Wilberding, James - Forms, Souls, and Embryos (2016, Routledge)

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FORMS, SOULS, AND EMBRYOS

‘Wilberding’s Forms, Souls, and Embryos is a pioneering work. It explores the

uncharted territory of late ancient philosophy’s growing interest in medicine and
biology. Its distinguished achievement lies in discovering a new world for future
research – the metaphysical foundation of the key concepts of conception and the
origin of life, as presented in Neoplatonism, the school which carried the vital-
ity of ancient thought into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Wilberding’s
conclusion that the Neoplatonic attribution of causal significance to both sexes in
biological generation does not constitute as quiet a revolution as it seems origi-
nally is equally valid for the achievement of his book itself.’
Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, Florida State University, USA
Forms, Souls, and Embryos allows readers coming from different backgrounds to
appreciate the depth and originality with which the Neoplatonists engaged with
and responded to a number of philosophical questions central to human reproduc-
tion, including: What is the causal explanation of the embryo’s formation? How
and to what extent are Platonic Forms involved? In what sense is a fetus ‘alive,’
and when does it become a human being? Where does the embryo’s soul come
from, and how is it connected to its body? This is the first full-length study of this
fascinating subject, and is a must-read for anyone interested in Neoplatonism or
the history of medicine and embryology.
James Wilberding is Professor of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at Ruhr

University, Bochum (Germany). Previously he was a lecturer in Classics at
Newcastle University (UK) and Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Williams
College (USA).
Issues in Ancient Philosophy
Series editor: George Boys-Stones, Durham University, UK

Routledge’s Issues in Ancient Philosophy exists to bring fresh light to the central
themes of ancient philosophy through original studies which focus especially on
texts and authors which lie outside the central ‘canon’. Contributions to the series
are characterized by rigorous scholarship presented in an accessible manner; they
are designed to be essential and invigorating reading for all advanced students in the
field of ancient philosophy.
Forms, Souls, and Embryos, James Wilberding

Flow and Flux in Plato’s Philosophy, Andrew J. Mason
Forthcoming titles:
Philosophy beyond Socrates’ Athens, Ugo Zilioli
The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo Nilous, Mark Wildish
Body and Mind in Ancient Thought, Peter N. Singer
Taurus of Beirut and the Other Side of Middle Platonism, Federico M. Petrucci
FORMS, SOULS, AND
EMBRYOS
Neoplatonists on Human
Reproduction
James Wilberding
First published 2017
by Routledge
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© 2017 James Wilberding
The right of James Wilberding to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the

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without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Wilberding, James, author.
Title: Forms, souls, and embryos: Neoplatonists on human reproduction /
James Wilberding.
Description: First [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Issues
in ancient philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015046525 | ISBN 9781138955271 (hardback: alk.
paper) | ISBN 9781315666488 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Embryology–History. | Human reproduction–
Philosophy–History.
Classification: LCC QL953. W55 2016 | DDC 571.8/61–dc23LC record
available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015046525
ISBN: 978-1-138-95527-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-66648-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Sunrise Setting Ltd, Brixham, UK
To Kathrin
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1 The Embryological Background 13

General Background: Four Key Issues in Ancient Embryology 14
Embryology in Plato 15
2 The Metaphysical Background 33

Metaphysical Models in Embryology 33
The Biological Development of the Theory of Forms 44
3 Neoplatonic Embryology: The Core Theory 58

The One-seed Theory 58
The Origin and Nature of the Seed 60
The Maternal Actualization Thesis 63
Other External Factors in the Formation of the Offspring 84
Appendix to Chapter 3: Eclectic Theories 100

The Commentary on the Hippocratic On the Nature
of the Child by John of Alexandria 100
Theophilus Protospatharius’ On the Construction
of the Human Being 103
Pseudo-Galen’s De Spermate 104
Pseudo-Iamblichus’ Theology of Arithmetic 107
viii Contents
Pseudo-Galen’s Whether What is Carried in

the Womb is a Living Thing 108
The Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of
Animals by Michael of Ephesus 111
Michael’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Embryology 112
Michael’s Interpretation of Plato’s Embryology 114
4 The Formation and Animation of the Embryo 129

The Order of the Embryo’s Formation 129
The Animation of the Embryo 133
5 The Problem of Teratogenesis 156
Epilogue 171
Bibliography 174
Index locorum 201
Subject index 228
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book has had a very long period of gestation, which has given me the
occasion to present parts of it, sometimes in a very early stage of development,
at numerous seminars and conferences over the past years. I am very grateful to
the organizers of these events for these opportunities and to the audiences for
their helpful feedback: Durham University, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen,
Eötvös University Budapest, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen, Glasgow
University, Humboldt Universität Berlin, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Ludwig
Maximilians Universität München, Newcastle University, Ruhr Universität
Bochum, Universität zu Köln, Université Paris Diderot, University College
London, University of Chicago, University of Notre Dame, University of Oxford,
and Washington University in St. Louis. Some material in this book has also previ-
ously appeared in print, and I would like to thank the referees of these journals
for their contributions and the editors both for their own contributions and for
their permission to reprint this material here: ‘Plato’s Embryology’, Early Science and
Medicine 20 (2015): 150–68; ‘The Revolutionary Embryology of the Neoplatonists’,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49 (2015): 321–61;‘Teratology in Neoplatonism’,
British Journal of the History of Philosophy 22.5 (2014): 1021–42. The Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation provided the funding for Svetla Slaveva-Griffin to spend
an extended research period in Bochum, allowing me to benefit from countless
conversations in addition to her comments on the first half of the book, and the
final arrangements have been greatly facilitated by a research semester provided by
the Ruhr Universität Bochum. Finally, I am grateful to Claudia Smart and Giulia
Weißmann for proofreading the entire typescript, and I owe Giulia Weißmann
additional thanks for preparing the index locorum.

INTRODUCTION
Late antiquity provided the setting for a quiet revolution in embryology at the
hands of the Neoplatonists.The early embryological theory of the Hippocratics had
achieved some degree of balance between the roles of the sexes by positing that the
male and the female make equal contributions to reproduction: each can produce
both strong (androgenetic) and weak (gynecogenetic) seeds.1 This balance (such as
it was) was surrendered by subsequent embryologists. Notably, the two dominant
theories in the subsequent period leading up to the rise of Neoplatonism both
regarded the female contribution to reproduction as decidedly inferior to that of
the male. In the Aristotelian tradition the female had notoriously been assigned the
role of the material cause.2 Whereas the male is the sole provider of a true seed,
which is the active bearer of the offspring’s form, the female’s colder constitution
frustrates the natural production of seed, rendering her ‘infertile.’3 In lieu of a true
seed, she contributes menstrual fluid, an imperfect concoction of blood that must
be acted on by the efficient and formal principle in the male seed if it is to be trans-
formed into a viable human offspring.4 And despite a long tradition of opinion to
the contrary,5 Galen’s innovations do not ultimately succeed in completely over-
turning Aristotle’s view of the female.6 To be sure, Galen argues at length against
Aristotle’s contention that the female does not provide a seed of her own,7 but
Galen continues to maintain that the female constitution is fundamentally colder
than that of the male,8 and that as a result the female seed is moister and colder9 and
the female’s reproductive parts are incomplete,10 all of which leads him to conclude,
at least on occasion, that the male seed must be counted as the true active cause of
reproduction.11 In Neoplatonic embryology, by contrast, we witness a return to a
more balanced etiology. In fact, the female acquires a much more active causal role
than Aristotle, Galen or even the Hippocratic authors envisioned. Far from merely
supplying matter, many Neoplatonists identify the female rather than the male as
the immediate active cause of reproduction.
2 Introduction
This will be seen by many as a surprising development in the history of embry-

ology, and with good reason. For not only does this innovation mark a significant
substantive departure from traditional views on the respective roles of the male
and female, but it is advanced by a group of thinkers who have commonly been
seen as lacking both the interest and the aptitude for investigating the issues central
to biology, medicine and in general the world of natural science. Even scholars
of Neoplatonism have not been particularly generous in their assessments of this
group’s engagement with natural science. To take one very influential example,
Eduard Zeller in his widely circulated overview of ancient philosophy began his
discussion of Plotinus’ natural philosophy with the content header: ‘no research in
the natural sciences.’12 That this verdict continues to find traction in scholarship can
be seen in this more recent assessment of the long-term influence of Neoplatonism
on pursuits in natural science:
Thus philosophy, to which the study of nature traditionally belonged, became

increasingly influenced by Neoplatonism […] On account of its metaphysical
orientation, which discounts coming-to-be in favor of being, its epistemo-
logical interests were directed at speculative and theoretical disciplines such as
mathematics, astronomy/astrology and theology, with the result that scientific
interest for objects of passing experience lacked motivation.13
And this rather bleak outlook is reflected in previous surveys in the history of
embryology, as well. Joseph Needham’s celebrated A History of Embryology, for
example, skips over the Neoplatonists of late antiquity entirely,14 and this omis-
sion is hardly unique to his study.15 Even Erna Lesky’s ground-breaking and still
unsurpassed survey of ancient embryology finds no room to discuss Neoplatonic
authors.16 Bruno Bloch, in his own earlier survey of the history of embryology,
defends his omission of these thinkers by pointing once again to their lack of
aptitude: they are simply recycling older material without the aid of independent
empirical observation.17
Yet this assessment calls for caution. It cannot be said that these thinkers simply
neglected the pursuit of natural science; at most the tenable point can be that the
Neoplatonic conception of ‘scientific interest’ differs considerably from our own.
After all, even a cursory look at the titles of the texts in this tradition – including
commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Meteorology – bears witness to the time and
energy they devoted to ‘the objects of passing experience.’18 Indeed, scholars have
recently begun to see that Neoplatonists took the explanation of sensible phe-
nomena very seriously precisely because of their status as images of the intelligible
world. As a result Neoplatonic natural philosophy is currently receiving a level of
attention that it has not enjoyed for centuries.19
Nevertheless, the traditional assessment would seem to have firmer footing
when the spotlight is placed more specifically on biology and medicine. Late antiq-
uity was a period of intense production of commentaries, and these in turn give us
a window into the Neoplatonic curriculum. So the fact that no commentaries were
Introduction 3
produced on Aristotle’s biological works such as On the Generation of Animals, On the

Parts of Animals, and History of Animals until Princess Anna Comnena, the daughter
of the Byzantine Emperor Alexis I Comnenus, commissioned Michael of Ephesus
to fill this gap in the twelfth century,20 suggests that biology was not included in
the standard curriculum. Indeed, although it is possible to find some references to
these treatises in other Neoplatonic works, the majority of these references turn up
in contexts in which their authors are describing the broad contours of Aristotle’s
philosophical program and do not give any indication of an awareness of the con-
tents of these treatises.21 Olympiodorus’ classification of these treatises is telling. In
his account of Aristotle’s philosophical program at the beginning of his commen-
tary on the Meteorology, he classifies the treatises on plants and animals as treatises
concerned primarily with the soul and announces that the study of these treatises,
together with On the Soul itself, is to be pursued after that of the Meteorology.22
And while there are also a number of references to specific doctrines or statements
from Aristotle’s biological treatises,23 in light of the massive productivity of these
authors the overall scarcity of such references would appear only to reinforce the
impression that these treatises were of negligible value in their eyes. Moreover, these
references do not even serve as a guarantee that these authors had direct access to
Aristotle’s biological writings, as they might have drawn them from some inter-
mediate source.24 If, therefore, the Neoplatonists’ attention to Aristotle’s biological
treatises is a fair measure of their interest in biological topics, then it would seem
that the traditional assessment is indeed well founded.
All of this would initially suggest that a book-length study of Neoplatonic
embryology in late antiquity is going to have problems getting off the ground,
not only because the Neoplatonists’ understanding of science might differ from
our own but above all because of what would appear to be an utter disinterest
on their part in the fields of biology and medicine. In fact, there is a significant
amount of material on embryology to be found within the works of what I shall
be referring to as the core group of Neoplatonists in late antiquity. This core group
will form the scope of the present study and includes above all Plotinus, Porphyry,
Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius, Philoponus and Simplicius, though others will be
considered along the way. With the exception of Philoponus, a Christian thinker
whose thought is inextricably tied to this tradition, the focus is decidedly on pagan
authors, in part because early Christian theories of embryology and animation have
already enjoyed a much greater level of scholarly attention25 but also because one of
the goals of this study is to demonstrate a significant extent of agreement between
these core Neoplatonists.
Porphyry’s epistolary treatise To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled (Ad Gaurum),
even though it has not survived in its entirety,26 has a rightful claim to being the
Platonic treatise on embryology and will form the backbone to the present study,
and as such deserves a few words of introduction here. In the mid-nineteenth
century, in a monastery on Mount Athos, the remains of a twelfth-century27 manu-
script were discovered which contains the conclusion of Galen’s On Marasmas,
followed by Galen’s Introduction to Logic and then the Ad Gaurum, which in the
4 Introduction
manuscript was also attributed to Galen. This attribution was swiftly overturned by
Karl Kalbfleisch in his introduction to the published edition of the text in 1895, and
in Galen’s place Porphyry’s authorship was proposed. While this attribution is not
beyond all doubt, the contents of the Ad Gaurum are unmistakably Neoplatonic.
For in it we find reference to a number of common Neoplatonic ideas, e.g. that
every generator generates something inferior to itself,28 and that the presence of
the intelligible in the sensible is to be explained via considerations of suitability
and likeness.29 Moreover, even if absolute certainty is not an option, there are a
handful of convincing reasons for taking Porphyry to be the Neoplatonic author in
question, central among which is Michael Psellus’ report that Porphyry had indeed
written a treatise on whether the embryo was an animal,30 as well as a report from
an embryological context in Iamblichus concerning Porphyry’s position on when
the soul enters the body that matches the position advanced in the Ad Gaurum.31
In it Porphyry’s primary objective is to establish – both independently and as the
best reading of Plato’s statements on the matter – that the descending soul enters
the body only at birth. It follows that the embryo or fetus – I shall use these terms
synonymously to refer to the offspring throughout the entire gestation period from
conception to birth, since ancient terminological distinctions such as they are do
not map neatly onto our own – achieves the psychological status of an animal
(ζῷον) only at birth. In the course of doing so, Porphyry works out a theory that
addresses a number of the central issues of the metaphysics of developmental biol-
ogy, especially the nature and origin of the seed and the respective roles of the souls
of the father, the mother and the offspring.
While no other core Neoplatonist devotes an entire treatise to embryology,
these and other issues related to embryology are treated by nearly all of the core
Neoplatonists at various points in their surviving works. Sometimes one finds
excursions into embryology in predictable places, for example in the commentaries
on Aristotle’s On the Soul or Physics, where references in the object texts to seeds or
generative soul are not uncommon, but some interesting material can be found in
the unlikeliest of places, including in the commentaries on the Organon. The total-
ity of all such excursions, digressions, and passing remarks and analogies adds up to
an amount of material considerable enough to allow significant conclusions to be
drawn about the general contours of Neoplatonic embryological theory.
Nor should this wealth of material on embryology embedded within a diverse
range of works come entirely as a surprise, given the historical overlap between
Neoplatonic and medical circles in late antiquity.32 This overlap begins already in
Plotinus’ school in Rome, which included three physicians,33 and continued in
the famous Neoplatonic schools in Athens and Alexandria, with which a number
of physicians were associated, including above all Iacobus Psychrestos,34 Gessius,35
Agapius of Athens and Alexandria,36 John of Alexandria,37 a certain Asclepius,38 and
perhaps most intriguingly Asclepiodotus of Alexandria and Aphrodisias, a student of
Proclus who was celebrated by his contemporaries for both his medical and philo-
sophical abilities.39 Unfortunately, no writings by these physicians have survived,
though we do have writings by other physicians with Neoplatonic backgrounds,
Introduction 5
such as Oribasius of Pergamum,40 Pseudo-Elias,41 and Stephanus of Athens.42

Moreover, some Neoplatonic commentators and philosophers, despite their lack
of registered interest in Aristotle’s biological treatises, reveal more than a passing
interest in medicine, as is particularly clear in the cases of Olympiodorus,43 Elias,44
David,45 Priscian,46 John Philoponus,47 and Marinus,48 and beyond this front line
one finds still more enthusiasts of Neoplatonism with various degrees of medical
training or interest.49
While this evidence of bilateral interest between Neoplatonism and medicine

certainly casts some doubt on the conventional marginalization of biological sci-
ence by Neoplatonic thinkers, it cannot succeed in completely overturning the
charges against them, as their ventures into embryology make clear. For here it must
be admitted that there is absolutely no independent experimentation or empiri-
cal investigation into reproductive anatomy to be found. More striking still is their
very selective engagement with the issues that had come to be seen as central to
embryological studies. A stretch of text in Aëtius’ On the Opinions of the Philosophers
poses a series of questions that together offer a fairly representative selection of the
most pressing controversies in ancient embryology:50 What is the substance of the
seed? Is the seed a body? Do females emit seed? How does conception take place?
What causes the determination of the offspring’s sex? Why do deformities occur?
Why do females sometimes not succeed in conceiving? How do twins and triplets
come to be? How is parental resemblance to be explained? Why does it some-
times happen that the offspring resemble others and not the parents? Why are some
females infertile and some men impotent? Why are mules sterile? Is the embryo an
animal? How is the embryo nourished? What is the first part formed in the womb?
Why are seventh-month children viable? How long does the formation of animals
in the womb take? As Aëtius’ doxographical survey of the diverse responses to these
questions illustrates, interest in these issues was by no means limited to a small
group of specialists in embryology. In addition to many physicians, the participants
in these controversies named by Aëtius include Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Democritus,
Epicurus, Leucippus, Plato, Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Strato, even if not all of them
are reported to have registered views on all of the above issues. So one might rea-
sonably expect Neoplatonic authors to position themselves in respect to many or
even most of these controversies, but the fact is that the Neoplatonists as a group
show very little awareness of these controversies as such. This is not to say that they
advanced no views on the issues behind the controversies, though this is sometimes
the case, e.g. regarding the determination of the offspring’s sex, on which one finds
next to nothing in our core authors, despite the fact that Aristotle and Galen each
offer carefully considered explanations of this matter.51 Rather, what it means is
that with most of these issues the Neoplatonists do advance views but that they do
so without argument and without signaling any awareness of the controversy sur-
rounding these issues. Consider, for example, the controversy regarding the question
of female seed. Aëtius reports that a number of philosophers took positions on this
matter,52 but what is particularly striking is the dialectical manner in which previ-
ous philosophers engaged with this issue. In On the Generation of Animals Aristotle
6 Introduction
does not simply assume that the female contributes no seed, rather he marks out
this position in opposition to the reigning two-seed theory of the Hippocratics,53
and when Galen in turn seeks to re-establish the two-seed theory, he does so by
arguing at length against Aristotle’s one-seed theory.54 In this way both Aristotle and
Galen meet the expectations we place upon scientists and scholars to engage with
and respond to the community of scholars working on a shared problem. Compare
this to Porphyry’s approach to the issue in his Ad Gaurum. He simply assumes that
there is no female seed, without offering any arguments against the Hippocratic or
Galenic two-seed theories or even giving any signal that he is aware of any con-
troversy surrounding this position. In fact, none of our core authors acknowledges
the controversy surrounding the female seed.55 Or consider the issue regarding the
first part of the offspring to be formed in the womb. Here too Porphyry advances
clear views, though the particular views he advances and the manner in which he
advances them reveal much about his engagement with the medical tradition. To
begin with, Porphyry explicitly draws his account of the initial formation of the
embryo from the Hippocratic On the Nature of the Child. One can even go so far as
to say that this Hippocratic treatise is just about the sole source of medical mate-
rial in the Ad Gaurum.56 The silence with which Porphyry passes over this treatise’s
prominent commitment to the two-seed theory already gives us some clues to his
selective engagement with the medical tradition. Moreover, Porphyry insists that
all of the organs are formed and completed simultaneously at birth.Yet once again
he does not even acknowledge that this account stands in stark opposition to the
accounts proposed by Aristotle and Galen,57 and subsequent Neoplatonists have
even less to say about the order of formation.58 Or consider, finally, the viability of
the seven-month child. Porphyry does not touch upon this issue in what survives
of the Ad Gaurum, but Proclus does. In his lengthy discussion of nuptial arithmetic
in his commentary on Plato’s Republic 546a–7a, Proclus sees an opportunity to
defend the traditional views on the possibility of seven-month pregnancies and
the impossibility of eight-month pregnancies.59 He begins by reporting the view
of ‘Herophilus and many other highly regarded [physicians]’ – and this is to my
knowledge the only reference to Herophilus in the surviving Neoplatonic texts –
that the ancient belief in the possibility of the seven-month pregnancy is erroneous
and due to a miscalculation of the date of conception.60 Proclus’ response to this,
however, is hardly what one would expect from a philosopher with serious interests
in medicine: he simply appeals to the (greater) authority of the Pythagoreans, the
Orphics, Zoroaster, Empedocles and others who do accept this belief.61
The upshot of this brief and selective discussion, which will be further devel-
oped in the following chapters, is that the Neoplatonists’ relationship to biology
and in particular to embryology defies simple characterization and even betrays the
hint of some internal tension. There were considerable numbers of medical prac-
titioners affiliated with the Neoplatonic schools, and one can find even the core
Neoplatonists advancing views on most of the pressing embryological issues of their
day. Given this level of interest, however, their engagement with the embryological
enterprise (medical texts, Aristotle’s biological writings, experimental observation
Introduction 7
and anatomy) is surprisingly limited. Moreover, this limited engagement raises spe-
cial questions about their original contribution to the embryological tradition with
which this introduction began. One wonders, in particular, how the Neoplatonists
arrived at their innovative understanding of embryological etiology if it was not the
result of carefully scrutinizing the leading theories of their predecessors, that is, the
theories of the Hippocratics, Aristotle and Galen.
Explaining this development is one of the central aims of the present study, and
the impression one gains, as one works through the embryological material in the
surviving works of these core Neoplatonists, is that at least one of the major rea-
sons why these authors are neglecting a great deal of previous work in embryology
was that they are simply not interested in embryological issues for their own sake.
Rather, their entire approach to embryology is guided by higher-order (metaphysi-
cal, psychological, cosmological, theodicean) concerns, which determine both the
scope and the contours of their program. This presumably explains, for example,
why the Neoplatonists neglect the issue of sex determination but still find occasions
to address the problem of teratogenesis, even though the former is a universal fea-
ture of embryological development and the latter is only an occasional eventuality.
Teratogenesis, after all, threatens to undermine the Neoplatonic commitment to the
sensible world’s administration by intelligible principles. Likewise, this helps make
sense of the decidedly biological development that the theory of Forms undergoes
in their hands, which could easily strike one as a surprising anomaly in light of their
modest interest in, for example, Aristotle’s biology. Here, their main concern was to
establish a framework that could account for the realization of intelligible forms in
the sensible biological world. Finally, recognizing these principal concerns also goes
a long way towards explaining the novel way that they allocate causal roles to the
male and female agents. For as we shall see, this allocation allows them to see the
causation of creation in the sensible world as following the same basic pattern as it
does in the intelligible world.
This study will begin with a look at the background to Neoplatonic embryology.
This examination will include a brief historical survey of a selection of embryologi-
cal issues that were central to the tradition leading up to Neoplatonism, though
the focal point of this examination will be directed at Plato’s own remarks on
embryology, with the aim of determining to what extent Plato may be thought to
have advanced a coherent embryological theory (Chapter 1). Following this, it will
be necessary to set out the metaphysical background to Neoplatonic embryology.
Here it will be argued that the metaphysical model of procession and reversion that
is characteristic of Neoplatonism is ultimately what lies behind Neoplatonic inno-
vations in embryological etiology. In this connection the biological development
of the theory of Forms and its embryological implications will also be explored
(Chapter 2).
In Chapter 3 an embryological theory will be presented that may justifiably be
called the core theory of Neoplatonic embryology. The justification for this des-
ignation will be provided by showing how the theory’s constitutive tenets – the
most central being that there is no female seed, that the male seed is a collection
8 Introduction
of form-principles, and that these form-principles in the male seed are in a state of
potentiality and require actualization from an external agent, usually identified as
the mother – are shared by the core group of Neoplatonists. Once this consensus
has been established, the core theory may be used as a Neoplatonic litmus test in
embryology. In an appendix to this chapter, a number of embryological theories
that contain some signs of Neoplatonic influence will be evaluated in terms of the
core theory, and it will be argued that all of them depart from the core theory to
such an extent that they ought to be regarded as (at most) examples of eclectic
embryological theories.
In Chapter 4 two issues concerning the subsequent development of the embryo
will be examined: its formation and animation. Unlike the constitutive tenets of
the core theory, these are matters on which there was some disagreement among
Neoplatonic authors, though there was a general agreement that the two issues are
intimately connected. In this chapter two main competing approaches to formation
and animation will be presented, one according to which formation and animation
are accomplished all at once, and another according to which each of these opera-
tions is accomplished sequentially.
The final chapter will deal with the major biological obstacle to the Neoplatonists’
preferred view of the sensible world as a success story: the fact that not all cases of bio-
logical reproduction appear to turn out successfully, even if the majority of cases do.
As we shall see, the problems surrounding teratogenesis lead Proclus and Philoponus
to reconfigure the boundary between natural organisms and unnatural aberrations.
Notes
1 See, for example, Genit. 6, 48, 11–28 (7.478 L.). For discussion, see Lesky (1951: 76–119).
The commentary on Nat. Puer. by John of Alexandria suggests that in late antiquity this
Hippocratic theory was made to conform to Galenic embryology (e.g. In Hipp. Nat. Puer.
134, 27–136, 9 and 138, 13–14).
2 Aristotle GA 716a6–7; 727b31–3; 729a10–11 and 29–33; 730a27–b2; 731b20–2; 732a9;
733b26–7; 738b20–1; 740b24–5.
3 Aristotle GA 728a18.
4 Let it be said that remarks such as these have led a number of scholars to severe under-
estimates of the actual contributions made by the female in Aristotle’s embryology. For
some characterizations of such views, see Henry (2007: 2–4) and Mayhew (2004: 29–31),
though Mayhew misrepresents Dean-Jones, cf. Dean-Jones (1994: 14). A number of
recent studies such as Henry (2007) have provided ample correction of these miscon-
ceptions, but these do not affect the point being made here.
5 Maclean (1980: 29ff.) discusses Renaissance physicians who sided with Galen against
Aristotle in the mistaken belief that by doing so they were advancing the equality of the
sexes, though as Maclean remarks, Galenism and feminism are a ‘curious combination’
(29). Connell (2001) provides further examples of scholars from the Medieval period
onwards who have seen Galen as a more ‘feminist’ alternative to Aristotle.
6 Needham (1959: 69) infers from a remark in Lucian Vitarum Auctio (2.47,11–48,2
Macleod) that in Galen’s time embryology was ‘specially associated’ with the Peripatetic
school.
7 See especially Galen De sem. 2.1 (144,4–160,23 (4.593,1–610,10 K.)) and Nickel (1989:
40–9).
Introduction 9
8 For example Galen De sem. 2.4 (176,13 (4.624,1–2 K.)). See De Lacy’s note ad 86,24–5
and Nickel (1989: 43).
9 For example Galen De sem. 2.4 (176,1–2 (4.623,4–6 K.)); De usu part. 14.6 (2.301,3–6
(4.164,1–4 K.)). See Nickel (1989: 43).
10 Galen De usu part. 14.6 (2.299,3–23 (4.161,12–162,13 K.)).
11 See De usu part. 14.6 (2.301,10–14 (4.164,8–12 K.)) with De Lacy (1992: 216): ‘the
male semen is the α’ ρχὴ δραστική.’ And see Nickel (1989: 42–9) and Connell (2001).
Elsewhere Galen limits himself to saying that the formative power (διαπλαστικὴ
δύναμις) is in the seed (De facult. natur. 162,24–163,20 (2.85,10–86,10 K.) and 174,11–
17 (2.100,16–101,4 K.)), sometimes even implying that it is in both seeds (De sem.
196,12–14 (4.642,1–3 K.)). All of these remarks must be understood against the back-
ground of De foet. form. 104,15–106,13 (4.700,4–702,4 K.), where Galen explains at
length that he cannot identify the agent responsible for forming the embryo.
12 Zeller (1919–23, vol. 3.2: 619): ‘Keine naturwissenschaftliche Forschung.’ Zeller goes on
to say that because for Plotinus the sensible world is only an obfuscation of the intel-
ligible, ‘mußte ihm notwendig für eine Erforschung der physikalischen Gesetze ebenso
der Sinn wie auch die Fähigkeit abgehen’ (619).
13 Föllinger (1999: 255): ‘So wurde die Philosophie, zu der traditionellerweise die
Beschäftigung mit der Natur gehörte, zunehmend vom Neuplatonismus bestimmt […]
Dessen Erkenntnisinteresse galt aufgrund seiner metaphysischen Ausrichtung, die das
Werden gegenüber dem Sein abwertete, den spekulativen und theoretischen Disziplinen
wie Mathematik, Astronomie/Astrologie und Theologie, so dass das wissenschaftliche
Interesse an Objekten der vergänglichen Emperie nicht gefördert wurde.’
14 Needham (1959). Located between his study of Galen and Latin medieval embryology,
one finds a total of eight pages devoted to embryology in patristic, Jewish, Arabic and
alchemical circles (75–83).
15 See also Adelmann (1942, vol. 1: 45): ‘The death of Galen in 200 AD marks the end of
progress in embryological learning for over thirteen centuries.’ This remark is followed
by a seven-page survey of embryology in the Middle Ages. Cf. Adelmann (1966, esp. vol.
2). Similar claims may be made about, e.g. Meyer (1939) and Leperchey (2010).
16 Lesky (1951). This is due in part to the chronological boundaries the author sets for her
study, which ends with Galen, though she does bring in other post-Galenic authors,
including Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine, and Nemesius.
17 Bloch (1904: 55).That said, Bloch proceeds to give a very brief overview of some figures
who concerned themselves with embryology in late antiquity, but he restricts this over-
view to Christian circles: Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustinus, Nemesius, and Theophilus
Protospatharius (55–9).
18 Cf. Lennox (1994: 15). For a list of works by Neoplatonic authors, see Gerson (2010, vol.
2: 915–65).
19 The relevant studies are too numerous to list, but one might gain a first impression
of this new work from Sorabji (2005, vol. 2), Chiaradonna and Trabattoni (2009), and
Wilberding and Horn (2012).
20 See Wilberding (2014b: 697) and the discussion of Michael of Ephesus in the Appendix
to Chapter 3.
21 Collective references to the biological treatises as part of Aristotle’s philosophical program
can be found, for example, in: Elias In Cat. 113,34; In Isag. 115,35–6; Nemesius Nat. hom.
46,21; Olympiodorus Proleg. 6,14; In Meteor. 1,12; 4,1–5; and 6,6–11; Philoponus In Cat.
3,11; In GC 2,14–15; In Phys. 2,8; Simplicius In Cat. 4,12 and 318,34; In Phys. 365,10.
Sometimes the titles of specific treatises are given in these programmatic statements, e.g.
HA: Olympiodorus In Meteor. 14,11; Philoponus In Meteor. 9,13–14; Simplicius In DC
3,8; In Phys. 3,8; PA: Philoponus In Meteor. 9,14; In Phys. 2,9; GA: Olympiodorus In
Meteor. 14,10–11; Philoponus In Cat. 3,25–6; In Meteor. 9,14; In GC 124,26–7; Simplicius
In DC 3,5; In Phys. 3,8–9.
10 Introduction
22 Olympiodorus In Meteor. 4,1–5. If, however, this classification is taken to be representa-

tive of a broader Neoplatonic understanding of the biological treatises, it would seem
to raise more questions than it answers, since the sidelining of works thought to be
about the soul by Neoplatonists is even more puzzling. By contrast, Philoponus (In DA
140,18–19) characterizes the biological treatises as being about the body that receives
soul. Cf. In DA 591,22–3.
23 For example for Aristotle’s HA, see Ammonius In Cat. 71,21 (HA 490a12); Philoponus
In Cat. 112,15 (HA 490a12); In DA 268,1 (HA 569a10–13); In DA 591,23; Porphyry
Quaest. Hom. ad Il. XXIV.315–16 (MacPhail: 272; cf. HA 618b25–31) and 291,20–2
(Schlunk: 34–5; cf. HA 603a2–3). For Aristotle’s PA: Olympiodorus In Meteor. 273,4–18;
Philoponus In DA 25,12–14 (PA 641a33ff.); 55,12 (PA 641a33ff.); 140,18–19; 157,21;
381,4 (PA 642a31ff.); 384,25 (PA 669a3ff.); [Simplicius] In DA 2,3–4 (PA 641a17); 8,3
(PA 641a36); 149,3 (PA 669a13–23); 150,29 (PA 669a2–5 and 20–3); 242,3 (PA 641a17–
b10); [Simplicius] In Phys. 369,13; Syrianus In Meta. 33,18 (PA 1.3). Proclus (In Remp.
2.149, 21–2) attributes the doctrine that motion originates from the right to οι‛ περὶ
ζῷ ων γράφοντες, but the source might be PA 671b29 and 672a24, as Kroll suggests. For
Aristotle’s GA: Ammonius In De Int. 16,26 (GA 786b21); Philoponus In DA 286,15 and
289,3–4 (GA 725a3ff); Simplicius In DA 116,16 (GA 4.8). And see note 24.
24 On zoological anthologies in antiquity, see Kullmann (1998). An intermediate source of
some kind might help explain some of the erroneous references that one finds in these
authors, e.g.: Proclus apud Philoponus Aet. Mund. 523,13–15 claims that Aristotle ‘in his
treatises on the generation of animals’ (ε’ ν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως ζῷον) describes life as a
kind of illumination, which would seem to be a reference to De Plant. 815b33. Likewise,
Philoponus (In DA 10,25–6) not only misquotes Aristotle’s famous νοῦς θύραθεν doc-
trine but even attributes it to PA rather than GA (736b27–8). And see Alexander In
DS 79,14 (with Wendland’s note); Porphyry Quaest. Hom. ad Il. XXIV.315–16 (with
MacPhail’s note ad loc.), David In Isag. 204,15–16 (with Busse’s note), and the changes
Stüve suggests or makes to Olympiodorus’ text at In Meteor. 6,6–11.
25 See, for example, Congourdeau (1989), (2000) and (2007), Jones (2004), Pouderon
(2008), Scholten (2005: 404–9), Waszink (1947).
26 For a discussion of the original length of the manuscript, see Kalbfleisch (1895: 3 and his
Nachtrag zu S. 3 on p. 31) and Dorandi (2008: 124).
27 Kalbfleisch (1895) dates the manuscript to the thirteenth century, but see now Dorandi
(2008: 123).
28 AG 14.3.8–9 (54,11–12). See the discussion in Chapter 2 of the principles PIP and PNP.
29 AG 11.2.12–14 (48,28–49.2); 13.7.1–5 (53,17–21); 14.4.8–11 (54,22–5). Cf. Porphyry
Sent. 28; 29.21–2; 33.49–53; 37.41–4; 38.11; De abst. 2.47 (175,16) and 2.48 (176,2–
3). And see, for example, Plotinus Enn. 1.2.4.25–9; 1.9.1.4–7; 4.3.8.50–4; 4.3.12.37–9;
4.3.13.7–12; 6.4.2 and 15 passim; etc.
30 Porphyry Fr. 267F (Michael Psellus De omnif. doctr. 115) and cf. Michael Psellus Op. psych.
theol. daem. 77,5–8.
31 See Iamblichus DA §31. Other reasons for specifically attributing the AG to Porphyry
include: (i) The AG’s account of sense perception fits exactly with Nemesius’ brief report
(Nat. hom. 59.13ff.) of Porphyry’s now lost On Perception. Although Plotinus’ views on
sensation, for example, are similar to those found in the AG, he never discusses a ‘cone’
(kônos) extending from the eye as the AG does, but it is precisely this term that reappears
in Nemesius’ summary of Porphyry’s On Perception. And (ii) the reference to ‘other sacred
books’ at AG 10.5.5–6.3 (47,20–8) is also easily seen as a reference to other works of
Porphyry, though there is not exactly a consensus among scholars as to which works are
meant (see Kalbfleisch (1895: 21), Dörrie (1959: 162–5), Risch (2007), Zambon (2002:
27–8) and Wilberding (2011a: ad 10.6.3). For a fuller discussion of Porphyry’s authorship,
see Dorandi (2008) and Wilberding (2011a: 9–10).
32 For what follows, including a more in-depth account of many of the individuals men-
tioned below, see Wilberding (2014c).
Introduction 11
33 Eustochius of Alexandria, Paulinus of Scythopolis, and Zethus the Arabian. See Porphyry
VP 2.12–31 and 7.5–24.
34 See Damascius VI 84D–E and J, and Wilberding (2014c).
35 See Damascius VI 128 and now Watts (2009), and Wilberding (2014c).
36 See Athanassiadi (1999: 257n278), and Wilberding (2014c).
37 See Chapter 4.
38 A student of Ammonius and the teacher of Stephanus of Athens, not to be identified
with Asclepius of Tralles. See Westerink (1964: 172–5) and Wilberding (2014c).
39 Reports on Asclepiodotus can be found in Damascius VI (e.g. 96), Proclus In Parm.
618,12–14, and Simplicius In Phys. 795,13–14. For a brief account, see Wilberding
(2014c). Sadly, Asclepiodotus’ commentary on Plato’s Tim. (cf. Olympiodorus In Meteor.
321,26–39) has not survived.
40 Editions of Oribasius’ surviving works have been published in the series Corpus Medicorum
Graecorum. For a brief assessment of Oribasius’ interest in Neoplatonism, see Wilberding
(2014c).
41 See Westerink (1967: xv), who concludes that Pseudo-Elias is probably a professor of
medicine lecturing on logic, though his ‘philosophical knowledge is of the flimsiest.’
Wolska-Conus (1989: 69–82) argues that Pseudo-Elias is to be identified with Stephanus
of Athens.
42 There are a number of questions surrounding the identity of this Stephanus. See
Wilberding (2014c).
43 Westerink (1964: 172) and (1975: 27) points out Olympiodorus’ very frequent use of
Hippocrates, a fact best explained in his view by concluding that Olympiodorus must
have lectured on Hippocrates. Roueché (1999) rejects this conclusion but agrees that
Olympiodorus does display an ‘unusual degree of interest in medicine’ (155).
44 Westerink (1964: 172–3) and Roueché (1999: 154).
45 Westerink (1962: xx–xxiv) and (1964: 173–4).
46 See De Haas (2010).
47 For Philoponus’ knowledge and use of Galenic medical ideas, see Todd (1984) and van
der Eijk (2006: 1–4 and the notes (passim, e.g. 138n226)). It remains uncertain whether
Philoponus actually composed commentaries on medical texts. See Pormann (2003),
Strohmaier (2003), van der Eijk (2005: 134n371) and DPA vol. 5a 554–63.
48 In Damascius VI 97I Marinus is reported to have been a follower of Galen’s theories.
49 For example Nemesius of Emesa (see Sharples and van der Eijk (2008: 1–32)), Eunapius
of Sardis (see Wilberding (2014c: 367n32)), and Julian the Apostate, who commissioned
Oribasius’ epitomes of Galen and the ancient physicians.
50 A new reconstruction of Aëtius’ Plac. phil. is currently being produced by Jaap Mansfeld
and David Runia. For book 5, however, the Stobaean material is also lost, so that we are
basically left with Ps.-Plutarch’s Plac. phil. (Mor. 904C–911C), an abbreviated version of
Aëtius’ lost work. I have been working with Lachenaud’s edition of that text, though
I have adopted the more informative system of referring to the text by book, chap-
ter and lemma (as in H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879), 415–44), even though
Lachenaud’s edition does not include the numbers for the lemmas. A comparable list of
issues is also found in Censorinus De dei nat. 5–11 (pp. 48–75).
51 For Aristotle, see GA 767a13–b23 and for Galen, see De sem. 180,19–196,21 (4.628,3–
642,11 K.) and De usu part. 2.296,8–310,7 (4.158,3–175,17 K.).Aëtius (Plac. phil. 5.7.1–7)
reports the views of Empedocles, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus,
among other physicians.
52 Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.1–3.
53 Aristotle GA 721a30–731b14 (esp. 726a28–731b14).
54 Galen De sem. 144,4–178,15 (4.593,1–625,17 K.).
55 The Neoplatonic theory of spermatogony is presented in Chapter 3.
56 See especially AG 2.2 (34,20–35,9) and 10 passim (46,12–48,8) with notes ad loc. in
Wilberding (2011a) and Brisson et al. (2012). One remark (AG 3.4 (37,6–7)) appears to
be drawn from a source outside of the Hippocratic corpus (see Brisson et al. (2012: 229)).
12 Introduction
57 For Aristotle, see GA 734b22–35a26. Cf. GA 740a3–7; 741b15–25; 753b18–19; HA

561a4–21. For Galen, readers are referred to Nickel (1989: 71–83).
58 For a fuller discussion of Neoplatonic accounts of the formation of the embryo, see
Chapter 4.
59 Proclus In Remp. 2.31,22ff. and cf. 2.59,6ff. For some background on the issue, see
Hanson (1987).
60 Proclus In Remp. 2.33,9–14 (Herophilus Fr. 198). Note that von Staden remarks that ‘the
textual basis for attributing this view to Herophilus is flimsy’ (299).
61 Proclus In Remp. 2.33,14ff.. Interesting in this connection is also that Proclus does not
appeal to Aristotle, even though Aristotle offers further support for Proclus’ position (HA
584a35–b25 and GA 772b6–12). See Wilberding (2014c).
1
THE EMBRYOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The aim of this chapter is to examine Plato’s remarks pertaining to embryology,

which are almost entirely contained in the Timaeus, and to set out his views in as
much detail as the texts permit. In this way, when we turn to the Neoplatonists
we will be in a better position to evaluate to what extent their theories are fair
representations, or at least fair developments, of Plato’s theory. This examina-
tion of Plato will be facilitated by a brief overview of four key issues in ancient
embryology, namely the three major issues in spermatogenesis1 – the number of
seeds involved in reproduction, the corporeal origin of the seed, the manner in
which the offspring is present in the seed – along with the moment of animation
of the offspring. As we shall see, these are all issues that were widely discussed by
both philosophers and physicians in antiquity, and so we can reasonably expect
Plato to have been familiar with them and to be addressing them in the Timaeus
(or else to be consciously avoiding them). To be sure, these four issues are far
from exhausting the scope of ancient embryology. The list of embryological
questions collected by Aëtius gives a sense of some of the issues being left out of
this overview, e.g. how twins are formed, how the offspring’s sex is determined,
and how to account for deformities and (lack of) resemblance.2 Although we
shall see that Neoplatonists did concern themselves with some of these other
issues, their interest in them was limited and Plato does not incorporate them
into his account at all.We can therefore leave these other questions aside for now.
In the next chapter we shall have the opportunity to explore a further key issue
in ancient embryology, namely the causal factors involved in embryogenesis, but
since this is again a topic on which Plato has little to offer its discussion may be
postponed.
14 The embryological background
General Background: Four Key Issues in Ancient

Embryology
The first issue concerns the number of seeds involved in normal biological repro-
duction. On one theory the male is the sole supplier of seed. References to such
a theory in Aeschylus and Euripides suggest that it was widespread among early
Greeks, and we have evidence that it was advanced by a number of philosophers,
including Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Aristotle, and the Stoics.3 An obvi-
ous difficulty connected to the one-seed theory is how to account for maternal
resemblance, which the alternative two-seed theory could easily explain. The view
that both the male and the female emitted seed found a wide-ranging scope of
acceptance among philosophers – Alcmaeon, Hippon, and other Pythagoreans,
Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus – and especially among ancient
physicians: the Hippocratics, Diocles, Herophilus, Soranus, and Galen.4 One dif-
ficulty of the two-seed theory that its proponents must address is why the male is
required for reproduction, seeing as the female already has a seed at hand. A com-
mon (but not universal) response to this difficulty was to posit that the female seed
is either inferior or else completely inactive.5
The second issue relates to the corporeal origin of the seed, and there were
three standard responses to this issue. The oldest was the so-called encephalo-
myelogenic theory, which states that the seed comes from the brain and/or the
marrow.6 This was held by Pythagoreans such as Alcmaeon and Hippon, and traces
of this theory can still be found in the Hippocratic corpus and in Diocles.7 This
theory eventually gave way to the theory of pangenesis, which has the seed being
drawn from the entire body in order to better account for the family resem-
blances, as was advanced by Anaxagoras, Democritus, Hippocratic authors, and
Epicurus.8 The third and final position to emerge was the hematogenous theory,
which derives seed from the concoction of blood. This appears to be advanced by
Parmenides and Diogenes of Apollonia and is taken up and developed in much
greater detail by Aristotle and later physicians such as Erasistratus, Herophilus,
and Galen.9
The next issue that was commonly discussed concerned the manner of the
offspring’s physical presence in the seed. Preformationists held that the body of
the offspring exists pre-formed in the seed, whereas epigenesists (e.g. Aristotle and
Galen10) argued that the parts are formed successively after conception. Some form
of preformationism necessarily follows from pangenesis, where the exact type of
preformationism to follow will depend on the kind of parts being supplied and
whether they are pre-arranged into an organic unity (though preformationism
would seem to be at least conceptually possible even in the absence of pangen-
esis). It is helpful to distinguish between three varieties of preformationism, which
I shall call homoiomerous preformationism, anhomoiomerous preformationism
and homuncular preformationism. The first two maintain respectively that the
homoiomerous parts such as the humors or flesh and bone and the anhomoiomer-
ous parts such as the head, hands and organs pre-exist in the seed but are not yet
The embryological background 15
organized into a unified whole, while according to homuncular preformationism

the seed already contains a unified organic living thing. It is not clear that anyone in
antiquity actually intended to defend homuncular preformationism, though some
remarks come close to suggesting it.11
In addition to accounting for the formation of the body, the manner and source
of the offspring’s soul became an increasingly important topic of philosophical
embryology, a topic that was often broached by asking the question of when the
seed (or embryo or offspring) becomes a living thing (ζῷον).12 The moment of ani-
mation was commonly identified either as conception, in which case the soul was
often seen as being provided in some way by the seed(s),13 or birth, in which case
the soul was generally held to come from outside,14 though there are exceptions
in both cases – the middle Platonist Numenius, for example, is reported to have
thought that the soul comes in from outside at the moment of conception,15 and
the Stoics pointed to birth as the moment of animation but would not agree that
this animation involves a soul coming in from outside.16 The development of more
refined psychological theories permitted a more gradualist approach to animation.
Thus, it is Aristotle who first gives a clear and nuanced exposition of these issues.
On his account, the male seed provides for the vegetative and sensitive soul, which
successively comes to exist in the embryo, with the rational soul coming in from
the outside at some undetermined point.17 Likewise, Galen advances a similarly
gradualist account of animation in which the various powers of soul emerge as the
relevant organs are formed.18
Embryology in Plato
Plato’s views on these issues have been the subject of various interpretations over
the years. Remarks that give some indications on Plato’s embryological views can
be found scattered throughout the dialogues, but it is in the Timaeus that we find
Plato’s most considered views on the issue, with the two most critical passages
appearing at 73b1–e1 and at the end of the dialogue in 91a4–d5.
The first passage is concerned with the nature of the seed and its origin in the
body:
As for flesh and bones and things of that nature, this is how it is. The starting
point for all these was the formation of marrow. For life’s chains, as long the
soul remains bound to the body, are bound within the marrow, giving roots
for the mortal race.The marrow itself came to be out of other things. For the
god isolated from their respective kinds those primary triangles which were
undistorted and smooth and hence, owing to their exactness, were particularly
well suited to make up fire, water, air and earth. He mixed them together in
the right proportions, and from them made the marrow, a πανσπερμία con-
trived for every mortal kind. Next, he implanted in the marrow the various
types of soul and bound them fast in it. And in making his initial distribution,
he proceeded immediately to divide the marrow into the number and kinds
of shapes that matched the number and kinds of shapes that the types of soul
were to possess, type by type. He then proceeded to mold the ‘field,’ as it were,
that was to receive the divine seed, making it round, and called this portion
of the marrow, ‘brain.’ Each living thing was at its completion to have a head
to function as a container for this marrow. That, however, which was to hold
fast the remaining, mortal part of the soul, he divided into shapes that were at
once round and elongated, all of which he named ‘marrow.’ And from these as
from anchors he put out bonds to secure the whole soul and so he proceeded
to construct our bodies all around this marrow, beginning with the formation
of solid bone as a covering for the whole of it.
(Plato Timaeus, Zeyl translation slightly revised, 73b1–e1)
This passage has been pointed to as evidence that Plato is an encephalo-myelogenic

theorist,19 and there is certainly a good deal of truth in this attribution. For here
Plato describes the marrow, which is constituted of the most perfect triangles, as the
starting point of the formation of all the other parts. More importantly, he labels the
marrow a πανσπερμία, which usually gets translated as a kind of seed.20 But a closer
look at the details of this passage reveals that Plato appears to be employing the
term πανσπερμία in the sense of a receptacle or a seedbed rather than a seed itself.21
For he goes on to say that the Demiurge ‘implants’ (φυτεύων) the various types of
soul in the marrow. Moreover, the concentration of marrow that constitutes the
brain is called a ‘field’ (α’´ρoυραν), and this field is again said not to be a seed but
to ‘receive the divine seed,’ which is the immortal (rational) soul.22 In short, the
marrow appears to be introduced not as a universal seed but as a universal seed-
bed; that is, a receptacle for all kinds of seeds. The true seed appears to be the soul,
though Plato does not explain here or elsewhere in the Timaeus how exactly the
soul is supposed to execute the essential seminal function of forming the embryo.
Moreover, Plato explicitly refers only to the rational soul as a seed, but the larger
implication of the passage appears to be that all three kinds of soul are in fact seeds,
since otherwise the marrow could not be called a universal seedbed ‘for every mortal
kind.’23 To be sure, Plato does subsequently refer to the marrow as a ‘seed’ (σπέρμα),
which would seem to be in tension with what he says here, but the tension is eas-
ily alleviated by acknowledging that in the remaining part of the Timaeus Plato is
conceiving of marrow that is already in possession of soul.24 As we shall see below,
Neoplatonists and commentators picked up on and drew their own conclusions
from this terminological discrepancy.25
The second and third issues explored in our overview are best approached by
considering the second and the major embryological passage in the Timaeus:
For the fluids we consume there is a channel, and where it receives the fluids
going through the lungs over the kidneys to the bladder and expels them
under pressure from air, they bored a channel to the compacted marrow that
runs from the head down the neck and over the spine – the marrow, that is,
that we called ‘seed’ above. This marrow, seeing that it is ensouled and has
been given vent [in the male member], created a vital desire for emission in
the [part] where the venting takes place and so brought an ε’´ρως of begetting
to completion. This is the reason why the male genitals are disobedient and
self-willed, like a living thing that will not listen to reason and on account
of its raging desires tries to overpower everything else. And in women the
wombs and uteri are said for these same reasons26 to be a living thing within
them that desires to give birth to children; whenever this living thing remains
unfruitful for too long beyond the due season, it becomes irritated and dif-
ficult and wanders throughout the entire body and blocks off the passages
of breath, and by restricting its respiration sends the body into severe dif-
ficulties and provides for all sorts of diseases,27 until the [female] desire and
the [male’s] ε’´ρως bring [these the male and female parts] together and, like
plucking a fruit from the trees, sow into the womb as if into a tilled field
living things that are too small to see and unformed, and then after having sepa-
rated them again, they nourish them until they grow large inside [the womb]
and after this they bring them to the light of day, completing the generation
of living things.
(Plato Timaeus 91a4–d5, my emphasis)
Before examining some of the larger issues in this passage, a few words are neces-
sary on the phrase in italics.This is a translation of καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες (Timaeus
91d3), and scholars have proposed a number of plausible interpretations of this
phrase. (i) One possible interpretation has been put forth by Karl Praechter, namely
that the living things that were initially sown into the flesh of the womb are then
separated from the wall of the womb for gestation.28 Such an interpretation might
be behind Archer-Hind’s (1888) translation: ‘and again separating them.’29 (ii)
Praechter also suggests another interpretation on behalf of Michael of Ephesus,
though Praechter distances himself from it.30 Working on the assumption that Plato
is a two-seed homuncular preformationist, one might take καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες
to mean that each of the tiny human beings – the one supplied by the male and the
other by the female – must be divided again into their organs so that a single com-
posite human being may be created out of some male parts and some female parts.
In fact, there is good reason to doubt that Michael’s Plato was a homuncular pre-
formationist.31 More to the point, there are very good reasons for not ascribing any
variety of preformationism to Plato, as we shall see below. (iii) The current scholarly
consensus favors a third interpretation that takes this phrase together with μεγάλα
[…] ε’κθρέψωνται, with both picking up on the description of the seed as α’ όρατα
υ‛πὸ σμικρότητος καὶ α’ διάπλαστα: since the seed is still small and unformed, it must
be given form and made larger. Thus, καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες is given the technical
embryological sense of articulating the embryo.32 It is certainly true that it was com-
mon in embryological contexts to discuss when the articulation of the limbs took
place – the so-called point of first articulation, and that διακρίνειν and διάκρισις
are terms commonly used to refer to this process.33
When confronted with the details of the Greek text, however, the consensus
interpretation runs into serious problems. First, there is the problem of the πάλιν
at 91d3. For what, on the consensus interpretation (iii), would it mean for the
embryo to be articulated again? But the real problem concerns the subjects of the
participle διακρίναντες: the male ἔρως and the female ε’ πιθυμία remain the subject
throughout 91c7-d5.34 But how can Plato think that the male ε’´ρως and the female
ε’ πιθυμία are responsible for articulating the embryo’s features? This is a problem
that has already been brought out with great force by Sarah Broadie.35 (iv) These
problems disappear if we simply do not insist on importing the technical embry-
ological sense of ‘articulation’ and instead translate the participle διακρίναντες
straightforwardly as the complement to συναγαγόντες: first, the male ε’´ρως and the
female ε’πιθυμία bring the two reproductive parts together, and then they separate
(διακρίναντες) them again (πάλιν).While the suggestion that love is responsible not
just for bringing the male and female together but also for separating them might
sound surprising, it is reasonable if we bear in mind that the desire at issue is a desire
not for union but for creation. In other words, on the Timaeus’ account, there is no
desire for sexual intercourse per se; there is only a desire for procreation.This desire
for procreation leads to sexual intercourse in the first instance, but afterwards it
promotes other, non-sexual activities, such as caring for and nourishing the embryo
during its full period of gestation (cf. Timaeus 91d4–5).36 This should be compared
to Plato Symposium 207a–b, where again ε’´ρως and ε’ πιθυμία (207a7) are described
as causing certain ailments in living things that account not only for sexual inter-
course (συμμιγῆναι α’ λλήλoις b1–2) but also for their nourishing of the offspring
(τὴν τροφὴν τoῦ γενoμένου b2; ε’κτρέφειν b5).
Now back to the larger issues. As has been remarked,37 Plato is not delivering a
fully worked out embryology here, and the concision of his account has led to some
diverging opinions on where Plato stands with respect to the existence of maternal
seed and preformationism. This passage initially appears to provide strong evidence
for Plato’s subscribing to the one-seed theory.38 There is no explicit mention of a
female seed here or anywhere else in the Timaeus. The focus of Timaeus 91a4–b7,
where the creation of the channel that leads the seed to the reproductive organ is
described, is exclusively on men, and when Timaeus turns to discuss female repro-
ductive organs no such channel is mentioned. Moreover, the language of plucking
a fruit (καρπόν – singular) and sowing it in the womb, and describing the womb as
a field further suggests that the female is simply receiving the male seed.This would
also seem to be corroborated by Plato’s likening the receptacle to a mother and
the source of this reception to the father.39 Finally, a one-seed theory would also
harmonize well with several remarks regarding the male and female contributions
to generation that Plato makes elsewhere in the corpus. The Republic, for example,
already appears to draw a strong distinction between the male and female contri-
butions to reproduction: the male begets (ο’ χεύειν) children, while the female bears
(τίκτειν) them,40 and the same goes for Diotima’s account of physical pregnancy in
the Symposium, where Plato appears to buy in to the traditional view that the male
actually gives birth to the child when he emits the seed, where the female’s role
appears limited to providing a beautiful receptacle.41
Nevertheless, a strong case might be made for saying that Plato is in fact a
two-seed theorist and is simply not giving voice to the role of the female seed
in this passage.42 For the identification of the seed with the (ensouled) matter of
the brain or marrow would seem to demand a two-seed theory, since brain and
marrow are just as much a part of female anatomy as they are of male anatomy.
Perhaps this is also why, according to the little evidence we possess, all Presocratic
encephalo-myelogenic theorists were also two-seed theorists.43 When viewed
from this perspective, then, Plato’s endorsement of a version of the encephalo-

myelogenic theory would already seem to commit him to a two-seed theory.
Further, certain details in the present passage supply some additional support for
a two-seed theory. He conspicuously says that the female reproductive organs are
living things ‘for these same reasons’ (διὰ τὰ αυ’ τὰ ταῦτα) that explained the male
case, which could be taken to refer to a single cause of life in the male and female
reproductive organs: the life-status of the female reproductive organs is owed to
the presence of an ensouled marrow seed.44 Likewise, what is said to be sown into
the womb are ‘living things’ (ζῷα – plural), which could be taken to mean that
two seeds are involved.
Given the considerable amount of evidence pointing in each direction, the truth
would seem to lie near some intermediate position. In light of Plato’s identifica-
tion of marrow and seed, it is very difficult to deny the existence of a female
seed,45 but he might well have thought that this seed made no direct contribu-
tion to the formation of the embryo. Such a theory was advanced by Herophilus,
the famous physician living approximately a century after Plato, whose detailed
anatomical studies led him to conclude that although the female produces a seed,
there are no spermatic ducts leading the seed to her uterus so that the seed was
expelled from the body without making any contribution, and this view was sub-
sequently taken over wholesale by Soranus.46 A similar theory has been ascribed to
the Presocratic Hippon, who lived in the century prior to Plato. Presumably it was
theoretical rather than anatomical considerations that led Hippon to this conclu-
sion: the encephalo-myelogenic theory demands the existence of the female seed,
but perhaps Hippon denied it any role in embryology in order to avoid the problem
of parthenogenesis.47 We may do justice to the present passage, then, by allowing for
a female seed but then taking Plato seriously when he describes the seminal duct as
being constructed exclusively in the male.48
The other considerations in favor of a more efficacious female seed are not
compelling. Plato does not seem particularly interested in addressing the problem
of maternal resemblance, and even if he were concerned about this, the remarks
he makes elsewhere suggest that he would have again agreed with Hippon that
the nourishment provided by the mother is sufficient to the task.49 For example,
when Socrates in the Republic complains about the current Athenian constitution’s
ability to corrupt the nature of its citizens, he draws a comparison to how differ-
ences in soil can alter and pervert the natures of plants: ‘just as a foreign seed sown
in alien ground: when it is overcome, it fades and likes to go over into the native
species.’50 Given the widely accepted analogy between the earth–plant relationship
and the mother-embryo relationship, the implication would seem to be that the
nourishment supplied by the mother is sufficient to account for significant forma-
tive changes in the embryo.51 In addition, Plato’s description of the living things
in the seed still being ‘unformed’ (α’ διάπλαστα) also leaves the door open for the
female to exercise some formative influence during the period of gestation, a point
to which we shall return below. Second, when the womb is said to be a living thing
‘for these same reasons,’ Plato is making an epistemological point rather than giv-
ing a causal account.52 He is drawing our attention to that fact that it is possible to
witness behavior of both male and female reproductive organs from which it may
be inferred that they are independent living things. Just as we may infer that the
male member is an independent living thing on account of its unruliness in being
aroused, so too may the womb be inferred to be a living thing on account of its
own brand of unruliness, namely its proclivity to wander. In both cases the parts
behave contrary to the interests of the whole on account of their individual agendas
– the male’s desire (ε’ πιθυμία) for emission and ε’´ρως of procreation (γεννᾶν), and
the female’s desire (ε’ πιθυμία) for childbearing (παιδoπoιία).The διὰ τὰ αυ’τὰ ταῦτα
is, therefore, sufficiently accounted for by this parallel. There remains the question
of how to account for the womb’s desire for childbearing,53 but it is hard to see how
transferring the account given for the male to the female would be of any help here.
For that account can only explain the male’s desire to emit seed and procreate but
not the female’s unique desire to bear children, which is perhaps better explained
by assuming that her reproductive parts lack the seed that they naturally long for.
Finally, Plato’s use of the plural ζῷα to describe the seed cannot be decisive, as he
has been loose with his use of singulars and plurals throughout the passage,54 and
the repetition of the plural in his account of birth – ‘completing the generation of
living things’ – suggests that Plato has switched to the plural because he is discussing
all cases of reproduction collectively and not because he means to suggest that there
is a multitude of living things within a single seed.
Plato’s position on preformationism has equally caused a great deal of confusion.
A number of scholars have seen Plato as a preformationist – even as a homuncular
preformationist – but what he gives us in the Timaeus is really just a puzzle. This
puzzle is concentrated in his description of the seed in Timaeus 91d2–3. On the
one hand he calls the seed a ζῷον (or even a plurality of ζῷα) that is simply too
small to see, which suggests a strong form of preformationism, but on the other he
describes these same ζῷα as being ‘unformed’ (α’ διάπλαστα), which would seem to
speak against preformationism.55 What has gone unnoticed is that this same puz-
zle is already to be found in Democritus, whose embryology appears to have had
a significant influence on Plato’s own.56 This is certainly not to say that Plato took
over Democritus’ embryological theory wholesale, as there are many features of the
Democritean embryology that are incompatible with the bits of theory to which
Plato does clearly subscribe. Democritus, for example, advances a two-seed theory of
pangenesis in which the female seed makes a significant contribution to the embryo,
and his atomism figures prominently in his embryology. Yet Plato does appear to
help himself to bits and pieces of Democritus, which is perhaps only to be expected
given Democritus’ contributions to the field.57 This is most striking in Plato’s possi-
ble appropriation of the Democritean term πανσπερμία,58 as well as in the readiness
of both philosophers to infer the existence of organic entities that are ‘too small
to be seen’ on the basis of rational inquiry.59 Yet it also appears in a more subtle
form in connection with Democritus’ commitment to preformationism. A com-
mitment on his part of some kind necessarily follows from his pangenesis, though
which kind exactly he subscribes to is obscured somewhat by mixed messages in our
evidence. One fragment appears to provide strong evidence for Democritus’ com-
mitment to homuncular pangenesis: ‘Sexual intercourse is minor stroke: for a human
being bursts forth from a human being, and is torn off, separating, by a blow.’60
Yet homuncular pangenesis would seem to be irreconcilable with two of Aristotle’s
reports about the formation of the embryo in the womb. He criticizes Democritus
for maintaining that the embryo remains in the womb ‘in order that the parts may be
formed (διαπλάττηται) after the fashion of the parts of the mother,’61 whose articu-
lation of the embryo begins on the outside and works its way inwards.62 So just as
Democritus describes the seed as an α ’´νθρωπoς that still needs to be διαπλάττεσθαι,
Plato describes it as ζῷα that are still α’ διάπλαστα. Even Plato’s use of the plural ζῷα
might have some connection to the enigmatic Democritean fragment 68B124: οʽ μεˋν
∆ημóкριτος λέγων ἄνθρωποι εἱ̑ς ἔσται кαˋι α ’´νθρωπος πάντες, if it has not been cor-
rupted in transmission.63 For Democritus, this paradox is presumably to be resolved
by a more liberal reading of 68B32 that credits him with a softer version of pangen-
esis.This, in any case, would also seem to be the implication of 68A141: ‘Democritus
says that [the seed derives] from the entire body and the most important parts such
as its bones, flesh and sinews.’64 If this is right, then Democritus’ theory would be
preformationist to the extent that the seed contains a human being in the sense of
containing all of the relevant parts of a human being (certainly bones, flesh and sin-
ews, and perhaps even anhomoiomerous parts), though these parts would still need
to be assembled together and formed in the womb.65
The puzzle, however, that Plato presents to us in the Timaeus, is more resist-
ant to solution, though preformation, in any of its three forms, would seem to
be difficult to square with the theory of the Timaeus. Some might look to but-
tress the case for preformationism by appealing to Diotima’s account of pregnancy
in the Symposium,66 and perhaps the absence of any discussion in the Timaeus of
the standard question of the order of formation of the offspring’s parts could be
interpreted as further evidence that Plato is simply assuming that the parts are
already formed. Yet the fact stands that in the Timaeus the seed consists only of
soul plus marrow, while even the weakest variety of preformationism, homoiomer-
ous preformationism, demands that all of the fundamental homoiomerous parts
be present in the seed.67 As we shall see, subsequent Platonists and commentators
will cut the Gordian knot by simply choosing to place the decisive emphasis either
on the α’ όρατα ὑπὸ σμιкρότητος ζῷα (preformationism) or on the α’ διάπλαστα
(anti-preformationism).
Determining a unified and coherent position on the animation of the offspring
in Plato is once again difficult. Part of the difficulty has to do with the well-known
ambiguities surrounding his views on the immortality of the soul and in partic-
ular how they relate to his views on the soul’s tripartite division. The myth in
the Phaedrus, for example, strongly suggests that all three parts collectively survive
death,68 in which case one should expect the entire soul to descend from the out-
side into the offspring all at once. Yet in the Timaeus only the rational part of the
soul is said to be immortal,69 which would allow for animation to proceed sequen-
tially with the mortal parts possibly being provided by the parents.
Another difficulty concerns Plato’s rather ambiguous accounts throughout the

corpus of the soul’s entry into the body, which he never investigates with any rigor.
A case could certainly be made for the soul’s entry into the seed if one is willing to
put enough weight on certain casual remarks made in the course of his discussions
of transmigration and recollection. In the myth of the Phaedrus, for example, the
soul that has seen the most during its celestial journey will ‘go in the seed (γονή)
of a man who will become a philosopher,’70 and the myth in the Statesman likewise
has the souls falling to earth as seeds (σπέρματα).71 Moreover, as Tertullian points
out in his treatise On the Soul,72 Plato’s injunctions against drunken sexual activity
in the Laws also could be taken as evidence that the rational soul is already present
in the seed. For there the Athenian stranger warns that such actions could result in
‘unbalanced children who are not to be trusted, with devious characters and in all
probability with misshapen bodies too’ because the man’s insolence ‘will inevitably
rub-off on to the souls and bodies of his children.’73 The same would seem to go for
the stranger’s proscription against masturbation and homosexual relations because
in these practices ‘the human race is deliberately murdered.’74 It should be noted,
however, that passages such as these, if pressed too hard, would appear to have the
unwanted implication that the rational soul of the offspring is derived from the
father’s soul rather than being supplied from outside. Perhaps even Er’s report of
Orpheus’ choice of life could be seen as support for a very early moment of anima-
tion, if not in the seed then at least in the embryo. For we are told that he decided
against the human race because he, i.e., his soul, ‘did not want to be generated and
come to be in a woman.’75 Finally, in the Epinomis – now recognized to be spurious,
though its authenticity was taken for granted by many Platonists in antiquity76 – the
Athenian stranger unmistakably has the individual soul pre-existing in the embryo:
I am not saying anything clever, but only what we all know in some way, both
Greeks and foreigners: from the start the terms of life are harsh for every liv-
ing thing. First we have to go through the stage of being embryos [πρῶτον
μεν̀ τò μετασχεῖν τῆς τῶν κυουμένων ἕξεως]. Then we have to be born [τò
γίγνεσθαι] and then be brought up and educated.
(Plato Epinomis 973d1-5, McKirahan, Jr. translation)
On the other side, the evidence in favor of this soul’s entering at birth is probably
strongest in the Phaedo. This is true not only of Cebes’ and Simmias’ Pythagorean
account of the soul being a kind of breath that enters the body at birth and is
expelled at death,77 but also of Socrates’ argument from recollection. The language
of the recollection argument is for the most part kept fairly generic, with the soul’s
entry being repeatedly expressed simply as ‘coming to be,’78 but the argument itself
strongly suggests that we should understand this expression in terms of the soul’s
coming into the body at birth. For the argument assumes that no time elapses
between the moment of the soul’s entry and the operation of all forms of sensa-
tion, not just touch but even hearing and sight,79 which would make birth the most
likely candidate for the moment of animation,80 and which in turn would explain
some of Plato’s slightly less generic descriptions of the soul’s arrival.81 Additional
support might be found in a passage in the Phaedrus myth, which is considered by
some to be evidence for the soul’s entrance at birth,82 when Plato says that once
a soul has lost its wings it ‘wanders until it lights upon something solid, where it
settles and takes on an earthly body, which owing to the power of this soul, seems
to move itself; the whole combination of soul and body is called a living thing.’83
Otherwise, outside of the Timaeus, when Plato refers to the soul’s arrival, he
mostly employs generic expressions that do not indicate any specific view on the
moment of animation.84 The overall impression one gains from looking at all of
these remarks is that in the other dialogues Plato is not committed to any particular
view on the matter, and any expectations we might have about this issue being
cleared up in the Timaeus are disappointed.85
The two points that the Timaeus makes sufficiently clear are that only the
rational soul is immortal, while the appetitive and spirited parts of soul are mortal,
and that the seed already possesses soul. We may begin, then, by asking about the
kind(s) of soul present in the seed. As we saw above, the material substratum of the
seed, marrow, is said to receive all three parts of soul, but there are good reasons to
refrain from concluding that all three parts of soul are present in the seed. First of all,
it would be difficult to reconcile such a view with the Timaeus’ theory of transmi-
gration. For whatever matter (marrow) and soul there is in the seed would have to
be derived from the father, since the seed pre-exists in the father. But according to
the theory of transmigration, the offspring’s rational soul already exists prior to its
arrival in the offspring (whenever that may be), and it pre-exists not in the father’s
body but in the heavens whence it descends into the offspring. So we should at
the very least refrain from inferring the presence of the offspring’s rational soul in
the seed from the fact that the seed is ensouled, unless we can provide additional
evidence to the effect that the rational soul independently enters the seed from
outside.Yet what the Timaeus tells us about the arrival of the rational soul can only
be described as ambiguous. The two most relevant passages are 42e-44b and 90d,
but neither settles the matter entirely. Both describe how the revolutions of the
rational soul are initially disturbed by the violent physical motions of the body, and
in particular by the motions associated with nourishment and sensation.86 Although
the language regarding the soul’s entry is once again left rather vague,87 if we may
assume that these disturbances begin immediately upon entry, then we would have
good reason at least to infer that the rational soul is not entering into the seed, as
the seed is not engaged in nourishment and sensation, though this does not set-
tle whether the rational soul is entering the fetus at some point during gestation
or the completed offspring at birth. It is possible that Plato intended his account
of the order of construction of the original human being to reflect some truths
about the formation and animation of subsequent generations of human beings
in the womb. If so, then some conclusions could be drawn from the fact that the
soul is said to be joined to the body only after the body has been put together,88
and more specifically that the three parts of soul are said to be implanted in the
marrow simultaneously as the marrow is divided and shaped into the brain and the
spinal column.89 Namely, it could be concluded that the rational soul enters the
offspring as soon as the brain is sufficiently formed, but this must remain a matter
of speculation.
Regarding the appetitive and spirited parts of soul, Plato might well be envision-
ing these as deriving from the father via the seed. He certainly does not provide
us with many alternatives for explaining their presence in the offspring. Although
accounting for the spirited part of soul in this manner does raise some questions, it
is relatively easy to accept this explanation for the origin of the offspring’s appetitive
soul. After all, we are told that the seed is ensouled, and seeing as the appetitive soul
is the lowest-order soul in Plato’s psychology, the seed would at least have to possess
it. Moreover, this would be consistent with his account of plants in 77a-c, where he
ascribes appetitive soul not just to trees and plants but even to seeds.90
Bearing all of the above caveats in mind, Plato’s views on the formation and
animation of offspring in the Timaeus may be briefly summarized as follows. He
subscribes to the encephalo-myelogenic theory of seed, though he places particular
emphasis on the soul being the true seed, from which it follows that he is also a
two-seed theorist. Yet the female seed appears to make no contribution to repro-
duction. Plato’s claim that the male seed is ensouled is probably best understood to
mean that the mortal parts of soul – the appetitive and spirited parts – are already
contained in it in some way. For these parts of soul, being mortal, cannot be thought
of as descending into the body from an external source and so may reasonably be
assumed to derive from the father. Plato refers to the seed delivered by the male as
a ζῷον because it already contains this principle of soul, and he presumably does
not follow Democritus in calling it an α ’´νθρωπος because the rational soul is not
provided by the father. The rational soul descends from an external source, and
although the moment of its entry must remain a matter of speculation, his account
of the construction of the original human being would suggest that the rational
soul is present as soon as its receptacle, the brain, is formed.
We have also seen that Plato’s brief handling of embryology leaves many other
questions open. There are a number of standard embryological questions that Plato
does not pursue at all.91 The causes, for example, of the offspring’s sex, of twins, of
deformities and of dissimilarities to both parents are simply not addressed. He tells
us nothing about whether the embryo breathes, or whether the embryo is nour-
ished through the mouth or the umbilical cord. In fact, he never even mentions the
umbilical cord, or the chorionic and amniotic membranes, partly because he does
not appear to be interested in the issue of the order of generation of the offspring’s
parts.92 These are, for the most part, questions in which Neoplatonists will also
show only limited interest. The omissions that will occupy them the most concern
two related metaphysical issues surrounding the causation of the embryo’s forma-
tion. They will take Plato’s emphasis on a soul-principle being the true seed very
seriously, but Plato offers no explanation of how this seminal soul is able to form
the embryo. Further, Plato strikingly never appeals to the Forms in his account of
generation.This is true not only of his brief handling of embryology, but also of the
more detailed account of the generation of the original human being. Unlike the
Demiurge, who is said to look to the Forms for orientation in his creative activity,
the generated gods responsible for creating the human body are never said to look to
the Forms, which is somewhat surprising given that we are told that human beings
and animals are contained within the Demiurge’s intelligible model93 and that the
generated gods are said to imitate the Demiurge.94 Yet the way they succeed in imi-
tating the Demiurge is rather by creating human beings after the model created by
the Demiurge – the cosmos, where the differences between the human body and
the world body result not because they are looking to a different model but because
they are trying best to accommodate this cosmic model to new circumstances.95 As
we shall see, the Neoplatonists will develop sophisticated theories of the soul and
the Forms that will allow them to fill in these gaps in Plato’s embryology.
Notes
1 See Lesky (1951), Lonie (1981: 99–110) and von Staden (1989: 288–96).
2 See Introduction p. 5 with note 50.
3 Aeschylus Eumen. 657–66 (cf. Sept. 754) and Euripides Orest. 551–6 (and cf. Sophocles
Od.Tyr. 1211 and 1257). Anaxagoras is sometimes reported to have advanced a two-seed
theory, e.g. Censorinus De dei nat. 5.4 and 6.8, and this is sometimes accepted by mod-
ern scholars, for example by Lachenaud (2003: 298), who claims to find this in Aristotle
GA 763b30–764a1 (59A107 DK), but Aristotle here clearly attributes a one-seed the-
ory to Anaxagoras. Joly (1960: 78–80) prefers Censorinus’ testimony to Aristotle’s. For
Diogenes of Apollonia, see Censorinus De dei nat. 5.4 (64A27 DK) and cf. 64A24 DK.
For Aristotle, see GA 1.19–23 (726a30–731b14). Concerning the Stoics, see Censorinus
De dei nat. 5.4; SVF 1.128 and cf. Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.11.4 (on which see Lesky (1951:
171)). For Zeno, see Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.2 (SVF 1.129); for Sphaerus, see Diogenes
Laertius VP 7.159 (SVF 1.626).
4 For Alcmaeon, see Censorinus, De dei nat. 5.4 (24A13 DK) and 6.4 (24A14 DK). Hippon
is sometimes described as having advanced a one-seed theory on the basis of 38A14 DK
and Censorinus De dei nat. 5.4, but Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.3 (38A13 DK) attributes a theory
of female seed to Hippon, though this seed does not contribute to the embryo as it is
not conducted to the uterus, as in Herophilus. See Lesky (1951: 28) and below on the
female seed in Plato. For other references to the Pythagoreans, see Diogenes Laertius VP
8.28 (58B1 DK); Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.1; and Zhmud (2012: 374–80). For Parmenides,
see 28B18 DK; Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.11.2 (28A54 DK); Censorinus De dei nat. 5.4; 6.5; and
6.8 (the latter two passages are included in 28A54 DK). For Empedocles, see 31B63
DK. Cf. 31A81 DK. For Democritus, see Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.1 (68A142 DK); Aristotle
GA 764a6–11 (68A143 DK), and Morel (2008: 46ff.). For Epicurus, see Aëtius Plac. phil.
5.5.1. For the Hippocratics, see especially Genit. and Nat. Puer. and Lonie (1981: 119–22).
Also Mul. I 8 (8.34,9f.; 8.56,21f.; and 8.62,20f. L.) and Vict. I 144,4–5 (6.500,8f. L.). For
Diocles, see Fr. 42a–b and cf. Lesky (1951: 30). For Herophilus, see Fr. T60 (Galen De
sem. 146,20–148,24 (4.596,4–598,7 K.)) but also note 5. For Soranus, see Gyn. 1.4.93–8.
Regarding Galen, see especially De sem. 2.1 (144,4–160,23 (4.593,1–610,10 K.)) and
Nickel (1989: 40–9).
5 Herophilus held that the female seed simply does not contribute anything to the embryo
because his anatomical studies suggested to him that the seed was conducted to the
bladder and from there expelled. Soranus (Gyn. 1.12.93–8) takes over this view from
Herophilus. This same view has also been attributed to Hippon (38A13 DK).
6 Cf. Galen’s reference to this view as ταύτης παλαιᾶς δόξης (In Tim. 14, 10).
7 Regarding Alcmaeon, see Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.3, and Censorinus De dei nat. 5.2 (both
are included in 24A13 DK). Censorinus testifies that Alcmaeon actually opposed the
encephalo-myelogenic theory, but as Lesky (1951: 12) points out, this is simply due
to his ‘ungenaue Sammelberichterstattung.’ For Hippon, see Censorinus De dei nat.
5.2 (38A12 DK); Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.3.3 (38A13 DK). For more general evidence of
Pythagoreans holding this view, see Diogenes Laertius VP 8.28 (58B1 DK) and the note
ad 905A in Lachenaud’s edition of Ps.-Plutarch’s Mor. There are traces of this view in
the Hippocratic corpus at, for example, Genit. 44,10–20 (7.470,8–16 L.). In general, see
Lesky (1951: 13–18); Lonie (1981: 101–3); von Staden (1989: 288–96). For Diocles, see
Fr. 41a–b.
8 Anaxagoras 59B10 DK; Democritus 68B32 DK and cf. Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.3.6 (68A141
DK). Concerning the Hippocratics, see, for example, Morb. Sacr. 5 (12,21–14,2 (6.368,10–
370,11 L.)); Aer. 14 (58,8–26 (2.58,11–60,8 L.)); Genit. 1.1 (44,1–10 (7.470,1–8 L.)), and
in general, Lesky (1951: 76ff.), Lonie (1981: 99–110) and von Staden (1989: 288–96).
Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 38 and 66; cf. Lucretius De rerum nat. 4.1037–57; Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.3.5.
9 Parmenides 28B18 DK. For Diogenes of Apollonia, see 64A24 and B6 DK; Diocles Fr.
40 (Herophilus T191), and see van der Eijk’s extended comments ad loc. For Erasistratus
and Herophilus, see Herophilus T191 (with von Staden’s discussion on pp. 293–6). For
Galen, see, for example, De sem. 1.12–14 (106,14–114,21 (4.555,5–563,13 K.)); De usu
part. 14.10 (2.316,5–319,22) and 16.10 (2.412,21–424,15). On Galen’s hematogenous
theory, see Lesky (1951: 181), and Nickel (1989: 34 and 89).
10 Aristotle GA 734a16ff. For Galen’s views on preformationism and epigenesis, see Nickel
(1989: 67–83) and Boylan (1986).
11 Notably, Aeschylus Eumen. 657–66 and Euripides Orest. 551–6. Among philosophers,
Democritus 68B32 DK strongly suggests the homuncular variety, but, when under-
stood in the context of the rest of his embryology, he seems to be advancing a weaker
form of preformationism. See the discussion of Plato below. Note one of Leon the
Physician’s etymological explanations of the Greek term embryon is ‘a mortal is within’
(ἔνδον βροτόν) (Synopsis 16,13 Renehan).
12 For example Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.15.1–5; [Galen] An animal sit (passim).
13 Emmel (1918) and Waszink (1954) provide overviews on the topic of animation,
though often the views they attribute – especially as concerns the Presocratics – are
not sufficiently supported by the evidence. See now Congourdeau (2007). This group
would appear to include at least: Hippon (38A3 DK), Diogenes of Apollonia (64B6
DK; Tieleman (1991) has now argued forcefully that 64A28 DK is describing the
views of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon); Democritus (68A140 DK which is com-
monly understood in light of Lucretius De rerum nat. 3.370–95 to mean that soul
atoms are contained in the seed; e.g. Waszink (1954: 178); Congourdeau (2007: 275));
Leucippus (67A35 DK); Lucretius De rerum nat. 3.670–712. In the Hippocratic corpus
one finds divergent views, though there seems to be some agreement that the soul is
accounted for by what is supplied by the parents. In the Nat. Puer. there is no men-
tion of the soul at all, though one may point to 14.2 (τò μέλλον ζῷον ε’´σεσθαι) and
its claim that motion begins at the point of full articulation (21.1; cf. Galen De sem.
94,8–11 (4.543,8–12 K.)) to show that the issue of the moment of animation is at
least implicitly in the background of this treatise. Iamblichus’ claim that Hippocrates
singled out the point of first formation as the moment of animation appears to be a
misinterpretation of Porphyry AG 2.2 (see Wilberding (2011a: 58n18)). In Vict. I 28
(144,15–146,5 (6.500,23–502,23 L.)), by contrast, the soul is said to be already present
in each seed. Cf. Gundert (2000: 32–3). The view that the embryo receives its soul
at conception from the seed is also defended in [Galen] An animal sit (on which see
Kapparis (2002) 201–13) and see the Appendix to Chapter 3.
14 Waszink (1954: 176–7) and Emmel (1918: 6–8) describe the Orphics and Pythagoreans,
Alcmaeon of Croton, Parmenides, and Philolaus as advocating this view, but the evi-
dence is not always compelling. Anaxagoras, who does not identify the soul with any
element(s), is also reported to have said that nous comes in from the outside (59A93 DK),
though this report looks suspiciously like a speculative application of his cosmology to
embryology (cf. 59B11ff. DK).
15 apud Porphyry AG 2.2.

