only to rise again in 1995, when
Beijing built bunkers above Mischief Reef in the wake of a Philippine oil concession.

The dispute seemed to take a turn for the better in 2002, when ASEAN and China
came together to sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea. The Declaration sought to establish a framework for the eventual negotiation
of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. The parties promised “to exercise
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes
and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of
inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other
features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” For a while, the
Declaration seemed to keep conflict at bay. Over the next half decade, Beijing
launched a charm offensive across Southeast Asia, and the claimants refrained
from provoking each other by occupying additional features.

Rather than fighting battles out on the Sea, though, the claimants began to needle
each other through demarches and notes verbales. In May 2009, Malaysia and
Vietnam sent a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf setting out some of their claims. This initial submission unleashed a flurry
of notes verbales from the other claimants, who objected to the two nation’s claims.

In particular, China responded to the joint submission by submitting a map

containing the infamous “nine-dash” line. This line snakes around the edges of the
South China Sea and encompasses all of the Sea’s territorial features as well as the
vast majority of its waters. However, Beijing has never officially clarified what the
line is meant to signify. Instead, it has maintained “strategic ambiguity” and said
only that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the
relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. This could mean that
China claims only the territorial features in the Sea and any adjacent waters
allowed under maritime law. Or it could mean that China claims all the territorial
features and all the waters enclosed by the nine-dash line, even those that exceed
what’s permitted under maritime law.

Since the publication of the nine-dash line, the region has grown increasingly
concerned by China’s perceived designs on the South China Sea. In 2012, Beijing
bore out some of these concerns when it snatched Scarborough Shoal away from
the Philippines. The two states had quarreled over allegations of illegal poaching by
Chinese fishermen. After a two-month standoff, the parties agreed to each
withdraw from the Shoal. Manila did. Beijing did not. Since then, China has
excluded Philippine boats from the Shoal’s waters.

In response to this escalatory move, Manila filed an arbitration case against China
on January 22, 2013, under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippine claimed center around maritime law issues, although
China asserted that they cannot be resolved without deciding territorial issues
first. For that reason, Beijing largely refused to participate in the proceedings,
although it drafted and publicly released a position paper opposing the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The Philippines submitted its memorial as well as a response to China’s
position paper.

As the case proceeded in the background, China adopted an increasingly assertive

posture in the region. In early May 2014, a Chinese state-owned oil company
moved one of its rigs into waters claimed by Vietnam south of the Paracel Islands.
This provocation touched off confrontations between Vietnamese and Chinese
vessels around the rig, as well as rioting against foreign-owned businesses in parts
of Vietnam. Faced with this pushback, China withdrew the rig in mid-July, a month
ahead of schedule.

Additionally, Beijing launched an accelerating land reclamation campaign across

the South China Sea. In at least seven locations, Chinese vessels poured tons of
sand to expand the size of features occupied by China. Beijing also began
construction of infrastructure on much of this reclaimed land, including an airstrip
capable of receiving military aircraft. Although other claimants have reclaimed land
in the past, China has reclaimed around 3000 acres of new land, more than all other
claimants combined over the history of their claims, according to the U.S.
Department of Defense.

The other claimants condemned this latest project as counterproductive, and

President Obama urged China to stop throwing elbows and pushing people out of
the way in pursuit of its interests. Beijing has not complied with these entreaties,
and it is unclear what the next twist or turn in the story of the South China Sea will
be.

The South China Sea’s delineation as “international water” dates back to the late
Ming period (1403 – 1644) and the introduction of European trade companies in
East Asia. With an increased European presence in Asia, European ideals of free
passage and trade policies clashed with the tributary system of the Chinese
Empire. The understanding of the South China Sea as “international water” is
derived from the European understanding of the freedom of navigation rather than
from the Chinese understanding of the South Sea. For China, the South Sea was a
part of the Chinese Empire and a critical economic thruway for trade and
exploration.

China’s legal claim rests in an assertion of first discovery in the second century CE.
China also asserts that the South China Sea was mapped by Chinese scholars in the
third century CE and that archeological evidence from several islands match Han
Dynasty era artifacts (placing them in the early second century CE). If true, these
assertions would be the earliest historical basis of any claimants, as the claims of
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia are derived from later events, including
European colonization. Incorporated into China’s claim is the assertion that many
of those subsequent events, including the French colonization of the habitable
South China Sea in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, were illegitimate and do not
negate China’s historical claims.

