‐1‐
Timothy Maradeo
Anna Peterson
Greek 420
5 May 2022
Socrates Discusses Narration
[392ξ] οὐκοῦν περί γε ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους
λέγεσθαι, τότε διομολογησόμεθα, ὅταν εὕρωμεν οἷόν ἐστιν
δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐάντε δοκῇ
ἐάντε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι;
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος: τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον
παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.
καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, τοῦτο, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ μανθάνω ὅτι λέγεις.
[392δ] ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δεῖ γε: ἴσως οὖν τῇδε μᾶλλον
εἴσῃ. ἆρ᾽ οὐ πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται
διήγησις οὖσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων;
τί γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλο;
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῇ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένῃ ἢ
δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν;
καὶ τοῦτο, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι δέομαι σαφέστερον μαθεῖν.
[392c] “And so it is necessary that these very words be said
about mankind. Then we will agree upon, whenever we find
out what justice is and that it is naturally profitable, whether he
appears or whether he does not to be the sort.”
“Most true,” he said.
“Let these things be the end of the matter: But of the diction, as
I think, one must reflect upon this, and, indeed, the matter and
the manner must be entirely considered.”
“But,” Adeimantus said, “I don’t understand what you are
saying.”
[392d] “But indeed,” I said, “It is necessary: perhaps then you
will understand this better. Doesn’t everything said by
storytellers or poets as a narrative happen to be either of past,
present, or future things.”
“For what else would it be?” he said.
“Then indeed do they truly accomplish it through a simple
narrative or through imitation, or a combination of the two?”
“This also,” he said, “I still need to learn about more clearly.”
 ‐2‐
γελοῖος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔοικα διδάσκαλος εἶναι καὶ ἀσαφής: ὥσπερ
οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγειν, οὐ κατὰ ὅλον ἀλλ᾽ ἀπολαβὼν [392ε]
μέρος τι πειράσομαί σοι ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι ὃ βούλομαι. καί μοι
εἰπέ: ἐπίστασαι τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὰ πρῶτα, ἐν οἷς ὁ ποιητής φησι
τὸν μὲν Χρύσην δεῖσθαι τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἀπολῦσαι τὴν
θυγατέρα, τὸν δὲ χαλεπαίνειν, τὸν δέ, ἐπειδὴ [393α] οὐκ
ἐτύγχανεν, κατεύχεσθαι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν;
ἔγωγε.
οἶσθ᾽ οὖν ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν—“ ... καὶ ἐλίσσετο
πάντας Ἀχαιούς, Ἀτρείδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε
λαῶν”Hom. Il. 1.15 λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ
ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ
αὐτός: τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ
πειρᾶται [393β] ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν
εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποίηται διήγησιν περί τε τῶν
ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν διήγησις μέν ἐστιν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἑκάστοτε λέγῃ
καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων;
πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
1
In the Iliad, the narrator directly addresses Menelaos, Patroklos,
Melanippos, and Achilles. In the Odyssey, only Eumaios is addressed (Block
1982, 11).
“I seem to be an amusing and uncertain teacher: just like men
unable to speak, I will attempt [392e] to take, not from the
entire thing, but from some small part in this in order to make
clear for you what you wish. And indeed, tell me: do you know
the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says Chryses
requires Agamemnon to release his daughter, but he was angry,
and he, when [393a] he was not doing it, cursed the Achaeans
before the god?”
“I do.”
“And you are familiar with these verses, – ‘and he was begging
all the Achaeans, mostly the two sons of Atreus, leaders of
men’ Hom. II. 1.15. The poet himself also speaks1, and he does
not try to direct the dialogue to us at another time as the words
of someone else: but from these things, as if he was Chryses,
he speaks and very much attempts to persuade [393b] us that
Homer seems to be not the one speaking, but the priest – the
old man. And he makes some entire other narrative about the
affairs in Ilion, and the affairs in Ithaca, and the affairs endured
in the entire Odyssey.”
“Yes, entirely then,” he said.
“Then is it a narration each time he gives a speech in the
middle of the affairs of the speech?”
“For how not?”
 ‐3‐
[393ξ] ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν, ἆρ᾽ οὐ
τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν
ἑκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα;
φήσομεν: τί γάρ;
οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ
σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;
τί μήν;
ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ
μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα [393δ]
ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποίησίς τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονυῖα εἴη.
ἵνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι οὐκ αὖ μανθάνεις, ὅπως ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο
ἐγὼ φράσω. εἰ γὰρ Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν ὅτι ἦλθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε
θυγατρὸς λύτρα φέρων καὶ ἱκέτης τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν
βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος ἔλεγεν ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι
ὡς Ὅμηρος, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἦν ἀλλὰ ἁπλῆ διήγησις.
εἶχε δ᾽ ἂν ὧδε πως—φράσω δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου: οὐ γάρ εἰμι
ποιητικός—
2 3
Homer address the audience/reader directly five times in the Iliad but not
at all in the Odyssey (Block 1982, 12).
“[393c] But whenever he says some speech as if he is someone
else, at that time will we not say that he makes himself as
similar as possible to the style of the one who he says is about
to speak?”
“We do say that: for what else would we say?”
“And making oneself similar to another either in tone or in
shape – is it not the act of imitating that person for which some
imitation belongs?”
“What else would it be?”
“In a thing such as this, as it seems, both he and the other poets
are making the narrative through imitation.”
“Entirely yes then.”
“But if the poet hides himself nowhere, [393d] then the entire
production and narrative would be made without imitation by
him.2 But in order that you don’t say that you are confused, I
will say how this could be done. For if Homer, after he said
that Chryses came carrying the ransom of his daughter and
suppliant of the Achaeans, but mostly of the kings, was
speaking this accordingly, not as Chryses, but still as Homer,
you know that it would not be imitation but simple narration3.
It would go something in this way – I will say it without the
meter, for I am not a poet –
Socrates makes the distinction between 1st and 3rd person narration. For
more information on 1st person narration in Homer, typically a rhetorical
device, see Block 1982.
 ‐4‐
ἐλθὼν [393ε] ὁ ἱερεὺς ηὔχετο ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δοῦναι
ἑλόντας τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοὺς σωθῆναι, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα οἱ λῦσαι
δεξαμένους ἄποινα καὶ τὸν θεὸν αἰδεσθέντας. ταῦτα δὲ
εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο καὶ συνῄνουν, ὁ δὲ
Ἀγαμέμνων ἠγρίαινεν ἐντελλόμενος νῦν τε ἀπιέναι καὶ αὖθις
μὴ ἐλθεῖν, μὴ αὐτῷ τό τε σκῆπτρον καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ στέμματα
οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι: πρὶν δὲ λυθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα, ἐν Ἄργει
ἔφη γηράσειν μετὰ οὗ: ἀπιέναι δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν καὶ μὴ ἐρεθίζειν,
[394α] ἵνα σῶς οἴκαδε ἔλθοι. ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτης ἀκούσας ἔδεισέν
τε καὶ ἀπῄει σιγῇ, ἀποχωρήσας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πολλὰ
τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι ηὔχετο, τάς τε ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνακαλῶν
καὶ ὑπομιμνῄσκων καὶ ἀπαιτῶν, εἴ τι πώποτε ἢ ἐν ναῶν
οἰκοδομήσεσιν ἢ ἐν ἱερῶν θυσίαις κεχαρισμένον δωρήσαιτο:
ὧν δὴ χάριν κατηύχετο τεῖσαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὰ ἃ δάκρυα τοῖς
ἐκείνου βέλεσιν. οὕτως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἄνευ [394β]
μιμήσεως ἁπλῆ διήγησις γίγνεται.
μανθάνω, ἔφη.
μάνθανε τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία γίγνεται,
ὅταν τις τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ
ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπῃ.
καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, μανθάνω, ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ περὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας
τοιοῦτον.
after the priest came, [393e] he was praying to the gods, on the
one hand for them to grant the capture of Troy – and that they
be safe – and on the other hand that the ransom be accepted to
free the daughter and to respect the god. And after he said these
things, some others felt awe and consented, but Agamemnon
was angry and commanded him to leave immediately and to
not come again, lest the staff and wreath of the god not be
strong enough for him: for before his daughter is released, he
said she will grow old with him in Argos. And so, he ordered
him to leave and to not make him angry, [394] so that he could
go home safely. But the old man, after hearing this, was afraid
and left silently, and having gone away from the camp, he
prayed very much to Apollo, calling up the title of the god,
recalling and demanding that if at any time yet, either in
building the temple or in sacrificing burnt offerings, he gained
his favor: for this he prayed that the Achaeans pay a price for
his tears by his shafts. In this way,” I said, “oh companion, the
narration is clearly given without [394b] imitation.”