16 The Stoics have the soul developing out of the pneuma provided in the seed in three
stages: prior to conception the pneuma is in a state of hexis, and at conception it trans-
forms into the state of physis; the cold air that impacts the body at birth transforms it
again into a soul. See SVF 1.128; 2.741ff. (esp. 2.745); 2.804–8 (esp. 2.806). Hierocles
adopts a more gradualist version of this theory, according to which the air provided by
the mother in the womb already begins to effect this transformation, which is then com-
pleted at birth (El. Moral. 1.15–19). On Stoic embryology see Tieleman (1991), Gourinat
(2008), Ramelli (2009: 37–8). Herophilus may also be counted in this group, see T202a–c
(and p. 258; but cf. T247). Soranus (Gyn. 1.33.45–6 and 1.43.17–18) takes over the Stoic
view, though for him it becomes a ζῷον before birth.
17 More specifically, Aristotle says that the male seed potentially contains the vegetative soul
(GA 736b8–13 and 741a23–6) and the sensitive soul (GA 736b13–24 and 741a13–15).
The potentiality follows from Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the ε’ ντελέχεια ηʽ πρώτη
σώματος φυσικοῦ ο’ ργανικοῦ (DA 412b5–6). The vegetative soul is actually present
once the corresponding organs exist, and so too for the sensitive soul. Although he
says that the soul is only potentially present in the seed, it is central to his embryologi-
cal theory that the male seed possesses motions in actuality (730b15–22), where these
motions correspond to the forms of the parts to be created (GA 4.3 passim). Otherwise,
there would be no efficient cause of the formation of the organs. The rational soul
alone comes to the embryo from the outside (GA 736b27–9), because it alone is not
the entelechy of an organ (DA 1.4 408b18–29; 2.1 413b24–7; 3.4–5 passim). The female’s
menstrual fluid can at most provide for a vegetative soul, as the phenomenon of uterine
moles (and by analogy wind-eggs) shows (GA 741a18–25; HA 10.7 638a10ff.; on the
authenticity of HA 10, see van der Eijk (1999)).
18 In De usu part. 2.357,24–8 (4.239,1–4 K.) Galen claims to have shown in his (now lost)
De demonstr. and PHP that the embryo is a ζῷον as soon as its parts are formed. In De
foet. form. he explains that the embryo begins as a plant (70,12–13), and then qualifies
as a ζῷον as soon as the heart starts beating (74,11–18), though at this point it is only
comparable to the animal life of oysters and mussels. The powers of sensation themselves
also appear to emerge gradually as the organs are more fully articulated (76,10–78,11).
19 For example Lesky (1951: 18–20); Lesky and Waszink (1959: 1228); Cornford (1937:
295); van der Eijk (2001: 92); Congourdeau (2007: 197).
20 Zeyl (2000) and Taylor (apud Cornford (1937: 294)): ‘universal seed’; Cornford (1937): ‘a
mixture of seeds of every sort’; Archer-Hind (1888): ‘a common seed’; Paulsen and Rehn
(2003): ‘den gesamten Samen’; Brisson (2012: 40): ‘une semence universelle.’ Cf. Müller’s
(1857) ‘eine Verbindung aller Samen.’
21 Rankin (1964: 33) comes close to drawing this conclusion.
22 Cf. Theophilus Protospatharius De corp. hum. fabr. 5.3.1 (189,5–8), where the brain is
described as a ‘field’ in which the rational soul is planted, either directly or by means of
the spinal marrow.
23 There has been some disagreement on the sense in which the marrow here is said to be
a πανσπερμίαν παντὶ θνητῷ γένει (73c1–2). Cornford (1937: 294–5), following Rivaud
(1925) and subsequently followed by Rankin (1964: 34), has suggested that Plato is here
alluding to the future degeneration of human beings into all the other kinds of mortal
animals. As the skeletal structures of all these animals are degenerate forms of the human
structure, the marrow, it is claimed, is a suitable foundation for the souls of all mortal
kinds of animals. I believe the main motivation behind this interpretation has now been
sufficiently diffused by Johansen (2004: 151–2) and follow him (and others) in taking the
rational, spirited and appetitive parts of soul to be the proper residents of the marrow.
24 This is particularly clear in Tim. 91b1–2. All of these characterizations of marrow as ‘seed’
(Tim. 74a3–4; 74b3; 86c3–4; and cf. 77d3–4) are subsequent steps in the generation of
the human body that depend on the crucial initial procedure of implanting the soul into
the marrow (73c3–4), as is made clear, for example, in 75a2–3 (cf. 74e1–2), 81d4–7 and
91b1–2.
25 See Chapter 3 on Platonists on the seed and the Appendix to Chapter 3 on Michael on
the seed.
26 See note 52.
27 It has been often and correctly remarked that Plato here is taking up the doctrine of the
‘wandering womb,’ which figures prominently in Hippocratic gynecology, on which see
Longrigg (1998: 194–201). Although Longrigg gives no examples here of the wander-
ing womb causing respiratory problems, this is an ailment described often enough in
Hippocratic medicine (e.g. Mul. II 125–6 and 130 (8.268,9–272,8 and 278,7–11 L.)).
This is likely Plato’s intended meaning, though his use of πνεῦμα (91a6), α’ ναπνοήν
(91b2) and α’ νέπνευσεν (91b3) in connection with the male seed raises some questions
about whether the ailment in question (τὰς τοῦ πνεύματος διεξόδους α’ ποφρα άττον,
α’ ναπνεῖν ου’ к ε’ῶν) is rather the obstruction of the menstrual flow, which is still more
frequently associated with the wandering womb (see Longrigg (1998: 194–201)).
28 Praechter (1928: 29n23).
29 And cf. Paulsen and Rehn’s translation: ‘sie dann wieder von ihr trennen’ (my emphasis).
30 Michael of Ephesus was a Byzantine commentator working in the twelfth century
whose embryology will be discussed in greater detail in the Appendix to Chapter 3.
31 In the Appendix to Chapter 3 I argue against the view that Michael’s Plato was a
homuncular preformationist. He appears rather to be a two-seed vital anhomoiomerous
preformationist.
32 For example Taylor (1928); Cornford (1937), Zeyl (2000), Brisson (2012).
33 See, for example, the Hippocratic Nat. Puer. 17.1–18.1 (59,9–61,7).
34 contra Rankin (1964: 35).
35 See Broadie (2012: 270–1). Broadie does not even consider alternative senses of
διακρίναντες, but she does an excellent job drawing out the absurd consequences of the
consensus interpretation. If the male ε’´ρως is responsible for the formation, then ‘Plato
is on the way to admitting a third sort of principle into his cosmology, something that is
neither Intelligence nor material Necessity nor the combined effect of the two of them
[…] its mode of causation is sui generis.’
36 This is analogous to the effects of the basic desire to restore the natural state of the body.
When my body is cold, this desire will lead me to approach the fire, but once my body
becomes too warm, it will also lead me away from the fire (cf. Phlb. 32a–b). This is pos-
sible because the motivating desire is not simply a desire to be warm. Perhaps Plato even
followed the Hippocratic author of Superf. in believing intercourse during pregnancy to
be harmful to the child (see Superf. 13 (78,15–16) and 26 (82,14–15); cf. Soranus Gyn.
1.46.64–7), though interpretation (iv) hardly requires us to assume this.
37 For example Taylor (1928: 639) and Lesky (1951: 20).
38 For example (1951: 30n1); Congourdeau (2007) with caution; Taylor (1928: 638–9)
appears to lean towards the one-seed theory, but is uncertain. As we shall see below, all
Neoplatonists adopt the one-seed theory.
39 Tim. 50d2–3.
40 Plato Rep. 454d10–e1. As Dover (1980: 147) notes, the verb τίκτειν can be used of both
male begetting and female bearing, but the contrast here is clear.
41 Plato Symp. 206b–e (esp. 206d7: ’ι´σχον τò κύημα), on which see Pender (1992: 73–6).
42 A two-seed theory has been attributed to Plato by Cherniss (1935: 284n243), Gerlach
(1938: 182), Geurts (1941: 77 (apud Lesky (1951: 30)); and Rankin (1963: 141) and (1964:
36).
43 For Alcmaeon, see 24A13–14 DK; for the Pythagoreans, see Diogenes Laertius VP 8.28
(58B1 DK), Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.1; for Hippon, see Censorinus De dei nat. 5.2 (38A12
DK) and Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.3 (38A13 DK).
44 Cf. Taylor (1928: 639).
45 Cf. Cherniss (1935: 284n243): ‘I think anyone who reads Timaeus 91A–D will admit
that Plato could not consistently have otherwise supposed [viz. that there is also a female
seed]. Spinal marrow which is seed exists in both sexes, and he expressly says both sow
the unformed animals into the womb.’ As will become clear, I agree with Cherniss only
regarding the former claim.
46 Herophilus T61, with the comments by von Staden on 230ff. Soranus Gyn. 1.12.96–8.
47 Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.5.3 (38A13 DK) (and see above note 4). According to Aëtius Plac. phil.
5.7.7 (38A14 DK) Hippon viewed the female contribution to consist only in τροφή. See
Lesky (1951: 27–8).
48 Taylor (1928: 637) also appears to restrict the seminal duct’s creation to the male. Note
that Aristotle considered the uterus to be the female counterpart to male seminal pas-
sages (GA 720a12–14).
49 For Hippon, see Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.7.7 (38A14 DK) with Lesky (1951: 27–8).
50 Plato Rep. 497b4–5: ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ε’ ν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ε’ξίτηλον εἰς τὸ
ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ’ιέναι. Cf. Plato Rep. 491d1–4; Theaet. 149e3–4; Menex.
237e1–238a5.
51 Interestingly, Aristotle himself seems to accept some version of this theory in GA 2.4
738b27–36, for which Galen later criticizes him for effectively turning nourishment
into a seed instead of acknowledging a female seed (De sem. 154,1–11 (4.602,10–603,15
K.) and 156,1–7 (4.604,12–18 K.)). Lesky (1951: 173–7) takes Galen’s criticism to be
directed at both Aristotle and Athenaeus of Attaleia.
52 I read the διαˋ ταˋ αὐταˋ ταῦτα as modifying λεγόµεναι and delete the comma after ταῦτα:
‘are said for these same reasons to be a living thing within them.’
53 Taylor (1928: 639) points to this question: ‘As we have had no description of the forma-
tion in the female of a counterpart to the ε’´ρως τoῦ γεννᾶν, one may perhaps suppose
that T. regards the passion as due in both sexes to the same cause, the attempt of the
µυελóς to exit […] Yet the very next sentence suggests the cruder view that the whole
of the child’s body comes from the father.’
54 As noted on p. 18, Plato gives the analogy of plucking a single fruit (καρπὸν) at Tim.
91d1, and at 91b7–c2 Plato turns to the womb by using the plural (αι‛ δ’ ε’ ν ταῖς γυναιξὶν
αὖ μῆτραί τε καὶ ὑστέραι) but then switches to the singular ζῷoν, which remains the
subject of 91c2–7.
55 Taylor (1928) attributes homuncular preformationism to Plato: ‘The ζῷoν spoken of
here is supposed to be the future infant itself in miniature, as we see from the words
μεγάλα … ει’ς φῶς α’ γαγóντες’ (640). Balss (1923: 320) and Wellmann (1929: 307–8) also
attribute some form of preformation to Plato, though both put a great deal of weight
on Michael of Ephesus’ account of Plato’s embryology, on which see the Appendix
to Chapter 3. Lesky (1951: 20) credits Praechter (1928) and Geurts (1941) with hav-
ing refuted Michael’s relevance, and she herself thinks that the α’ διάπλαστα decides the
matter: ‘denn der Ausdruck “nicht durchgeformte Lebewesen” spricht durchaus gegen
die Annahme von Präformation.’ The conclusion reached by Brisson (2012: 41) may be
viewed as a recapitulation of the puzzle: ‘Quoi qu’il en soit, Platon peut être considéré
comme un préformiste, dans la mesure où les êtres vivants sont déjà formés dans le
sperme même s’ils sont invisibles et informes.’
56 This parallel between Plato and Democritus was noted by Wellmann (1929), even if
Wellmann depends too much on Michael’s exegesis (see note 55), but is oddly not to be
found in Nikolaou (1998).
57 Democritus appears to have developed at least one of – if not the – most comprehensive
embryological theories of the Presocratic philosophers. He is often regarded as hav-
ing exercised a considerable influence on Hippocratic embryology. See, for example,
Wellmann (1929); Lesky (1951: 70–6); Stückelberger (1984: 49–87); Lonie (1981: 62–71,
176–86 and passim). His influence has been called into question by Perilli (2007: 162–
72): ‘There are two radically opposing parties: philosophers as a rule see an influence of
Democritus on medical treatises concerning specific aspects, while historians of medi-
cine usually tend to exclude it. I subscribe to the latter view.’ (167)
58 67A15 and 28 DK.
59 In PA 665a31–3 (Democritus 68A148 DK) Aristotle, who maintains that only blooded
animals have viscera, criticizes Democritus for overturning the empirical evidence and
positing viscera that are too small to see (διὰ μικρότητα α’´δηλα) in bloodless creatures.
Plato appears to make a similar inference about the seed in Tim. 91d2 (α’ όρατα υ‛πò
σμικρότητος). Cf. Tim. 43a3.
60 68B32 DK: ξυνουσίη α’ ποπληξίη σμικρή. ε’ ξέσσυται γὰ ρ α’´νθρωπος ε’ ξ α’ νθρώπου καὶ
α’ ποσπᾶται πληγῆι τινι μεριζόμενος. Lesky (1951: 72) takes this to imply homuncular
preformationism: ‘Der real-morphologische Zusammenhang zwischen den elterlichen
Organen und Organteilen und denen des Keims, die dieser in präformiertem Zustand –
denn als Mensch stürzt er schon aus dem Menschen heraus – vererbt erhält, ist […]
zum Ausdruck gebracht.’ Lonie (1981: 180), with somewhat more caution, agrees: ‘It
is exceedingly tempting to see a form of the homunculus theory here […] Clearly we
cannot be certain that Democritus did think in this way; but we can at least say that of
existing theories, that of Democritus was the best suited to explain organic structure.’ As
Gemelli Marciano (2007: 215) shows 68B32 DK ‘n’est toutefois attestée nulle part sous
sa forme complète.’ Cf. also John of Alexandria’s use of a similar phrase in what is clearly
not a case of homuncular preformationism, In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 134,16 Bell et al.
61 Aristotle GA 740a35–7 (68A144 DK). For a Platonic interpretation of this report by
Michael of Ephesus, see the Appendix to Chapter 3.
62 Aristotle GA 740a13–15 (68A145 DK).
63 Diels–Kranz label the fragment unintelligible and do not even translate it. Diels con-
jectures that 68B124 DK is a corruption and suggests the original read α’´νθρωπος
ε’ ξέσσυται ε’ ξ α’ νθρώπου παντός (cf. 68B32 DK), which might well be right. As it stands,
the sense might be that every portion of the seed may be counted as a human and that
all of these ‘humans’ go together to form a single human offspring. The phenomenon of
multiparity might be in the background here.
64 Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.3.6 (68A141 DK): Δημóκριτoς α’ φ’ οʽ λων ́ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν
κυριωτάτων μερῶν oἱ̑oν ὀστῶν σαρκῶν καὶ ’ινῶν [τò σπέρμα ει’̑ ναι]. There is some dis-
agreement about whether the first καί is meant to be epexegetic (thus Perilli (2007: 171))
or co-ordinative (De Ley (1980: 135–6)). In the former case we have homoiomerous
pangenesis, the results for the latter interpretation will depend on how one understands
α’ φ’ οʽ ́λων τῶν σωμάτων (which De Ley takes to refer to the organs).
65 As Morel (2007: 110–11) and (2008: 52–3) notes, there remains some ambiguity about
how to reconcile Democritus’ two-seed theory, which is already supposed to account
for paternal and maternal resemblances at conception (68A143 DK), with his claim
(68A144–5 DK) that the mother forms the embryo according to her own parts during
gestation. On the former aspect of Democritus’ theory, see Lesky (1951: 73–4) and De
Ley (1980: 142–3).
66 In the Symp. 206c–e Plato appropriates the female experience of pregnancy for the male.
Ejaculation of the seed is recast as giving birth. Plato is silent on the woman’s birth pains.
Birth, moreover, is recast as an entirely pleasant affair that no longer maps onto a female’s
experience.The only pain worth mentioning is that of the male, when he cannot offload
his ‘offspring’ (τò κύημα). See Sheffield (2001: 13–15).
67 Nor may one claim that for Plato marrow is the only fundamental homoiomerous part.
At least when Plato describes the creation of flesh, there is no indication that it is being
created out of marrow (Tim. 74c5–d2). Bones, likewise, are soaked in marrow but are
not described as being generated out of marrow (Tim. 73e1–74a1). Additional (minimal)
support against preformationism might be drawn from Leg. 872e5–10 where Plato advo-
cates equal punishments for matricide and patricide, in stark contrast to the preforma-
tionism-based defense of Orestes in Aeschylus’ Eumen. 602–10 and 652–66.
68 Plato Phdr. 246aff. This also seems at least implicit in the myth of Er (e.g. Odysseus’
unique choice is accounted for by saying that only he has freed himself of φιλοτιμία
(Rep. 620c5). The immortality argument in Rep. 10 is also often understood to apply to
the entire tripartite soul (e.g. Robinson (1967: 147), Graeser (1969: 27)).
69 Plato Tim. 41a–42d, 69c–70b, and 90a–d.

70 Phdr. 248d2–3: ’ιδοῦσαν ει’ς γονὴν α’ νδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου. There is, however,
some ambiguity surrounding the sense of γονὴ here, as it can mean ‘seed,’‘womb,’‘parent-
age,’ and ‘generation.’The sense of ‘womb’ occurs in Plato Crat. 414a2–3, and ‘generation’
seems to be the intended sense at Crat. 411d7 and Leg. 967d5. It appears to mean ‘parent-
age’ at Symp. 178b2, Rep. 541a2 and Leg. 917a5. I am not convinced by Congourdeau’s
(2007) argument that because the context is not sexual γονή cannot mean ‘seed’ in Phdr.
248d2–3, though Porphyry agrees with her conclusion (AG 9.4–5), as we shall see on
p. 138. Other characterizations in the Phdr. are less specific, e.g. 249b3–5: ει’ς θηρίου βίον
[…] ει’ς α’´νθρωπον; 250a1: ει’ς τόδε τὸ ζῷον, but cf. p.23 on Phdr. 246c2–4.
71 Polit. 272e3: ει’ς γῆν σπέρματα πεσούσης. Cf. also Plato’s application of the metaphor of
‘sowing’ in connection with the soul: Tim. 41c8 and 41e–45, 42d4–5; Phd. 83d10–e1. Cf.
Rep. 492a2–3.
72 Tertullian DA 25.9: At idem in sexto Legum monens cauere, ne uitiatio seminis ex aliqua
uilitate concubitus labem corpori et animae supparet, nescio de pristina magis an de ista
sententia sibi exciderit. Ostendit enim animam de semine induci, quod curari monet,
non de prima aspiratione nascentis.
73 Leg. 775c7–d4, Saunders’ translation in Cooper (ed.) (1997).
74 Plato Leg. 838e–839a, esp. 838e7–8: κτείνοντάς τε ἐκ προνοίας τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.
It is, however, surely significant here that the ‘victim’ of the murder is not an individual
but the human γένος.
75 Rep. 620a5–6: οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι.
76 Plotinus appears to have held it to be authentic. Enn. 6.7.11.44–5 appears to refer to
Epin. 981b–c and/or 984b–c. See also 5.9.5.28 with Harder’s note ad loc. and 4.3.32.17
with Beutler’s note. Proclus explicitly denies the authenticity of the Epin., though his
reasons for doing so are not compelling. See Taylor (1921), Westerink (1977: 270–1) and
Brisson (2005: esp. 11).
77 This view is put most explicitly in their characterizations of death, e.g. Phd. 70a3–4:
ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη.
78 γενόμενοι (Phd. 75b10, c9, 76c13); πρὶν γενέσθαι (75c4, e2); πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι (75c7, d5);
γεγόναμεν (76a5); γιγνόμεθα (76d2); πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς (76e4, e6–7); πρὶν γενέσθαι
ἡμᾶς (77a1, b1). Cf. πρότερον at 76e1.
79 Phd. 75b10–12: Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; Πάνυ γε.
80 To be sure, it is possible that Plato believed that the embryo at some point in the period
of gestation came to have possession of actual sensation, but it seems unlikely that he
believed that the embryo could see. In any case, Simmias’ response (πάνυ γε) shows that
he thinks the point being made is obvious, which would not be the case if Plato was
thinking of sensation in embryos.
81 Cf. πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι (Phd. 73a1–2); πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου
εἴδει (76c10–11); πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι (77b7–8); πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν
εἰς σῶμα (81e1–2); πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι (92b5–6); πρὶν
εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι (92d8); τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν (95d1–2); εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται
(95d5), and in particular Socrates’ remark that as soon as the soul arrives we are human
beings: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ’ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν (76c6–7).
82 For example Waszink (1954: 178), who refers to Tim. 42e–43a, Phdr. 246c–d and 248c–d,
but see Waszink’s (1947: 322) more cautious verdict: ‘Plato never made a definite and
unmistakable statement about this subject.’ ̯
83 Phdr. 246c2–5: ἡ δεˋ πτερoρρυήσασα φέρεται ἕως ἂν στερεου τινος ἀντιλάβηται, οὗ
κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὑτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης
δύναμιν, ζῷον τὸ σύμπαν ἐκλήθη.
84 Cf. ὁπότε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο (Rep. 619d8); φέρεσθαι εἰς τὴν γένεσιν (Rep.
621b4); πάλιν ἀφικομένοις δεῦρο (Leg. 870e1); φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν
(Phdr. 248d1). Also Phdr. 249b3–5; Rep. 620d1–5.
85 As Waszink (1954: 178) notes, Aëtius’ report (Plac. phil. 5.15.1) that Plato considered the
embryo to be a ζῷον is probably just based on Tim. 91d2–3.
86 Tim. 43b5–7 and 44a5–b2.
87 ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐνδεθῇ θνητόν (44b1); περὶ τὴν γένεσιν (90d1–2). The latter phrase is
often translated as a reference to the birth of the offspring (e.g. by Zeyl and Cornford). So
too the language of transmigration: εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβαλοῖ
(42b5–c1); μεταβαλοῖ θήρειον φύσιν (42c3–4).
88 Tim. 42e8–43a6.
89 Tim. 73c3–6, esp. εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ διανομῇ τῇ κατ’ ἀρχάς.The future expressions μέλλουσαν
ἕξειν and ἔμελλε καθέξειν need only mean that the soul is implanted just as soon as the
marrow receives the respective forms. Cf. also 90d1–2 which would seem to imply that
the head already exists at the moment of the soul’s ‘generation.’
90 Tim. 77a6.
91 See, by way of comparison, the list of embryological questions documented in Aëtius,
listed in the Introduction (p. 5).
92 Again, this could be accounted for if Plato is in fact a preformationist, or if he thinks that
the order of embryological creation mirrors that of the original human being described
in the Tim.
93 Tim. 39e3–40a2. Note also Aristotle’s famous criticism that the theory of Forms is
superfluous because ‘man is begotten by man, each individual by an individual’ (Meta.
1070a26–8, Ross translation), which suggests that Aristotle thought the theory was sup-
posed to have implications in biology.
94 Tim. 41c5; 42e8; 44d3–4; 69c5.
95 Thus, the head is said to be modeled after the shape of the universe, but the body and
limbs are added simply to keep it from rolling around (44d8–e2 and 69c6–7). The eyes
are added to help make the revolutions in the head more like those of the universe by
enabling us to study and reflect on the latter (47b5–c4 and 90c7–d7). The same goes for
the ears (47c4–e2). These and other differences can still be counted as imitations of the
Demiurge’s activity insofar as they are following his lead of making human bodies as best
as possible. Likewise, we, too, are to maintain our bodies by imitating the regimen of the
universe (88c7–89a1).
2
THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND
The brief survey of ancient embryology in the previous chapter was restricted to
four key issues that occupied both physicians and philosophers in antiquity and that
were particularly relevant to Plato’s handling of embryology in the Timaeus, which
we then examined in order to discern as well as possible his own views on these
issues.This examination revealed a significant degree of ambiguity in Plato’s embry-
ology and in particular a couple of loose ends that would occupy later Platonists.
As we saw, Plato offers no account of how the soul in the seed manages to form
the embryo, and he gives no indication of whether or how the Forms are causally
relevant to the account of biological human reproduction. In order to see how later
Platonists were able to develop an embryology capable of tying up these loose ends,
we shall now explore the metaphysical background of Neoplatonism. The aim of
the first section is to show how fundamental metaphysical commitments shaped
ancient embryological theories in terms of both their causal accounts of forma-
tion and their views on the respective contributions of the male and the female.
Here the reader will find a brief overview of Neoplatonic metaphysics, and it will
be argued that a particular embryological framework is already to be found in this
metaphysical model. The second section will then be dedicated to showing how
Neoplatonists developed Plato’s theory of Forms in a way that made it an invaluable
asset to biological theory.
Metaphysical Models in Embryology

Before embarking on an examination of Neoplatonic metaphysics and its implications
for Neoplatonic embryology, it will be advantageous first to demystify the claim that
metaphysical theories can influence and shape embryological theories. This is best
achieved by looking at a couple of examples of more familiar embryological theories.
34 The metaphysical background
We might begin with a brief look at the Hippocratic embryology of On the

Nature of the Child, as this offers a straightforward illustration of how metaphysical
views on the nature of causation influence embryological theories at a very general
level. There was a fundamental disagreement in antiquity over the nature of causa-
tion in the natural world, which is often characterized as a controversy between
mechanism and teleology. Although there are known difficulties in articulating a
satisfactory conception of ancient mechanism,1 for our current purposes we may
simply designate as mechanists those theorists who seek to explain the phenomena
of the natural world without appealing to teleological principles. Hence, we should
expect embryologists with teleological metaphysical commitments to develop tel-
eological embryologies (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Galen), and those with mechanistic
metaphysical commitments to develop mechanistic embryologies. The Hippocratic
author of On the Nature of the Child serves as a good example of the latter. For the
author is clearly committed to a Democritean world-view, in which the principles
of predomination2 and ‘like to like’ suffice to explain the goings-on in the world,
and so he proposes an embryology that conforms to this mechanistic framework:
‘As the flesh grows it is formed into distinct members by breath. Each thing goes
to its similar – the dense to the dense, the rare to the rare, and the fluid to the fluid.
Each settles in its appropriate place, corresponding to the part from which it came
and to which it is akin.’3
A second example, drawn from Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, will help
illustrate the embryological implications of a more detailed metaphysical model
and will simultaneously allow us to call attention to one major point of Peripatetic
embryology that will be rejected by the Neoplatonists. Needless to say, a thorough
examination of Aristotle’s embryology would take us too far afield, but it shall suf-
fice to look briefly at how Aristotle’s particular understanding of the four causes
shapes his views on the respective contributions of the male and the female to
reproduction. An obvious first point to be made is that Aristotle analyzes biological
reproduction in terms of his theory of four causes, which already sets the biological
explananda within a certain metaphysical framework, but he also brings a particular
understanding of these four causes to reproduction, according to which the formal
and efficient causes coincide while the material cause is provided from another
source. As he indicates at several points, he is drawing this understanding of the
concurrence of the causes from production in the crafts, in which the craftsman is
responsible for imparting the shape to matter via the movement of his hands and
tools, whereas the matter does not come from the craftsman but is already there
(729b9–20 and 730b8–23). As a result, when Aristotle applies this model of causa-
tion to biological reproduction, he is led to a disjunctive demarcation of the male
and female contributions: one should take on the exclusive role of the formal-
efficient cause, and the other the exclusive role of matter.4 To be clear, this claim
goes well beyond the one-seed theory, and it certainly represents a fairly heavy-
handed interpretation of the empirical evidence. It is one thing, for example, to
claim that only the male produces a seed, but it is another thing entirely to maintain
that this male seed, which we can see to be a physical body and so to consist of
The metaphysical background 35
both form and matter, contributes only form and no matter. And this latter claim is
owed to this causal model.5 Moreover, the corollary to this claim, namely that the
female supplies only matter, is notoriously difficult to reconcile with the obvious
fact that the offspring usually resembles the mother in many respects. Aristotle is
certainly well aware of this problem, and he does work out a solution to it that
amounts to a concession that the female can also take on a causal role in the forma-
tion.6 Finally, this model leads to Aristotle’s striking claim that the seed, although
by all appearances inert, in fact contains motion in actuality (730b19–22). Here

again the reasoning is based on the concurrence of the efficient and formal causes
in the case of craft production. Just as the craftsman communicates form to matter
via the motion of his hands and tools, so too must the seed be seen as a tool that
contains formative motion in actuality. As we shall see later in this chapter, it is par-
ticularly with respect to this last point that Neoplatonists will end up disagreeing
with Aristotle on account of their application of their own metaphysical model to
biological reproduction.
This brief preliminary discussion was simply meant to show that both of these
authors come to embryology with preconceived ideas about causation and, unsur-
prisingly, these ideas are reflected in their embryologies. This much, I think, is
uncontroversial, and my claim about Neoplatonists is simply that the same sort of
thing is going on: they have particular metaphysical views on causation, and these
views help shape their embryology.
In order to see how this works, we shall require some account of the meta-
physical framework that is fundamental to Neoplatonism, that of procession and
reversion. Needless to say, given all that lies before us, this account must be kept
very brief, and in what follows I shall be taking the Plotinian account of the gen-
eration of the Intellect by the One as a representative example of this more general
framework. Even though this framework will already be familiar to many readers,
our understanding of its precise impact on theories of generation will be facilitated
by reviewing at least a few of the framework’s general lines here, with a particular
emphasis on three central principles of Neoplatonic metaphysics.
The first of these is the principle that production necessarily follows from perfec-
tion (PNP).7 The ultimate principle of Plotinian metaphysics is the One, which
is utterly perfect. Therefore, according to this principle the One must necessarily
produce, and this production is procession.The nature of this product of procession
is determined by the second principle: the product is always an inferior likeness of the
producer (PIP).8 Plotinus employs a number of different characterizations to refer
to this product, including ‘Otherness’ (ἑτερóτης), ‘Movement’ (κίνησις), and the
‘Dyad,’9 though in scholarship it is commonly referred to as the inchoate Intellect
or the Pre-Intellect.10 The Dyad is a likeness of the One insofar as it is still essen-
tially unified,11 and it is an inferior likeness of the One because it is in a state of
potentiality. Plotinus sometimes underscores this potentiality by referring to the
Dyad as (intelligible) matter, and it is also this potentiality that leads us to the third
and final principle of Neoplatonic metaphysics: the priority of the actual to the poten-
tial (PAP).12 Being in a state of (unified) potentiality, the Dyad desires its source, as
something lacking determination desiring something that gives determination.13

This then leads to reversion, in which the Dyad turns back, as it were, to its source
in an attempt to grasp it, and although it is not able to grasp the One in its unity,
it does grasp it in multiplicity and in this way achieves its full determination as
Intellect. Plotinus often compares this moment of reversion to what happens with
the eye in sight: before it sees, the eye lacks content and as such is not a fully
fledged eye, but it becomes complete by receiving the form of the object of sight.14
These aspects of reception and becoming actual go some way to explain Plotinus’
characterization of the product of procession as ‘potentiality’ and ‘matter.’ Yet the
eye analogy threatens to obscure a second moment of generation that takes place
at this stage. Whereas the eye might be thought simply to internalize a form that
previously existed outside of itself, the inchoate second principle ‘breaks up the
power that it received, as it is unable to take hold of it, and makes the single power
into many’ (Ennead 6.7.15.20–22). In this way the Forms are generated within the
second principle, which at this point may properly be called the Intellect. Thus,
whereas the Dyad was in a state of unity but also potentiality, the Intellect is in a
state of actuality but also plurality.
There are two strikingly different ways in which this model may be applied to
biological reproduction. The first conforms more or less to the familiar Aristotelian
understanding of reproductive etiology, with the One and the Dyad correspond-
ing to the male and the female respectively and the Intellect to the completed
offspring. This application readily suggests itself on account of several aspects of
the interaction between the One and the Dyad that would appear to resonate
with the traditional understanding of the sexual interaction between the male and
the female. Not only would this seem to capture one obvious fact about bio-
logical reproduction – the Intellect is generated as it were outside of the One but
within the Dyad, just as the male generates in another while the female generates in
herself15 – it also reflects a key feature of Aristotle’s embryology, which, as we have
seen, describes the female as taking on the role of matter. For on this model the
Dyad serves as matter.This understanding of the female as matter goes hand in hand
with her receiving form from the male, just as the Dyad receives formal determina-
tion from the One.This application leads, then, to a particular understanding of the
roles of the male and female, with the female being conceived as an inferior, passive
principle that receives a unified form and makes it multiple, and the male as the
superior active supplier of this unified form.
It is the second application of this model that is truly revolutionary and, as we
shall see in Chapter 3, one of the hallmarks of Neoplatonic embryology. On this
application, too, the Intellect is analogous to the completed offspring, but the two
moments of its generation, procession and reversion, are here given their due as
distinct contributions of the male and the female respectively. As we saw above, the
first moment of procession results in a distinct yet inferior likeness of its cause. At
this stage it is still incomplete, and its incompleteness is manifest in its two charac-
teristic features: it is still potential, and it is still in some sense a unity.16 This moment
of procession will be related to the emission of seed by the male parent. As a result,
Neoplatonists will underline several features of the seed drawn from this model:
that it is a distinct and inferior likeness of the male, and that it is in some sense a
unity that is still potential and that requires actualization from an external agent that
is like it but in a state of actuality. In the second moment this inchoate offspring
is brought to completion and actuality (reversion), and at the same time it is made
multiple. This moment of actualization, too, requires a distinct cause that is like the
offspring. Whereas in the metaphysical model this requirement could be filled by
the same cause, the One, this option will no longer be available when the model is
applied to sexual reproduction. For after emission the father is no longer in a posi-
tion to actualize the seed. Hence, the one who has received the seed, the mother,
takes on the role of the actualizer. This application of the metaphysical model,
then, leads to a strikingly different understanding of the male and female contri-
butions than did the first application. The male will be understood as the cause of
procession, and the female as the cause of reversion or actualization. Within the
embryological framework, this actualization will lead the seed into its embryonic
state and complete its development into a child, a process that is likewise accompa-
nied by the emergence of the multiplicity of the embryo’s parts. Two implications
deserve particular accentuation. On this understanding the male and the female
are effectively on an ontological par insofar as both are related to different aspects
of the One’s generation of Intellect. Accordingly, the female is emphatically not
merely a provider of matter, nor is she even directly responsible for the generation
of the multiplicity in the offspring, no more so than the One is responsible for the
multiplicity that arises in the Intellect.
Thus, these two applications of the metaphysics of procession and reversion
suggest diverging conceptions of the male and female roles in biological reproduc-
tion, and Neoplatonic embryology draws inspiration from each, though the latter
application appears in several respects to have been the dominant one. Although the
elucidation and examination of supporting evidence for this embryological theory
must be postponed until the next chapter, we may here briefly summarize the
theory as follows. The male’s contribution appears to be modeled after the One’s
processional activity (as in the second application). In emitting the seed the male
provides an inferior image of himself that is still in some sense in a unified state.
The Neoplatonic conception of the female, however, combines key features of both
applications. As in the first application, she alone will be responsible for supplying
the matter, and as such she may be seen as a cause of the multiplicity and exten-
sion of the embryo, but she is also given the responsibility for the actualization of
the male seed, thereby bringing it out of its mere potential state, as in the second
application.Whereas the matter is a corporeal contribution made by the female, this
actualization will be achieved by her nature or vegetative soul.
The main case for this understanding of Neoplatonic embryology will be made
in the next chapter, where we will examine some of the Neoplatonists’ specific
claims about male and female contributions to reproduction. For now, let us rather
draw attention to certain texts belonging to their philosophical inheritance that
would have provided them with some motivation to think of the metaphysics of
procession and reversion in sexual terms. There are three sources in particular that
deserve some comment.
The first pertains to Plato and the Pythagorean tradition. To begin with, there
is the fact that Plato famously labels the Intellect ‘father’ and the matter ‘mother’ in
the Timaeus.17 But at least of equal importance is the content of Plato’s unwritten
doctrine, which explicitly describes the generation of the Forms from the One
and the Dyad. This might have been of no import, had not Aristotle, who is our
earliest source of this doctrine, criticized it by making the comparison to sexual

reproduction:
Since the Forms were the causes of all other things, [Plato] thought their
elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small
were principles; as essential reality, the One. For from the great and the small,
by participation in the One, come the Forms. […] Yet what happens is the
contrary; the theory is not a reasonable one. For they make many things out
of matter, and the form generates only once, but what we observe is that one
table is made from one matter, while the man who applies the form, though
he is one, makes many tables. And the relation of the male and the female is
similar; for the latter is impregnated by one copulation, but the male impreg-
nates many females; yet these are imitations of those first principles.
(Metaphysics 897b18–22 and 988a1–7, my emphasis)18
In addition to these doctrines, the Pythagorean table of opposites, for which again
Aristotle’s Metaphysics is our primary source, notably links the male to oneness and
limit and the female to plurality and the unlimited.19
Another source can be found in the ancient theogonies of the poets and
theologians, which become increasingly important to later Neoplatonists who dis-
play a heightened interest in the exegesis of theogonies, perhaps as a response to
Christianity, as this would have allowed Platonists to anchor their own thought
in divine texts that were considered to be still more ancient than those of the
Christians.20 As Proclus puts it, ‘the poets under the inspiration of Phoebus will use
a richer style, filled with terms from mythology’ to express the same truths that phi-
losophers would express in a more straightforward and systematic manner.21 Thus,
later Platonists would approach these poetic accounts of sexual unions among
the gods looking for the hidden truths of their metaphysical systems. Homer and
Hesiod become, therefore, subjects of intensified study,22 but the poetic texts associ-
ated with the Orphic tradition, particularly the Sacred Discourses in 24 Rhapsodies,
are especially relevant here. Not only were they valued as the holy starting point of
all Greek theology,23 but they also present a mythological theogony that at points
emphasizes the embryological aspects of generation, e.g. by referring to the ‘womb
of Rhea’ (ε’ν τоῖς κóλπоις τῆς ʽРέας)24 and to Phanes bearing ‘the glorious seed of
the gods’ (σπέρμα θεῶν κλυτóν).25
Finally, the Chaldean Oracles would have offered material that encouraged many
later Neoplatonists to recast the metaphysics of procession and reversion along the
lines of sexual reproduction, since they saw the Oracles as putting forward the very
metaphysical system that they themselves propounded. In fact, the Chaldean Oracles
propose a philosophical hierarchy that is in some ways more comparable to Middle
Platonic metaphysics, especially in that the highest principle of the Chaldean Oracles
is an Intellect that does not transcend being, which cannot be said of the One of
Neoplatonism, but the dynamics involved in the generation of the intelligible and
sensible worlds offer more than enough parallels to justify its appropriation into
Neoplatonic thought. Thus, the Oracles describe an intelligible triad consisting of

the highest principle (the first Intellect), the Power (δύναμις) that emanates from it,
and the second Intellect that is produced by these two, a schema of generation that
is easily assimilated to the Plotinian generation of the Intellect from the One and
the Dyad.26 But what is striking about the Oracles is how decidedly embryological
the account of this generation is. It is not just that the higher principle is referred to
throughout as ‘Father;’ the Power that emanates from him is repeatedly described
as a ‘womb’ which the father ‘inseminates’:
For as a girdling [υ‛πεζωκòς], intellectual membrane [υ‛μὴν], [the Power] sep-

arates the first fire and the other fire which are eager to mingle.
(Fr. 6, Majercik translation slightly revised)
For in the womb [κóλπоις] of this triad all things are sown [ε’´σπαρται].
(Fr. 28, Majercik translation)
Source of sources, the womb [μήτρα] holding all things together.
(Fr. 30, Lewy translation)27
It is a worker, it is the dispenser of life-giving fire [that] fills up [πληρоῦσ’]
the life-giving womb [τòν ζῷоγóνоν κóλπоν] of Hecate [and]…pours on
the Connectors a force of fruitful and very powerful fire.
For Implacable Thunders leap from him and the lightning-receiving womb
[κóλπоι] of the shining ray of Hecate, who is generated from the Father.
From him leap the girdling [υ‛πεζωκòς] flower of fire and the powerful breath
[situated] beyond the fiery poles.
For after he thought his works, the self-generated Paternal Intellect sowed
[ε’ νέσπειρεν] the bond of Love, heavy with fire, into all things.
(Fr. 39, Majercik translation. Cf. Fr. 108)
Following the results of some recent re-evaluations of the Oracles,28 we may say that
at each level of generation, that is to say in the generation of the second Intellect
from the first principle and in that of the World-Soul from the second Intellect,
there is a feminine principle called ‘Hecate,’29 and this Hecate is described as a
‘womb’ (κóλπоι or μήτρα).
Texts such as these led Neoplatonists to an increasingly sexualized understanding

of their own metaphysical system. I say ‘increasingly,’ because in the founder of the
Neoplatonic tradition, Plotinus, this sexualized understanding is hardly to be found,
despite some suggestions to the contrary,30 as can be witnessed by briefly examin-
ing the language he uses to describe procession and reversion. To be sure, Plotinus
routinely employs terms for generation and products of generation that have some
biological connotations, namely γεννᾶν, γέννημα, γεννητης, ̀ and γεννητικóς in lieu
of the more generic πоιεῖν, etc. He is also quite willing to refer to the One as
31
‘father’ (the same goes for the Intellect in its relation to Soul),32 and to the product
of a metaphysical generation as a ‘child’ (παῖς or τóκоς or κóρоς).33 None of this,
however, need imply any sort of biological conceptualization of procession and
reversion. For Plotinus might simply be presenting the ontological hierarchy in the
form of a genealogy.34 This suspicion would appear to be confirmed by a closer
examination of his terminology, and in particular of any relevant uses of terms
denoting seed, womb, emission, or conception. Plotinus does at times introduce
the notion of a seed to explain certain features of the intelligible world, as in this
passage:
[The One cannot exist by itself alone] if this is in every nature, to produce
what comes after it and to unfold itself as a seed [σπέρματоς] does, from
a partless beginning which proceeds [ι’оύσης] to the final stage perceived
by the senses, with what comes before abiding for ever in its own proper
dwelling-place, but, in a way, bringing to birth what comes after it from a
power unspeakably great, all the power which could not stand still as if it had
drawn a line round itself in selfish jealousy, but had to go forth [χωρεῖν] for
ever, until all things have reached the ultimate possible limit [impelled] by the
power itself, which sends [πεμπоύσης] them out and cannot leave anything
without a share of itself.
(Plotinus Ennead 4.8.6.7-16, Armstrong translation slightly revised)
In my view this passage presents the strongest evidence for seeing a nod to an
embryological understanding of metaphysical generation in Plotinus. Here we find
a reference to seed that serves its typical purpose in the Enneads, namely to provide
an illustration of how a plurality of things that exist in separation from one another
can, at some higher ontological level, exist all together in a partless manner.35 But
the employment of this analogy is not in and of itself sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that Plotinus wishes to liken metaphysical generation to embryological
generation. At the very least we should expect some mention of a seed being emit-
ted by one thing and received by another, leading to conception and birth. In this
regard this passage is striking both for what it offers and for what it does not offer.
On the one hand, Plotinus goes beyond the analogy as described in order to speak
of a power (δυνάμεως) ‘going forth’ (χωρεῖν) and ‘sending’ (πεμπоύσης) its influ-
ence to everything. The verb (χωρεῖν) can be found in medical texts in the sense
of emitting a seed,36 but that does not appear to be its sense here. Rather, what
Plotinus has in mind is not the emission of a seed but its natural development. As
we shall see in Chapter 3, Plotinus views the seed as a composite of form-principles
(logoi) in some material (fluid for animals and humans, solid for plants) substratum,
and these logoi are responsible for generating the body of the offspring. Thus, when
Plotinus speaks here of ‘what comes before abiding for ever in its own proper
dwelling-place,’ he is not referring to the sower of seed, but to the seed itself; that
is, to the logoi in the seed which remain logoi while creating something corporeal.
Thus, the ‘going forth’ is not the going forth of emission but of the development
and production of the offspring. The absence of an explicit reference to emission
in this passage need not mean that Plotinus does not make such a reference else-
where, and Plotinus certainly has a number of terms that he uses to refer to the
activity of procession.Yet it is perhaps telling that he does not appropriate the most
common medical terms for the emission of semen to do so, namely πρоΐεσθαι,37
α’ φιέναι,38 καταβάλλειν,39 ε’ κκρίνειν,40 α’ πоκρίνειν,41 σπερμαίνειν42 and μεθιέναι43
with perhaps one exception where one might reasonably suspect that Plotinus is
consciously using a term for the emission of seed in his description of Intellect as
‘emitting’ life in order to establish something else in existence.44 Plotinus’ usual
terms for procession – ἰέναι, προϊέναι, διδόναι, γεννᾶν, ε’λλάμπειν, ῥεῖν, ὑπερρεῖν,
προχεῖν etc. – have no particular embryological associations. It is possible that
Plotinus is avoiding the Greek terms for emission on account of their connotations
of diminishment or effort.45 Nor does he employ the typical medical expressions
for conception (συλλαμβάνειν,46 σύλληψις,47 κύησις,48 κατέχεσθαι, κυΐσκεσθαι)
or any unambiguous terms for the womb (ὑστέρα, μήτρα, δελφύς, κόλποι)49 to
describe the nature and activity of the Dyad (or the corresponding lower inchoate
principles); at most he uses some more general expressions that are also found in
embryological discussions but that need not carry these connotations, e.g. ὑποδοχή
(‘receptacle’)50, ὑποδέχθαι (‘to receive’), χώρα (‘cavity’ or ‘place’). The same might
be said of Plotinus’ use of πληροῦν and πληροῦσθαι.51 In fact, Plotinus never even
refers to the Dyad as ‘mother’ or ‘female.’52
Plotinus’ lack of interest in describing procession and reversion in sexual terms
is put most fully on display in his metaphysical recasting of the Hesiod succession
myth. As Hesiod tells it, sexual reproduction accounts for nearly all of the gods’
births. An account of even just the most salient points of the theogony would
have to include: Gaia gives birth to (τέκ’) Kronos by sleeping with (ευ’ νηθεῖσα)
Ouranos (Theogony 133), and Zeus, in turn, is born when ‘Rhea was subject to love
(δμηθεῖσα) in Kronos and bore (τέκε) splendid children’ (453).53 Kronos then swal-
lows these children as they are born, with the exception of Zeus, as Rhea was able
to switch the child with a stone that Kronos gulped down in its place (466–91).
Plotinus turns his attention to this myth only once and very briefly:
This, then, is the generation of this νоῦς, and worthy of νоῦς in all its purity:
it came to be [in the first place] from the first principle [i.e., τοˋ ἕν], and when
it had already come to be, it produced all those things that truly are: all the
beauty of forms, all the noetic gods. It is full of those things that it produced
and, as if it had swallowed them up again, contains them in itself lest they spill
out into matter and be brought up in the house of Rhea [τραφῆναι παρὰ τῇ
‘Ρέα˛]. Thus the mysteries and the myths about the gods say riddlingly that
Kronos, the wisest of the gods, shuts up again within himself that which he
produces before the birth of Zeus, so that he is filled full and is νоῦς in its
satiety. After this, they say that in its satiety, νоῦς produces Zeus, for νоῦς in
its perfection produces ψυχή. [They are saying that] being perfect, it had to
produce, and that it is impossible for such a force to remain unproductive.

(Plotinus Ennead 5.1.7.27–38, Lamberton translation)54
As this passage has already been commented on by several scholars,55 I shall limit
myself to pointing out the obvious – though to my knowledge as yet not com-
mented upon – omission of any talk of sexual reproduction and indeed of any
female contribution at all. This is the only mention of Rhea in the Enneads, and
she is reduced to an undependable au pair in whose care it is best not to leave one’s
child.56 Gaia is never mentioned. To be clear, I am not raising these points in order
to accuse Plotinus of male chauvinism or political incorrectness – indeed we shall
see that Plotinus takes pains to emphasize that in reproduction the mother is not a
mere receptacle. Nor do I wish to suggest that Plotinus was not engaging with the
theogonic tradition. On the contrary, he does incorporate a fair number of refer-
ences to Homer and Hesiod in the Enneads and is even willing to interpret some
aspects of these poems and myths as expressing certain truths about his intelligible
world.57 The point is that his engagement with this project of reconciling the views
of the poets and theologians with Platonic philosophy is very modest in compari-
son to later Platonists, and his efforts in this undertaking are generally characterized
by a certain superficial brevity that appears to prevent some of the implications
about the respective roles of the two sexes from unfolding.
By contrast we see later Neoplatonic thinkers placing a particular emphasis on
these sexual elements. Given the facts that the Chaldean Oracles and the Orphic
tradition employ more explicitly sexualized vocabularies58 and that both of these
traditions are known to have had only a minimal impact on Plotinus’ thought,59
the prominence that these traditions came to enjoy among later Platonists might
have been what encouraged them to take the sexual elements in the theogonies
more seriously and to begin to understand their own metaphysical systems in more
explicitly sexual terms. For reasons of expediency, Proclus may be taken here as
an example of this development, since this sexual turn is particularly evident in
his work. (In the next chapter, we shall see how this turn manifests itself in the
embryological theories of a number of Proclus’ Neoplatonic predecessors and suc-
cessors.) Proclus addresses the broad problem of applying the sexualized language
of the theogonies to the metaphysics of procession and reversion in a passage of his
Platonic Theology that deserves our full attention:
By focusing now on the above, we may explain what is meant by the paternal
causes and the procreative [γονίμους] powers of the mothers in the myths.
For in all cases we shall posit that the cause of the superior and more uni-
fied nature is paternal, and we shall maintain that the inferior and more
particular pre-exists in the rank of the mother. For in the domain of theol-
ogy [παραˋ τοῖς θεοῖς], the father is analogous to a monad and to the cause
of limit, whereas the mother is analogous to a dyad and the unlimited power
of generation [γεννητικῇ]. But for Plato it is always the case that the paternal
is of one kind [μονοειδές], namely it is situated high above the things that
proceed from it and has a prior existence as an object of its offsprings’ desire,
and the maternal is of two kinds [δυοειδές]: [Case 1] In the myths she is
sometimes put forward as superior to her offspring, and [Case 2] sometimes
inferior to them in terms of her being (just as in the Symposium they call
Poverty the mother of Erôs). And [this manner of expression occurs] not
only in the mythical tales but also in philosophical treatises concerned with
being, as occurs in the Timaeus. For there [Plato] called being ‘father’ and
matter ‘mother’ and ‘nurse of generation.’ So those powers [in Case 1] that
are procreative [γoνίμoι] and perfective [τελεσιουργοί] of the second powers
and providers of life and causes of separation are set down as mothers of the
things brought forward from themselves. And those other powers [in Case 2],
the ones that receive the processions and multiply their activities and extend
the lower side of their offspring, are also called mothers.
(Proclus Platonic Theology 1.28 (1.122,3–26))60
Here Proclus presents a general picture of how the male and female roles in theo-
gonies are to be understood when transferred to the metaphysics of procession
and reversion, and this picture strikingly captures the key features of our summary
above. The male is uniformly associated above all with unity and procession.61 (He
is also identified here as the object of reversion,62 a point to which we will return
below.) By contrast, there appear to be two prima facie incompatible conceptions of
the female. From one perspective she is merely a passive receptacle of the offspring.
On this conception she is strongly associated with matter, reception, and causing
multiplicity.63 From the other perspective she is rather an active contributor to the
offspring. Proclus associates this conception with the mother’s being ‘perfective’
(τελεσιουργός), ‘procreative’ (γόνιμος), and a cause of ‘separation’ (διάκρισις).What
Proclus means by calling her ‘perfective’ is that she plays a crucial role in bring-
ing the product of male procession to perfection by leading it back to its cause.
That is to say, she is the mediating cause of reversion,64 even if the ultimate goal
of reversion is the original cause associated with the male.65 Proclus uses the term
γόνιμος in a wide variety of contexts, but he often associates it specifically with
the female nature,66 and when he does it often appears to reinforce this active role
in creation.67 Both of these points are closely related to the female’s being a cause
of ‘separation.’ Separation in this context is not to be understood as the unfolding
of the procession from the male into multiplicity, since this sense of ‘separation’ is
associated with the passive conception of the female. Rather, it refers to the female’s
ability to establish the procession from the male as a distinct entity, which again
involves an active contribution on her part.68
Yet, although these two conceptions would appear to be incompatible and
although Proclus acknowledges that the myths that he is looking at tend simply to
give precedence to one conception over the other, in his own metaphysical theory
he ultimately integrates these two conceptions into a single account, as is made
very clear by several passages in his corpus, e.g., in his discussion of the intelligible-
intellective triad (which Proclus here is identifying with the hypercelestial place in
Plato’s Phaedrus)69 in Platonic Theology 4.10:
This class of gods is feminine and procreative [γόνιμος] and produces all things
via intelligible powers.This is why Plato called it ‘place’, insofar as it is a recepta-
cle of paternal causes, bringing to birth [λοχεύουσαν] and leading the generative
powers of the gods forth into their existence as inferior entities. In fact, after
having called matter ‘the place of the forms’, he calls it ‘mother’ and ‘nurse’ of
the logoi that proceed from Being and the paternal cause. And it is by virtue of
this analogy that he also refers to the hypercelestial place by this name, since it
is feminine and is a cause of all those things in a maternal manner of which the
intelligible father is a cause in a paternal manner. Yet, whereas matter merely
receives the forms, the mother and nurse of the gods not only receives but also
brings into existence these inferiors and generates them together with the father.
(Proclus Platonic Theology 4.10 (4.33,17–34,3))
This passage provides us with a fitting place to close our examination of the relation
between the Neoplatonic metaphysics of procession and reversion and biological
reproduction. It offers a clear example of a sexualized understanding of their meta-
physical model. The vocabulary – not only ‘mother’ and ‘father’ but even ‘bringing
to birth’ – he employs here is meant to draw clear parallels between metaphysics and
biological reproduction. (A brief look at other passages would show that Proclus is
equally comfortable recasting metaphysical agents as ‘wombs’ being inseminated.)70
Most importantly, the sexualized understanding of metaphysics on view here fol-
lows the lines that were suggested above: the male is the source of processional
activity, and the female both receives the processional activity of the male and
employs her own procreative powers to complete the offspring. This, as indicated
and as will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, is the basic framework within
which Neoplatonists will seek to explain biological reproduction.
The Biological Development of the Theory of Forms

Before turning to the specifics of these biological theories, some additional back-
ground will be required on another central aspect of Neoplatonic metaphysics: the
theory of Forms. In the hands of these later Platonists, the theory of Forms becomes
crucial to explaining biological generation, even though the biological relevance
of the theory in Plato is at best ambiguous (despite Aristotle’s suggestion that the
theory of Forms was supposed to help explain reproduction).71 In Chapter 1,

we already took note of one instance of this ambiguity in the Timaeus. There we
saw that Plato, on the one hand, describes the intelligible world as a paradigm that
contains in itself Forms of all the living things that come to be in the cosmos.72 On
the other hand, when he comes to describe the generation of the original human
being, there is no indication that the Form of Human Being has any influence at all
on the generated gods responsible for its creation, nor that this Form has any role
to play in the subsequent reproduction of human beings.73

To this may be added a further point on the well-known broader ambiguities
and tensions surrounding Plato’s statements regarding the scope of the theory of
Forms. Even in the Timaeus Plato’s broad approval of Forms of natural kinds such
as animals and the elements is not worked out in any detail. He speaks of ‘all the
living things that were to have come to be’ within the sensible cosmos being con-
tained in the intelligible model,74 but this is spelled out only in terms of four very
general kinds, each corresponding to one of the four elements.75 Are we, therefore,
to conclude that there is only a single Form of all birds, that is ‘the kind that has
wings and travels through the air,’ or are there distinct Forms for each species of
bird?76 Likewise, is there a Form of Plant, or even distinct Forms corresponding
to different species of plants? One might think there must be at least one Form
corresponding to plants, since plants, too, are acknowledged to be ‘living things’
in the Timaeus.77 Yet plants are not described as contributing to the completion of
the sensible universe qua image of the intelligible model, rather they are simply
created out of the necessity for nourishment to replenish proper living things.78
The answers to these and similar questions are left unstated in the Timaeus, and the
Parmenides famously raises still further difficulties.There the young Socrates notori-
ously declares that he is uncertain whether there are Forms of natural kinds such as
human being and fire.79 Moreover, he emphatically denies that there are any Forms
corresponding to ‘any of the most ignoble and trivial things’ (τι α’ τιμότατόν τε καὶ
φαυλότατον).80 This denial is significant because of its implications in two areas.
First, even if it is conceded that there are Forms of living things, (despite Socrates’
uncertainty), the scope of this concession might be limited to noble and non-trivial
living things, which could exclude things such as worms and flies. Second, since
one of the examples given of this ignoble and trivial class is hair,81 questions are
raised about the possibility of Forms corresponding to parts of living things, and
especially to more ignoble and trivial parts. In short, the theory of Forms, such as
it is found in Plato’s dialogues, leaves much room for subsequent development, in
terms of both the scope and specificity of the Forms as well as their efficacy in
biological generation.
It was above all the metaphysics of procession and reversion along with the
resulting ontological hierarchy that allowed later Platonists to address each of these
issues effectively. We have already had the opportunity to review how the Intellect
together with the object of its thought, the Forms, timelessly arises via the two acts
of procession from and reversion back towards the One.82 The rest of the Plotinian
story of how procession and reversion ultimately lead to the generation of the
sensible world will already be familiar to most readers, but a brief review of a few
salient points will help to show how the theory of Forms was developed in such
a way as to become an integral part of biological explanations. It follows from the
PNP principle that the Intellect must also produce an image of itself, which again
will establish itself in being by reverting back to its source. What results is Soul,
which – again by PNP – must in turn create an image of itself, which we may iden-
tify here as the World-Soul. This World-Soul is usually seen as having two parts, a
higher part that transcends the sensible world, and a lower part, often called ‘nature,’
that is both responsible for creating the sensible world and is immanent in it. What
is important for our current concerns is that the same content that is present to the
Intellect is present to each of these three derivative entities – Soul, nature and the
sensible world – though in a sequentially derivative way that is appropriate to these
lower ontological levels. Thus, between the Form of Fire in Intellect and the sen-
sible fire in the cosmos there are two intermediary formal principles of fire at the
level of Soul and nature – these formal principles are generally referred to as logoi83
– where this derivativeness is spelled out in terms of increasing plurality, complexity,
and specificity. While there is, for example, presumably exactly one Form of Fire at
the level of the Intellect, there is a variety of kinds of fire in the sensible world, each
existing in different quantities and places and at different times.84
Armed with this theory of derivative formal principles, the Neoplatonists are
in a position to address the questions surrounding both the scope of the theory of
Forms and their causal efficacy in the sensible world with great sophistication. The
causal efficacy of the Forms can now be accounted for via nature – both the uni-
versal nature of the entire cosmos and the individual natures belonging to particular
living things – since nature is an agent that is both immanent in the sensible world
and contains formal principles that are ultimately derived from the Forms. It is for
the most part at this level of nature and vegetative soul that biological generation
takes place, and the next chapter will offer sufficient opportunity to examine this in
more detail. What this means for our current concerns is that as we now approach
the question regarding the scope and specificity of the theory of Forms from a
biological perspective, we should be focusing above all on the scope and specificity
of the formal principles at the level of nature, since these will be the ones directly
involved in biological generation.
Regarding the existence of a Form of Human Being, later Platonists show none
of the hesitancy of the Parmenides’ young Socrates. There is without question a
Form of Human Being,85 and as this Form is passed down to Soul and then to
nature, it unfolds to provide the content that becomes relevant only at these lower
ontological levels. This unfolding leads to formal principles corresponding to the
parts of the human body, as Proclus tells us in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides:
As for the parts of animals, shall we say that there are also Ideas of them, so
as to make a paradigm not only of man but also of the finger, the eye, and
every other part? Since in general each of them is clearly a substance, let us
admit that they exist by virtue of a cause, but since they are parts, not wholes,
they are inferior to indivisible intellectual being […] Perhaps, then, it would
be correct to say that of all such things as are parts, there are no intellectual
causes [νοερὰ αἴτια] […] but only psychic and natural causes, for division
takes place first in souls, next in natures. Here then, in souls at least, there is a
reason-principle or form of finger, tooth, and every other part.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 825,
26–826,11, Morrow–Dillon translation)86
In other words the metaphysics of procession and reversion allows Proclus to

address the issue he sees being raised about the problem of Forms of parts when
Parmenides asks the young Socrates about the existence of a Form of Hair. His
response is that there are no Forms of human parts, but there is a Form of Human
Being that contains information about human body parts. As he argues, not only
are Forms of parts unnecessary; they are incompatible with the character of the intel-
ligible realm, which is essentially whole and indivisible. Thus, it would not be quite
right to say that the Form of Human Being contains hands as parts, as that would
compromise the unity and wholeness of the Forms, but we might say with Proclus
that the latter is contained in the former in a causal manner.87 This distinction
between Forms at the level of Intellect and formal principles at the level of nature
allows Proclus to account for the basic intelligibility of parts while preserving the
integrity of the intelligible world.
It should be emphasized that these formal principles are causally active. As we
shall see in the next chapter, these principles will in some sense be present in the
seed and will be responsible for carrying out the formation of the offspring’s parts,
though there is more to the story that is best postponed until the full examination
of Neoplatonic embryology. At this point, the more pressing questions concern
the scope and specificity of these formal principles. After all, if this set of principles
at the level of nature is responsible for the formation of an individual human off-
spring, it is fair to ask exactly how much of the individual formation can actually
be accounted for by them. In terms of the scope of these principles, this is to ask
whether there are principles corresponding to all parts of the human body, and in
terms of their specificity, this amounts to asking whether the variation in the shape
and size of parts that can be observed among different individual human beings can
also be accounted for by these principles. To answer these questions is to establish
the exact extent to which a given individual human body is an image of the Form
of Human Being.
Regarding the former question, Proclus is content with the blanket statement
that there are formal principles for all parts of the human body.88 Proclus’ teacher
Syrianus appears to have advanced the same view, crediting it to Iamblichus and
Plotinus.89 Plotinus had indeed already developed at length the thesis that there are
logoi at the level of nature that are derived from intelligible Forms but differ from
them in important ways,90 and he even appears to have focused his attention more
precisely on the Parmenidian problem of formal principles corresponding to less
reputable parts. He does not discuss Parmenides’ example of hair specifically, but he
does accept derivative logoi of analogous parts in other animals,91 and at one point
in Ennead 2.3 he grapples with the intelligibility of bile in human beings. This is
a particularly interesting example of a less reputable part given the disagreement
between Plato and Aristotle on the purposefulness of bile; that is, on the possibility
of bile being part of an intelligent plan. In the Timaeus Plato underlines the tradi-
tional association between bile and unpleasant bitterness,92 but he ultimately finds
a place for it in his teleological anthropology by proposing an account in which
bile does make a contribution to the whole: by manipulating the bitter bile, reason
is able to exert influence over the appetitive part of the soul.93 Aristotle explicitly
opposes the Platonic theory in his On the Parts of Animals,94 and concludes force-
fully that residues are the mere products of necessity and have no final causes.95
Thus, when Plotinus chooses ‘bile’ as his sole example to illustrate his claim that
all parts – even the most disreputable – contribute something to the whole, in this
case by serving the function of stirring up the spirited part of soul (following Plato’s
suggestion in the Timaeus),96 his intention might well be to establish that even the
lowliest parts of the human body correspond to formal principles at the level of
nature.97 This, in any case, is the conclusion reached by later Platonists, who include
both hair and bile among the parts accounted for by such principles.98
The latter question concerning the specificity of these formal principles is tanta-
mount to the notorious question concerning the existence of Forms of individuals,
and here again Plotinus appears to have done the groundwork for later Platonists.
His views on the existence of Forms of individuals have formed the object of a
number of studies arriving at strikingly different conclusions,99 and he is most often
characterized as having accepted such Forms – at least at some point in his career –
in contradistinction to the philosophers who both preceded and followed him in
the Platonic tradition who resoundingly rejected them.100 Yet his considered posi-
tion would not appear to be all that different from the rest of the Platonic tradition.
In Ennead 5.7 [18] On Whether There are Ideas of Particulars he does indeed advance
a theory of forms of individuals, but these are best not understood as intelligible
Forms residing in the Intellect on a par with the Forms of Human Being and
Beauty. For he is operating for the most part in this treatise at the level of nature,
and so the forms that correspond to individuals would also seem to belong to this
level.101 That is to say, he is thinking of the ‘form’ of Socrates as a bundle of logoi at
the level of nature, logoi that correspond to the particular features of his body’s parts.
That these logoi are not supposed merely to correspond to generic human parts is
made clear at several points. In an earlier treatise Plotinus stipulates a lower limit
on the level of specificity of these logoi. There are, he tells us, distinct logoi account-
ing for aquiline and snub noses, but that the differences between different shapes
of aquiline noses are no longer attributable to distinct logoi.102 And in Ennead 5.7
Plotinus appears prepared to lower this limit still further so that all of one’s visible
features are accounted for, concluding that all the features of identical twins are due
to the same bundle of logoi.103
These, then, are the general lines of development that made the theory of Forms
not only relevant but essential to human reproduction. Although at the level of
Intellect there is only the unitary Form of Human Being, this Form unfolds over
the subsequent strata to such an extent that at the level of nature formal principles
exist of such specificity and scope as to account for all the parts of the human body
in all (or perhaps nearly all) of their particularity.There is, however, one general class
of exceptions. Neoplatonists denied that any deformities were fully attributable to
formal principles, maintaining rather that such cases were to be explained by the
failure of the natural formal principles to master matter, but a more comprehen-
sive discussion of Neoplatonic approaches to teratology may be deferred to a later

chapter.104
Although the generation of non-human living things falls outside of the scope
of this study, it may be remarked here that the development of the theory of Forms
with respect to non-human living things follows these same lines. As with human
beings, Neoplatonists accept the existence of Forms of non-human living things.105
To my knowledge none of them ever sets out to offer a comprehensive inventory
of Forms of living things, but this might well be because they implicitly accepted
Forms for all living things. Once again, however, the Parmenides’ problem of igno-
ble and trivial things shows its head, as any number of living things were viewed
as base and thus as possibly unworthy of inclusion in the Intellect. This goes in
particular for those animals that were seen to be parasitic on or in some other
way detrimental to human life, such as scorpions, serpents, and intestinal worms.106
Thus we may draw some general conclusions about the comprehensiveness of the
theory of Forms from what Platonists have to say about these problematic cases,
and the fact is that they show themselves to be concerned with accommodating
such living things within the theory.This can be seen, for example, in Plotinus, who
addresses the problem in several different treatises and concludes that such creatures
are ultimately derived from intelligible principles.107 He is able to circumvent their
alleged malignancy and count them as purposeful contributions to the universe by
appealing to our lack of a full understanding of the natural world. Thus, he urges
that even poisonous snakes ‘contribute something useful to the Whole […] though
the reason why they exist remains obscure to us.’108
This same commitment to inclusiveness can be witnessed in the remarks
Platonists make about two other classes occupying the lower end of the spectrum
of living things, namely plants and the animals that arise from putrefaction. Since
our focus is on the generation of human beings,109 we may restrict ourselves here to
the observation that in both cases we find Platonists acknowledging the existence
of intelligible formal principles. It is Proclus who delivers the most succinct state-
ment on the existence of Forms of plants: ‘each species of both animals and plants
is constituted from above in accordance with some intellectual paradigm,’110 and
this appears to be representative of a widely shared view among Neoplatonists.111
Even though it is often difficult to determine whether they envision a single Form
of Plant at the level of Intellect or a plurality of species Forms, they make very
clear that the generation of plants is causally accounted for by formal principles
ultimately derived from the Intellect, and the same can be said of the living things
generated by putrefaction.112
We may now summarize the results of this examination as follows. The

Neoplatonic metaphysics of procession and reversion along with the ontological
hierarchy entailed by it creates a framework in which the theory of Forms takes on
a crucial role in biology. Once Forms of human beings and other living things are
posited in the Intellect, it follows from the metaphysics of procession and reversion
that these Forms will unfold into a comprehensive set of formal principles at the
level of nature.These formal principles are wide-ranging enough to account for the
generation of all kinds of living things and their parts, and, barring deformities, they
are particular enough to account for most and perhaps even all of the features of
individuals. Moreover, these formal principles are active causes and as such respon-
sible for the formation of these living things. In the next chapter we shall see that
these active formal principles responsible for creating the body of the offspring are
contained in the male seed. This might appear to suggest that the male seed is a
self-sufficient agent of the formation of the offspring, but as the examination will
show, the full Neoplatonic account of embryogenesis is more complex and more
well balanced.
Notes
1 For a critical discussion of this label, see Berryman (2009).
2 This principle, also called the ‘prevalence principle’ or the ‘epikrateia mechanism,’ states
that the form of each of the offspring’s parts is determined by whichever of the two
parents’ seeds dominates over the other with respect to that part. See Lesky (1951: 73
and 83–5), and Lonie (1981: 126–30).
3 Nat. Puer. 17.1, 59, 9–13 (7.496, 17–20 L.), Lonie translation (and see his comments ad
loc. and at 150–2). And see Chapter 1, note 57.
4 See caveat in Introduction, note 4.
5 GA 729b14–21 and 730b8–15. Aristotle does claim to find some empirical corrobora-
tion for this claim in the generation of insects (GA 729b21–33), but his interpretation
of this data is equally influenced by this causal model. Cf. Meta. 988a1–7.
6 The full solution is nuanced and requires more exposition than can be provided here
(see Cooper (1988), Coles (1995) and Henry (2006a) and (2006b)), but the follow-
ing points should suffice to serve our immediate purposes. Although Aristotle repeat-
edly describes the female as being incapable of contributing a seed (GA 728a17–21;
732a7–11; 739a20–6; 749a15–16; 765b8ff. 766a30–4, b12–14, etc.), at several points
he labels the female menses as ‘seminal’ (GA 716a10–12; 728a26; 737a27–9; 750b4–5;
767b15–17; 771b20; 774a2–3; cf. 765b35–6).While the female’s cold nature is incapable
of completely concocting blood into a seed, it might be said to produce an imperfectly
concocted seed that contains the information needed to account for any resemblance
the offspring might bear to the mother (or her progenitors). In GA 4.3 Aristotle spells
this out by developing a theory of actual and potential motions in the male seed and the
female menses that correspond to all of one’s inheritable features, according to which
the female motions in the menses are all initially in a state of potentiality (768a13–14)
and so must be actualized by the male motions in the seed, where this actualization can
be seen as the completion of the concoction of the female seed. The case in which the
male motion actualizes the corresponding potential female motion is said to occur when
the male motion fails to ‘master’ (κρατεῖν) the matter, and this is generally because the
menses has not been adequately prepared (concocted) for the male seed (767b15–18).
The language of ‘mastering’ would already seem to betray a deviation from Aristotle’s
usual conception of matter. He hardly ever speaks of matter being ‘mastered’ by form
(cf. Meteor. 378b25–379a1 and 379b33), presumably because the term suggests a kind of
active resistance that does not suit his usual understanding of hylomorphism. Indeed, it
has been suggested that in the GA we encounter a new conception of matter that differs
considerably from that of the Phys. and Meta. precisely in its being more active (Happ
(1971: 748) and Connell (2001: 314)).
7 Plotinus Enn. 3.8.5.6–8; 4.8.6.7–9; 5.1.6.37–8 and 7.37–8; 5.2.1.7–9; 5.4.1.26–36. Cf.
Proclus El.Th. §25.
8 Plotinus Enn. 3.8.5.24–5; 4.7.83.9–11; 5.1.6.39 and 7.47–8; 5.2.2.1–4; 5.3.16.5–7;
5.5.13.37–8; 5.8.1.19–21; 6.7.17.4–6; Porphyry Sent. 13 and AG 6.2 (42.17–21);
Proclus El.Th. §7 and In Tim. 3.322, 1ff.; etc. The Neoplatonists understood Plato to be
advancing this principle at Phlb. 27a5–6 (cf. Proclus In Tim. 1.259, 26–260, 4). And see
Lloyd (1976). Cf. Aristotle DA 417a18–20 and 418a3–6; Meta. 1032a22–5.
9 See Enn. 2.4.2–5; 2.5.3; 5.1.3.23 and 5.1ff.; 5.4.2.4–10; 5.5.4.24–5.
10 For example Lloyd (1987) and Emilsson (2007: 70–8).
11 As Plotinus repeatedly maintains, the Dyad, while not being itself a multiplicity, is the
cause of multiplicity in the Intellect: ‘it is eternally receiving something else that is made
many in itself ’ (Enn. 5.3.11.3–4: α ’´λλо α’ εὶ λαμβάνων ἐν αὐτῷ πληθυνóμενоν.) Cf.
Enn. 5.3.11.7–8; 6.7.15.20–2; and 3.8.8.32–4. As Rist (1963: 99–102) shows, Plotinus’
conception of the Dyad as the cause of multiplicity without being multiplicity itself
comes closer to Plato’s own understanding of the Dyad (as presented by Aristotle at, for
example, Meta. 1091b30ff., 1092b1 and 1085b5ff.) than does Speusippus’, which appar-
ently identified the Dyad and multiplicity.
12 Plotinus Enn. 2.5.1.8–10; 2.5.3.28–31; 4.7.83.13–16; 5.1.3.11–15; 5.9.4.4–6; 5.9.5.1–4;
6.1.26.3–7. Cf. Proclus El.Th. §77; Proclus apud Philoponus Aet. Mund. 42.1–43.24.
13 Enn. 3.8.11.23–4; 5.3.10.48–11.8; 5.6.5.8–10; cf. 5.3.13.17–19. This description of the
One as the actualizing agent of the Pre-Intellect’s potentiality is prima facie at odds
with certain features of Plotinus’ account of the One, especially his use of the concept
of δύναμις in connection with the One. There are indeed puzzles here that need to
be worked out, but they do not undermine the account presented here. Regarding the
active sense of δύναμις when applied to the One, see Emilsson (2007: 30).
14 Enn. 3.8.11.1–8; 3.9.5; 5.1.5.18 and 6.42–8; 5.2.1.19–20; 5.3.10–11; 5.4.2; 5.5.7.
15 GA 716a13–17 and 21–2; HA 489a11–12; Cf. Plato’s Symp. 191c2–4: καὶ διὰ τоύτων
τὴν γένεσιν ἐν ἀλλήλоις ἐπоίησεν, διά τоῦ ἄρρενоς ἐν τῷ θήλει, and Proclus In Remp.
1.252,14–16.
16 As we saw above, its multiplicity results from its actualization. Cf. Enn. 3.8.10.6–10;
6.7.15.20–2. And see note 11.
17 Plato Tim. 50d2–4. Cf. Tim. 28c3; 37c7; 41a7; 42e7; 51a4–5; 71d5.
18 Ross translation with slight revision to reflect Jaeger’s text, which brackets τоὺς
ἀριθμоύς in line 22. (Ross brackets τὰ εἴδη instead.)
19 Aristotle Meta. 986a22–6. Kahn (2001: 65–6) suggests that the ‘jumbled’ collection of
moral and mathematical, concrete and abstract principles, together with the absence of
One-Dyad coupling, indicates a possible archaic origin of this table. Cf. Aristotle EN
1096b5–6 and 1106b29–30; DC 285a10–13. The various testimonies on the table of
opposites vary to some extent in length and content, and not all of them include the
male and the female, e.g. Plutarch Mor. 370E, though the commentators do generally
include male and female (Alexander In Meta. 41,35–42,3; Philoponus In Phys. 360,26–8;
Asclepius In Meta. 36,12–20; Aspasius In EN 13,10–16; Simplicius In Phys. 181,22–30
(this is a quotation of Eudorus, on which see Kahn (2001: 97–8) and In Phys. 429,7–18).
20 For a recent discussion of the Neoplatonists’ interest in the poets and ‘theologians,’ see
the introduction to Marzillo (2010).
21 Proclus In Parm. 646,16–18, Morrow–Dillon translation. See also Theol. Plat. 1.2
(1.9,20ff.) and 1.4 (1.25,24ff.).
22 On Homer, see Lamberton (1986); on Hesiod, see Marzillo (2010).
23 Cf. Proclus Theol. Plat. 1.5 (1.25,26–7): ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ’ ῞Eλλησι θεоλоγία τ ης ̑
’Ορφικ ̑ης ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας ἔκγоνоς. For an excellent discussion of Proclus’ use and
interpretation of Orphic material, see Brisson (1987).
24 Orph. Fr. 132 (Damascius In Parm. 4.57,11–12). Cf. Orph. Fr. 1.694 (Aristophanes Aves
694), Orph. Fr. 243 and 224.13.
25 Orph. Fr. 85 (Proclus In Tim. 1.450,11). Cf. Orph. Fr. 183 and 224.19. On the identi-
fication of Metis and Phanes, see Brisson (1987: 56). In this connection it should also
be mentioned that preserved among the texts of this Orphic tradition is one fragment
dealing directly with some of the classic embryological questions: the embryo is formed
35 days after the seed is emitted into the womb, and the entire period of gestation is
seven months (Orph. Fr. 327 (Proclus In Remp. 2.33,14ff.)).
26 For an excellent brief introduction to the Chald. Or., see Finamore and Johnston (2010).
27 See Lewy (1978: 116).