It is easily verifiable that China had continuous trade contact with what was called
the South Sea Region, which referred to the nations in South and Southeast Asia
from a China-centric perspective. The known trade routes with this region were
predominant during the Kingdom of Wu (222 CE – 279 CE) and continued to
expand during the subsequent Liang Dynasty (502-587 CE), with Funan
(present-day part of Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) acting as a major entrepot
for South Sea Region trade in the Mekong River Basin by the sixth century CE. By
the thirteenth century, continued trade with the South Sea Region relied on the
shipping capacities of Malay city-states in the absence of Chinese naval power.

While the International Court of Arbitration governing maritime disputes has made
it clear that (in legal terms) historical claims are wholly irrelevant to territorial and
maritime disputes in the case of the South China Sea, the People’s Republic of
China continues to assert the relevance of its historical claims. Despite the clear
legal discourse on the subject of historical claims, the narrative of China – the
largest actor in the region – must be considered and understood when analyzing
the disputes. So long as actors are operating within different frameworks – with
China continuing to call attention to historical claims and the international
community continuing to focus on unenforceable international law, meaningful
discussion and eventual resolution of the South China Sea disputes will be out of
reach.

The existing debate over Chinese historical claims is whether they are relevant to
the present-day territorial and international waters in the South China Sea. The
International Court of Arbitration and ASEAN have said no, but the Chinese
government continues to argue that they are indeed relevant and constitute a valid
present-day claim. It is not the validity of China’s presence in the South China Sea
that is in question. Rather, it is whether a trading presence (in which shipping lanes
circumvented the open ocean and dangerous rocks of the South China Sea islands)
can be considered a legitimate present-day claim of sovereignty to the various
islands in the South China Sea.

It is possible that historical claims are not about attachment to a specific piece of
land, as evidenced by the sweeping nature of the nine-dashed line. Rather, China’s
concern may be in recalling the traditional hierarchical Asian paradigm in which the
“middle kingdom” acted as the center of a tributary system of various levy-paying
states. In exchange, the Chinese Emperor would offer protection to a series of
states whose relative power was starkly inferior to China’s (Percival, 2007). This
system, which was in use throughout most of China’s history, ended with European
colonialism in Asia, particularly with the French colonization of Vietnam in 1885,
during which China failed to protect its tributary client state. While the nature of
this tributary arrangement changed throughout China’s history, such as the
privatization of trade and establishment of a customs system by the Kangxi
Emperor in the late 17th century, the Sino-centric nature of such a system heralds
many of the underlying assumptions to the present-day Chinese historical claims in
the South China Sea. Alongside claims to the South China Sea, Xi Jinping’s Belt and
Road Initiative is seen to be a resurrection of these tributary ideals.

Regardless of the motivations or rationale behind the resurgent employment of

historical claims in the South China Sea, those histories have become increasingly
relevant to the debate over sovereignty and the occupation of uninhabitable
islands in the region. The lack of legally legitimate historical claims to South China
Sea islands (beyond the trade routes argument) leaves the Chinese perspective
with no legal standing under international law. With each state using its own
narrative to support their claims, there is little chance for historical and factual
reconciliation – making the historical realities and claims of China crucial to the
understanding of the current status of the region. As China continues to advance
its activities in the South China Sea, it is crucial to reach a better understanding of
why Beijing is in pursuit of a larger military and diplomatic presence in southeast
Asia.

The Process of Militarisation

China has fully militarized at least three of several islands it built in the
disputed South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile
systems, laser and jamming equipment and fighter jets in an increasingly aggressive
move that threatens all nations operating nearby, a top US military commander
said Sunday.

US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral John C Aquilino said the hostile actions were
in stark contrast to the Chinese president Xi Jinping’s past assurances that Beijing
would not transform the artificial islands in contested waters into military bases.
The efforts were part of China’s flexing its military muscle, he said.
“Over the past 20 years we’ve witnessed the largest military buildup since world
war two by the PRC,” Aquilino told the Associated Press in an interview, using the
initials of China’s formal name. “They have advanced all their capabilities and that
buildup of weaponization is destabilizing to the region.”