28 See Finamore and Johnston (2010: 163–5) with reference to Brisson (2000: 147n93 and
151), and van den Berg (2001: 252–9).
29 On Hecate as a female principle in the Chald. Or. that unites receptivity and activity, see
Dillon (1986: 121–2). Unfortunately, Dillon’s study does not explore the development
of female principles beyond Middle Platonism.
30 Mazur (2009: 71): ‘[Plotinus] employs physiological terminology and concepts drawn
from contemporaneous embryology, and they frequently involve explicit reference to
aspects of biological reproduction, such as seed, sperm, conception, impregnation, labor
and birth […] the imagery of insemination and conception is crucial for the entire
system.’
31 See Sleeman and Pollet (1980: 199,12–201,30) for a full list of occurrences.
32 Enn. 2.9.2.4; 5.8.1.3; 5.8.13.5. For the Intellect, see Enn. 2.9.16.9; 5.1.1.1–2; 5.1.2.37;
5.1.3.14 and 21; 5.1.8.4–7. On the use of the term ‘father’ in Plotinus, see Ferwerda
(1965: 76–80).
33 παῖς: Enn. 3.8.11.38; 5.1.1.9; 5.8.12.9; 5.8.13.2; cf. 2.9.16.8 and 6.9.7.32; τóκоς: Enn.
5.8.12.3 and 6; κóρоς: Enn. 3.6.14.39–41.
34 Cf. Enn. 5.1.7.27, with reference to Plato Rep. 547a5 and Homer Il. 6.211.
35 Although hands, eyes, etc. are all distinct parts occupying different locations of the
human body, the principles of these parts, which Plotinus calls logoi, all exist together in
the seed. See also Enn. 2.6.1.10–12; 3.2.2.18–23; 3.7.11.23.27; 4.3.10.10–13; 4.7.5.42–
8; 4.9.3.16–18; 5.9.6.10–24. Plotinus’ understanding of seed will be discussed in greater
detail below.
36 For χωρεῖν, see, for example, the Hippocratic Genit. 46,8–9 (7.474,2–3 L.); cf. Genit.
49,14 (7.480,1–2 L.) and Nat. Puer. 83,19–21 (7.540,18–19 L.). I have found no
instances of πέμπειν in this sense.
37 For Aristotle, see Bonitz (1870: 638b30ff.). Galen De sem. 70,1 (4.518,3 K.). Plotinus
uses this term only twice in the relevant sense, once in a context about providence (Enn.
6.8.17.3) and once in a metaphysical context (Enn. 5.1.3.8–9), on which see below.
Note that πρоϊέναι in Sleeman-Pollet (1980: 896,34ff.) is πρόειμι (ibo) and not πρоΐημι.
38 For Aristotle, see Bonitz (1870: 128a14ff.) and cf. Galen De sem. 70,1 (4.518,3 K.) (cit-
ing Aristotle). Hippocratic Corpus: Genit. 45,20 (7.472,13 L.) and 47,4 (7.474,21 L.).
Plotinus only uses ἀφιέναι once in the relevant sense of ‘sending forth,’ but it is applied
to rivers.
39 This does not appear to be used by Aristotle in the relevant sense. Galen De facult.
natur. 108,23 (2.11,9–10 K.); De usu part. 2.304,18–19 (4.168,15 K.); De sem. 68,7
(4.516,10 K.); De propr. plac. 94,12; etc. Soranus Gyn. 1.10.28; 1.12.54; 1.12.126; etc. In
the Hippocratic corpus καταβάλλειν is used of the seed sown in the earth (Nat. Puer.
68,25 (7.514,11 L.)). καταβάλλειν occurs once in Plotinus (Enn. 3.2.1.4) but in a dif-
ferent context.
40 Aristotle GA 719b32; 738a1–2; 765b10–11 and 15; 787b30; Galen De usu part.
2.318,14–15 (4.186,12 K.); 2.319,7–14 (4.187,12–18 K.); De sem. 152,11 (4.601,7 K.);
[Galen] Def. med. 19.450,5 K. Likewise, ἔκκρισις. Neither occurs in the Enn.
41 For example Hippocratic Genit. 44,14 (7.470,14–15 L.); 47,18 (7.476,7 L.); Galen De
sem. 70,20 (4.519,12 K.); 136,25 (4.586,7 K.); 150,26–7 (4.600,9–10 K.); for Aristotle
see Bonitz (1870: 82a9ff. esp. 26–30); Soranus Gyn. 1.20.30; Likewise, σπέρματος
α’ πόκρισις: Soranus Gyn. 1.9.9; Galen De usu part. 2.345,8–9 (4.222,8–9 K.); De sem.
204,11 (4.649,11 K.); etc.; for Aristotle see Bonitz (1870: 82b3ff.). Hippocratic Genit.
46,1 (7.472,18 L.). Plotinus uses α’ πoκρίνειν only once, at Enn. 4.3.23.44 of the secre-
tion of blood. α’ πόκρισις does not occur in the Enn.
42 For example Galen De usu part. 2.302,13–14 (4.165,17 K.); 2.302,22 (4.166,7 K.);
2.318,9 (4.186,7 K.); De sem. 86,18 (4.536,9 K.); etc.; [Galen] Def. med. 19.450,6–7 K.;
Porphyry AG 9.4 (46,3–4); [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 19,8; etc. σπερμαίνειν does not
occur in the Enn.
43 For example Hippocratic Genit. 46,24 and 47,3 (7.474,16 and 20 L.); 48,12 (7.478,1–2
L.); Diogenes Laertius VP 7.158 (SVF 2.741); [Galen] Def. med. 19.371,1 K. and
19.450,3 K. (SVF 2.742); Soranus Gyn. 1.11.61 and 1.12.6–7. μεθιέναι occurs twice in
the Enn. at 6.2.3.31 and 6.2.22.18, where the first is not in the relevant sense and the
second is a quotation of Plato Phlb. 16e1–2.
44 Enn. 5.1.3.8–9: αυ’ τὴ [i.e. ἡ ψυχή] λόγoς νoῦ καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια καὶ ἣν πρoΐετaι ζωὴν
εἰς ἄλλoυ ὑπóστασιν.
45 ἐκκρίνειν and ἀπoκρίνειν have strong connotations of diminishment, and compounds
of ἵημι have a stronger element of volition and/or effort than does, for example,
έλλάμπειν or ῥεῖν. Cf. the use of ἐκρεῖν in Galen to denote semen leaking out either in
the sense of gonorrhea (Galen De loc. aff. 8.439,11–18 K.) or in the sense of the male
seed not being retained by the female (De simpl. medicament. temp. 12.250,5–7 K.; cf.
Soranus Gyn. 3.15.11–15).
46 συλλαμβάνειν does not occur in the Enn. in the relevant sense, see Sleeman–Pollet
(1980: 953, 20–34).
47 The one instance of σύλληψις (Enn. 4.4.30.12) is neither employed in the same sense
nor in a metaphysical context.
48 κύησις occurs once at Enn. 2.3.14.35 in reference to a human conception. Likewise
for κύειν at 2.3.14.32–3. The only possibly significant use of the term κύειν comes at
4.7.13.7, where Plotinus describes the Soul as being ‘pregnant’ with the intelligible
content, but there is still no talk of sexual intercourse in this passage. See the discussion
of Enn. 5.1.7.27–38 below.
49 None of these terms is to be found in the manuscripts of the Enn. H–S2 conjecture
μητρῶν for μητέρων at Enn. 4.3.7.29, but the context here is about actual women and
wombs and not metaphysical principles.
50 Plotinus often uses ὑποδοχή, which can refer to the womb or the reception of seed in
embryological discussions (e.g. the Hippocratic Mul. I §217 (8.422,14 L.); Galen De usu
part. 2.288,2 (4.147,3 K.); Aristotle GA 722b14), of matter (see Sleeman–Pollet (1980:
ad loc.)), but he is surely employing this expression with an eye to Plato Tim. 49a6,
where it has the more generic sense of ‘receptacle.’The same goes for ὑποδέχεσθαι (e.g.
the Hippocratic Aer. 72,5 (2.76,6 L.); Galen De sem. 144,11 (4.594,2–3 K.) and χώρα
(Aristotle HA 541a2–3; again in Plotinus with reference to Tim. 52a–b, see Sleeman–
Pollet (1980: ad loc.))
51 As has been pointed out (Mazur (2009: 71–2 with note 24)), Aristotle does use these
terms to denote impregnation (e.g. GA 718b4; 751a15; HA 541a13; etc.), but this is not
their primary sense. In the Hippocratic Genit., Nat. Puer. and Morb. IV, Superf., Oct. and
Septim. these terms are only used in other contexts, if at all (cf. Hipp. Mul. I §1 (8.10,17
L.)), and the same is true of Galen’s De sem., De foet. form. and De uteri dissect.
52 See Sleeman and Pollet (1980: 660,6–24).The term ‘mother’ does appear in the context
of his critique of Gnosticism, but there it is not referring to the Dyad (2.9.12.3 and 9).
53 Evelyn-White translation.
54 Lamberton (1986: 104–5) translation. The other passages in which Plotinus makes ref-
erence to this myth also omit all reference to the female counterparts: 3.8.11.35–45;
3.8.12.7–13; 3.8.13.1–11; 5.5.3.16–24. Cf. Plotinus’ remarks on Zeus at 5.5.3.16–25.
55 See Pépin (1955: 21–7); Lamberton (1986: 104–6). Cf. Hadot (1981).
56 Presumably Plotinus is playing on the association between Rhea (ʽΡέα) and flux (ῥεῖ),
the idea being that what falls into matter is subject to change. Cf. SVF 2.1084.
57 Notable are Plotinus’ remarks on Pandora (4.3.14) and Heracles (1.1.12.35–9). For a
discussion of these and other instances of appropriation in the Enn., see Lamberton
(1986) and Pépin (1955).
58 See p. 38–9ff.
59 For Plotinus’ acquaintance with the Chald. Or., which is generally held to be very lim-
ited or perhaps even non-existent, see Dillon (1992), who concludes that Plotinus ‘had
actually perused the Chaldaean Oracles […] but that he derived from them no more than
the memory of certain striking turns of phrase’ (140). See also Majercik (1998).
60 See also the preceding and following passages, Theol. Plat. 1.28 (1.121,21–122,3 and
1.123,1–15).
61 These associations are also found elsewhere in Proclus. Regarding the male and
unity, see e.g. In Remp. 1.193,12–13; 1.246,10–11; Theol. Plat. 3.14 (3.51,1–2); 3.21
(3.74,1–8); 4.10 (4.33,12–13); 4.28 (4.81,14–16); 4.30 (4.91,6–26); 5.16 (5.54,3–17);
5.37 (5.135,9–10); El. Th. §151; In Crat. §149 (85,2–3); In Tim. 1.302,23–5; In Parm.
782,3–6. Regarding the male and procession, see, for example, In Remp. 1.205,1–3; In
Tim. 2.130,14–15; Theol. Plat. 5.37 (5.138,19); In Parm. 936,13–15. Sometimes Proclus
associates procession with the female rather than the male in order to emphasize the
abiding nature of the male (e.g. In Remp. 1.135,14–17; Theol. Plat. 5.13 (5.43,14–16);
In Crat. §149 (85,2–3); In Tim. 1.220,8–10; 3.180,26–8), but in these cases the female
appears to be associated with procession in the limited sense of causing the procession
from the abiding male.
62 This is made clear by Proclus calling it ‘an object of its offsprings’ desire.’
63 Thus Proclus often makes the connection between female principles (mothers) and
matter (e.g. In Remp. 2.204,26–205,27; 2.227,5–8; Theol. Plat. 4.10 (4.33,17–34,3); In
Tim. 1.384,16–22) and with reception from higher principles (e.g. Theol. Plat. 5.37
(5.138,19–20); In Remp. 1.205,1–3; In Tim. 2.130,14–15). So, too, with multiplicity, e.g.
In Remp. 1.135,15–17; 1.246,11–13; Theol. Plat. 1.28 (1.122,24 and 1.123,12–13); 4.28
(4.81,14–16); 4.30 (4.91,6–8); 5.11 (5.36,20–30).
64 Proclus makes the connection between perfective causes and reversion clear on many
occasions, e.g. In Remp. 1.136,23–6; 2.21,15–19; 2.120,26–8; Theol. Plat. 1.22 (1.104,
15–16); 4.24 (4.72,10–12); El. Th. §153 (134,34–5); In Alc. 53,7–8; 235,13–15; In Parm.
944,27; In Crat. §112 (65,6–7); §185 (111,26–112,4); In Tim. 2.222,27–9; 2.223,16–20;
2.271,10–11. In several other passages Proclus also associates this perfective activity with
the mother in contradistinction to the father, e.g. In Parm. 909,1–8 and In Crat. §178
(104,3–5). At In Alc. 122,8–17 Proclus distinguishes once between the two aspects of
the female, but this time he calls only this perfective aspect the ‘mother’ and the other is
called ‘receptacle.’ When we come to discuss the respective roles of the female and uni-
versal nature in actualizing the male seed, In Alc. 72,1–4 will be of particular interest (see
Chapter 3). For the female as the cause of reversion, see also In Remp. 1.134,17–135,17,
where Proclus describes the female’s reception from the male as a kind of reversion.
65 Theol. Plat. 1.28 (1.122,12–13). This is reaffirmed elsewhere, e.g. In Tim. 1.220,4–8; In
Crat. §107 (58,24–59,8).
66 In Remp. 1.134,12–15; 1.137,4–5; 1.193,12–14; 2.204,29–205,14; Theol. Plat. 4.10
(4.33,17–34,23); 4.27 (4.79,16–25); 4.29 (4.86,21–3); 4.31 (4.94,4–5); 5.32 (5.118,7–
10); 5.39 (5.144,4–5); El. Th. §152 (cf. §151); In Crat. §112 (65,2–3); §145 (82,28–9);
§167 (91,16–25); In Tim. 1.220,4–26; In Eucl. 150,6–12. Cf. Theol. Plat. 2.9 (2.58,17–
19); In Parm. 782,3–6; In Tim. 2.242,12–14; 2.257,3–5; 3.175,23–31.
67 Theol. Plat. 4.10 (4.33,17–18): Θηλυπρεπὴς γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τάξις αὕτη καὶ γόνιμος καὶ
δυνάμεσι νοηταῖς τὰ πάντα παράγουσα. See also In Remp. 2.204,29–205,14; In Crat.
§167 (91,16–25); In Tim. 1.220,4–26; and In Parm. 782,3–6.
68 See, for example, Theol. Plat. 5.11 (5.36,10–12); 5.12 (5.41,1–6); In Tim. 1.220,9.
69 Plato Phdr. 247c3.
70 Passages such as these presumably show the influence of the Chaldean Oracles and the
Orphic tradition, in which the womb also featured prominently (see p. 38–9): In Remp.
2.205,2 and 16; Theol. Plat. 1.28 (1.123,5); 4.36 (4.106,1); 5.11 (5.36,5 and 13 and 38,2);
5.16 (5.56,25); 5.20 (5.76,1); 5.22 (5.83,19); 5.27 (5.101,14); 5.37 (5.138,23). A particu-
larly striking reference to the womb is found at In Crat. §167 (91,17–19), where Proclus
recasts the womb itself as a giving source rather than a receptacle.
71 See Aristotle Meta. 1070a26–8.
72 Tim. 39e3–40a2, esp. 39e4–5 (cf. 31a4–5). Plato also accepts Forms of elements (51bff.,
and cf. 39e–40a along with the Soph. 266b) and of the cosmos as a whole, which is also
a living thing (30c2–31b3).

73 See Chapter 1, p. 25.
74 Tim. 39e4–5: τὰ πάντα ζῷα ἐντὸς αὑτοῦ γεγενημένα, Zeyl translation.
75 Tim. 39e10–40a2.
76 Tim. 39e10–40a1, Zeyl translation. Cornford (1937: 40n2) sees οὗ δ’ ἔστιν τἆλλα ζῷα
καθ’ ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια at Tim. 30c6 as evidence that Plato envisioned Forms of
individual species. This reading had already been proposed by Atticus (apud Proclus In
Tim. 1.425,11–16 (Atticus Fr. 33)). Cf. also Aristotle Meta. 1060a15–16.
77 Tim. 77b1–2. See also Plato Phd. 110d3–4 on the presence of plants on the ‘true’ earth
(cf. Plotinus Enn. 5.8.3.32–4), Polit. 274d2 on seeds and plants being provided by the
gods, and Rep. 532c1 on seeing plants outside of the cave.
78 Moreover, plants do not fit into the four general kinds, since the members of the prima
facie appropriate kind – the kind corresponding to living things on earth – are said not
just to live on land but to have feet (πεζὸν, Tim. 40a1–2), which plants do not have.
79 Parm. 130c1–4.
80 Parm. 130c5–d3. This is reinforced by Plato at Soph. 249a2 (and cf. Aristotle Meta.
1074b17–18), where being is said to be σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγιον.
81 Parm. 130c6.
82 See earlier in this chapter, pp. 35–6.
83 For a fuller discussion of logoi in Neoplatonism, see Brisson (1999) and Lautner (2009).
84 See Wilberding (2006: 215–18).
85 For example Alcinous Didask. §12 (167,1–8); Asclepius In Meta. 80,14–15; 93,2–5;
428,1–4; Damascius In Parm. 3.90,12 (2.182,5–6 Ruelle); 4.77,7 (2.288,7 Ruelle);
Hermias In Phdr. 121,1–2 (115,28–9 Courveur); Philoponus In Phys. 225,29–226,11;
Plotinus Enn. 5.9.14.18–19; 6.6.8.5; Proclus In Parm. 707,16–18; 812,7–13; In Tim.
1.439,24–5; 2.132,17–23; Syrianus In Meta. 39,8–28; 111,27–112,6; 113,33–7.
86 On this passage, see Dörrie and Baltes (1987–2008, vol. 5: 338ff.) and d’Hoine
(2006:162–4), which I found helpful for this discussion. See also Proclus In Parm.
973,12–27.
87 See El.Th. §65 and d’Hoine (2006: 164) and in general Baltzly (2008) and Lloyd (1982).
88 ἑκάστου τῶν τοιούτων (Proclus In Parm. 825,28) and ἑκάστου τούτων (826,11). And
see d’Hoine (2006:162–4).
89 See Syrianus In Meta. 8,17–20 and 107,14–18, on which see Dörrie and Baltes (1987–
2008, vol. 5: 338ff.). Cf. also Syrianus In Meta. 113,33–7 and Asclepius In Meta. 167,31–
4. As O’Meara and Dillon (2008: 120n55) note, Iamblichus appears to have treated this
topic in his lost commentary on the Parmenides.
90 See, for example, 2.3.16–17; 3.8.4; 5.1.6; 5.7 passim; 6.7.9. For this and what follows on
Plotinus, see Wilberding (2011b).
91 Plotinus Enn. 6.7.9.34–46, on which see Wilberding (2011b: 58–9).
92 See Tim. 82e–83e and 86e–87a. Plato forges a strong association between bile and dis-
ease, but since bile may be manipulated by reason, these diseases appear to provide the
means to their own cures.
93 Tim. 71b–d.
94 PA 676b22–5.
95 PA 677a15–18. Aristotle does, however, concede that in some cases nature is able to
make use of residues.
96 Plotinus Enn. 2.3.12.24–9. 2.3.12.12–32 has been put in brackets by Henry-Schwyzer
and Armstrong, on the grounds that it does not seem to be in tune with the rest of the
chapter. Beutler-Theiler transpose it to the conclusion of chapter 5, as do Ficino and
Perna. I would agree with those who think it out of place – indeed it strikes me as two
separate passages, breaking at 12.24 – but I do not see good reasons for doubting its
authenticity. Importantly, the remark about the function of bile clearly reflects Plotinus’
own views (cf. 4.4.28.35–43; 32.27–30; and 41.9–11).
97 In 2.3.16 Plotinus turns specifically to the issue of what parts of particular living things
are accounted for by logoi. He does not mention bile here, but 2.3.12.24–9 suggests that
it might well be in the back of his mind. See Wilberding (2011b: 60–3).
98 See the description of the logoi in the seed in Proclus In Tim. 1.396,8–26, which might
well be derived from Porphyry’s commentary on the Tim. (Porphyry In Tim. Fr. 51
(38,29–39,14)). This passage is cited and discussed in Chapter 3, p. 63. The language
here stops just short of explicitly positing principles for each of these parts. Proclus says
rather that there are principles that ‘cause [these parts] to exist’ (ὑφίστησι(ν) 1.396,11
and 18), but the implication would seem to be that these parts correspond to their own
proper logoi.
99 See Armstrong (1977); Blumenthal (1966); Mamo (1969); Rist (1963) and (1970);
Kalligas (1997); D’Ancona Costa (2002); Vassilopoulou (2006). See also Gerson (1994:
72–8). For a convenient summarizing characterization of recent solutions to this prob-
lem, see Tornau (2009: 337).
100 For a discussion of some of the evidence surrounding this issue, see Dörrie and Baltes
(1987–2008, vol. 5: 336ff., esp. 344n45). For a recent case of such a characterization,
see Baltzly (2008: 405n19): ‘[Proclus’] acceptance of the atomon as a maximally particu-
lar sort of universal is not yet to embrace a Plotinian notion of Forms of individuals.’
A notable exception appears to be Amelius, who (apud Syrianus In Meta. 147,2–6) is
reported to have accepted an infinite number of Forms. As Pieter d’Hoine has pointed
out to me, what kinds of Forms are meant here is a matter of some controversy, but
he has recently argued (d’Hoine (2010)) that this is best understood as a reference to
Forms of sensible individual living things (as opposed to Forms of individual souls). For
an alternative interpretation, see Brisson (1987: 831–6).
101 That the logoi at issue in 5.7 [18] are the logoi of a nature is clear from Plotinus’ descrip-
tion of them being the formal principles at work in matter (e.g. 5.7. 2, 11–12). Thus,
when these logoi fail to form the matter, the result is said to be para physin (5.7. 2, 14).
The embryological component of the treatise in chapters 2–3 also makes this clear, as
the seed is derived from the vegetative power of soul. Here I believe I am in agreement
with Remes’ excellent discussion in (2007: 76ff.). Remes ultimately describes forms
of individuals as ‘collections of logoi’ which ‘are forms only in a very loose sense of the
word […] they are logical parts of forms, that is, possibilities within the form of human
being’ (81). This opposes a widespread reading of Enn. 5.7, according to which Plotinus
is arguing that there are Forms of individuals at the level of Intellect but that these are
Forms of individual souls and not bodies (see, for example, d’Hoine (2006: 155). On the
reading being proposed here, Plotinus is focused on bodies and not souls and is estab-
lishing ‘forms’ of them but at the level of nature and not Intellect.
102 Plotinus 5.9.12.4–12.
103 Plotinus 5.7.3.3–6. In the sequel (3.6–7) Plotinus even entertains the suggestion that
even with identical twins there will be differences in the logoi that simply cannot be
perceived in the body, and Damascius may be agreeing with him at De princ. 3.5,10–13.
104 Neoplatonic explanations of terata are explored in Chapter 5. One issue that cannot
be pursued here is accounting for inheritable disease. Marinus relates (VPr 31) that
Proclus was concerned that he had inherited arthritis, and cf. e.g. In Tim. 1.99,17; In
Tim. 1.396,10ff.
105 See especially Proclus In Parm. 823,12–824,8, and cf. Alcinous Didask. §12 (167,1–8);
Asclepius In Meta. 80,14–15; 167,31–4; 428,1–4; Damascius De princ. 3.7,17-21; 3.36,3–
9; 2.179,2–6; 2.198,11–18; In Parm. 4.77,7 (2.288,7 Ruelle); Iamblichus In Tim. Fr. 43;
Plotinus Enn. 6.7.7–11; Proclus In Remp. 2.337,23–38,6; In Parm. 735,5–9; 812,7–13;
916,12–17,16; In Tim. 1.425,11–426,25; 1.439,24–5; 2.132,17–23.
106 Galen (De foet. form. 104,25–106,1 (4.700,17–701,6 K.)) picks out such examples as a
problem for making the World-Soul responsible for the generation of all living things,
since this would border on blasphemy. Later Platonists did not agree with the charge of
blasphemy. See Wilberding (2011b: 67).
107 Plotinus Enn. 5.9.10–12, 6.7.7–11, and 2.3.16–18. Cf. 4.4.29.35. For a more detailed
discussion of the relevant passages, see Wilberding (2011b: 67–72).
108 Plotinus Enn. 2.3.18.4–5.
109 I have explored these issues in Wilberding (2011b), (2012) and (2015a).
110 Proclus In Parm. 824,3–4. See also Proclus In Parm. 792,26–793,3; 811,26–812,2; and
In Tim. 1.385,3–9.
111 See, for example, Plotinus Enn. 5.1.4.1–10; 5.8.3.30–4; 6.7.11; Asclepius In Meta.
181,13–16; Damascius In Parm. 3.43,15–17 (2.155,3–5 Ruelle); 4.122,16–123,2
(2.314,26–315,6 Ruelle); De princ. 2.119,5–6 (1.163,7–8 Ruelle); Syrianus In Meta.
33,22–34; Simplicius In Phys. 313,10–12. Cf. Porphyry Sent. 10.
112 See, for example, Asclepius In Meta. 398,9–13; 407,16–18; 408,2–27; Syrianus In Meta.
186,3–14; Philoponus In DA 52,13–25; 227,1–5; In GC 84,8–12.
3
NEOPLATONIC EMBRYOLOGY
The Core Theory
The main aim of this central chapter is to reconstruct the embryological theory
advanced by the Neoplatonists. To be sure, there are some differences of opinion
on certain aspects of the theory, but it will be argued that it is possible to discern
a number of tenets that reappear consistently in Neoplatonic texts and that col-
lectively may be described as the core of Neoplatonic embryology. These are: (i)
there is a single, male seed; (ii) this seed is a collection of immaterial form-prin-
ciples in a state of potentiality; and finally (iii) these principles must be actualized
by an external agent, who is usually identified with the mother. To these a fourth
tenet may be added, which is no less prevalent but which is somewhat subordi-
nate to the others, namely (iv) that other cosmic factors, including but not limited
to the stars, also have a role to play in the formation of the embryo. A final central
tenet, that (v) the individual soul must be provided from outside, which is to say
that the offspring’s soul is not derived from the parents but descends into the off-
spring’s body from another source at the appointed time, which is usually taken
to be at birth, will be examined in Chapter 4, since it is possible to detect some
difference of opinion on the overall manner of animation. In this chapter each
of the first four tenets will be explored in turn, and in each case Porphyry’s Ad
Gaurum will be taken as the starting point of the investigation, since this is the
most comprehensive and systematic treatment of embryology by a Neoplatonist
and it encompasses all of these core tenets.
The One-seed Theory

One of the more surprising features of the Ad Gaurum is that Porphyry nowhere
explicitly engages with the issue of whether there is a female seed, despite the fact
that this issue was a common topos in ancient embryology.1 In fact, the same may
be said of all the Neoplatonists, which may be taken as an indication of a lack of
Neoplatonic embryology: the core theory 59
genuine engagement on their part with the medical tradition,2 though this omission
is more striking in the Ad Gaurum given its length and decidedly embryological
focus. Porphyry rather takes the sole existence of the male seed as a pre-established
starting point of his discussion.3 His reasons for doing so surely include that this
is the view more solidly established in the philosophical tradition, having been
advanced by Aristotle and the Stoics,4 and Porphyry presumably understood this to
be the view expressed in Plato’s Timaeus. For although he never explicitly attributes
this view to the Timaeus, he is broadly concerned to show that the theory he
advances in the Ad Gaurum is in harmony with Plato’s views.5 Yet it is likely that the
metaphysical framework of procession and reversion also drew Porphyry and other
Neoplatonists to this view. For as we saw in the previous chapter, this framework
invites an understanding of the male’s contribution to reproduction modeled after
the One’s processional activity and of the female’s contribution in terms of recep-
tion and actualization.6 We shall see the influence of this framework coming to the
fore in the discussion of the following two tenets.
Although the later Platonists do not acknowledge this to be a contentious issue,
their commitment to the one-seed theory may be inferred from concise descrip-
tions of conception and insemination that refer to the mother as receiving a seed
(in the singular) and herself providing matter. Such descriptions can be found in
the writings of nearly all Neoplatonists, including Ammonius, Asclepius, Damascius,
Proclus, Simplicius, and Syrianus.7 There are two individuals, however, whose com-
mitment is more ambiguous, though I believe that they, too, are best understood
as endorsing the one-seed theory. The first is Plotinus. Plotinus never explicitly
mentions a seed contributed by the female, nor does he appear to view the menses
as seminal.8 At times it certainly looks like he is envisioning the father as the sole
provider of the offspring’s form. At Ennead 3.1.1.32–35, for example, he bluntly
declares the father to be the cause of the child, while the mother is a mere auxiliary
cause (συνεργόν), and in Ennead 2.3.14.31–32 the mother is mentioned not as a
contributor at all but as a possible obstacle to the offspring’s natural development.
All of this would seem to suggest that Plotinus subscribes to the one-seed theory.Yet
in Ennead 5.7, which is without doubt his most embryologically minded treatise, he
describes the offspring as coming about from ‘mixtures’ (μίξεις) of male and female
form-principles, with the resemblance to one or the other parent being deter-
mined by which contribution ‘prevails over’ (κρατεῖ) the matter.9 This language
is typical of two-seed theories, according to which the male and female seeds are
mixed in such a way that each may dominate in certain respects thereby account-
ing for the resemblances to both parents.10 It may well be, then, that Plotinus in
this treatise is thinking of reproduction in terms of a two-seed theory, but, as we
shall see on pp. 65–7,11 Porphyry is able to integrate this language of ‘mixture’ and
‘prevalence’ into his one-seed account, and it is possible that Plotinus was already
thinking along these lines. The second somewhat problematic case concerns John
Philoponus. We will have the opportunity to explore Philoponus’ embryology in
more detail below,12 but for now it suffices to draw attention to a single passage
in his commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption in which he prima
60 Neoplatonic embryology: the core theory
facie accepts a female seed in addition to the menses. Here he gives an example of
the coincidence of causes, beginning with the very first causes of a human being:
If then there happens to be such-and-such a seed from the father, and such-
and-such a seed and blood from the mother [καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς σπέρμα
καὶ αἷμα τοιόνδε] (for they say that blood stands for matter, and seed for the
efficient cause).
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation

and Corruption 295,24–27, Kupreeva translation)
In light of Philoponus’ demonstrable medical background, and in particular his

knowledge of Galen’s work,13 this passage might suggest that he bucked the
Neoplatonic trend and uniquely sided with current medical theory by advancing a
two-seed theory. Elsewhere, however, he consistently describes the starting point of
human generation in terms of a single seed plus the menses,14 and at several points
he indicates that he is not even thinking of the menses as a seminal contribution.15
Given the evidence, therefore, it is reasonable to disregard the above passage as an
anomaly, perhaps one indeed of emendation,16 and to attribute a one-seed theory
to Philoponus.
The Origin and Nature of the Seed

Given Plato’s clear nod to the encephalo-myelogenic theory in the Timaeus, it is
perhaps a bit surprising that the Neoplatonists collectively show little interest in
establishing the exact corporeal origin of the seed. Still more surprising is that
none of those who do consider the issue declare their allegiance to Plato’s view
(though neither do they acknowledge any disagreement).17 This certainly cannot
be due to a lack of attention to the Timaeus, a text of fundamental importance to
the Neoplatonists. If anything, it might well have been the result of a particularly
close reading of the Timaeus. For as we saw above, in the Timaeus the marrow
is actually presented simply as a material receptacle for the true seed, which
was identified with soul.18 As a result, later Platonists might not have viewed
the make-up and origin of this receptacle to be an issue of any real importance,
which is reflected in a number of generic descriptions of the material basis of the
seed. Plotinus, for example, twice describes the material basis of the seed, which
he tells us is not the important part, simply as ‘something moist,’19 and Pseudo-
Simplicius strikes a similar tone when he reports several views without taking
sides.20 Yet at least some Neoplatonists seized on this as an opportunity to revise
Plato’s theory – whether to bring it back in line with current medical theory or
simply to harmonize it with Aristotle’s theory – by introducing a hematogenous
generation of seed. This is what Porphyry does in the Ad Gaurum with some
subtlety when he offers the transformation of blood into seed as an example of
a bodily process that takes place within us without our perceiving it,21 and some
others follow suit.22
Neoplatonists demonstrate a much greater interest in establishing the origin

and nature of the non-material aspect of the seed, and it is here that we begin
to see the importance of the metaphysical model of procession and reversion. In
our exploration of this model in the preceding chapter, we saw how it suggests an
embryological application in which the male’s emission of seed is likened to the
activity of procession. Thus, according to the PIP principle (see Chapter 2), we
should expect the male seed to be an inferior image of the father and in particular
an image that is still in a state of unity and potentiality. Here we shall see that the
Neoplatonists meet this expectation by conceiving of the seed as a unified collec-
tion of form-principles that are still in a state of potentiality.
In the Ad Gaurum Porphyry underlines the importance of the PIP principle to
embryology, and provides some important details about its application to embryol-
ogy. He introduces the principle in chapter six:
But one should realize that this too is certainly going to be said in conformity
with Plato. For according to him the things that have been engendered from
the substances of some things are always a step down from the things that had
engendered them in terms of power and substance, and it is impossible for
them to be of the same substance as the things that engendered them.
(Ad Gaurum 6.2 (42,17–21))23
Porphyry then illustrates the PIP principle in terms of the successive powers or
kinds of soul. Intellect (νοῦς) generates discursive reason (διάνοια), which is inferior
to intellect insofar as it is not able to comprehend all things at once. Likewise, the
offspring of discursive reason is the non-rational power of sensation (ἡ ἀλογία),
which itself is not able to reason discursively, and its offspring in turn is the veg-
etative power (ἡ φυτική), which does not partake in sensory judgments and
representation.24 This vegetative soul, which Porphyry also identifies with nature,25
is traditionally associated with nourishment, growth, and reproduction, and it is
the agent responsible for the production of the seed, and by extending the applica-
tion of the PIP principle to this activity of production, Porphyry is able to draw
the conclusion that the power of soul in the seed is inferior even to the vegetative
power. In this way he not only determines the specific identity of the agent within
the male responsible for the production of the soul-principle in the seed but also
spells out the manner in which this soul-principle is inferior to the vegetative soul:
‘And for this reason the vegetative power in us generated something worse than
itself, the seed, since it lacks actual movement’ (Ad Gaurum 14.3 (54,12–13), cf. 3.1
(36,16–18)).
Yet Porphyry also seems to have some reservations about saying that the pro-
duction of the seed follows the model of emanation entirely. Indeed, such a view
would entail serious problems. For the products of procession remain inferior to
their producers even after successfully reverting back to them.The inchoate Intellect,
for example, upon its reversion back to the One becomes the Intellect and not the
One itself. Thus, the implication in this case would be that the soul-principle in
the seed, even after it has been perfected by reversion (discussed below), does not
become a true vegetative power of soul or nature but remains something subor-
dinate. Such a view would lead to the objectionable consequence that even the
vegetative power of soul needs to be supplied to the offspring from outside. For this
reason we find a bit of wavering in Porphyry’s statements on the generation and
nature of the psychological element in the seed. On the one hand, in Ad Gaurum
14.3 the seed is clearly distinguished as something inferior to the vegetative power,
insofar as the latter possesses actual motion while the former does not. On the other
hand, Porphyry repeatedly describes the seed as itself having a nature or vegetative
power of its own.26 This wavering is mirrored by his indecision in Ad Gaurum 16.1
as to whether the seed’s vegetative power is ‘separated off ’ from or ‘generated by’ the
father’s vegetative power,27 since what is generated by the vegetative power should
according to the PIP principle be inferior to it (as in 14.3) while what is separated
off from something would seem rather to be on an ontological par with its source
(as in 16.1).Yet there does appear to be a coherent position behind these vacillations.
The seed may be said to have a vegetative power, which does indeed reflect a slight
deviation from the model of procession. But Porphyry's main concern is to empha-
size that this power cannot be active (and thus cannot be a true vegetative power)
when the seed is taken all by itself, and to the extent that this power’s transition to
activity depends on an external agent (discussed on pp. 63–71) he remains true to
his metaphysical model.
As we saw in Chapter 2, according to this metaphysical model of creation the
product should also share the same formal content present in the producer, though
it will be present in it in a derivative way.We also saw that there are form-principles
at the level of nature accounting for all or nearly all of the physical features and
parts of an individual body. We have now identified the producer as the father’s
nature or vegetative power, which is essentially a collection of form-principles cor-
responding to the father’s bodily parts at work in matter, and the seed as an inferior
image consisting of these same form-principles that are only potentially active.28
The discussion of the third tenet below will offer sufficient additional evidence of
this potentiality.
For now we may focus on illustrating the unified nature of the seed. In nearly
every Neoplatonic thinker one finds the seed presented as a classic example of
a diversity of form-principles existing in a unified state. For this reason the seed
was often employed as an analogy to the Intellect, meant to make the claim that
the Intellect is a unity of diverse and even opposed Forms more palatable. Hence
the seed is presented as containing a plurality of diverse and even opposed form-
principles of parts and features, which themselves could never co-exist harmo-
niously in an extended material state but which are somehow able to co-exist
harmoniously in the seed.29 Indeed, Neoplatonists routinely emphasize not only
that these form-principles co-exist harmoniously, but that each part of the seed
contains all of the form-principles in their entirety, which is possible only because
they are incorporeal.30 Both the unity and the comprehensiveness of the resulting
set of form-principles in the seed are well captured by a description of the seed
in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, which might have been drawn from
Porphyry’s own lost commentary on the treatise:
If it is the case that human semen, which is so small in bulk yet contains
within itself all of the [seminal] reasons, gives rise to so many differences in
our hard parts, such as bones which may be either solid or hollow, in our soft
parts, like the lungs and the liver, in our dry parts, like our nails and hair, in
our fluid parts, like blood and phlegm, in our viscous parts, like marrow and
fat, in our bitter parts, like bile, in our insipid parts, like saliva, in our dense
parts, like the tendons, in our thinly stretched parts, like the membranes – for
it somehow gives rise to all of these, both those that are homoeomerous and
those formed from them, from [its own] small bulk, or, rather, from no bulk
[at all], because it is the [seminal] reasons which produce these things, and
they are without bulk.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 1.396,10–20 =
Porphyry Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus Fr. 51
(38,30–39,9), Runia translation)
The unified nature of the seed is often expressed by saying that the form-prin-
ciples in the seed are not yet ‘separated’ (χωρίζεσθαι) or ‘not (yet) distinguished’
(ἀδιάκριτοι) from one another.31 It is only when this seed receives the matter of the
mother that it strictly becomes extended and divided.32
This understanding of the seed in terms of form-principles might have served
an important role in Neoplatonic interpretations of the embryology of the Timaeus.
As we saw in Chapter 1, one of the puzzles encountered there concerned Plato’s
description of the seed as living things that are still in need of formation and sepa-
ration.33 Although the surviving commentaries on the Timaeus do not extend to
this passage,34 it is tempting to see this conception of the seed as a solution to this
puzzle. By emphasizing that the true seed for Plato is an immaterial principle of
soul, they might have read this remark about the seed’s being a plurality of living
things still in need of separation as a fair representation of their view that the seed
is a collection of unseparated form-principles.35
The Maternal Actualization Thesis

We have now seen how the emission of the seed by the male has been understood
in a manner analogous to the metaphysics of procession, and so it is time to look
at the most striking innovation of Neoplatonic embryology, its adaptation of the
metaphysics of reversion. Above we established that the PIP principle leads to a
conception of the seed as consisting of form-principles marked by two features.
First, these form-principles are present in their material substrate in a thoroughly
unified manner. Second, from a psychological point of view, the seed is inferior
even to the vegetative soul in that its form-principles remain in a state of inactivity.
This second feature would certainly seem to fit the empirical data, since when we
observe seeds all by themselves we do not see them doing anything. It is only once
they have been planted in the womb or, in the case of plants, in the soil that the
process of generation begins. Prima facie, this description of the seed would also
not appear that far removed from Aristotle’s, since he views the seed as possessing
a vegetative soul only potentially (On the Generation of Animals 736b8–10). In fact,
the Neoplatonists readily adopt this Aristotelian language of potentiality to describe
their own conception of the seed.36 The crucial difference lies in the type of poten-
tiality envisioned. Aristotle’s metaphysical model encourages him to see this as an

advanced state of potentiality (sometimes called a second potentiality)37 that can
shift itself into activity as soon as matter is provided, just as the carpenter can
bring himself to build something as soon as suitable wood is within reach. For this
reason, although Aristotle denies that the vegetative soul is actually present in the
seed, he does not hesitate to affirm that there is actual motion in the seed (On the
Generation of Animals 730b19-22). By contrast, we have seen that Porphyry denies
that there is any actual motion in the seed, and this is because his own Neoplatonic
metaphysical model, and in particular the PAP principle (see Chapter 2), suggests
to him that the power in the seed must be potential in a lesser sense that requires
actualization by an external agent. Taken together, this means that the next stage of
the process must account both for the separation of the seed’s form-principles and
for their transition to actuality, and the mother was generally seen to be at least the
proximate agent responsible for both of these contributions.
In the Ad Gaurum Porphyry explicitly invokes the PAP principle to account
for this transition. Immediately after concluding that the seed lacks actual motion,
he adds: ‘the seed receives this actual motion from the nature in the mother and
from its environment, since in all things the actual precedes the potential’ (14.3
(54,13–15)). This remark about the ‘environment,’ to which we shall return below,
should not distract us from Porphyry’s true view about the agent of actualization,
which is the mother’s vegetative soul. He reiterates this view without reference to
the environment later on: ‘But since the mother’s soul is sufficient for the seed as
regards the embryo’s needs […] the vegetative soul and the creative power in the
life-giving womb are sufficient’ (16.3 (56,18–21)). Let us then first investigate how
Porphyry explains the mechanics of this process of actualization by the mother.
For his explanation he employs the metaphor of a captain or steersman of a
ship, a metaphor that would appear to draw both on Aristotle’s tentative sugges-
tion about the soul’s relationship to the body being analogous to that of a sailor to
his ship and on Plato’s myth about the captain of the universe in the Statesman,38
in a passage that offers several insights into his psychological and embryological
theories:
Therefore, nature even joins with different captains at different times. For
[i] as long as the seed is in the father, it is administered by the vegetative
[power] of the father as well as by the father’s soul from above which con-
spires with the vegetative power towards its works. And [ii] once it has been
released from the father into the mother, it joins the vegetative [power] of the
mother and her soul – and by ‘joins’ one must understand, not that both are
destroyed together nor that they are resolved into their elements like <un>
mixed items, but rather that they maintain that divine and paradoxical [kind
of joining], blending, that is the special power of living [substances]. And so
in this way [they] are both united with the suitable things just like elements
that get destroyed in mixtures, and again preserve in this way their own pow-
ers just like things that are unmixed and are separated out by themselves.
And this is indicative of their being neither bodies nor even having their
substances because of the dispositions of bodies. However, as far as concerns
the complete blending which does not entail the destruction of its parts, I
am prepared to provide an account of the appropriate length in other sacred
books. And [iii] once [this power] is no <longer> under the direction of the
mother, and indeed when the mother does not resist the [force] that will cut
off the blending via separation, that [power] for its part is delivered by the
laws of nature from darkness to light, from its abode moist with blood to the
airy hollow. And it in turn at this time immediately gets from outside the
captain who is present by the providence of the principle that administers the
whole, which in the case of animals would in no way let the vegetative soul
come to be bereft of a captain.
(Ad Gaurum 10.5–6 (47,16–48,5))39
The language of blending here is significant. It is clearly derived from the Stoics
who distinguished three types of mixture: juxtaposition (παράθεσις), blending
(κρᾶσις), and fusion (σύγχυσις).40 Whereas juxtaposition is simply a mixture in
which the constituent elements while retaining their identity are situated side by
side and are in mere surface contact with one another as illustrated by a pile of sand
or beans, the other two forms of mixture allow the elements to penetrate through
and through. In fusion this penetration is achieved at the cost of the identity of
the constituent parts, which perish in order to create a new substance, as was seen
to occur in pharmacological mixtures.41 Yet in blendings the constituent elements
penetrate each other through and through without sacrificing their own identities
and thus can be separated out again, as was thought to occur in mixtures of water
and wine. Of course, the Stoics were materialists and applied this doctrine accord-
ingly, notably to account for how the soul could pervade the body when the soul
is itself a body. Porphyry here at once criticizes this Stoic doctrine as an account
of how material entities form a unity and appropriates it for his own purposes
by placing it in an immaterial context. His exact criticisms of the Stoic theory of
blending are found in the Summikta Zêtêmata, where he objects that neither the
constituent water nor the constituent wine is really preserved insofar as the mix-
ture itself is neither pure water nor pure wine, and that, moreover, this is really just
a case of juxtaposition, only that the particles of wine and water are so tiny that
they escape perception.42 Yet it is, maintains Porphyry, possible for two substances
to blend together in such a way that while forming a unity their identities and
substances are preserved, but, as he says, such blending is ‘indicative of their neither
being bodies nor even having their substances because of the dispositions of bodies.’
In short, it is souls and soul-powers that are capable of forming a true unity while
preserving their identities.43
This doctrine of psychic blending is then applied at all three stages of the
embryo’s Werdegang. First, the vegetative power of the seed blends together with
the father’s vegetative power so that both are set in motion and actualized by the
father’s irrational and sensitive soul. This blending, of course, lasts only as long as
the seed is in the father. Then, once the seed has been successfully implanted in
the womb, its vegetative power blends with that of the mother, so that both are
actualized by the mother’s sensitive soul, since this for Porphyry counts as a self-
moving soul. In each of these two cases the actualization is achieved indirectly via
a foreign vegetative power. Finally, just before birth the offspring’s vegetative power
is released from the maternal soul and gains its own self-moving soul, which then
itself actualizes the offspring’s vegetative power directly.
This application of blending not only gives us some insight into how Porphyry
accounted for the unity of a soul composed of many powers that accrue over time;
it also tells us something about how Porphyry conceived of the natures or vegeta-
tive powers. By employing the language of blending, he is emphasizing that the
vegetative power of the offspring preserves its own identity despite the fact that it
blends with and in turn separates from both the father’s and the mother’s respective
vegetative powers. This means that the vegetative powers of the father, mother, and
offspring are in some important sense not generic.There would be no reason to stress
that the vegetative power could be separated out again if there were no real distinc-
tions between the three.44 Hence, according to the Ad Gaurum different individuals
possess different individualized natures.45
Although the mechanics of family resemblance is not Porphyry’s primary concern
in the Ad Gaurum – the common topos of the determination of the offspring’s sex is
never explicitly addressed at all – this metaphysical account of emission, conception,
and gestation presents us with the basic lines of his explanation of resemblance,
even if he does not go into a great deal of detail on the subject. Since seed is said
to contain copies of all of the father’s form-principles, this should be sufficient to
account for any paternal resemblance. Moreover, Porphyry clearly thinks that his
metaphysical embryology, which has the mother actualizing and ‘steering’ these
principles, puts him in a position to account for maternal resemblance without
having to posit a female seed.The exact details are left unstated, but presumably the
following scenario captures the core idea. In the case of a snub-nosed father and an
aquiline-nosed mother, the seed produced by the father would contain a logos of
snub nose, but this logos would need to be actualized by the respective kind of logos
contained in the mother’s vegetative soul, which would be a logos of aquiline nose.
The results of such an actualization would be unpredictable – sometimes leading to
an offspring with a snub nose and sometimes to one with an aquiline nose.
Although this remains a very rough solution, Porphyry supports it with two
empirical examples of non-seminal influence. The first of these is grafting. Here
Porphyry revises the traditional metaphor of the embryo’s relation to the womb
as a plant being rooted in the earth in order to champion a more sophisticated

analogy, according to which both the embryo and the womb are likened to plants,
the former to a grafted scion and the latter to the receptive rootstalk. This revision
allows Porphyry to criticize the Aristotelian view that the mother is merely sup-
plying matter and nourishment and to underline her contribution to the offspring’s
formal nature. Thus, the generation of the embryo does not proceed:
merely in the manner of earth for the supply of nourishment nor in the
manner in which she furnishes milk alone to offspring after birth, but rather
resembling in a way [buds] that are being grafted and added onto [the base
of another plant]: <the> power in the womb forms a natural unity with
the seed, and it is by this power that the base [i.e. the womb], which has its
proper nature, and the part being added on [i.e. the seed], which has its proper
nature, make up a kind of mixture in order to form the single nature of the
part that has been successfully added on [i.e. the embryo].Then, the adminis-
tration of the engendered thing proceeds in accordance with the grafted part,
but whatever [functions] naturally come from the base are administered by
the part [i.e. the womb] that has received [the grafted part] and in accordance
with its own nature. And sometimes the qualities of the base predominate,
and sometimes those of the grafted part take hold of the whole.
(Ad Gaurum 10.1–2 (46,15–24))46
Porphyry does not go into specifics here, but the idea is clear enough. As we saw
above, since the vegetative power in the seed forms a complete blending with the
mother’s vegetative power, a new vegetative power is produced while the two con-
stituent vegetative powers retain their identities in the mixture. This new nature
acts as a unity but in such a way that both constituent natures find expression in
its activity. The missing details here are frustrating, but what is significant is that
Porphyry’s account of psychological blending leads him to depart significantly from
earlier Peripatetic accounts of the mechanics of grafting. For Theophrastus insists
that the scion’s relation to the rootstalk is not essentially different from that of any
other plant’s relation to the earth. The rootstalk simply provides nourishment, just
as the earth does, while the formation and growth of the scion are both due to the
power in the scion itself. The only advantage gained by grafting is that the nour-
ishment provided by the rootstalk is ready-made, leading to finer fruit. But this is
a mere difference in quality – not in nature or character. Theophrastus underlines
his point with an example: grafting cultivated olive tree scions onto wild olive tree
rootstalks leads to (superior) cultivated olives, whereas grafting wild olive tree scions
onto cultivated olive tree rootstalks makes a slight difference but does not lead to
better olives.47 Porphyry, by contrast, emphasizes that scions have a very different
relation to their rootstalks than ordinary plants have to the earth.The rootstalk does
not merely provide nourishment, rather it has an active role in the administration of
the scion’s flowers and fruits – and it influences their constitution to an extent that
mere nourishment could not. Without going into specifics Porphyry makes clear
that although it is a single nature that is responsible for the formation and organiza-
tion of the subsequently produced flowers and fruits, their development proceeds in
certain respects in accordance with the rootstalk and in others in accordance with
the scion, resulting in a graft-hybrid flower or fruit.48 This is, then, a clear case of
formal influence without a seed.
Ideoplasty – also known as telegony or the theory of maternal impressions –
that is, the phenomenon of the physical appearance of the offspring being influ-
enced by the representations that the mother entertains at conception, provides

a second empirical example of the mother having a significant formative effect
without providing a seed.49 Heliodorus relates an example of ideoplasty that tran-
spired between an Ethiopian royal couple: although both the king and the queen
were dark-skinned, they produced a pale-skinned child because at the moment
of conception the queen was looking at an image of light-skinned Andromeda.50
Many today might balk at the suggestion that ideoplasty be counted as an empiri-
cal example, but this phenomenon was widely accepted as fact by ancient thinkers,
including doctors.51 As such it may be seen as an explanandum in desperate need of
an explanans, and Porphyry, who makes his own commitment to ideoplasty clear
(Ad Gaurum 5.4 (41,21–6) and 6.1 (42,15–17)) provides a metaphysical embryol-
ogy that seems uniquely qualified to do just that. The seed or embryo is actualized
by and obedient to the mother’s vegetative soul, but this soul is in turn obedient to
the part of the mother’s soul responsible for representation, and as a result the seed
may also be affected by the form of the mother’s representations (6.4 (43,6–7)). He
once again refrains from explaining in detail how this is supposed to occur,52 but
what is significant here is that this phenomenon demonstrates that the mother’s
soul is actively involved in forming the offspring and thus provides some support
for Porphyry’s claim that maternal influence should be accounted for in its entirety
by the role that her soul plays in the actualization of the seed.
According to this reconstruction of Porphyry’s metaphysical embryology, the
formation of the offspring’s body is entirely accounted for by the contributions of
the male and the female, with the former supplying the seed and the latter both
supplying matter (menses) and serving as the actualizer of the form-principles in
the seed. The World-Soul would appear to have no part to play in this story, which
defies an expectation raised by Galen in his On the Formation of the Fetus, where he
reports that one of his Platonists teachers claimed that the World-Soul is the agent
responsible for the formation of all living things, a view that he himself rejects.53 In
fact, a view along these lines can be found in Themistius. The passage in question is
from his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which has survived in its entirety
only in translation.54 The object text of this stretch of commentary is Aristotle’s
remark at Metaphysics 1070a26–28 that Platonic Forms are superfluous in biologi-
cal reproduction since the father will always be able to supply the form of human
being. Thus, Themistius’ goal in his comments is to show that Platonic Forms of
natural kinds are necessary for all forms of biological generation, and to this end he
examines the necessary preconditions for successful reproduction of a human being.
He begins with the now familiar description of the human seed as a collection of
form-principles and then he demands an explanation of how these form-principles

are able to carry out the teleological activity of forming the offspring. He dismisses
the suggestion that the father’s soul could be making a contribution, since ‘the
father exerts no artistry,’ by which he presumably means that the male need not be
in possession of – and certainly need not be thinking of – anatomical knowledge in
order to produce an offspring. Rather, the logoi seem to do the work for him.55 He
then offers the following as his own alternative explanation:
And no wonder that nature does not understand the movement of its work
toward the end aimed at, since it does not know and does not think about
the work it does.This shows you that these logoi have been inspired by a cause
nobler, worthier, and higher in rank than themselves, i.e. the soul in the earth
which Plato thought had been produced by the secondary gods and Aristotle
by the sun and the ecliptic.Therefore, it [i.e. nature] does its work and advances
toward the end without understanding the end, just as inspired people talk and
foretell the future without understanding themselves what they say.56
Instead of appealing to the soul of the mother, Themistius brings in ‘the soul in the
earth,’ which is perhaps not quite identical to the World-Soul,57 but what is strik-
ing is that he depicts this soul’s contribution in a manner that resonates strongly
with Porphyry’s description of the mother in embryology: its role is to ‘guide’ – the
original Greek here might have been κυβερνῆσθαι – and to ‘inspire’ – presumably
ἐμπνεῖν – the logoi in matter, just as Porphyry described the mother in her role as
captain-soul as ‘steering’ (κυβερνῆσθαι) and ‘inspiring’ (ἐμπνεῖν) the logoi in the seed-
embryo-fetus.58 Themistius leaves us no choice but to speculate about what, if any,
contribution the female makes to reproduction. It is possible that the Earth-Soul’s
contribution is supposed to supplement the female soul’s activity in some way.59 Be
that as it may, this passage can be counted as affirming the more general thesis at issue,
namely that the form-principles in the male seed require an external agent for their
actualization, even if in this case the mother is not identified as the actualizer.
Returning, then, to Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum, we might now ask anew whether
Porphyry envisioned some role for the World-Soul after all. Karl Kalbfleisch, the
editor of the first critical edition of the text of the Ad Gaurum, advances this view
in his introduction:
On the contrary the author of the treatise Ad Gaurum (10.3ff.) explains une-
quivocally that it is the vegetative soul (φύσις, φυτικὴ ψυχή) that already
belongs to the seed that builds the body by means of the form-principles
contained in it together with the parents’ souls, under the supervision of and
with the support of the World-Soul
(τῆς τὰ ὅλα διοικούσης ἀρχῆς – 10.6, cf. 16.5).60
So let us take a look at the two passages Kalbfleisch takes to be indicating the
World-Soul’s involvement in the formation. The first and apparently primary
passage (AG 10.6) we already looked at on p. 65. Here Porphyry does clearly refer
to the World-Soul, but he is surely not saying that the World-Soul is ‘supervising’
(Aufsicht) the process of formation. The World-Soul’s responsibility here is rather
limited to the role of, as it were, a cosmic match-maker. The body of the offspring
together with the vegetative soul is provided by the parents, and once this is pre-
pared, the World-Soul makes sure that a (suitable) individual soul descends into it at
the right time, namely at birth. The second passage Kalbfleisch refers to is possibly
more ambiguous:
However, regarding the corporeal and irrational substance, what is lacking in

terms of its being joined together [with a captain] at birth is provided and
afforded by the universe, as an individual soul is immediately present, the very
soul which comes to be present to the [body] that has been brought forth at
just the right moment, and comes to be in harmony with the instrumental
body that is suited to receive it.
(Ad Gaurum 16.5 (56,28–57,3))
The universe here might well be intended as a reference to the World-Soul, and
it is said to provide τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς συναρτήσεως – in and of itself a fairly vague
expression.Yet even if this is the only occurrence of συνάρτησις in the Ad Gaurum,
there is a relevant use of the verb συναρτᾶν that would appear to shed some light
on the intended sense, namely in Ad Gaurum 10.4 where Porphyry is introducing
the analogy of the soul’s relation to the embryo as that of a captain that is ‘joined’
(συνηρτημένον) to his ship. This strongly suggests that the role of the World-Soul
here is the same as in 10.6, namely to supply the suitable individual descended soul,
and this takes place μετὰ τὴν κύησιν, i.e. at birth.
There is a final passage that Kalbfleisch does not refer to in connection with his
claim about the World-Soul’s involvement but which seems relevant nonetheless. It
is the remark about the environment that we already noted above:
And for this reason the vegetative [power] in us [males] generated something
worse than itself, the seed, since it lacks actual movement. As a supplement, it
receives the movement from the nature in the mother and from its environ-
ment, since in all things the actual precedes the potential.
(Ad Gaurum 14.3 (54,12–15))
This is perhaps the most promising passage in the Ad Gaurum in terms of the
World-Soul’s involvement in the formation of the embryo, as the ‘environment’ is
put on a par with the mother’s lower soul in the context of actualizing the vegeta-
tive power in the seed-embryo.Yet the exact meaning of the passage is difficult to
establish with any degree of certainty, especially as the term ‘environment’ is itself
ambiguous, referring perhaps to the womb, perhaps to the geographical region and
perhaps to something even grander.61 As we shall see below, other Neoplatonists
acknowledge the influence of meteorological and geographical factors in their
embryological theories, and it is possible that Porphyry has such factors in mind
here. But given the ambiguity, the most sensible way to understand this passage is
to take it to be saying exactly what was said in the other two passages: as long as
the embryo-fetus is in the womb, the mother serves as its captain, but at birth it
receives a new captain from the environment, i.e. from the universe, i.e. from the
World-Soul. We may conclude, then, that the Ad Gaurum gives us no grounds for
assuming the World-Soul is jointly with the mother responsible for the formation
of the embryo, as Kalbfleisch suggests.

Yet precisely a theory along these lines may be found in Proclus’ commentary on
Plato’s Parmenides. The passage in question forms part of Proclus’ examination of the
question raised in Parmenides 130b-d regarding the scope of the theory of Forms. One
of the issues encountered there, as we saw above,62 concerns whether there are Forms
of natural kinds such as man. Like Themistius, Proclus accepts that there are indeed
Forms of natural kinds, and part of his argument for their existence consists in show-
ing that such higher causes are required even in cases of normal biological generation.
The argument begins by considering how the father and the mother each contrib-
ute to the generation of their offspring, and the answer he presents bears a striking
resemblance to Porphyry’s views in the Ad Gaurum. The father produces a seed, but:
the seed has its form-principles potentially, not actually; for being a body, it
cannot have the form-principles undividedly and actually. What, then, is it
which has the form-principles in actuality? For everywhere actuality pre-
cedes potentiality, and the sperm, being undeveloped, requires something else
that will bring it to perfection. You will say63 it is the nature of the mother
that does this; this nature is what actualizes the form-principles and forms
[διαπλάττουσα] the creature coming to birth. It is not, of course, the visible
form of the mother that makes the babe in the womb, but [her] nature, which
is a bodiless power and a source of motion, as we say. If, then, it is [her] nature
that changes the form-principles of the seed from potentiality to the activity
of formation [εἰς τὴν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν διάπλασιν], it has the form-principles
in actuality.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 792,
7–18, Morrow–Dillon translation revised)
As in the Ad Gaurum, Proclus establishes the mother’s role as setting the form-
principles contained in the seed in motion and thus to actualize them with the
form-principles of her own nature.64 Three points in this passage require some
comment before proceeding. First, Proclus here somewhat surprisingly depicts the
seed as not having the form-principles in an undivided manner, which would seem
to go against the universally accepted Neoplatonic view of the seed set out above.
It should therefore be emphasized that Proclus does make his allegiance to this
universal view of the seed clear, both in the Parmenides commentary and else-
where.65 His concern here is simply that the analogy between the seed and the
Intellect frequently given by Neoplatonists to illustrate the manner in which all of
the Forms are present in the Intellect might mislead his readers into thinking that
the form-principles in the seed are already in a state of activity, just as the Forms
are.With this concern in mind, he reminds his readers that these form-principles in
fact exist at a much lower level of reality, being contained in some sense in a body.
Second, Proclus’ language in this passage suggests that he has one of the puzzles of
the embryology of the Timaeus in mind. Earlier in the chapter, we saw how the
conception of the seed as a collection of unseparated form-principles provides a
helpful foundation for understanding Plato’s claim that the ‘living things’ sown in
the womb still need to be separated.66 Now we can see how Proclus is employing
this same theory to explain Plato’s parallel remark about these living things still
being ἀδιάπλαστα (Timaeus 91d3), a term which is usually understood passively
(‘unformed’) but which was probably taken to have an active sense (‘unforming’)
by Proclus in this context.67 His solution is that the form-principles in the seed
remain ‘unforming’ in the sense that they are in a state of potentiality; only when
they are actualized by the mother do they achieve their active state of forming the
embryo. Finally, although he does not say so here, a remark in his commentary
on Plato’s Timaeus indicates that he follows Porphyry in seeing this activity of the
mother’s nature as accounting for maternal resemblance.68
Yet, as in the Ad Gaurum, the mother’s nature is not entirely sufficient to carry
out the task alone. This is why Porphyry emphasized that the nature still in need of
actualization in the seed ‘joins with the vegetative soul of the mother and with her
soul’ (Ad Gaurum 10.5.4–5 (47,19–20) my emphasis) since only her higher soul is
self-moving. In the sequel to this passage Proclus seems to agree with this idea that
the mother’s ‘nature’ is not self-sufficient, though he puts the problem in a different
way: this nature is devoid of reason and so cannot be up to the task of forming and
maintaining entities as complex as sensible living things all by itself (Commentary
on Plato’s Parmenides 792,24-6).69 Proclus’ solution does not appear to lie in the
mother’s higher soul but in the concentric layers of natures within the cosmos,
beginning with the nature in the earth and ascending outwards through the spheres
of the elements and the celestial spheres until he finally reaches the nature of the
universe itself. Each of these natures is said to contain the form-principles of the
entire set of living things associated with it, though it is not clear that every layer
of nature addressed here is involved in the normal biological generation of humans.
His appeal to the nature of the earth, for example, is explicitly directed only at
plants and ‘spontaneously’ generated creatures. The nature of the earth contains the
form-principles for these living things since for them there are no maternal natures
that could take on the role of actualizing principle (792,27–793,11).70 Presumably,
then, the nature of the earth is not involved in the normal biological generation of
humans, but then Proclus turns his focus upwards:
Why say more [about the earth]? For as we mount upwards in this way we
shall find the nature of every stage contains the living beings that are in
that rank, and the nature in the moon the species in all of the [sublunary
spheres] [τῶν ἐν πᾶσιν εἰδῶν], for from there the whole of generation is
steered [ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα κυβερνᾶται γένεσις], and in her the transcend-
ent monad of embodied natures is preestablished.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides
793,11–15, Morrow–Dillon translation)
The remark about ‘every stage containing the living beings of that rank’ should prob-
ably be understood as a reference to the three other sublunary elemental spheres,71

in which case it amounts to the claim that the natures of the spheres of water, air,
and fire are also responsible for the living beings ‘spontaneously’ generated in them.
If so, Proclus is likely thinking of the theory of correspondence between elements
and classes of living things, which Plato sets out in Timaeus 39e-40b.72 Be that as it
may, it is only when we come to the nature of the moon that form-principles of all
sublunary living beings are said to be present, since it ‘steers’ sublunary generation.73
In what sense, then, is the lunar nature steering sublunary generation? One must
suppose that what Proclus has in mind are the connections often made between
the moon’s waxing and waning and the flow of menstrual fluid in women and,
according to some reports, of seed in men, but it is the manner of this influence that
is relevant.74 For even Aristotle notes that the phases of the moon affect the men-
strual cycle, but for him this was a result of the warmth of lunar light.75 Proclus, by
contrast, emphasizes that this steering follows from the lunar nature’s possession of
the logoi of the living things affected. This emphasis, together with the description
of the activity as ‘steering,’ suggests that Proclus is thinking of the moon’s nature as
playing a role similar to that of the mother.76 For we have already seen both that
Porphyry repeatedly employed the notion of ‘steering’ to denote the relationship
between the vegetative power of the embryo and the actualizing soul of the mother
in her role as ‘captain’ (κυβερνήτης),77 and that Themistius employed a similar term
to capture the activity of the soul of the earth. Proclus appears to bring these ideas
together: the mother’s nature is the proximate agent responsible for actualizing the
logoi in the seed-embryo, but the lunar nature replaces the mother’s higher soul as
the second-level actualizer.
This relation is given more precision in the following lines, where Proclus takes
this idea even further as he continues his examination and locates a still more uni-
versal nature – in fact, the universal nature – in the universe as a whole. In doing
so he emphasizes once again the possession of logoi and the analogy to the mother:
And so making our progress upwards through the spheres78 we shall come
finally to the nature of the whole; and we shall ask about it whether it possesses
or does not possess the Ideas [τὰ εἴδη], and we shall compel our respond-
ent to admit that the form-principles, i.e. the creative and moving powers,
of all things are contained in it. For all things that are perfected through
inferior powers are established more firmly and perfectly by more universal
beings [πάντα γὰρ ὅσα διὰ τῶν καταδεεστέρων ἐπιτελεῖται, κρεῖττον καὶ
τελειότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλικωτέρων ὑφίσταται]. Being, then, the mother of all
things, the Nature of the All would include the form-principles of all things.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 793,15–22,
Morrow-Dillon translation, slightly revised)
This appears to be a cosmic application of certain general metaphysical principles

outlined in the Elements of Theology. There, in §§56–7, Proclus aims to establish that
in a causal series the higher causes are efficacious throughout the ensuing lower lev-
els of causes.79 As Dodds points out in his commentary, Proclus’ concern here is to
eliminate the impression that lower-level causes at work in the sensible world are at
any point independent of the transcendent causes that gave rise to them.80 Proclus
pursues a similar line of thought under the slightly different rubric of particular and
universal causes in §§70–2, where his goal is to show that the higher principles in
a causal series produce more universal effects which then serve as a foundation for
the more particular effects produced by lower-level causes.81 As his examples reveal,
throughout these sections Proclus is thinking primarily of the causal series of the
three hypostases. Thus, in §57 he explains how whatever Soul causes is caused ‘in
a greater measure’ (μειζόνως) by Intellect, and in §72 how matter is caused by the
One and serves as a foundation for body, which is caused by Intellect, which in turn
serves as a foundation for living bodies caused by Soul. Here, however, Proclus is
envisioning a series of encosmic causes, each containing form-principles of differ-
ent levels. The seed deriving from the father’s nature contains the form-principles
of the offspring in a potential state, and the natures of the mother, the moon, and
the universe all contain them in an actual state and are collectively responsible for
bringing the form-principles in the seed into a state of actuality and thus forming
the embryo. The driving idea behind this series is once again that even the lowest
formal principles at work in the sensible world must derive their power from the
Forms corresponding to them, and that this derivation is achieved through a chain
of increasingly universal natures that culminates in the universal nature that itself
connects the series to the Forms in the Intellect via the Soul.82 If this is the case,
then we may conclude that in this respect at least the nature of the moon is not
working directly on the seed or embryo; rather, it is providing the form-principles
already present in the mother, linking them to higher causes. Likewise, the involve-
ment of the nature of the universe is two removes away, as it primarily provides for
the form-principles in the moon. Nevertheless, it is correct to say that the universal
nature is the ‘firmest’ and ‘most perfect’ cause of the embryo’s formation precisely
because it is the head of this causal series.83
Proclus, therefore, shows himself to be broadly in agreement with Porphyry’s
adaptation of the metaphysics of reversion to human reproduction, and he agrees
in particular that the female is the (at least proximate) agent of actualization of the
form-principles in the seed.Although in the transmitted writings of his own teacher,
Syrianus, one finds only the broader thesis that the reproduction of sensible living
things requires higher causes to lead them from potentiality to actuality, without any
evidence for this more specific claim about the role of the female,84 this latter thesis
does live on in Proclus’ philosophical legacy. His student Ammonius Hermeiou, for
example, appears to have put some thought into embryology.85 Unfortunately, only
one work that he published himself has come down to us, namely his commentary
on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, but despite this work’s logical focus his commitment
to this actualization thesis may be discerned in it, and further confirmation may be
then found in commentaries composed by others as written records of Ammonius’
lectures.86 In his commentary on On Intepretation he points to the embryo as an
example of something in a potential state that must be led to actuality and states
that this process of actualization requires another pre-existing human being.87 Here
he does not explicitly identify the agent of actualization with the mother, but this
much is suggested in a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagôgê that was anonymously
composed but based on Ammonius’ lectures, where the author describes the agent
as a nature that receives the seed.88
The mother’s role is made more explicit in a commentary on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics by his student Asclepius, which Asclepius composed as a written record
of Ammonius’ lectures on the treatise.89 One of the key passages here is found
in Asclepius’ general discussion (θεωρία) of Metaphysics 7.7 1033b19–1034a21, in
which Aristotle reiterates his claim that Platonic Forms are irrelevant to genera-
tion since ‘a human being generates a human being.’90 This prompts Asclepius to
rehearse an argument against the existence of transcendent Forms, which is pre-
sented in the passage below. As the passage in question is difficult, it is cited here
in its entirety:
[1] Having shown that form [τὸ εἶδος] all by itself does not come to be,
here [Aristotle] says that it is not possible for forms to exist all by themselves
in actuality. For, he says, if we should assume this, generation will be done
away with. Generation, then, is of those things that are not yet present but
that are able to come to be. If, then, we should assume that forms pre-exist
in actuality and in this way come to be in matter, then on this line there
will not really be any generation but only mixture. [2a] Next after having
said this, Aristotle extends his argument to those who exalt the Forms [τὰς
ἰδέας] and says that it is not possible for us to say that Forms exist separately
by themselves and the enmattered forms are generated from them. For we
observe both in the crafts and in cases of natural generation that everything
that is generated is generated by things of the same type [ἐξ ὁμοειδῶν]. [2a-i]
For both the woodworker and the drawing board91 that is produced by him
are enmattered. And the same goes for [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔχει] the form of the
drawing board that the woodworker has.92 For it is of the same type as the
drawing board that has come to be. [2a-ii] And similarly in cases of natural
generation: the creator is of the same type as what is created, since a human
being generates a human being, and it is by having the form-principles of the
offspring in itself that are of the same type as the offspring that the mother’s
nature generates. Yet the Forms that those men postulate cannot be of the
same type, since this would make them enmattered, and the genera of these
Forms would be different, and this would go on ad infinitum. For the same
argument would apply to them. Therefore, the Forms must be of a different
type. [2b] If, then, the Forms are of a different type, the sensible things could
not come to be of the same type, that is, a human being would not for the
most part come to be from a human being, since nature would produce what
it produces by looking to things that are of different types. And [Aristotle
says] that generation would be done away with, which contradicts the phe-
nomena right in front of our noses. [2b-i] And if someone should bring up
the case of the mule and ask how it is that we observe mules being brought
forth from horses, since this is obviously a case of something of one type
coming to be from something of another type, we shall answer him that there
is something of the same type even in these cases, though it is without name
and escapes our notice: for the mare generates the mule because she has the
form-principle and form of mule in herself. Aristotle calls this common form
‘quasi-mule’ [οἷον ἡμίονον].93 Therefore, there is a common form, as was said
above, though it is without name.
(Asclepius Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 404,3–31)
The argument against the Platonic Forms proceeds in three steps. The first step (1),
which does not target the Platonists specifically, involves denying any distinction
between transcendent and immanent forms. Without this distinction, one is forced
to say that sensible things come to be when the ‘separated’ Forms themselves enter
into matter. But then, since both matter and these Forms pre-exist, the coming-
to-be of sensible things has been reduced to a case of mere mixing together of
pre-existing components, which is then viewed as an absurdum. The second step
(2) then begins from the traditional distinction between transcendent and imma-
nent forms and argues that even on this assumption transcendent Platonic Forms
would seem to be untenable. For, firstly (2a), the immanent forms would have to
be generated out of the transcendent Forms, which is to say that immaterial causes
would be producing enmattered things.Thus, such a generation of immanent forms
would be in violation of the principle that like is produced by like (ἐξ ὁμοειδῶν),
a principle whose validity is evidenced by surveying what happens in generation
in (2a-i) the crafts and in (2a-ii) the domain of nature. So (2b), if we want to insist
on immanent forms being generated by transcendent Forms, then we must replace
the principle of like being produced by like with the principle of unlike being
produced by unlike. But this substitution would have to apply to the generation in
the sensible world as well, with the result that human beings should for the most
part be generating non-human beings. Since this obviously is not the case, we may
conclude – ignoring the objection in 2b-i for now – that this substitution is invalid
and that therefore transcendent Forms cannot be reasonably included in a causal
account of the generation of sensible things.
In the commentary Asclepius limits himself to elucidating Aristotle’s position
and offers no explanation here of how the proponent of the Forms should deal
with this argument.94 Nevertheless, as a committed Platonist Asclepius (as well as
Ammonius) would certainly have rejected this argument, and one suspects that
the refutation would at least in part involve pointing out an equivocation in the
argument’s use of the term ὁμοειδής. Be that as it may, what interests us here
is that within this purportedly Peripatetic argument against the Platonic Forms
we encounter some very un-Peripatetic remarks on biological generation, remarks
that would seem to be indicative of an underlying Neoplatonic causal model of
embryology.
The first such remark occurs in 2a-ii. Here Asclepius is making his case that
in generation in the sensible world the producer and the product are of the same
type (ὁμοειδής). He begins with the crafts (2a-i), saying that the woodworker, the
drawing board and even the form that the former possesses of the latter are all of
the same type. This would seem to be a fairly straightforward Peripatetic example
with the woodworker serving as the formal and efficient cause of the drawing
board. This is in part what makes Asclepius’ characterization of biological genera-
tion in 2a-ii so striking. For here, too, he urges that the creator (τὸ ποιοῦν) is of
the same type as the creation (τῷ γινομένῳ), but when he spells this claim out, it
emerges that he is thinking of the mother (and not the father) as the creator analo-
gous to the woodworker. More specifically, he points to the form-principles in
the mother’s nature, just as Porphyry and Proclus did. To be sure, unlike Porphyry
and Proclus, Asclepius does not explicitly say that the mother’s role is to bring the
form-principles from a state of potentiality to actuality,95 and elsewhere he even
stays rather close to Aristotelian theory by characterizing the male seed as an effi-
cient cause and a source of motion,96 which would seem to generate some tension
with his claims here about the female’s own active role. I would suggest that this
tension is the result of Asclepius’ filling in the details of Aristotle’s remarks with his
own Neoplatonic understanding of the metaphysics of embryology, and that his
characterization here of the mother’s nature as the creator strongly suggests that he
is toeing the Neoplatonic line.97
This impression is only strengthened by Asclepius’ remarks on the generation of
mules in 2b-i. Here an imagined Platonist comes to the defense of the Forms by
urging that the scope of the principle that like is produced by like is hardly as uni-
versal as the Peripatetic argument would suggest, and the generation of mules serves
to illustrate his point: mules do not come to be from mules but from a (female)
horse and a (male) donkey. To this Asclepius supplies a Peripatetic response that
once again focuses solely on the female. In fact, the generation of mules is a case of
like being generated by like because the creator – the mare – herself possesses the
form-principle of mule.98
If we turn now to Simplicius, another of Ammonius’ students, we discover the
maternal actualization thesis once again on display, though here, too, there is some
at least prima facie tension. Simplicius finds the opportunity to address this issue in
his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 2.3, as part of his discussion of Aristotle’s brief
description of the formal cause (Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 310,20–314,24).
He begins his comments with a lengthy exposition of Alexander, who had appar-
ently used Aristotle’s reference to a model (παράδειγμα – Physics 194b26) as a
springboard to discuss the manner in which nature functions as a cause in biologi-

cal generation (310,25–311,37). There is no need to go into all the details of this
exposition; what is important is that Alexander sets out a causal account of the
formation of the embryo that Simplicius finds objectionable. On this account the
formation is achieved part by part, where the seed is identified as the creator of
the first part, which then itself creates the next part and so on until the formation
is completed. Thus, on this view the seed is a self-sufficient (requiring only mat-
ter from the mother) cause of the offspring, though it is the proximate cause only
of the first part. More specifically, the nature in the seed is solely responsible for
setting the process of formation in motion (311,12–16). Simplicius responds with
several objections, but the one that interests us here concerns his application of the
PAP principle: ‘everything that comes to be in a state of actuality from a state of
potentiality must be led to the state of actuality by something in a state of actual-
ity’ (312,34–36). This principle allows him to conclude that the nature in a human
seed is not sufficient for the creation of a human being; only the nature of a human
being is capable of this (313,1–4).99 Thus, he sees himself confronted with the dif-
ficulty of explaining how the nature in the human seed, given that it is not yet the
nature of a human being, could properly be said to create a human being (313,4–5).
In response to this difficulty, Simplicius offers us the following:
Well, as we said before, this nature [in the seed] creates simultaneously as it
comes to be because it is well endowed and because it is a kind of life that is
being raised up and roused to form, because the natural task of the male seed
and the [contribution] of the female is the transformation of the seed which
finds its natural completion in an animal.100 The true and proximate creative/
efficient cause in the case of animals is the maternal nature and the paternal
nature, while in the case of plants it is the nature of the wheat and of the earth,
since the form pre-exists in actuality in the father and the mother and in the
form-principles established in actuality within the earth, by which what is in
a state of potentiality is led to actuality. And in this way the nature of what is
coming to be, if it is said to be creative, would be creative in the sense that it
itself is coming to be, but the true creative [nature] is the [nature] of what is
actually of this sort. For nature is generative of its like, and all intermediaries
[e.g. the seed] are prepared for the sake of this, and even if in the intermediary
the nature is altered, as it is brought to perfection and being and simultaneously
also creates, it still preserves a single chain until the end, and once it has arrived
at this end, it ceases from creation. Even Aristotle says that those things are by
nature that are moved continuously starting from some principle within them
and arriving at some end, at which point the motion ceases. Consequently, in
the human being the form-principle of what is being generated has already
been prepared and what is coming to be comes to be in accordance with it,
(*) with the father providing the principle and the motion that achieves its
objective by means of his seed (in the same way that the craftsman in the
case of mechanical puppets [νευροσπαστουμένων] provides the principle of
motion and the impulse that achieves its objective) in accordance with the
form-principle of the entire ordered motion that pre-exists in him, while the
maternal nature is productive of the form in a still more proximate manner.
(Simplicius Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 313,5–27)
Let us begin unpacking this response by looking at how Simplicius understands the
generation of plants, since this offers the clearest view of his adoption of the mater-
nal actualization thesis. Recalling that the plant’s relation to the earth is generally
held to be analogous to the embryo’s relation to the mother, he tells us that the seed
of the plant is in a potential state and is led to actuality by the form-principles con-
tained in an actual state in the earth.101 Thus, Simplicius’ description of the nature
of the wheat – analogous in this example to the nature of the human male – as a
true and proximate creative (or efficient) cause cannot be understood to mean that
either it or the nature in its seed is the agent of actualization. It is rather a creative
cause in the sense of creating the seed that, upon being actualized by the earth,
comes to be wheat.
Initially, things do not seem as clear-cut in the case of the human being, pri-
marily because in 313,22–6 (beginning at (*) in the translation) he appears to
say that the father supplies actual motion via his seed, which would suggest that
the father is the agent of actualization. An interpretation along these lines has
been suggested by Devin Henry.102 Henry’s study offers an excellent analysis of
Simplicius’ analogy of the nature of the seed to ‘mechanical puppets.’ (This transla-
tion of νευροσπαστουμένων above is owed to his study.) By ‘mechanical puppet’
we should understand a device consisting of a multiplicity of parts and gears that are
arranged in such a way that by pulling a cord a complex movement of these parts
results. The virtue of this interpretation of νευροσπαστουμένων is that it offers a
model that has an internal teleological and formal structure but requires an external
source of movement: the way the mechanical puppet moves is predetermined by
how it has been built, but someone must still pull the cord to create the movement.
As Henry shows, this model best captures Simplicius’ conception of what a nature
is, which he worked out at length in an earlier digression in this commentary
(282,31–289,35) and which he refers back to at the start of our passage.103 In this
digression he articulates a conception of nature as distinct from all kinds of soul,
including even the vegetative soul. Only souls, according to Simplicius, are causes
of motion, nature is not. This is certainly a surprising thing to claim in a commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Physics, given that Aristotle himself defines natural things as those
that contain a ‘principle of movement and rest’ (Physics 192b13–14), but Simplicius
accommodates this definition by interpreting ‘principle of motion and rest’ in a pas-
sive manner: ‘nature is a source of movement not in respect of moving but of being
moved, and of rest not in respect of stopping but being stopped.’104 Nature, then, is
ultimately identified as a ‘propensity’ (ἐπιτηδειότης) of matter to undergo certain
ordered motions leading to a certain form,105 which Simplicius then elucidates in
terms of the PAP principle: this propensity must be actualized by an efficient cause
that already possesses the form in question.106 This is why nature is comparable to a
mechanical puppet: both contain propensities to be moved in organized ways that

must by actualized by an external agent.
Returning now to the nature of the human seed, we may say that it is a collection
of form-principles which,107 when set in motion and actualized, bring about the
formation of the offspring. The question now becomes who or what the agent of
actualization is. At 313,22–6 (beginning at (*) in the translation) Simplicius appears
to be saying that it is the father, for he states here that the father provides ‘the prin-
ciple and the motion that achieves its objective’ (τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν μέχρι τέλους
κίνησιν), but there is good reason to resist this interpretation, since it would result in
a causal model of human reproduction that is radically different from that of Proclus
and others as well as from his own model of vegetative reproduction. This would be
a serious problem, but if we take his example of the mechanical puppets at face value,
this problem disappears: the father provides the motion that achieves its objective
‘in the same way that the craftsman in the case of mechanical puppets provides the
principle of motion and the impulse that achieves its objective.’108 The craftsman’s
contribution is not to actually set the puppet in motion but to construct the pup-
pet in such a way that when actual motion is introduced that motion achieves the
intended outcome, and in this way he may be said to provide for the motion that
achieves its end.That is, he provides potential motion of a certain sort. By analogy, the
father’s contribution is to create the seed, which likewise has a propensity to achieve
its intended outcome once it is set in motion. To be sure, the language of supply-
ing ‘a principle of motion,’ ‘the motion that achieves its objective,’ and ‘the impulse
that achieves its objective’ would appear to suggest something more than supplying
a mere propensity for motion, but this is by design. Even though Simplicius has
offered a radical reinterpretation of nature as a propensity to be moved, he continues
to use active language to describe it in order to bridge the gap between his account
and Aristotle’s text.This is indeed already the case in his digression on nature, where
he takes pains to defend the compatibility of his own understanding of nature with
the description of nature as ‘a kind of life’ and ‘a motion that achieves its form,’109
If the father is not described here as the supplier of actual movement, noth-
ing stands in the way of our understanding the case of human reproduction to be
analogous to that of vegetative reproduction, with the mother serving as the actual-
izer of the form-principles in the seed.110 This, then, is how we should understand
Simplicius’ claim that ‘the maternal nature is productive of the form in a more
proximate manner,’111 as is confirmed by a synopsis of human reproduction in his
commentary on Aristotle’s Categories that invokes both PIP and PAP in turn:
What is imperfect is generated from what is perfect, and what is in a state of

potentiality from what is in a state of actuality. For a human being generates a
seed, as the father does, and again generates a human being from a seed, as the
mother does. For everything in a state of potentiality must be led to a state of
actuality by something that is in a state of actuality.
(Simplicius Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 244,1–4)
This synopsis, which can also be found in a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagôgê by

Elias,112 a second-generation student of Ammonius,113 offers a succinct statement of
the maternal actualization thesis.
Two minor issues remain. The first concerns how the mother’s nature can be
thought to be the agent of actualization given Simplicius’ passive interpretation
of natures,114 and the second concerns his claim that the nature of the offspring is
itself creating the body.115 Both of these issues, however, are already familiar from
our examination of other Neoplatonists. Porphyry is also willing to describe the

formation of the embryo as the work of the nature in the seed, as long as this nature
is ‘steered’ by the mother’s nature,116 which resonates with Simplicius’ remark that
the offspring’s nature creates ‘because it is a kind of life that is being raised up and
roused to form.’117 And that the mother’s nature is not entirely sufficient to effect
the transition to actuality was seen in both Porphyry and Proclus. As we saw above,
whereas Porphyry deals with this by linking the maternal nature to the mother’s
self-moving soul, Proclus sees the solution in the maternal nature’s relationship to
higher and more universal causes, and Simplicius appears to be thinking in terms of
the latter.This, in any case, would make good sense of his remark that the actualiza-
tion of natures is ultimately due to an illumination from God.118
To take one final example, the maternal actualization thesis is also to be found in
the writings of yet another student of Ammonius, John Philoponus, though there
are unique challenges in sorting out Philoponus’ views on embryology. As with
Ammonius’ other students, some of Philoponus’ commentaries were composed in
connection with seminars given by his teacher, though supplemented with mate-
rial of his own. In addition there is evidence that he developed some of his views
(in other areas, at least) over time in radically different directions, in some cases
resulting in a complete reversal of his earlier views. This, coupled with Philoponus’
knowledge of medical theory and in particular of Galen,119 makes an ultimate assess-
ment of his commitment to the maternal actualization theory very difficult. The
thesis is advanced in its clearest form in his commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul,
which belongs to this group of transcripts of Ammonius’ lectures with additions.The
lemma under examination forms part of Aristotle’s discussion of the faculty of sensa-
tion in On the Soul 2.5. Here, Aristotle presents his well-known account of sensation
as a faculty that must undergo two stages of actualization. The first stage takes place
in the course of the generation of, e.g., a human being, and results in a fully formed
organ of sensation endowed with its respective power, e.g. an eye with the power of
sight, which is likened to possessing knowledge without contemplating that knowl-
edge. The second stage involves this power being actualized by an external sense
object, thereby creating actual sight, which is likened to the contemplation of the
knowledge in one’s possession. In this lemma (417b16–19) Aristotle provides a brief
causal account of the first stage of actualization: ‘the first transition is brought about
by the generator (ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος), and once it has been generated it already pos-
sesses sensation in the sense of knowledge, and actual sensation is said to correspond
to the contemplation of knowledge.’ Most scholars today would understand this
reference to ‘the generator’ as an allusion to the father,120 as is entirely reasonable in
light of Aristotle’s claim in On the Generation of Animals that the male is the efficient
cause of the sensitive soul,121 but that is not how Philoponus takes it:
What then is it that first leads what is in a state of potentiality to the possession,
i.e. to the state of second potentiality or first actuality? Aristotle says it is ‘the
generator.’ For in gestation the propensity is led to the possession. Just as, then,
the man who is actually literate leads the child to the possession [of literacy],
so too does the nature in the mother lead the seed and in general the matter
of the living thing to sensation in the sense of possession. Gestation, then, is
a change and transition of what is of a nature to sense into sensation in the
sense of possession.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul 306,2–8)
This instantiation of the maternal actualization thesis, which is not on offer at this
point in the commentaries by Themistius and Pseudo-Simplicius (though it is later
appropriated by the Byzantine commentator Sophonias),122 is particularly striking
insofar as he is extending it beyond its usual application of accounting for the actu-
alization of the form-principles of the body in order to explain the generation of
the sensitive power of soul.This is significant and will be examined in more detail in
Chapter 4,123 but for now we shall focus on Philoponus’ commitment to the broader
thesis. Additional evidence from within the ‘Ammonian’ commentaries could be
adduced, though nothing quite as unambiguous as the passage above,124 along with
some passages that certainly strike a more Aristotelian tone, though not so much
so as to be incompatible with the maternal actualization thesis.125 The same would
seem to go for the works Philoponus composed outside of Ammonius’ seminars.126
At this point we have seen how Neoplatonists from Porphyry onwards have
adopted some form of the external actualization thesis with the overwhelming
majority identifying the mother as the proximate agent of actualization. This is his-
torically significant insofar as the proponents of the maternal actualization thesis no
longer give the male the pride of place he receives in Aristotelian embryology, rather
both the male and female natures are more or less accorded equal weight.127 This
may be seen as an important corrective to much of the androcentric embryology
that the Neoplatonists inherited, even if it is never quite presented as such, yet the
extent of its historical significance must be assessed with caution. It neither marks
the end of androcentric theories of reproduction, nor should it be seen as ushering
in a new wave of gynecocentric theories. It is, however, at the very least, a welcome
and innovative less androcentric alternative that flourished for several centuries in
Neoplatonic schools, though perhaps not in the earliest Neoplatonic school.
It is in any case not conspicuously present in Plotinus’ Enneads. As we saw above,
overall Plotinus’ conception of the seed would appear to be comparable to that
of other Neoplatonists: it is a collection of form-principles containing images of
the individual parts of the father.128 He also clearly sees the male seed as an agent
that is responsible for the formation of the offspring,129 and he emphasizes that
the female should not be seen as a mere material cause of formation.130 Moreover,
Plotinus routinely invokes the PAP principle in other contexts in the Enneads and
in general holds that lower principles derive their active power from higher princi-
ples,131 from which it would follow that the form-principles in the seed also derive
their efficacy from higher powers. All of this would suggest that Plotinus is at least
well positioned to subscribe to the maternal actualization thesis.Yet the manner in
which the seeds maintain their connection to the higher principles, that is, whether
it involves a transition from a potential state to an actual state132 and whether such
transition would be achieved by the World-Soul (universal nature) or some indi-

vidual soul is difficult to determine in Plotinus. There are many scattered remarks
in the Enneads that could be related to this issue,133 but what strikes me as the most
promising line of interpretation takes its starting point from Plotinus’ discussion of
the problem of transmigration in Ennead 6.7. Here he draws our attention to the
form-principles in the seed that are responsible for creating an individual body and,
insisting that these form-principles must be the activities of some soul, asks about
the identity of the soul at issue. He rejects the suggestion that it could merely be
the vegetative soul and answers instead that it is the descending rational soul, which
would suggest that the rational soul descends at conception in order to actualize the
form-principles in the seed.134 He returns to this suggestion a little further down:
And if the soul has the opportunity, it makes what is finer, but if not, what it
can; it is foreordained to make in any case: it is like the craftsmen who know
how to make many forms and then make just this one, for which they had the
order or which their material by its suitability [to a particular form] required.
For what is there to prevent the power of the World-Soul from drawing a
preliminary sketch, since it is the universal forming principle, even before the
soul-powers come from it, and this preliminary sketch being like illumina-
tions running on before into matter, and the soul which completes the work
itself following the traces of this kind and making by articulating the traces
part by part, and each individual soul becoming this to which it came by
figuring itself, as the dancer does to the dramatic part given to him?
(Plotinus Ennead 6.7.7.5–16, Armstrong translation revised)
The details of this passage are certainly murky, but I think the following offers a
fair reconstruction of its sense. The World-Soul, we are told, provides a ‘preliminary
sketch.’This is best understood as a reference to the form-principles provided by the
vegetative souls of the parents, which Plotinus describes elsewhere as not deriving
from the descended soul itself, but rather ‘from the universe.’135 If so, then we should
expect these logoi to be provided at the moment of conception, in which case the
reference to the sketch (προϋπογράφειν) in the present passage finds a striking echo
in Ennead 2.9.12.20–21, where a preliminary sketch (περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφή) is
said to be imprinted on the menstrual fluid.136 The individual descended soul is said
to be present after this sketch is in place, which would mean that the soul could
descend at or after conception. Yet this soul is also said to ‘complet[e] the work’
(ἐξεργαζομένην)137 in the manner analogous to a craftsperson who, while capable
of producing all sorts of different forms in matter, must allow the material she is
working on to guide her actions, which strongly suggests that this soul is descend-
ing well before birth and perhaps directly at conception.138 In this case Plotinus’
descended soul would appear to be taking on the role that Porphyry had allotted to
the mother’s soul, and this is possible because, as he routinely says,139 every descend-
ing soul contains the entire spectrum of logoi within itself.
Other External Factors in the Formation of the Offspring

There are two more shared theses in Neoplatonic embryology.The first, that the soul,
or at least the rational soul, is provided to the offspring from an external source, will
be examined in Chapter 4 since the overall manner of animation was the subject of
some disagreement. The second concerns a variety of factors and agents external to
the parents that were seen as influential variables in the process of formation. These
include above all dietary, meteorological, and astrological influences. This material is
being included in this study in order to give a faithful overall picture of Neoplatonic
theories of biological generation, but it is peripheral to the central embryological
account. In fact, apart from the enigmatic reference to the ‘environment’ discussed
above, these influences hardly find any mention at all in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum,140
and most of the material in this area is either drawn from offhand remarks or else not
worked out in adequate detail. For this reason, the following survey will be limited
to setting out some of the main ideas one encounters in this area.
Neoplatonists would have found a broad foundation for including one’s diet
and regimen among the factors that affect the formation in the Hippocratic and
Galenic medical traditions, as well as in Aristotle’s biology, which should come as
no surprise given their respective theories on the corporeal origin of the seed(s)
and the nourishment of the embryo by the menses.141 Plato also addresses the
issue in the Laws, where the Athenian proposes legislation banning inebriated indi-
viduals (whether male and female) from procreating and promoting a program of
‘athletics of the embryo’ for the period of gestation, which amounts to a form of
passive exercise achieved by having pregnant mothers going for walks,142 and in
the Republic, where he has Socrates emphasize that the age of both parents is cru-
cial to producing healthy offspring.143 Neoplatonists would certainly have needed
little encouragement to stress the importance of such factors, since a healthy regi-
men was already a central part of their approach to philosophy, and since they
accepted (with some qualifications) the Galenic view that the mixture of the body’s
humors affected one’s psychological states,144 and I believe we may take Proclus’
brief remarks in his commentary on the Republic, where with reference to Plato’s
Laws he acknowledges (without describing) distinct forms of diet and exercise that
are conducive to the male and female roles in reproduction, to be fairly representa-
tive of a more universal Neoplatonic position.145 In the case of the pregnant mother,
there are some indications that the proper diet is at least partially communicated by
means of the cravings (pica) she experiences.146 Proclus also takes this opportunity
to emphasize the importance of correctly matching the male and female bodily
temperaments to each other,147 and since the bodily temperaments are themselves
subject to the influence of environmental factors, he acknowledges that these, too,

must be taken into consideration.148
The suggestion that Neoplatonists were committed to any manner of astral
influence over the sublunary world and especially over human lives needs some
justification, if only because they sometimes present themselves as being deeply
skeptical of astrological practice.149 Since this skeptical attitude is generally seen
as being strongest in Plotinus, we would do well to begin with him. As Porphyry
reports in his Life of Plotinus, his master, after having spent much time and energy
studying astrological tables, concluded that they had an unreliable foundation and
refuted much of their contents.150 This provides the first indication of Plotinus’
skepticism towards astrology, and it would seem to be confirmed by a number of
passages questioning or even ridiculing astrology in the Enneads themselves, but as
has been recently shown, Plotinus’ views on astrology are much more positive –
and more nuanced – than often supposed.151 To adopt the terms coined by A.A.
Long,152 Plotinus is an advocate of both soft and hard astrology, which is to say that
he allows not only that the stars can signify events, but also that they cause them.Yet
he reins in the causal influence of the stars in several ways aimed at safeguarding the
nobility of the stars as well as the autonomy of human action. Plotinus protects the
nobility of the stars by insisting that whatever effects they cause are not produced
because the stars intended to cause such effects – he mocks those who speak of stars
becoming ‘angry’153 – rather, their attention is always directed at intelligible being,
and the effects they produce for the sublunary region come about automatically.154
Moreover, the scope of the stars’ causal efficacy is limited in two ways. First, they
represent only one set among many of the causes at work in the sublunary world.
The influence they bear on conception and birth, for example, is secondary to
that of the parents.155 Second, their influence is limited to the domain of the body
and lower soul, which means that each of us is in the position to rise above these
astral influences, since we are all in possession of a higher soul that becomes sub-
ject to these influences only if we choose to live according to our lower selves.156
Subsequent Platonists basically adopt this same attitude towards astrology157 and
often even display a great deal of enthusiasm for astrology,158 as can be discerned
from the commentaries that they composed on astrological texts.159 Indeed, it has
even been suggested that in sixth-century Alexandria astrology formed a valuable
part of the quadrivium and as such was a required element in one’s philosophical
education.160 This is certainly not to say that one never finds serious caveats regard-
ing astrology expressed by these thinkers. Olympiodorus, for example, says at one
point in his commentary on Plato’s Gorgias that ‘there is no place for astrology,’161
but comments such as these must not be misunderstood, since his target here turns
out to be astrological determinism and not astrology per se.
The Platonic and Aristotelian corpora both offer a number of passages that would
have provided later Platonists with the opportunity to reflect on the influence that
the stars exercise over the generation of sublunary sensible living things.162 In the
Physics Aristotle famously states ‘man generates man and so does the sun,’ adding in
the Metaphysics that it is not just the sun itself but its motion along the ecliptic.163
Plato also credits the sun with the generation, growth, and nourishment of sensible
things in the course of his discussion of the Form of the Good in the Republic,164
and a remark in the Theaetetus about the meaning of Homer’s golden cord (Iliad
8.17–27) further suggests that Plato agrees with Aristotle in underlining the impor-
tance of the sun’s motion for its contribution to the being of sensible things.165 The
Republic’s enigmatic pointing to problems related to the so-called ‘nuptial arithmetic’
as the cause of the inevitable degeneration of the Kallipolis must also be understood
as a nod to the influence of celestial bodies on human reproduction. The ‘fruitful-

ness and barrenness of both soul and body’ is related to the ‘revolutions completing
the circumferences of their circles,’ and it is the task of the philosopher-kings to use
‘calculation along with observation’ (λογισμῷ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως) to determine who
should procreate when.166 In the Timaeus he goes even further. Not only are all of
the stars and planets now involved in the generation, but what is generated is also
specified to include both bodies and the lower forms of soul of sublunary living
things.167 Moreover, the rational souls, which are created directly by the Demiurge,
are each linked to an individual fixed star168 – there being exactly as many fixed stars
as there are rational souls169 – and to one of the wandering stars or the earth, which-
ever one the soul bears a natural affinity towards.170 The former serve as ‘vehicles’
from which the Demiurge shows the individual souls the nature of the universe
prior to their first incarnation, and the latter become their appropriate seats through-
out the life of the universe, from which they descend into birth and to which they
return upon the death of the sublunary bodies. Such remarks about celestial seats and
vehicles resonate with the accounts of the celestial journeys of the souls in the myths
of the Phaedo, Phaedrus, and the Republic.
It is possible to detect two main ways in which later Platonists developed these
indications of celestial influence on the formation of the body, one metaphysi-
cally deflationary and the other much more metaphysically robust, where the latter
likely provides the ultimate foundation for the former. The deflationary approach
basically amounts to acknowledging that the celestial motions are responsible for a
number of meteorological phenomena that in turn affect sublunary living things.
This includes not only the changing of the seasons, which was understood to be of
greater importance in the generation of plants and the ‘spontaneous’ generation of
certain other life forms than to humans and other animals, but also the phases of the
moon, which were held to have an effect on the humors.171 The more metaphysi-
cally robust approach to celestial influence takes as its starting point the postulation
of various form-principles in the celestial bodies that account for non-physical
‘effluences’ (ἀπόρροιαι), ‘illuminations’ (ἐλλάμψεις), or ‘powers’ (δυνάμεις) com-
ing from them to the living things in the sublunary regions.172 We already saw one
instance of this approach when we examined how Proclus posits form-principles
in the moon and the other celestial spheres in order to supplement the actual-
izing activity of the mother.173 This suggested that the celestial form-principles
in question are either identical to or more universal forms of the form-principles
of sublunary living things. Some references to these celestial influences, however,
paint a rather different picture. In his commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens
Simplicius appears to be envisioning celestial form-principles of physical properties

such as heat and cold.174 It is easy to see that the communication of such physical
properties would affect all sublunary living things, but one may detect another line
of thought in Neoplatonism which seems to establish special connections between
individual heavenly bodies and individual species. In his On Sacrifice and Magic
Proclus describes how ‘all the things on earth are full of the celestial gods’ because
each planet (including the sun and moon) heads its own causal series which extends
down to specific kinds of sublunary things extending over a wide metaphysical

spectrum including ‘angels, demons, souls, animals, plants and rocks.’175 Although
the thesis appears to apply to all planets, most of Proclus’ examples are of species
that bear a special relation to the sun. Among the animals in the solar series he lists
lions and cocks;176 among plants the date-palm, the bay laurel, and the heliotrope;
among minerals, the ‘sun-stone’ (ἡλίτης) and ‘the so-called eye of Belos’ (ὁ Bήλου
προσαγορενόμενος ὀφθαλμός) are named.177 These beings give expression to their
relation to the sun in correspondingly different ways: the heliotrope turns with the
sun; the cock salutes the sun as it rises with its crow; the date-palm’s shape imitates
that of the sun’s solar rays being emitted from it. It would appear to follow from this
that each planet has a special role to play in the generation of some set of sublunary
natural kinds,178 presumably by each planet providing an image of its own logos to
each kind, but no more details are forthcoming.
The fact that the planets and stars are supplying properties via their rays opens
the door to astrological considerations since the various locations of the planets at
any given time will result in different combinations of properties, and the astro-
logical significance of all of this is increased when we take into account that the
celestial bodies were held to be affected by each others’ effluences too,179 from
which it would follow that the planets’ positions relative to each other as well as to
the Zodiac and the cardinal points were thought to bear additional consequences
for the composition of the effluences reaching the sublunary region. Here, again,
Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s enigmatic remarks on nuptial arithmetic in the
Republic outlines some of the effects of these consequences for reproduction, and
although the exact reasoning behind them remains obscure, some examples will
at least give basic contours to the purported role of celestial causation in repro-
duction.180 We are told, for example, that if any of the five planets is affected at
the moment of conception by the effluences from a so-called maleficent planet,
the seed will be destroyed in one to five months, depending on which planet is
affected.181 The moon’s state and position at conception is also critical, as it can
determine both the duration of the pregnancy (seven months versus nine months)
and condition of the offspring. The wrong position of the moon at conception can
result in a malformed offspring or one deprived of reason.182
The four tenets examined in this chapter may therefore all be categorized as
core tenets of Neoplatonic embryology, along with the external animation thesis
which will be investigated in Chapter 4.This is certainly not to say that these views
are advanced only by Neoplatonic philosophers and physicians. Acknowledging the
causal relevance of dietary, environmental, and even astrological factors, after all, is
nearly ubiquitous in ancient embryology, and the one-seed theory is also widely
held outside of Neoplatonic circles.Yet collectively they may be used as a yardstick
by which later embryological theories may be assessed for their commitments to
Neoplatonism, as may be seen first-hand in the following appendix.
Notes

2 See Wilberding (2014c: 358–60).
3 Porphyry repeatedly says that only the male produces a seed: AG 2.4 (35,24–25); 3.1
(36,16–17); 10.1 (46,14); 10.5 (47,16–26); and cf. De abst. 4.20 (263,14–16). At AG
14.1 (53,28–31) Porphyry considers an alternative view according to which the form-
principle of menses is already present in the seed, which might suggest a two-seed
theory, but Porphyry does not endorse this view. See the discussion of his rejection of
the seminal theory of animation in Chapter 4.
4 See above Chapter 1, pp. 14–15.
5 See, e.g., Porphyry AG 2.1 (34,14–15); 2.4 (35,22–36,10); 4 passim (37,27–41,4); 6.2–3
(42,17–43,5); 8.2 (44,10–45,4); 9 passim (45,5–46,11); 12.2 (50,12–15); 12.3 (50,23–
25); 13.6 (53,7–10); 15.4 (55,14–18); 17.1 (58,19–20); 17.2 (58,29–59,2). For a discus-
sion of the details of Plato’s theory in the Timaeus, see above Chapter 1.
6 See above Chapter 2.
7 Ammonius In Isag. 105,1–3; Asclepius In Meta. 345,30–32 (cf. In Meta. 57,36–58,1;
397,16–17; 448,4–5); Damascius In Parm. 2.42,9–15 (2.94,13–16 Ruelle); Proclus In
Tim. 1.300,1–13; In Parm. 792,3–15 (discussed in more detail below, and cf. Proclus
In Remp. 2.33,16; 2.35,24–25); Simplicius consistently discusses conception in terms
of a single seed and menses (In DC 101,23–26; 110,5–8; 127,2–3; In Cat. 244,2–3; In
Phys. 219,29–32 (citing Aristotle); 248,23–249,5; 313,7–9; 362,6–7; 391,25–27; and see
below on Simplicius’ views on the mother as the actualizer); Syrianus In Meta. 97,21–
24. Cf. Michael Psellus Orat. min. 31.96–100.
8 Plotinus refers to the menses only twice, and each time it is contrasted with the formal
element (5.8.2.6–7 and 2.9.12.18–21).
9 See especially 5.7.2.1–12. See also Plotinus’ denial at 3.6.19.17–25 that the mother is a
mere receptacle, and see below pp. 82–4.
10 Note in particular Plotinus’ use of the term ‘prevalence’ (ἐπικράτησις) in line 8, and
cf., e.g., the Hippocratic Genit. §5 48,7–8 (7.476,22–23 L.); §6 48,17–28 (7.478,5–15
L.); Nat. Puer. §12 53,1–2 (7.486,1–2 L.); Galen De sem. 178,16–19 (4.626,1–6 K.);
182,18–20 (4.630,1–3 K.); Democritus 68A143 DK (Aristotle GA 764a6–11).
11 In this connection it bears repeating that Plotinus is not describing a mixture of seeds
but of logoi.
12 See below pp. 81–2.
13 For Philoponus’ knowledge and use of Galenic medical ideas, see Todd (1984) and van
der Eijk (2006: 1–4 and the notes (passim, e.g. 138n226)). It remains uncertain whether
Philoponus actually composed commentaries on medical texts. The strongest case for
Philoponus’ authorship has been made for a commentary (of which only a fragment
survives) on the 11th book of Galen’s De usu part., as argued by Strohmaier (2003) and
endorsed by van der Eijk (2005a: 134n371) and Pormann (2003: 249).
14 Philoponus In Phys. 114,22–26; 115,2–3; 144,33–145,2; 145,31–146,9; 148,9–10;
157,20–21; 158,2–3; 175,30–31; 247,22–29; 331,19–23; 332,3–4; Aet. Mund. 339,4–5;
409,26–28; 432,11–19; 449,23–28; 501,3–12; In APo 280,17–20; In DA 34,12–13; De
intell. 53,35. Cf. Philoponus (?) In APo 376,7–10.
15 See esp. In Phys. 247,22–29; Aet. Mund. 432,11–19; 449,23–28, and cf. In Phys. 186,18–
24; 516,16–19. Unlike Aristotle, who denied that the matter of the male seed was
incorporated into the body of the offspring (see above Chapter 2, pp. 34–5), Philoponus
has both the seed and the menses contributing matter, e.g., 144,33–145,2; 145,31–
146,9; Aet. Mund. 501,3–12.
16 In the notes to her translation, Kupreeva (2005: 151n361) already indicates that it might
be better to translate the καί epexegetically: ‘the seed from the mother, i.e., the blood,’
though in my view even this is difficult to reconcile with Philoponus’ other remarks
on the menses (see references in previous two notes), in which he opposes the seed and
menses.
17 The closest instance would appear to be Proclus’ acknowledgement of the Timaeus’
doctrine that the bonds of the soul are rooted in the marrow (In Remp. 2.113,15–16
and 2.125,9–11; cf. Plato Tim. 73b2–5), though he does not draw any conclusions here
about the nature or origin of the seed.
18 See above, Chapter 1, pp. 15–16.
19 See Plotinus 5.9.6.17 and 5.1.5.11–12. Similarly Philoponus In DA 88,34–89,1. Cf.
Proclus’ vague characterization of the seed having ‘mass’ (In Tim. 1.396,10–19) or ‘body’
(In Parm. 792,8).
20 [Simplicius] In DA 113,31–34. There is a striking parallel to this lack of commitment
on the issue in Simplicius In Phys. 225,25–27. Cf. Simplicius In DC 168,10–11.
21 Porphyry AG 7.2 (43,23–24). Cf. Porphyry Quaest. Hom. ad Od. 8.583 (80,15–16).
22 Themistius gives us at least one example (Paraphr. in DA 53,6–7). Cf. also Sophonias
Paraphr. in DA 62,21–23 and 63,5–6; Sophonias In PN 33,15–22; Nemesius Nat. hom.
86,4–7; Psellus Theologica 5.93–94 Gautier. A passing remark in John of Alexandria’s In
Hipp. Nat. Puer. provides another suggestion of how later Platonists might have accom-
modated Plato’s remarks into a hematogenous theory. For he characterizes marrow as
‘the fattest of the blood’ (170,25–26; cf. Aristotle PA 652a29–30 and the Hippocratic
Genit. 45,14–16 (7.470 L.)).
23 I follow Mynas’ suggestion of emending ἄξια to ἀπό at 42,20 (cf. 42,22–23: oὕτω γὰρ
διάνoια γέννημα oὖσα νoῦ ὑπoβέβηκε μὲν κατʼ oὐσίαν ἀπὸ τoῦ γεννήσαντoϛ αὐτὴν
νoῦ). Porphyry returns to this principle in AG 14.1–3 (53,28–54,15), discussed below
in Chapter 4.
24 AG 6.2–3 (42,22–43,1). Cf. the Syriac fragment of Porphyry’s Historia philosophica
translated in Altheim and Stiehl (1954: 28) and in the critical apparatus of Diels-Kranz
ad 31B117, but not included in Smith (1993).
25 In AG 6.3 (42,28–29) Porphyry identifies the product of the non-rational power as the
vegetative power (ἡ φυτική), and in 16.4 (56,24–27) he refers back to this claim but
now identifies the product as the ‘nature’ (φύσις) of the offspring. For Porphyry’s com-
mitment to individual natures, see below.
26 E.g., AG 16.1 (55,30–32) and 10.5 (47,16), where αὐτὴ refers back to φύσις (10.4
(47,14)).
27 AG 16.1 (55,31–32). Cf. 16.3 (56,18).
28 As Porphyry says, the father’s vegetative power reproduces its own form-principles in
the blood that is to become the seed (AG 7.2 (43,23–4)).
29 For seeds consisting of logoi, see Plotinus especially Enn. 5.9.6.10–24 (also 2.6.1.10–
12; 4.3.10.10–13; 4.9.3.16–18; 5.1.5.11–13; 5.3.8.4–9); Asclepius In Meta. 408,8–9;
Iamblichus In Nic. Arith. 82,1–5; [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 16,4–6 (cf. 21,17–19);
Michael Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 32,15ff.; Olympiodorus In Alc. 109,24–110,2;
Philoponus In Phys. 93,2–5; 320,1–2; (and cf. 247,22–29); Simplicius In Cat. 210,9–10;
306,23–24; and the references in the next two notes.
30 See Asclepius In Meta. 38,6 and 202,25–26; Olympiodorus In Phd. 13.2.27–32 (p. 169);
Plotinus Enn. 4.7.5.42–48; Damascius De princ. 3.91,20–21 (1.274,25 Ruelle); Proclus
In Tim. 1.396,10–26 (reporting Porphyry’s view with approval); In Parm. 754,10–13;
792,7–8; De decem dub. 8.30–46; Philoponus In DA 13,26–35; Simplicius In Phys.
382,16–21. See also the references in the preceding and following notes.
31 See, e.g., Plotinus Enn. 5.9.6.10–13 (cf. Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 113,28–114,2);
2.6.1.10–12; 3.2.2.18–23; Simplicius In Phys. 382,15–21; Damascius De princ. 3.55,6–10
(1.252,1–4 Ruelle) and 3.91,18–23 (1.274,24–27 Ruelle); and cf. Iamblichus In Nic.
Arith. 82,1–5 (cf. 81,23–24) and [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 5,5–8. This view can already
be found in Stoic sources, e.g., SVF 1.497. The same point is often made using the
language of ‘partlessness,’ e.g., Olympiodorus In Alc. 109,24–110,1; In Phd. 13.2.27–32
(p. 169); Philoponus In DA 13,30–34 (cf. 238,9–12); Plotinus Enn. 4.8.6.7–10; Proclus
In Parm. 792,7–9; De decem dub. 8.30–46; In Tim. 2.47,22–28.
32 See the references in the notes 29–31 and especially Damascius In Parm. 2.42,10–11
(2.94,14–15 Ruelle); Asclepius In Meta. 202,26–27; Plotinus Enn. 3.2.2.18–23 (cf.
3.7.11.23–27); 4.9.5.9–12; Simplicius In Cat. 306,23–24; Philoponus In Phys. 93,3–8.
33 See Tim. 91d2–3. They are ἀδιάπλαστα ζῷα that still require an act of διακρίνειν.
34 Porphyry does, however, discuss this passage in AG 4 and in AG 9.2. In the latter passage
he argues against those who would claim that according to Plato the seed is already an
animal possessing a self-moving soul by underlining Plato’s characterization of these
ζῷα as ‘unformed’ (ἀδιάπλαστα (45,14–15)), which would preclude the possibility of
their already being animals.
35 As we will see this same conception of the seed will allow Proclus to explain in what
sense these logoi are still ἀδιάπλαστα.
36 Elias In Isag. 85,4–7; Iamblichus In Nic. Arith. 82,1–5; Philoponus In DA 306,6–7;
Porphyry AG 14.3 (54,12–15); Proclus Enn. In Parm. 754,10–14; 792,7–15; 888,4–7;
Simplicius In Cat. 244,1–5; In Phys. 1275,8–11. Cf. Plotinus Enn. 6.7.5.2–6.
37 Cf. Aristotle DA 412a9–28; 417a21–b2; and Phys. 255a30–b5.
38 Aristotle DA 413a8–9 and Plato Polit. 272e4 and esp. 273c2–4.
39 Reading oὐδʼ ὡϛ τὰ ˂μὴ˃ κραθέντα at 47,21 with Deuse (1983: 187n209), and ὅταν
δὲ μή˂κέτι ᾖ˃ κατὰ τὴν at 47,28, following Kalbfleisch’s suggestion in the apparatus.
40 There is some disagreement among our sources regarding the terminology, definitions,
and classification of mixtures. For a detailed examination of the sources, see Todd (1976:
49ff.). In what follows I more or less follow the account found in Long and Sedley
(1987, vol. 1: 292–4).
41 Cf. SVF 2.472.
42 See Dörrie (1959: 47f.).
43 For a recent discussion of possible Plotinian and Ammonian influence on Porphyry’s
doctrine of blending, see Emilsson (1994: 5357–61).
44 Cf. AG 16.1 (56,5): τῆς ἰδίας τοῦ σπέρματος φύσεως.
45 See also below on grafting along with AG 10.2 (46,21–2): τό τε ὑποκείμενον ἔχον ἰδίαν
φύσιν τό τε ἐνοφθαλμιζόμενον ἔχον τὴν οἰκείαν.
46 Reading συμφυομένης τῷ σπέρματι <τῆς> ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ δυνάμεως at 46,17–18, fol-
lowing Kalbfleisch’s suggestion in the apparatus. Cf. Plotinus 2.9.7.18–22.
47 Theophrastus De caus. plant. 1.6.1–2 and 10. So too Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis
6.15.117–8.
48 There are known examples of graft-hybrids, though these are technically graft-
chimaeras (though I would prefer to ignore here the modern botanical distinction
between hybrids and chimaeras, as it does not seem relevant to Porphyry’s understand-
ing of botany), the most famous of which is the +Laburnocytisus ‘Adamii’ whose new
growth is a mixture of its two constituent parts – the Laburnum anagyroides and the
Chamaecytisus purpureus. Presumably Porphyry was familiar with some examples of
such hybrids and revised Theophrastus’ account in light of them. Cf. Geoponica 10.76 (in
Lenz (1856: 134)) where, among other examples, mulberry scions grafted onto white
poplar are reported to produce white mulberries.
49 In German this phenomenon is usually called ‘Versehen.’ For some discussion of ideo-
plasty in the history of embryology, see Kahn (1913), von Günther (1936), Wahl (1974:
46–72), Bien (1997: 82–4) and Pinto-Correia (1997: 128–32). Pürzer (1937) is a strik-
ing example of a twentieth-century scientific study of the topic that stops notice-
ably short of rejecting this causal account: ‘Leider sind wir aber nicht in der Lage, die
Unmöglichkeit des Versehens zu beweisen’ (20).
50 Heliodorus Aethiopica 4.119. Soranus’ example is also worth repeating, as it emphasizes
that ideoplasty is not restricted to mental representations of one’s own species: women
who see monkeys during conception can give birth to monkey-like children (Gyn.
1.12.101–120).
51 Genesis 30:37–9; Augustine De Trin. 3.5 and 11.2.5; Heliodorus Aethiopica 4.8; Aëtius
Plac. phil. 5.12.2 (Empedocles 31A81 DK) and 5.12.3 (SVF 2.753); Soranus Gyn.
1.12.101–120; Galen De ther. ad Pis. 14.253,17–254,4 K., translated in Bien (1997: 172)
and Richter-Bernburg (1969: 85–86) (For the authenticity of De ther. ad Pis. see Nutton
(1997)); [Galen] De hist. philos. 19.327,17–328,2 K. and Dionysius Halicarnassensis, De
imitatione 6.202,23–203,6 (Usener and Radermacher); Pliny Nat. hist. 7.12. See also
Bien (1997: 82–4).
52 I have explored this issue at greater length in Wilberding (2008).

53 Galen De foet. form. 104,25–106,2 (4.700,17–701,7 K.). A similar view is later reported
by John of Alexandria (In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 156,14–16), who will be discussed in greater
detail in the appendix to this chapter.
54 More specifically, a Hebrew translation of an Arabic translation of the original Greek
text, though the passage we are interested in has been preserved in the more immedi-
ate Arabic translation in Averroes’ long commentary on the Metaphysics. An English
translation of the passage by Charles Genequand and Richard Sorabji has appeared in
R. Sorabji (2005: vol. 1, passage 1.16 (pp. 42–3)), but readers are directed to the revised
translation in Meyrav (forthcoming).
55 Cf. Galen’s objection to making the rational soul responsible for the formation of the
embryo in De foet. form. 104,22–24 (4.700,14–17 K.).
56 I would like to thank Yoav Meyrav for providing me with his revised translation of this
passage. Readers are advised to see Meyrav (forthcoming) for a translation of the pas-
sage in its entirety and for more discussion.
57 Henry (2003: 189n10) reports that there was originally some scholarly disagreement
about whether Themistius intended the soul of the earth or the World-Soul here.
Henry defends the correctness of the soul of the earth, pointing to Plato Polit. 271aff.,
in which the generation of an earth-born race is described. To his reasons we may also
add a parallel passage in Proclus, namely In Parm. 793,4–11, which is discussed on pp.
72–4.Themistius appears to reject this conception of the earth in Orat. 27 (2.163,7–23),
translated in Panella (2000: 172). See now also the contributions by Henry, Meyrav, and
Wilberding in Sorabji (ed.) (forthcoming).
58 For ἐμπνεῖν, see Porphyry AG 10.6 (48,6–7) and 16.4 (56,25). For κυβερνῆσθαι, see
AG. 6.3.7 (43,4); 8.2.2 (44,11); 10.4.4–10 (47,8–14); 10.5.1 (47,16); 10.6.7–11 (48,3–
7); 11.1.1 (48,9); 11.2.13 (49,1); 18.39 (62,3).
59 Possibly Proclus also advances such a view. See p. 73.
60 Kalbfleisch (1895: 13): ‘Dagegen erklärt der Verfasser der Schrift an Gauros (AG 10.3ff.)
mit voller Bestimmtheit, dass es die bereits dem Samen zukommende vegetative Seele
(φύσις, φυτικὴ ψυχή) ist, welche, vermöge der in ihr enthaltenen Keimformen in
Verbindung mit den Seelen der Eltern, unter Aufsicht und mit Unterstützung der Weltseele
(τῆς τὰ ὅλα διοικούσης ἀρχῆς – AG 10.6, vergl. 16.5) den Körper baut.’
61 Cf. Festugière’s (1944–54, vol. 3, 265–302) remark in his note ad loc.: ‘On n’ose pré-
ciser. S’il s’aggisait du nouveau-né après la sortie, τὸ περιέχον serait évidemment l’air
enveloppant.’ Although I do not agree with Festugière’s tentative suggestion, presum-
ably with an eye on the Stoics (cf. SVF 2.804–808), that the surrounding air is meant
here, I am inclined to agree that Porphyry is thinking of the newborn at the moment
of delivery. Cf. Plotinus Enn. 6.4.15 and Philoponus In GC 295,28.
63 Proclus’ dialectical approach here is intriguing. I understand Proclus to be agreeing with
his interlocutor, i.e., it is the mother’s nature, and then proceeding to draw inferences
from this about the mother’s nature that ultimately allow him to lead his interlocutor to
still higher causes.
64 Morrow–Dillon capitalize ‘nature’ here and throughout this passage, as if Proclus were
already introducing the nature of the universe into the argument, but it is the mother’s
nature that is at issue here. Proclus is building up to the nature of the universe. See
Martijn (2010: 43–54). Unlike Porphyry, Proclus tends to reserve the term ‘soul’ for
rational souls. His ‘natures’ therefore do correspond in some sense to the vegetative
powers of soul (cf. Martijn (2010: 63)), though they do not generally receive the desig-
nation ‘soul.’ See Opsomer (2006) and Martijn (2010: 32–4). Cf. Simplicius’ discussion
of ‘nature’ below.
65 See In Parm. 754,5–15; De decem dub. 8.30–46; cf. In Tim. 1.396,20.
66 See above Chapter 3, p. 63.
67 See Smyth (1920: §472).
68 See Proclus In Tim. 1.110,31–111,3.
69 Cf. Galen (De foet. form. 104,15–24 (4.700,5–17 K.)) registers a similar complaint.
70 As I understand Martijn’s (2010: 44) claim that the nature of the earth is the ‘first level
universal nature […] containing the principles of all individual natures,’ she does not
wish to restrict the scope of the earth’s nature’s influence to plants and ‘spontaneously’
generated living beings, though her summary on p. 54 – ‘Universal nature, containing
all individual natures (that live in/on the earth?)’ – reveals a degree of cautious uncer-
tainty. As the sequel shows, the earth’s logoi derive in some sense from the natures of the
higher spheres, cf. In Eucl. 173,13–18.
71 See Martijn (2010: 44) and d’Hoine (2006: 53–54). Martijn helpfully refers to Proclus
Theol. Plat. 3.2 (3.8.14–20), where Proclus speaks explicitly of the natures of the earth,
fire (presumably the fire-sphere), and the moon.
72 In the Timaeus the living beings corresponding to air and fire are birds and the heavenly
bodies respectively. As Olympiodorus notes (In Meteor. 301,16–25), Aristotle opposed
this doctrine (Meteor. 382a6–9; but cf. GA 761b16–32) on the grounds that no animals
live in air or fire, but Proclus is likely thinking of airy and fiery daimons (Cf. Epin. 984d
and Plotinus 2.1.6.54; 3.5.6.37–8; 6.7.11.67; Proclus In Parm. 818,5; and see Wilberding
(2006: 206–7)).
73 In Parm. 793,14, cf. In Crat. §71 (30,8–15).
74 The connection between the moon’s phases and the female menstrual cycle was a well-
established part of folk medical belief. Although it does not appear to have made its way
into Hippocratic medicine (but cf. Oct. 88,4–16 (7.458,17–60,9 L.)), it can be found in
Aristotle’s GA (e.g. 767a6–8). Soranus (Gyn. 1.12.144–75) reports (and rejects) a num-
ber of connections believed to obtain between the moon and the health of humans and
animals, including that ‘the generative faculties in ourselves as well as in other animals
are said to increase with the waxing moon but to decrease with the waning moon’
(οὕτως καὶ τὰς σπερματικὰς δυνάμεις ἐν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις αὔξεσθαι μὲν
πληρουμένης τῆς σελήνης, ἐλαττοῦσθαι δέ μειουμένης), which appears to extend the
influence of the moon to men as well as women. Cf. Proclus’ report of Iamblichus’
views on the moon’s influence at In Tim. 3.65,17–20: τὴν μὲν σελήνην πρώτην εἰς
τὸν περὶ γῆν τόπον τετάχθαι λέγων, ὡς φύσεως ἔχουσαν λόγον καὶ μητρὸς πρὸς τὴν
γένεσιν (πὰντα γὰρ αὐτῇ συντρέπεται καὶ συναύξεται μὲν αὐξομένης, ἐλαττοῦται δὲ
ἐλασσουμένης), and see Olympiodorus In Alc. 18,10–19,6, who, among other con-
nections, links the body’s humors and the growth of hair to the waxing and waning of
the moon. Cf. also Porphyry In Ptol. Tetrab. §2 (190,22–195,10) and §§44–45 (216,24–
219,21), on the authenticity of this work, see Bezza in Goulet (1994–2012, volume Vb:
1381–4).
75 See Aristotle GA 767a6–8.
76 Cf. In Crat. §167 (91,19–25); In Tim. 2.146,3–11.
77 See AG 6.3 (43,4); 8.2 (44,11); 10.4 (47,8–16); 10.6. (48,3–7); 11.1 (48,9); 11.2 (49,1);
18.39 (62,3).
78 As with the sublunary elemental spheres, Proclus skips over the other celestial spheres.
Martijn (2010: 44) notes, correctly in my view, that this suggests that the natures of
the other planets also contain principles of all the lower natures. Cf. Proclus In Remp.
2.58,22–24; In Tim. 2.106,1–9; In Parm. 956,12–23.
79 As d’Hoine (2006: 55n110) notes, In Parm. 793,19–21 ‘seems to be a corollary of El.
Th. §56 (54,4–6)’: Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ
αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ’ ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο.
80 Dodds (1963: 230).
81 Cf. Proclus El.Th. §177.
82 Cf. Proclus In Parm. 794,2–795,6.
83 Cf. also In Crat. §167 (91,19–25); In Alc. 72,1–4; Theol. Plat. 1.63,21–26; and In Tim.
2.146,3–11 and 3.135,15–136,4. Other questions remain, e.g., concerning the identity
of the logoi in the natures of the moon and the universe. Proclus says the lunar nature
contains ‘the species in all [of the spheres]’ (τῶν ἐν πᾶσιν εἰδῶν) and the universal
nature contains ‘the logoi of all’ (πάντων […] τοὺς λόγους), but if we follow the line of
thought outlined in El. Th. §§70–72 these logoi should be more universal at each level.
Perhaps, then, the idea is that the mother’s vegetative nature contains logoi of parts such
as eyes and nose, the lunar nature contains the logos of human being and other species
(in which the logoi of the parts are embedded), and the universal nature contains the
logos of living thing (in which all the species, including those of the celestial bodies, are
embedded).
84 Syrianus In Meta. 36,22–30. Cf. In Meta. 185,29–186,14. At In Meta. 188,28–29 he
describes the seed as having a ποιητικὴν δύναμιν, which could possibly indicate that
he was in agreement with Aristotle, but presumably this should be understood as an
efficient potentiality along the lines of the AG: a power that becomes the efficient cause
of the formation when it is actualized from an external source.
85 See also Chapter 4, p. 149.
86 The relevant texts for our purposes are the commentaries on Aristotle’s Cat. and
Porphyry’s Isag., which have been transmitted under Ammonius’ name but are gener-
ally held to be ἀπὸ φωνῆς commentaries by unnamed students of his (see Blank (2010:
661)), Asclepius’ In Meta., on which see below note 89, and Elias’ In Cat. Simplicius and
Philoponus, two other students of Ammonius, will be dealt with separately below.
87 Ammonius In De Int. 250,6–7 and 26–30.
88 Ammonius In Isag. 48,3–7. See also In Isag. 104,32–105,8, where this nature is not
described as being in the seed but rather as creating the embryo out of the seed.
89 This is indicated by the headings of the comments on each of the first four books
(In Meta. 1,1–3; 113,1–2; 137,1–3; 222,1–3) which are described as being ἀπὸ φωνῆς
Ἀμμωνίου τοῦ Ἑρμείου. Although the comments on books 5–7 are not presented as
such (cf. 302,1–2; 358,1 and 375,1–2), the entire commentary is commonly taken to be
representative of Ammonius’ thought. See Verrycken (1990: 204–10) and Blank (2010:
663). The passages that interest us most here are all derived from these last three books.
If it could be shown that these passages are in fact Asclepius’ own additions, it would
only serve as further evidence of the ubiquity of the thesis in question.
90 Asclepius In Meta. 404,3–405,26. Cf. Aristotle Meta. 1033b32.
91 This must be the sense of τὸ ἀβάκιον here (pace Jackson, Lycos and Tarrant (1998:
58n20)). Asclepius is engaging in the familiar practice of using an object at hand in the
lecture room to illustrate a philosophical point. This is a very common example – oth-
ers include tables and chairs – among Ammonius and his students for illustrating the
production of an artifact by a τέκτων, cf. Ammonius In Isag. 2,3–4; 101,15–17; Asclepius
In Meta. 24,6–8; 51,14–21; 398,16–17 (cf. 26,1; 320,31–35; 397,13); Olympiodorus In
Gorg. 4,1–5; Philoponus In APr 7,25–28; In DA 208,3–5; Elias In Cat. 240,21–22; etc.
92 That is, the form that he has in his soul. This must be the sense of 404,14–15, with
αὐτοῦ referring back to ὁ τέκτων. Cf. Ascelpius In Meta. 407,14–15 and 410, 2–3.
93 Cf. Aristotle Meta. 1033b33–1034a2.
94 Often Asclepius offers explicit responses to Aristotle’s positions in his θεωρίαι, e.g., In
Meta. 76,10–12; 84,19–24; 87,25–32; 89,17–20; 90,6–10; 91,19–26; 150,40–151, 2; etc.,
but this is not the case here.
95 He does characterize the seed as having the form of human being only in a potential
manner (In Meta. 410,35), but there is no mention of how it is brought to actuality.
96 Some of these characterizations of the father are clearly part of his exposition of
Aristotle, e.g., In Meta. 84,11–12 and 87,22–24, but in others he appears to be giving
his own view, e.g., In Meta. 304,11–13; 305,26–28; 306,15–16; 355,23–24; 397,27–29;
410,33–411, 2. Likewise, on two occasions Asclepius does describe the female simply in
terms of providing the matter (In Meta. 51,21–24 and 91,14–17), though in each case
he is summarizing Aristotle’s view (cf. 51,24 and 91,19–20).
97 An anonymous referee has alternatively suggested that it might have been Asclepius’
Peripatetic opponent himself who was propounding the maternal actualization thesis.
Either way, the text is further evidence of just how widespread this thesis was in late
antiquity.
98 As Elizabeth Asmis has helpfully brought to my attention, Asclepius’ exegesis might
have been partly motivated by the fact that Aristotle’s text also appears to have the
(female) horse generating the mule (οἷον ἵππος ἡμίονον, Meta. 1033b33).
99 Henry (2005: 20–21) infers from these lines that the nature of the human seed must itself
be the nature of a human being, but that is antithetical to Simplicius’ true point here,
as he emphasizes himself in the next line: ἡ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἡ μήπω οὖσα ἀνθρώπου
φύσις.
100 Diels’ text runs: ἐπεὶ τὸ τοῦ ἄρρενος σπέρμα καὶ τὸ τῆς θηλείας φύσιν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ
σπέρματος μεταβολὴν καὶ τελειοῦσθαι πεφυκυῖαν εἰς ζῷον. I have changed the φύσιν
to φύσει based on a suggestion by Marwan Rashed. The τὸ prior to τῆς θηλείας is
infelicitious, as it suggests a female seed (as Fleet (1997: 174n200) seems to accept). But
this is unlikely to be the real meaning, since Simplicius does not subscribe to the two-
seed theory elsewhere (see above, note 7) and the singular τοῦ σπέρματος in the same
line would be difficult to reconcile with the two-seed theory. Note that one manuscript
omits σπέρμα after ἄρρενος.
101 For a more thorough discussion of the generation of plants, see Wilberding (2015a).
102 Henry (2005: 18–27). I discussed Henry’s interpretation briefly in Wilberding (2008:
429–30), but the account provided below is meant to tie up some of the loose ends left
in that discussion.
103 In Phys. 313,5–6, and cf. the critical apparatus in Diels’ text ad loc and Fleet (1997:
174n199). Golitsis (2008: 139–49) offers some commentary on this digression.
104 Simplicius In Phys. 287,10–11, Fleet translation slightly revised.
105 Simplicius In Phys. 287,13–15; 287,20–21; 288,9–10; 288,20; 288,28–30; 288,34;
289,12–15; 289,21–23.
106 Simplicius In Phys. 288,17–32. Cf. 314,12–14.
107 See above on the nature of the seed, e.g., Simplicius In Cat. 210,9–10; 306,23–24; In
Phys. 382,16–21.
108 The translations by Fleet (1997: 70) and Henry (2005: 22–3) obscure this point and beg
the question of whether the father is the cause of actual motion by translating τεχνίτης
as ‘operator’ rather than as ‘craftsman,’ which is surely its usual meaning.
109 Simplicius In Phys. 287,20–21 and 289,25–35 (esp. 30–31). For a description of nature
in terms of ὁρμή, cf. In Phys. 265,9–22.
110 Cf. also Simplicius’ description of the seed passively being moved (κινηθέντος) as opposed
to moving itself at In Phys. 1150,18–21.
111 Elsewhere Simplicius draws strong connections between the term and motion, demi-
urgy and actualization, cf., e.g., In Cat. 256,3–7; In DC 228,16–18; In DC 306,19–25;
In DC 676,4–5; In Phys. 375,31–34. Cf. [Simplicius] In DA 11,20–22.
112 Elias In Isag. 85,3–7.This synopsis does not, however, appear in the commentary attrib-
uted to Ammonius, though it does contain a discussion of the PAP principle, including
the example of the illiterate boy that Elias also gives (Ammonius In Isag. 104,14–18).
See the discussion of Ammonius above.
113 See Opsomer (2010: 697).
114 Simplicius In Phys. 313,8–10 and 26. The same problem could be raised for the inter-
pretation that the father is the cause of actual motion, since it is the father’s nature that
is at issue here (313,10).
115 Simplicius In Phys. 313,6–7 and 18. Cf. Simplicius In Cat. 306,23–24.
116 Porphyry AG 10.3 (46,24–47,5); cf. AG 16.2 (56,5–15) and see above, pp. 64, 66 and
69.
117 Simplicius In Phys. 313,6–7.
118 Simplicius In Phys. 288,28–30.
119 See above, note 13.
120 E.g., Smith (1931) and Everson (1997: 91) simply translate it as ‘male parent’ (see the
next note), though others refrain from attempting to pinpoint the identity of the gen-
erator, e.g., Ross (1961: 237) and Polansky (2007:240–44).
121 Aristotle GA 741a13–14. See Johansen (2007: 296–8) for a discussion of DA 417b16–
19 against the background of this theory in the GA.
122 Themistius and Pseudo-Simplicius remain neutral on the identity of the actualizer
in their comments on this passage. Cf. Themistius Paraphr. in DA 56,12–29; Pseudo-
Simplicius In DA 123,30–37; and Sophonias Paraphr. in DA 69,11–22.
123 This is connected to Philoponus’ un-Porphyrian (cf. AG 14 (53,28–54,25)) claim that
the seed contains logoi not just of the parts of the body but also of the non-rational
powers of soul (In DA 163,34–36). See Chapter 4, p. 143.
124 At In Phys. 242,3–7 Philoponus describes both the maternal and the paternal nature
as being involved in the creation, and at In Phys. 322,10–17 the nature responsible for
creation is said first to receive the seed. Elsewhere in the In DA commentary (222,25–32)
Philoponus also describes the seed as potential and an ἐπιτηδειότης that is perfected
(τελειωθὲν – passive), and the formation is also described in passive terms at In APo
280,17–18. See also In Phys. 186,18–24 and In DA 213,31–37.
125 As with other Neoplatonists sometimes the seed or the male is described as the efficient
cause, e.g., In Phys. 516,16–22; In GC 295,26–27; In DA 13,28–30; cf. Philoponus (?) In
APo 376,7–10. Any strong claims about the father being the cause of motion are tem-
pered by In Cat. 201,21–26, where the motion of emission as opposed to any motion
contained in the seed itself is underlined (cf. In APo 280,18–19). Other times the focus
on the mother is limited to her reception of seed, e.g., In APo 280,19–20.
126 Here, too, Philoponus describes the nature that is responsible for the creation of the
embryo as first receiving the seed (Aet. Mund. 374,19–27). In Aet. Mund. 369,1–21 he
uses both active and passive language of the perfection of the seed, and he speaks of the
‘vitalization and formation of the embryo in the womb,’ which he identifies with the
generation of form (ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζώωσίς τε καὶ διάπλασις οὐ δήπου
ὕλης ἀλλ’ εἴδους ἐστὶν γένεσις), cf. Opific. Mund. 209,22–210,8. Some re-evalution,
however, might be required in light of Philoponus’ criticism of the PAP principle at Aet.
Mund. 3.6–7 (see 44,23–45,4 and 53,1–55,22).
127 Asclepius appears to come closest to presenting the female as the more important
agent, insofar as he presents her as the analogical pendant to the craftsman (In Meta.
404,9–31, cited and discussed above). Porphyry also goes in this direction. Whereas
Aristotle in embryological contexts had reserved the prestigious term ‘demiurge’ for
the male (Aristotle GA 738b20–21, cf. 738b11–13; 720b24–32; 735a27–29; 766a14–16;
771b21–23; 772b31–33), Porphyry uses this term in the AG primarily of the female
(AG 6.1 (42,13–16); 16.3 (56,21) cf. 12.7 (51,30–52,2); 13.6 (53,14–17)). (δημιουργεῖν
is also applied to the seed, but only once its connection to the womb is established,
see AG 3.1 (36,17–18).) Likewise, he calls both the male and the female ‘captains’ (AG
10.5–6 (47,16–48,8)). Nevertheless, Porphyry has Plato saying that the demiurgic con-
tribution of the female is only ‘nearly equivalent’ to that of the male (σχεδὸν τὴν ἴσην
δημιουργίαν, AG 8.2 (44,10–12)), which might well suggest that Porphyry still harbors
some reservations about fully elevating the female’s status in reproduction (though per-
haps σχεδὸν should be translated here as ‘approximately’). Be that as it may, the general
position found in Porphyry and the others is that individual natures are responsible for
biological creation, and the male and female both lay equal claim to the possession of
individual natures.
128 See above notes 29–31.
129 On the agency of seeds, see Enn. 3.8.7.18–23; 4.3.10.11–13; 5.3.8.4–5; 6.7.5.5–8. This
finds some further confirmation in the numerous passages in which Plotinus accounts
for the offspring’s resemblance to its parents (especially the father): 2.3.12.1–11;
2.3.14.29–34; 2.9.12.18–33; 3.1.1.32–36; 3.1.5.20–34 and 53–5; 3.1.6.1–7; 3.3.7.26–8;
4.7.5.40–51; 5.7 passim.
130 As we saw above, in Enn. 5.7 Plotinus has the female contributing logoi of her own,
though whether this is by means of a seed or otherwise was left unclear. See also
3.6.19.18–25.
131 See Chapter 2, p. 35 with note 12.
132 Cf. 3.7.11.23–4 for a description of the seed being initially in a ‘quiet’ state.
133 There are in particular a number of passages in which Plotinus attributes responsibility
for the creation of individual bodies to nature, the World-Soul or the universe (e.g.,
2.1.5.18–20; 2.3.16–17 passim; 2.9.18.14–17; 4.3.6.13–18; 4.3.11.8–12; 4.4.34.1–3;
6.6.7.5–7), but these must be understood in a way that accommodates both his claims
about the parents’ roles and those about the individual descending soul’s role. I have
discussed these passages in greater detail in Wilberding (forthcoming-a) and cf. Sorabji
(2005: vol. 1, 211–12 and vol. 3, 362–3) and Wilberding (2008: 426–9). My view is
that the contribution made by the parents is sometimes presented as a contribution
from nature or the universe in contexts where Plotinus’ primary aim is to distinguish
between activities ascribable to the individual descending soul and those ascribable to
that end of the soul spectrum that is already at work in the sensible world. In the pas-
sages discussed below from Enn. 6.7 he explains how we might harmonize these two
factors. One sense in which the universe or nature is acting in a way that goes beyond
the contributions by the parents will be discussed below in the section on external fac-
tors. There is a notable missed opportunity to bring in the maternal actualization thesis
in Enn. 5.9. In 5.9.4.7–10 Plotinus illustrates the PAP principle by appealing not to the
contributions of mothers in the creation of the offspring but to the formative influ-
ence of the fathers, presumably insofar as they rear and educate their sons. (It is possible
to translate πατέρων as ‘parents’ here, which would allow us to understand Plotinus’
example as compatible with the maternal actualization thesis, but a parallel passage in
5.1.3.13–15 makes this interpretation unlikely.) Further below, in 5.9.6.10–24, Plotinus
then relates his concerns to the logoi in seeds, but once again there is no mention of the
mother. Rather, he speaks vaguely of the nature in the seed receiving its impulse from
above and from its priors (ἐκεῖθεν ὁρμηθεῖσα ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς).
134 Plotinus Enn. 6.7.5.1–15.
135 In 3.1.5.30–4, for example, Plotinus includes one’s similarity to one’s parents among the
external influences that come ‘from the universe’ (cf. 2.3.15.13–17). In other contexts,
especially those where he is concerned to play down the efficacy of the stars and the
universe, parents are not counted among, and are even contrasted with, external influ-
ences (e.g., 3.1.5.53–5 and 6.1–7; 2.3.12.1–11). See note 133.
136 περιβολὴ καὶ περιγραφὴ τυποῦσα ἐπὶ τοῖς καταμηνίοις παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου.The notion of
a sketch of the entire body being supplied at the start is already to be found in Aristotle’s
GA 743b20–4 (and cf. 740a28–9 and 764b30). Galen also adopts this idea, although
for him the sketch is not present until the third stage of formation (De sem. 94,1–3
(4.542,17–543,3 K.) and 100,23–4 (4.549,16–550,2 K.)). What both accounts share
– and what is much more explicit in Michael of Ephesus’ extensive development of
the idea (In GA 76,16–18; 80,26–7; 101,9–102,12; 103,8–11; 106,2–32; 114,17–25;
115,29–33; and see below on Michael’s embryology) – is the distinction between a
preliminary outline and the actual formation and articulation of the body. A similar idea
appears in Proclus In Remp. 2.327,25–8.
137 Compare the use of αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται in 3.3.4.37–43 at 39. As in the passage above, here
Plotinus wishes to emphasize that the individual soul must be responsible for the body
it inhabits, though he leaves open whether the matter is already suitable or has to be
made suitable by the descending soul, whereas in our passage he seems to have found a
way to accommodate both options. The descended individual soul is also described as
creating (δημιουργεῖ) in 4.7.13.8. Armstrong seems to take this passage to refer to the
World–Soul’s act of creation (note that he adds ‘the world’ as the unexpressed object of
δημιουργεῖ in l. 8), but Plotinus makes clear here that the individual descending soul is
the focus of the passage. For the soul in question is described as ‘wanting to direct a part’
(μέρος δὲ διοικεῖν βουληθεῖσα, l. 11) and initially being transcendent ‘together with
the World-Soul’ (μετὰ μὲν πάσης τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ὑπερέχουσα, l. 9–10). Cf. also
4.3.9.20–6.
138 At 4.3.7.25–31 Plotinus says that the descending soul comes to the offspring while
it is still in the womb, though this could mean at any moment between conception
and birth. Plotinus is sometimes taken to advance the view that the soul descends at
birth (e.g., Brisson in Brisson–Pradeau (2002–10, vol. 2: 223n159); Brisson (2012: 116);
Wilberding (2006: 188)), but there is no incontrovertible evidence for this view. Earlier
moments of entry are suggested by Kalligas (1994–2013, vol. 2: 200 ad 2.1.5.21–3) and
Helleman-Elgersma (1980: 413).
139 For example 5.7.1.8–9; 5.7.2.5–7; 5.7.3.20–3; 6.7.6.33–6.
140 Porphyry AG 14.3 (54,13–15), see p. 70 in this chapter.
141 For the Hippocratic tradition, see, e.g., Vict. I 142,27–146,16 (6.500,1–504,13 L.); Vict.
II 176,2–5 (6.560,1–2 L.); Insomn. 226,10–13 (6.654,15–19 L.). For Galen, see, e.g. De
usu part. 2.143,20–144,22 and 2.308,19–309,2 (3.885,7–886,15 and 4.173,18–174,6
K.) with Bien (1997: 130–3) and (1999: 70–1). For Aristotle, see, e.g., GA 775a31–b2
and Pol. 1335b12–19.
142 Plato Leg. 674b5–6; 775b4–e4; 789a4–b4 and e1–2. ‘Athletics of the embryo’ is
Saunders’ translation of τὴν τῶν τηλικούτων (namely τῶν κυουμένων) γυμναστικήν
(789b1–2).
143 Plato Rep. 460d8–461c5. Cf. Aristotle GA 783b25–6. Proclus also takes age to be a
relevant factor (In Remp. 2.26,9–14 and 2.63,7–8).
144 The Neoplatonists’ views on humoral theory deserve a more thorough examination
(cf. Wilberding (2014c)). See, e.g., Plotinus 1.8.8.28–38; 1.8.14 passim; 3.1.5.24–7;
3.1.6.5–10; 3.1.8.14–20; 4.3.23.42–7; 4.3.26.12–14; 4.4.21 passim; 4.4.28.40–52;
4.7.84.14–17; 4.8.2.42–5. See Boys-Stones (2007: 120–1), who also suggests that at
4.3.7.22–5 Plotinus might be implicitly referring to Galen’s reading of the Hippocratic
Aer. in his QAM 57,14–62,22. Plotinus’ commitment to the environmental corollary
is also witnessed in his advice to Porphyry in VP 11.12–17. Also: Porphyry (?) In Tim.
Fr. 86 (102,26–34); Porphyry AG 15.5; Iamblichus Vita Pyth. 207–8; Proclus In Tim.
2.62,32–63,16; In Remp. 1.38,9–12; 2.63,7–19; In Crat. §174 (99,8–11); In Crat. §176
(100,13–18); Proclus In Timaeum ad 89e3–90a2 (Arabic text and English translation in
Arnzen (2013)); Ammonius In Isag. 7,32–8,4 (cf. 36,21–3); In APr 5,16–19 and In APr
73,43–4; Olympiodorus In Gorg. 11.1 (64,19–21).
145 Proclus In Remp. 1.244,17–27. See also Galen PHP 322,27–32 (5.465,16–466,5 K.),
who appears to credit Plato with a more detailed program than can be accounted for in
the dialogues. De Lacy (note ad loc.) suggests that Galen might have been drawing some
of these details from Posidonius (cf. PHP 324,5–9 (5.466,12–17 K.)). See also Plotinus
2.3.14.29–33; 3.1.1.32–5; Philoponus In GC 295,27–8; Simplicius In Epict. 15,36–41
(2.11–14 (p. 219) Hadot); cf. Sophonias In PN 25,26–8.
146 Porphyry AG 5.1 (41,10–13); 8.1 (44,7–10); 8.4 (45,4); Proclus In Remp. 2.33,20–6.
147 Proclus In Remp. 2.61,7–19 (cf. 2.61,16–17). Cf. Galen’s comments on the Hippocratic
Aphorisisms 7.62–3 (In Hipp. Aphorism. 7 (18b.861,3–872,3 K.)).
148 In particular the seasons and the winds, see Proclus In Remp. 2.61,15–63,6. See also
Proclus In Remp. 2.62,21–63,6; In Tim. 1.99,13–17; In Tim. 1.107,14ff.; In Tim. 1.139,31;
In Tim. 1.162,11ff.; De decem dub. 36.11–14.
149 For a brief overview of astral influence in embryology, see Burnett (1990).
150 Porphyry VP 15.21–6.
151 See the excellent survey of the issue by Adamson (2008), whose findings I am summa-
rizing here.
152 Long (1982).
153 2.3.1.
154 For example 2.3.9.38–9.

155 For example 3.1.6.1–9; 2.3.12.3–8.
156 For example 2.3.9.27–31.
157 Westerink (1971: 18) describes the ‘Grundhaltung der Neuplatoniker zur Astrologie’:
‘während man gewisse dogmatisch unzulässige Voraussetzungen verwirft (namentlich
den Determinismus und den Glauben an böse Mächte im Himmel), hindert das doch
nicht, die Astrologie als Wissenschaft ernst zu nehmen.’
158 To my knowledge, the most in-depth discussion of astrology in Neoplatonism is Gieseler
Greenbaum (2009). She describes (128) Porphyry and Proclus as being the ones most
interested in incorporating astrology into their philosophical systems, while Plotinus
and Iamblichus show some reservations (Plotinus’ as described above; Iamblichus’ con-
cerns were directed more at the fallibilism of astrological predictions (see De myst. 9.4)).
159 Porphyry composed a commentary on Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos. The authenticity of this
commentary has been questioned in the past, but for a recent defense of his author-
ship, see Gieseler Greenbaum (2009: 151ff.). The commentary on Paulus’ astrological
Introduction has now been determined to be a (either direct or ἀπὸ φωνῆς) commentary
by Olympiodorus, see Westerink (1971). Although the authenticity of the paraphrase of
Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos attributed to Proclus is dubious, his interest in astrology is beyond
doubt.
160 See Westerink (1971: 20).
161 Olympiodorus In Gorg. 48.5 (253,30).
162 For a brief synopsis of the role of astrology in later Roman medicine, see Nutton (2004:
265–71). For a new assessment of Galen’s interest in astrology, see Cooper (2011).
163 Phys. 194b13: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. Meta. 1071a12–16: ὥσπερ
ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο
ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος. See also GC 336a31ff.;
Meteor. 346b19ff.; GA 4.2 766b33–67a13; Pol. 1335a35–b2.
164 Rep. 509b1–3.
165 Theaet. 153d1–5. And cf. Tim. 24c4–d3 for the importance of climate for wisdom.
166 Rep. 546a–c.
167 The Demiurge addresses the ‘generated gods,’ who include both the planets (Tim.
38b–d) and the fixed stars (Tim. 40a), with the task of creation in 41a–d.
168 Tim. 41d8–e4.
169 Tim. 41d8.
170 Tim. 41e4–42a2 and 42d4–5.
171 See note 74.
172 For example Plotinus Enn. 4.4.35.37–69; Iamblichus De myst. 1.18; 3.16; 3.28–30;
4.10; Ammonius In De Int. 36,7–12; Proclus In Tim. 1.43,4–5; 1.220,17–20; In Remp.
1.89,15–17; 2.57,1–18; 2.60,19–24; De sacr. 149,19–21. Cf. Asclepius In Meta. 196,22–3;
Philoponus In GC 295,28–296,1; and the references in the notes below. As some of
Proclus’ remarks show, these illuminations are not simply to be identified with the vis-
ible light given off by the stars (he says that they penetrate the surface of the earth in
In Tim. 2.231,9–13 (cf. 2.211,5–6)). Rather, they are communicated via cosmic sym-
pathy (In Tim. 1.412,18–23; cf. De sacr. 151,10–13). On the astrological use of the term
ἀπόρροια see the references in Westerink’s edition of Damascius’ In Parm. (vol 4, p. 171).
Note also the repeated use of the terms ἔλλαμψις and ἐλλάμπειν in the sections of El.
Th. that appear to form the metaphysical background of discussion in In Parm. 793–4:
§57 (56,11); §70 (66,12 and 30); §71 (68,1–2 and 11); and cf. ἐμφάσεις (68,5) with
Dodds’ note.
173 See pp. 72–4 in this chapter.
174 Simplicius In DC 88,8–19. See also In DC 115,3–2 and 373,15–24, where he empha-
sizes that the stars themselves possess these properties only in a causal sense. His refer-
ence at 88,13 to Saturn ‘being believed’ (πεπίστευται) to be cold suggests that he is
thinking of the account in Ptolemy’s Tetrab. 1.4 or else of some other account along the
same lines. For there each of the planets is said to provide one or some combination of
the four fundamental properties of body: the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry. Similar
accounts can be found in Cicero De natura deorum 2.119; Anonymus Christianus Herm.
2.24 (37,20ff.); Damascius apud Philoponus In Meteor. 44,20–30; Pliny Nat. hist. 2.34;
Philolaus apud Proclus In Eucl. 167,1–12; cf. Porphyry Peri Agal. 9,1ff. (358F Smith) and
De antro 16 (68,14–16).
175 De sacr. 149,28–150,1 and 150,23. See In Tim. 1.111,9–14; 2.201,27–202,1; In Parm.
818,3–19; and cf. Simplicius In Epict. 94,25–8 (38.129–31 (pp. 365–6) Hadot).
176 Proclus explains an often-told tale (see Orth ‘Huhn’ in RE 8 2536,66ff. for references)
of the lion being afraid of the cock in terms of the latter’s possessing a stronger relation
to the sun than the former. See also Michael Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 16.214ff. for
a similar theory of planetary causal series, although he explains the lion’s fear of the
cock by including the former in the lunar series and the latter in the solar series. Even
lion-faced demons, Psellus reports, cower in the presence of cocks.
177 De sacr. 149,20–2. And see Tarrant (2006: 206n478).
178 See In Tim. 1.43,2–16 (and cf. In Eucl. 173,13–18), where Proclus says that the minerals
corresponding to the individual planets are grown (φύεται) and generated (γεννᾶται)
by the planets and their effluences (ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων […] θεῶν καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν
ἀπορροίας). Although he refrains from going into more detail at this point, he presum-
ably did do so in his (now lost) comments on Timaeus 58dff., where Plato examines
the nature of metals. For in Olympiodorus’ In Meteor. (266,37–377,11) we find a more
detailed presentation of Proclus’ views on the correspondences between metals and
planets, and Olympiodorus does provide a list of the properties Proclus thought to
derive from the planets. Some of these directly or indirectly correspond to the four
fundamental physical properties mentioned above. Saturn, for example, is said to pro-
vide coldness (266,39), and the temperate force (τὸ εὔκρατον) attributed to Jupiter is
presumably to be understood as a mixture of warmth and coldness (267,1; cf. Ptolemy
Tetrab. 1.4). Likewise, the ‘sharp cutting’ power (τὸ τμητικὸν καὶ ὀξύ) attributed to Mars
(267,2–3 Stüve) is perhaps to be understood as an intense form of heat (cf. Ptolemy
Tetrab. 1.4 and Proclus In Remp. 2.58,28). Other properties, however, are not obvi-
ously reducible to these four, e.g., heaviness (βαρύ), gloominess (στυγνόν), translucence
(διαφανές), and the quality of glittering (στιλπνόν).
179 For example cf. Simplicius In Phys. 360,1–4; Damascius In Parm. 4.45,1–12 (2.270,19–
24 Ruelle).
180 Proclus In Remp. 2.56,15–61,11. Cf. In Tim. 3.64,8–69,28, esp. 69,4–27.
181 Proclus In Remp. 2.58,15–20.
182 Proclus In Remp. 2.60,19–24. Similar claims about the offspring’s rational power being
affected by astrological configurations can be found in the anonymous commentary In
Paul. Alex., e.g., 21,17–19. Westerink (1971) presents compelling reasons for attributing
this work to Olympiodorus, either directly or as a Nachschrift by one of his students.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Eclectic Theories
There are a number of embryological texts of late antiquity that were not included
in the examination of the core theory in Chapter 3 because the full extent of their
respective commitments to Neoplatonism and especially Neoplatonic embryology
has yet to be sufficiently established, even if they do contain clear signs of some
Neoplatonic influence. In this appendix, we shall examine five texts of late antiquity
that discuss embryology, namely John of Alexandria’s commentary on the Hippocratic
On the Nature of the Child, Theophilus Protospatharius’s On the Construction of the
Human Being, Pseudo-Iamblichus’ Theology of Arithmetic, Pseudo-Galen’s Whether
What is Carried in the Womb is a Living Thing, and Pseudo-Galen’s De Spermate, as well
as the later Byzantine commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals by
Michael of Ephesus. By comparing the embryological theories advanced in each of
these texts to the core theses worked out in Chapter 3, we shall see that each text has
been influenced to a certain degree by one or more of the core theses but that none
of them attempts to integrate all of the theses. As a result it may be concluded that
the embryological theories found in these texts should be viewed as eclectic rather
than as straightforward examples of Neoplatonic embryology.
The Commentary on the Hippocratic On the Nature of the

Child by John of Alexandria
We may begin our examination with the commentary on the Hippocratic On
the Nature of the Child by John of Alexandria, which has unfortunately not been
transmitted in its entirety. This commentary deserves consideration here in light
of what has been called its ‘peculiar brand of “Neoplatonic” coloring,’1 as this
raises some questions about its relation to the core theory. We know very little
about John’s life, but he appears to have been a (presumably Christian) iatrosophist
working in sixth- to mid-seventh-century Alexandria.2 Although On the Nature
Appendix to Chapter 3: eclectic theories 101
of the Child formed part of the canon studied during one’s medical education in
Alexandria in late antiquity, this is the only commentary that has survived.3 We may
begin by briefly confirming that John’s surviving writings offer many indications
of his having some broader background in philosophy,4 with a number of passages
pointing more specifically to some training in Platonism. He works Plato into his
commentary on several occasions, even suggesting somewhat anachronistically at
one point that Hippocrates’ involvement in the abortion of the six-day embryo
reveals the influence of the Republic’s ban on prostitution,5 and he integrates some
Platonic vocabulary throughout.6 He also employs a strategy familiar from the
Platonic tradition’s interpretation of the Timaeus to explain away Hippocrates’ part-
by-part account of the embryo’s formation to make way for his own view that all
of the embryo’s parts begin to be formed at the same time (though they may be
completed at different times), declaring Hippocrates’ ordering to be merely ‘for
didactic purposes.’7 More tellingly, John at one point invokes numerological con-
siderations to explain the duration of the embryo’s first formation and at another
cites the Chaldean Oracles.8 The latter is only one instance of John’s broader ten-
dency to acknowledge that there are higher causes at work in embryology and in
medicine more generally.9 He even appears to accept the efficacy of spiritual medi-
cine, such as Proclus himself seems to have practiced, though he denies that this is
strictly speaking the same brand of medicine that, for example, Galen practiced.10
Unfortunately, John does not pursue his interest in higher causes in his commen-
tary, as he emphasizes that On the Nature of the Child is not concerned with these
higher causes,11 though perhaps this is also because he sees them as transcending the
limits of human knowledge to some extent.12
The embryological theory that we find in his commentary proceeds, then, for
the most part within the domain of the lower causes drawn from Hippocratic and
Galenic medicine, and on the surface, at least, there is very little that recalls the core
theory. John advances a two-seed theory, according to which the female seed serves
as matter and nourishment for the male seed,13 though John takes pains to empha-
size that the female seed, too, contributes to the form of the offspring.14 The seed
is said to derive from the entire body (pangenesis), though there are some indica-
tions that John might be trying to develop a unified theory of spermatogenesis that
accommodates the insights of the hematogenous and encephalo-myelogenic theo-
ries.15 Otherwise, John tells us rather little about the nature of the seed. At no point
does he say or even suggest that the seed consists of immaterial form-principles
present everywhere in the seed. In fact, at one point he suggests quite the opposite,
namely that the seed is anhomoiomerous.16 And while he does describe the seed
as being a potential animal,17 nowhere does he draw attention to any need for any
external agent of actualization. Rather, John’s account of the formation of the fetus
gives the mechanical processes familiar from Hippocratic theory their due. The
male and the female seeds mix together,18 and then heat and breath work together
to create an eddy that ‘pushes out’ (ἐξωθεῖ ) like parts to like parts.19 Accordingly,
John explains the determination of the offspring’s sex in the traditional manner:
males are produced by greater amounts of heat arising from warmer seed and/or
102 Appendix to Chapter 3: eclectic theories
from the right side of the womb.20 Yet he signals at key points that this mechani-
cal process is not the whole story, and here we might have some evidence of the
core theory’s influence on John’s interpretation of Hippocrates. For he empha-
sizes that Hippocrates is wrong to call heat an efficient cause, when it is in fact
a mere instrumental cause,21 and that even the breath should be understood as an
instrumental cause.22 The true creative cause is a ‘formative power’ (διαπλαστικὴ
δύναμις) which oversees the process from the start; it is responsible both for mixing
the two seeds together,23 leading like to like,24 and in general for shaping the parts.25
This power is what John sees lying behind Hippocrates’ invocation of an ‘original
nature’ (ἀρχαίην φύσιν), shaping the parts ‘in a craftsman-like manner.’26 Given
his acknowledgment of the higher causes at work in embryology, it is particularly
striking that he rejects the view advanced by ‘some men’ that this power is to be
identified with ‘some more divine power’ that comes down from the heavens, cre-
ates the fetus and then re-ascends back into the heavens.27 Rather, John appears to
be conceiving of this formative power along traditional Galenic lines, which is to
say that it is a teleological principle contained within the male seed that serves as
both efficient and formal cause of the embryo’s formation.28
There is, however, one current in the commentary that might well be the result
of Neoplatonic influence. This comes in John’s comments on a remark at the very
beginning of the Hippocratic On the Nature of the Child, in which the Hippocratic
author describes conception as the mixing of the two seeds:
If the seed which comes from both parents remains in the womb of the
female, it is first of all thoroughly mixed together – for the woman of course
does not remain inactive [ἅτε τῆς γυναικὸς οὐκ ἀτρεμεούσης] – and con-
denses and thickens as it is heated.
(Hippocratic On the Nature of the Child 53,1–4 (7.486 L.))
Within the mechanistic context of Hippocratic embryology, this remark about

the mother not remaining inactive should be understood to mean that she is not
only supplying her own seed but also supplying the heat that mixes the two seeds
together.Yet John sees much more going on in this passage:
What, then, is the female doing? Surely not staying home and moving about
in moderation? Certainly not that; rather, here when he uses ‘woman,’ he
speaks of the formative power in the womb. For he says that these kinds of
sperm are mixed together if the formative power does not remain inactive,
whenever it receives them, but transforms them.
(John of Alexandria Commentary on Hippocrates’
On the Nature of the Child 138,22–6, Bell et al. translation)29
Here John appears to ascribe the power responsible for forming the embryo to
the female’s womb, which marks a significant departure from Hippocratic and
Galenic embryology and is probably most easily explained by the assumption
that John has had some exposure to Neoplatonic theory, even if there is other-
wise little evidence of Neoplatonic influence. This suggestion also fits well with
John’s view that the account cannot even end with the mother’s formative power,
since this, too, must have some causal connection to the Demiurge,30 which again
resonates with the core theory. Yet this issue as well as the issues surrounding
the animation of the offspring are not pursued in the surviving portions of the
commentary.
Theophilus Protospatharius’ On the Construction of the

Human Being
Of the five texts under examination in this section, On the Construction of the Human
Being is certainly the one with the least claim to any tenet of the core theory.
Indeed, it could easily serve as a prime example of the possibility of working on
human physiology in late antiquity without allowing oneself to be influenced by
Neoplatonism, if it were not for one brief and enigmatic passage, also relating to
the beginning of the Hippocratic On the Nature of the Child, which might be best
explained as a case of exactly such influence.
Here again, we know little about the life and dates of Theophilus; the most recent
study places him in the ninth to tenth century CE.31 Judging from the surviving
texts that have been attributed to him, his ambitions and influences lie outside of
the philosophical tradition. He never, for example, refers to Plato by name.32 His
treatise On the Construction of the Human Being draws heavily from Galen, though in
his embryological account, which is mostly found in the fifth book, he combines
Galenic thought with a good deal of material drawn from Hippocrates, whom he
refers to as the ‘Prometheus of medicine’33 – much of the text consists of long quo-
tations of both authors – and occasionally injects into this mixture etiological nods
to the Christian God. The resulting embryological theory, then, is certainly eclectic,
though Neoplatonic embryology would seem for the most part to have been left
out of the mix. He subscribes to a two-seed theory, in which both seeds consist of
both form and matter, yet the female seed is inferior to the male seed, in that it is
colder, weaker, less perfect, and more matter than form.34 Thus, at one point he labels
the male seed the ‘creative principle’ and the female seed as a mere ‘contributing’
cause.35 Regarding the origin of the seed in the body, Theophilus’ eclecticism leads
him on a path similar to that of John of Alexandria, combining Hippocratic pan-
genesis with Galenic anatomy and hematogenous theory. The seed is said to come
from the entire body,36 though it is said to be created from blood and pneuma in the
female ‘testes’ (ὄρχεις) located next to each horn of the uterus.37 These two claims
are brought in line by noting that the blood in the testes itself derives from the entire
body and thus already contains all the body’s parts.38 None of this recalls the core
theory. Moreover, there is no talk at all of the seed consisting of immaterial logoi, let
alone of logoi that require an external actualizer such as the mother. For the most
part,Theophilus’ explanation of conception and formation follows the cues given by
Galen and Hippocrates, though he tends to pass over the more mechanically minded
passages in Hippocrates39 and he routinely replaces Galen’s references to ‘nature’ with

references to God’s wisdom and demiurgy.40
Yet there is one passage on conception in which Theophilus appears to depart
somewhat from his two main sources. In 5.31–2 he presents an amalgam of pas-
sages from Hippocratic texts, beginning with a series of passages on the relative
strength and weakness of the two seeds and how predomination determines the
outcome (from On Generation §§6–8), adding a remark about the inheritability of
diseases (from On the Sacred Disease), and then he offers an interlude of his own
before returning to Hippocrates with a series of passages on conception and first
formation (from On the Nature of the Child §§12 and 14).41 In this interlude we find
Theophilus arguing that the seed (as well as blood) must itself be ensouled, since it
derives from the living thing in its entirety, which consists of both body and soul.42
To my knowledge, no such argument can be found in the Hippocratic and Galenic
corpora.The importance of this claim about the seed’s animated state appears to lie
in Theophilus’ understanding of conception, which he describes as follows:
There is no blood, therefore, in a soulless body, nor does the seed become
white in soulless bodies. Rather, the seed goes out ensouled from ensouled
bodies, and it mixes together with the nature of the woman [καὶ μίσγεται
ὁμοῦ τῆς φύσεως τῆς γυναικὸς], and it condenses and thickens as it is heated.
(Theophilus On the Construction of the Human Being 5.32 (240,17–241,4))
As Greenhill points out in his edition, Theophilus segues from his interlude on the
ensouled status of the seed directly into the beginning of On the Nature of the Child
§12, but he makes a critical substitution. In place of the Hippocratic phrase ‘for the
woman of course does not remain inactive,’ the very phrase which, as we saw above,
provided John of Alexandria with the opportunity to introduce a formative power
into the womb, Theophilus has the seed mixing together with the nature of the
woman.43 This substitution has puzzled the text’s editors, who suggested that the
passage must be corrupt,44 but it seems to me that Theophilus has gotten wind of
the Platonic thesis that conception is best explained as a mixture of a soul-principle
in the seed with a soul-principle of the mother, that is, with her nature.45 For this
would account not just for the substitution in the Hippocratic text but also for the
otherwise inexplicable interlude on the psychic nature of the seed. In other words,
Theophilus – like John – thinks that the Hippocratic claim about the mother not
being inactive is best interpreted along Platonic lines.46 Outside of this passage, how-
ever, I have been unable to find anything resembling the core theory, and even this
point strikes me as a poorly integrated feature in an unabashedly eclectic theory.
Pseudo-Galen’s De Spermate
Anyone who happens to be familiar with the relatively obscure Pseudo-Galenic De
Spermate might reasonably expect this text to be an important locus of Neoplatonic
embryological theory, but as we shall see, although this text is both focused on
embryology (and especially on astrological embryology) and explicitly invokes

Neoplatonic thinkers and theories, the overall result is eclectic and compartmental-
ized in such a way that the embryological theories themselves remain more or less
free of Neoplatonic influence. It must be said at the outset, however, that any con-
clusions drawn about the De Spermate must be considered to be provisional until
a critical edition of the text is established.47 Given this regrettable current state of
affairs, I shall limit myself here to some general remarks about the main lines of the
author’s views in relation to the core theory outlined above.