There were no immediate comments from Chinese officials. Beijing maintains its
military profile is purely defensive, arranged to protect what it says are its
sovereign rights. But after years of increased military spending, China now boasts
the world’s second-largest defense budget after the US and is rapidly modernizing
its force with weapons systems including the J-20 stealth fighter, hypersonic
missiles and two aircraft carriers, with a third under construction.

Aquilino spoke with the Associated Press onboard a US navy reconnaissance

aircraft that flew near Chinese-held outposts in the South China Sea’s Spratly
archipelago, one of the most hotly contested regions in the world. During the
patrol, the P-8A Poseidon plane was repeatedly warned by Chinese callers that it
illegally entered what they said was China’s territory and ordered the plane to
move away. China’s official position however is that it remains committed to a
peaceful resolution of the South China Sea issue. For example, China’s Foreign
Ministry asserted in July 2020 that “China is not seeking to become a maritime
empire” and that it “treats its neighboring nations on an equal basis and exercises
the greatest restraint.”

“China has sovereignty over the Spratly islands, as well as surrounding maritime
areas. Stay away immediately to avoid misjudgment,” one of the stern radio
messages said in a veiled threat to the P-8A Poseidon Plane. As the P-8A Poseidon
flew near the Chinese-occupied reefs, some appeared to house multi-story
buildings, warehouses, hangars, seaports, runways, and radars. Near Fiery Cross,
more than 40 vessels could be seen apparently anchored.

Aquilino said the construction of missile arsenals, aircraft hangars, radar systems
and other military facilities on Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross appeared
to have been completed but it remained to be seen if China would pursue the
construction of military infrastructure in other areas.

“The function of those islands is to expand the offensive capability of the PRC
beyond their continental shores,” he said. “They can fly fighters, bombers plus all
those offensive capabilities of missile systems.” China sought to shore up its vast
territorial claims over virtually the entire South China Sea by building island bases
on coral atolls nearly a decade ago. The US responded by sending its warships
through the region in what it calls freedom of operation missions. The US has no
claims itself but has deployed navy ships and aircraft for decades to patrol and
promote free navigation in international waterway and airspace.

China routinely objects to any action by the US military in the region. The other
parties – the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei – claim all or part of
the sea, through which approximately $5tn in goods are shipped every year.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), whose most
recent charter came into force in November of 1994, constitutes the current basis
of international law in the South China Sea disputes (UNCLOS, 2016). Long before
the inception of recognized international maritime law, and throughout much of
pre-modern history the South China Sea played a pivotal role as an “intersection of
history” as the primary route for the vital trade connection between China and
India, Europe, and the Middle East. Many of the claims to the South China Sea are
derived from this pre-modern era on the basis that traders and admirals settled on
or stopped at the Spratly and Paracel islands while traversing the South China Sea
on trading trips. All claimants in the South China Sea disputes, including China, are
signatories to UNCLOS, which sets forth clear laws for the waters surrounding the
territories of nation-states. All regulations are established from the baseline of
sovereign and inhabited islands, making the law’s application to the South China
Sea particularly challenging. Legal maritime rights in terms of UNCLOS are derived
from the status of land features, which are the focal point of claims made to islands
in the South China Sea by Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other
ASEAN claimants.

UNCLOS Provisions and Regulation Areas:

● Territorial Waters: 12 Nautical Miles from low-water line – can use all
resources and set all regulations.
● Contiguous Waters: 12 Nautical Miles beyond Territorial Water
Boundary – can enforce only taxation, immigration, customs, and
pollution regulations.
● Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 200 nautical miles from low-water line –
has exploitative rights to all natural resources. Can regulate but must
maintain freedom of maritime navigation and overflight.

In contrast, the Chinese government’s claim – which is often referred to as the

nine-dashed line claim because of the number of lines on the original map that were
used to mark the boundaries of China’s maritime claims to the region – is not based
on a claim to land features and therefore does not fall within the legal maritime
framework of UNCLOS. Rather, China’s nine-dashed line claim is derived from a
1947 map drawn by Yang Huairen, a geographer for the Nationalist Government
that fell in 1949. Yang’s work consisted of 11 dashes that were located in slightly
altered locations. One notable exclusion from the renewed 2009 claim is the Gulf
of Tonkin, which Mao Zedong ceded to Vietnam in 1952.