The De Spermate is a text of obscure origin. It is generally referred to as a
Latin translation, but the nature of the suspected source text remains unclear. It
has been suggested that the original was composed in Greek in late Antiquity, per-
haps in Alexandria, and subsequently transmitted first into Arabic and from there
into Latin, though an Arabic origin cannot as yet be ruled out.48 The text consists
of three not completely distinct sections: an embryological section, a philosophi-
cal interlude, and an astrological section.49 The embryological theory of the first
section reveals no real resemblance to the core Neoplatonic theory. The author
advances a two-seed theory coupled with a synthesis of pangenetic and hemetog-
enous elements on the seed’s corporeal origins.The seed is principally derived from
the blood, but it is led up to the head, and when it descends again from there it
passes by the seats of the four humors – the liver, the lungs, the gallbladder, and the
spleen – and thereby acquires the nature of each of the four humors, thus allowing
our author to maintain the pangenetic claim that the seed derives from the whole
body and from all four humors. The female seed is said to be weaker and colder
than the male seed and functions as its nourishment.50 Much of this is comparable
to what we saw in John and Theophilus. Once again, we have a spermatology that
is a serious departure from the core theory, and once again there is no mention of
the seed containing form-principles corresponding to the parts of the body, nor
of the seed being in a potential state and requiring actualization, and thus also not
of the mother or any other agent serving as the actualizer of the seed. Rather the
seed is said to be ‘complete and animate’ (emittitur completum et animatum) already at
emission.51 Moreover the process of embryogony is explained for the most part in
Hippocratic terms, which is to say in terms of the mixture resulting from the rela-
tive strength and quantity of the male and female seeds52 as well as of the location
of the seed in the womb,53 supplemented by some post-Hippocratic considerations
relating to pneumatic theory and especially to astrology and the theory of tem-
peraments.54 The overall impression gained from this embryological section is that
the author was wholly unfamiliar with the metaphysical concerns that dominated
the embryological discussions among the Neoplatonists and that even his medical
background is derivative and amateurish.55
Even if the embryological section fails to address the core tenets of Neoplatonic
embryology, one might expect this omission to be addressed in the subsequent
philosophical interlude, where the author repeatedly invokes Porphyry’s name.
Questions surrounding the accuracy of the author’s representation of Porphyry and
the identity of his source(s) would require a more thorough examination than can
be provided here, but the following should be sufficient for our present purposes.
He twice refers to Porphyry’s ‘Eisagôgai,’56 but this cannot be a reference to his
famous introduction to Aristotle’s Organon or to his Eisagôgê eis tên Apotelsmatikên
tou Ptolemaiou. ‘Eisagôgai’ appears rather to be a generic label for a group of intro-
ductory treatises,57 which at least includes the lost Summikta Zêtêmata, as a number
of correspondences between the De spermate and the fragments and testimonia from
the Summikta Zêtêmata suggest.58 Moreover, one of our main, though contested,
sources for the Summikta Zêtêmata is Nemesius’ De natura hominis, and there is at
least some reason to think that our author’s access to Porphyry has been mediated
by Nemesius. This is found primarily in the prima facie puzzling report: ‘Porphyry
says this in order to demonstrate the soul’s conjunction with the body, and by this
he affirms that the Word of God is in the substance of man.’59 The puzzle is how
he can describe Porphyry, the author of the infamous Against the Christians, as
affirming the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the answer would seem to be that
he is taking his cues from Nemesius, who after quoting from Porphyry’s Summikta
Zêtêmata on the soul’s union with the body, goes on to argue that Porphyry’s solu-
tion to the mind–body problem can also serve to explain the Incarnation: ‘If this
account is true in the case of the soul because the soul is incorporeal, it is still more
true in the case of the Word of God, which is more uncompounded and more truly
incorporeal.’60
By contrast, one finds little evidence of familiarity with Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum
or more generally with the Neoplatonic metaphysics of embryology.61 The aim of
this philosophical interlude is not a deeper exploration of the metaphysical under-
pinnings of the embryological theory; the author appears to be content with his
theory as it stands. All that the author seems to think is philosophically lacking is
an account of the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. To be sure, this
does afford the author the opportunity to introduce some Neoplatonic doctrine
relating to the soul’s animation of the body: the pneuma is not the soul but rather
joined to the soul as its tool,62 and thus the soul is not bound in a place;63 its rela-
tion to the body is rather like that of light to air or fire to wood.64 Further, even
prima facie inanimate bodies have some share in soul,65 though in human beings a
rational soul is joined to the offspring,66 which accounts for the fact that astrologi-
cal influence is more efficacious in humans than in other animals.67 Some of the
contents of this section do bear upon physiology and embryology. We are given a
brief account of the relationship between the blood, pneuma, and seed,68 in which
it emerges that the author locates the soul in the head.69 The author, then, does at
least give expression to the fourth tenet of the core theory, namely that the rational
soul is provided to the offspring from an external source, whereby he reaffirms his
view that this soul is already present at conception,70 but, as we have seen, there
is nothing here that speaks to the fundamental Neoplatonic thesis that the seed is
a collection of immaterial logoi in a state of potentiality and requiring an external
agent of actualization, and so the embryology of the De Spermate cannot be con-
sidered Neoplatonic.
Pseudo-Iamblichus’ Theology of Arithmetic

The Theology of Arithmetic, traditionally attributed to Iamblichus but now gener-
ally regarded as dubious, has much to say on the topic of embryology and displays
a significant familiarity with ancient medical texts, especially those belonging to
the Hippocratic corpus and Diocles.71 As with the three texts examined above,
the eclectic character of this treatise72 raises some doubts about the project of
reconstructing a coherent embryology from the scattered remarks contained in
it, but unlike the above texts, the Theology of Arithmetic clearly advances the core
theory’s one-seed thesis and conceives of the seed as consisting of a unified plu-
rality of form-principles in potentiality.73 Yet the rest of its embryology, while
rich in detail on issues relating to the time of formation and animation (predict-
ably influenced by numerological considerations), does not reveal any significant
Neoplatonic influence. Conception is said to take place within seven hours of
emission (61,6–7), and the formation proceeds in seven-day stages: after seven
days it resembles a ‘membranaceous, water-bearing kind of thing’ (τινὶ ὑμενώδει
ὑδροδόχῳ), then spots of blood appear on the outside, in the third week they
appear in its interior, in the fourth the moisture coagulates and becomes some-
thing in between blood and flesh, and by the end of the fifth week (35 days) the
embryo (τὸ βρέφος) is formed in the middle, being at this stage only the size of a
bee but nevertheless having the head, neck, trunk, and limbs roughly made out.74
At some undetermined point the embryo acquires the life-status of a plant, which
it retains until roughly seven hours prior to birth, during which time it is neither
a plant nor an animal. It is not a plant because it is no longer able to maintain
itself with nourishment from the umbilical cord, which is now severed, nor is it
yet an animal, since it is not detached and has not reached its completion, which
is achieved by breathing in external air.75 This claim about the importance of
breathing in external air is significant for evaluating the author’s commitment to
Neoplatonism. As we saw above, Porphyry also appeals to the fact that embryo-
fetuses do not breathe through their noses as long as they are in the womb, to
support his own view that they are not yet animals, but the claim here appears to
be different, as the account of birth makes clearer still:
Just as embryo-fetuses [τὰ βρέφη] were sown and ordered in the womb by
the hebdomad, so also after birth in seven hours they reach the crisis of
whether or not they will live. For all those which are born complete and
not dead come out of the womb breathing [ἐμπνέοντα], but as regards the
acceptance of the air which is being breathed and by which the form of the soul
acquires tension [τὴν τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος παραδοχήν, ὑφ’ οὗ τονοῦται τò
τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος], they are confirmed at the critical seventh hour one way or
the other – either towards life or towards death.
([Iamblichus] Theology of Arithmetic 64,19–65,3,
Waterfield translation slightly revised)
Whereas Porphyry’s appeal simply serves to underline that the organs of the
embryo-fetus are not yet in a position to sustain the basic activities of animal life,
for the author of the Theology of Arithmetic the inhaled air is critical for his theory
of the embryo-fetus’ animation. Indeed, for a supposedly Neoplatonic treatise this
theory sounds prohibitively similar to the materialist account of the Stoics, who
claimed that the soul is to be identified with pneuma possessing a certain kind of
tension (τóνος) and that the offspring gains a soul at birth when the cold air cre-
ates this tension in its pneuma.76 Precisely such a Stoic version of emergentism was
the target of criticism by Porphyry in the Ad Gaurum as well as by Plotinus,77 as
it goes against the basic Platonic view that the soul descends into the body from
the outside and more generally against the PIP principle.78 The author, however,
is hardly a Stoic, and he appears to subscribe himself to the theory of transmigra-
tion.79 Overall, then, this text would appear to offer several elements drawn from
the core theory – the one-seed theory, the conception of the seed as a bundle of
logoi in potentiality, and a view of the soul that is capable of independent existence
and transmigration, but insofar as it omits any discussion of the actualization of the
seminal logoi and also contains some indications of emergentism, it should be seen
as an eclectic rather than thoroughly Neoplatonic theory of embryology.
Pseudo-Galen’s Whether What is Carried in the Womb is a

Living Thing
Similar tensions emerge in the short Pseudo-Galenic treatise entitled Whether What
is in the Womb is an Animal (An animal sit),80 which has been referred to as ‘a possibly
Neoplatonic essay.’81 The argument of An animal sit is at times difficult to follow,
but I believe the underlying view may be characterized as follows. Already at the
moment of conception the male seed – the treatise subscribes to the one-seed
theory82 – ought to be regarded as an animal consisting of body and soul, including
even the rational soul.83 What makes this view possible is the author’s understand-
ing of the nature of soul and its generation. For in his view the soul can itself
initially exist in a seminal state and then bloom, as it were, into a fully fledged soul
as the body itself is formed. Thus, the author is prepared to concede that initially
the seed sown in the womb is in some sense only potentially an animal;84 it is in
a state in which everything contained in it is still mixed together.85 Yet it is still an
animal because all of the relevant powers are already there along with some form
of motion needed for development, and their corresponding activities gradually
emerge: first those concerned with nutrition and growth, then taste and breathing,
then the other senses, and at birth local motion.86
The An animal sit offers four main lines of argument for its thesis that the
seminal and embryonic offspring is already a (rational) animal. The first (2,4–6,18
(19.159–165 K.)) turns on the claim that perfection or completeness at the end of
the process of development can be achieved only if perfection or completeness is
already present at the start.87 Our author illustrates this principle by means of an
analogy between the generation of the cosmos and that of a human being. When
the universe was conceived,88 it already contained the four elements plus its prin-
ciple of motion and administration, which is identified as pneuma pervading all of
the elements,89 but all of these components were still fused together in an undis-
tinguished mass in disordered motion.90 During gestation it unfolds and separates
these components to compose the cosmos, which contains these same elements in
a differentiated and structured manner, and its motion also becomes orderly.91 His
main point here is that the pneuma that will ultimately become the equivalent of the
World-Soul was there from the start, and that as a result ‘this cosmos was originally
even then a ζῷον endowed with pneuma and intellect, just as it obviously is now.’92
It should then follow by analogy that the embryonic human being is also already
a ζῷον endowed with pneuma and intellect, and the author appeals to the medical
tradition for further support. The Hippocratic theory of pangenesis is taken as evi-
dence that the seed already contains everything needed for a ζῷον.93
The second line of argument (6,19–12,1 (19.165–72 K.)) consists in show-
ing that the activities that the embryo engages in justify the claim that the soul is
already present. Although the activities of nutrition belong to the domain of nature
rather than soul, our author emphasizes with an appeal to Hippocrates that nour-
ishment takes place both through the umbilical cord and through the mouth, with
the implication being that it is not living merely in the manner of a plant,94 but it
is the powers related to sensation and breathing that provide the strongest evidence
for the presence of the soul at work in the embryo-fetus. Whereas Porphyry argues
that the sensory powers cannot be present in any way until the organs are complete,
the An animal sit contends that the very existence of the organs signals the presence
of soul, even during their formation, since they are the seat of the soul.95 Thus, the
soul, he concludes, ‘is constituted simultaneously as the body is constituted.’96 As
mentioned above, he is willing to concede that the sense of taste is the only sensory
power active during gestation,97 but he turns this point to his advantage. Both the
Ad Gaurum and the An animal sit agree that the eyes, ears, and nose are shut for as
long as the embryo-fetus is in the womb, but whereas Porphyry had taken this for
an indication that the organs are not yet complete and consequently the soul is
absent, our author maintains that this closure is a sign of the soul’s presence, since
it must be the soul that is keeping them shut.98 Finally, the fact that the embryo is
breathing in the womb shows that the soul is there, since breathing is an activity
performed by the soul (rather than nature).99
The third line of argumentation may be summarized as follows. All other cases
of natural reproduction result in an offspring that is the same kind of living thing
as the parent, whether this be a plant or an animal. So it would be strange if human
beings were an exception to this rule and produced only some lower form of living
thing. Indeed, if there is to be an exception to the rule, it would seem to be that
certain cases of biological generation – namely, ‘spontaneous’ generation – result in
higher-order living things.100 A final, fourth line of argument proceeds by analyzing
the laws and customs concerned with abortion and matters of inheritance in cases
of unborn children.101
Assessing the place of the An animal sit in the Platonic tradition is not easy. On
the one hand, although the author only mentions Plato by name once102 – by con-
trast, he mentions Hippocrates and the Asklêpiadai four times each – he is clearly
drawing on Platonic texts.103 His understanding of the generation of the cosmos
appears to have its roots in a literal reading of the Timaeus, and he subscribes to
the existence of a World-Soul104 and to a celestial journey resembling that of the
Phaedrus.105 Further, his remarks on ‘spontaneous’ generation are very similar to
accounts found in the Neoplatonic tradition,106 and like Neoplatonists this author
places great emphasis on the absence of calculation in nature’s activity.107 On the
other hand, unlike Porphyry this author shows virtually no interest in demonstrat-
ing that the opinion advanced here is in fact Plato’s own opinion, and so he does
not engage with any of the embryological material in the Timaeus. He seems, rather,
much more interested in grounding his views in the medical tradition.108
More importantly, the views advanced in the An animal sit on the nature and
generation of the soul are very difficult to pin down and appear, in certain points at
least, to be incongruous with much of Neoplatonic thought.To begin with, pneuma
appears to be introduced not as a mere vehicle of the soul but as its substance. The
literal cosmogony that gives a central place to pneuma pervading all of the elements
sounds strikingly Stoic,109 even if the emphasis that the author places on the nerves
and the brain as the seat of the soul suggests that the author is no Stoic.110 Yet nei-
ther are his views on the individual soul entirely Platonic. In fact, there seems to
be an underlying tension in his account of the soul. Some of his remarks suggest a
Platonic picture of an immaterial soul that is independent of the human body and
comes to the human body from outside. Thus, he appears to subscribe to the view
that individual souls can leave the body and embark on celestial journeys,111 and
he says at one point that it is the Demiurge of the universe himself who sows the
soul into the womb at conception.112 A more Stoic and materialist picture emerges,
however, when one focuses on what is said about the process of animation and
the soul’s relation to pneuma. The soul is said to be nourished by pneuma which
is won from digested food,113 and at one point he infers from the claim that the
nerves branch off from the brain together with pneuma that the soul is ‘put together’
(συνίστασθαι) simultaneously as the body is put together.114
Moreover, as we have seen, whereas all Neoplatonists show a significant level of
commitment to the PIP and PAP principles115 – the logoi in the seed need to be
perfected and set in motion from the outside – this author’s commitment to these
principles is ambiguous at best. The main line of his argument, which maintains
that perfection at the end of the process of development can only be achieved if
perfection is already present at the start, seems to call these principles into ques-
tion.Thus, whereas Porphyry emphasizes that the logoi in the seed are ‘inferior’ and
must be set in motion and actualized by the mother,116 the author of An animal
sit emphasizes the perfection of the logoi and the pre-existence of motion at the
start.117 Although the author does concede that the seed-embryo is initially only
potentially a ζῷον, there is no indication that the mother or any other external
agent is required to help in the process of the body’s formation or the emergence
of the soul’s powers. It is only at the very end of the process, months after it began
exercising its power to breathe and to taste, that one finds a possible nod to the
PAP principle: ‘For this [i.e. the seed at conception] is already a ζῷον potentially,
and it becomes one actually when it goes forth from the womb and makes contact
with the one who supplied its principle. For it is a part and an offspring of the
great Living Thing – the cosmos.’118 Yet even here it is not clear that this reference
to ‘contact’ should be taken to mean that the cosmos is in any way the agent of
the offspring’s transformation into an actual ζῷον. In short, we may conclude that
the An animal sit is the work of someone who has been strongly influenced by the
Platonic tradition, but that it also reveals significant Stoic and medical influences,
leading to a syncretic and possibly inconsistent theory of animation that departs
sharply in places from the shared views of Neoplatonists in late antiquity.
The Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of

Animals by Michael of Ephesus
Finally, let us now examine the only surviving Greek commentary on Aristotle’s On
the Generation of Animals, traditionally but falsely attributed to John Philoponus and
now known to be the work of the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus.
Almost nothing is known about the life of Michael of Ephesus, and what we do
know is in large part inferred from his writings. His name indicates that he was
a Christian, and this is confirmed by a number of passages in his commentar-
ies.119 His routine references to medicine also give us good reason to believe that
Michael was a physician.120 It is only thanks to an offhand remark he makes in his
commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 10 about the Presocratic Heraclitus of Ephesus
being a ‘fellow citizen’ that we may be certain that Michael was himself a native
of Ephesus.121 Even the dates of Michael’s life were a matter of controversy until
the appearance of a ground-breaking article by Robert Browning,122 in which it
was shown that Michael’s commentary work was part of a larger project directed
by Princess Comnena in Constantinople – this location is confirmed in Michael’s
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 10 (610,11f.) – to fill in the gaps left
in the Aristotelian commentary tradition. This allows us to infer that Michael was
working in the first half of the twelfth century.
Despite the fact that we know so little about his life, Michael of Ephesus has the
distinction of being one of the most wide-ranging commentators on Aristotle ever
to have lived. His surviving commentaries on Aristotle – there is no evidence that
he composed commentaries on other authors – follow the standard Olympiodorian
structure that first approaches a passage via a preface (διάνοια) addressing its general
import and then turns to discuss the details of the text (λέξις),123 and the scope
of his commentary work extends over the traditional divisions of philosophy to
include logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics. Of particular interest to
our concerns is that Michael was the first to comment on Aristotle’s biological
treatises On the Parts of Animals, On the Movement of Animals, On the Progression of
Animals, and especially On the Generation of Animals, all of which survive.124 It is this
last commentary that interests us here.
There is general agreement that Michael is much less interested in harmonizing
Aristotelian and Platonic thought than most other commentators on Aristotle. He
is, for example, willing to criticize Plato, even without being explicitly prompted
to do so by Aristotle’s text, as we shall see below. Consequently, rather than pre-
senting a single Platonic–Aristotelian embryological theory in his commentary on
Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, Michael offers us two very different embry-
ological theories, that of Plato and that of Aristotle, thereby granting us two distinct
opportunities to assess the presence or absence of Neoplatonic thought. Below
each of these theories will be examined in turn.
Michael’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Embryology

Let us begin with a synopsis of Michael’s understanding of Aristotle’s embryology,
which, given Michael’s strongly Aristotelian sympathies, I believe we may also fairly
characterize as Michael’s own theory of embryology. Thus, in what follows I shall
use the locutions ‘Michael’s embryology’ and ‘Michael’s interpretation of Aristotle’s
embryology’ interchangeably. As we shall see, Michael’s embryology follows the
broad contours of Aristotle’s own theory, though there is some Neoplatonic influ-
ence, which is consistent with his interpretation of other domains of Aristotle’s
philosophy.125 Nevertheless, in its central points his embryology remains firmly
Aristotelian and so cannot be accurately characterized as a Neoplatonic embryology.
We may begin by observing that Michael is a one-seed theorist, which we have
already seen to be a position common to Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. The seed
is generated solely by the male at the moment of copulation.126 And, again like the
Neoplatonists and Aristotle, he is a hematogenous theorist, defending the view
that the seed comes to be from the thinnest blood by the heat produced in the
act of reproduction.127 The female, then, provides no seed (although he is at times
prepared to follow Aristotle in referring to the menses as ‘seminal’),128 rather, the
female menses has the role of matter and nourishment for the embryo.129 Further,
Michael follows Aristotle in taking this seed to contain the creative power that is
responsible for the formation of the offspring, which we shall return to below. He
envisions the process of embryogenesis as follows. When the male seed is supplied
to the womb, it acts on the menses for seven days, after which it transfers its crea-
tive power to the menses, whereupon the matter of the male seed is either expelled
or transformed into pneuma.130 It is at this point that the embryo (κύημα) may be
said to exist.131 All of this, however, appears to be a truncated version of a more
detailed account which he offers at certain points. According to this more detailed
account, when the male seed encounters the menses, it first acts on the surface of
the menses to create the chorion.132 What happens next is described by Michael as
a four-stage process with the power alternately sketching parts and then creating
these parts. The first two stages are concerned exclusively with the heart: first the
power in the seed sketches the heart in the menses within the chorion, and then it
creates the heart based on this sketch.133 Once the heart is formed, the power in the
seed is transferred to the heart, which now takes over as the formative agent of all
subsequent parts.134 Thus, when in the truncated account Michael simply says that
the power is transferred to the menses, we should understand this to mean that it is
conferred upon the menses that has been transformed into the heart. After this, in
a third stage, the creative power, now in the heart, creates a sketch in the remain-
ing menses of all the other parts of the offspring. The sketch of all these parts is
created all at once.135 Moreover, the sketch, which is said to be completed around
20 days after conception, appears to be empirically observable in aborted embryos.136
Finally, this same power then goes about forming and articulating each of these
parts in a particular sequence. We are told that the process proceeds in the order
of necessity and suitability and that it begins with the upper interior parts before
forming the lower interior parts and finally the exterior parts.137 The precise order
of all of the parts’ creation, however, is not provided, though Michael does say that
the umbilical cord is formed first,138 apparently followed by the brain, and that the
eyes are last to be completed.139
Michael’s striking distance from Neoplatonic embryology emerges when one
turns to consider his views on the localization and genesis of the soul’s powers in
the body as well as on the causal story behind this account of creation. Michael
stays very close to the Aristotelian account of the localization of the powers of soul.
Whereas the later Platonic tradition follows the Galenic revision of the Timaeus
account, which makes the brain the locus of reason and sensation, for Michael the
sensitive power and reason remain located in the heart.140 The brain simply serves
a cooling function to balance out the heat in the heart,141 and he has little to say
about the liver.142
The account of animation that Michael gives does appear to show some
Neoplatonic influence – at least in his language and analogies in his characterization
of the seed. Notably, Michael is prepared to describe the seed in terms of a
collection of immaterial logoi of the parts of the offspring,143 which Aristotle never
does,144 and at one point Michael even compares these logoi to forms present in
the intellect, a common Neoplatonic analogy which is also not to be found in
Aristotle.145 Yet the telling difference which keeps Michael firmly grounded on
Aristotelian soil concerns the ontological status of these logoi. For Neoplatonists, it
is axiomatic that the seed is inferior to its producer, the vegetative soul, and so for
them the logoi in the seed can only exist in a state of potentiality and motionlessness
and they require actualization from outside, either by the mother or some other
cosmic cause that possesses these same kinds of logoi in actuality. But Michael stays
true to Aristotle by maintaining that these logoi in the seed are already in a state
of actuality and are thus all by themselves the efficient cause of the formation of
the embryo.146 This difference is then mirrored in Michael’s account of animation.
For him the male seed, even prior to encountering the menses, already possesses
a soul in actuality; that is, in the first stage of actuality comparable to that of a
geometer who is not presently engaged in geometry.147 The comparison to the
geometer serves to underline the seed’s self-sufficient ability to create: just as

the geometer requires no actualization from outside of himself to contemplate
geometry, so too for the seed. A more appropriate analogy might have compared
the seed to a trained carpenter.148 For Michael does acknowledge that the soul
in the seed requires the menses as matter in order to engage in its activity,149 but
the need for matter from outside does nothing to change the fact that the seed’s
(and the carpenter’s) creative power is ready to go to work. Moreover, Michael
emphasizes that the soul is delivered as a unity pre-containing all three of its
powers – the nutritive (to which the formative and creative power belongs)150 –
the sensitive and even the rational – which are received ‘directly from the first
constitution when [the embryo] is in the belly.’151 Each of these powers begins in a
state of first actuality and then proceeds in sequence to a state of second actuality
in the course of the process of development. For the nutritive power this occurs at
the very latest with the formation of the heart,152 while the sensitive and rational
powers achieve this state once the offspring has left the womb.153
Michael’s Interpretation of Plato’s Embryology

Given the faithfulness of his interpretation of Aristotle’s embryology, one might
expect a similar degree of faithfulness when Michael turns to Plato, whether to the
original embryology of the Timaeus or at least to subsequent Neoplatonic devel-
opments, but one of the most interesting things about his interpretation of Plato’s
embryology, which is presented in two passages of his commentary, is how far off
the mark it appears to be from both of these targets.
Consider the first of these passages, which presents us with Michael’s summary
of Plato’s embryology:
Plato says that the seed derives from the entire body of both the male and the
female, but he does not mean a seed like the one we are familiar with, rather
he means that very tiny heads – too small to see – go out from the head and
similarly hands from hands and feet from feet and liver from the liver and
likewise for the other parts, and equally from the mother; and after they have
grown and been put together in the womb, they are delivered to the outside
world. Plato said this and also that the collection of parts such as these does not
go out all by itself, rather these parts are accompanied by some moisture that
envelopes them, just as an amphora envelopes wine. Strictly speaking, he says,
the above-mentioned parts are both said to be and are the seed, but for this
reason even the moisture enveloping these parts is referred to as ‘seed,’ just as
the amphora is often referred to as wine because of the wine contained in it.
(Michael of Ephesus Commentary on Aristotle’s
On the Generation of Animals 25,20–31)
Here we encounter a strikingly Presocratic-sounding embryology consisting of

the following tenets. (i) Plato advanced a two-seed theory in which the female
seed does make a contribution to the offspring. Further, (ii) this is a theory of
anhomoiomerous pangenesis and consequently of anhomoiomerous (but not
homuncular)154 preformationism. In addition, (iii) these anhomoiomerous parts are
contained in a fluid which is itself not technically part of the seed but which may
be referred to as ‘seed.’ A final tenet, namely (iv) that these anhomoiomerous parts
in the seed are alive, may be added to this list in light of the second passage:
As for Plato’s having said that the kinds of parts that we were saying derived
from the father are themselves alive, and not only this but also that the womb
and the male reproductive part are living things, listen to what Plato says in the
Timaeus, first regarding the reproductive part of the male and the female. For
the following is what he says in his own words: the gods contrived the ἔρως
for sexual union by constructing an ensouled living thing, one in us [men] and
one in women (Timaeus 90e9–91a2). Thus he says that there are living things
in us by means of which generation takes place – the member of the male
and the womb of the female – and they are living things not merely because
they are alive but because they are obedient to what according to Plato is
their [own] self-moving soul: the male genitals are disobedient and self-willed,
like a living thing that will not listen to reason and on account of its raging
desires tries to overpower everything else (Timaeus 91b4–7). And concerning
the womb, Plato again says that it is a living thing, as are the parts deriving
from the father. And again the wombs and uteri in women are for these same
reasons called an animal within them with an appetite for producing children.
And whenever it is barren for an unseasonably long time, it becomes severely
irritated and wanders throughout the body, and it blocks up the passages for
the breath (pneuma) and prevents [the woman] from breathing, sending her
into great difficulties and presents her with all kinds of illnesses, until the
[female] appetite and the [male] ἔρως, gather together, as if stripping fruit
from trees, and sow into the womb, as if into fertile soil, living things not fully
formed and too small to see, and then again separating them,155 nourishing
them large within, and after this bringing them to light, completing the gen-
eration of living things (Timaeus 91b7–d5).156 This passage of Plato explicitly
declares that living things are going out from the father.
On the Generation of Animals 33,19–34,6)157
The question is how exactly Michael came to this understanding of Plato’s

embryology. Karl Praechter, one of the great scholars on Michael, insists that this
interpretation has no basis in the Timaeus itself,158 and explains Michael’s endorse-
ment of it as follows. First, Praechter impressively demonstrates that Michael’s
general (and laudable) approach to commentating on Aristotle involves taking pains
to clarify how Aristotle’s theory relates to Plato’s, and this encourages him to see
implicit references to Plato that Aristotle probably did not intend.159 So Michael
has come to believe that Plato is a two-seed pangenesis theorist because he sees
Plato lurking behind certain generic references to ‘some men’ (τινες) in Aristotle’s
criticism of pangenesis in On the Generation of Animals.160 Further, when it comes to
explaining why Michael wants to see Plato behind precisely these references despite
the prima facie discrepancies between this theory and the theory expounded in
Plato’s Timaeus, Praechter appeals to two features of Michael’s education regarding
Plato: that he had at best limited first-hand exposure to Plato’s dialogues and that his
own knowledge is based primarily on oral teaching and compendia.161 Praechter
further suggests – though I think this remains just a suggestion – that the culprit
might have been Neoplatonism, which, as he puts it, ‘created a picture [of Plato]
that was in many respects altered.’162
A comparison with the results of our above investigation into Neoplatonic
embryology makes sufficiently clear that Michael cannot have derived this pan-
genesis interpretation from Neoplatonic theories, though we can say with certainty
that his engagement with Plato in the second passage is mediated by a Neoplatonic
source. This source in question is Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum 8.2–3 (44,13–32). Not
only does Michael present the same three passages of the Timaeus that Porphyry
presents in the same order, but he even appears to take over some of Porphyry’s own
intervening remarks.163 Nevertheless, Michael sticks to his own agenda. Whereas
Porphyry’s main concern in Ad Gaurum 8 is to show that the phenomena supposed
by some to show that the embryo is already an animal (e.g. movement, pica) can all
be sufficiently explained by Plato’s hypothesis that the womb is an independent ‘ani-
mal’ capable of movement and desire, Michael appeals to these passages to establish
that Plato endorsed vital anhomoiomerous pangenesis. Unlike Porphyry, Michael
places the emphasis in these passages on Plato’s description of the seed as a plurality
of microscopic living things, which he takes to be tiny heads, tiny hands, and so on
derived from the entire body. The point about the womb appears to be appropriated
in the service of a rather different point: Plato’s acknowledgment that the womb is
an independent living thing provides in his view some support for saying that the
microscopic anhomoiomerous parts making up the seed are themselves living things.
Thus, Timaeus 91b7–d5, and in particular Plato’s puzzling description of the
seed as a plurality of living things that are too small to see, might well be Michael’s
main evidence for attributing vital anhomoiomerous pangenesis to Plato. As other
passages in his commentary illustrate, Michael appears to have recognized this
as a hallmark feature of anhomoiomerous pangenesis such as was advanced by
Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Empedocles,164 and then drew the conclusion that
Plato’s theory must follow along the same lines. In other words, Michael solves the
puzzle surrounding the ‘living things’ that are still ‘unformed’ by setting this state-
ment against the Presocratic tradition that posited living anhomoiomerous parts in
the seed that still need to be arranged into a unified whole. In fact, the affinity that
Michael sees between Platonic and Presocratic pangenesis theories can be seen on
both sides of the equation. For when faced with the Democritean puzzle exam-
ined above165 regarding the female’s role in forming the embryo, Michael offers a
surprisingly Platonic explanation (though he makes clear that he does not himself
accept this view):
The living thing remains in the womb until it is completed. Why? In order
to receive nourishment from it, and not for the reason that Democritus
advances. For he claims that it remains in the womb in order that the parts
might be formed in conformity with the parts of the pregnant woman. For,
he says, since the hand is such and such, and each of the other parts of the
mother are such and such, it remains in the womb in order that nature166
might look to the mother’s parts as if to a paradigm and model and form the
parts of the embryo in conformity with her parts.

On the Generation of Animals 102,12–23)
Not all of Michael’s four tenets, however, can be derived from these three Timaeus
passages. For he mentions only the male seed in his comments, which is somewhat
puzzling given his tenet (i) that there is also a contributing female seed. Perhaps this
should be taken as evidence that Michael has no considered, internally consistent
interpretation of Plato’s embryology, in which case he might have drawn the theory
summarized at 25,20–31 from a compendium and then subsequently interpreted
the Timaeus passages eight pages later at 33,19–34,6 in terms of a one-seed theory
without noticing the inconsistency. This might be right, but it strikes me as unduly
uncharitable. I would rather suggest that Michael might be acknowledging here
that Plato in fact does not explicitly mention a female seed in the Timaeus, but that
he nevertheless believes he is justified in inferring the existence of a contributive
female seed from the similarities he sees between Plato’s theory and Presocratic
pangenesis theories. After all, as Aristotle himself tells us, all pangenesis theories are
two-seed theories.167
It remains to explain tenet (iii), namely that there is a moisture containing these
microscopic vital parts that is not strictly speaking seed though it may be referred
to as ‘seed.’This is a prima facie odd claim for two reasons. Not only is it something
most of us will not recall having read in the Timaeus, but it also seems to be a rather
superfluous detail, and yet Michael devotes half of his summary of Plato’s embryol-
ogy to this point. In fact, Michael would appear to be deriving this tenet from the
Timaeus, and if so, he has good reason to place this extra emphasis on it. For tenet
(iii) would seem to be rooted in the puzzle discussed in Chapter 1 surrounding
Plato’s use of the term πανσπερμία. There we saw that Plato first categorizes mar-
row as a πανσπερμία (73c1) which we determined is best understood as a universal
receptacle of seed (where the seed in question was identified as the soul), but then
subsequently refers to the marrow simply as ‘seed’ (91b1–2). We explained this dis-
crepancy in the Timaeus by acknowledging that in the second passage the marrow
is only called ‘seed’ because the soul is already present in it. Michael disregards the
Timaeus’ crucial point about the soul being the true seed, but he appropriates the
point about there being a receptacle for the true seed for his pangenesis theory.
Thus, he understands Plato to be saying that there is a fluid that contains the living
anhomoiomerous parts and that when these parts are present in it, we may also call
this containing fluid a ‘seed.’
This brings us to a final problem in Michael’s interpretation: nowhere in the

Generation of Animals commentary does he give any indication that he was even
aware of Plato’s commitment at Timaeus 73b–d to the encephalo-myelogenic the-
ory. Yet in his commentary on Aristotle’s Parts of Animals Michael shows that he
is aware of this feature of Platonic embryology, even if he never does so in the
Generation of Animals commentary. For in response to Aristotle’s criticism of ‘some
people’ (τινες) who think that marrow is a spermatic power of seed (On the Parts
of Animals 651b20–2), Michael correctly identifies this as a reference to Platonists:
And [Aristotle] says that marrow is a certain nature of blood, and that it is not,
as some people think, a spermatic power of seed, i.e., a principle of seed. For
the Platonists posited the marrow as a principle of seed, just as they posited
the brain as a principle of nerves.
On the Parts of Animals 36,35–37,3)
Here again I think it is fair to question whether Michael does indeed have a single
coherent interpretation of Plato’s embryology, but we have now seen that Michael
might have so fully subsumed this detail into his pangenesis theory that he no longer
finds the marrow itself to be a noteworthy feature of Plato’s explanation. After all,
one of the most celebrated and authoritative affirmations of pangenesis theory is that
of the Hippocratic treatise On Generation, and here, too, one finds encephalo-mye-
logenic elements literally side-by-side with the theory of pangenesis.168 Moreover,
the author of On Generation to a large extent even manages to alleviate the tension
between these two theories by making the spinal marrow into a collection and dis-
tribution point within the pangenetic account of the production of seed.169 If the
suggestions above are correct, Michael’s interpretation of Plato is following along the
same lines: the parts are transmitted via a fluid, presumably marrow, though Michael
is no longer interested in specifying it, given that it is a mere receptacle.
In short, Michael’s Presocratic interpretation of Plato’s embryology is even fur-
ther removed from the Neoplatonic core theory than his interpretation of Aristotle’s
embryology is, which itself, as we have now seen, shows only limited Neoplatonic
influence.
Notes
1 Duffy (1997: 22 and cf. 114 (ad 60,29–34)).
2 There has been some excellent recent work aimed at disambiguating the many ‘Johns’
working on medicine and/or philosophy in late antiquity (see especially Pormann
(2003: 248–51)), but scholars have so far found little reason to doubt that the commen-
tary on the Hippocratic Epidemics VI and the commentary on On the Nature of the Child
are both by the same John of Alexandria. So, for the purposes of this investigation, I shall
be proceeding on the (widely shared) assumption that both of these commentaries are
the work of a single John of Alexandria. For a more in-depth look at John’s embryology,
see Wilberding (forthcoming-b).
3 See Duffy (1997: 10–12 and 21–2).

4 Not only does he introduce Democritus (In Hipp. Epid. VI 102,27–104,3 and In Hipp.
Nat. Puer. 146,6–10), Epicurus (In Hipp. Epid. VI 84,3–4), and Parmenides (In Hipp.
Epid. VI 62,5–6) into his comments, he also often employs philosophical methods and
perspectives on the text. He begins his commentary on Nat. Puer., for example, by
stating that the skopos of the treatise is matter, and then considers whether it is about
proximate or remote matter (130,6–20). Duffy (1997: 22) has already taken notice of
his ‘fondness for logical argumentation and proof […and his] use of diairesis or division.’
5 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 146,16–32 (cf. Hippocrates Nat. Puer. 55,4–55,6). Bell et al. note nihil
de hac re apud Platonem invenimus, but John is likely thinking of Rep. 373a3 along with
461b9–c7. See also John’s reference to Gorg. 513c at In Hipp. Epid.VI 44,21–3.
6 For example God is twice referred to as ‘the Demiurge’ (In Hipp. Epid. VI 60,31 and
In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 164,39), and nature is described as ‘holding the reins’ (ἡνιοχεῖ ) at In
Hipp. Nat. Puer. 134,13. Cf. Duffy ad 60,29–34.
7 See In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 158,20–160,7 and 162,1–6. The expression διδασκαλίας χάριν
is often employed by Platonists looking to avoid the literal interpretation of the Tim.’s
cosmogony in favor of an account compatible with the bidirectional everlastingness
of the cosmos, e.g., Aristotle DC 279b32–280a2; Philoponus Aet. Mund. 123,15–18
and 186,6–191,14; Porphyry apud Philoponus Aet. Mund. 547,24–5; Simplicius In DC
304,5.
8 See John’s distinction between physical and mathematical explanations at In Hipp. Nat.
Puer. 164,37–166,23 (cf. 134,22–4 and 148,1–5). At In Hipp. Epid. VI 60,34 he cites
Chald. Or. 22.3, though there are two deviations from Des Places’ text.
9 See In Hipp. Epid.VI 60,30–4 and 96,7–12.
10 In Hipp. Epid. VI 104,1–9. For this approach to medicine in the Neoplatonic tradition,
see Wilberding (2014c).
11 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 130,13–15.
12 Cf. In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 160,2–3 and 164,39–40.
13 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 134,20–7.
14 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 134,27–136,9 and 138,13–14.
15 If so, the idea would be that the seed is derived from blood (In Hipp. Epid.VI 82,10–11)
from all over the body (In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 172,23–33), where marrow is considered
a form of blood (170,25–6; cf. Aristotle PA 652a29–30 and the Hippocratic Genit.
45,14–16 (7.470 L.)).
16 This emerges from his discussion of the mixing of seeds, In Hipp. Nat. Puer 138,17–20. It
should be noted that this is not in tension with his nod to the hematogenous theory, as
he sees blood, too, as an anhomoiomerous substance (160,27–8). The idea is apparently
not that the seed (or the blood) contains the various parts of the body in microscopic
form but that different portions of it vary in terms of their qualities.
17 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 152,14–15.
18 For example In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 136,9–40 and 138,16–20.
19 On the eddies, see In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 136,23 and 140,6–36. For John’s adoption of the
principle of like to like, see 158,7–19.
20 See In Hipp. Epid.VI 60,5–62,9 and 82,4–14, and In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 164,40–166,6.
21 See In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 152,26–7.
22 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 174,11–19.
24 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 158,17–19.
26 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 154,28–30: φαμὲν ὅτι ἀρχαίην φύσιν λέγει τὴν διαπλαστικὴν
δύναμιν, τὴν τεχνικῶς διαπλάττουσαν τὰ μόρια. Note that John’s text of the Nat. Puer.
here (καὶ κακῶς τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἀρχαίῃ φύσει ὑπῆρχε 154,26–7) diverges considerably
from ours (καί πως τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ φύσει ὑπῆρξεν 57,24 (7.494 L.)).
27 In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 156,13–16.
28 See In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 150,15–17 and 154,31–156,4 with Wilberding (forthcoming-b)
for a more detailed analysis.
29 Τί ἄρα ποιούσης τῆς γυναικός; μὴ οἰκουρούσης καὶ μέτρῳ κινουμένης; οὐδαμῶς
τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ νῦν γυναῖκά φησι τὴν διαπλαστικὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ οὖσαν.
φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ σπέρματα μίγνυνται ἅμα τῆς διαπλαστικῆς δυνάμεως μὴ οὐχ
ἡσυχαζούσης, ἐπὰν δέξηται ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἄλλο ποιούσης. I would like to thank Philip
van der Eijk for his suggestion to me that John might be referring to the formative
power in the male seed when it comes to be present in the womb. This possibility cannot be
ruled out, but I think the use of the definite article τήν makes it unlikely. Moreover, I
agree with Bell et al. that this power is meant to be the subject that is said to receive
(δέξηται) the seeds, which would also speak against taking this power to be in the
male seed. See also ἡ διαπλαστικὴ δύναμις ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ οὖσα (132,5). We should also
see a further reference to this power belonging to the womb at In Hipp. Epid. IV
60,30–2: πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον διαπλαστικὴν δύναμιν αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ μήτραν καὶ κρᾶσιν
σπέρματος, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν μὴ λέγειν τούτων αἴτιον, with Duffy’s note regarding
καὶ μήτραν: fort. μήτρας scribendum est.
30 See In Hipp. Epid. VI 60,29–33 (see note 6) and 96,7–12.
31 See Grimm-Stadelmann (2008: 36–42).
32 Plato’s name turns up only once (at 21,1) as part of a reference to Galen’s PHP.
33 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.20 (216,1).
34 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.26 (222,6–9); 5.28 (224,1–3); 5.29 (226,5–227,7); 5.36 (261,15–
262,3; a paraphrase of Galen De usu part. 2.316,19ff.).
35 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.29 (227,15–228,3).
36 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.34 (252,11–253,3), a paraphrase of the Hippocratic Genit. 46,11–16
(7.474 L.).
37 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.18 (210,1–6). Cf. Galen De uteri dissect. 48,5–50,11 (2.899–901 K.)
and see Nickel’s comments (1971: 76–7).
38 De corp. hum. fabr. 5.31–2, esp. 239,10–12.
39 For example in the course of presenting the theory of Nat. puer. 17 on the first for-
mation of the embryo, more or less verbatim (De corp. hum. fabr. 5.33 (244,7–245,12)),
Theophilus skips over the analogy to the bladder (Nat. Puer. 60,8–18 (7.498 L.)), which
is meant to illustrate the mechanical nature of the process.
40 Cf., e.g., De corp. hum. fabr. 5.19 (210,7–16) and Galen De usu part. 2.288,11–17 (4.147
K.); De corp. hum. fabr. 5.33 (243,9–244,3) and Galen De usu part. 2.359,23–360,2
(4.241–2 K.); De corp. hum. fabr. 5.38 (268,6–11) and Galen De usu part. 2.311,4–8
(4.177 K.). Elsewhere Theophilus builds in references to God’s demiurgy or wisdom,
e.g., De corp. hum. fabr. 5.38 (266,10–267,1), cf. Galen De usu part. 2.293,23–6 (4.154
K.). Apparent inconsistencies between the two accounts are either left standing or hast-
ily ironed over. E.g., on the order of formation of the parts, Theophilus reconciles the
two theories by presenting the Hippocratic theory of first formation as what happens
after Galen’s first three organs (liver, heart, and brain) are formed (De corp. hum. fabr. 5.33
(243,9–245,12), a synthesis of Galen’s De usu part. 15.6 (2.356,9–363,10 = 4.241–6 K.)
and the Hippocratic Nat. puer. 17 (59,9–60,18 = 7.497–9 L.)).
41 More specifically, the passages taken over (in some cases with slight modification) are:
Genit. 48,11–23 (7.478 L.); 49,3–22 (7.478–80 L.); Morb. Sacr. 10,12–16 (6.364 L.); Nat.
Puer. 53,2–4; 53,4–9; 54,2–3; 54,17–18; 54,20–55,1; 56,21–57,4.
42 See especially De corp. hum. fabr. 5.32 (240,9–12).
43 Cf. πρῶτον μὲν μίσγεται ὁμοῦ, ἅτε τῆς γυναικὸς οὐκ ἀτρεμεούσης, καὶ ἀθροίζεται
καὶ παχύνεται θερμαινομένη (Nat. Puer. 53,2–4 (7.486 L.)) and καὶ μίσγεται ὁμοῦ τῆς
φύσεως τῆς γυναικὸς, καὶ ἀθροίζεται καὶ παχύνεται [θερμαινομένη] (De corp. hum. fabr.
241,2–4).
44 Greenhill notes ‘loc. fort. corrup.’ in his apparatus (241), which he explains in his annota-
tions (342): videtur hic aliquid corrupti latere, quod corrigere nequeo; φυσήσεως tamen, aut
tale quid legendum, sequentia indicant. He also reports that a previous editor attempted to
read <τὸ> τῆς φύσεως τῆς γυναικὸς as a reference to the foeminae secretionem naturalem.
45 Cf. Porphyry AG 47,16–28 and 34,23–35,2.

46 If this suggestion is correct, then it might also go some way towards explaining a strik-
ing addition to the Hippocratic text found at the end of 5.32. There he is ostensibly
quoting the end of Nat. Puer. §14, which runs as follows: Ὁκόταν δὲ ἤδη τοῦτο γένηται,
κατιόντος τοῦ αἵματος ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ πηγνυμένου, σὰρξ γίνεται. κατὰ δὲ μέσον
τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ ὀμφαλὸς ἀπέχει, δι’ οὗ πνέει καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ἴσχει (Nat. Puer. 56,25–57,4
(7.492 L.)). But on Theophilus’ rendering, it is not only breathing and growing that
proceed through the umbilical cord, but also sensation: δι’ οὗ πνέει καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ
αὔξησιν ἔχει (De corp. hum. fabr. 243,7–8, my emphasis. Greenhill places a comma after
πνέει, presumably to avoid the conclusion that the embryo has sensation through the
umbilical cord, but this is the natural reading and corresponds to the Hippocratic text).
47 There are over 40 known manuscripts. For some background on the text, the manu-
scripts and their transmission, see Merisalo (2012a) and (2012b). In what follows I am
working with two sorely outdated non-critical editions of the text, namely in Cornarius’
1549 edition and Chartier’s 1638 edition. Both are currently available online via the
Bibliothèque interuniversitaire de Santé website, though we must acknowledge Pahta’s
warning that Cornarius (and presumably by extension Chartier) ‘is in many places so
different from the manuscript copies that it may be regarded as an independent version
or a later paraphrase’ (1998: 157). I have also consulted the Middle English translation in
Pahta (1998), along with her modern English paraphrase and very helpful notes, which
contain alternative readings from a selection of the Latin manuscripts.
48 See Merisalo and Pahta (2008: 92).
49 See Pahta (1998: 100–2). The embryological section corresponds to chapters 1–10 (pp.
135–141) in Cornarius (henceforth C), chapters 1–7 (pp. 229–32) in Chartier (Ch),
and lines 1–287 in Pahta (P). The philosophical interlude is found in chapters 11–13
(pp. 141–3c) in C, chapters 8–10 (pp. 232–3e) in Ch, and lines 287–433 in P. And the
astrological section is found in chapters 13–25 (pp. 143c–156) in C, chapters 10–22 (pp.
233e–9) in Ch, and lines 434–669 in P.
50 Sperma viri fortius est et calidus muliebri, muliebre vero nutrimentum est spermatis virilis (135c
C; cf. 229b (left column) Ch and 10–12 P); similis matri etiam hac causa sit, quia sperma eius
est nutrimentum spermatis viri (139c C; cf. 230d (left column) Ch and 208–10 P).
51 135c C; cf. emittitur perfectum et animatum 229b (left column) Ch, and 16 P.
52 See, e.g., spermati muliebri associatum (135c C; cf. 229b (left column) Ch and 16–17 P).
53 See 139c C (cf. 231d (left column) Ch and 206–22 P) and especially 137b–d C (cf.
230c–e (left column) Ch and 96–120 P).
54 On the pneumatic theory, see, e.g., 135d–6d C (cf. 229c (left column)–229b (right col-
umn) Ch and 17–54 P). On astrology and the temperaments, see esp. 140b–d C (cf.
231b–f (right column) Ch and 246–87 P along with the entire third section (see note 49).
55 For example his suggestion that the shoulders are formed first (prius autem formantur
humeri 136c C (cf. 229b (left column) Ch and 48 P)) seems utterly bizarre and virtually
inexplicable until one realizes that it is simply an ill-considered inference drawn from
the Hippocratic Nat. Puer. 17.2 (59,18–19): καὶ ἥ τε κεφαλὴ γίνεται ἀφεστηκυῖα ἀπὸ
τῶν ὤμων. Compare this to the much savvier remarks by John of Alexandria on this
passage (In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 158,11–13 and 162,1–6).
56 The title is given in the plural: 141d and 142c C (cf. 232a and e (left column) Ch, and
348 and 381 P).
57 As Svetla Slaveva-Griffin kindly brought to my attention, he employs a similar label-
ing strategy when he refers to Aristotle’s De anima as the Physics (143a C (cf. 233b (left
column) Ch and 404–5 P)). Cf. DA 403a27–8.
58 These include: (i) the mixture of the soul and body not being like a mixture of elements
(141c C; cf. 232e (left column) Ch and 334–6 P. See Porphyry Fr. 259F,13–15 and 28–9);
(ii) the report of Ammonius’ views within the discussion of Porphyry (142d–143a C;
cf. 233a–b (left column) Ch and 394–404 P (note that the name has been corrupted
in all three; see Pahta ad loc.). See Porphyry Fr. 259F,80ff.); (iii) the analogy to sun and
fire (142d–3a C; cf. 233a–b (left column) Ch and 394–404 P. See Porphyry Fr. 261F).
59 Hoc dicit Porphyrius ad ostensionem coniunctionis animae cum corpore, et per hoc affirmat verbum
dei in substantia (correcting C’s and Ch’s sapientia to substantia based on Merisalo’s work
on the manuscripts) hominis esse (141d C; cf. 232a (right column) Ch and 345–8 P).
60 Nemesius Nat. hom. 43,9–11, cf. 42,9–11. In fact, there are already correspondences to
Nemesius in the embryological physiology. Cf., e.g., 137d–8a C (cf. 230f (left column)–
230b (right column) Ch and 121–36 P) and Nemesius Nat. hom. 86,1–15 (where phleg-
matis figuram is perhaps a corruption from Nemesius’ τὸ ἑλικοειδὲς καὶ κιρσοειδὲς
πλέγμα. Note that some manuscripts have κρισοειδὲς φλέγμα).
61 The author, for example, holds that the individual soul enters the body at conception
(emittitur completum et animatum 135c C (cf. 229b (left column) Ch and 16 P) and sperma
non semper animatum ab homine vernire in matricem, sed tunc tantum quando a deo statutum
est gigni infantem, et tunc anima sociatur spermati 143b C (cf. 233d (left column) Ch and
423–6 P), which Porphyry vehemently disputes in the AG. To be fair, the author does
not explicitly attribute this view to Porphyry, who is perhaps rather to be understood
as one of the omnes physici who maintain that animam novam de coelo immitti et associari
spermati in matrice vel puero prius formato (143b C (cf. 233c (left column) Ch and 417–19
P)), but his distance from Porphyry’s position is nevertheless striking. More intriguing
is the enigmatic statement at 139c C (cf. 231e (left column) Ch and 223–4 P): sicut enim
sperma viri habet potestatem in toto corpore, ita natura potestatem habet in matrice, which reso-
nates with the maternal actualization theory insofar as both pair the female’s nature to
the male’s seed. But the statement’s intended meaning (as well as its compatibility with
the author’s two-seed theory) remains unclear.
62 142b–c C (cf. 232d–e (right column) Ch and 369–85 P).
63 Nec lege loci tenetur 142c C (cf. 232e (right column) Ch and 385 P).
64 142d–3a C (cf. 232e (right column)–233a (left column) Ch and 388–404 P).
65 143a–b C (cf. 233b (left column) Ch and 408–17 P).
66 143b C (cf. 232c–d (left column) Ch and 417–26 P).
67 140d–141c C (cf. 232c–d (left column) Ch and 287–328 P).
68 142a–b C (cf. 232b–c (right column) Ch and 351–71 P).
69 142b C (cf. 232c (right column) Ch and 368–70 P). According to 400 P the soul is
located in the heart, but this appears to be the result of an earlier corruption of a corpore
into a corde.
70 141a C (cf. 232b (left column) Ch and 295–6 P, and see Pahta’s note ad loc.) and 143b
C (cf. 232c–d (left column) Ch and 415–26 P).
71 The Theol. Arith. twice reports Diocles’ views on embryology (62,8–9 and 64,11). To
my knowledge the only other Neoplatonic text to refer to Diocles is Olympiodorus’
In Meteor. 30,8 (Diocles Fr. 241), though van der Eijk marks this as a dubious fragment.
72 See Waterfield (1988: 23).
73 The one-seed theory is clear at [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 61,5–6, where the male seed
is strikingly, and to my knowledge uniquely, said to be emitted seven times into the
female womb (cf. Hipp. Nat. Puer. 13.2 and Kudlien (1965: 420–2)). The author’s use of
the seed to explain the nature of the monad suggests a strong level of agreement with
Neoplatonic theory of the seed, e.g., Theol. Arith. 1,10–12; 16,4–6.
74 Theol. Arith. 61,12–62,20; cf. 52,7–8; 64,7–9. This (apparently genderless) timeline
applies to cases of seven-month pregnancies. Nine-month children are formed in the
sixth week for female children, and the seventh week for male children (62,21–63,1),
which is an interesting reversal of the usual view that male embryos develop more
quickly than females (e.g., Hipp. Nat. Puer. 18.5 and 21.1), presumably in order to allow
for male embryos to be formed in the more perfect seventh heptad.
75 [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 61,6–13.
76 On the Stoic theory, see Gourinat (2008: esp. 71–6) and Long (1999: 560–4).
77 See Porphyry AG 14 (53,28–54,25) and Plotinus Enn. 3.1.8.7–8 and 4.7.83, on which
see Deuse (1983: 184f.), Wilberding (2008: 429) and Chapter 4, pp. 135–6.
79 For example Theol. Arith. 52,8–16.

80 [Galen] An animal sit 19.158,1–181,12 K. The TLG text is based on Wagner (1914)
which is significantly different from (and superior to) Kühn’s text. An English transla-
tion (often but not always following Kühn’s text) with a short introduction and some
notes appears as Appendix 1 in Kapparis (2002: 201–13), though there are some seri-
ous problems with the translation, especially of the more philosophical content. There
is also an Italian translation in Colucci (1971), though I have not been able to obtain
a copy of it. Much more work is needed on this short treatise. It is possible that An
animal sit was one of Porphyry’s targets in the AG. Cf. AG 17.3 (59,2–4) and An animal
sit 14,6–16,12, esp. 16,7–12 (19.176–8 K.); AG 18 (62,24–30) and An animal sit 6,3–7
(19.164–5 K.) (with 9,21–3 (19.169–70 K.)). Congourdeau (2007: 293) suggests that
the author of An animal sit might rather have been reading the Ad Gaurum, which is also
possible. Some of the arguments and terminology in An animal sit also appear to have
been appropriated by Anonymus Christianus in Herm. Cf. An animal sit 6,3–7 (19.164–5
K.) and Herm. 63,14–17; An animal sit 9,21–3 (19.169–70 K.) and Herm. 62,4–7; An
animal sit 9,23–6 (19.170 K.) and Herm. 62,7–9; An animal sit 16,8–12 (19.178 K.) and
Herm. 64,16–19; An animal sit 2,21 (ἀρχηγὸν καὶ πρωτόγονον πνεȗμα – 19.160 K.) and
Herm. 36,11 (ἀρχηγὸν καὶ πρωτόγονον πνεȗμα).
81 Nutton (1990: 140).
82 An animal sit 6,7 (19.165 K.).
83 Here I find myself agreeing with Larrain (1992: 68) and Congourdeau (2007: 312–13).
Scholten (2005: 399n80) objects that Larrain’s claim that the An animal sit aims to show
that the rational soul is already present in the embryo-fetus is ‘not certain.’ Although
the author appears to state this fairly clearly: ὡς δὲ καὶ ψυχῆϛ μετέχει καὶ λογισμοȗ
διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς πειράσομαι δεῖξαι (8,14–15 (19.168 K.)), Scholten points out that the
expression ψυχὴ λογική does not occur in An animal sit and maintains that based on
what follows, 8,14–15 simply amounts to announcing that ‘die beim Embryo erken-
nbar vorhandenen Sinnesorgane Ausdruck einer sinnvollen Ordnung sind.’ In support
of Larrain’s view, I would point to two features in the argument. First, one of the central
arguments of the text is that completeness can only come from completeness, and so
the embryo must already be complete (or perfect) if a grown human being is to be so.
This is illustrated by the comparison between microcosmos (man) and macrocosmos
(discussed below). Here it is important that the universe is described as ‘intelligent’ even
at its earliest embryonic stage: ζῷον [τε] γὰρ πρῶτον καὶ ἔμπνουν τε καὶ ἔννουν ὅδε
ὁ κόσμος καὶ τότε ἦν ὡς καὶ νῦν φαίνεται (3,18–19 (19.161 K.)). Moreover, the aim
described at 8,14–16 covers the text running all the way to 12,1 (19.172 K.), and here
the author shows more than that the sense-organs reveal a rational ordering of the body.
In particular, part of the argument of this section is that the soul (rather than nature) is
responsible for breathing, not just for those who are awake but even for the slumber-
ing (and so for embryos, too). The argument is somewhat opaque, but it invokes at one
point (11,2–21 (19.171–2 K.)) the fact that the soul journeys through the heavens, and
this soul must at least include the rational soul. This is corroborated by the author’s
claim that this soul is housed in the brain (8,22–9,2 (19.168 K.); cf. 9,15–17 (19.169
K.)). See also 6,17–18 (19.165 K.).
84 An animal sit 5,6–6,18 (19.164–5 K.).
85 An animal sit 6,12 (19.165 K.). Cf. the analogy to the universe: 3,2–3 and 9–10
(19.160–1 K.).
86 At 6,13–18 (19.165 K.) the author states that the offspring κινεῖσθαι ταῖς ἐξ αὑτоῦ
κινήσεσιν ἄρχεται at birth. Given the activities that the embryo-fetus is credited with
in An animal sit, it ̯ is likely that what is meant here is just local motion. (Cf. Plato’s denial
of τῆς ὑφ’ ἑαυτоυ κινήσεως to plants at Tim. 77c4–5, and Galen’s interpretation of this
in In Tim. 12,22–13,7. I discuss Galen’s interpretation in detail in Wilberding (2014a)).
That motion is present all along may be inferred from 6,23–7,1 (19.166 K.) as well as
from the analogy to the generation of the macrocosm, since the author takes pains to
emphasize that even the embryonic universe was in motion, just not yet in ordered
motion (3,2–9 (19.160–1 K.)). Nourishment appears to be taking place from the begin-
ning, though it proceeds in three stages: first without the umbilical cord (this is not
explicitly mentioned, but it may be inferred), then through the umbilical cord, and then
through both the umbilical cord and through the mouth (7,12–8,5 (19.167 K.)). The
sense of taste is there before the other senses, presumably once it begins to consume
nourishment with its mouth (9,26–10,5 (19.170 K.)). The other senses are said to be in
action μετ’ ὀλίγоν τεχθέντоς τоῦ βρέφους (9,22 (19.170 K.)), which I understand to
mean at birth (cf. 6,13–18 (19.165 K.)). Breathing, which the author argues at length
is performed by the soul and not nature, begins well before birth, presumably once the
mouth and nose are formed (10,5–11,8 (19.170–1 K.)).
87 This principle is summed up succinctly at 3,20–2 (19.162 K.) and cf. 4,5–7 (19.162 K.).
88 This is the author’s own manner of speaking: 3,20 (19.162,1 K.): ἡνίκα ἐκυΐσκετο.
89 2,19–3,1 (19.160 K.), where oὐρανόϛ at 2,19 appears to refer to fire. Pneuma appears to
be the author’s preferred term, but he adds ὅπερ καλoῦσι παῖδεϛ φιλoσόφων ἢ ψυχὴν
ἢ μoνὰδα ἢ ἄτoμoν ἢ πῦρ ἢ τῷ γένει πνεῦμα πρῶτoν, which suggests to me that this
author was not a professional philosopher.
90 2,19–3,19 (19.160–1 K.). He underlines that the universe was already in motion (3,5–9
(19.161 K.)) and that the motion of the completed cosmos is ordered (3,3–5 (19.161
K.)), from which it would seem to follow that the embryonic universe was moving in
a disordered manner. Cf. Plato Tim. 30a4–5.
91 2,19–3,19 (19.160–1 K.). The author seems to be envisioning the generation of the
cosmos as occurring in time.
92 3,18–19 (19.161 K.). Cf. Plato’s description of the cosmos as a ζῷoν ἔμψυχoν ἔννoυν
(Tim. 30b8).
93 4,8–6,18 (19.162–5 K.).
94 6,19–8,12 (19.165–7 K.). The author’s appropriation of Hippocrates here is discussed
by Congourdeau (2007: 237). See also Lonie (1981: 188).
95 8,15–9,17 (19.168–9 K.). See Chapter 4, pp. 136–9.
96 This should apply to all organs of sensation, but our author singles out the brain καὶ
τὸν ἐγκέφαλoν δὲ ὄντα ταύτηϛ oἰκητήριoν ἐξ ἀρχῆϛ ἔτι συνιστάμενoν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ
κύτει τῆϛ κεφαλῆϛ ἐγγιγνόμενoν ἔχει (8,22–4 (19.168 K.)) – and, interestingly, the
nerves as the houses of the soul: ἡ τῶν νεύρων φύσιϛ oὖσα ψυχῆϛ oἰκητήριoν ἐξ ἀρχῆϛ
ἅμα τῷ πνεύματι συμβλαστάνουσα δηλοῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἅμα τῷ σώματι συνισταμένῳ
συνίστασθαι (9,15–17 (19.169 K.)). These two remarks probably amount to the
same claim, as he is presumably thinking of the nerves as ‘offshoots’ of the brain (see
Herophilus Fr. T125: Tὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου βλαστήματα, νεῦρα αἰσθητικὰ, καὶ
προαιρετικὰ, διὰ ὧν αἴσθησις καὶ προαιρετικὴ κίνησις, καὶ πᾶσα σώματος πρᾶξις
συντελεῖται). Here our author reveals himself to have been more deeply influenced by
the discovery of the nerves than most philosophers of late antiquity. See Solmsen (1961)
and von Staden (1989: 247–59).
97 As evidence for this claim he offers the fact that some fetuses starve to death because
they find the nourishment available to them unpalatable (9,26–10,5 (19.170 K.)).
98 9,23–6 (19.170 K.). There is some tension between the claim at 9,24–5 that the nose
is held shut and the claim at 7,1–2 (19.166 K.) that the embryo breathes with its nose.
Perhaps our author is only presenting Hippocrates’ opinion in 7,1–2 and only means to
assent to the part of it having to do with the mouth (cf. 10,6–7 (19.170 K.)).
99 10,5–11,8 (19.170–1 K.). The author appears to accept the fact that embryos breathe
on medical authority (7,1 (19.166 K.)) and medical authority also supports his view
that the soul is responsible for breathing (10,9–10 (19.170 K.)), but he also provides
arguments of his own for the latter claim (10,10–11,8 (19.170–1 K.)). He also seems to
think that this follows from his previous conclusions about the soul being sown with
the seed (10,5–8 (19.170 K.)).
100 12,1–16,12 (19.173–8 K.).
101 16,13–18,15 (19.178–81 K.).
102 1,7 (19.159 K.).

103 For example An animal sit 1,16–17 (19.159 K.): кαὶ ἀνδρῶν, ὃς ἂν ἐкείνῳ φίλος ᾖ
(cf. Plato Tim. 53c7); An animal sit 2,6 (19.159 K.): οὗπερ οἷον δάνεισμα кαὶ μόριον
ὑπάρχομεν (cf. Plato Tim. 42e9–43a1: ἀπὸ τοῦ кόσμου δανειζόμενοι μόρια); An ani-
mal sit 6,16–18 (19.165 K.): τὰ φωσφόρα ὄμματα τείνει διὰ παντὸς τὴν ἡλίου кαὶ
σελήνης μιμούμενα φύσιν кαὶ τὸν νοῦν ἵστησι τῇ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον ἀπειкαζόμενον
φορᾷ (cf. Plato Tim. 44a–b and 90d); An animal sit 1,16 (19.159 K.) συνοπαδός (cf.
Plato Soph. 216b2); An animal sit 11,14 (19.172 K.): τὸν ὑπερουράνιον τόπον (cf. Plato
Phdr. 247c3); An animal sit 16,11–12 (19.178 K.): τὸ ὅμοιον кατὰ δύναμιν θεῷ (cf. Plato
Theaet. 176b1–2: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ кατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ). And see notes 90 and 92.
104 An animal sit 11,9 (19.172 K.).
105 An animal sit 11,10–19 (19.172 K.) Cf. Plato Phdr. 245c–57b.
106 An animal sit 13,17–21 (19.175 K.). I discuss ‘spontaneous’ generation in greater detail
in Wilberding (2012).
107 An animal sit 11,6–8 (19.171 K.) and 13,17–19 (19.175 K.).
108 It is presumably for this reason, together with the knowledge he displays of embryol-
ogy and embryological terminology (e.g. 14,7–16 (19.176 K.)), his views on pneuma
(discussed below) and the importance that he attributes to the nerves (see note 96), that
Congourdeau (2007: 312) classifies the author as a physician rather than a philosopher.
Kapparis (2002: 213) accuses the author of misunderstanding the term кύσαρον con-
tained in a passage quoted (14,9–11 (19.176 K.)) from the Hippocratic Nat. puer. (cf.
60,2–6 (7.498 L.)), but see Lonie (1981: 189), who confirms our author’s interpreta-
tion, as does John of Alexandria in In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 162,21–3. On the μηκώνιον, cf.
Aristotle HA 587a24–33.
109 An animal sit 2,20–1 (19.160 K.): τὸ διῆκον <ἔχον> διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν ἀρχηγὸν
καὶ πρωτόγονον πνεῦμα (the subject is the pre-cosmic universe). Cf. SVF 2.416: καὶ
πέμπμον παρεισάγει κατὰ τοὺϛ ∑τωïκοὺϛ τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ὑφ’ οὗ τὰ
πάντα συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι. Also SVF 2.414; 2.441 (145,16–17).
110 See note 96, and Solmsen (1961: 195).
111 11,9–15 (19.172 K.).
112 8,24–9,1 (19.168 K.).
113 6,22–3 (19.166 K.): τρέφεται μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ πνεύματι. And cf. 8,5–6 (19.167 K.):
ἀτμίζει δὲ καὶ πνευματοῖ τὴν διακριθεῖσαν τροφὴν καὶ προστίθησιν ἑκάστῳ μορίῳ
ῥᾳδίωϛ. The author nowhere explicitly says that the pneuma in question is material,
and it is possible that he had some form of immaterial pneuma in mind, which would
be more in line with Neoplatonic doctrine (e.g., Iamblichus De myst. 3.2; Proclus In
Tim. 3.297,25). But to my knowledge, no Platonist thinks of the soul as something that
requires nourishment, except metaphorically insofar as it may be said to be nourished
by knowledge or by Intellect.
114 9,15–17 (19.169 K.), cited in note 96.
116 Porphyry AG 14.3. Discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 63–7.
117 An animal sit 15,4–6 (19.176–7 K.): καὶ γὰρ οὐδ’ ἂν εἶχεν ἀνθρώπου λóγον τò
γιγνóμενον, εἰ μὴ πάντας μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεῖχε τοὺς τελείους λόγους. Cf. 3,9–10
(19.161 K.) and 4,5–7 (19.162). On motion, see note 86.
118 6,8–11 (19.165 K.).
119 For example Michael In EN IX–X 462,19f.; 549,21f.; 620,17f.
120 See Praechter (1906: 863–4) and Ierodiakonou (2009: 187–94).
121 Michael In EN IX–X 570,21–2 (and cf. In GA 149,19), on which see Praechter (1906:
902).
122 Browning (1962). Ebbesen (1981) buttressed this conclusion by defusing Praechter’s
argument for an earlier dating.
123 For more on this form of commentary, see Wilberding (2014b), Festugière (1963), and
Westerink (1971: 7–8).
124 In addition there has been some speculation as to whether Michael composed a com-
mentary on Aristotle’s Historia animalium. References to the HA can be found fre-
quently (e.g., In PA 88,23; In PN 134,29–30). There is also minimal evidence outside
of Michael’s corpus of its existence. See Praechter (1909: 52) and (1906: 864), who
concludes: ‘verloren, falls er überhaupt existiert hat.’ This is not included in any recent
catalogues of Michael’s works: Mercken (1990: 433n82), Benakis (1991: 47–8 and 2009:
65); Ierodiakonou (2009: 186); Barber and Jenkins (2009: xi).
125 For some examples of Neoplatonic influence in Michael’s ethics, see Steel (2002),
O’Meara (2008) and Ierodiakonou (2009). His commentary on books 6–14 of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics show heavy dependence on Syrianus, as shown by Praechter

(1906: 892ff.) and Luna (2001: 197–202). For some influence in his commentary on the
Pol., see O’Meara (2008: 46–50).
126 That the seed is provided by the male: e.g., In GA 46,15–16; 57,2–5; 59,13–18; 73,19–
21; 75,7–8; 79,2–4. That the seed is produced at the moment of copulation: e.g., In GA
7,24–5; 12,24–8; 37,22; 41,29–31; 42,25–7.
127 That the seed is derived from blood: e.g., In GA 5,1–3; 7,24–5; 12,24–5; 28,35–29,1;
31,34–32,2; 56,15–16. That the seed comes to be due to the heat in copulation: e.g.,
In GA 7,24–5. At times (In GA 36,11–19 and 132,17) Michael distinguishes between
σπέρμα and γονή such that the γονή refers to the male seed and the σπέρμα is the mix-
ture of the γονή plus menses. This is drawn from Aristotle GA 724b12–22, which some
editors take to be an interpolation. Cf. John of Alexandria (In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 132,2–4
and 158,2–3), who reverses this order and makes the σπέρμα the more complete entity.
128 That the female has no seed: e.g., In GA 33,15; 34,11; 48,27–8; 50,34–5; 52,17.
References to menses as ‘seminal’: e.g., 4,35; 178,9ff.; 192,2. Cf. Aristotle GA 728a26–7;
737a28–9; 750b4–5; 767b15–17; 771b21–3; 774a2–3.
129 For example 57,4–5 and 25; 58,19–20; 59,13–24; 69,8; 93,15–16.
130 In GA 58,20–5. At 63,30–4 he adds that this process is completed within a day in
bloodless animals.
131 In GA 63,30–34. Cf. In GA 36,11–19.
132 In GA 101,11–13.
133 For example In GA 78,16–21; 80,18–27; 100,12–13; 101,22–4; 103,8–11; 106,20–2;
111,27; 112,8; 114,13–25; 115,28–30.
134 For example In GA 78,19–21; 101,22–4; 114,17–18.
135 For example In GA 80,26–7; 101,24–5; 106,20; 114,18–19; 115,28–30.
136 In GA 106,26–9.
137 Michael describes the sequence of creation in terms of necessity and suitability at
106,26 but in term of suitability and value at 114,22, where he includes ‘flesh and the
other organs of perception’ among the most valuable (114,29–31). After these come
the bones and the instruments (ὀργανικά), by which he appears to refer to the hands
and feet and such (115,26–7; cf. 114,24), and finally hair and nails and such (115,27–8).
Yet the eyes are apparently completed last of all (112,8), their full completion being
achieved only after birth (114,2–3).
138 Although Michael most often divides the sequence of creation into two sets of parts,
first the heart and then the rest, sometimes he distinguishes three sets of parts: the
heart, then the umbilical cord, and then the rest (e.g., 100,13–14; 101, 24–6; 103,8–11;
141,24–5; 171,8–9).
139 At In GA 111,32–5 Michael says that the brain is completed directly after the heart,
though presumably the umbilical cord is completed before the brain. See also note 137.
140 In GA 101,22–4; 111,27–8; 113,9–15; 223,11–17.
141 For example In GA 111,28–32 and 229,16–230,32.
142 At 189,30 (cf. 27,7–8) the Platonic view of these three organs might be creeping into
Michael’s account, and cf. Michael’s Platonic interpretation at 245,30–6 of Aristotle’s
τινες at GA 788a10.
143 See In GA 59,17–19; 73,13–34; 77,9–14; 78,1–4 and 14–15; and 80,21–3.
144 In GA 59,19; 73,19–34; 77,9–10; 78,1–4 and 14–15; 80,21–3. Cf. 150,20–2. Aristotle
prefers to speak of δυνάμεις or κινήσεις corresponding to the parts being present in
the seed (cf. GA 4.3).
145 See In GA 73,18–26. Cf., e.g., Plotinus 3.2.2.18–31 and 5.9.6.9–13.
146 See In GA 73,30–4; 77,9–14; 78,11–15; and 80,21–3. Cf. his frequent description of
the seed as the cause of motion: 46,1; 58,19; 59,18; 77,13–14; 87,24–5; 88,8–11; etc.
Note also that this same account of the seed can be found in Ps.–Alexander In Meta.
501,1–10, which provides some further evidence for Michael’s authorship of the com-
mentary on the later books.
147 In GA 79,29–80,6; 87,4–5. Cf. 73,30–4.

148 Cf. In GA 78,14–15.
149 In GA 79,29–32; 84,2–3; 100,22–7.
150 For example In GA 100,25–9.
151 In GA 83,15–16. Cf. 73,28–30; 101,23–4.
152 For example In GA 78,19–26; 100,15–34 and 101,22–4. At times Michael suggests the
vegetative soul is present as soon as the male seed encounters the menses, e.g., In GA
79,28–32.
153 In GA 83,36–85,2. Michael’s curious argument against sensation in the womb is that
there are no objects of sensation in the womb. This claim needs some spelling out, to
say the least. But cf. 214,11–215,16 where Michael appears to distinguish between an
earlier stage in the embryogenesis in which the embryo merely has the psychological
status of a plant, and a later stage in which the embryo ‘has received sensation’ but is still
inactive because it is asleep. Michael does acknowledge that intellect comes in from the
outside (In GA 84,28; 85,30–1; 87,11), though he does not adequately integrate this
into his account of the rational soul’s coming to be.
154 Homuncular preformationism is ruled out in this passage by Michael’s claim that these
parts ‘are put together’ (σύνθεσιν λαβόντα) in the womb. This also is made clear in the
next passage.
155 I translate καὶ πάλιν διακρίναντες here as ‘and then again separating them’ because I
suspect that Michael might be interpreting this passage in light of Aristotle’s remarks on
the πανσπερμία theory of reproduction (GA 769a26–b3). If so, the διακρίναντες would
be picking up on what Aristotle describes as taking a sampling from the panspermatic
mixture. See In GA 184,6–16, where Michael substitutes ‘bringing in’ (εἰσήγαγε) for
Aristotle’s ‘mixing’ (κεράσειε) and ‘separating’ (τῇ διακρίσει, cf. χωρίζειν) for his ‘taking’
(λαμβάνειν). This change in vocabulary would be easily explained if he is linking this
doctrine to Plato’s account of the mechanics of reproduction in Tim. 91d, where the
union of the male and the female is described in terms of συναγειν and διακρίνειν.Yet
two caveats should be noted here. Michael does not explicitly connect the πανσπερμία
theory to Plato, and (somewhat surprisingly given what Michael says in In GA 25,20–
31), he claims that Plato is only discussing the male seed here. Cf. also the ‘sehr gezwun-
gene’ interpretation of Tim. 91d that Praechter cautiously attributes to Michael (1928:
29n23), which I take to be somewhat different from the interpretation suggested above.
Praechter, as I understand him, is suggesting that Michael advanced homuncular pre-
formationism and that he understood Plato’s πάλιν διακρίναντες (Tim. 91d3) to mean
that whole organisms are being broken up again into their organs. It should, however,
be clear by now that Michael’s Plato is not a homuncular preformationist.
156 Michael’s text does not contain any significant divergences from Plato’s text, but the
translation here is different from the one above (Chapter 1, pp. 16–17) in order better
to reflect Michael’s interpretation of the text.
157 This passage is not discussed by Praechter (1906 or 1928), nor by Balss (1923) or
Wellmann (1929).
158 Praechter (1928: 27) ‘eine biologische Theorie, die in dessen Werken keinen
Anhaltspunkt hat.’
159 This is particularly the case when Aristotle refers to anonymous opponents with phrases
such as φασί τινες and οἴονταί τινεϛ, and as Praechter points out (1928: 28), Michael is
right about Aristotle often using such expressions when he criticizes Plato (cf. Bonitz
(1870: 598a9ff.), even if he does take it too far.
160 Praechter points specifically to the instance at 721b11. However, when Michael first
introduces his reading of Plato’s embryology in In GA 25,20–31 within his discussion
of GA 722b3–30, it seems fairly clear that what is prompting this discussion of Plato is
not an indefinite pronoun – there are no indefinite pronouns in this section – but one
horn of a specific dilemma with which Aristotle confronts the vital anhomoiomerous
pangenesis theorists: either these parts are disconnected, in which case it is not clear
how they will be alive, or else they are already in a continuous state, in which case they
are already a ‘small living thing’ (GA 722b3–4: ζῷον μικρόν). Michael reasonably – and
perhaps even correctly – sees this mention of a ζῷον μικρόν as reference to Plato’s ζῷα
ἀόρατα ὑπὸ σμικρότητοϛ.
161 Praechter (1928: 27–8).
162 See note 161.
163 Michael’s remarks after the first Tim. passage (In GA 33,24–7) are nearly identical to
Porphyry AG 8.2 (44,15–17), though his remarks after the second and third passages are
his own. Cf. Dorandi (2008: 131).
164 See In GA 76,7–14; 166,5–7 (and 166,19–167,32 in which he spells out how the
formula applies to Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus); 171,26–8; 172,11–14;
183,25–7.
165 See Chapter 1, pp. 20–1.
166 On this invocation of nature, cf. also In GA 184,6–16.
167 GA 721b10–11 and 724a7–13.
168 See Genit. 1.2–3 (44,10–45,10 (7.470–72 L.)).
169 See Lonie (1981: 102–3 and 111) and Lesky (1951: 1240–1), who describes the author
as aiming at a Verschmelzung of the two theories: ‘Dem Rückenmark teilt der Verfasser
hierbei gleichsam die Funktion einer zentralen Depot- und Verteilungsstelle des
Samens zu, nach der hin und von der aus die Elemente des Flüssigen, die ja nach dieser
Anschauung Träger des Keimgutes sind, im ganzen Körperbereiche strömen’ (1241).
4
THE FORMATION AND ANIMATION
OF THE EMBRYO
In Chapter 3 it was argued that a group of core Neoplatonists shared a common

embryological theory, and the focus of this theory was placed on metaphysical and
etiological questions surrounding the generation and origin of the seed and its
transformation into an embryo. In this chapter we shall be examining a couple of
issues concerning the subsequent development of the embryo, namely the forma-
tion of its parts and its animation. Although these two issues might seem unrelated,
in ancient embryology there were in fact close ties between theories of animation
and theories of formation. But this is not the only reason these two topics have
been reserved for special treatment in this chapter. In contrast to the core theory,
there is no overwhelming consensus among Neoplatonists on these two issues. As
far as the embryo’s formation is concerned, this may well simply be due to a lack
of interest on their part in working out the details of the sequence of formation,
but in the case of the embryo’s animation it is possible to detect a significant point
of disagreement among Neoplatonists on the time and manner of the embryo’s
animation.
The Order of the Embryo’s Formation

What is possibly most striking about the Neoplatonists on the formation of the
embryo is just how little interest they show in the matter.The determination of sex,
for example, must be counted among the fundamental issues of ancient embryo-
genesis, but to my knowledge it is not discussed at all by our core authors, and
the same could almost be said for the mechanics of family resemblance.1 I would
suggest that we understand these omissions as indications of the project they saw
themselves engaging in. Their primary interest lay in the philosophy of biology,
and their main concern was to establish a framework that could account for the
130 The formation and animation of the embryo
realization of intelligible forms in the sensible biological world. This they achieved
with the core theory, and they might well have thought that there is no further
metaphysical payout in working out the details of the embryo’s formation, which
could then comfortably be left to the medical specialists.
Even so, questions concerning the order of the formation of the embryo’s parts
have traditionally been strongly tied to questions pertaining to the embryo’s ani-
mation and more generally to the seat(s) of the soul in the organic body, and this
should raise our expectations for at least some limited, psychology-based treatment
of formation. This is not the place for an exhaustive doxography on the order of
the embryo’s formation, but a brief look at several major theories on the order of
the body’s formation would help illustrate this connection to psychological theory.
For Aristotle the heart is the primary seat of the mortal soul,2 and this leads him
to posit the heart as the first part of the embryo to be formed.3 Once the heart has
been formed, the potential vegetative soul contained in the male seed is transferred
to the heart and achieves a state of actuality in it, and it then takes over the process
of formation. Thus, the heart for Aristotle is the ‘first principle from which also the
subsequent ordering of the animal’s body is derived’ (Aristotle On the Generation
of Animals 740a7–9, Peck translation). Similar connections between the order of
formation of the body and the location(s) of the soul were made by subsequent
philosophers. The Stoics, for example, also maintained that the soul is located in
the heart, and so they too have the heart coming to be first.4 Galen later criticized
the Peripatetic and Stoic order of formation,5 but the order that he himself pro-
poses is likewise unmistakably the product of his own Platonic views on the seats
of the soul. Thus, on his view, it is the liver that is first formed, since this is the
seat of the lowest order of soul, the appetitive soul, which Galen identifies with
the Aristotelian vegetative soul and Stoic nature, and only then are the heart and
subsequently the brain formed.6 This is not to say that empirical observation has
no role to play in his argumentation, but Galen’s observations on this matter have
clearly been influenced by his psychology.7 Given these connections, and in light of
the fact that Neoplatonists generally adopted Galen’s understanding of the seats of
the three parts of the soul being in the liver, heart, and brain, it would certainly be
reasonable to expect the Neoplatonists to follow Galen in pointing to the liver as
the first-formed organ, yet this expectation is disappointed.
Let us begin once again by considering Porphyry’s remarks in the Ad Gaurum.
The most detailed account of formation that he provides is focused narrowly on
the earliest stage of the process:
Indeed, both in plants and in the vegetative womb the administration is

nearly the same: the power in the seed immediately puts a membranaceous
shell around its exterior, as Hippocrates says8 – just as in the case of fruiting
shoots it completes the flower and the pod – and this becomes the chorion,
and this power draws out a thin tube, like an intestinal tube, from the middle,
in the manner of a root or a stalk, and the embryo, hanging from and rooted
by this, draws breath and most of all supplies itself with nourishment from it.
The formation and animation of the embryo 131
This tube they call the umbilical cord, and from the spherical circumvolution
of the seed in length and breadth [this power] stirs up another external mem-
brane, which becomes for the thing being formed its defense against exterior
[dangers], and in the remaining time up until [the embryo] goes forth [from
the womb] [this power] forms all the interior parts and makes them solid. At
least, if a premature [embryo] is drawn out of the womb by force, even if it
is nearing the time of parturition, one will discover that its insides are dis-
soluble and not firm, although the shape is present and the exterior shell has
been manufactured.
(Porphyry Ad Gaurum 10.3 (46,14–47,5))
The description of the initial formation appears roughly to follow the account
given in the Hippocratic On the Nature of the Child, where the umbilical cord and
membranes are said to be the first items formed,9 but after this initial sequential
formation Porphyry decidedly refrains from naming any one organ as the first
formed.10 On the contrary, he lays great emphasis on the fact that none of the
parts are complete until birth.11 Yet, in light of Porphyry’s clear allegiance to the
Galenic localization of the three Platonic parts of the soul, it might seem prima
facie surprising that he does not follow Galen in allowing the liver to be formed
very early in the embryogenesis in order to serve as the seat of the vegetative soul
that is responsible for the rest of the embryo’s formation. Instead, Porphyry rejects
this view in no uncertain terms, and his reasons for doing so derive from his own
views on animation:
Plato, too, is of this opinion when he divides the soul and assigns the control
centre to the head, the spirited part to the heart, and the appetitive part to the
liver. And how can there be a place for the soul to enter where there is not
yet any head or heart or liver?
(Porphyry Ad Gaurum 13.6 (53,7–10))
Porphyry’s arguments for the concurrent formation of all organs are closely tied to
his understanding of the nature and origin of the soul, which will be examined in
greater detail in the following section on animation. For now let us simply observe
that he appears to be articulating a view well outside of the traditional preforma-
tionism–epigenesis dichotomy.12 Porphyry is certainly no preformationist since he
subscribes to the core theory, according to which no actual parts of the embryo are
contained in the seed but only potential form-principles corresponding to these
parts. But insofar as he does not hold that the parts are formed in succession, neither
is he advocating the traditional form of epigenesis. (Only the umbilical cord and
the two membranes are said to be formed in succession, and Porphyry probably did
not view them as genuine parts of the offspring.) Rather, he advances the view that
all parts are generated and completed concurrently, though incrementally, over the
entire course of gestation.
On the whole, subsequent Platonists have even less to say about the order of
formation. Most frequently one finds very brief, quasi-Hippocratic accounts of the
initial formation of the seed into blood and flesh, followed by a vague reference to
the formation into a human body.13 Later accounts also tend to pass over the ques-
tion of whether the three fundamental organs have any degree of priority in the
process of generation.
Given this general lack of interest, it is striking that the most extensive discussion
of the order of formation by a Platonist of this period – that by John of Alexandria,

the iatrosophist introduced in the Appendix to Chapter 3 – also advances a thesis of
simultaneous formation. Like Porphyry he focuses on whether all the parts come
to be at the same time or not, without even mentioning the first-organ question.
John classifies the opinions on this matter into three broad groups: (i) the parts of
the body neither begin to be formed nor complete their formation simultane-
ously; (ii) they do not begin to be formed simultaneously, but they are completed
simultaneously; and (iii) there is a simultaneous beginning, but the parts are com-
pleted at different times (Commentary on Hippocrates’ On the Nature of the Child
158,22–6). Notably absent from this classification is the fourth logical possibility,
namely that (iv) the parts both begin to be formed and complete their formation
simultaneously, perhaps because John is not aware of anyone who advanced this
view, though it would seem to be at least a possible interpretation of Porphyry’s
view in the Ad Gaurum. Be that as it may, John himself subscribes to (iii) (160,3–4),
and he supports his view by first presenting a theoretical argument against a non-
simultaneous beginning of formation, and then offering an empirical argument
for a non-simultaneous completion. The former argument is rather interesting and
could easily have been a familiar argument in Platonic circles: if the formative
power, suitable matter and a suitable instrument (heat) are all present, there is no
good reason for one part to begin being formed before any other (158,34–40).14
John’s commitment to (iii) is all the more remarkable given the details of his source
text, since, as he acknowledges, On the Nature of the Child appears to advance the
view that the commencement of the formation of the embryo’s parts is sequential,
with flesh being formed first (158,26–9).15 So this would seem to be a case where
John’s understanding of Hippocrates has been strongly influenced by philosophi-
cal considerations. As a result, John is led to a somewhat forced interpretation of
his source text, and he tries to resolve the tension by arguing that the ‘flesh’ that
is said to be formed first must be understood to refer to an amalgam of different
parts (158,5–6 and 30–2), and by explaining away other would-be references to
a sequential commencement of formation as a didactic tool on Hippocrates’ part
(162,1–6).16 Even when he turns to argue for a sequential completion of the parts,
he makes no attempt to bring in any consideration about the seats of the soul’s
parts. He simply delivers an argument by empirical analogy: nature’s formation is
likened to cooking a stew, with different ingredients put in the pot at the same time
requiring different lengths of time depending on their various constitutions to be
fully cooked (158,40–160,2). In fact, he distinctly restricts his thesis to the claim that
the completion is sequential and insists that he has no idea which parts are finished
prior to others, since this would involve understanding the skopos of nature, which
he says is beyond his ken (160,2–4 and cf. 164,39–40).17
The accounts of the embryo’s formation, then, found in these treatises, the two
longest embryological treatises written by Platonists in late antiquity, share some
common ground, but we cannot conclude that there was a shared theory of for-
mation. After all, even though John and Porphyry both advance some form of
concurrent formation, there are fundamental differences. For Porphyry the most
crucial point to be made about formation is that all the parts are completed simul-
taneously at birth, and precisely this is denied by John. Moreover, there is little
evidence for theories of simultaneous formation in other Neoplatonic authors, and
even some evidence of non-concurrent theories.18
The Animation of the Embryo

There was a general consensus among the Neoplatonists that the rational souls
descended into the body from the outside – that is, from a source other than the
parents’ souls – as soon as the body became a suitable receptacle, which was usually
held to be at birth.Yet, regarding the non-rational soul, there appear to have been
two competing timelines. According to one timeline, the animation is incremen-
tal or gradual: the embryo’s development proceeds sequentially through a series of
higher and higher states of life which encompass more and more non-rational pow-
ers.This timeline of animation requires an explanatory theory that can account for
different powers coming to be in the embryo at different times. One such theory,
as we shall see, held that the non-rational soul and its powers develop from form-
principles (logoi) contained in the seed. Let us call this the seminal theory. In its
traditional form, the seminal theory is an internal theory of animation; that is,
the non-rational soul is not being delivered to the embryo from some external
source but is already present in the seed in a potential state, and for this reason
it is compatible and often associated with incremental animation. The alterna-
tive was to say that all non-rational powers must be delivered to the embryo at
the same time, namely with the entry of the rational soul, and this was often
associated with a very different theory of animation, which I shall refer to as
the pneumatic body theory of animation. This is an external theory of animation,
which is to say that the non-rational soul is not derived from the parents and is
not contained in the seed (not even in a potential manner) but is delivered to
the embryo from an external source. More precisely, according to this theory
the non-rational soul and its powers are acquired by the rational soul prior to its
entering the body of the embryo; as it descends through the heavens, it obtains
a pneumatic body in which the non-rational powers are supposed to reside. In
contrast to the seminal theory, the pneumatic body theory is not even compatible
with incremental animation.
My aim in what follows is to explore each of these theories and timelines in
greater depth. I shall argue that Porphyry advanced a consistent account of the
non-rational soul, insofar as he rejected the seminal theory and accepted the pneu-
matic body theory and its timeline. Yet this consistency was lost in the following
generations, as an incrementalist account of animation became increasingly popular.
As we shall see, it was John Philoponus who pointed out the tension between the
incremental seminal theory and the pneumatic body theory. In order to better
accommodate incremental animation, Philoponus actually succeeds in rehabilitat-
ing the seminal theory in such a way as to make it compatible with Neoplatonic
metaphysics, though he appears to stop short of fully committing to it.

Let us begin our examination of Neoplatonic theories of animation with
Porphyry, since the positions he takes on the seminal theory, the pneumatic body
theory, and the timeline of animation all come together in a consistent account.We
will return to the timeline and pneumatic body theory below once we have suffi-
ciently understood the reasoning behind Porphyry’s rejection of the seminal theory.
Porphyry’s primary aim in the Ad Gaurum is to show that the so-called ‘self-
moving soul’ (ἡ αὐτοκίνητος ψυχή) enters only at birth. As he emphasizes, the
self-moving soul is what is responsible for making the embryo into an animal
(ζῷον), and since the defining features of animality are sensation and impulse, he
is committed to showing that both the rational and the non-rational soul enter
only at birth.19 This is closely tied to a second aim concerning the origin of this
soul, namely that it must descend from outside and that no part of it is transmit-
ted by the parents. The second aim actually follows from the first, since the first is
meant to exclude both the case of the soul’s being actually present and active in the
embryo and that of the soul’s merely being present in a potential manner without
engaging in any activity. Porphyry is willing to allow that the soul is potentially
present to the embryo only in the very minimal sense that the body of the embryo
is the kind of thing that will ultimately be able to receive a soul when it is suf-
ficiently developed and is thus comparable to a young boy’s potentially possessing
the knowledge of how to read and write, not because it is already inherent in him
but because he is the kind of living thing that can learn and so receive it from out-
side (Ad Gaurum 1.1–4 (33,1–34,10)). If the soul, then, comes to be present only at
birth, it cannot have been transmitted by the parents. As a result, much of the argu-
mentation in the Ad Gaurum is focused on establishing the first aim. Porphyry’s
arguments extend over the entire treatise and are at times somewhat dialectical,20
but the essence of his argumentation may be distilled into a three-part strategy:
presenting empirical arguments based on the behavior of the embryo, textual refer-
ences to the Platonic corpus, and above all theoretical considerations concerning
the creation of body and its relation to soul. Each of these lines of argument will
be explored in turn below.
The theoretical line of argument may be analyzed into two strategic components.
The first amounts to a categorical rejection of the seminal theory of animation,
according to which the soul originates from the seed and is thus already present at
least in some potential sense at emission. It would follow from this argument that
the soul must derive from some external origin. The second then aims to establish
that a soul arriving from an external source could only arrive at birth.
Porphyry’s rejection of the seminal theory comes in the form of an attack on the
Stoics, since he understood the Stoics to be advocating the seminal theory:
Yes, they say, but just as the seed has the form-principle for teeth which
[the offspring] develops after its delivery, and similarly for beards and seed
and menses, so too are there form-principles of impulse, representation, and
sensation in [the seed], though their development [takes place] only after
birth. It is obvious that those who say these things do not produce anything
compelling based on clear evidence but rather conjectures and probabilities
based on their belief that unless [these form-principles] were present in [the
seed], [these features] would not subsequently arise. But their ambition blinds
them to the fact that they are making the soul seminal and proclaiming the
vegetative [power] better than the self-moving soul. These are the ignorant
views of the Stoics who have turned things upside-down and dared to gen-
erate the better from the worse: they grant being and substance to all things
from matter, and they make nature the offspring of tenor [ἕξις], and the soul
responsible for sensation and impulse the offspring of nature, and again the
rational [soul] the offspring of these, and intellect the offspring of the rea-
soning [soul]. While they generate everything from the bottom up through
different kinds of and accumulations of motions, one ought to proceed from
the top down and advance from the better to the lesser, because every gen-
erator is by its own substance naturally disposed to generate something worse
than itself and not something better [PIP]. And for this reason the vegeta-
tive [power] in us generated something worse than itself, the seed, since it
lacks actual movement. As a supplement, it receives the movement from the
nature in the mother and from its environment, since in all things the actual
precedes the potential [PAP]. But if there are principles of representation and
impulse in the seed and if nature is what then advances these form-principles
to actuality, then the air that meets [the newborn] at the moment of delivery
will, as Chrysippus thinks, be the nature that, having been put in motion,
transformed [nature] into soul. And no account could be more materialist
[ἀψυχότερος] than this one, because it is godless and dares to produce the
better from the worse.
(Porphyry Ad Gaurum 14.1–4 (53,28–54,20))
The Stoics might initially seem to be a surprising target for Porphyry’s attack, since
their embryology bears at least some resemblance to his own. Not only do they, too,
understand the seed to be a collection of form-principles,21 but they even agree with
Porphyry that the offspring remains in a vegetative state until birth, at which point
it advances to a psychological state capable of sensation and impulse.22 Yet Porphyry
is objecting to the manner in which the Stoics, as he understands them, account for
the offspring’s animation. For on his understanding of the Stoic account, it violates
both PIP and PAP. The general problem regarding PIP is how the vegetative soul,
which is responsible for the production of the seed,23 could generate something
better than itself, namely the sensitive soul. Porphyry has the Stoics answering that
this is possible because form-principles of the sensitive soul’s powers are present
in the seed, which is a significant departure from the Neoplatonic theory of seed
examined above, according to which there are form-principles corresponding only
to parts of the body. But Porphyry can fairly object that this does not solve the
problem. For if creation boils down to an agent producing an (inferior) image of
itself, how could the vegetative soul produce form-principles of powers, namely
sensation and impulse, which it does not itself possess?24 Moreover, even if it were
to be conceded that such form-principles of higher powers of soul could some-
how come to be in the seed, the theory still runs afoul of PAP. According to PAP,
such form-principles would first be in a state of potentiality, and their actualization
would require an agent possessing these principles in actuality. But according to a
widely reported Stoic view – a view that Porphyry also cites here – it is the cold
air that the offspring encounters at birth that is responsible for changing this nature
into an animal soul, but Porphyry rejects this view on the grounds that cold air is
hardly in actual possession of sensation and impulse.25
If the above establishes that the soul cannot be transmitted from the parents, it
must be that the soul enters into the offspring from an external source, and this is
where the pneumatic body theory of animation comes in. The pneumatic body
theory holds that the individual rational soul, as it descends from the intelligible
region through the celestial spheres, acquires a pneumatic body and with it the
non-rational soul en route. This theory has been confined to the background of the
Ad Gaurum, but there is ample evidence in other surviving texts that Porphyry had
subscribed to some version of this theory.26 This is not the place for an in-depth
examination of the many questions and problems surrounding the pneumatic body
theory,27 but in the context of our current concerns two points deserve special
mention. First, unlike the seminal theory, the pneumatic body theory does not
violate PIP or PAP: the non-rational powers of soul are simply delivered to the
pneumatic body from an external source that actually possesses these powers.28
Second, since the non-rational soul is added to the rational soul during its descent,
it cannot be present in the embryo before the rational soul. Incremental animation
is ruled out. Rather, the animation of the offspring must occur all at once.
It remains, then, to show that this entry can take place only at birth, and Porphyry’s
argument proceeds from his account of the conditions of the soul’s presence in the
body: an individual soul is present in an individual body if and only if the body is
a suitable receptacle for that soul. Let us refer to this as the suitability principle.29
The strongest motivation that Porphyry provides for the suitability principle is
rooted in the teleological principle that neither nature nor God does anything in
vain (Ad Gaurum 13.6 (53,11–17)). For a human body is a suitable receptacle for
the self-moving soul precisely when it can serve as a proper instrument of the soul’s
activities. Thus, if one were to reject this principle and insist that the soul is present
prior to the body’s having become a suitable receptacle, one would to some extent
be calling the teleological administration of the universe into question. Porphyry
then spells out this notion of suitability in physiological terms: no power of soul is
present – again, not even potentially present – until its corresponding organ is com-
pleted, e.g. the power of sight is not present in an eye that is not yet able to serve as
an instrument of sight. The importance that the perfected physiological state of the
organs bears for the soul’s presence can be inferred from the major psychological
and functional problems that result from even minor physiological imperfections,
e.g. the fluid constituting a cataract in the eye severely diminishes sight, and bile
in the brain can dramatically affect one’s representations (15.5 (55,25–9)). In these
examples the soul-powers are still present to some extent because these imperfec-
tions have not affected the underlying physiological harmony of the organ, but
once the flaws are serious enough to destroy this harmony, the power is completely
gone and not even potentially present (16.7 (57,29–58,7)).
The success of Porphyry’s argument, then, ultimately rests on his ability to estab-
lish that the totality of the body’s organs simultaneously becomes functional at
birth, and it is at this point that his argument appears most vulnerable. For support
he offers an analogy to fruit: just as fruit falls from the tree when it is ripe, i.e. fully
formed, so too is the offspring’s complete formation coupled with its birth (13.4
(52,31–53,2)).Yet it might still be objected that, even if we grant that this intuition
provides some support for the claim that the body as a whole is not completed
until birth, it cannot all by itself entirely account for his view that all of the parts are
completed simultaneously, nor by extension can it entirely justify his claim that all
of the parts or powers of the self-moving soul come to be present in the offspring
at the same time.
Consider again Galen’s alternative view: first the liver is formed so that it might
serve as the seat of the vegetative soul, which is the first part of soul to be present
in the offspring, and then the heart and finally the brain are formed, since the other
parts of soul are present only later.The argument above has established only that the
totality of all the body’s organs is complete at birth, but not that no individual organ,
e.g. the liver, is complete sometime before birth.Yet Porphyry does have other rea-
sons for rejecting Galen’s view. Galen and Porphyry relate the vegetative soul to the
Platonic tripartite soul in very different ways. Whereas Galen seeks to square the
Platonic and Aristotelian divisions of the soul by simply identifying the vegetative
and the appetitive parts,30 Porphyry draws a sharp line between the vegetative and
the appetitive soul. He counts the appetitive soul as part of the descending soul; it is
an aspect of the non-rational soul acquired in the heavens during the rational soul’s
descent into the body.31 By contrast, the vegetative soul, which is distinct from and
inferior to the non-rational soul,32 alone does not come from outside. Rather, it is
already present in the embryo once the vegetative power in the male seed has been
actualized by the self-moving soul of the female.33 This, then, is what explains the
different views taken by Galen and Porphyry on the timeframe of the liver’s forma-
tion. Although Galen and Porphyry agree that the liver is the seat of the appetitive
soul, Galen identifies the appetitive with the vegetative soul and thus needs the
liver to be completed early on to serve as its seat. For Porphyry, the liver is the seat
of a power that, by virtue of the pneumatic body theory of animation, cannot be
present until birth.
Porphyry further maintains that his views on the timeline of animation and
formation are corroborated, or at least cannot be refuted, by ‘the evidence of the
facts’ (τῶν συμβαινόντων τὴν ἐνάργειαν) (3.5 (37,19–20)). His primary empirical
argument concerns the similarities in the manner of administration of embryos and
plants, which he believes provide good reason for inferring that only the vegetative
power of soul is present to the former just as it is to the latter. Just as plants are nour-
ished via their roots, embryos are nourished not by their mouths as proper animals
are but via the umbilical cord, and just as plants receive air only through their pith,
so too do embryos receive air again via the umbilical cord and not by breathing
through their noses (3.1–5 (36,11–37,26); cf. 12.4 (51,4–5)). This mode of argu-
ment, however, remains contentious insofar as the ‘evidence’ to which Porphyry
appeals, namely that the embryo breathes and receives nourishment only through
the umbilical cord, was in fact a subject of some disagreement in ancient and late
ancient embryology.34 Indeed, one might perhaps be justified in inferring from the
fact that Porphyry gives no indication that he was aware of this disagreement that
he was not familiar with much of the literature on the topic. Be that as it may, he
does show himself to be aware of several observations on the basis of which others
apparently argued that the embryo is a ζῷoν endowed with faculties of motion,
sensation, and desire: in the baths they appear to move in response to the heat (5.1
(41,5–7)); the strange cravings that mothers experience during pregnancy could
also be taken to indicate that it is the embryo itself that is craving something, espe-
cially since the offspring appears to suffer some form of branding if these cravings
are not satisfied (5.1–2 (41,7–13)); and finally the fact that stillborn deliveries are
more painful would suggest that the embryos are helping to deliver themselves and
therefore actively in motion (5.3 (41,13–18)).Yet these observations, in Porphyry’s
view, hardly amount to compelling evidence. For not only are there all sorts of
motions that are caused by the vegetative soul alone (7.1–3 (43,12–44,3)), but the
womb may also be the cause of many movements and cravings, since, as Plato said,
it is an independent animal within the female body (8.1–4 (44,4–45,4)).
Finally, Porphyry also takes pains to show that his timeline of animation is in
full agreement with Plato. This is no easy task, and he acknowledges that other
Platonists maintain that the descended soul enters as early as conception.35 His argu-
ment focuses on three main passages36 that in his view were misunderstood by some
of his Platonic predecessors. The first concerns Plato’s description of insemination
at Timaeus 91d2–3 as ‘sowing animals (ζῷα) unformed and too small to be seen,’
which Porphyry deals with by insisting that the fact that these ζῷα are ‘unformed’
(ἀδιάπλαστα) shows that Plato cannot really be thinking of them as animals (9.2
(45,10–21)).37 The second is Socrates’ remark at Phaedrus 248d2–4 about the soul of
the man who has had the most sublime vision during his flight through the heav-
ens going into the γονή of a philosophical man,38 and here Porphyry fairly points
out that the term γονή need not be understood in the sense of ‘seed,’ since it may
also have the sense of ‘generation’ (9.4 (45,29–46,6)). Somewhat more difficult to
deal with is Plato’s account of plants in Timaeus 76e–77c. For here plants are called
ζῷα and said to partake of the appetitive soul and have sensations of pleasure and
pain, which should mean that the same holds of embryos, too, given Porphyry’s
view that they are alive in a sense analogous to plants. A detailed examination of
this passage and its subsequent reception would take us too far off course,39 but for
present purposes Porphyry’s response might be summarized by saying that in his
view Plato makes very clear not only that plants are ζῷα only in the minimal sense
of having life (ζῆν), but also that he is using the term ‘sensation’ homonymously of
plants, so that there is no need to blur the line between plants and animals (4.1–11
(37,27–41,4)). Thus, for Porphyry Plato’s remarks on plants are far from implying
that embryos are ζῷα in the relevant sense, and this is confirmed for him by Plato’s
description of the generated gods introducing the soul to the body only after the
latter has been created (9.5 (46,6–11) with Plato Timaeus 42e8–43a6).
We may, therefore, summarize Porphyry’s position on the animation of the
embryo by saying that while there might well be some vulnerable points in his
argumentation, on the whole he offers a coherent and internally consistent account
of animation. He rejects the seminal theory of animation because it violates PIP and
PAP and instead advocates the pneumatic body theory of animation. This commits
him to having the non-rational powers of soul enter the embryo simultaneously with
the descending rational soul, and he openly embraces this timeline of animation.
When we look to the Neoplatonists after Porphyry, we see some tensions start-
ing to emerge in their views on animation. Here we shall be taking Iamblichus
and Proclus as illustrative of these tensions, beginning with Iamblichus. As we have
already seen in Chapter 3, Iamblichus subscribes to the core theory and the principles
PIP and PAP, and so we should not be surprised that he rejects the seminal theory
of animation in favor of the pneumatic body theory of animation. Like Porphyry,
Iamblichus holds that the rational soul acquires the non-rational powers during its
descent through the heavens,40 with the timeline of animation being a function of
the body’s suitability, but consider this fragment of his now lost treatise On the Soul,
in which he presents several views on the manner and time of animation:
According to Hippocrates the Asclepiad, life is actually created and the soul
becomes present when the seed is formed into an embryo (for then it is suit-
ably disposed to share in life);41 while according to Porphyry it is as soon as
the child is born.42 Some other opinion might arise, not expressed as yet, that
there are very many powers and essential properties [τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς
oὐσίας] of the soul and that at critical moments, in different ways at different
times, when the body that is coming into being is suited to do so, it partakes
first of the vegetative life [τῆς φύσεως], then of sensation, then of the appeti-
tive life [τῆς ὁρμητικῆς ζωῆς], and then of the rational soul, and lastly of the
intellectual soul.These are the many opinions concerning the times at which
the soul becomes associated in a natural union with the body.
(Iamblichus On the Soul §31, Finamore and Dillon translation)
With this suggestion of successive animation, Iamblichus is generally held to

be presenting his own view on the matter.43 His brevity leaves many questions
unanswered, for example regarding the exact moment of each stage of animation
(though there is good reason to believe that Iamblichus thought the rational soul
entered at birth),44 but the main question we are left with is how this gradualist
account of animation is supposed to be compatible with his pneumatic body theory
of animation, which should commit Iamblichus to having all the non-rational pow-
ers appear in the body at the same time as the rational soul.
In Proclus we can find hints of this same tension again, even though for the most
part he appears to stay closer to the Ad Gaurum’s account of formation and anima-
tion, with most of the relevant material being found in his commentary on Plato’s
Timaeus. (Unfortunately only his commentary on Timaeus17a–44d has survived,
so we do not have the advantage of examining Proclus’ exposition on the central
embryological passages towards the end of the dialogue.) Here again, it should first
be recalled that Proclus is committed to the core theory and PIP and PAP, and we
may now add that Proclus also subscribes to the pneumatic body theory of anima-
tion. He agrees with Porphyry that the pneumatic body that serves as the vehicle
of the non-rational soul accumulates in layers as the rational soul descends through
the celestial spheres, and with this accumulation the rational soul also acquires the
corresponding non-rational powers of soul,45 which then enter the offspring’s body
when it becomes a suitable receptacle.46 All of this would suggest that he agrees
with Porphyry’s view that the non-rational soul enters the offspring simultane-
ously with the rational soul. In fact, we can even find him agreeing with Porphyry’s
reasoning about the moment of the rational soul’s entry: it must be at the moment
of complete formation, he says, and this must be at birth, since otherwise the com-
pleted offspring would remain in the womb in vain,47 and he underlines that this
animation really does take place in a moment.48
Proclus even gives us some reason to believe that his teacher, Syrianus, held the
same view on the moment of animation. This comes in connection with his com-
ments on Timaeus 18d7–e3, where Socrates reminds his audience that the rulers in
their constructed city arrange marriages in such a way as to produce the best pos-
sible offspring. Here Proclus reports Longinus’ opinion that Plato thought the soul
entered the offspring together with the seed, which is to say that Longinus is not just
at odds with Porphyry on the moment of animation, but also on the soul’s origin: he
is advocating a form of traducianism.49 He then reports that Porphyry had rejected
this view, but that his arguments were somehow lacking.50 To be clear, Proclus has
no reservations about the force of Porphyry’s arguments for placing the moment of
animation at birth. As we saw above, these arguments rested mainly on two points,
that only the completed body is a suitable receptacle for the soul, and that the body
is completed only at birth. Proclus agrees with these points and employs a similar
line of argument himself. His criticism is rather that Porphyry failed to address the
worry that led Longinus to this erroneous view in the first place, which I believe
amounts to the following. Since Plato in the Republic maintains that the best guard-
ians can be generated by strategic coupling,51 and he further believes that the best
guardians are determined by the features of their souls and not of their bodies,52 he
must believe that the souls of the offspring are derived from their parents. According
to Proclus, then, what is missing from Porphyry’s account is an explanation of how,

if the soul is not coming from the parents, this eugenic program can nevertheless
produce people with good souls. Proclus is happy to report, however, that this miss-
ing piece has already been supplied by his teacher Syrianus, who simply pointed out
that the doctrine of suitability can take care of this problem: parents with good souls
will have bodies suited to their souls, so even if they do not directly transmit a soul,
their union will produce a body similar to their own bodies which in turn will be a
suitable receptacle for a good soul (which will be supplied from outside at birth).53
But if all of this is reminiscent of the Ad Gaurum’s account of animation, some of
Proclus’ comments come very close to suggesting a much more sequential account.
Take, for example, Proclus’ comments on Timaeus 42e–43a, where Plato describes
how the generated gods created mortal bodies and then placed souls in them. Here
one has the distinct impression that Proclus is envisioning the vehicle of the non-
rational soul, and with it the non-rational soul itself, as being put together in the
embryogenesis. When Proclus comes to Plato’s remark that the gods ‘bound the
revolutions of the immortal soul into a body that is ebbing and flowing’ (Timaeus
43a4–6), he registers this passage as additional support for his thesis that the rational
soul enters only at birth, but in doing so he says that the non-rational soul is already
present when the rational soul arrives:
After the many dissimilar parts have been unified [into a single body] the
soul is present: first, generally, the mortal soul (for it is on account of this soul
that the body is ‘flowing,’ on account of its vegetative, its sensitive, and its
desiderative life), and second, the immortal soul (for this is not simply bound
to a body but to a body that is ‘ebbing and flowing’). And the former soul is
generated with the body, while the latter is bound to the body.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 3.321,25–31)54
So on Proclus’ reading, the rational soul descends to a body that is already ‘ebbing
and flowing’ in the sense that it is already endowed with non-rational powers of
soul – powers that are generated with the body. How these powers are supposed to
be accounted for without violating PIP and PAP, and how more generally Proclus
thought this account of incremental animation is compatible with the pneumatic
body theory of animation, is left unresolved.
It is only in the commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul by John Philoponus that
this conflict between the pneumatic body theory and incremental animation is artic-
ulated and confronted.There are, of course, well-known difficulties in attributing the
views expressed in the commentary to Philoponus himself, as it is an earlier work
based on the lectures by his teacher, Ammonius.55 The difficulties become still more
formidable on this particular issue since the commentary appears to contain gestures
at a solution to the problem that are not necessarily compatible. In fact, the com-
mentary even seems to offer two incompatible theories on the manner of animation.
To begin with, like Porphyry and Proclus, Philoponus subscribes to the pneumatic
body theory, which he expounds at given points throughout the commentary.56
He describes a pneumatic body that the rational soul receives together with the
non-rational powers of soul as it descends through the heavens into the offspring’s
body, adding that this pneumatic body, with its non-rational soul, survives for a
time after the organic body of flesh and bones perishes, though this vehicle, too,
eventually perishes and takes the non-rational soul with it.57 And these references
to the pneumatic body are not easy to explain away. For he discusses it at length
in the prologue, where it is featured as the vehicle of spirit and appetite as well as
of the powers of sensation and representation,58 and he returns to the pneumatic

body throughout the commentary, at one point even identifying it with the organ
of common sense.59
Yet this pneumatic body theory of animation is hard to square with the incre-
mental manner of animation that is also set out in the commentary. The passage
in question is the conclusion of a dialectical discussion (Commentary on Aristotle’s
On the Soul 213,7–214,33) of the traditional question of whether the embryo is a
ζῷον.60 Philoponus begins by reporting how some people argue that it is not a ζῷον
(213,7–12), then replies to these arguments (213,12–25), offers another argument
against the ζῷον-position (213,26–31), then replies to this (213,31–214,2). At this
point, it looks like Philoponus is going to side with those who claim the embryo is a
ζῷoν, but then he presents a final round of objections to the ζῷoν-position (214,2–
11), before finally introducing what appears to be his own, more nuanced view:
If creation advances step by step from the less perfect to the more perfect,
and the superior forms of life [ζωαί] do not otherwise come along unless the
more deficient have been present in advance, and if the order is first the inan-
imate [τò ἄψυχoν], then vegetative life, then that of zoophytes, then that of
non-rational animals and lastly that of rational animals, one ought to see that
nature uses this order of creation [in gestation]. After solidifying the semen,
that which is constituted is a kind of inanimate thing [ἄψυχόν τι]; then when
it is first given organic structure it resembles a plant for as long as it does not
partake in sensation; as it advances and takes on a sense of touch and motion
[but not local motion], it is at this stage like the zoophytes, being attached to
the womb, its own source, as they are to stones or to the shells lying around
them, and it remains in this state until birth; then at that stage they become
perfect animals, and undergo local motion and nourish themselves through
their own organs – I mean the mouth and the like – and act with all the
senses. At the end in the case of human beings they take on rational life, hav-
ing initially lived a non-rational life.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul
214,11–25, Charlton translation slightly revised)
Philoponus is clearly aligning himself with the advocates of gradualist animation.

First (i) there is an inanimate seed61 that (ii) at some point after conception is solidi-
fied in the womb, though it remains inanimate at this point.62 Then, in accordance
with Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the form of an organic body, (iii) as soon as
the embryo receives some basic organic structure it likewise attains the life-status
of a plant.63 Then, as the organic structure becomes more refined, it receives the
powers of touch and (non-local) motion and thereby achieves the life-status of a
zoophyte. It retains this status ‘until birth’ (v) at which point it becomes a ‘complete
ζῷoν’ with all the senses and local motion.64 Finally, (vi) at some undetermined
point – either at or after birth – it receives the rational soul.65
The question, then, becomes how Philoponus sought to account for this
sequential addition of powers of soul, and in contrast to Iamblichus and Proclus,

Philoponus appears to have worked out a theory to explain this. Consider the fol-
lowing three passages from his Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul:
For there are many things that have a moist natural heat yet are not ensouled;
they also require natural form-principles. He says that the seed is the first
soul, as if it is the seed of the soul and the principle of the soul. For just as it
is the principle of the human body, likewise, he believes, it is the principle
of the soul.
(89,2–5, van der Eijk translation slightly revised)
The rational soul enters the body after the formation of the complete living
thing, while the other psychic faculties or the form-principles of these are
sown together with the seed [συγκαταβαλλομένων τῷ σπέρματι].
(163,34–6, van der Eijk translation slightly revised)
What then is it that first leads what is in a state of potentiality to the posses-
sion, i.e. to the state of second potentiality or first actuality? Aristotle says it
is ‘the generator.’ For in gestation the propensity is led to the possession. Just
as, then, the man who is actually literate leads the child to the possession [of
literacy], so too does the nature in the mother lead the seed and in general the
matter of the living thing to sensation in the sense of possession. Gestation,
then, is a change and transition of what is of a nature to sense into sensation
in the sense of possession.
(306,2–8)
What these passages show us is Philoponus invoking a version of the seminal theory
of animation that accounts for the lower powers of soul by positing form-principles
of them in the seed. This should come as a bit of a surprise, given that Philoponus
subscribes to the core theory with PIP and PAP. For as we just witnessed, in the Ad
Gaurum a solution along these lines was attributed to the Stoics and concluded to be
off-limits because it violated the principles of PAP and PIP, but Philoponus appears
to be envisioning a Platonic rehabilitation of the seminal theory that is compatible
with both principles. Recall that the Stoics ran afoul of the PAP principle by insist-
ing that cold air would be sufficient to actualize the form-principles of sensation and
motion, even though cold air does not itself possess these powers. Philoponus now
avoids this objection by identifying a more suitable agent of actualization. It is the
mother, he says, who is responsible for leading these potential powers to actuality,
thereby extending the maternal actualization thesis to account for the actualization
of both the form-principles of the body’s parts and those of the lower powers of soul,
up to and including sensation (306,2–8).66 This leaves the violation of PIP, which,
according to Porphyry, occurs when it is assumed that the vegetative soul produces
form-principles of higher-order powers such as sensation that it does not itself pos-
sess. In these three passages all Philoponus says is that they are ‘sown together with
the seed’ (163,36), without clueing us in how they are sown without violating PIP.
Yet in a passage that deserves our full attention, Philoponus not only offers a
possible solution to this problem, but also – again in stark contrast to Iamblichus
and Proclus – shows himself to be fully aware of the tension between the incre-
mental seminal theory of animation and the concurrent pneumatic body theory.
It is found in the comments on Aristotle’s On the Soul 415a26–b2, where Aristotle
submits that reproduction, that is, ‘creating another thing like oneself,’ is the most
natural activity there is, which all things engage in, unless they are deformed or
spontaneously generated. Our passage begins with Philoponus detecting a potential
problem in Aristotle’s thesis that picks up the lingering difficulty about how to
account for the form-principles of soul in the seminal model of animation:
But one might raise this aporia: If creating another like oneself is supremely
natural for all living things [ζῷσι] and each is generative of its like [τοῦ
ὁμοίου], then it will either turn out [i] that the generative power resides
in the non-rational soul, too, and [the power of] sensation [will generate a
power of] sensation, and the spirit [will generate] spirit, and similarly with
the rest of the powers, or [ii] that the vegetative [soul] is generative of the
non-rational soul, with the result that what is better has resulted from what
is worse, which would be bizarre. Perhaps, then, it is possible to say [iii] that
the form-principles of the psychic powers exist partlessly in the seed deriving
from animals [ζῴων] in the very same manner in which the shoot that has
been cut off [from the tree] possesses partlessly in itself all the natural powers
and in which the parts of insects that have been cut off from their wholes
possess in themselves both the sensitive power and local motion. For it is not
something lifeless that is emitted.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s
On the Soul 268,9–19)
The aporia concerns how a human being, given the wide spectrum of powers in our
souls, can be understood to be creating another like itself. Here it is the reproduc-
tion of the non-rational powers of soul that is seen as particularly problematic. Two
would-be solutions are ruled out. The suggestion (i) that the non-rational soul is
responsible for reproducing itself must be rejected. Philoponus does not say why,
but one suspects it is because it involves a confusion of the homunculus variety:
each power of soul would end up having its own generative power, when in fact
the generative power should belong exclusively to the vegetative soul. The other
would-be solution – having the vegetative soul generate the higher-order non-
rational soul – is rejected for the same reason Porphyry had rejected it: it violates
PIP. Yet Philoponus thinks that the seminal model of animation can be saved by
positing an alternative manner of transmission. If the form-principles of the non-
rational powers of soul are simply transplanted, as opposed to generated, then there is
no longer any violation of PIP. Although Philoponus does not develop this sugges-
tion adequately, he does bring some empirical examples into play that would seem
to support his suggestion that non-rational powers can be transmitted without

being generated anew.
We can see, then, that Philoponus is invested in rehabilitating the seminal theory
of animation by making it compatible with PIP and PAP,67 and in this way incre-
mental animation can be more fully accommodated in his embryology. Yet there
remains the tension between the seminal theory of animation and the pneumatic
body theory, and Philoponus immediately turns to articulate this problem in the
sequel:
But if it be granted that there are also form-principles of the non-rational

soul in the seed, and that the non-rational soul comes to be in the body
through their maturation and perfection, and that no substance of the non-
rational soul comes to be in the body from an external source, then we will
be contradicting much of what has been agreed upon. Let us examine the
case of human beings. It is said that unto the human soul, as it goes down
into generation and before it falls into this [organic] body, there is previously
woven onto it the pneuma and the non-rational powers in the pneuma. If this
is right, the non-rational soul must pre-exist the seed. For if the non-rational
soul has its generation in the seed, what has been said is wrong, and if the
non-rational soul has its being in the pneuma and continues to exist after the
dissolution of the animal [ζῴου], its form-principles cannot be in the seed.
For then it will have its being, too, in the seed.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul 268,19–30)
Here Philoponus articulates two problems for the seminal theory, a chronological
issue about the time at which the non-rational soul comes to be and perishes as well
as a deeper metaphysical issue about the origin of the non-rational soul. Regarding
the chronological issue, while the seminal theory has the non-rational soul coming
to be and perishing together with the organic body, the pneumatic body theory
has the non-rational soul persisting after the destruction of the organic body and
coming to be even prior to the seed.68 Regarding the metaphysical issue of origins,
the pneumatic body theory has the non-rational soul entering the organic body
from an external source, whereas on the seminal theory the non-rational soul can
be accounted for internally; that is, without appealing to any source outside of the
parents. So we would seem to be at an impasse, and Philoponus has to either stick
with the traditional theory of the pneumatic body and reject the seminal theory, or
keep the seminal theory and discard the pneumatic body theory.
In the final section of this pivotal passage, Philoponus appears to be presenting

his solution to this dilemma. Unfortunately, there are difficulties both with the text
and with the content of this solution. Here is the text printed by Hayduck:
εὔλογον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπιδιαμένουσαν <μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν>69 τοῦ σώματος

καὶ προϋπάρχειν αὐτοῦ. μήποτε οὖν ὥσπερ τῶν αὐτομάτων ζῴων τε καὶ
φυτῶν ἡ γένεσις οὐκ ἐκ προϋποκειμένης ψυχῆς τῇ διαδοχῇ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ
τῆς ὕλης ἐπιτηδείας γενομένης ὑπὸ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας ἐνίεται ἐν αὐτῇ
τῶν τε βοτανῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις,
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλόγου ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις γίνεται ἐκ τῆς ὅλης
δημιουργίας ὑφισταμένων αὐτῶν. ‡ εἰ γόνιμος οὖν δύναμις τῆς ἀλόγου
ψυχῆς, οὐδεμία ἀπορία· τῆς γὰρ γονίμου δυνάμεως οὐ χρεία ταύτῃ τὴν
κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἐχούσῃ ἀιδιότητα ‡.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On the
Soul 268,30–8, with daggers added)
Yet it is reasonable that the soul continues to exist <after the dissolution> of
the body and pre-exist it. Perhaps, then, just as the generation of the spon-
taneous animals and plants takes place not by succession from a pre-existing
soul, rather when the matter has become suitable the forms of the plants and
animals and the soul-powers in them are sent in the matter by the universal
activity of creation, so too in the case of the non-rational soul in all animals:
it comes to be from the universal activity of creation once they [i.e. the
animals] have been constituted. ‡ If, then, there is a generative power of the
non-rational soul, there is no difficulty. For there is no need of the generative
power for this soul, since it possesses numerical everlastingness. ‡
I have put the final two lines of this passage in daggers because no satisfactory sense
can be made of the received text.To begin with, the text as it stands makes Philoponus
out to be saying that the non-rational soul possesses individual everlastingness, which
is unacceptable, and there seems to be a more general disconnect between the con-
tent of these lines and the preceding lines. Luckily, an alternative to Hayduck’s text
has also come down to us, albeit as part of someone else’s commentary.The Byzantine
commentator Sophonias composed a commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul that is
known to be heavily dependent on Philoponus’ own commentary. Indeed, in his
comments leading up to our passage, he has been taking over Philoponus’ comments
selectively but more or less verbatim.After virtually quoting Philoponus 268,9–14, he
skips over 268,14–31 and comes to the passage that interests us:
μήποτ’ οὖν, ὥσπερ τῶν αὐτομάτων ζώων τε καὶ φυτῶν ἡ γένεσις οὐκ ἐκ
προϋποκειμένης ψυχῆς τῇ διαδοχῇ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὕλης ἐπιτηδείου
γενομένης ὑπὸ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας ἐνίενται ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν βοτανῶν καὶ τῶν
ζώων τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχικαὶ δυνάμεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλόγου
ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις γίνεται, ἐκ τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας ὑφισταμένης αὐτῆς.
ἡ γόνιμος οὖν δύναμις τῆς ἀλόγου ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐν τῇ μερικῇ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ
φύσει, ἥτις γίνεται τῆς διαμονῆς τῶν ψυχικῶν εἰδῶν αἰτία. οὐδεμία δὲ περὶ
τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τούτῳ ἀπορία κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐχούσης ἀιδιότητα, οὐδὲ
προσδεὴς γονιμότητος.
(Sophonias Paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul 57,9–17)
Perhaps, then, just as the generation of the spontaneous animals and plants
takes place not by succession from a pre-existing soul, rather when the matter
has become suitable the forms of the plants and animals and the soul-powers
in them are sent in the matter by the universal activity of creation, so too
in the case of the non-rational soul: it comes to be in animals, having been
brought into existence from the universal activity of creation. The power, then,
that is generative of the non-rational soul is not in the particular nature but in universal
nature, which is the cause of the perpetuation of the forms of soul. But there is no dif-
ficulty here concerning the rational soul, since it possesses numerical everlastingness and
has no need of a generative power.
After this Sophonias goes back to offering comments that correspond to Philoponus’
text almost verbatim. I submit that the passage in italics is also Philoponus and
should be read in place of the passage marked in daggers above.
Two significant difficulties remain, however. One concerns the opaque refer-
ence to ‘the universal activity of creation’ (τῆς ὅλης δημιουργίας). This expression
is found throughout the earlier commentaries on Aristotle,70 and Philoponus pri-
marily introduces it in contexts in which he is rejecting the view that forms and
powers of soul either emerge from or are to be simply identified with the mixtures
(κράσεις) of the underlying bodies. Although he never mentions Galen by name
in these contexts, his repeated association of this mixture theory with ‘the doctors’
suggests that he has Galen’s That the Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the
Body in mind here.71 His principal objection to the Galenic thesis is that it violates
the PIP principle: to have a power of soul or higher-level form simply emerge
from a mixture of bodies amounts to having something superior being generated
from something inferior.72 Philoponus aims to comply with the PIP principle by
accounting for these forms and powers by appealing to the suitability principle and
positing a higher source. When the matter becomes suitable, these forms and pow-
ers are automatically supplied to it from this higher source. (It may be emphasized
here that Philoponus does not see this higher source accounting for the matter’s
becoming suitable, but only for supplying the forms and powers to it once it is suit-
able.) If the italicized lines of the above text are indeed faithful to Philoponus, he
identifies this source as universal nature, which is perhaps meant to be identical to
the World-Soul.73
Another difficulty lies in determining exactly how this solution is supposed to
solve the dilemma between the seminal and the pneumatic body theories of ani-
mation. If the general idea of Philoponus’ solution is that the non-rational powers
of soul are derived from a source, such as universal nature or the World-Soul, that
possesses them in actuality, this general idea would seem to be compatible with
both the seminal theory and the pneumatic body theory. Possibly, then, Philoponus
intends it to be integrated within the seminal theory. If so, it would be providing us
a new explanation of how the form-principles of the non-rational powers come to
be in the seed without violating PIP. He would be replacing his earlier suggestion
(268,14–19) that these form-principles are somehow transplanted from the male
parent’s soul without being generated anew, and would now be maintaining that
they are delivered by universal nature to the seed, when the seed’s matter is suitable
to receive them. (Then, as before, the actualization of these form-principles would
be explained by appeal to the mother’s soul.) This would allow him to answer
the two objections voiced against the seminal theory above. After this revision,
the seminal theory would no longer be an internal theory of animation, since the
form-principles would be delivered by an external source, and we could perhaps
even say that the non-rational soul pre-exists and survives the organic body, since
its source, universal nature, is everlasting. One major advantage of this interpretation
of his solution would be that Philoponus would still be in a position to account for
the incremental animation that he described above, but it would also force one to
rethink all of the references to the pneumatic body throughout the commentary.
Yet Philoponus’ opening remark about it being ‘reasonable’ that the non-rational
soul pre-exists and survives the seed (268,30–31) would seem rather to suggest
that he intends to side with the pneumatic body theory, and on balance the evi-
dence appears to support taking the solution here as a complement to this theory
of animation. On this interpretation, then, Philoponus would be explaining how
the non-rational powers of soul come to be in the pneumatic body: as the rational
soul descends through the heavens, it collects the pneumatic body, and as this body
is being constituted, it becomes a suitable receptacle for the non-rational powers
of soul, which are delivered to it by universal nature or the World-Soul. In other
words, he is effectively telling the same story about the origin of the non-rational
powers that Porphyry tells,74 which is certainly encouraging, and it is corroborated
by another passage in his Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul where Philoponus
employs these same concepts and examples in explicit connection with the pneu-
matic body during the soul’s descent (52,4–25). If this is right, then he would be
jettisoning the seminal theory of animation, and this is unfortunate. After all, he
himself made significant improvements to the seminal theory that made it compat-
ible with Neoplatonic metaphysics. More unfortunate still is that Philoponus ends
up confronted with the same tensions faced by his predecessors, as he subscribes to
both the pneumatic body theory of animation and incremental animation, though
perhaps his predicament is not quite so dire. For according to the timeline he
sets out (214,11–25), the powers of sensation and motion are in fact present only
at birth and can thus be accounted for by the pneumatic body theory, after all.
He says that only non-rational powers of the very lowest order belong to the
embryo before birth – those belonging to zoophytes – and it is possible that he
thought these could be accounted for in some other way. In the case of insects, at
least, Philoponus appears willing to say that such powers are present directly in the
corporeal body without any intervening pneumatic body.75 So perhaps he thinks

that the more trivial non-rational powers can be conferred, at least initially, directly
onto the corporeal body earlier in the process of embryogenesis when it becomes
suitably organized.
Given these two incompatible theories of the embryo’s animation, it is tempt-
ing to speculate that what we are witnessing here is a disagreement between
Philoponus and his teacher Ammonius, whose lecture he claims to be transcribing
‘with additions of his own’ (1,3). More specifically, one might suspect that the more
medically minded Philoponus is the one responsible for the seminal theory, and that
he ultimately concedes to his teacher’s more traditional view. With both thinkers,
however, concrete attributions prove difficult.
Ammonius’ own views on all matters are notoriously difficult to pin down, and
this case is no exception.76 In the surviving writings associated with Ammonius’
name, there are no explicit references to either theory of animation. What we do
find is a timeline of incremental animation that bears some resemblance to the
timeline in Philoponus’ commentary. This timeline is found in two passages of his
Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagôgê (which is itself, somewhat problematically, an
ἀπὸ φωνῆς commentary). Each of the two passages represents human generation
as taking place in five stages, and although the five stages in the two passages do
not entirely coincide, they are not incompatible. By putting these two accounts
together we get a process with a total of six stages: First, (i) the lifeless seed is emit-
ted, and then at conception (ii) nature turns this seed into a bit of flesh.77 Only at
this point can the seed or embryo be said to be potentially alive. Then, (iii) once it
begins to engage in the activities of nourishment and growth, it has the life-status of
a plant.78 Next (iv) the embryo becomes a ζῷoν when it receives sensation; it then
(v) becomes an ἄλoγoν ζῷoν when motion is supplied in the form of the appeti-
tive and spirited parts,79 and (vi) it finally becomes a human being at birth when it
partakes in reason.80 So, as far as Ammonius is concerned, we can at most conclude
that this timeline, if it may be ascribed to him, would be in serious tension with the
pneumatic body theory of animation.
As for Philoponus, if in his Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul he is resisting
the pneumatic body theory in favor of the seminal theory of animation, we might
expect to find him clearly advocating the seminal theory in his later works. The
timeline of formation and animation described in two later works, On the Creation
of the World and Against Proclus on the Everlastingness of the World, hardly settles the
matter, as it, too, corresponds roughly to the one we saw above. It begins with a seed
that is still unensouled.81 Then, once this seed is turned into blood and some basic
organic structure is generated, it may be said to have the vegetative soul.82 The non-
rational soul is said to be present as soon as the embryo is formed,83 which probably
takes place just before birth,84 and the rational soul appears roughly simultaneously
with the non-rational soul.85 We might be surprised to see that the timeline is
slightly less incremental, insofar as Philoponus is no longer emphasizing the emer-
gence of lower-order ‘zôophytic’ powers of soul prior to the powers of sensation
and local motion, but this cannot be because Philoponus is still committed to the
pneumatic body theory. On the contrary, in these two treatises he distances himself
from much of the pneumatic body theory, including the very existence of soul
vehicles.86 Neither, however, does he clearly advocate the seminal theory, at least
not the Platonic version of this theory examined above. If anything, it would seem
that Philoponus means to return to a more Aristotelian account of animation that
does not require form-principles of non-rational powers because the non-rational
soul is simply identified with the entelechy of the organic body.87
Notes
1 See Chapter 3, pp. 66–8 and 72.
2 Strictly speaking, it is the sensitive and nutritive soul whose seat is located in the heart
(e.g. PA 666a10–13; PN 465a4–6 and 469a5–12; MA 703b23–4; GA 743b25–6). The
rational soul is not situated in any part of the body (DA 429a24–5).
3 GA 734b22–35a26. Cf. GA 740a3–4; 741b15–25; 753b18–19; HA 561a4–21.
4 SVF 2.761; 837; 879–81; 3.29. In two doxographies (Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.17.1 and
Censorinus De dei nat. 5.5–6.2), the Stoics have also been credited with the view that all
parts are formed concurrently, which, as we shall see, is a view very similar to Porphyry’s.
These reports, however, are at odds with Galen’s report, according to which they agreed
with Aristotle that the heart was formed first. On this disagreement, see Gourinat (2008:
70–1). Perhaps these two views can be reconciled if we assume that for the Stoics the
heart was the first organ to appear but that no organ was fully formed until birth. Be that
as it may, the doxographical reports on the Stoics’ views make good sense in light of the
Stoic view on the animation of the embryo, which is supposed to take place all at once
at birth.
5 For a brief summary of Galen’s critique of the Stoic position, see Nickel (1989: 77–9).
6 Galen, however, advanced different views over his career on the order of development
of the embryo, as he himself acknowledges at De foet. form. 66,19–32 and De propr. plac.
90,17ff. See Nickel (1989: 71–83) for a full discussion.
7 On this point, see esp. Nickel (1989: 79).
8 See Nat. Puer. §12.6 (7.488,13ff. L.) and, for the analogy to plants, Nat. Puer. §§22–7, esp.
§22.
9 See Nat. Puer. §§12.1–14.2. In Nat. Puer., however, the umbilical cord is described as
being formed prior to the membranes. Democritus is also reported to have thought
that the umbilical cord was formed first (68B148 DK, cf. Aëtius Plac. phil. 5.17.6 and
Censorinus De dei nat. 6.1).There appears to be a further similarity between Democritus
and Porphyry: both envision the formation of the embryo as proceeding from the out-
side with the interior parts formed last (cf. Democritus 68A145 DK, and see Chapter 1,
p. 21).
10 Cf. John of Alexandria’s reading of Nat. Puer. below, which he interprets in terms of
synchronic formation.
11 See AG 10.3 (46,24–47,5) cited above and AG 13.4 (52,26–31).
13 For example Proclus In Remp. 2.35,23–36,2 (though the context is doxographical, and
cf. 2.33,14–18); [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith. 61,13–63,1; Ammonius In Isag. 105,1–10;
Philoponus In Cat. 201,12–13; In Phys. 157,33–158,1; 319,23–5; 322,12–14; 848,7–8; and
especially Aet. Mund. 374,19–23; cf. Philoponus Opific. Mund. §124; John of Alexandria
In Hipp. Epid. VI 98,15–29; In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 142,26–144,22; 158,1–4; 170,12–19. The
passages from Ammonius and Philoponus are discussed below.
14 The objection that a given view is an ἀποκληρωτικὸς λόγος (158,37–8) is common
in Neoplatonic authors, e.g. Ammonius In De Int. 169,29; Asclepius In Meta. 134,6–
7; 254,2–3; etc.; Elias In Isag. 101,35; Philoponus In Meteor. 82,35–6; Aet. Mund. 5,1;
Olympiodorus In Meteor. 133,18; etc. See the section on John of Alexandria in the
Appendix to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the formative power.
15 That said, simultaneous formation is advocated elsewhere in the Hippocratic corpus, e.g.
Vict. I 142,18–26 (6.498 L.).
16 The phrase used here is διδασκαλίας χάριν, familiar from Platonist attempts to diffuse
the sequential cosmogony of the Tim. See the Appendix to Chapter 3, p. 101.
17 See the Appendix to Chapter 3, p. 101.
18 Philoponus expresses the view that the homoiomerous parts are created before the anho-
moiomerous parts, with flesh being the first of the former and the heart the first of the
latter (Aet. Mund. 374,21–3; In Phys. 52,37–53,1; 404,3–5; and see note 13). Elsewhere
he makes clear that he considers the liver to be present and functioning in the embryo
(In DA 213,21), and although this last passage is set in a dialectical context, it appears
to capture his own view (see below). See also Simplicius In Phys. 106,26; 626,12–14;
875,8–11; 876,12–14.
19 For a list of instances of αὐτοκίνητος ψυχή, see Wilberding (2011a: 95). See AG 1.1
together with 4.6–11 and 6.2 (cited below), as well as 13.6 (53,7–10), cited above.
20 An outline of Porphyry’s arguments in the AG may be found in Wilberding (2011a:
19–24).
21 See, for example, SVF 1.497; 2.499 and 746.
22 See note 25.
24 See also AG 17.1ff. (58,21ff.) where Porphyry begins to confront the view that the
soul is merely transmitted by the parents. Here he gives a lengthy characterization of his
opponents’ views, in which he suggests that the alleged existence of form-principles of
soul-powers (e.g. AG 17.6–7 (59,28 and 60,21–3)) would have to be accounted for by
positing that the seed is produced not by the vegetative soul alone but also by the soul
responsible for sensation, representation, and impulse (AG 18 (60,25ff.)). Unfortunately,
shortly thereafter the manuscript is damaged to the point of unintelligibility, and his
own response to these views has not survived. Perhaps he simply reasserted that only
the vegetative soul is the producer of the seed, but as we shall see below Philoponus will
eventually take issue with Porphyry on this matter.
25 The Stoic view that cold air is responsible for the transformation of physis to psychê is also
reported in Plotinus 4.7.83 (SVF 2.804); Tertullian DA 25.2 (34,31–35,7 (SVF 2.805));
Plutarch Mor. 946C; 1052F; 1053D; 1084E (SVF 2.806); Porphyry Fr. 249F. For further
passages see Waszink (1947: 321) and Babut and Casevitz (2004: 319).
26 The relevant texts include: Porphyry Sent. 29; De antro 11 (64,9–21); In Tim. Fr. 16, 22–3,
75 and 80; and in the fragments of Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and De regr. an., esp. 271F, 287F,
288aF, and 290F. The doctrine is also found in Synesius’ De insomniis and Macrobius’
Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, which are thought to have been influenced by
Porphyry (see references in note 27). There is a hint of this doctrine in AG at 11.3
(49,16–19) and perhaps at 15.4 (55,18–21).
27 See Smith (1974: 151–8); Deuse (1983: 215–30); Dodds (1963: 313–21 and 347–8); I.
Hadot (1978: 98–106 and 181–7); Pépin (1999); and Pépin’s remarks in Brisson et al.
(2005: 593–6).
28 Although the identity of this source is not beyond dispute, I think Deuse (1983: 216–17)
is right to take it to be the World-Soul, but Simplicius offers an alternative that is equally
compatible with PIP and PAP: the source of the non-rational powers is the descend-
ing rational soul itself (In Epict. 78,10–21). It would be a violation of PIP, however, if
Porphyry thought that these powers of soul were identical to or emerged from the mix-
tures of the pneuma, as is perhaps suggested in Porphyry In Tim. Fr. 80 (Proclus In Tim.
3.234, 28–30).
29 In addition to ἐπιτηδειότης he uses a variety of other terms to refer to this notion of
suitability, including various terms for ‘harmony’ (ἁρμονία, συμφωνία, συναρμοστία).
See especially: AG 11.3–4; 12.1–7; 13.4–7; 14.4; 15.1–5; 16.2 and 6. For a study of
Porphyry’s conception of suitability in the AG, see Aubry (2008).
30 For example De foet. form. 104,16–19 (4.700,6–10 K.). See De Lacy (1988).
31 AG 13.6 (53,7–10), on which see p. 131.
32 Cf. AG 6.3 (42,28–30); 9.1 (45,9–10); 9.2 (45,26–7); 10.6 (48,2–5); 14.2 (54,3–4).
Nevertheless, Porphyry does show a certain willingness to refer to the Aristotelian veg-
etative soul as a ‘part’ of the Platonic appetitive soul, but he is critical of his contempo-
raries who do not understand the sense in which the former is a part of the latter (AG
4.2 (38,8–9)).
33 See Chapter 3, pp. 63–71. Porphyry’s claim that the vegetative power or soul is the onto-
logical product of the non-rational soul (AG 6.3 (42,28–43,1), on which see Chapter 3,
p. 61), must not be misunderstood to mean that the vegetative soul also descends into the
body from outside.
34 See Congourdeau (2007: 235–9) for a survey of views.
35 Numenius is the only one Porphyry mentions by name (AG 2.2 (34,26)), but he prob-
ably also has Longinus in mind here, who defended a form of traducianism (see note 49).
36 In addition to the three passages discussed here, Porphyry presents a quote from Plato
that is not part of the received Platonic corpus: ‘But how, they say, can Plato at one point,
while going over the misfortunes of the soul, say “if they [the souls] are indeed laid up
in store and will come to belong to the things carried in the womb”?’ (εἴγε ἀπέκειτο
καὶ τῶν κυουμένων γενέσθαι). Kalbfleisch is probably right to see this as a reference to
[Plato] Epin. 973d2–4 (on which, see Chapter 1, p. 22), but if so, Porphyry’s response to
this only applies to his reformulation and fails to address the less ambiguous statement at
Epin. 973d2–4.
39 For a recent discussion of Plato’s claims about plant sensation, see Carpenter (2010).
For an examination of the Neoplatonic understanding of vegetative life, see Wilberding
(2014a) and (2015a).
40 Iamblichus does object to some details of Porphyry’s views on the descent and the vehi-
cle of the soul, but they agree on this fundamental point concerning the acquisition of
the non-rational powers. See Dillon (1973: 371–7); Finamore (1985: 11–27 and 85–91);
Finamore and Dillon (2002: 98–9, 116, 183–5, and 215); Dörrie and Baltes (1987–2008,
vol. 6.1: 375–82).
41 Iamblichus appears to draw this view from a misunderstanding of Porphyry AG 2.2,
where Porphyry first says that some men say that animation occurs when the embryo
is formed and that Hippocrates says that first formation takes place at 30 days for males
and 42 days for females, but stops short of saying that Hippocrates himself thought that
animation takes place then. See Wilberding (2011a: 58n18).
42 There is general agreement that Iamblichus is referring to the AG here.
43 Finamore and Dillon (2002: 163) infer this from Iamblichus’ use of the potential optative:
Гένοιτο δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλη τις δόξα οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν ῥηθεῖσα. See also Dörrie and Baltes
(1987–2008, vol. 6.1: 339), Deuse (1983: 231–5) and Festugière (1944–54, vol. 3: 224n4).
44 The interpretation offered by Finamore and Dillon (2002: 164) strikes me as implausible:
‘It is ensouled at the moment of birth […] The time interval between the vegetative and
perceptive soul cannot be very great, perhaps only a few seconds. It is intriguing that
Iamblichus posits an interval at all. Perhaps he has in mind the time of the actual birth-
ing process followed by the newborn’s subsequent cries.’ Iamblichus does seem to hold
that the rational soul enters the body at birth (Vita Pyth. §153 Deubner–Klein), but he
appears to have a more extended process of animation in mind, as Dörrie and Baltes
(1987–2008, vol. 6.1: 340) envision. At the very least Iamblichus would certainly agree
that the embryo has the life-status of a plant long before birth, and the details of his
considered views might well be similar to those sketched of Ammonius and Philoponus,
which are discussed immediately below.
45 For example In Tim. 3.285,9–10; 3.297,26–298,2; 3,299,9–11; In Remp. 2.159,4–10;
Theol. Plat. 3.18,24ff.; El. Th. §209. On Proclus’ theory concerning the vehicles of the
soul, see Dodds (1963: 313–21); Halfwassen (1995: 111–17); Dörrie and Baltes (1987–
2008, vol. 6.1: Baustein 165) as well as the sources in note 27.
46 Proclus El. Th §189 (164,24–8); In Tim. 1.51,27–30; In Remp. 2.113,13–19. And see
Proclus’ invocation, in embryological contexts, of the principle that nature does nothing
in vain: Proclus In Parm. 791,24–5 and In Tim. 3.322,17–21.
47 Proclus In Tim. 3.322,18–24. He adds the argument that as long as the embryo is in the
womb, it is a part of the mother and therefore not yet complete. Olympiodorus disagrees
with Proclus about the embryo’s being a part (In Meteor. 143,16–17)
48 Proclus In Remp 2.352,26–353,6 and In Tim. 3.323,16.
49 Proclus In Tim. 1.51,9–10 (Longinus Fr. 10d Brisson and Patillon; Fr. 48 Männlein-
Robert): Λογγῖνος δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἀπορεῖ, μήποτε ὁ Πλάτων τοῖς σπέρμασιν οἴεται
συγκαταβάλλεσθαι τὰς ψυχάς. Cf. In Tim. 1.51,19. This, then, appears to be slightly
different from the view Porphyry reports at AG 2.2 (34,23–6), where the soul is said
to come from outside into the seed at emission; cf. In Tim. 3.322,24–6, where Proclus
clearly distinguishes between the soul ἐνδεῖται παρὰ τῶν θεῶν and τῷ σπέρματι
συγκαταβάλλεται (cf. Männlein-Robert (2001: 427–37)). Proclus himself at times
says that the soul descends into the γονή (In Tim. 3.281,12; 3.302,9; In Remp. 2.72,2;
2.185,27), but he is borrowing this locution from Plato’s Phdr. 248d2, and his exegesis of
this passage of the Phdr. (In Remp. 2.72,1–6) makes clear that he is not thinking of the
γονή as the seed emitted by the male (cf. Porphyry AG 9.4 discussed above on p. 138).
50 In Tim. 1.51,12–13.
51 Plato Rep. 458c6–460b6; cf. Rep. 546a1–d3 and Tim. 18c6–19a5.
52 Plato Rep. 454b4–c2.
53 Proclus In Tim. 1.51,13–52,3. Cf. In Remp. 2.63,7–19; 2.118,5–15; In Alc. 94,1–17.
54 Reading αἰσθητικῆς at 321,28 with Dörrie and Baltes (1987–2008, vol. 6.1: 343) for
Diehl’s αἰσθητῆς.
56 See Blumenthal (1986).
57 For example In DA 10,6–8; 12,17–20; 15,10–11; 17,19–20,22; 201,24–32; 222,14–16;
239,2–38; 438,25–36, and cf. In Phys 836,20–4. Philoponus also envisions an astral vehi-
cle that is not subject to destructibility for the rational soul itself, see In DA 18,26–31
and 49,4–10.The vegetative soul requires no vehicle beyond the organic or ‘oyster’ body
itself, cf. In DA 10,5–6; 12,20–2; 15,11; 17,6–7; 201,22–4.
58 In DA 17,19–20,22. Here he argues that this body must exist in order to account for the
possibility of post-mortem punishments and ghost sightings.
59 For example In DA 158,11–23; 161,19–162,16; 418,19–24; 433,34–5; 438,25–36.
60 On this passage, see Scholten (2005: 382–90).
61 On the inanimate state of the seed, see also In DA 209,9–10; 222,25–32 and 305,36–7.
This would appear to be in conflict with In DA 89,2–5 and 268,19, where he describes
the seed alternatively as ‘not lifeless’ (οὐ ἄζων) and ‘first soul’ (πρώτην ψυχὴν). Perhaps
this apparent tension can be resolved by understanding Philoponus in these two passages
to be thinking of the seed post-conception, after it has been actualized by the mother.
62 For flesh as the first-formed substance from the seed, see also In Phys. 52,30; 157,32–
158,3; 322,12–15; 399,34–400,3; 404,3–5; 848,7–8.
63 On the contested issue of whether plants should be counted as having organic bodies,
our author makes clear that they should (In DA 217,18–218,3 and 270,8–11).
64 On the link between animation and organic structure, see also In DA 209,16–17 and
222,25–32 (cf. Aristotle DA 412b5–6). On the perfect form being achieved at birth, see
also In Phys. 322,12–15. On the power of sensation being received directly at birth, see
also In DA 306,8–10.
65 In the present passage, it seems that the rational soul enters just after birth. Elsewhere in
his early commentaries, Philoponus refers to the rational soul entering after the complete
formation, e.g. In Phys. 129,27–30; In DA 163,34–5.
66 See also Chapter 3, pp. 81–2.
67 In light of the passages discussed above, it is difficult to agree with Scholten’s claim
(2005: 392–3) that ‘[n]ichts deutet bei Johannes Philoponos darauf hin, dass phytische
und alogische Seele potentiell im Samen vorhanden wären oder durch ihn übertragen
würden’ [sic]. By contrast, Verbeke (1966: xxxix–xl) straightforwardly attributes seminal
traducianism to Philoponus and does not recognize any serious tension with the pneu-
matic body theory.
68 The idea here is presumably not that the rational soul’s descent begins even before the
emission of seed, but that the pneumatic body and non-rational soul are preserved over
several incarnations, though they are mortal and will eventually perish. Cf. Proclus In
Tim. 3.298,30–299,4 and 3.299,31–300,2.