In comparing the two maps, scholars in addition to the U.S. State Department–
have noted that the 2009 dashes come far closer to the shores of nations in the
region than did the 1947 map. Figure 2 depicts the nine-dashed line in relation to
China’s 200 nm EEZ (as defined by UNCLOS) with the artificial islands that were
constructed inside the EEZs of the Philippines and Malaysia. In this map, the
aggressiveness of the Chinese claim and the seriousness of the conflict becomes
obvious. To make matters worse, the current legal structure for governing maritime
disputes is not equipped to resolve such varying definitions and claims to the
sovereignty of what are, in most cases, uninhabitable atolls and reefs.

● Figure 2: China’s South China Sea Claims (2009)

 ● Figure 3: China’s South China Sea Claim (1949)

Major Stakeholders

China

China is one of the main stakeholders in the conflict, as it claims almost 80

percent of the sea along with the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China’s position
is based on its historical presence and sovereignty over the sea, as well as its
natural extension of its continental shelf. China has been involved in
diplomatic and military confrontations with other claimants, such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
China’s stake in the South China Sea is not only driven by its national
interests, but also by its strategic and economic considerations. The South
China Sea is a major trade conduit, where one-third of the world’s shipping
occurs. It is also rich in natural resources, such as seafood and oil reserves.
China wants to secure its access and control over these resources, as well as
to protect its maritime security and sovereignty. China also views the South
China Sea as a vital part of its Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure
and development project that aims to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa.

Taiwan

Taiwan’s stakes in the south china sea conflict are complex and multifaceted.
Taiwan is one of the six claimants in the disputed waters, along with China,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Taiwan occupies the largest
natural land feature in the South China Sea, Taiping Island (also known as Itu
Aba), which is part of the Spratly Islands. Taiwan also claims sovereignty over
the Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal.
On paper, Taiwan and China share the same claims, based on the dashed or
U-shaped line that appears on both Taiwanese and Chinese maps. Taiwan’s
position in the South China Sea is important for several reasons. First, it
affects the stability and security of the region, as Taiwan is a major
stakeholder and potential partner for dialogue and cooperation. Second, it
influences the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China, as well as
Taiwan’s relations with other countries that have interests or involvement in
the South China Sea. Third, it reflects Taiwan’s identity and aspirations as a
democratic and responsible actor in the international community.

Brunei
Brunei is one of the claimant states in the South China Sea dispute. Brunei has
limited claims that center on the Louisa Reef in the Spratly islands, parts of which
are also claimed by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Brunei’s
foreign ministry has urged countries to discuss issues bilaterally and underscored
that negotiations should be based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law. Brunei’s two-step approach indicates that
while the mechanism for conflict-resolution is bilateral and adherent to UNCLOS, it
also stresses the importance of the ASEAN-China code of conduct. Brunei has
maintained its two-step approach in addressing the South China Sea and insists
that specific issues in the maritime region should be addressed bilaterally.

Philippines
The Philippines is an important actor in the South China Sea conflict, as it has a
stake in the security, sovereignty, and economic interests of the region. The
Philippines claims parts of the sea, including the Spratly Islands, which are also
claimed by China and other neighboring countries. The Philippines has been
involved in several incidents with China over the disputed waters, such as the 2012
Scarborough Shoal standoff, the 2016 arbitration case, and the 2021 Whitsun Reef
incident. The Philippines has also sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and
alliances, such as the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the US, the 2014 Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US, and the 2021 joint patrols with
Japan. The Philippines has also pursued diplomatic engagement with China, such as
the 2017 bilateral consultation mechanism and the 2019 memorandum of
understanding on oil and gas cooperation. However, the Philippines faces
challenges in balancing its relations with China and its allies, as well as in enforcing
its rights under international law. The 2016 arbitration ruling by the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in favor of the Philippines was largely ignored by China and
has not been fully implemented by the Philippines. The Philippines also faces
domestic pressures from various sectors, such as the military, the public, and the
media, to adopt a more assertive or conciliatory stance toward China. The
Philippines’ role in the South China Sea conflict is therefore complex and dynamic,
as it tries to safeguard its personal interests while ensuring regional stability and
cooperation.