69 Following a suggestion by Hayduck in the critical apparatus.
70 See Philoponus In GC 169,4–23; In DA 52,4–25; 270,13–16; In Phys. 191,9–29; 403,19–
31. Todd (1980: 163) points out the likelihood of the phrase having been drawn from
Proclus.
71 See In GC 169,4–6; In DA 50,31–2 and 51,13–15; In Phys. 403,28. See Todd (1980:
163–4), Todd (1984: 110) and Sorabji (2005, vol. 1; 199–201).
72 See Philoponus In DA 52,22–5 and In Phys. 191,24–5.
73 See In DA 120,23–4 and 271,6–8, and cf. Philoponus’ comparison to the musician
who provides the tuning to the suitable strings ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐν τῷ μουσικῷ
(In DA 52,10). In the early commentaries Philoponus does observe the distinction
between universal and particular natures (e.g. In Phys. 201,23–5). Cf. also Proclus In Tim.
3.284,31–285,1.
74 See pp. 136–7.
75 See In DA 201,22–32 and cf. In DA 238,38–239,38.
76 See above Chapter 3, p. 75 and Blank (2010: 663).
77 Ammonius seems to think he is using a technical medical term here: ἐκ τοῦ καταβληθέντος
σπέρματος δημιουργεῖ πρῶτον τò σαρκίον, ὥς φασιν οἱ ἰατροί (In Isag. 105,1–2; this
stage is left out of the account in 48,3–7), but the term τò σαρκίον does not appear in
the transmitted works of Galen or the Hippocratic authors in this context. Yet the idea
that flesh is formed first (after the initial membranes and the umbilical cord – see above,
pp. 131–2) can be found in the Hippocratic Nat. Puer. 15.1. It is striking that this same
term occurs in the same context in Philoponus In Phys. 52,30 and 157,34 and even in
the later Opific. Mund. 6.25 (590,1–2).
78 In Isag. 48,4–5 and 105,5–6.
79 The account in 48,3–7 distinguishes between an earlier ζῷoν stage (endowed only with
sensation) and a subsequent ἄλoγoν ζῷoν stage (endowed with θυμός and ἐπιθυμία), but
makes no specific mention of motion. By contrast, the account in 105,1–8 makes no
mention of θυμός and ἐπιθυμία and does not distinguish between a ζῷoν stage and an
ἄλoγoν ζῷoν stage. Here there is only one stage between the vegetative and the ratio-
nal, namely that of a ζῷoν endowed with sensation and motion. The above attempts to
reconcile these differences by taking θυμός and ἐπιθυμία as two non-rational sources of
motion, in which case 105,1–8 is simply giving an abbreviated account.
80 In Isag. 48,6–7 and 105,7–8.
81 Opific. Mund. 5.1 (460,22–3) and Aet. Mund. 9.16 (374,19–22).
82 Opific. Mund. 5.1 (460,23–4); 6.23 (584,9); Aet. Mund. 9.16 (374,19–22).
83 Opific. Mund. 5.1 (460,24–5); 5.10 (488,17–490,1); 6.23 (584,7–8).
84 Philoponus repeatedly emphasizes that the complete formation and thus even rational
animation takes place in the womb (Opific. Mund. 5.1 (460,25–462,2) and 6.25 (588,17–
590,18); Aet. Mund. 9.14 (369,7–21) and 9.16 (374,19–27)). This much Porphyry could
agree with. The question is how soon before birth this complete formation is achieved.
Scholten (2005) sees a radical new theory in the works here that has the rational soul
entering the embryo well before birth: ‘Damit wird der Eintritt der λογικὴ ψυχή in den
Embryo anscheinend zeitlich nahe an die erste Stufe des Seelenlebens, die Begabung mit
den vegetativen Kräften, herangerückt’ (396n68). The main evidence for this claim is
found in Opific. Mund. 6.25 (588,17–590,18), where Philoponus discusses the lex talionis
passage in LXX Ex. 21:22–3, which states that a man who violently causes a woman
to suffer a miscarriage should incur the death penalty only if the child is ‘fully formed’
(ἐξεικονισμένον). Philoponus classifies this passage as biblical confirmation of this thesis
that (rational) animation takes place at full formation, but I have found no evidence that
Philoponus thought the formation was not completed shortly before birth.
85 In Opific. Mund. 5.1 (460,25–7) the rational animation is described as taking place after
(εἶτα) the non-rational animation. In Opific. Mund. 6.23 (584,11–14) it is said to enter
together with the non-rational soul. Likewise, Opific. Mund. 6.24 (588,12–14) has ratio-
nal animation taking place ‘after’ the formation (cf. 6.25 (590,10–11)), while Opific.
Mund. 6.23 (582,13–14) has it taking place directly at formation.
86 The term does not appear in either work, and in Aet. Mund. 7.14–21 (272,27–293,22)
Philoponus launches an attack on the vehicle theory. While this attack is explicitly
directed only at the doctrine of the immortal astral vehicle supposedly attached to the
rational soul, some of the arguments he employs are equally damaging to the postulate
of a pneumatic body. To be clear, pneuma is still a part of his physiology, but what he says
about pneuma is decidedly Galenic (e.g. Aet. Mund. 288,8–11) and in no way suggests
that the pneuma has come into the organic body at birth from an external source or that
it survives the death of the organic body. Rather, with Galen he says it is generated in
the body (e.g. Aet. Mund. 396,25–397,2). Cf. I. Hadot’s comments (1978: 184–7) on the
identification by Pseudo-Simplicius of this body with the ζωτικὸν or ἔμφυτον πνεῦμα
familiar to medical theory. In Opific. Mund. 6.23–6 (582,5–592,11) Philoponus does not
even consider the possibility that the πνοὴν ζωῆς of LXX Gen 2:7 could be a reference
to the soul’s pneumatic vehicle.
87 See especially Opific. Mund. 6.23 (584,14–20). Cf. Aet. Mund. 9.11 (347,28–365,11).
5
THE PROBLEM OF TERATOGENESIS
In spite of all of its ontological shortcomings, the Neoplatonists urge us to see

the sensible world as a success story. It is, after all, the best possible image of its
intelligible model. They are fully aware, however, that this cosmic optimism could
only be justified with reference to evidence from natural phenomena. Accordingly,
the Neoplatonists concern themselves with showing how a wide variety of natu-
ral phenomena are best understood in terms of causation by higher principles at
work here in the sensible world. As we have now seen, their interest in explaining
natural phenomena extends well beyond the celestial spheres and carries them all
the way down to the marshy fields of biology. Here their aims include showing
that teleological processes are at work in embryology and that the overwhelming
majority of an offspring’s physical features could be accounted for by the activity
of corresponding form-principles. The countless distinguishing features that we
easily observe among different human beings are not the chance result of mat-
ter’s overcoming a single form-principle common to all individual human beings;
rather, these features are themselves instances of the successful activity of myriad
intelligible principles acting in the sensible world. Yet this optimistic view of the
intelligible world’s influence over the sensible must confront the fact that not all
cases of biological reproduction appear to turn out successfully, even if the majority
of cases do. To be sure, teratogenesis poses difficulties not just for Neoplatonists but
for the entire tradition of teleological embryology to which Neoplatonic embryol-
ogy belongs,1 though these difficulties may be seen as taking on a new urgency in
a Neoplatonic setting, given the added importance they attach to intelligible prin-
ciples ruling the sensible world.
Yet in spite of this new urgency, there is no extended investigation into the
causes of terata in the transmitted Neoplatonic texts, not even in the sole surviving
Neoplatonic text dedicated to embryology, Porphyry’s To Gaurus On How Embryos
Are Ensouled, where the topic comes up only once and very briefly at that.2 It is
The problem of teratogenesis 157
tempting to see this omission as an indication of a limited interest on their part in

biology, but this predicament is actually comparable to the one we would find our-
selves in if we set out to investigate teratology in the Corpus Galenicum.There, too, one
would search in vain for a sustained discussion of teratology, but in a variety of works
one would discover a number of isolated passages in which Galen addresses terato-
logical phenomena,3 and this is also the case with the body of Neoplatonic texts.
Even so, an examination of these isolated passages could easily give the first
impression that the Neoplatonists failed to acknowledge the urgency of the prob-
lems that teratology poses to their optimistic world-view. Indeed, many of the
remarks that one finds would prima facie appear to signal an outright capitu-
lation. This appearance arises first and foremost in the many passages in which
Neoplatonists point to the frustrating influence of matter as the cause of teratogen-
esis,4 which would certainly appear to amount to simply biting the teleological
bullet, but the story turns out to be not that simple. To see why this first impression
is misleading, we need to take a closer look at some of these claims about matter
and see how some Neoplatonists sought to make them compatible with a teleologi-
cal world-view. In doing so it will be helpful to focus our investigation in the first
instance on teratological cases involving an excess or deficiency in the offspring’s
body, such as being born with a sixth finger, which incidentally also appears to be
the most widely cited case of teratology in Neoplatonic authors.5
Such cases are frequently referred to an excess or deficiency in the matter, though
there is some question as to the identity of the matter at issue. After all, in certain
contexts both the male seed and the female menses qualify as matter, and although
most of the passages referred to above offer no further specification as to which of
these is intended, some do. There are several passages where the matter in question
is unmistakably identified as the male seed, but we should be cautious about con-
cluding that such passages give a fair representation of their considered views. As
far as I can tell, such claims are limited to the commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics,6
where they are clearly paying respect to Aristotle’s remark that terata arise ‘when
the seed is corrupted’ (Physics 199b6–7). Yet the suggestion that too much or too
little male seed is responsible for the generation of terata is difficult to square with
Neoplatonic spermatology: given their position that all of the formal principles are
contained in every part of the seed, no matter how small,7 how could a missing fin-
ger or hand be due to a small amount of male seed? In fact, the Neoplatonists, like
Aristotle, generally think of the matter in embryogenesis as being provided by the
female, and so the following passage from Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s
On the Soul strikes me as much more felicitous and perhaps captures better their
considered views:
But perhaps someone might raise the problem what the origin of terata is. Is
this not as a result of a deficiency or a surplus on the part of the seed? […]
My response concerning the terata is that it is the matter which is the cause,
since there is also need for a certain suitability of the matter, both in quan-
titative and in qualitative respects; and the menstrual blood is the matter of
158 The problem of teratogenesis
living beings; therefore, when this is in excess or deficient or has been made
contrary to nature, it is the cause of terata.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul 14,1–8,
van der Eijk translation slightly revised)8
This identification makes fairly clear that the problem is not exactly the inter-
ference of matter per se, that is of prime matter; rather it is the proximate form
of matter as found in the menses. The Neoplatonists did not view the menses
as a seminal principle containing form-principles corresponding to the embryo’s
parts,9 but the menses is nevertheless a composite of matter and form-principles
corresponding to its own constitution. Thus, we should think of teratogenesis as
resulting from the conflict between form-principles – those in the seed and those
in the menses.10 In order for the parts to be generated, the form-principles in the
seed require matter of a specific quality and quantity, and in cases of teratogenesis
this condition is not met. This situation may alternatively be described in terms of
the principle of suitability: the menses is not entirely suitable for reception of the
seed’s form-principles.The matter per se is the problem only in the sense that when
opposed form-principles seek extension in matter, they can no longer co-exist in
the same space, as it were, and this leads to conflict.11
While this construal of matter sits better with the Neoplatonists’ conception
of seed, it would still seem to be at odds with their overall teleological outlook
of the sensible world. At times our Neoplatonic authors even appear openly to
embrace this deviation by simply explaining teratogenesis as a case of spontaneous
causation.12 In doing so, they are employing the term ‘spontaneous’ in a radically
different sense to that familiar from Aristotle. Indeed, it seems to have nearly the
exact opposite meaning. According to Aristotle’s definition in Physics 2.6 a proc-
ess P is ‘spontaneous’ only if it meets three conditions: (i) processes of P’s type are
mostly goal-directed, (ii) P itself is not goal-directed, and (iii) P has an external
cause (Physics 197b18–20). In the domain of biology, spontaneous generations of
living things occur, briefly, when material factors come together in the absence of a
teleological formal principle in such a way that some form of life results anyway.13
Thus, Neoplatonists are in agreement with Aristotle up to a point, since both parties
would say that spontaneous generation is due to material factors, but the agreement
ends there. For Aristotle sees these factors as making a surprising positive, end-like
contribution to the world, but the Platonists see them as simply frustrating the natu-
ral formal principles that are at work in the world. It follows that the label is applied
to very different cases by each school. Although Neoplatonists agree with Aristotle
about the phenomenon of, for example, certain life forms springing non-seminally
from decaying corpses and plants, this is not a case of spontaneous generation for
them because they disagree with Aristotle about the etiology. For the Neoplatonists,
in strong contrast to Aristotle, even in such cases a soul is responsible for the crea-
tion and so they prefer the label ‘generation from putrefaction’ or ‘generation of
what is unlike’ to describe these cases. It is when something unnatural and worse,
not better, results that we have a case of Neoplatonic spontaneous generation, and
that is why we find this term employed in these cases of teratogenesis.
In the same vein, we can find these authors describing these phenomena as
cases where nature is making a mistake, resulting in an offspring that is contrary to
nature’s plan (παρὰ φύσιν).14 In spite of passages such as these, we must be careful
not to jump to any conclusions about nature failing in the sensible world. After all,
even Aristotle had sought to reintegrate these cases back into the domain of natural
phenomena, though his attempt would seem to fall short of a genuine reconcili-
ation of terata and nature. What he says is that although terata do not fall within
the scope of normal (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) nature, they do fall within that of universal
nature (φύσιν πᾶσαν) (On the Generation of Animals 770b9–11). This statement is
difficult to unpack, in part because Aristotle, unlike later Platonists, does not actu-
ally subscribe to a notion of a universal nature over and above the particular natures
of individual living things.15 On one possible interpretation his statement would
amount to saying that even terata belong to the domain of natural living things
insofar as the formal principle that gives rise to them is natural, even if it fails to
achieve its end.16 If this is right, then it is possible to find a similar line of thought
in Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,17 but ultimately one must still
concede that this approach does little to ameliorate the difficulties that terata pose
to the sovereignty of nature’s intelligible principles in the sensible world, since on
this line these principles fail in achieving their aims.
What is needed is rather the very distinction between particular natures and
universal nature that is not to be found in Aristotle but is a central feature of the
Neoplatonic world-view. How this distinction can be employed to account for
teratogenesis can best be seen by now turning from the merely quantitative cases
of terata to the qualitative cases, and in particular to a subset of these cases in
which formal components of different kinds of animals would seem to be com-
bined in the offspring. Here we must distinguish between two different classes of
such combinations. First, there is the class of human offspring whose appearance
would seem to contain features merely resembling those of some other animal, e.g.
a man with facial features resembling those of a bull. In these we have a fairly com-
mon phenomenon that was subject to much analysis in physiognomical discussions
in antiquity and late antiquity.18 It is worth noting that some of these cases involve
a certain overlap with the quantitative cases, given the terminology used to refer to
them. A man with a small head, for example, was called ‘ostrich-headed,’ and one
with short arms ‘weasel-armed.’19 The second class concerns the fantastic hybrid
creatures of mythology, such as the minotaur; that is, a man who does not merely
have a face that resembles a bull’s but actually has a bull’s head on a human body.
Whereas the minotaur and centaur present cases involving human hybrids and as
such are at least tangentially related to human embryology, most of the examples
one encounters in this class involve various combinations of non-human animals.
Nevertheless, what the Neoplatonists have to say about these latter cases does pro-
vide some insight into their approach to teratology, and for this reason we shall
briefly examine some of these accounts below.
Let us begin with the more quotidian class of terata that merely resemble
non-human animals in certain ways. Obviously, if one of the parents has such fea-
tures, the offspring would not be counted as a teras, and its appearance would be
explained in the usual way. The case that interests us here is when the appearance
cannot be accounted for by the usual hereditary factors, and this kind of teras
poses a new kind of problem that we did not encounter in the quantitative cases.
For in the case of the six-fingered man, for example, there is no need to account
for the origin of the form of the sixth finger, since form-principles of fingers are
already included in the human seed. With the bull-faced man, by contrast, it would
seem that some non-human form-principle is contaminating the formation of the
human offspring, and so some explanation is required both of the origin of this
principle and of the manner of its transmission. Aristotle had considered some such
cases in his On the Generation of Animals, but if the Neoplatonists had been exposed
to his explanation, they are unlikely to have found it satisfactory. For he explains the
bull-faced man as an instance of relapse (λύεσθαι). According to his theory, when
the male seed fails to dominate the matter, the powers in the seed can relapse into
more distant powers, first into those of the male’s forefathers, but ultimately into
the more generic powers of human being and animal. The bull-faced human, then,
is the result of the powers corresponding to the facial features relapsing back to the
order of animal (On the Generation of Animals 769b7–16, cf. 768b8–25). In other
words, Aristotle cannot account for the apparent bovinity of the facial features, but
only for their non-humanity. The fact is that he does not think that there is any
genuine bovinity to account for, since on his view the only way genuine bovine
features could become part of a human being’s constitution would be by the inter-
breeding of humans and bovines, which is impossible due to the different periods
of gestation for each species (769b22–5). Consequently, Aristotle classifies all such
instances as cases of mere likeness (ἐοικότα μόνον) (769b13–21).
It is easy to see why this simply will not do for Neoplatonists. For in the creation
of likenesses they see the paradigmatic causal relation, and so likenesses such as these
certainly invite and perhaps even demand a causal account that makes reference to
an intelligible principle. And it is here that the appeal to universal nature comes
into its own, as the following passage from Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s
Physics illustrates:
But perhaps even these [i.e. terata] are not absolutely contrary to nature, but
in respect of [their] particular nature [they are] not by nature but contrary
to nature, while in respect of universal nature [they are] both by nature and
according to nature. For the particular nature pursues one form and avoids
one privation, but the nature of the whole pursues every form and avoids
every privation. For this reason, in respect of the nature of man the teras is
neither by nature nor according to nature; but in respect of the whole of
nature, since nothing in the universe is contrary to nature (for there is no
evil in the universe), it is not contrary to nature but by nature and according
to nature – for even these things [i.e. terata] arise because nature as a whole
alters the underlying matter and makes it unsuitable for receiving the form
of the particular nature. I mean something like this: suppose the surround-
ing atmosphere [τὸ περιέχον], mixed in such and such a way by the rotation
of the heavenly [spheres], did something to the matter of the human being
that is being generated so that it [i.e. the matter] became unfitted to receive
the form which nature would naturally impose upon it: then human nature
would fail of its aim through the unsuitability of the matter, but another form
would arise, which would be contrary to nature in respect of the particular

nature, but according to nature and by nature as regards the whole of nature.
(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 201,10–25,
Lacey translation slightly revised)20
Here the explanatory economy of the appeal to universal nature is on full display.
Philoponus begins by staying true to the widely shared explanation of teratogenesis
in terms of the frustrating influence of matter, as we saw above, but now we see that
the unsuitability of the matter is only the proximate cause. For the constitution of
the matter – and here we may assume that Philoponus has the menses in mind – is
said to be determined by environmental factors, which are in turn governed by the
celestial spheres, all of which is managed by universal nature. This fits nicely with
the core theory set out in Chapter 3, where we saw that Neoplatonists acknowl-
edged the importance of environmental and celestial factors in embryology. All that
is added here is that these factors are guided by universal nature and can lead to
cases of teratogenesis.21
Yet rendering the matter unsuitable for the reception of the perfect human form
is only one part of universal nature’s contribution to teratogenesis. It also provides
an alternative form to which the matter is suitable. Philoponus does not exactly
emphasize that universal nature is the source of this alternative form – he says only
that another form will come to be (201,23) – but insofar as this alternative form is
said to be ‘in accordance with’ and ‘by’ universal nature, this would seem to be the
conclusion we are meant to draw. This conclusion finds some additional support
in Philoponus’ remarks about the forms of ‘spontaneously’ generated creatures also
being supplied by universal nature,22 and is further corroborated by its consistency
with remarks on teratogenesis made by other Neoplatonists. This is brought out
very clearly, for example, in a passage of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Cratylus,
even if his exegesis of Plato’s text does nothing to boost our confidence in Proclus’
grasp of animal husbandry. In Cratylus 393b7–c7 Plato introduces the presumably
hypothetical case of a horse giving birth to a calf, which he classifies as a ‘teras, as
it were’ (ὥσπερ τέρας), in order to make a point about the naturalness of names.
Proclus seizes on this as a straightforward empirical example and sets about explain-
ing how it is possible that calves are sometimes born of horses. The explanation
is comparable to Philoponus’ above: the calf is contrary to nature in terms of the
individual nature of the horse, which has not prevailed over the matter, but it is in
accordance with universal nature because this is where the calf ’s form derives from
(Commentary on Plato’s Cratylus §82 (38,22–39,1)). Proclus even goes so far as to
draw the implication that the calf born of a horse, insofar as its form derives from
universal nature, is not a genuine teras at all: ‘This is why Plato here does not call
these things terata simpliciter but “quasi-terata” [οἷον τέρατα], since they are not in
every way contrary to nature’ (Commentary on Plato’s Cratylus §82 (39,1–3)).23
Proclus’ suggestion that these offspring are not genuine terata and Philoponus’
indication that ‘another form’ is generated bring out some of the difficulties involved
in determining the intelligibility of terata. To begin with, we need to distinguish
between those congenital deformities that simply amount to a deficiency and those
that involve a combination. Plotinus and Proclus both deny that there is any form-
principle of lameness, for example,24 though such offspring would still presumably
be classified as being in accordance with nature insofar as universal nature is respon-
sible for the unsuitability of the matter. By contrast, the latter class of terata does
appear to correspond to form-principles, though not in the way that normal off-
spring do. As we saw in Chapter 2, non-teratogenic individuals correspond to a
unified seminal form-principle that is itself a bundle of form-principles accounting
for all of its parts. Teratogenic offspring, by contrast, do not correspond to such a
unified seminal form-principle, but insofar as they are in accordance with universal
nature, they are nevertheless intelligible in the broader sense that all of their features
are accounted for by intelligent form-principles, only these are derived from more
than one source. To this extent, such hybrid terata are comparable to mules, which
were also classified as terata because their form results from the mixture of those of
horse and donkey.25 Thus Proclus at one point describes them as ‘mixtures of forms
occurring in connection with matter’ (On the Existence of Evils 60.20–1).
There is, however, at least one passage in Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus
that suggests that forms corresponding to all possible combinations of different
form-principles have already been pre-established at the level of soul. It is here
that we come to the second class of hybrids – the fantastic creatures of mythology.
To be clear, the overall impression one gains from Neoplatonic texts is that they
did not believe that the creatures of myth really existed, at least not in the literal,
flesh-and-blood sense. Hippocentaurs, for instance, are routinely named – includ-
ing by Proclus – side by side with Aristotle’s goat-stags as examples of creatures
that exist in thought but not in nature.26 This is not to say that the Neoplatonists
did not take mythology seriously. On the contrary, as we saw in Chapter 2 Homer
and Hesiod were understood to be anticipating valuable philosophical insights, but
Neoplatonists seem to have accommodated the references to these fabulous crea-
tures by advancing non-literal interpretations of them in terms of higher, immaterial
powers.27 Nevertheless, in this one instance at least, Proclus appears to go on record
as accepting the existence of these creatures in a more literal sense. His general aim
in this passage is to describe the way in which hybrid creatures (τὰ καλούμενα
κοɩνογενῆ – cf. Plato’s Sophist 265e8) involve a mixture of genera and species forms,
and his examples leap from the prosaic (mules – cf. again Sophist 265e1–2) to the
fabulous: ‘beings that have a human face but the rest of it is like a fish, or beings
having the form of a dragon but with the face of a lion’ (Commentary on Plato’s
Timaeus 2.202,23–6, Baltzly translation), adding that many such creatures arise in
the earth and the sea. This leap from mules, which are the offspring of individuals
of two species actually interbreeding, to the likes of mermaids might invite some
entertaining speculation as to how exactly he thought the latter were spawned,28
but the real point of interest lies in his account of the metaphysical parameters of
such combination:
All of these form-principles [of combination], which determine all of the

mixtures of forms in the universe, have likely been comprehended in advance

in the soul, and no other form-principles of combination could arise apart
from these, as all things are formed according to them.
(Proclus Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 2.202,26–30)
This suggests that terata are intelligible in a much more robust sense: all of the bun-
dles of form-principles corresponding to teratological possibilities exist not only at
the level of sensible matter; rather, they pre-exist in some prior manner at the level
of soul.
Two general observations about the Neoplatonic appeal to universal nature as
the cause of teratogenesis may be added. The first concerns the subsequent history
of the appeal to universal nature as the cause of teratogenesis. We have already seen
that the mature Philoponus ultimately rejects universal nature, and it would appear
that centuries later this explanation of teratogenesis became an object of con-
troversy in Christian Byzantium. Unlike Michael of Ephesus, whose Aristotelian
explanation of teratogenesis confirms our previous findings from the Appendix to
Chapter 3 about the minimal influence of Neoplatonism on his embryology (e.g.
Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals 185,1–29), several other
nearly contemporaneous Christian thinkers also associated with the university
in Constantinople showed themselves much more willing to adopt Neoplatonic
lines of thought. At the time this was not without its dangers. In 1082 CE John
Italus was condemned for his misguided Platonic views, which at the very least
included the doctrine of Platonic Forms and the transmigration of souls.29 Against
this background it is perhaps surprising to find the universal nature explanation of
teratogenesis advanced by John’s teacher, Michael Psellus, as well as by his student,
Eustratius of Nicaea,30 and Psellus at least, who had also found himself subject to
accusations of pursuing Platonism beyond the limits permitted by Christian doc-
trine,31 even signals the tension with Christian doctrine at one point and reverses
direction. His treatise Different Solutions to the Problems in Nature contains two sepa-
rate discussions of teratology.32 In one, he straightforwardly gives the Neoplatonic
explanation via universal nature, without indicating in any way that he does not
accept this account.33 In the other he attributes this account to ‘the Greeks who
take their wisdom too far’ (οἱ περιττοὶ τὴν σοφίαν Ἕλληνες, Different Solutions to
the Problems in Nature 16.50–1), and he objects specifically to the ‘illogical’ con-
jecture regarding the existence of universal nature (16.79–81). As he spells out
elsewhere, his complaint is that this conjecture goes against Christian scripture
(Op. psych. theol. daem. 119,30–120,1).
Perhaps this perceived conflict with scripture has something to do with our
second observation, which concerns the nagging misgivings one might have at
the thought of welcoming deformed children back into the fold of nature’s design.
While those born with crippling disabilities might take some comfort in the idea
that these congenital physical impediments are not just a case of bad luck but a part
of some divine plan, one cannot help but wonder what universal nature is trying to
achieve by setting up certain individuals to go through life with the added challenge
of deformity and disability. The answer to this quandary will come as no surprise
to those familiar with the Platonic doctrine of transmigration. Olympiodorus
succinctly presents the solution in his comments on the eschatological myth in
Plato’s Gorgias. When a disembodied soul is to return to the sensible world, then
‘in accordance with its individual worth it receives once again an organic home in
this world.They [i.e. the souls] receive their organs of one kind or another, whether
maimed, disabled, or whatever, to match their previous constitution’ (Commentary on
Plato’s Gorgias §50.3 (264,28–31), Jackson et al. translation).34 Moreover, although
this should be seen as a punishment for past wrongdoings, Neoplatonists, true to
Plato, place the emphasis on rehabilitation rather than retribution. To paraphrase
Olympiodorus, if being born into a deformed body makes no contribution to the
improvement of the soul, then nature has acted in vain (§50.2 (263,20–5)). To this
we shall add only that universal nature’s aim in teratogenesis is not always focused
on the rehabilitation of descending souls. So much is clear from the fact that many
cases of teratogenesis were known to result in miscarriages.35 In such cases universal
nature’s care is presumably directed at the parents or the community.
Let us conclude by taking notice of how the core theory outlined in Chapter
3 is designed to disarm a teratological concern of an entirely different order, one
which may be seen as the Neoplatonic pendant to one of the central questions of
contemporary evolutionary biology, namely how the world influences living things
in such a way that new species come about. For the Neoplatonists the problem is
spun the other way; they want to establish that species forms remain stable over
endless generations, and it was not the possibility of evolution towards higher levels
of fitness that was seen as a serious theoretical threat at the time, but rather the
possibility of devolution; that is, the possibility of increasing levels of deformity with
each new generation.
The anti-Hegelian idea that the world and its inhabitants are somehow devolv-
ing from a golden age of bliss and wisdom into lower and lower forms of existence
necessitating toil and ignorance was widespread in antiquity. Hesiod made this idea
famous in his account of the five ages of man (Works and Days 109–201), which
clearly had some impact on Plato’s thought, not only in the Sophist myth but also
in his discussion of the decline of the Kallipolis in Republic books 8–9, where Plato
seems to exploit this pessimistic intuition with an explicit reference to Hesiod.36
This may be compared to the prologue of the Timaeus, in which the original
Athenians were born of divine seed and far excelled the city’s subsequent inhabit-
ants (Timaeus 23b7–24a2), and to the Critias, where Plato describes the divinity
in mankind as growing fainter and fainter until they appear ‘hideous’ (αἰσχροί) to
those who are able to see them for what they are.37 Some of the Stoics also seem to
have emphasized the superiority of early humans over their descendants.38 And yet
for the subject of our study perhaps the most significant nod in this direction comes
from the Jewish tradition of the Pentateuch. In Genesis 1–2 the first human beings
are described as having been created by God’s own hand, whereas all subsequent
human beings are created by other human beings. Moreover, since Adam and Eve
are hardly God’s equals, they are bound to produce inferior offspring, which then
would be expected to produce inferior offspring in turn.This decline is reflected in

the decreasing lifespans of the generations.Whereas the generations between Adam
and Noah generally live nearly a millennium each, Abraham is described as dying
‘an old man, full of years’ at the age of 175.39
The Jewish Platonist Philo, in his commentary on Genesis, picks up on these
indications of decline and uses them as an opportunity to make a case for retrograde
evolution:
Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul, surpassing all
the men that now are, and all that have been before us. For our beginning
is from men, whereas God created him, and the more eminent the maker is,
so much better is the work. For as that which is in bloom is always better
than that whose bloom is past, be it animal or plant or fruit or aught else in
nature, so the man first fashioned was clearly the bloom of our entire race,
and never have his descendants attained the like bloom, forms, and faculties
ever feebler having been bestowed on each succeeding generation. I have
observed the same thing happening in the case of sculpture and painting: the
copies are inferior to the originals, and what is painted or molded from the
copies still more so, owing to their long distance from the original. Much
the same appears in the case of the magnet: for the iron ring which touches
it is held most forcibly, but that which touches this one less so. A third hangs
on to the second, and a fourth on to the third, and a fifth on to the fourth,
and so on in a long series, all held together by one attracting force, only not
all alike, for those removed from the starting point are getting continuously
looser, owing to the attraction being relaxed and losing its power to grip as
it did before. Mankind has evidently undergone something of the same kind.
As generation follows generation the powers and qualities of body and soul
which men receive are feebler.
(Philo On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses §§140–1,
Colson and Whitaker translation slightly revised)40
It is entirely reasonable that this theory of retrograde evolution would appeal to

one such as Philo. As a pious Jew the story of the creation of the world in Genesis
is bound to have considerable authority for him, even if his ultimate interpreta-
tion of this text is influenced by his understanding of Plato’s Timaeus.41 Indeed, the
paths of influence probably ran in both directions. His adherence to the account of
Genesis is likely to have been a key factor in his developing and defending the literal
interpretation of the Demiurge’s creation of the universe in the Timaeus, although

in Aristotle, Alexander, and the Middle Platonists Atticus and Plutarch Philo would
have found good company for his literal interpretation.42 The thesis of a unique,
discrete43 creation is a natural complement to the thesis of retrograde evolution.
After all, if things have been getting worse for the entire lifespan of the universe, and
the universe’s lifespan had no beginning, then one might expect things to be in a
much worse state in the present than they actually are. More importantly, however,
the theory of retrograde evolution would seem to imply a certain genealogical con-
ception of participation in the Forms that ultimately demands a unique and discrete
creation account. Rather than putting forward the view that each individual human
being has a direct and immediate connection to the Form of Human Being, as is
generally thought to be the case by contemporary and late ancient scholars alike,
Philo appears to suggest here that one’s relation to the Form of Human Being is
mediated through one’s ancestors.
Philo’s theory of retrograde evolution poses a formidable challenge to later
Platonists who wish to preserve the integrity of the species over all time. The chal-
lenge is so formidable because Philo’s position would seem simply to be the logical
result of two premises that Platonists should find unobjectionable. The first is the
now familiar PIP principle, illustrated here by Philo’s analogy to magnets and copies
in art. The second is the prima facie undeniable (if somewhat mundane) observa-
tion that the parents produce their offspring.44 Taken together, it would appear to
follow that each generation of offspring is an inferior copy of the previous genera-
tion.45 Plotinus even bears witness to this challenge in a vexingly dialectical chapter
of his treatise On Whether the Stars are Causes, where he articulates a view that he
ultimately opposes and that is very close to that of Philo above:
This is, perhaps, why what comes later in the series is always worse. Men, for
instance, were quite different once from what they are now, since by reason
of the [space] between [them and their origins] and the continual pressure of
necessity their form-principles have yielded to the affections of matter.
(Plotinus Ennead 2.3.16.27–9, Armstrong translation slightly revised)
The Neoplatonists, however, meet this challenge and collectively reject Philo’s
genealogical account of participation. This rejection begins with their understand-
ing of the creation account in the Timaeus, which they do not take to mean that
the cosmos came into being some finite time ago. Rather, they were more or
less in agreement that the physical world was beginningless, and that the Timaeus’
discussion of the world being ‘generated’ should be understood as a didactic tool
that is meant to help the reader see that the sensible world is continually depend-
ent for its being on its intelligible cause, namely the Demiurgic Intellect and the
Forms.46 In fact, the beginninglessness and endlessness of the cosmos and all of the
species within it follow from their metaphysics of procession and reversion, which
demands that the timeless activity of the Intellect is the production of a sensible
image of itself and all of its contents (the Forms). Thus, there can be no Adam; that
is, no first human being that is directly brought into existence by divine causes in a
way that subsequent human beings are not.
Nor do they concede that normal biological reproduction necessarily entails
the generational decline envisioned by Philo, despite their universal acceptance of
the PIP principle. This is because in some sense they take issue with Philo’s second
premise. As we have now seen, the parents are certainly the proximate causes of the
offspring, but their causal efficacy is tied to their being part of the entire ontologi-
cal hierarchy. In each act of biological creation, the form-principles in the seed are
not simply transferred as images from the father to the offspring, but also restored
by a series of higher causes that begins with the mother’s nature or soul and reaches
all the way to the corresponding Forms.47 In other words, it is wrong to think of
the origin of a given human being’s form-principles as simply a genealogical or
‘horizontal’ affair, where each individual is caused by an individual of an earlier
generation; rather, to take up again Philo’s analogy to art, the stable integrity of all
the copies is safeguarded because each of them is checked, as it were, against the
original. In this way Neoplatonists sought to neutralize the concern that the natural
sequence of reproduction over generations necessarily entails deformity and a dete-
rioration of the sensible world’s intelligibility, and thus to eliminate a considerable
perceived threat to the successfulness of the sensible world.
Notes
1 For an overview of earlier explanations of terata, see Bien (1997).
2 Porphyry AG 12.6 (51,22–3), where Porphyry simply describes terata as instances of
nature failing to achieve the form. One may also count Porphyry’s remarks on ideoplasty
as an explanation of at least some cases of teratogenesis (see Chapter 3, p. 68, and Bien
(1997: 82–4)).
3 See Bien (1999: 67): ‘Galen hat keine umfassende Mißbildungstheorie früherer Autoren
explizit vertreten oder gar selbst eine eigene Mißbildungstheorie aufgestellt. Dennoch
äußert er sich an verschiedenen Stellen seines Werkes zu Fehlbildungsphänomenen.’
4 For example Ammonius In De Int. 138,6–7 (cf. In De Int. 250,24–31); Asclepius In Meta
369,22–5 and 446,11–15; Philoponus In Phys. 201,10–202,16; 269,17–22; 291,10–23;
318,29–31; 319,6–9; 320,8–9; In DA 14,1–8; In Cat. 128,2–4 (and cf. In Cat. 190,24–6);
Proclus In Tim. 2.266,11–16 (cf. De mal. subst. 60; Simplicius In Phys. 362,5–6;Themistius
Paraphr. in Phys. 56,15–21 and Paraphr. in Phys. 62,8–10. Cf. John of Alexandria In Hipp.
Nat. Puer. 130,24–8; Psellus Op. psych. theol. daem. 33,20–5; Michael of Ephesus In GA
189,3–13.
5 For example Ammonius In Isag. 16,9–12; Asclepius In Meta. 365,30–4; 369,22–5; In Nic.
Arith. 106.22–7 (p. 44); Olympiodorus In Alc. 94,11–22; Philoponus In APr 61,14–23;
In Cat. 128,2–4; In Phys. 262,23–8; 267,5–6; 269,17–22; Simplicius In Phys. 339,28–34;
Syrianus In Hermog. 2.98,18 and 2.126,15; Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,15–21. Cf.
Eustratius In EN VI 367,26–32; 375,33–376,4; Michael of Ephesus In Meta. 452,11–16;
In GA 189,3–13.
6 Philoponus In Phys. 319,6–9; In Phys. 320,8–9; Simplicius In Phys. 381,10–11;Themistius
Paraphr. in Phys. 62,8–10. Cf. Plotinus 3.1.1.34–5, where a ‘well-flowing seed’ (εὔρους εἰς
παιδοποιίαν <γονὴ>) is listed as one factor in the success of reproduction, but the text is
uncertain here. γονή has been inserted by Theiler, presumably incorrectly, since Plotinus
otherwise always uses σπέρμα for seed. (The term γονή occurs only once in the Enn.,
namely at 1.3.1.8, where Plotinus is quoting Plato Phdr. 248d1–4. Possibly the text was
originally making a point about the need for an ample womb by means of the Homeric
locution εὐρὺς κόλπος, though this would also be the only occurrence of κόλπος in the
Enn. On the narrow uterus as a cause of terata, see Bien (1997: 136–8)).
8 Psellus appropriates this account in Op. psych. theol. daem. 33,20–1.
9 See Chapter 3, pp. 59–60, and cf. 50n6.They devoted very little attention to the problems
surrounding maternal resemblance for one-seed theorists, but there are indications that
they thought the mother’s lower soul was responsible. See Chapter 3, pp. 59, 66–7 and 72.
10 I would like to thank Jan Opsomer for the insightful suggestion that there might be an
interesting parallel between two different approaches to explaining teratogenesis and two
familiar Neoplatonic approaches to accounting for evil. On the one approach (Plotinus),
matter is simply the cause of evil, whereas on the latter (Iamblichus, Proclus), there is
no single cause of evil but various accidental causes, including conflicting forms. Thus,
one could imagine that there are two corresponding approaches to teratogenesis: simply
pointing to matter and pointing to accidental causes such as conflicts between form-
principles. Be that as it may, it is worth noting that those authors who take pains to avoid
simply pointing to the negative influence of matter as the cause of teratogenesis tend to
go in the direction of saying that the terata are not genuine terata at all, and thus not evil
but rather part of the divine plan.
11 See Plotinus 3.2.2.18–23.
12 See, for example, Asclepius In Meta. 365,30–4; Philoponus In Phys. 262,23–8; 269,17–
22; 291,10–23; Simplicius In Phys. 261,15–17 (where Fleet’s ‘portent’ is an infelicitous
translation of teratos); In Phys. 339,28–34; Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,15–21. For a
fuller discussion of spontaneous generation in Neoplatonism, see Wilberding (2011b)
and (2012).
13 Condition (i) is met because biological generation is usually a process guided by a for-
mal and final cause. For a discussion of some of the tensions and problems in Aristotle’s
theory of spontaneous generation, see Balme (1962), Lennox (1982), Gotthelf (1989) and
Henry (2003).
14 For example Ps.-Alexander Probl. 2.47 (65,36–66,2); Philoponus In APr 152,13–16; In
Phys. 262,23–8; 269,21; 291,10–23; 307,21–2; 309,21–4; 310,12; 316,10–12; 331,9–11;
Porphyry AG 12.6 (51,22–3); Simplicius In Phys. 271,10–15; 374,24–6; 380,26–381,1;
Ps.-Simplicius In DA 294,10–16; Themistius Paraphr. in APr 17,9; Paraphr. in Phys. 37,8–
10. Cf. Alexander Manti. 178,10–11; De fato 193,14–16; Proclus In Remp. 1.66,1–3;
Eustratius In EN VI 375,33–376,4.
15 For this view, see, for example, Nussbaum (1978: 95–8); Cooper (2004: 127n13); Judson
(2005: passim) and Bostock (2006: 54).
16 Such an interpretation could appeal to GA 767b13–15.
17 Philoponus In Phys. 269,17–22 and 273,14–16. Cf. Aristotle Phys. 199a33–b7.
18 See Swain (ed.) (2007).
19 For the ostrich-headed (στρουθοκέφαλος), see Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 56,17. Cf.
Plutarch Mor. 520C and Ps.-Galen Def. med. 19.454,3 K., and see Bien (1997: 71). For
the weasel-armed (γαλεάγκων or γαλιάγκων), see Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg.16.205. Cf.
Ps.-Aristotle Physiogn. 808a31–2 and Plutarch Mor. 520c.
20 Cf. In Phys. 201,25–202,21. As Jan Opsomer has kindly pointed out to me, there are
very close parallels between this text and Proclus’ De mal. subst. 27.10–18 and 60.1–43.
Further parallels to Proclus are discussed below.
21 One interesting detail in his account is that Philoponus allows the celestial things only a
mediated causal role: their motions influence the environment. In other words, he is not
envisioning here any kind of direct causality by means of the rays issued from the indi-
vidual planets and stars, though as we saw above this, too, figures into some Neoplatonic
accounts of embryology and could easily supplement the account given here. We have
already seen, for example, that Proclus thinks the position of the stars can lead to terata
(see Chapter 3, p. 87) and the theory that Michael Psellus sketches, according to which
deformities of specific parts of the body are connected to the positions of individual
celestial bodies, might well derive from a Neoplatonic source. See Psellus Op. log. phys.
alleg. 16.50–72. Cf. Ideler Physici et Medici Minores, vol. 1, 387,1–13 and Ptolemy Tetrab.
3.8–9 (3.447–547 (pp. 195–201)).
22 See, for example., Philoponus In GC 169,4–23; In DA 52,4–25; 270,13–16; In Phys.
191,9–29; 403,19–31. These passages are discussed in Chapter 4, p. 147.
23 Proclus In Crat. §82 (39,1–3). Proclus is presumably thinking of ὥσπερ τέρας in Crat.
393b9. See also Proclus De mal. subst. 60.1–28, where Proclus describes creatures that
‘appear’ to be terata.
24 Plotinus Enn. 5.9.10.2–5; Proclus De mal. subst. 44.17–18.

25 Of the mule Philoponus says that it cannot reproduce because its nature is not pure,
neither horse nor mule (In DA 267,29–32: ἱστοροῦσι δὲ ὅτι κυήσασαί ποτε ἡμίονοι
ἐξήμβλωσαν, μὴ δυνηθείσης τῆς φύσεως τελεσφορῆσαι τὸ κυηθὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι
εἰλικρινῆ μηδετέραν φύσιν, μήτε τὴν ἵππου μήτε τὴν ὄνου, ἀλλ’ ἑκατέραν πήρωμα
εἶναι). On mules, see also Ammonius In Isag. 125,9–20; Asclepius In Meta. 95,19–22;
404,25–31; 406,1–7; 411,8–13; Philoponus Aet. Mund. 12,14–24; Porphyry Isag. 19,1–3;
Syrianus In Meta. 107,27–31.
26 For example Ammonius In Isag. 39,14–40,6; Asclepius In Meta. 75,11–12; Elias In Isag.
47,6–9; Philoponus In Cat. 9,17–18 (cf. In GC 44,13–16); Proclus In Parm. 885,8–13;
Simplicius In Cat. 270,25–30. Cf. Themistius Paraphr. in Phys. 102,7–8.
27 For example Hermias In Phdr. 33,5–7 (30,27–9 Courveur).
28 He limits himself to the generic claim that they are ‘constituted’ (συνέστηκεν), which
hardly commits him to the possibility of reproduction via bestiality, though cf. Plutarch
Mor. 990F–991A.
29 See Hussey (2010: 142–6).
30 Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.188–206 and Eustratius In APo II 157,6–13 (cf.
Eustratius In EN VI 367,26–32 and 375,33–376,4).
31 Hussey (2010: 143).
32 Michael Psellus ἕτεραι ἐπιλύσεις φυσικῶν ἀπορημάτων πρὸς τοὺς ἰδίους μαθητὰς καὶ
ἑτέρους ἐπερωτῶντας in Op. log. phys. alleg. 16 (pp. 47–56). The two discussions are
contained in problem two, ποίᾳ αἰτίᾳ τῶν βρεφῶν τὰ μέν εἰσιν ἐλλιπῆ, τὰ δὲ ἄρτια
(16.33–83), and problem six, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν τῶν γεννωμένων τινὰ τερατοειδῆ γίνονται
(16.187–213).
33 Michael Psellus Op. log. phys. alleg. 16.188–206. He does append to this account two
alternative accounts offered by astronomers and the Hippocratics (16.207–13).
34 See also Proclus In Tim. 1.51,13–52,3.
35 See, for example, Philoponus In Phys. 314,4–5 and 322,7; Porphyry AG 12.6 (51,21–3);
Simplicius In Phys. 372,8–9.
36 See Rep. 547a1. On Plato’s appropriation of Hesiod in the Soph., see El Murr (2010) and
Rowe (2010).
37 Plato Crit. 121a8–b4, though Plato here is surely envisioning a moral rather than physical
decline. See also Phlb. 16c7–8.
38 See Posidonius Fr. 284 Edelstein-Kidd (Fr. 448 Theiler).
39 Gen. 25:7–8, cf. Gen. 5:4 and 9:29.
40 Philo scholars debate whether this doctrine of degeneration was drawn from Stoic
theory. The source in question is usually Posidonius (see note 38). Such influence is
defended by Früchtel (1968: 37–8) and Theiler (1971: 25–35). Runia resists this sugges-
tion (1986, 386n106), in the opinion that ‘the parallels between Opif. and the Senecan
passage are not sufficient to assume a common source…. The notion of a Golden Age
and subsequent decline was widespread in Greek literature.’ Moreover, as I understand
Runia (386n107) he wants to cast doubt on Philo’s actual commitment to the doctrines
outlined in this passage, insisting that ‘Philo does not exhibit anything like true historical
thinking here…The fate of the first man is exemplaristic of what happens to the soul,
and so can profitably be allegorized (§154–66).’ But I do no find Runia’s suggestion
that the allegorization of §154–66 should be read back into §140–1 convincing, and I
suspect that Früchtel (36–40) is right that, if anything, the allegorical reading goes the
other way around. Philo’s interpretation of the Fall of Man amounts to this account of
retrograde evolution: ‘Er berichtet nie vom Sündenfall als einem einmaligen Geschehen,
sondern immer nur in der oben beschriebenen Weise von einer Abwärtsentwicklung der
Menschheit…Es zeigt sich, daß Philo nur eine allegorische Deutung der jahwistische
Sündenfallgeschichte kennt.’
41 On this see Runia (1986), Dörrie and Baltes (1987–2008, vol. 5: 398ff.), and Sterling
(1992).
42 See Aristotle DC 280a28–34 and Proclus In Tim. 1.276,30–277,3, and cf. Sorabji (2005,
vol. 2: 162).
43 I am consciously avoiding the term ‘temporal.’ As Baltes (1976–8, vol. 1: 32 and 87ff.)
has pointed out, time for Philo is created with the sensible world, so that creation cannot
take place in time. See Opific. Mund. §26; Leg. alleg. 1.2 and 2.3; Aet. Mund. §§52–4. That
said, Frick (1999: 100n29) is quite right to draw our attention to De decalogo §58 where
Philo does indeed say there was a time when there was no cosmos.
44 Philo appears to have been open to Hierocles’ understanding (apud Stobaeus Anthol.
4.640,8–10 = Ramelli (2009: 82–3)) of the Tim.’s ‘visible gods’ who assist God in cre-
ation as human parents who act as agents of God by ‘molding the living being in the
womb’ (De decalogo §120) and thereby imitating God’s creative act.Their creative activity
is limited to the body, or at least it does not encompass the entire soul, as ‘the divine part’
is said to come ‘from outside’ (Opific. Mund. §67; Her. §184). See Runia (1986: 252–3).
45 Though I make this point immediately below, I should emphasize here that the
Neoplatonists will reject this second premise.
46 The notable exception would be the late Philoponus. See Sorabji (2005, vol. 2: 162–89)
and Baltes (1976–8).
47 See the discussion in Chapter 3.The general point made here has already been succinctly
observed in Menn (1998: 116).
EPILOGUE
The present study was launched with the bold claim that Neoplatonic philosophers
succeeded in setting out an embryological theory that was revolutionary in the
way that it allocated causal roles to the male and the female, yet this new move-
ment was labeled a quiet revolution in large part because of how Neoplatonists
refrained from stressing the novelty of their theory by comparing and contrasting
their views to those of their most notable predecessors. This was seen to be con-
nected to a number of puzzles that collectively amounted to wondering how it
could be that the Neoplatonists of all people ended up with such a revolutionary
take on embryological etiology, given both their record of disinterest in Aristotle’s
biological treatises and more generally their reputation for being averse to the natu-
ral sciences that had been assigned to them in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
scholarship. One aim of the preceding chapters has simply been to demonstrate
the extent of Neoplatonic interest in embryology by going through a significant
amount of embryological material found in their surviving writings, and the closer
examination of this material has also shown it possible to discern a core embryolog-
ical theory that was shared by the major Neoplatonist thinkers of late antiquity and
that includes as a hallmark feature this new understanding of the male and female
contributions. Regarding the puzzles, our results would appear to confirm the sug-
gestion offered in the Introduction, namely that both the scope and the contours of
their embryological program were determined by higher-order concerns, such as
showing that the sensible world is a fair image of the intelligible.
These results should be seen as a significant advance in our understanding of
the Neoplatonists and of the history of embryology, and they open up new avenues
for future research. One such avenue, for example, would concern the possible
implications that the maternal actualization theory has for the general Neoplatonic
picture of women. If Aristotle’s biology is often cited as evidence of a rather misog-
ynistic world-view, then why should the embryology of the Neoplatonists not be
172 Epilogue
counted as evidence of their distancing themselves from such a world-view? My

own impression is that this more commensurate embryological understanding of
women was not accompanied by a more commensurate social and political view
of women.This impression is partly due to the said quietness of their approach: just
as the Neoplatonists never trumpet their theory as an improvement over earlier
theories, neither do they ever seize the opportunity to depict their own concep-
tion of the female as an important correction to earlier views on the female.1
Moreover, it is hard to remain hopeful that, for example, Porphyry, the first advo-
cate of the maternal actualization theory, advanced the cause of women, given that
he admonished his wife to ‘flee from every womanly element of the soul as if you
were clothed in a man’s body.’2 That said, there is certainly enough of interest on
male and female roles in Neoplatonic texts to warrant a fuller examination, and
any further research that should show this impression to be inaccurate would be
warmly welcomed.
This study also calls for a re-evaluation of the influence of Neoplatonism in the
subsequent history of embryology. One of the incongruities of the current state of
research in this area is that even though there has been no previous examination
of the embryological theories of the Neoplatonists of late antiquity, there has been
no shortage of scholars seeing Neoplatonic influence on later figures in the history
of embryology. What scholars mostly have in mind in these instances are cases in
which certain features generally associated with the Neoplatonic world-view, such
as the World-Soul or the pneumatic body or immaterial powers, are incorporated
into later embryological theories,3 but the results achieved here allow for these
questions of influence to be asked with much greater precision. For by extending
the methodology employed in the Appendix to Chapter 3 to later cases of suspected
influence, it is possible to determine which, if any, of these authors are staying true
to the core theory as it is found in the Neoplatonists of late antiquity, and which
are, in a more general and eclectic manner, simply adopting this or that feature of
Neoplatonism into their own thought. Such a procedure would help to establish
whether any later thinkers were engaging directly with Neoplatonic embryology itself
as opposed to merely applying the broader general framework of Neoplatonism to
embryology.4 It would be particularly interesting to know what, if any, afterlife the
theory of maternal actualization enjoyed once the Greek Neoplatonists surrendered
their thought to subsequent cultures and traditions. The Renaissance Neoplatonist
Marsilio Ficino, for example, would be an obvious candidate for a recipient of the
full Neoplatonic embryology, given his extensive output, his access to the major
texts of the tradition, and his overall commitment to the movement, and one can
indeed find Ficino acknowledging the core theses of Neoplatonic embryology, but
the thesis of maternal actualization might be an exception to this rule.5 By contrast,
it is possible to identify other authors in the history of embryology who involve the
mother’s soul in the process of embryogenesis, though in these cases it is not clear
that her role is the actualization of potential form-principles, as the Neoplatonists
of late antiquity thought.6 Future research along these lines would do us a great
service. By listening for the distinctive voices of Neoplatonic embryology in the
Epilogue 173
chorus of history, we might discover the enduring echoes that render this revolu-
tion not so quiet after all.
Notes
1 Perhaps, however, passages such as Plotinus Enn. 3.6.19 and Proclus Theol. Plat. 4.10
(4.33,17–34,3) deserve more consideration in this connection.
2 Porphyry Ad Marc. §33 (125,23–126,2 (296,2–4 Nauck)), O’Brien Wicker translation
slightly revised. To be fair to Porphyry, however, it should be said that just prior to this
he instructs his wife to ‘not be overly concerned about whether your body is male or
female’ (125,21–2 (295,23–296,1 Nauck)), which is surely picking up on Plato’s restric-
tion of the differences between males and females to the body (Rep. 454b4–457c2).
3 For some examples of these general claims of Neoplatonic influence, especially in
Renaissance embryology, see Hirai (2005) and (2011) and Pagel (1985). For examples
drawn from the Cambridge Platonists and the seventeenth century, see Bodemer (1974).
4 See, for example, Hirai (2011: 34–9), where Nicolò Leoniceno’s embryology is shown to
be directly influenced by Simplicius’ remarks on embryology in his In Phys.
5 See especially his Theol. Plat. 11.4.10 (vol. 3, pp. 256ff. Allen and Hankins). Here we
find Ficino discussing embryology’s connection to the theory of Forms, and his discus-
sion appears to be following the lead that Proclus set in In Parm. 791,21ff. (examined in
Chapter 3). The seed is said to contain form-principles in potentiality (Non tamen sunt
in semine corporeo nisi potentia; cf. Proclus In Parm. 792,7–9) and requires an actual agent
to lead them to a state of actuality: Insuper inesse actu necessarium est. Quod enim est poten-
tia tale, tamquam imperfectum, in aliquid actu tale non aliter quam per aliquid, quod actu tale
sit perfectiusque, produci potest (cf. Proclus In Parm. 792,9–11). But whereas Proclus then
introduces the nature of the mother as the proximate agent of actualization (In Parm.
792,11–15), Ficino offers this obscure remark: Insunt ergo singularum animantis partium
specie differentium singulae rationes atque excisa, si fieri potest, saepissime recreentur. There is
no mention of maternal actualization in Hirai’s (2007: 33–56) examination of Ficino’s
understanding of the seed.
6 Consider, for example, the remark by Cosmas Indicopleustes to the effect that stillborn
babies had access to the rational soul while in the womb (Chist.Top. 7.78 (p. 187)), which
Scholten (2005: 410–11) takes to mean that the embryo has access to the rational soul
of the mother, or the report by Weisser (1983: 231) that Ibn Al-Quff (thirteenth century)
held that the embryo was looked after by the mother’s soul until it acquired its own
rational soul.
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Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (In APr)
Wallies, M. (1905). Ioannis Philoponi In Aristotelis Analytica priora commentaria. CAG 13,2.
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On the Creation of the World (Opific. Mund.)

Scholten, C. (1997). Johannes Philoponos. De opificio mundi. Über die Erschaffung der Welt.
3 Volumes. Herder, Freiburg.
Reichardt, G. (1897). Joannis Philoponi De opificio mundi. Teubner, Leipzig.
LONGINUS
Fragments (Fr.)
Brisson, L. and M. Patillon (1994). ‘Longinus Platonicus Philosophus et Philologus. I.
Longinus Philosophus,’ in ANRW II.36,7: 5214–99.

Männlein-Robert, I. (2001). Longin. Philologe und Philosoph. Eine Interpretation der erhaltenen
Zeugnisse. K.G. Saur, Munich and Leipzig.
LUCIAN
Auction of Lives (Vitarum Auctio)
Macleod, M. D. (1974). Luciani Opera.Tomus II, libelli 26–43. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
MARINUS
On the Life of Proclus or On Happiness (VPr)
Saffrey, H. D. and A.-P. Segonds (2002). Marinus. Proclus ou sur le bonheur. Les Belles Lettres,
Paris.
MARSILIO FICINO
Platonic Theology (Theol. Plat.)
Allen, M. J. B. and J. Hankins (2001–6). Marsilio Ficino. Platonic Theology. 6 volumes. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
MICHAEL OF EPHESUS
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics VI–XIV (In Meta.)
Hayduck, M. (1891). Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria. CAG 1.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics V (In EN V)
Hayduck, M. (1901). Michaelis Ephesii In Librum Quintum Ethicorum Nichomacheorum. CAG
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics IX–X (In EN IX–X)
Heylbut, G. (1892). Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nichomachea Commentaria. CAG
20. Reimer, Berlin: 461–620.
Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals (In GA)
Hayduck, M. (1903). Ioannis Philoponi (Michaelis Ephesii) In Libros De Generatione Animalium
Commentaria. CAG 24,3. Reimer, Berlin.
Commentaries on Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals, On the Motion of Animals, and
On the Progression of Animals (In PA, In MA, In IA)
Hayduck, M. (1904). Michaelis Ephesii In Libros De Partibus Animalium, De Animalium Motione,
De Animalium Incessu Commentaria. Reimer, Berlin.
Preus, A. (1981). Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus. On the Movement and Progression of Animals.
Translated with introduction and notes. Georg Olms, Hildesheim and New York.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia (In PN)
Wendland, P. (1903). Michaelis Ephesii In Parva Naturalia Commentaria. CAG 22,1. Reimer,
Berlin.
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MICHAEL PSELLUS
Minor Orations (Orat. min.)
Littlewood, A. R. (1985). Michaelis Pselli Oratio Minora. Teubner, Leipzig.
Shorter Works on Logic, Physics, Allegory, etc. (Op. log. phys. alleg.)
Duffy, J. M. (1992). Michaelis Pselli Philosophica Minora.Vol. I: Opuscula logica, physica, allegorica,
alia. Teubner, Stuttgart and Leipzig.
Shorter Works on Psychology,Theology, and Demonology (Op. psych. theol. daem.)
O’Meara, D. J. (1989). Michaelis Pselli Philosophica Minora. Vol. II: Opuscula psychologica, theo-
logica, daemonologica. Teubner, Leipzig.

Theologica
Gautier, P. (1989). Michaelis Pselli Theologica.Volume 1. Teubner, Leipzig.
Westerink, L. G. and J. M. Duffy (2002). Michael Psellus Theologica. Volume 2. Saur, Munich
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Various Doctrines (De omnif. doctr.)
Westerink, L. G. (1948). Michael Psellus De Omnifaria Doctrina. J. L. Beijers, Utrecht.
NEMESIUS
On the Nature of Man (Nat. hom.)
Morani, M. (1987). Nemesii Emeseni De Natura Hominis. Teubner, Leipzig.
Sharples, R. W. and P. J. van der Eijk (2008). Nemesius. On the Nature of Man. Liverpool
University Press, Liverpool.
OLYMPIODORUS
Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology (In Meteor.)
Stüve, G. (1900). Olympiodori In Aristotelis Meteora Commentaria. CAG 12,2. Reimer, Berlin.
Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I (In Alc.)
Westerink, L. G. (1956). Olympiodorus. Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato. North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias (In Gorg.)
Westerink, L. G. (1970). Olympiodori In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria. Teubner, Leipzig.
Jackson, R., K. Lycos and H. Tarrant (1998). Olympiodorus. Commentary of Plato’s Gorgias.
Translated with Full Notes. Brill, Leiden.
Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo (In Phd.)
Westerink, L. G. (1975). The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Vol. 1 – Olympiodorus.
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Prolegomena and Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (Proleg. and In Cat.)
Busse, A. (1902). Olympiodori Prolegomena et in Categorias Commentarium. CAG 12,1. Reimer,
Berlin.
Olympiodorus (?) Commentary on Paul of Alexandria (In Paul. Alex.)
Boer, A. (1962). Heliodori, ut dicitur, in Paulum Alexandrinum commentarium. Teubner, Leipzig.
ORPHICS
Fragments (Orph. Fr.)
Kern, O. (1963). Orphicorum Fragmenta. 2nd edition. Weidmann, Berlin.
PHILO JUDAEUS
Works not listed below are cited according to:
Cohn, L. (1896–1926). Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt. 7 Volumes. Reimer, Berlin.
On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (Opific. Mund.)
Cohn, L. (1896). Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt.Volume 1. Reimer, Berlin: 1–60.
184 Bibliography
Colson, F. H. and G. H.Whitaker (1981). Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes).
Volume I. Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
2–137 and 435–6.
Runia, D.T. (2001). Philo of Alexandria. On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses. Brill, Leiden.
PLATO
Tetralogies I–II
Duke, E. A., W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson and J. C. G. Strachan (1995).
Platonis Opera I. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Tetralogies III–IX (except Rep.)
Burnet, I. (1901–7). Platonis Opera II–V. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Republic (Rep.)
Slings, S. R. (2003). Platonis Rempublicam. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Timaeus (Tim.)
Burnet, I. (1901–7). See above.
Archer-Hind, R. D. (1888). The Timaeus of Plato. Macmillan, London.
Cornford, F. M. (1937). Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato translated with a running
Commentary. Routledge, London.
Müller, H. (1857). Platons sämmtliche Werke, übersetzt von Hieronymus Müller. Volume 6.
Brockhaus, Leipzig. Translation reprinted in U. Wolf (ed.) (1994) Platon. Sämtliche Werke.
Volume 4. Rowohlt, Reinbek.
Paulsen, T. and R. Rehn (2003). Platon.Timaios. Reclam, Stuttgart.
Rivaud, A. (1925). Platon.Tome x:Timée, Critias. Les Belles Lettres, Paris.
Taylor, A. E. (1928). A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Zeyl, D. J. (2000). Plato:Timaeus. Hackett, Indianapolis and Cambridge.
PLINY
Natural History (Nat. hist.)
Rackman, H.,W.H.S. Jones and D. E. Eichholz (1938-62). Pliny. Natural History in Ten Volumes.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
PLOTINUS
Enneads (Enn.)
Henry, P. and H.-R. Schwyzer (1964–82). Plotini opera. 3 Volumes. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Armstrong, A. H. (1966–88). Plotinus. Enneads. 7 Volumes. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Brisson, L. and J.-F. Pradeau (2002–10). Plotin Traités. Flammarion, Paris.
Creuzer, F. (1835). Plotini Opera omnia. Porphyrii Liber de vita Plotini cum Marsilii Ficini commen-
tariis et eiusdem interpretatione castigata. 2 Volumes. Typographeum Academicum, Oxford.
Kalligas, P. (1994–2013). Plotinus’ Enneads. 5 Volumes to date. Centre for Editions of Ancient
Greek Authors, Athens Academy.
Perna, P. (1580). Plotini Platonicorum facile coryphaei Operum philosophicorum omnium libri LIV
in sex Enneades distributi. Ex antiquiss. Codicum fide nunc primum Graece editi, cum Latina
Marsilii Ficini interpretatione & commentatione. Basel.
Theiler,W., R. Beutler and R. Harder (1956–71). Plotins Schriften. 6 Volumes. Meiner, Hamburg.
PLUTARCH and Ps.-PLUTARCH

Moralia (Mor.)
Babut, D. and M. Casevitz (2004). Plutarch Œuvres Morales:Traités 70 et 71. Les Belles Lettres, Paris.
Lachenaud, G. (2003). Plutarque. Œuvres Morales. Tome XII. 2e Partie. Opinions des Philosophes.
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PORPHYRY
Sodano, A. R. (1964). Porphyrii In Platonis Timaeum Commentarium Fragmenta. Istituto della
Stampa, Naples.
Fragments and Testimonia (Fr.)
Smith, A. (1993). Porphyrius Fragmenta. Teubner, Stuttgart and Leipzig.
Homeric Enquiries (Quaest. Hom.)
Schlunk, R. R. (1993). Porphyry. The Homeric Questions. A Bilingual Edition. Peter Lang, New
York.
Sodano, A. R. (1970). Quaestionum Homericarum liber I. Giannini, Naples.
Homeric Enquiries on the Iliad (Quaest. Hom. ad Il.)
Schrader, H. (1890). Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquias.
Teubner, Leipzig.
MacPhail, J. A. (2011). Porphyry’s Homeric Questions on the Iliad. Text, Translation, Commentary.
De Gruyter, Berlin.
Homeric Enquiries on the Odyssey (Quaest. Hom. ad Od.)
Schrader, H. (1890). Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquias.
Teubner, Leipzig.
Isagôgê (Isag.)
Busse, A. (1887). Porphyrii Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium. CAG 4,1. Reimer,
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Life of Plotinus (VP)
Henry, P. and H. R. Schwyzer (1964). Plotini Opera. Tomus I. Porphyrii Vita Plotini. Enneades
I–III. Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1–38.
On Abstinence (De Abst.)
Nauck, A. (1886). Porphyrii Philosophi Platonici Opusula Selecta. Teubner, Leipzig: 85–270.
On Statues (Peri Agal.)
Bidez, J. (1913). Vie de Porphyre, le philosophe néo-platonicien. Avec les fragments des traités Περὶ
ἀγαλμάτων et De regressu animae. Teubner, Leipzig.
Smith, A. (1993). Porphyrius Fragmenta. Teubner, Stuttgart and Leipzig: 407–35.
On the Cave of the Nymphs (De antro)
Nauck, A. (1886). Porphyrii philosophi platonici Opuscula selecta. Teubner, Leipzig: 55–81.
Sentences (Sent.)
Brisson, L. (ed.) (2005). Porphyre. Sentences. 2 Volumes. J.Vrin, Paris.
To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled (Ad Gaurum) and (AG)
Kalbfleisch, K. (1895). Die neuplatonische fälschlich dem Galen zugeschriebene Schrift πρòς
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To Marcella (Ad Marc.)
Des Places, É. (1982). Porphyre.Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella. Les Belles Lettres, Paris.
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Edelstein, L. and I. G. Kidd (1972–99). Posidonius. 3 Volumes. Cambridge University Press,
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Theiler, W. (1982). Poseidonios: Die Fragmente. 2 Volumes. de Gruyter, Berlin.
PRESOCRATICS
Fragments
Diels, H. and W. Kranz (1952). Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 9th edition. 3 Volumes.
Weismannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin. (DK)
PROCLUS
Commentary on Hesiod’s Works and Days (In Hes.)
Marzillo, P. (2010). Der Kommentar des Proklos zu Hesiods ‘Werken und Tagen.’ Edition,
Übersetzung und Erläuterung der Fragmente. Narr, Tübingen.
Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I (In Alc.)
Segonds, A.-P. (1985–6). Proclus. Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon. 2 Volumes. Les Belles Lettres,
Paris.
Commentary on Plato’s Cratylus (In Crat.)
Pasquali, G. (1908). Procli Diadochi In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria. Teubner, Leipzig.
Duvick, B. (2007). Proclus on Plato Cratylus. Duckworth, London.
Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (In Parm.)
Steel, C. (2007–9). Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria. 3 Volumes. Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Morrow, G. R. and J. M. Dillon (1987). Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Commentary on Plato’s Republic (In Remp.)
Kroll,W. (1899–1901). Procli Diadochi in Platonis rem publicam commentarii. 2 Volumes. Teubner,
Leipzig.
Diehl, E. (1903–6). Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria. 3 Volumes. Teubner,
Leipzig.
Baltzly, D. (2009). Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Volume IV. Book 3, Part II: Proclus on
the World Soul. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tarrant, H. (2006). Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Volume I. Book 1: Proclus on the
Socratic State and Atlantis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements (In Eucl.)
Friedlein, G. (1873). Procli Diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii.Teubner,
Leipzig.
Elements of Theology (El.Th.)
Dodds, E. R. (1963). The Elements of Theology. 2nd edition. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hymns (Hymn.)
van den Berg, R. M. (2001). Proclus’ Hymns.Text,Translation and Commentary. Brill, Leiden.
On Providence (De prov.)
Isaac, D. (1979). Proclus. Trois Études sur la Providence II: Providence, Fatalité, Liberté. Les Belles
Lettres, Paris.
Steel, C. (2007). Proclus. On Providence. Duckworth, London.
On Sacrifice and Magic (De sacr.)
Bidez, J. (1928). ‘Proclus Sur l’art hiératique’, in Catalogue des Manuscrits Alchimiques Grecs VI.
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On the Existence of Evils (De mal. subst.)

Isaac, D. (1982). Proclus.Trois Études sur la Providence III: De l’existence du mal. Les Belles Lettres,
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Platonic Theology (Theol. Plat.)
Saffrey, H. D. and L. G. Westerink (1968–97). Proclus: Théologie platonicienne. 6 Volumes. Les
Belles Lettres, Paris.
Ten Problems Concerning Providence (De decem dub.)
Isaac, D. (1977). Proclus. Trois Études sur la Providence I: Dix Problèmes concernant la Providence.
PTOLEMY
Tetrabiblos (Tetrab.)
Hübner, W. (1998). Claudii Ptolemaei Opera quae exstant omnia.Volumen III,1. Teubner, Leipzig
and Stuttgart.
SIMPLICIUS
Kalbfleisch, K. (1907). Simplicii In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium. CAG 8. Reimer, Berlin.
Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens (In DC)
Heiberg, I. L. (1894). Simplicii De Caelo. CAG 7. Reimer, Berlin.
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (In Phys.)
Diels, H. (1882–95). Simplicii in Aristotelis Physica. CAG 9 and 10. Reimer, Berlin.
Fleet, B. (1997). Simplicius On Aristotle Physics 2. Duckworth, London.
Commentary on Epictetus’ Handbook (In Epict.)
Dübner, F. (1840). Theophrasti Characteres, Marci Antonini Commentarii, Epicteti Dissertationes ab
Arriano literis mandatae, Fragmenta et Enchiridion cum Commentario Simplicii, Cebetis Tabula,
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Hadot, I. (1996). Simplicius Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Épictète: introduction et édition critique
du texte greque. Brill, Leiden.
[Simplicius] Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul (In DA)
Hayduck, M. (1882). Simplicii In libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria. CAG 11. Reimer, Berlin.
SOPHOCLES
Oedipus the King (Od.Tyr.)
Storr, F. (1912). Sophocles in Two Volumes: I Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone.
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SOPHONIAS
Paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul (Paraphr. in DA)
Hayduck, M. (1883). Sophoniae In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis. CAG 23,1. Reimer,
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Commentary on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia (In PN)
Wendland, P. (1903). Themistii (Sophoniae) In Parva naturalia commentarium. CAG 5,6. Reimer,
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SORANUS OF EPHESUS
Gynecology (Gyn.)
Burguière, P., D. Gourevitch and Y. Malinas (1988–2000). Soranos d’Éphèse. Maladies des
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Temkin, O. (1956). Soranus’ Gynecology. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.
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Fragments
von Arnim, I. (1903–5). Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. 4 Volumes. Teubner, Stuttgart. (SVF)
Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 Volumes. Cambridge
SYRIANUS
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (In Meta.)
Kroll, W. (1902). Syriani in metaphysica commentaria. CAG 6,1. Reimer, Berlin.

Dillon, J. and D. O’Meara (2006). Syrianus On Aristotle Metaphysics 13–14. Duckworth,
London.
O’Meara, D. and J. Dillon (2008). Syrianus On Aristotle Metaphysics 3–4. Duckworth, London.
Commentary on Hermogenes (In Hermog.)
Rabe, H. (1892–3). Syriani in Hermogenem commentaria. 2 Volumes. Teubner, Leipzig.
TERTULLIAN
On the Soul (DA)
Waszink, J. H. (1947). Tertullian. De Anima. Meulenhoff, Amsterdam.
THEMISTIUS
Paraphrase of Aristotle’s On the Soul (Paraphr. in DA)
Heinze, R. (1899). Themistii In libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis. CAG 5,3. Reimer, Berlin.
Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics (Paraphr. in Phys.)
Schenkl, H. (1900). Themistii In Aristotelis Physica paraphrasis. CAG 5,2. Reimer, Berlin.
Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (Paraphr. in APr)
Wallies, M. (1884). Themistii quae fertur in Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum librum I paraphrasis.
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Private Speeches (Orat.)
Schenkl, H., G. Downey and A. F. Norman (1965–74). Themistii Orationes quae supersunt. 3
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THEOPHILUS PROTOSPATHARIUS
On the Construction of the Human Being (De corp. hum. fabr.)
Greenhill, G. A. (1842). Theophili Protospatharii De Corporis Humani Fabrica Libri V. Oxford
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Grimm-Stadelmann, I. (2008). Theophilos. Der Aufbau des Menschen. Kritische Edition des Textes
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THEOPHRASTUS
On the Causes of Plants (De caus. plant.)
Einarson, B. and G. K. K. Link (1976 and 1990). Theophrastus De Causis Plantarum. 3 Volumes.
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INDEX LOCORUM
AESCHYLUS ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

Eumen. De fato
602–10 31n67 193,14–16 168n14
652–66 31n67
657–66 25n3, 26n11 In DS
79,14 10n24
AËTIUS
Plac. phil. In Meta.
5.3.3 26n7 41,35–42,3 51n19
5.3.5 26n8
5.3.6 26n8, 30n64 Mantissa
5.5.1 25n4, 29n43 178,10–11 168n14
5.5.1–3 11n52
5.5.2 25n3 [Alexander] Probl.
5.5.3 25n4, 26n7, 29n43, 29n47 2.47 (65,36–66,2) 168n14
5.7.1–7 11n51
5.7.7 29n47, 29n49 AMMONIUS
5.11.2 25n4 In APr
5.11.4 25n3 5,16–19 97n144
5.12.2 91n51 73,43–4 97n144
5.12.3 91n51
5.15.1 32n85 In Cat.
5.15.1–5 26n12 71,21 10n23
5.17.1 150n4
5.17.6 150n9 In De Int.
16,26 10n23
ALCINOUS 36,7–12 98n172
Didask. 138,6–7 167n4
§12 (167,1–8) 55n85, 57n105 169,29 150n14
250,6–7 93n87
ALCMAEON 250,24–31 167n4
24A13 DK 25n4, 26n7 250,26–30 93n87
24A13–14 DK 29n43
24A14 DK 25n4
202 Index locorum
In Isag. DC
2,3–4 93n91 279b32–280a2 119n7
7,32–8,4 97n144 280a28–34 170n42
16,9–12 167n5 285a10–13 51n19
36,21–3 97n144
39,14–40,6 169n26 EN
48,3–7 93n88, 154n77, 154n79 1096b5–6 51n19
48,4–5 154n78 1106b29–30 51n19
48,6–7 154n80
101,15–17 93n91 GA
104,14–18 94n112 716a6–7 8n2
104,32–105,8 93n88 716a10–12 50n6
105,1–2 154n77 716a13–17 51n15
105,1–3 88n7 716a21–2 51n15
105,1–8 154n79 718b4 53n51
105,1–10 150n13 719b32 52n40
105,5–6 154n78 720a12–14 29n48
105,7–8 154n80 720b24–32 95n127
125,9–20 169n25 721a30–731b14 11n53
721b10–11 128n167
ANAXAGORAS 722b3–4 128n160
59A93 DK 27n14 722b3–30 128n160
59B10 DK 26n8 722b14 53n50
59B11ff. DK 27n14 724a7–13 128n167
724b12–22 126n127
ANONYMUS CHRISTIANUS 725a3ff. 10n23
Herm. 726a28–731b14 11n53
36,11 123n80 726a30–731b14 25n3
37,20ff. 99n174 727b31–3 8n2
62,4–7 123n80 728a17–21 50n6
62,7–9 123n80 728a18 8n3
63,14–17 123n80 728a26 50n6
64,16–19 123n80 728a26–7 126n128
729a10–11 8n2
ARISTOPHANES 729a29–33 8n2
Aves 729b9–20 34
694 52n24 729b14–21 50n5
729b21–33 50n5
ARISTOTLE 730a27–b2 8n2
DA 730b8–15 50n5
403a27–8 121n57 730b8–23 34
408b18–29 (1.4) 27n17 730b15–22 27n17
412a9–28 90n37 730b19–22 35, 64
412b5–6 27n17 731b20–2 8n2
413a8–9 90n38 732a7–11 50n6
413b24–7 27n17 732a9 8n2
415a26–b2 144 733b26–7 8n2
416b32–418a7 (2.5) 81 734a16ff. 26n10
417a18–20 51n8 734b22–35a26 12n57, 150n3
417a21–b2 90n37 735a27–9 95n127
417b16–19 81, 95n121 736b8–13 27n17
418a3–6 51n8 736b13–24 27n17
429a10–430a25 (3.4–5) 27n17 736b27–8 10n24
429a24–5 150n2 736b27–9 27n17
Index locorum 203
737a27–9 50n6 772b31–3 95n127

737a28–9 126n128 774a2–3 50n6, 126n128
738a1–2 52n40 775a31–b2 97n141
738b11–13 95n127 776a15–777a27 (4.8) 10n23
738b20–1 8n2, 95n127 783b25–6 97n143
738b27–36 29n51 786b21 10n23
739a20–6 50n6 787b30 52n40
740a3–4 150n3 788a10 126n142
740a3–7 12n57
740a7–9 130 GC
740a13–15 30n62 336a31ff. 98n163
740a28–9 96n136
740a35–7 30n61 HA
740b24–5 8n2 489a11–12 51n15
741a13–14 95n121 490a12 10n23
741a13–15 27n17 541a13 53n51
741a18–25 27n17 541a2–3 53n50
741a23–6 27n16 561a4–21 12n57, 150n3
741b15–25 12n57, 150n3 569a10–13 10n23
743b20–4 96n136 584a35–b25 12n61
743b25–6 150n2 587a24–33 125n108
749a15–16 50n6 603a2–3 10n23
750b4–5 50n6, 126n128 618b25–31 10n23
751a15 53n51 638a10ff. 27n17
753b18–19 12n57, 150n3
761b16–32 92n72 MA
763b30–764a1 25n3 703b23–4 150n2
764a6–11 25n4, 88n10
764b30 96n136 Meta.
765b8ff. 50n6 897b18–22 38
765b10–11 52n40 986a22–6 51n19
765b15 52n40 988a1–7 38, 50n5
765b35–6 50n6 1032a22–5 51n8
766a14–16 95n127 1033b19–1034a21 75
766a30–4 50n6 1033b32 93n90
766b12–14 50n6 1033b33 94n98
766b33–767a13 98n163 1033b33–1034a2 93n93
767a6–8 92n74, 92n75 1060a15–16 55n76
767a13–b23 11n51 1070a26–8 32n93, 55n71, 68
767a36–769b30 (4.3) 27n17, 50n6, 1071a12–16 98n163
127n144 1074b17–18 55n80
767b13–15 168n16 1085b5ff. 51n11
767b15–17 50n6, 126n128 1091b30ff. 51n11
767b15–18 50n6 1092b1 51n11
768a13–14 50n6
768b8–25 160 Meteor.
769a26–b3 127n155 346b19ff. 98n163
769b7–16, 160 378b25–379a1 51n6
769b13–21 160 379b33 51n6
769b22–5 160 382a6–9 92n72
770b9–11 159
771b20 50n6 PA
771b21–3 95n127, 126n128 641a17 10n23
772b6–12 12n61 641a17–b10 10n23
204 Index locorum
641a33ff. 10n23 84,11–12 94n96

641a36 10n23 84,19–24 93n94
642a31ff. 10n23 87,22–4 94n96
642b21–644a11 (1.3) 10n23 87,25–32 93n94
651b20–2 118 89,17–20 93n94
652a29–30 89n22, 119n15 90,6–10 93n94
665a31–3 30n59 91,14–17 94n96
666a10–13 150n2 91,19–20 94n96
669a2–5 10n23 91,19–26 93n94
669a3ff. 10n23 93,2–5 55n85

669a13–23 10n23 95,19–22 169n25
669a20–3 10n23 113,1–2 93n89
671b29 10n23 134,6–7 150n14
672a24 10n23 137,1–3 93n89
676b22–5 56n94 150,40–151,2 93n94
677a15–18 56n95 167,31 –4 55n89, 57n105
181,13–6 57n111
Phys. 196,22–3 98n172
192b13–14 79 202,25–6 89n30
194b13 98n163 202,26–7 90n32
194b26 77 222,1–3 93n89
197a36–198a14 (2.6) 158 254,2–3 150n14
197b18–20 158 302,1–2 93n89
199a33–b7 168n17 304,11–13 94n96
199b6–7 157 305,26–8 94n96
255a30–b5 90n37 306,15–16 94n96
320,31–5 93n91
PN 345,30–2 88n7
465a4–6 150n2 355,23–4 94n96
469a5–12 150n2 358,1 93n89
365,30–4 167n5, 168n12
Pol. 369,22–5 167n4, 167n5
1335a35–b2 98n163 375,1–2 93n89
1335b12–19 97n141 397,13 93n91
397,16–17 88n7
[Aristotle] De Plant. 397,27–9 94n96
815b33 10n24 398,9–13 57n112
398,16–17 93n91
[Aristotle] Physiogn. 404,3–31 76
808a31–2 168n19 404,3–405,26 93n90
404,9–31 95n127
ASCLEPIUS 404,14–15 93n92
In Meta. 404,25–31 169n25
1,1–3 93n89 406,1–7 169n25
24,6–8 93n91 407,14–15 93n92
26,1 93n91 407,16–18 57n112
36,12–20 51n19 408,2–27 57n112
38,6 89n30 408,8–9 89n29
51,14–21 93n91 410,2–3 93n92
51,21–4 94n96 410,33–411,2 94n96
51,24 94n96 410,35 94n95
57,36–58,1 88n7 411,8–13 169n25
75,11–12 169n26 428,1–4 55n85, 57n105
76,10–12 93n94 446,11–15 167n4
80,14–15 55n85, 57n105 448,4–5 88n7
Index locorum 205
In Nic. Arith. De princ.

106.22–7 (p. 44) 167n5 2.119,5–6 57n111
2.179,2–6 57n105
ASPASIUS 2.198,11–18 57n105
In EN 3.5,10–13 56n103
13,10–16 51n19 3.7,17–21 57n105
3.36,3–9 57n105
ATTICUS 3.55,6–10 89n31
Fr. 33 55n76 3.91,18–23 90n31
3.91,20–1 89n30
AUGUSTINE
De Trin. In Parm.
3.5 91n51 2.42,9–15 88n7
11.2.5 91n51 2.42,10–11 90n32
3.43,15–17 57n111
CENSORINUS 3.90,12 55n85
De dei nat. 4.45,1–12 99n179
5–11 11n50 4.57,11–12 52n24
5.2 26n7, 29n43 4.77,7 55n85, 57n105
5.4 25n3, 25n4 4.122,16–123,2 57n111
5.5–6.2 150n4
6.1 150n9 DAVID
6.4 25n4 In Isag.
6.5 25n4 204,15–16 10n24
6.8 25n3, 25n4
DEMOCRITUS
CHALDEAN ORACLES 67A15 DK 30n58
Fr. 6 39 67A28 DK 30n58
Fr. 22.3 119n8 68A140 DK 26n13
Fr. 28 39 68A141 DK 21, 26n8, 30n64
Fr. 30 39 68A142 DK 25n4
Fr. 32 39 68A143 DK 25n4, 30n65, 88n10
Fr. 35 39 68A144 DK 30n61
Fr. 39 39 68A144–5 DK 30n65
Fr. 108 39 68A145 DK 30n62, 150n9
68A148 DK 30n59, 150n9
CICERO 68B32 DK 21, 26n8, 26n11, 30n60, 30n63
De natura deorum 68B124 DK 21, 30n63
2.119 99n174
DIOCLES OF CARYSTUS
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA Fr. 40 26n9
Stromateis Fr. 41a–b 26n7
6.15.117–8 90n47 Fr. 42a–b 25n4
Fr. 241 122n71
COSMAS INDICOPLEUSTES
Christ.Top. DIOGENES LAERTIUS
7.78 (p. 187) 173n6 VP
7.158 53n43
DAMASCIUS 7.159 25n3
VI 8.28 25n4, 26n7, 29n43
84D–E 11n34
84J 11n34 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA
96 11n39 64A24 DK 25n3, 26n9
97I 11n48 64A27 DK 25n3
128 11n35 64B6 DK 26n9, 26n13
206 Index locorum
DIONYSIUS HALICARNASSENSIS 76,10–78,11 (4.672–4 K.) 27n18

De imitatione 104,15–24 (4.700 K.) 92n69
6.202,23–203,6 91n51 104,15–106,13 (4.700–2 K.) 9n11
104,16–9 (4.700 K.) 152n30
ELIAS 104,22–4 (4.700 K.) 91n55
In Cat. 104,25–106,1 (4.700–1 K.) 57n106
113,34 9n21 104,25–106,2 (4.700–1 K.) 91n53
240,21–2 93n91
De loc. aff.
In Isag. 8.439,11–18 K. 53n45

47,6–9 169n26
85,3–7 94n112 De propr. plac.
85,4–7 90n36 90,17ff. 150n6
101,35 150n14 94,12 52n39
115,35–6 9n21
De sem.
EMPEDOCLES 68,7 (4.516 K.) 52n38
31A81 DK 25n4, 91n51 70,1 (4.518 K.) 52n37, 52n38
31B63 DK 25n4 70,20 (4.519 K.) 52n41
86,18 (4.536 K.) 53n42
EPICURUS 94,1–3 (4.542–3 K.) 96n136
Ep. Hdt. 94,8–11 (4.543 K.) 26n13
38 26n8 100,23–4 (4.549–550 K.) 96n136
66 26n8 106,14–114,21 (4.555–563 K.) 26n9
136,25 (4.586 K.) 52n41
EURIPIDES 144,4–160,23 (4.593–610 K.) 8n7, 26n4
Orest. 144,4–178,15 (4.593–625 K.) 11n54
551–6 25n3, 26n11 144,11 (4.594 K.) 53n50
146,20–148,24 (4.596–8 K.) 25n4
EUSTRATIUS 150,26–7 (4.600 K.) 52n41
In APo II 152,11 (4.601 K.) 52n40
157,6–13 169n30 154,1–11 (4.602–3 K.) 29n51
156,1–7 (4.604 K.) 29n51
In EN I et VI 176,1–2 (4.623 K.) 9n9
367,26–32 167n5, 169n30 176,13 (4.624 K.) 9n8
375,33–376,4 167n5, 168n14, 169n30 178,16–9 (4.626 K.) 88n10
180,19–196,21 (4.628–42 K.) 11n51
MARSILIO FICINO 182,18–20 (4.630 K.) 88n10
Theol. Plat. 196,12–4 (4.642 K.) 9n11
11.4.10 173n5 204,11 (4.649 K.) 53n41
GALEN OF PERGAMUM De simpl. medicament. temp.

De demonstr. 12.250,5–7 K. 53n45
27n18
De ther. ad Pis.
De facult. natur. 14.253,17–254,4 K. 91n51
108,23 (2.11 K.) 52n39
162,24–163,20 (2.85–6 K.) 9n11 De usu part.
174,11–17 (2.100–1 K.) 9n11 2.143,20–144,22 (3.885–6 K.) 97n141
2.288,2 (4.147 K.) 53n50
De foet. form. 2.288,11–17 (4.147 K.) 120n40
66,19–32 (4.663–4 K.) 150n6 2.293,23–6 (4.154 K.) 120n40
70,12–3 (4.667 K.) 27n18 2.296,8–310,7 (4.158–75 K.) 11n51
74,11–8 (4.670–1 K.) 27n18 2.299,3–23 (4.161–2 K.) 9n10
Index locorum 207
2.301,3–6 (4.164 K.) 9n9 3,20 (19.162 K.) 124n88

2.301,10–14 (4.164 K.) 9n11 3,20–2 (19.162 K.) 124n87
2.302,13–14 (4.165 K.) 53n42 4,5–7 (19.162 K.) 124n87, 125n117
2.302,22 (4.166 K.) 53n42 4,8–6,18 (19.162–5 K.) 124n93
2.304,18–19 (4.168 K.) 52n39 5,6–6,18 (19.164–5 K.) 123n84
2.308,19–309,2 (4.173–4 K.) 97n141 6,3–7 (19.164–5 K.) 123n80
2.311,4–8 (4.177 K.) 120n40 6,7 (19.165 K.) 123n82
2.316,5–319,22 (4.183–8 K.) 26n9 6,8–11 (19.165 K.) 125n118
2.316,19ff. (4.184) 120n34 6,12 (19.165 K.) 123n85
2.318,9 (4.186 K.) 53n42 6,13–18 (19.165 K.) 123n86, 124n86

2.318,14–15 (4.186 K.) 52n40 6,16–18 (19.165 K.) 125n103
2.319,7–14 (4.187 K.) 52n40 6,17–18 (19.165 K.) 123n83
2.345,8–9 (4.222 K.) 53n41 6,19–8,12 (19.165–7 K.) 124n94
2.356,9–363,10 (4.241–6 K.) 120n40 6,19–12,1 (19.165–72 K.) 109
2.357,24–8 (4.239 K.) 27n18 6,22–3 (19.166 K.) 125n113
2.359,23–360,2 (4.241–2 K.) 120n40 6,23–7,1 (19.166 K.) 123n86
2.412,21–424,15 (4.313–28 K.) 26n9 7,1 (19.166 K.) 124n99
7,1–2 (19.166 K.) 124n98
De uteri dissect. 7,12–8,5 (19.167 K.) 124n86
48,5–50,11 (2.899–901 K.) 120n37 8,5–6 (19.167 K.) 125n113
8,14–15 (19.168 K.) 123n83
In Hipp. Aphorism. 8,14–16 (19.168 K.) 123n83
18b.861,3–872,3 K. 97n147 8,15–19,17 (19.168–9 K.) 124n95
8,22–4 (19.168 K.) 124n96
In Tim. 8,22–9,2 (19.168 K.) 123n83
12,22–13,7 123n86 8,24–9,1 (19.168 K.) 125n112
14,10 26n6 9,15–17 (19.169 K.) 123n83, 124n96, 125n114
9,21–3 (19.169–70 K.) 123n80
PHP 9,22 (19.170 K.) 124n86
27n18 9,23–6 (19.170 K.) 123n80, 124n98
322,27–32 (5.465–466 K.) 97n145 9,26–10,5 (19.170 K.) 124n86, 124n97
324,5–9 (5.466 K.) 97n145 10,5–8 (19.170 K.) 124n99
10,5–11,8 (19.170–1 K.) 124n86, 124n99
QAM 10,6–7 (19.170 K.) 124n98
57,14–62,22 (4.798–803 K.) 97n144 10,9–10 (19.170 K.) 124n99
10,10–1,8 (19.170–1 K.) 124n99
[Galen] An animal sit 11,2–21 (19.171–2 K.) 123n83
1,7 (19.159 K.) 125n102 11,6–8 (19.171 K.) 125n107
1,16 (19.159 K.) 125n103 11,9 (19.172 K.) 125n104
1,16–17 (19.159 K.) 125n103 11,9–15 (19.172 K.) 125n111
2,4–6,18 (19.159–65 K.) 108 11,10–19 (19.172 K.) 125n105
2,6 (19.159 K.) 125n103 11,14 (19.172 K.) 125n103
2,19 (19.160 K.) 124n89 12,1 (19.172 K.) 123n83
2,19–3,1 (19.160 K.) 124n89 12,1–16,12 (19.173–8 K.) 124n100
2,19–3,19 (19.160–1 K.) 124n90, 124n91 13,17–19 (19.175 K.) 125n107
2,20–1 (19.160 K.) 125n109 13,17–21 (19.175 K.) 125n106
2,21 (19.160 K.) 123n80 14,6–16,12 (19.176–8 K.) 123n80
3,2–3 (19.160 K.) 123n85 14,7–16 (19.176 K.) 125n108
3,2–9 (19.160–1 K.) 124n86 14,9–11 (19.176 K.) 125n108
3,3–5 (19.161 K.) 124n90 15,4–6 (19.176–7 K.) 125n117
3,5–9 (19.161 K.) 124n90 16,7–12 (19.176–8 K.) 123n80
3,9–10 (19.161 K.) 123n85 16,8–12 (19.178 K.) 123n80
3,9–10 (19.161 K.) 125n117 16,11–12 (19.178 K.) 125n103
3,18–19 (19.161 K.) 123n83, 124n92 16,13–18,15 (19.178–81 K.) 124n101
208 Index locorum
[Galen] De hist. philos. 453 41

19.327,17–328,2 K. 91n51 466–91 41
[Galen] Def. med. Works and Days

19.371,1 K. 53n43 109–201 164
19.450,3 K. 53n43
19.450,5 K. 52n40 HIEROCLES
19.450,6–7 K. 53n42 El. Moral.
19.454,3 K. 168n19 1.15–19 27n16
[Galen] De sperm. (Only references to HIPPOCRATES AND THE CORPUS

Cornarius are included here, see 121n47). HIPPOCRATICUM
135–41 121n49 Aer.
135c 121n50, 121n51, 121n52, 122n61 58,8–26 (2.58–60 L.) 26n8
135d–6d 121n54 72,5 (2.76 L.) 53n50
136c 121n55
137b–d 151n53 Aph.
137d–8a 122n60 7.62–3 (4.596–598 L.) 97n147
139c 121n50, 122n61
140b–d 121n54 Genit.
140d–141c 122n67 44,1–10 (7.470 L.) 26n8
141a 122n70 44,10–20 (7.470 L.) 26n7
141c 121n58 44,10–45,10 (7.470–72 L.) 128n168
141c–3c in C 121n49 44,14 (7.470 L.) 52n41
141d 121n56, 122n59 45,14–6 (7.470 L.) 89n22, 119n15
142a–b 122n68 45,20 (7.472 L.) 52n38
142b 122n69 46,1 (7.472 L.) 53n41
142b–c 122n62 46,8–9 (7.474 L.) 52n36
142c 121n56, 122n63 46,11–16 (7.474 L.) 120n36
142d–143a 121n58, 122n64 46,24 (7.474 L.) 53n43
143a 121n57 47,3 (7.474 L.) 53n43
143a–b 122n65 47,4 (7.474 L.) 52n38
143b 122n61, 122n66, 122n70 47,18 (7.476 L.) 52n41
143c–156 in C 121n49 48,7–8 (7.476 L.) 88n10
48,11–23 (7.478 L.) 120n41
HELIODORUS 48,11–28 (7.478 L.) 8n1
Aethiopica 48,11–50,14 (7.478–82 L.) 104
4.8 91n51 48,12 (7.478 L.) 53n43
4.119 90n50 48,17–28 (7.478 L.) 88n10
49,3–22 (7.478–80 L.) 120n41
HERMIAS OF ALEXANDRIA 49,14 (7.480 L.) 52n36
In Phdr.
33,5–7 (30,27–9 Courveur) 169n27 Insomn.
121,1–2 (115,28–9 Courveur) 55n85 226,10–3 (6.654 L.) 97n141
HEROPHILUS Morb. Sacr.

T60 25n4 10,12–16 (6.364 L.) 120n41
T61 29n46 12,21–14,2 (6.368–70 L.) 26n8
T125 124n96
T191 26n9 Mul. I
8.10,17 L. 53n51
HESIOD 8.34,9f. L. 25n4
Theogony 8.56,21f. L. 25n4
133 41 8.62,20f. L. 25n4
Index locorum 209
8.422,14 L. 53n50 Vict. II

176,2–5 (6.560 L.) 97n141
Mul. II
8.268,9–272,8 L. 28n27 HIPPON
8.278,7–11 L. 28n27 38A3 DK 26n13
38A12 DK 26n7, 29n43
Nat. Puer. 38A13 DK 25n4, 26n5, 26n7, 29n43, 29n47
53,1–2 (7.486 L.) 88n10 38A14 DK 29n47, 29n49
53,1–4 (7.486 L.) 102
53,1–55,3 (7.486–488 L.) [12] 104 HOMER

53,1–57,4 (7.486–492 L.) [12.1–14.2] Il.
150n9 6.211 52n34
53,2–4 (7.486 L.) 120n41, 120n43 8.17–27 86
53,4–9 (7.486 L.) 120n41
54,2–3 (7.486 L.) 120n41 IAMBLICHUS
54,17–18 (7.488 L.) 120n41 DA
54,20–55,1 (7.488 L.) 120n41 §31 10n31, 139
54,21–55,3 (7.488 L.) [12.6] 150n8
55,4–55,6 (7.488–490 L.) 119n5 De myst.
55,13–18 (7.490 L.) [13.2] 122n73 1.18 98n172
56,13–57,4 (7.492 L.) [14] 104 3.2 125n113
56,19–57,4 (7.492 L.) [14.2] 26n13 3.16 98n172
56,21–57,4 (7.492 L.) 120n41 3.28–30 98n172
56,25–57,4 (7.492 L.) 121n46 4.10 98n172
57,5–12 (7.492–494 L.) [15.1] 154n77 9.4 98n158
57,24 (7.494 L.) 119n26
59,9–13 (7.496 L.) [17.1] 50n3 In Nic. Arith.
59,9–60,18 (7.496–498 L.) [17] 120n39, 81,23–4 90n31
120n40 82,1–5 89n29, 90n31, 90n36
59,9–61,7 (7.496–500 L.) [17.1–18.1]
28n33 In Tim.
59,18–9 (7.498 L.) [17.2] 121n55 Fr. 43 57n105
60,2–6 (7.498 L.) 125n108
60,8–18 (7.498 L.) 120n39 Vita Pyth.
62,19–63,9 (7.502–504 L.) [18.5] 122n74 §153 152n44
67,1–9 (7.510 L.) [21.1] 26n13, 122n74 §§207–8 97n144
68,19–70,5 (7.514 L.) [22] 150n8
68,19–77,7 (7.510–528 L.) [22–7] 150n8 [Iamblichus] Theol. Arith.
68,25 (7.514 L.) 52n39 1,10–12 122n73
83,19–21 (7.540 L.) 52n36 5,5–8 90n31
16,4–6 89n29, 122n73
Oct. 19,8 53n42
88,4–16 (7.458–460 L.) 92n74 21,17–19 89n29
52,7–8 122n74
Superf. 52,8–16 123n79
78,15–6 (8.484 L.) 28n36 61,5–6 122n73
82,14–5 (8.490 L.) 28n36 61,6–7 107
61,6–13 122n75
Vict. I 61,12–62,20 122n74
142,18–26 (6.498 L.) 151n15 61,13–63,1 150n13
142,27–146,16 (6.500–504 L.) 97n141 62,8–9 122n71
144,4–5 (6.500 L.) 25n4 62,21–63,1 122n74
144,15–146,5 (6.500–502 L.) 26n13 64,7–9 122n74
210 Index locorum
64,11 122n71 158,11–13 121n55

64,19–65,3 107 158,17–19 119n24
158,20–160,7 119n7
JOHN OF ALEXANDRIA 158,22–6 132
In Hipp. Epid.VI 158,26–9 132
44,21–3 119n5 158,30–2 132
60,5–62,9 119n20 158,34–40 132
60,29–33 120n30 158,37–8 150n14
60,30–2 120n29 158,40–160,2 132
60,30–4 119n9 160,2–3 119n12

60,31 119n6 160,2–4 133
60,34 119n8 160,3–4 132
62,5–6 119n4 160,27–8 119n16
82,4–14 119n20 162,1–6 119n7, 121n55, 132
82,10–1, 119n15 162,21–3 125n108
84,3–4 119n4 162,30–1 119n25
96,7–12 119n9, 120n30 164,37–166,23 119n8
98,15–29 150n13 164,39 119n6
102,27–104,3 119n4 164,39–40 119n12, 133
104,1–9 119n10 164,40–166,6 119n20
170,12–19 150n13
In Hipp. Nat. Puer. 170,25–6 89n22, 119n15
130,13–5 119n11 172,23–33 119n15
130,24–8 167n4 174,11–19 119n22
132,2–4 126n127
132,5 120n29 JOHN PHILOPONUS
134,13 119n6 Aet. Mund.
134,16 30n60 5,1 150n14
134,20–7 119n13 12,14–24 169n25
134,22–4 119n8 42,1–43,24 51n12
134,27–136,9 8n1, 119n14 44,23–45,4 95n126
136,9–40 119n18 53,1–55,22 95n126
136,23 119n19 123,15–18 119n7
138,13–14 8n1, 119n14 186,6–191,14 119n7
138,16–20 119n18 272,27–293,22 155n86
138,17–20 119n16 339,4–5 88n14
138,22–6 102, 119n23 369,1–21 95n126
140,6–36 119n19 369,7–21 154n84
142,26–144,22 150n13 374,19–22 154n81, 154n82
146,6–10 119n4 374,19–23 150n13
146,16–32 119n5 374,19–27 95n126, 154n84
148,1–5 119n8 374,21–3 151n18
150,15–17 120n28 396,25–397,2 155n86
152,14–15 119n17 409,26–8 88n14
152,26–7 119n21, 119n26 432,11–19 88n14, 88n15
154,28–30 119n26 449,23–8 88n14, 88n15
154,31–156,4 120n28 501,3–12 88n14, 88n15
156,13–16 119n27 523,13–15 10n24
156,14–16 91n53 547,24–5 119n7
158,1–4 150n13
158,2–3 126n127 De intell.
158,5–6 132 53,35 88n14
158,7–19 119n19
Index locorum 211
In APo 163,34–5 153n65

280,17–18 95n124 163,34–6 95n123,143163,36 144
280,17–20 88n14 201,22–4 153n57
280,18–19 95n125 201,22–32 154n75
376,7–10 88n14, 95n125 201,24–32 153n57
208,3–5 93n91
In APr 209,9–10 153n61
7,25–8 93n91 209,16–17 153n64
61,14–23 167n5 213,7–12 142
152,13–16 168n14 213,7–214,33 142

213,12–25 142
In Cat. 213,21 151n18
3,11 9n21 213,26–31 142
3,25–6 9n21 213,31–7 95n124
9,17–18 169n26 213,31–214,2 142
112,15 10n23 214,2–11 142
128,2–4 167n4, 167n5 214,11–25 142, 148
190,24–6 167n4 217,18–218,3 153n63
201,12–13 150n13 222,14–16 153n57
201,21–6 95n125 222,25–32 153n61, 153n64
227,1–5 57n112
In DA 238,9–12 90n31
1,3 149 238,38–239,38 154n75
10,5–6 153n57 239,2–38 153n57
10,6–8 153n57 267,29–32 169n25
10,25–6 10n24 268,1 10n23
12,17–20 153n57 268,9–14 146
12,20–2 153n57 268,9–19 144
13,26–35 89n30 268,14–31 146
13,28–30 95n125 268,19 153n61
13,30–4 90n31 268,19–30 145
14,1–8 158, 167n4 268,30–1 148
15,10–11 153n57 268,30–8 146
15,11 153n57 270,8–11 153n63
17,6–7 153n57 270,13–16 154n70, 169n22
17,19–20,22 153n57, 153n58 271,6–8 154n73
18,26–31 153n57 286,15 10n23
25,12–14 10n23 289,3–4 10n23
34,12–13 88n14 305,36–7 153n61
49,4–10 153n57 306,2–8 82, 143, 144
50,31–2 154n71 306,6–7 90n36
51,13–15 154n71 306,8–10 153n64
52,4–25 148, 154n70, 169n22 381,4 10n23
52,10 154n73 384,25 10n23
52,13–25 57n112 418,19–24 153n59
52,22–5 154n72 433,34–5 153n59
55,12 10n23 438,25–36 153n57, 153n59
88,34–89,1 89n19 591,22–3 10n22
89,2–5 143, 153n61 591,23 10n23
120,23–4 154n73
140,18–19 10n22, 10n23 In GC
157,21 10n23 2,14–15 9n21
158,11–23 153n59 44,13–16 169n26
161,19–162,16 153n59 84,8–12 57n112
212 Index locorum
124,26–7 9n21 310,12 168n14

169,4–6 154n71 314,4–5 169n35
169,4–23 154n70, 169n22 316,10–12 168n14
295,24–7 60 318,29–31 167n4
295,26–7 95n125 319,6–9 167n4, 167n6
295,27–8 97n145 319,23–5 150n13
295,28 91n61 320,1–2 89n29
295,28–296,1 98n172 320,8–9 167n4, 167n6
322,7 169n35
In Meteor. 322,10–17 95n124

9,13–14 9n21 322,12–14 150n13
9,14 9n21 322,12–15 153n62, 153n64
44,20–30 99n174 331,9–11 168n14
82,35–6 150n14 331,19–23 88n14
332,3–4 88n14
In Phys. 360,26–8 51n19
2,8 9n21 399,34–400,3 153n62
2,9 9n21 403,19–31 154n70, 169n22
52,30 153n62, 154n77 403,28 154n71
52,37–53,1 151n18 404,3–5 151n18, 153n62
93,2–5 89n29 516,16–19 88n15
93,3–8 90n32 516,16–22 95n125
114,22–6 88n14 836,20–4 153n57
115,2–3 88n14 848,7–8 150n13, 153n62
129,27–30 153n65
144,33–145,2 88n14, 88n15 Opific. Mund.
145,31–146,9 88n14, 88n15 209,22–210,8 95n126
148,9–10 88n14 460,22–3 154n81
157,20–1 88n14 460,23–4 154n82
157,32–158,3 153n62 460,24–5 154n83
157,33–158,1 150n13 460,25–7 155n85
157,34 154n77 460,25–462,2 154n84
158,2–3 88n14 488,17–490,1 154n83
175,30–1 88n14 582,13–14 155n85
186,18–24 88n15, 95n124 582,5–592,11 155n85
191,9–29 154n70, 169n22 584,7–8 154n83
191,24–5 154n72 584,9 154n82
201,10–25 161 584,11–14 155n85
201,10–202,16 167n4 584,14–20 155n87
201,23 191 588,12–14 155n85
201,23–5 154n73 588,17–590,18 154n84
201,25–202,21 168n20 590,1–2 154n77
222,25–32 95n124 590,10–11 155n85
225,29–226,11 55n85
242,3–7 95n124 LEUCIPPUS
247,22–9 88n14, 88n15, 89n29 67A35 DK 26n13
262,23–8 167n5, 168n12, 168n14
267,5–6 167n5 LONGINUS
269,17–22 167n4, 167n5, 168n12, 168n17 Fr. 10d 153n49
269,21 168n14
273,14–16 168n17 LUCIAN
291,10–23 167n4, 168n12, 168n14 Vitarum Auctio
307,21–2 168n14 2.47,11–48,2 8n6
309,21–4 168n14
Index locorum 213
LUCRETIUS 69,8 126n129

De rerum nat. 73,13–34 126n143
3.370–95 26n13 73,18–26 127n145
3.670–712 26n13 73,19–21 126n126
4.1037–57 26n8 73,19–34 127n144
73,28–30 127n151
MARINUS 73,30–4 127n146, 127n147
VPr 75,7–8 126n126
31 56n104 76,7–14 128n164
76,16–18 96n136
MICHAEL OF EPHESUS 77,9–10 127n144
In EN IX–X 77,9–14 126n143, 127n146
462,19f. 125n119 77,13–14 127n146
549,21f. 125n119 78,1–4 126n143, 127n144
570,21–2 125n119 78,11–15 127n146
610,11f. 111 78,14–15 126n143, 127n144, 127n148
620,17f. 125n119 78,16–21 126n133
78,19–21 126n134
In GA 78,19–26 127n152
4,35 126n128 79,2–4 126n126
5,1–3 126n126 79,28–32 127n152
7,24–5 126n126, 126n127 79,29–32 127n149
12,24–5 126n127 79,29–80,6 127n147
12,24–8 126n126 80,18–27 126n133
25,20–31 114, 117, 127n155, 128n160 80,21–3 126n143, 127n144, 127n146
27,7–8 126n142 80,26–7 96n136, 126n135
28,35–29,1 126n127 83,15–16 127n151
31,34–32,2 126n127 83,36–85,2 127n153
33,15 126n128 84,2–3 127n149
33,19–34,6 115, 117 84,28 127n153
33,24–7 128n163 85,30–1 127n153
34,11 126n128 87,4–5 127n147
36,11–19 126n127, 126n131 87,11 127n153
37,22 126n126 87,24–5 127n146
41,29–31 126n126 88,8–11 127n146
42,25–7 126n126 93,15–16 126n129
46,1 127n146 100,12–13 126n133
46,15–16 126n126 100,13–14 126n138
48,27–8 126n128 100,15–34 127n152
50,34–5 126n128 100,22–7 127n149
52,17 126n128 100,25–9 127n150
56,15–16 126n127 101,9–102,12 96n136
57,2–5 126n126 101,11–13 126n132
57,4–5 126n129 101,22–4 126n133, 126n134, 126n140,
57,25 126n129 127n152
58,19 127n146 101,23–4 127n151
58,19–20 126n129 101,24–5 126n135
58,20–5 126n130 101, 24–6 126n138
59,13–18 126n126 102,12–23 117
59,13–24 126n129 103,8–11 96n136, 126n133, 126n138
59,17–19 126n143 106,2–32 96n136
59,18 127n146 106,20 126n135
59,19 127n144 106,20–2 126n133
63,30–4 126n129, 126n131 106,26 126n137
214 Index locorum
106,26–9 126n136 Op. log. phys. alleg.

111,27 126n133 16.33–83 169n32
111,27–8 126n140 16.50–1 163
111,28–32 126n141 16.50–72 169n21
111,32–5 126n139 16.79–81 163
112,8 126n133, 126n137 16.187–213 169n32
113,9–15 126n140 16.188–206 169n30, 169n33
114,2–3 126n137 16.205 168n19
114,13–25 126n133 16.207–13 169n33
114,17–18 126n134
114,17–25 96n136 Op. psych. theol. daem.
114,18–19 126n135 32,15ff. 89n29
114,22 126n137 33,20–1 168n7
114,24 126n137 33,20–5 167n4
114,29–31 126n137 77,5–8 10n30
115,26–7 126n137 113,28–114,2 89n31
115,27–8 126n137 119,30–120,1 163
115,28–30 126n133, 126n135
115,29–33 96n136 Orat. min.
132,17 126n127 31.96–100 88n7
141,24–5 126n138
149,19 125n121 Theologica
150,20–2 127n144 5.93–94 89n22
166,5–7 128n164
166,19–167,32 128n164 NEMESIUS
171,8–9 126n138 Nat. hom.
171,26–8 128n164 42,9–11 122n60
172,11–14 128n164 43,9–11 122n60
178,9ff. 126n128 46,21 9n21
183,25–7 128n164 59,13ff. 10n31
184,6–16 127n155, 128n166 86,1–15 122n60
185,1–29 163 86,4–7 89n22
189,3–13 167n4, 167n5
189,30 126n142 OLYMPIODORUS
192,2 126n128 In Alc.
214,11–215,16 127n153 18,10–19,6 92n74
223,11–17 126n140 94,11–22 167n5
229,16–230,32 126n141 109,24–110,1 90n31
245,30–6 126n142 109,24–110,2 89n29
In Meta. In Gorg.
452,11–16 167n5 4,1–5 93n91
501,1–10 127n146 64,19–21 97n144
253,30 98n161
In PA 263,20–5 164
36,35–37,3 118 264,28–31 164
88,23 126n124
In Meteor.
In PN 1,12 9n21
134,29–30 126n124 4,1–4 9n21, 10n22
6,6–11 9n21, 10n24
MICHAEL PSELLUS 14,10–11 9n21
De omnif. doctr. 14,11 9n21
115 10n30 30,8 122n71
Index locorum 215
133,18 151n14 PLATO

143,16–17 153n47 Crat.
266,37–377,11 99n178 393b7–c7 161
266,39 99n178 393b9 169n23
267,1 99n178 411d7 31n70
273,4–18 10n23 414a2–3 31n70
301,16–25 92n72
321,26–39 11n39 Crit.
121a8–b4 169n37
In Phd.
13.2.27–32 (p. 169) 89n30, 90n31 Gorg.
513c 119n5
Proleg.
6,14 9n21 Leg.
674b5–6 97n142
Olympiodorus (?) In Paul. Alex. 775b4–e4 97n142
21,17–19 99n182 775c7–d4 31n73
789a4–b4 97n142
ORPHICS 789b1–2 97n142
Orph. Fr. 789e1–2 97n142
Fr. 85 52n25 838e–839a 31n74
Fr. 132 52n24 838e7–8 31n74
Fr. 183 52n25 870e1 32n84
Fr. 224.13 52n24 872e5–10 31n67
Fr. 224.19 52n25 917a5 31n70
Fr. 243 52n24 967d5 31n70
Fr. 327 52n25
Fr. 1.694 52n24 Menex.
237e1–238a5 29n50
PARMENIDES
28A54 DK 25n3, 25n4 Parm.
28B18 DK 25n4, 26n9 130b–d 71
130c1–4 55n79
PHILO JUDAEUS 130c5–d3 55n80
Aet. Mund. 130c6 55n81
§§52–4 170n43
Phd.
De decalogo 70a3–4 31n77
§58 170n43 73a1–2 31n81
§120 170n44 75b10 31n78
75b10–12 31n79
Her. 75c4 31n78
§184 170n44 75c7 31n78
75c9 31n78
Leg. alleg. 75d5 31n78
1.2 170n43 75e2 31n78
2.3 170n43 76a5 31n78
76c6–7 31n81
Opific. Mund. 76c10–11 31n81
§26 170n43 76c13 31n78
§67 170n44 76d2 31n78
§124 150n13 76e1 31n78
§§140–1 165, 170n40 76e4 31n78
§§154–66 170n40 76e6–7 31n78
216 Index locorum
77a1 31n78 546a–c 98n166

77b1 31n78 546a1–d3 153n51
77b7–8 31n81 547a1 169n36
81e1–2 31n81 547a5 52n34
83d10–e1 31n71 620a5–6 31n75
92b5–6 31n81 620c5 31n68
92d8 31n81 620d1–5 32n84
95d1–2 31n81 621b4 32n84
95d5 31n81
110d3–4 55n77 Soph.

216b2 125n103
Phdr. 249a2 55n80
245c–57b 125n105 265e1–2 162
246aff. 31n68 265e8 162
246c–d 32n82 266b 55n72
246c2–4 31n70
246c2–5 32n83 Symp.
247c3 55n69, 125n103 178b2 31n70
248c–d 32n82 191c2–4 51n15
248d1 32n84 206b–e 28n41
248d1–4 167n6 206c–e 30n66
248d2 153n49 207a–b 18
248d2–3 31n70 207a7 18
248d2–4 138 207b1–2 18
249b3–5 31n70, 32n84 207b5 18
Phlb. Theaet.
16c7–8 169n37 149e3–4 29n50
16e1–2 53n43 153d1–5 98n165
27a5–6 51n8 176b1–2 125n103
32a–b 28n36
Tim.
Polit. 18c6–19a5 153n51
271aff. 91n57 18d7–e3 140
272e3 31n71 23b7–24a2 164
272e4 90n38 24c4–d3 98n165
273c2–4 90n38 28c3 51n17
274d2 55n77 30a4–5 124n90
30b8 124n92
Rep. 30c2–31b3 55n72
373a3 119n5 30c6 55n76
454b4–c2 153n52 31a4–5 55n72
454b4–457c2 173n2 37c7 51n17
454d10–e1 28n40 38b–d 98n167
458c6–460b6 153n51 39e–40a 55n72
460d8–461c5 97n143 39e–40b 73
461b9–c7 119n5 39e3–40a2 32n93, 55n72
491d1–4 29n50 39e4–5 55n72, 55n74
492a2–3 31n71 39e10–40a1 55n76
497b4–5 29n50 39e10–40a2 55n75
509b1–3 98n164 40a 98n167
532c1 55n77 40a1–2 55n78
541a2 31n70 41a–d 98n167
543a–592b (books 8–9) 164 41a–42d 31n69
Index locorum 217
41a7 51n17 77c4–5 123n86

41c5 32n94 77d3–4 28n24
41c8 31n71 81d4–7 28n24
41d8 98n169 82e–83e 55n92
41d8–e4 98n168 86c3–4 28n24
41e4–5 31n71 86e–87a 55n92
41e4–42a2 98n170 88c7–89a1 32n95
42b5–c1 32n87 90a–d 31n69
42c3–4 32n87 90c7–d7 32n95
42d4–5 31n71, 98n170 90d 23, 125n103

42e–43a 32n82, 141 90d1–2 32n87, 32n89
42e–44b 23 90e9–91a2 115
42e7 51n17 91a4–b7 18
42e8 32n94 91a4–91d5 15, 16–7
42e8–43a6 32n88, 139 91a6 28n27
42e9–43a1 125n103 91b1–2 28n24, 117
43a3 30n59 91b2 28n27
43a4–6 141 91b3 28n27
43b5–7 32n86 91b4–7 115
44a–b 125n103 91b7–c2 29n54
44a5–b2 32n86 91b7–d5 115, 116
44b1 32n87 91c2–7 29n54
44d3–4 32n94 91c7–d5 18
44d8–e2 32n95 91d 127n155
47b5–c4 32n95 91d1 29n54
47c4–e2 32n95 91d2 30n59
49a6 53n50 91d2–3 20, 32n85, 90n33, 138
50d2–3 28n39 91d3 17–18, 72, 127n155
50d2–4 51n17 91d4–5 18
51a4–5 51n17
51bff. 55n72 [Plato] Epin.
52a–b 53n50 973d1–5 22
53c7 125n103 973d2–4 152n36
58dff. 99n178 981b–c 31n76
69c5 32n94 984b–c 31n76
69c6–7 32n95 984d 92n72
69c–70b 31n69
71b–d 55n93 PLINY
71d5 51n17 Nat. hist.
73b1–e1 15–16 2.34 99n174
73b2–5 89n17 7.12 91n51
73c1 117
73c1–2 27n23 PLOTINUS
73c3–4 28n24 Enn.
73c3–6 32n89 1.1.12.35–9 54n57
73e1–74a1 31n67 1.2.4.25–9 10n29
74a3–4 28n24 1.3.1.8 167n6
74b3 28n24 1.8.8.28–38 97n144
74c5–d2 31n67 1.8.14 97n144
74e1–2 28n24 1.9.1.4–7 10n29
75a2–3 28n24 2.1.5.18–20 96n133
76e–77c 138 2.1.6.54 92n72
77a–c 24 2.3 48
77a6 32n90 2.3.1 98n153
218 Index locorum
2.3.9.27–31 98n156 3.7.11.23–4 96n132

2.3.9.38–9 98n154 3.7.11.23–7 52n35, 90n32
2.3.12.1–11 96n129, 96n135 3.8.4 55n90
2.3.12.3–8 98n155 3.8.5.6–8 51n7
2.3.12.12–32 56n96 3.8.5.24–5 51n8
2.3.12.24–9 56n96, 56n97 3.8.7.18–23 96n129
2.3.14.29–33 97n145 3.8.8.32–4 51n11
2.3.14.29–34 96n129 3.8.10.6–10 51n16
2.3.14.31–2 59 3.8.11.1–8 51n14
2.3.14.32–3 53n48 3.8.11.23–4 51n13

2.3.14.35 53n48 3.8.11.35–45 53n54
2.3.15.13–17 96n135 3.8.11.38 52n33
2.3.16 56n97 3.8.12.7–13 53n54
2.3.16–17 55n90, 96n133 3.8.13.1–11 53n54
2.3.16–18 57n107 3.9.5 51n14
2.3.16.27–9 166 4.3.6.13–18 96n133
2.3.18.4–5 57n108 4.3.7.22–5 97n144
2.4.2–5 51n9 4.3.7.25–31 97n138
2.5.1.8–10 51n12 4.3.7.29 53n49
2.5.3 51n9 4.3.8.50–4 10n29
2.5.3.28–31 51n12 4.3.9.20–6 97n137
2.6.1.10–12 52n35, 89n29, 89n31 4.3.10.10–13 52n35, 89n29
2.9.2.4 52n32 4.3.10.11–13 96n129
2.9.7.18–22 90n46 4.3.11.8–12 96n133
2.9.12.3 53n52 4.3.12.37–9 10n29
2.9.12.9 53n52 4.3.13.7–12 10n29
2.9.12.18–21 88n8 4.3.14 54n57
2.9.12.18–33 96n129 4.3.23.42–7 97n144
2.9.12.20–1 83 4.3.23.44 53n41
2.9.16.8 52n33 4.3.26.12–14 97n144
2.9.16.9 52n32 4.3.32.17 31n76
2.9.18.14–17 96n133 4.4.21 97n144
3.1.1.32–5 59, 97n145 4.4.28.35–43 56n96
3.1.1.32–6 96n129 4.4.28.40–52 97n144
3.1.1.34–5 167n6 4.4.29.35 57n107
3.1.5.20–34 96n129 4.4.30.12 53n47
3.1.5.24–7 97n144 4.4.32.27–30 56n96
3.1.5.30–4 96n135 4.4.34.1–3 96n133
3.1.5.53–5 96n129, 96n135 4.4.35.37–69 98n172
3.1.6.1–7 96n129, 96n135 4.4.41.9–11 56n96
3.1.6.1–9 98n155 4.7.5.40–51 96n129
3.1.6.5–10 97n144 4.7.5.42–8 52n35, 89n30
3.1.8.7–8 122n77 4.7.83 122n77, 151n25
3.1.8.14–20 97n144 4.7.83.9–11 51n8
3.2.1.4 52n39 4.7.83.13–16 51n12
3.2.2.18–23 52n35, 89n31, 90n32, 168n11 4.7.84.14–17 97n144
3.2.2.18–31 127n145 4.7.13.7 53n48
3.3.4.37–43 97n137 4.7.13.8 97n137
3.3.7.26–8 96n129 4.8.2.42–5 97n144
3.5.6.37–8 92n72 4.8.6.7–9 51n7
3.6.14.39–41 52n33 4.8.6.7–10 90n31
3.6.19 173n1 4.8.6.7–16 40
3.6.19.17–25 88n9 4.9.3.16–18 52n35, 89n29
3.6.19.18–25 96n130 4.9.5.9–12 90n32
Index locorum 219
5.1.1.1–2 52n32 5.8.1.19–21 51n8

5.1.1.9 52n33 5.8.2.6–7 88n8
5.1.2.37 52n32 5.8.3.30–4 57n111
5.1.3.8–9 52n37, 53n44 5.8.3.32–4 55n77
5.1.3.11–15 51n12 5.8.12.3 52n33
5.1.3.13–15 96n133 5.8.12.6 52n33
5.1.3.14 52n32 5.8.12.9 52n33
5.1.3.21 52n32 5.8.13.2 52n33
5.1.3.23 51n9 5.8.13.5 52n32
5.1.4.1–10 57n111 5.9 96n133

5.1.5.1ff. 51n9 5.9.4.4–6 51n12
5.1.5.11–12 89n19 5.9.4.7–10 96n133
5.1.5.11–13 89n29 5.9.5.1–4 51n12
5.1.5.18 51n14 5.9.5.28 31n76
5.1.6 55n90 5.9.6.9–13 127n145
5.1.6.37–8 51n7 5.9.6.10–13 89n31
5.1.6.39 51n8 5.9.6.10–24 52n35, 89n29, 96n133
5.1.6.42–8 51n14 5.9.6.17 89n19
5.1.7.27 52n34 5.9.10.2–5 169n24
5.1.7.27–8 42 5.9.10–12 57n107
5.1.7.27–38 53n48 5.9.12.4–12 56n102
5.1.7.37–8 51n7 5.9.14.18–19 55n85
5.1.7.47–8 51n8 6.1.26.3–7 51n12
5.1.8.4–7 52n32 6.2.3.31 53n43
5.2.1.7–9 51n7 6.2.22.18 53n43
5.2.1.19–20 51n14 6.4.2 10n29
5.2.2.1–4 51n8 6.4.15 10n29, 91n61
5.3.8.4–5 96n129 6.6.7.5–7 96n133
5.3.8.4–9 89n29 6.6.8.5 55n85
5.3.10–11 51n14 6.7 83, 96n133
5.3.10.48–11.8 51n13 6.7.5.1–15 96n134
5.3.11.3–4 51n11 6.7.5.2–6 90n36
5.3.11.7–8 36, 51n11 6.7.5.5–8 96n129
5.3.13.17–19 51n13 6.7.6.33–6 97n139
5.3.16.5–7 51n8 6.7.7–11 57n105, 57n107
5.4.1.26–36 51n7 6.7.7.5–16 83
5.4.2 51n14 6.7.9 55n90
5.4.2.4–10 51n9 6.7.9.34–46 55n91
5.5.3.16–24 53n54 6.7.11 57n111
5.5.3.16–25 53n54 6.7.11.44–5 31n76
5.5.4.24–5 51n9 6.7.11.67 92n72
5.5.7 51n14 6.7.15.20–22 36, 51n11, 51n16
5.5.13.37–8 51n8 6.7.17.4–6 51n8
5.6.5.8–10 51n13 6.8.17.3 52n37
5.7 48, 59, 55n90, 56n101, 96n129, 6.9.7.32 52n33
96n130
5.7.1.8–9 97n139 PLUTARCH
5.7.2.1–12 88n9 Mor.
5.7.2.5–7 97n139 370E 51n19
5.7.2.11–12 56n101 520C 168n19
5.7.2.14 56n101 904C–911C 11n50
5.7.3.3–6 57n103 946C 151n25
5.7.3.20–3 97n139 990F–991A 169n28
5.8.1.3 52n32 1052F 151n25
220 Index locorum
1053D 151n25 44,15–7 (8.2) 128n163

1084E 151n25 45,4 (8.4) 97n146
45,5–46,11 (9.1–5) 88n5
PORPHYRY 45,9–10 (9.1) 152n32
Ad Marc. 45,10–21 (9.2) 90n34, 138
125,21–2 173n2 45,14–15 (9.2) 90n34
125,23–126,2 173n2 45,26–7 (9.2) 152n32
45,29–46,6 (9.4) 153n49, 138
AG 45,29–46,11 (9.4–5) 31n70
33,1–12 (1.1) 151n19 46,3–4 (9.4) 53n42

33,1–34,10 (1.1–4) 134 46,6–11 (9.5) 139
34,14–15 (2.1) 88n5 46,12–48,8 (10.1–6) 11n56
34,20–35,9 (2.2) 11n56, 26n13, 27n15, 46,14 (10.1) 88n3
152n41 46,14–47,5 (10.3) 130–31
34,23–6 (2.2) 153n49 46,15–24 (10.1–2) 67
34,23–35,2 (2.2) 121n45 46,17–18 (10.1) 90n46
34,26 (2.2) 152n35 46,21–2 (10.2) 90n45
35,22–36,10 (2.4) 88n5 46,24ff. (10.3ff.) 91n60
35,24–5 (2.4) 88n3 46,24–47,5 (10.3) 95n116, 150n11
36,11–37,26 (3.1–5) 138 47,5–16 (10.4) 70
36,16–17 (3.1) 88n3 47,8–14 (10.4) 91n58
36,16–18 (3.1) 61 47,8–16 (10.4) 92n77
36,17–18 (3.1) 95n127 47,14 (10.4) 89n26
37,6–7 (3.4) 11n56 47,16 (10.5) 89n26, 91n58
37,19–20 (3.5) 138 47,16–26 (10.5) 88n3
37,27–41,4 (4.1–11) 88n5, 4 90n34, 139 47,16–28 (10.5) 121n45
38,8–9 (4.2) 152n32 47,16–48,5 (10.5–6) 65
39,10–41,4 (4.6–11) 151n19 47,16–48,8 (10.5–6) 95n127
41,5–7 (5.1) 138 47,19–20 (10.5) 72
41,7–13 (5.1–2) 138 47,20–8 (10.5–6) 10n31
41,10–13 (5.1) 97n146 47,21 (10.5) 90n39
41,13–18 (5.3) 138 47,26–47,8 (10.6) 70
41,21–6 (5.4) 68 47,28 (10.6) 90n39
42,13–16 (6.1) 95n127 48,2–5 (10.6) 152n32
42,15–17 (6.1) 68 48,3–7 (10.6) 91n58, 92n77
42,17–21 (6.2) 51n8, 61 48,6–7 (10.6) 91n58, 91n60
42,17–28 (6.2) 151n19 48,9 (11.1) 91n58, 92n77
42,17–43,5 (6.2–3) 88n5 48,28–49.2 (11.2) 10n29
42,20 (6.2) 89n23 49,1 (11.2) 91n58, 92n77
42,22–3 (6.2) 89n23 49,4–50,2 (11.3–4) 151n29
42,22–43,1 (6.2–3) 89n24 49,16–19 (11.3) 151n26
42,28–9 (6.3) 89n25 50,3–52,2 (12.1–7) 151n29
42,28–30 (6.3) 152n32 50,12–15 (12.2) 88n5
42,28–43,1 (6.3) 152n31 50,23–5 (12.3) 88n5
43,4 (6.3) 91n58, 92n77 51,4–5 (12.4) 138
43,6–7 (6.4) 68 51,21–3 (12.6) 169n35
43,12–44,3 (7.1–3) 138 51,22–3 (12.6) 167n2, 168n14
43,23–4 (7.2) 89n21, 89n28 51,30–52,2 (12.7) 95n127
44,4–45,4 (8.1–4) 116, 138 52,26–31 (13.4) 150n11
44,7–10 (8.1) 97n146 52,26–53,27 (13.4–7) 151n29
44,10–12 (8.2) 95n127 52,31–53,2 (13.4) 137
44,10–45,4 (8.2) 88n5 53,7–10 (13.6) 88n5, 131, 151n19
44,11 (8.2) 91n58, 92n77 53,11–17 (13.6) 136
44,13–32 (8.2–3) 116 53,14–17 (13.6) 95n127
Index locorum 221
53,17–21 (13.7) 10n29 267F 10n30

53,28–31 (14.1) 88n3 271F 151n26
53,28–54,15 (14.1–3) 89n23 287F 151n26
53,28–54,20 (14.1–4) 135 288aF 151n26
53,28–54,25 (14.1–4) 95n123, 122n77 290F 151n26
54,3–4 (14.2) 152n32 358F 99n174
54,4–15 (14.3) 62, 125n116
54,11–12 (14.3) 10n28 In Ptol.Tetrab.
54,12–13 (14.3) 61 190,22–195,10 (§2) 92n74
54,12–15 (14.3) 70, 90n36 216,24–219,21 (§§44–45) 92n74

54,13–15 (14.3) 64, 97n140
54,15–25 (14.4) 151n29 In Tim.
54,22–5 (14.4) 10n29 Fr. 16 151n26
54,26–55,29 (15.1–5) 151n29 Fr. 22–3 151n26
55,14–18 (15.4) 88n5 Fr. 51 56n98, 63
55,18–21 (15.4) 151n26 Fr. 75 151n26
55,21–9 (15.5) 97n144 Fr. 80 151n26, 151n28
55,25–9 (14.3) 137 Fr. 86 97n144
55,30–2 (16.1) 89n26
55,30–56,5 (16.1) 62 Isag.
55,31–2 (16.1) 89n27 19,1–3 169n25
56,5 (16.1) 90n44
56,5–15 (16.2) 95n116, 151n29 Peri Agal.
56,18 (16.3) 89n27 9,1ff. 99n174
56,18–21 (16.3) 64
56,21 (16.3) 95n127 Quaest. Hom. ad Od.
56,24–7 (16.4) 89n25 8.583 (80,15–6) 89n21
56,25 (16.4) 91n58
56,28–57,3 (16.5) 70 Sent.
56,28–57,18 (16.5) 91n60 10 57n111
57,18–29 (16.6) 151n29 13 51n8
57,29–58,7 (16.7) 137 28 10n29
58,19–20 (17.1) 88n5 29 151n26
58,21ff. (17.1ff.) 151n24 29.21–2 10n29
58,29–59,2 (17.2) 88n5 33.49–53 10n29
59,2–4 (17.3) 123n80 37.41–4 10n29
59,28 (17.6) 151n24 38.11 10n29
60,21–3 (17.7) 151n24
60,25ff. (18) 151n24 VP
62,3 (18.39) 91n58, 92n77 2.12–31 11n33
7.5–24 11n33
De abst. 11.12–17 97n144
175,16 (2.47) 10n29 15.21–6 98n150
176,2–3 (2.48) 10n29
263,14–16 (4.20) 88n3 POSIDONIUS
Fr. 284 169n38
De antro
64,9–21 (11) 151n26 PROCLUS
68,14–16 (16) 99n174 De decem dub.
8.30–46 89n30, 90n31, 92n65
Fr. 36.11–14 98n148
249F 151n25
259F,13–15 121n58 De mal. subst.
259F,28–9 121n58 27.10–18 168n20
259F,80ff. 121n58 44.17–18 169n24
222 Index locorum
60 167n4 In Eucl.
60.1–28 169n23 150,6–12 54n66
60.1–43 168n20 167,1–12 99n174
60.20–1 162 173,13–18 92n70, 99n178
De sacr. In Parm.
149,19–21 98n172 618,12–4 11n39
149,20–2 99n177 646,16–18 51n19
149,28–150,1 99n175 707,16–18 55n85
150,23 99n175 735,5–9 57n105

151,10–13 98n172 754,5–15 92n65
754,10–13 89n30
El.Th. 754,10–14 90n36
§7 51n8 782,3–6 54n61, 54n66, 54n67
§25 51n7 791,21ff. 173n5
§56 93n79 791,24–5 153n46
§§56–7 74 792,3–15 88n7
§57 74, 99n172 792,7–8 89n30
§65 55n87 792,7–9 90n31, 173n5
§70 99n172 792,7–15 90n36
§§70–2 74, 93n83 792,7–18 71
§71 99n172 792,8 89n19
§72 74 792,9–11 173n5
§77 51n12 792,11–15 173n5
§151 54n61, 54n66 792,24–6 72
§152 54n66 792,26–793,3 57n110
§153 54n64 792,27–793,11 72
§177 93n81 793–4 99n172
§189 153n46 793,4–11 91n57
§209 152n45 793,11–15 72–3
793,14 92n73
In Alc. 793,15–22 73–74
53,7–8 54n64 793,19–21 93n79
72,1–4 54n64, 93n83 794,2–795,6 93n82
94,1–17 153n53 811,26–812,2 57n110
122,8–17 54n64 812,7–13 55n85, 57n105
235,13–15 54n64 818,3–19 99n175
818,5 92n72
In Crat. 823,12–824,8 57n105
30,8–15 (§71) 92n73 824,3–4 57n110
38,22–39,1 (§82) 161 825,26–826,11 47
39,1–3 (§82) 162, 169n23 825,28 55n88
58,24–59,8 (§107) 54n65 826,11 55n88
65,2–3 (§112) 54n66 885,8–13 169n26
65,6–7 (§112) 54n64 888,4–7 90n36
82,28–9 (§145) 54n66 909,1–8 54n64
85,2–3 (§149) 54n61 916,12–17,16 57n105
91,16–25 (§167) 54n66, 54n67 936,13–15 54n61
91,17–19 (§167) 55n70 944,27 54n64
91,19–25 (§167) 92n76, 93n83 956,12–23 92n78
99,8–11 (§174) 97n144 973,12–27 55n86
100,13–18 (§176) 97n144
104,3–5 (§178) 54n64 In Remp.
111,26–112,4 (§185) 54n64 1.38,9–12 97n144
1.66,1–3 168n14
Index locorum 223
1.89,15–17 98n172 In Tim.

1.134,12–15 54n66 1.43,2–16 99n178
1.134,17–135,17 54n64 1.43,4–5 98n172
1.135,14–17 54n61 1.51,9–10 153n49
1.135,15–17 54n63 1.51,12–13 153n50
1.136,23–6 54n64 1.51,13–52,3 153n53, 169n34
1.137,4–5 54n66 1.51,19 153n49
1.193,12–13 54n61 1.51,27–30 153n46
1.193,12–14 54n66 1.99,13–17 98n148
1.205,1–3 54n61, 54n63 1.99,17 56n104

1.244,17–27 97n145 1.107,14ff. 98n148
1.246,10–11 54n61 1.110,31–111,3 92n68
1.252,14–16 51n15 1.111,9–14 99n175
2.21,15–19 54n64 1.139,31 98n148
2.26,9–14 97n143 1.162,11ff. 98n148
2.31,22ff. 12n59 1.220,4–8 54n65
2.33,9–14 12n60 1.220,4–26 54n66, 54n67
2.33,14ff. 12n61, 52n25 1.220,8–10 54n61
2.33,14–18 150n13 1.220,9 54n67
2.33,16 88n7 1.220,17–20 98n172
2.33,20–6 97n146 1.259,26–260,4 51n8
2.35,23–36,2 150n13 1.276,30–277,3 170n42
2.35,24–5 88n7 1.300,1–13 88n7
2.56,15–61,11 99n180 1.302,23–5 54n61
2.57,1–18 98n172 1.384,16–22 54n63
2.58,15–20 99n181 1.385,3–9 57n110
2.58,22–4 92n78 1.396,8–26 56n98
2.58,28 99n178 1.396,10ff. 56n104
2.59,6ff. 12n59 1.396,10–19 89n19
2.60,19–24 98n172, 99n182 1.396,10–20 63
2.61,7–19 97n147 1.396,10–26 89n30
2.61,15–63,6 98n148 1.396,11 56n98
2.61,16–17 97n147 1.396,18 56n98
2.62,21–63,6 98n148 1.396,20 92n65
2.63,7–8 97n143 1.412,18–23 98n172
2.63,7–19 97n144, 153n53 1.425,11–16 55n76
2.72,1–6 153n49 1.425,11–426,25 57n105
2.72,2 153n49 1.439,24–5 55n85, 57n105
2.113,13–19 153n46 1.450,11 52n25
2.113,15–16 89n17 2.47,22–8 90n31
2.118,5–15 153n53 2.62,32–63,16 97n144
2.120,26–8 54n64 2.106,1–9 92n78
2.125,9–11 89n17 2.130,14–15 54n61, 54n63
2.149, 21–2 10n23 2.132,17–23 55n85, 57n105
2.159,4–10 152n45 2.146,3–11 92n76, 93n83
2.185,27 153n49 2.201,27–202,1 99n175
2.204,26–205,27 54n63 2.202,23–6 162
2.204,29–205,14 54n66, 54n67 2.202,26–30 163
2.205,2 55n70 2.211,5–6 98n172
2.205,16 55n70 2.222,27–9 54n64
2.227,5–8 54n63 2.223,16–20 54n64
2.327,25–8 96n136 2.231,9–13 98n172
2.337,23–38,6 57n105 2.242,12–14 54n66
2.352,26–353,6 153n48 2.257,3–5 54n66
224 Index locorum
2.266,11–16 167n4 4.94,4–5 (4.31) 54n66

2.271,10–11 54n64 4.106,1 (4.36) 55n70
3.64,8–69,28 99n180 5.36,5 (5.11) 55n70
3.65,17–20 92n74 5.36,10–12 (5.11) 54n67
3.69,4–27 99n180 5.36,13 (5.11) 55n70
3.135,15–136,4 93n83 5.36,20–30 (5.11) 54n63
3.175,23–31 54n66 5.38,2 (5.11) 55n70
3.180,26–8 54n61 5.41,1–6 (5.12) 54n67
3.234,28–30 151n28 5.43,14–16 (5.13) 54n61
3.281,12 153n49 5.54,3–17 (5.16) 54n61

3.284,31–285,1 154n73 5.56,25 (5.16) 55n70
3.285,9–10 152n45 5.76,1 (5.20) 55n70
3.297,25 125n113 5.83,19 (5.22) 55n70
3.297,26–298,2 152n45 5.101,14 (5.27) 55n70
3.298,30–299,4 154n68 5.118,7–10 (5.32) 54n66
3,299,9–11 152n45 5.135,9–10 (5.37) 54n61
3.299,31–300,2 154n68 5.138,19 (5.37) 54n61
3.302,9 153n49 5.138,19–20 (5.37) 54n63
3.321,25–31 141 5.138,23 (5.37) 55n70
3.321,28 153n54 5.144,4–5 (5.39) 54n66
3.322,1ff. 51n8
3.322,17–21 153n46 PTOLEMY
3.322,18–24 153n47 Tetrab.
3.322,24–6 153n49 1.4 99n174, 99n178
3.323,16 153n48 3.8–9 169n21
Theol. Plat. SIMPLICIUS

1.9,20ff. (1.2) 51n21 In Cat.
1.25,24ff. (1.4) 51n21 4,12 9n21
1.25,26–7 (1.5) 51n23 210,9–10 89n29, 94n107
1.63,21–6 (1.14) 93n83 244,1–4 80
1.104,15–16 (1.22) 54n64 244,1–5 90n36
1.121,21–122,3 (1.28) 54n60 244,2–3 88n7
1.122,3–26 (1.28) 43 256,3–7 94n111
1.122,12–13 (1.28) 54n65 270,25–30 169n26
1.122,24 (1.28) 54n63 306,23–4 89n29, 90n32, 94n107, 95n115
1.123,1–15 (1.28) 54n60 318,34 9n21
1.123,5 (1.28) 55n70
1.123,12–13 (1.28) 54n63 In DC
2.58,17–19 (2.9) 54n66 3,5 9n21
3.8,14–20 (3.2) 92n71 3,8 9n21
3.18,24ff. (3.5) 152n45 88,8–19 99n174
3.51,1–2 (3.14) 54n61 88,13 99n174
3.74,1–8 (3.21) 54n61 101,23–6 88n7
4.33,12–13 (4.10) 54n61 110,5–8 88n7
4.33,17–18 (4.10) 54n67 115,3–2 99n174
4.33,17–34,3 (4.10) 44 54n63, 173n1 127,2–3 88n7
4.33,17–34,23 (4.10) 54n66 168,10–11 89n20
4.72,10–12 (4.24) 54n64 228,16–18 94n111
4.79,16–25 (4.27) 54n66 304,5 119n7
4.81,14–16 (4.28) 54n61, 54n63 306,19–25 94n111
4.86,21–3 (4.29) 54n66 373,15–24 99n174
4.91,6–8 (4.30) 54n63 676,4–5 94n111
4.91,6–26 (4.30) 54n61
Index locorum 225
In Epict. 381,10–11 167n6

15,36–41 97n145 382,15–21 89n31
78,10–21 151n28 382,16–21 89n30, 94n107
94,25–8 99n175 391,25–7 88n7
429,7–18 51n19
In Phys. 626,12–14 151n18
3,8 9n21 795,13–14 11n39
3,8–9 9n21 875,8–11 151n18
106,26 151n18 876,12–14 151n18
181,22–30 51n19 1150,18–21 94n110

219,29–32 88n7 1275,8–11 90n36
225,25–7 89n20
248,23–249,5 88n7 [Simplicius] In DA
261,15–17 168n12 2,3–4 10n23
265,9–22 94n109 11,20–2 94n111
271,10–15 168n14 113,31–4 89n20
282,31–289,35 79 116,16 10n23
287,10–11 94n104 123,30–7 95n122
287,13–15 94n105 149,3 10n23
287,20–1 94n105, 94n109 150,29 10n23
288,9–10 94n105 242,3 10n23
288,17–32 94n106 294,10–16 168n14
288,20 94n105
288,28–30 94n105, 95n118 SOPHOCLES
288,34 94n105 Od.Tyr.
289,12–15 94n105 1211 25n3
289,21–3 94n105 1257 25n3
289,25–35 94n109
310,20–314,24 77 SOPHONIAS
310,25–311,37 78 In PN
311,12–16 78 25,26–8 97n145
312,34–6 78 33,15–22 89n22
313,1–4 78
313,4–5 78 Paraphr. in DA
313,5–6 94n103 57,9–17 147
313,5–27 79 62,21–3 89n22
313,6–7 95n115, 95n117 63,5–6 89n22
313,7–9 88n7 69,11–22 95n122
313,8–10 95n114
313,10–12 57n111 SORANUS OF EPHESUS
313,18 95n115 Gyn.
313,22–6 79, 80 1.4.93–8 25n4
313,26 95n114 1.9.9 53n41
314,12–14 94n106 1.10.28 52n39
339,28–34 167n5, 168n12 1.11.61 53n43
360,1–4 99n179 1.12.6–7 53n43
362,5–6 167n4 1.12.54 52n39
362,6–7 88n7 1.12.93–8 26n5
365,10 9n21 1.12.96–8 29n46
369,13 10n23 1.12.101–120 91n50, 91n51
372,8–9 169n35 1.12.126 52n39
374,24–6 168n14 1.12.144–75 92n74
375,31–4 94n111 1.20.30 53n41
380,26–381,1 168n14 1.33.45–6 27n16
226 Index locorum
1.43.17–18 27n16 TERTULLIAN

1.46.64–7 28n36 DA
3.15.11–15 53n45 34,31–35,7 (25.2) 151n25
37,4–12 (25.9) 31n72
STOICS
SVF THEMISTIUS
1.128 25n3, 27n16 Orat.
1.129 25n3 27 (2.163,7–23) 91n57
1.497 90n31, 151n21
1.626 25n3 Paraphr. in APr

2.414 125n109 17,9 168n14
2.416 125n109
2.441 125n109 Paraphr. in DA
2.472 90n41 53,6–7 89n22
2.499 151n21 56,12–29 95n122
2.741 53n43
2.741ff. 27n16 Paraphr. in Phys.
2.742 53n43 37,8–10 168n14
2.746 151n21 56,15–21 167n4, 167n5, 168n12
2.753 91n51 56,17 168n19
2.761 150n4 62,8–10 167n4, 167n6
2.804 151n25 102,7–8 169n26
2.804–8 27n16, 91n61
2.805 151n25 THEOPHILUS PROTOSPATHARIUS
2.806 151n25 De corp. hum. fabr.
2.837 150n4 21,1 (1.9) 120n32
2.879–81 150n4 189,5–8 (5.3) 27n22
2.1012 125n109 210,1–6 (5.18) 120n37
2.1084 54n56 210,7–16 (5.19) 120n40
3.29 150n4 216,1 (5.20) 120n33
222,6–9 (5.26) 120n34
SYRIANUS 224,1–3 (5.28) 120n34
In Hermog. 226,5–227,7 (5.29) 120n34
2.98,18 167n5 227,15–228,3 (5.29) 120n35
2.126,15 167n5 236,1–243,8 (5.31–32) 104, 120n38
239,10–2 (5.31) 120n38
In Meta. 240,4–243,8 (5.32) 121n46
8,17–20 55n89 240,9–12 (5.32) 120n42
33,18 10n23 240,17–241,4 (5.32) 104
33,22–34 57n111 241,2–4 (5.32) 120n43
36,22–30 93n84 243,7–8 (5.32) 121n46
39,8–28 55n85 243,9–244,3 (5.33) 120n40
97,21–4 88n7 243,9–245,12 (5.33) 120n40
107,14–18 55n89 244,7–245,12 (5.33) 120n39
107,27–31 169n25 252,11–253,3 (5.34) 120n36
111,27–112,6 55n85 261,15–262,3 (5.36) 120n34
113,33–7 55n85, 55n89 266,10–267,1 (5.38) 120n34
147,2–6 56n100 268,6–11 (5.38) 120n40
185,29–186,14 93n84
186,3–14 57n112 THEOPHRASTUS
188,28–9 93n84 De caus. plant.
1.6.1–2 90n47
1.6.10 90n47
Index locorum 227
VETUS TESTAMENTUM
Ex.
21:22–3 155n84
Gen.
1–2 165
5:4 169n39
9:29 169n39
25:7–8 169n39
30:37–9 91n51
SUBJECT INDEX
(This index includes only a selection of names of ancient people and works cited. For a full
catalog of these names the reader is referred to the index locorum.)
abortion 101, 109, 113 articulation (of the embryo) 17–18, 21,
Ad Gaurum: and World-Soul 68–71; 26n13, 27n18, 83, 96n136, 113
animation of the embryo 108, 133–9, Asclepius 59, 75–7, 93n89, 93n91, 94n96,
140, 141, 143; authorship 3–4, 10n31; 94n97, 94n98, 95n127
engagement with medical tradition 6;
formation of the embryo 109, 130–1; bile 48, 56n92, 56n96, 63, 137
maternal actualization theory 64–71, 72, birth 17, 18, 30n66, 32n87, 40, 41, 42, 44,
73; nature of seed 60–2; one-seed theory 52n30, 67, 85, 107; animation at birth
58–9; subsequent influence 106, 116, 4, 15, 22–3, 27n16, 58, 66, 70–1, 84,
123n80; teratology 156–7 97n138, 108, 123n86, 133, 134, 135, 136,
Alexander of Aphrodisias 77–8, 166 137, 140–3, 148, 149, 150n4, 152n44,
Ammonius Hermeiou 49, 75, 77, 81, 82, 153n65; formation complete at birth 6,
93n86, 93n89, 93n91, 94n112, 141, 149, 24, 126n137, 131, 133, 137, 140, 149,
154n77 150n4, 153n64, 154n84
animation of embryo 3, 8, 13, 15, 2124, blood 1, 14, 30n59, 50n6, 53n41, 60, 63,
26n13, 58, 84, 87, 103, 104, 106, 65, 89n16, 89n22, 89n28, 103, 104, 105,
107, 108, 110–11, 113–14, 133–50; 106, 107, 112, 118, 119n15, 119n16,
pneumatic body theory of animation 126n127, 126n130, 132, 149, 157; see
133–4, 136, 137, 139–42, 144–5, 147–50, also hematogenous theory; menstrual
154n67; seminal theory of animation fluid
(traducianism) 88n3, 133–6, 139, 140, bone 14, 15, 16, 21, 31n67, 63, 126n137,
143–5, 147–50, 152n35, 154n67 142
Aristotle 1, 6–7, 8n4, 9n21, 10n23, 14–15, brain 14, 16, 19, 24, 27n22, 110, 113, 118,
29n51, 32n93, 34–5, 36, 38, 48, 50n6, 59, 120n40, 123n83, 124n96, 126n139, 130,
60, 64, 67, 68, 73, 75, 79, 81, 85, 92n72, 137
112–13, 115, 117, 127n155, 127n159, breath 17, 22, 24, 34, 39, 101–2, 107, 108,
130, 144, 157–60, 171; and one-seed 109, 111, 115, 121n46, 123n83, 124n86,
theory 1, 6, 14, 34–5, 59; on actual 124n98, 124n99, 130, 138; see also
motion being in the seed 27n17, 35, 64; pneuma
on family resemblances 50n6; on terata
157–60; on the animation of the embryo celestial influence on human reproduction
15, 27n17, 64, 81–2, 130 85–8, 161, 168n21
Aristotle’s biological treatises, Neoplatonic celestial spheres (the heavens) 22, 72, 92n78,
interest in 2–3, 5 93n83, 110, 136, 140, 156, 161
Subject index 229
Chaldean Oracles 38–9, 42, 52n29, 54n59, Forms: and celestial bodies 73–4, 86–7;
55n70, 101, 119n8 biological development of the theory of
conception 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 27n13, 27n16, Forms 7, 25, 32n93, 33, 44–50, 71, 74,
30n65, 34, 40, 41, 52n30, 53n48, 59, 66, 75, 166–7, 173n5; generation of Forms
68, 83–4, 85, 87, 88n7, 91n50, 97n138, in Intellect 36, 38, 45, 166; of individuals
102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 48, 56n100, 56n01, 156, 162; of non-
113, 122n61, 138, 142, 149, 153n61 human living things 49, 55n76; of parts
core group of Neoplatonists defined 3 of living things 46–8
core theory of Neoplatonic embryology form-principles or formal principles
7–8, 58–88, 129, and passim (λόγοι) 8, 41, 46; conflict between 158;
how derived from Forms 46, 74; in
Damascius 3, 57n103, 59 potential state in seed 8, 61–2, 71–2,
deformities see teratogenesis 74, 77, 79, 107, 173n5 (see also maternal
Demiurge 16, 25, 32n95, 86, 95n127, actualization thesis; seed); in unified state
98n167, 103, 104, 110, 119n6, 120n40, in seed 37, 40, 62–3, 71–2, 107, 157;
166 of powers of soul 135–6, 143–5, 148,
Democritus 5, 11n51, 14, 20–1, 24, 29n56, 150, 151n24 (see also seminal theory of
29n57, 34, 116–17, 119n4, 128n164 animation); of terata 162–3; scope and
diet 19–20, 84, 88 specificity in natural world 46–50
disease 17, 56n92, 57n104, 104, 115
Dyad (Pre-Intellect) 35–6, 38, 39, 41, 43, Galen 1, 9n11, 9n14, 11n47, 11n48, 11n49,
51n11, 51n13, 51n19, 53n52, 61 15, 27n18, 29n51, 34, 57n106, 60, 81, 84,
88n13, 91n55, 96n136, 101, 102, 103–4,
eighth-month child 6, 12n59 113, 147, 150n4, 150n6, 154n77, 155n86,
emanation see procession; reversion 157; on the animation of the embryo
encephalo-myelogenic theory 14, 16, 19, 15, 137; on the formation of the embryo
24, 26n7, 60, 101, 118 14, 68, 130–1; two-seed theory 1, 6, 8n5,
evolution 164–6, 170n40 8n6, 14
experimentation and empirical data 2, 5, 6, grafting 66–8, 90n45, 90n48
30n59, 34, 50n5, 63, 66–8, 113, 130, 132,
134, 138, 145, 161 heart 27n18, 112–14, 120n40, 122n69,
126n138, 126n139, 130–1, 137, 150n2,
female: and matter 1, 34–5, 36, 37, 38, 150n4, 151n18
43, 44, 54n63, 59, 60, 63, 67, 68, 78, heat 87, 101–2, 104, 112, 113, 126n127,
82, 89n15, 94n96, 95n125, 101, 103, 132, 138, 143
112, 114, 143, 157 (see also menses); Hecate 39, 52n29
and Neoplatonic metaphysics 35–44, hematogeneous theory 14, 26n9, 60, 89n22,
52n29, 54n61, 54n63, 54n64; cause of 101, 103, 112, 119n16
multiplicity and separation 36–7, 43, Herophilus 6, 12n60, 14, 19, 25n4, 26n5,
54n63, 63, 64; female seed 5–6, 7, 14, 17– 27n16
9, 24, 25n4, 26n5, 29n45, 29n51, 50n6, Hesiod 38, 41–2, 162, 164
58–60, 66, 89n16, 94n100, 96n130, 101, Hippocrates and the Hippocratics 1, 7,
103, 105, 112, 114–15, 117, 126n128; 11n43, 26n7, 28n27, 28n36, 92n74,
importance relative to male 1, 8n4, 100–3, 104, 107, 109, 110, 121n46; and
14, 18, 24, 31n67, 36–7, 50n6, 59, 82, the six-day embryo 101; animation
95n127, 103, 105, 114; see also maternal of the embryo 26n13, 139, 152n41;
actualization thesis; womb; ideoplasty formation of the embryo 84, 101, 104,
fetus 4; see also embryo 120n40, 130–1, 132, 151n15, 152n41,
flesh 14, 15, 17, 21, 30n67, 34, 107, 154n77; mechanical embryology 30n57,
126n137, 132, 142, 149, 151n18, 153n62, 34, 101–2, 105; pangenesis 14, 101, 103,
154n77 109, 118; two-seed theory 1, 5–6, 8n1,
formative (διαπλαστική) power 9n11, 35, 14, 101
93n84, 102–3, 104, 114, 120n29, 132, Homer 38, 42, 86, 162
151n14 humors 14, 84, 86, 92n74, 97n144, 105
230 Subject index
Iamblichus 3, 4, 26n13, 47, 55n89, 92n74, 126n124, 126n127, 126n137, 126n138,

98n158, 168n10; on animation 139–40, 126n139, 126n142, 127n146, 127n152,
143, 152n40, 152n41, 152n44; Pseudo- 127n153, 127n154, 127n155, 127n159,
Iamblichus 107–8 128n60, 128n163, 163; and Aristotle’s
ideoplasty 68, 90n49, 90n50, 167n2 embryology 96n136, 112–14; and Plato’s
impulse 79, 80, 134–6, 151n24 embryology 17, 29n55, 30n61, 114–18
intellect (νοῦς) 10n24, 61, 109, 127n53, Michael Psellus 4, 99n176, 163, 169n21,
135, 139; Intellect (hypostasis) 35–6, 38, 169n33
39, 40, 41, 45–50, 51n11, 56n101, 61, 74, mouth 24, 109, 124n86, 124n98, 138, 142
125n13, 166 (see also Dyad); likened to mule 5, 76–7, 94n98, 162–3, 169n25
seed 62, 71–2, 113 myth 38, 41–4, 53n54, 159; Plato’s myths
22–3, 64, 86, 164
John of Alexandria 4, 8n1, 30n60, 89n22,
100–3, 104, 105, 118n2, 119n8, 120n29, natural science, Neoplatonic engagement
121n55, 126n27, 132–3 with 2–7
John Italus 163 nature: individual natures 37, 46–50,
56n101, 61–2, 64–8, 70–4, 75, 77–82,
liver 63, 105, 113, 114, 120n40, 130–1, 137, 89n25, 91n63, 91n64, 92n70, 92n78,
151n18 94n99, 95n124, 95n126, 96n127, 102,
Longinus 140, 152n35, 153n49 104, 117, 122n61, 130, 135, 136, 143,
144, 149, 154n73, 159–61, 167, 173n5
male: and Intellect 38–9; and Neoplatonic (see also vegetative soul); universal nature
metaphysics 35–44, 54n61; cause of 46, 54n64, 69, 72–4, 83, 86, 91n64,
procession and unity 18, 37–8, 43–4, 93n83, 96n133, 102, 117, 133, 136, 142,
54n61, 61, 63; importance relative to 144, 148, 153n46, 154n73, 159–64
female 1, 8n4, 14, 18, 24, 31n67, 36–7, Nemesius 9n16, 9n17, 11n49, 106
50n6, 59, 82, 95n127, 103, 105, 114;
matter of male seed 34–5, 88n15, 112, Olympiodorus 3, 5, 11n43, 85, 92n72,
157; sole supplier of seed (see one-seed 92n74, 98n159, 99n178, 99n182, 111,
theory); whether cause of motion (see 153n47, 164
seed) One, the 35–40, 45, 51n13, 59, 61, 74
marrow 14, 15–7, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27n22, Orphics 6, 27n14, 38, 42, 51n23, 52n25,
27n23, 27n24, 29n45, 30–1n67, 32n89, 55n70
60, 63, 89n17, 89n22, 117–18, 119n15
maternal actualization thesis 8, 37, 58, pangenesis 14, 20, 21, 30n64, 101, 103, 105,
54n64, 58, 63–84, 86, 94n97, 96n133, 109, 115–18, 128n160
103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 113–14, 122n61, πανσπερμία 15, 16, 21, 27n23, 117, 127n155
137, 143–4, 148, 153n61, 171–2 PAP 35–6, 64, 78, 79, 80, 83, 94n112,
matter 38, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50n6, 56n101, 59, 95n126, 96n133, 110, 111, 135–6, 139–
63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75–6, 78, 79, 82, 41, 143, 145, 151n28; defined 35–6; see
83, 88n15, 97n137, 103, 119n4, 132, 135, also maternal actualization thesis
146–8, 157, 163, 166, 168n10; and terata Philo Judaeus 165–7, 169n40
157–8,160–2 Philoponus 3, 8, 10n22, 10n24, 59–60,
medical tradition, Neoplatonic engagement 81–2, 89n15, 89n16, 95n123, 95n124,
with 4–7, 11n41, 11n43, 11n47, 58–9, 95n126, 111, 134, 151n18, 153n57,
60, 81, 88n13, 101, 105, 107, 109–11, 153n61, 153n65, 154n67, 154n73,
119n10, 130, 149, 154n77, 155n86 154n84, 155n86, 157–8, 159–62, 163,
menses 1, 27n27, 28n27, 50n6, 59–60, 68, 168n21, 169n25; knowledge of Galen
73, 83, 84, 88n3, 88n7, 88n8, 89n15, and medicine 5, 11n47, 88n13; on the
89n16, 92n74, 112–14, 126n127, animation of the embryo 141–50
126n128, 127n152, 135, 157–8, 161 pica (cravings) 84, 116, 138
metaphysical models in embryology 7, PIP 4, 10n28, 35, 61–2, 63, 80, 108, 110,
33–7, 44, 61, 62, 64, 77, 80 135–6, 139–41, 143–5, 147, 148, 151n28,
Michael of Ephesus 3, 17, 100, 28n30, 111, 166, 167; defined 35
Subject index 231
plants 3, 19, 24, 27n18, 41, 45, 49, 55n77, reversion 7, 35–45, 46, 47, 50, 54n64, 59,
55n78, 64, 67, 72, 78–80, 86, 87, 92n70, 61–2, 63, 74, 166
94n101, 107, 109, 123n86, 127n153, Rhea 38, 41–2, 54n56
130, 138–9, 142–3, 146–7, 149, 150n8,
152n39, 152n44, 153n63, 158, 165 Seed: one-seed theory 6, 14, 18, 25n3, 25n4,
Plato: animation of the embryo 22–4, 28n38, 34, 58–60, 88, 88n3, 89n28, 107,
27n24, 31n68, 31n80, 32n82; celestial 108, 112, 117, 122n73, 126n126, 168n9;
influence 86; diet and exercise 84; two-seed theory (see Galen; Hippocrates
encephalo-myelogenic theory 15–7, and the Hippocratics; Plato); whether
24, 60, 118; eugenics 140–1; nuptial there is actual motion in seed 27n13, 35,
arithmetic 87; preformationism 20–2, 50n6, 62, 64, 77, 78–80, 94n108, 95n114,
24, 28n31, 29n55, 30n67, 32n92, 115, 95n125, 102, 108, 110, 113, 127n146;
127n155; role of Forms in embryology see also encephalo-myelogenic theory;
24–5, 33; two-seed theory 18–20, 24, female (female seed); form-principles;
29n45, 114; unwritten doctrine 38 hematogeneous theory; male (matter of
Plotinus 2, 3, 4, 9n12, 35–6, 47, 48, 49, male seed); maternal actualization theory;
56n97, 56n101, 57n103, 59, 60, 82–4, preformationism
85, 96n133, 96n135, 97n137, 97n138, sensation 10n31, 23, 27n18, 31n80, 61,
98n158, 108, 162, 166, 168n10; and 81–2, 108, 109, 113, 121n46, 124n86,
sexual vocabulary 40–2 124n96, 127n53, 134–6, 138–9, 141–4,
pneuma 27n16, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109–10, 148–9, 152n39, 154n79
112, 115, 121n54, 124n89, 125n108, seventh-month child 5, 6, 52n25, 87,
125n113, 145, 151n28, 154n68, 155n86, 122n74
172; see also pneumatic body theory of sex, determination of embryo’s 5, 7, 13, 24,
animation; breath 66, 101–2, 129
PNP 10n28, 35, 46; defined 35 sexual intercourse 18, 21, 22, 36, 38, 41–2,
Porphyry 3, 56n98, 85, 92n64, 98n158, 53n48, 115
98n159, 105–6, 139–41, 144, 148, 172; Simplicius 3, 59, 60, 77–82, 87, 99n174,
see also Ad Gaurum 151n28
predomination 34, 67, 104 sketch 83, 96n136, 112–13
preformationism 17, 18, 20–1, 26n10, Sophonias 82, 146–7
26n11, 28n31, 29n55, 30n60, 31n67, Soranus 14, 19, 26n5, 27n16, 90n50, 92n74
32n92, 115, 127n154, 127n155, 131; soul: appetitive part of soul 23–4, 28n23,
varieties defined 14–5 48, 130, 131, 137, 138, 142, 149, 152n32;
procession 7, 35–44, 45, 47, 50, 54n61, 59, descent of soul 4, 22, 23, 24, 58, 70,
61–2, 63, 166; see also male (cause of 83–4, 86, 96n133, 97n137, 97n138, 108,
procession) 133, 134, 136–42, 148, 151n28, 152n40,
Proclus 3, 4, 6, 8, 23n10, 31n76, 38, 153n49, 154n68, 164; rational soul 15,
42–4, 46–7, 49, 54n61, 54n63, 54n64, 16, 22–4, 27n17, 27n22, 28n23, 83, 84,
55n70,56n98, 57n104, 59, 63, 71–5, 86, 91n55, 92n64, 99n182, 106, 108,
77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89n17, 90n35, 114, 123n83, 127n153, 133–7, 139–43,
91n63, 91n64, 92n70, 92n71, 92n72, 147, 148, 149, 150n2, 151n28, 152n44,
92n74, 93n83, 97n145, 98n158, 98n172, 153n57, 153n65, 154n68, 154n84,
99n176, 99n178, 101, 139, 140–1, 143, 155n85, 155n86, 173n6; sensitive soul
144, 152n45, 153n46, 153n49, 161–3, (non-rational soul) 15, 27n17, 61, 66,
168n10, 168n21, 169n23, 173n5 81–2, 113–14, 136, 150n2, 151n24,
propensity see suitability 153n64 (see also sensation); spirited
puppets 78–80 part of soul 23–4, 28n23, 48, 131, 142,
144, 149; tripartite division of soul 22,
representation 61, 68, 90n50, 135, 137, 142, 31n68, 137; vegetative or generative
151n24 soul 4, 15, 27n17, 37, 46, 56n101, 63, 69,
resemblance to parents 5, 13, 14, 19, 24, 83, 89n25, 89n28, 92n64, 93n83, 114,
30n65, 35, 50n6, 59, 66, 72, 129, 127n152, 130–1, 135–6, 137–8, 144–5,
168n9 149, 150n2, 151n24, 152n32, 152n33,
232 Subject index
152n44, 153n57, 154n84; vegetative transmigration 22, 23, 32n87, 83, 108, 163–4
souls, blending of 64–6, 67, 72; vegetative triangles 15–6
souls, individual 66; vegetative souls, twins 5, 13, 24, 30n63, 48, 57n103
responsible for creating seed 61–2, 70,
113 (see also animation) umbilical cord 24, 107, 109, 113, 121n46,
spermatic ducts 16–9, 25n4, 26n5, 29n48 124n86, 126n138, 126n139, 131, 138,
‘spontaneous’ generation 72–3, 86, 92n70, 150n9, 154n77
109–10, 125n106, 144, 146, 147, 148–9,
161 womb (uterus) 5, 6, 17–21, 24, 25n4,
Stoics 5, 14, 15, 26n13, 27n16, 59, 65, 27n16, 28n27, 29n45, 29n48, 29n54,
90n31, 91n61, 108, 110–11, 130, 135–6, 31n70, 38–41, 44, 52n25, 53n49, 53n50,
143, 150n4, 151n25, 165, 169n40 55n70, 64, 66–7, 70–2, 95n126, 95n127,
suitability or propensity (ἐπιτηδειότης) 4, 97n138, 100, 102–5, 107, 108–11, 112,
65, 70, 79–80, 82, 83, 97n137, 126n137, 114–17, 120n29, 120n37, 122n73,
132, 133, 136, 139–41, 143, 146–9, 127n153, 127n154, 130–1, 138, 140,
151n29, 154n73, 157–8, 161–2 142, 152n36, 153n47, 154n84, 168n6,
sun 69, 85–6, 87, 99n176, 121n58 170n44, 173n6
Syrianus 47, 59, 74, 93n84, 126n125, 140–1 World-Soul 39, 46, 57n106, 68–71, 83,
91n57, 96n133, 97n137, 109, 110,
teratogenesis 5, 7, 8, 13, 24, 49, 50, 57n104, 147–8, 151n28, 172; see also universal
144, 156–70 nature
Tertullian 9n16, 9n17, 22 ζῷον ἀδιάπλαστα ζῷα 17, 20–1, 29n45,
Themistius 68–9, 71, 73, 82, 91n57, 95n122 29n55, 72, 90n33, 90n34, 90n35, 116,
Theophilus Protospatharius 9n17, 27n22, 128n160, 138; when the embryo
100, 103–4 becomes a ζῷον 4, 15, 20, 24, 26n13,
Theophrastus 67 27n16, 27n18, 32n85, 109, 110–11,
traducianism see animation 128n60, 134, 142–3, 149, 154n79

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FORMS, SOULS, AND EMBRYOS

‘Wilberding’s Forms, Souls, and Embryos is a pioneering work. It explores the

James Wilberding is Professor of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at Ruhr

Series editor: George Boys-Stones, Durham University, UK

Forms, Souls, and Embryos, James Wilberding

has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the

ISBN: 978-1-138-95527-1 (hbk)

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1 The Embryological Background 13

2 The Metaphysical Background 33

3 Neoplatonic Embryology: The Core Theory 58

Appendix to Chapter 3: Eclectic Theories 100

Pseudo-Galen’s Whether What is Carried in

4 The Formation and Animation of the Embryo 129

5 The Problem of Teratogenesis 156

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This will be seen by many as a surprising development in the history of embry-

Thus philosophy, to which the study of nature traditionally belonged, became

produced on Aristotle’s biological works such as On the Generation of Animals, On the

such as Oribasius of Pergamum,40 Pseudo-Elias,41 and Stephanus of Athens.42

While this evidence of bilateral interest between Neoplatonism and medicine

22 Olympiodorus In Meteor. 4,1–5. If, however, this classification is taken to be representa-

57 For Aristotle, see GA 734b22–35a26. Cf. GA 740a3–7; 741b15–25; 753b18–19; HA

The aim of this chapter is to examine Plato’s remarks pertaining to embryology,

General Background: Four Key Issues in Ancient

organized into a unified whole, while according to homuncular preformationism

This passage has been pointed to as evidence that Plato is an encephalo-myelogenic

from this perspective, then, Plato’s endorsement of a version of the encephalo-

Another difficulty concerns Plato’s rather ambiguous accounts throughout the

15 apud Porphyry AG 2.2.

69 Plato Tim. 41a–42d, 69c–70b, and 90a–d.

Metaphysical Models in Embryology

We might begin with a brief look at the Hippocratic embryology of On the

by all appearances inert, in fact contains motion in actuality (730b19–22). Here

something lacking determination desiring something that gives determination.13

earliest source of this doctrine, criticized it by making the comparison to sexual

Neoplatonic thought. Thus, the Oracles describe an intelligible triad consisting of

For as a girdling [υ‛πεζωκòς], intellectual membrane [υ‛μὴν], [the Power] sep-

Texts such as these led Neoplatonists to an increasingly sexualized understanding

produce, and that it is impossible for such a force to remain unproductive.

The Biological Development of the Theory of Forms

theory of Forms was supposed to help explain reproduction).71 In Chapter 1,

to play in the subsequent reproduction of human beings.73

In other words the metaphysics of procession and reversion allows Proclus to

sive discussion of Neoplatonic approaches to teratology may be deferred to a later

We may now summarize the results of this examination as follows. The

27 See Lewy (1978: 116).

a living thing (30c2–31b3).

The One-seed Theory

(Philoponus Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation

In light of Philoponus’ demonstrable medical background, and in particular his

The Origin and Nature of the Seed

Neoplatonists demonstrate a much greater interest in establishing the origin

The Maternal Actualization Thesis

tiality envisioned. Aristotle’s metaphysical model encourages him to see this as an

as a plant being rooted in the earth in order to champion a more sophisticated

enced by the representations that the mother entertains at conception, provides

form-principles and then he demands an explanation of how these form-principles

However, regarding the corporeal and irrational substance, what is lacking in

of the embryo, as Kalbfleisch suggests.

ably be understood as a reference to the three other sublunary elemental spheres,71

This appears to be a cosmic application of certain general metaphysical principles

springboard to discuss the manner in which nature functions as a cause in biologi-

1 The Embryological Background 13

2 The Metaphysical Background 33

3 Neoplatonic Embryology: The Core Theory 58

Appendix to Chapter 3: Eclectic Theories 100

4 The Formation and Animation of the Embryo 129

5 The Problem of Teratogenesis 156

52 I have explored this issue at greater length in Wilberding (2008).

3 See Duffy (1997: 10–12 and 21–2).

45 Cf. Porphyry AG 47,16–28 and 34,23–35,2.

79 For example Theol. Arith. 52,8–16.