Malaysia
The importance of Malaysia in the South China Sea conflict is that it is one of the
claimant states of the Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by China and other
neighboring countries. Malaysia claims sovereignty over ten atolls in the
Spratlys archipelago, as well as jurisdiction over some submerged features,
based on the continental shelf principle. Malaysia’s policy towards the dispute
has been largely consistent over the past three decades, aiming to protect its
sovereignty and sovereign rights, uphold international law and foster peace and
stability in the region. Malaysia has pursued three main strategies to achieve
these policy outcomes: defend its claims, de-emphasize the dispute to maintain
friendly relations with China, and promote the ASEAN-led conflict management
process. However, Malaysia faces challenges in balancing its interests and
relations with China and its allies, as well as in enforcing its rights under
international law. Malaysia has been involved in several incidents with China
over the disputed waters, such as the 2019 standoff near Luconia Shoals, the
2020 intrusion by Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8, and the 2021 breach of
its airspace by Chinese military aircraft . Malaysia has also sought to strengthen
its defense capabilities and alliances, such as the 2019 acquisition of four littoral
mission ships from China, the 2020 joint exercises with the US Navy, and the
2021 joint patrols with Indonesia . Malaysia has also pursued diplomatic
engagement with China, such as the 2017 bilateral consultation mechanism and
the 2019 memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation. However,
these efforts have not resolved the underlying tensions or deterred China’s
assertive actions in the South China Sea. Therefore, Malaysia’s role in the South
China Sea conflict is important but also complex and dynamic, as it seeks to
protect its national interests while maintaining regional stability and
cooperation.

Vietnam
Vietnam is one of the claimant states of the Spratly Islands, which are also
claimed by China and other neighboring countries. Vietnam claims sovereignty
over 21 islands and reefs in the Spratlys archipelago, as well as jurisdiction over
some submerged features, based on the continental shelf principle. Similarly to
Malaysia, Vietnam’s policy towards the dispute has been largely consistent over
the past three decades, aiming to protect its sovereignty and sovereign rights,
uphold international law and foster peace and stability in the region. Vietnam
has pursued three main strategies to achieve these policy outcomes: defend its
claims, de-emphasize the dispute to maintain friendly relations with China, and
promote the ASEAN-led conflict management process. However, Vietnam faces
challenges in balancing its interests and relations with China and its allies too, as
well as in enforcing its rights under international law. Vietnam has been
involved in several incidents with China over the disputed waters, such as the
1974 Paracel Islands battle, the 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish, the 2014
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff, and the 2019 Vanguard Bank incident.
Vietnam has also sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and alliances,
such as the 2016 acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, the 2019
joint exercises with the US Navy, and the 2020 joint patrols with Indonesia.
Vietnam has also pursued diplomatic engagement with China, such as the 2011
bilateral agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime
issues and the 2019 memorandum of understanding on oil and gas cooperation.
However, these efforts have not resolved the underlying tensions or deterred
China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. Therefore, Vietnam’s role in
the South China Sea conflict is important but also complex and dynamic, as it
seeks to protect its national interests while maintaining regional stability and
cooperation.
QARMA

● What are the legal and historical bases of each claimant state’s
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the disputed features and waters in the
South China Sea?
● How can the claimant states disaggregate their claims to specific features
rather than entire island groups, and apply the relevant criteria of
international law, such as effective occupation, physical geography, and
maritime entitlements?
● To what extent is demilitarization of the South-China Sea required?
● How can the claimant states resolve their overlapping claims through
peaceful means, such as bilateral or multilateral negotiations, arbitration,
or adjudication?
● How can the claimant states cooperate on managing the resources and
environment of the South China Sea, such as through joint development
agreements, fisheries management, or marine protection?
● How can the claimant states enhance trust and confidence among
themselves and with other stakeholders, such as through dialogue
mechanisms, code of conduct, or crisis management protocols?
● How can the claimant states balance their interests and relations with
major powers, such as China and the United States, without
compromising their sovereignty and security?