“I understand,” he said.
“Understand then,” I said, “that the opposite of this happens
whenever someone takes out the things in the midst of
speeches and leaves behind interchanged things.”
“And this,” he said, “I understand, that there is such a thing
related to tragedies.”
 ‐5‐
ὀρθότατα, ἔφην, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ οἶμαί σοι ἤδη δηλοῦν ὃ
ἔμπροσθεν οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἦ, ὅτι τῆς ποιήσεώς τε καὶ μυθολογίας
[394ξ] ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις,
τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ
ποιητοῦ—εὕροις δ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις— ἡ
δ᾽ αὖ δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἔν τε τῇ τῶν ἐπῶν ποιήσει, πολλαχοῦ δὲ
καὶ ἄλλοθι, εἴ μοι μανθάνεις.
ἀλλὰ συνίημι, ἔφη, ὃ τότε ἐβούλου λέγειν.
καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου δὴ ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι ἔφαμεν ἃ μὲν λεκτέον
ἤδη εἰρῆσθαι, ὡς δὲ λεκτέον ἔτι σκεπτέον εἶναι.
ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.
[394δ] τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἦν ὃ ἔλεγον, ὅτι χρείη
διομολογήσασθαι πότερον ἐάσομεν τοὺς ποιητὰς μιμουμένους
ἡμῖν τὰς διηγήσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ μὲν μιμουμένους, τὰ δὲ μή,
καὶ ὁποῖα ἑκάτερα, ἢ οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι.
μαντεύομαι, ἔφη, σκοπεῖσθαί σε εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα τραγῳδίαν
τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὔ.
ἴσως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγέ
πω οἶδα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ, ταύτῃ
ἰτέον.
4
The dithyramb was a cult, choral song in honor of Dionysus. It developed
into a song sung under the leadership of an exarchon, through which it has
“You have received it most correctly,” I said, “and I think that
the thing which before I was not able to say is clear to you, that
of poetry and of fiction it is entirely [394c] through imitation,
just as you are saying, in tragedy and in comedy, but there is
through the report of the poet himself – found best somehow in
dithyrambs4 – and there is a combination of both also in the
poetry of epics, and in many places elsewhere, if you
understand me.”
“But I do understand,” he said, “what at some time you were
wishing to tell me.”
“And remember the prior thing, that we were talking about the
things which must be said when speaking, but how it must be
said still must be reflected upon.”
“But I do remember.”
“[394d] This then is what I was saying, that we must reach an
agreement whether we are to permit the poets to make the
narration by imitating, or sometimes through imitation,
sometimes not – and what sort each will be – or just never
through imitation.”
“I suspect,” he said, “that you are contemplating whether we
should receive tragedy and comedy into the city or not.”
“Perhaps,” I said, “and perhaps even more than these things:
for I do not yet know myself, but whichever way the argument
is carried, just like the wind, this way we must go.”
come to be associated with the cultural and religious policies of tyrants
(Zimmerman 2015).
 ‐6‐
καὶ καλῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, λέγεις.
[394ε] τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικοὺς
ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὔ: ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
ἕπεται, ὅτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἓν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι,
πολλὰ δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος
πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν, ὥστ᾽ εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος;
τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει;
οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μιμήσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι πολλὰ ὁ αὐτὸς
μιμεῖσθαι εὖ ὥσπερ ἓν οὐ δυνατός;
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
[395α] σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου
ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεί
που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα
δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ
τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις;
ἔγωγε: καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί. οὐδὲ μὴν
ῥαψῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα.
ἀληθῆ.
5
A rhapsodist in the Socratic tradition interprets the mind of the poet who,
in turn, interprets the gods. The inability to be both rhapsodist and actor
“And you speak well,” he said.
[394e] “This now then, oh Adeimantus, observe, whether it is
necessary for our guardians to be imitators or not: or is this
following the conclusions before, that each one should pursue
well one business, and not many, but if he tries this, having
attempted many, he would fail everything, in so much as he is
held in account.”
“But what is not likely?”
“And then does the same argument hold concerning imitation,
that the same man cannot imitate many things as well as he can
one?”
“No then.”
“[395a] He will hardly pursue anything of those things which
are worth pursuing about speech, both imitating and being an
imitator, since the same ones are not able at the same time to
make good imitations of two similar things, such as is the case
with comedy and tragedy. Are you not calling each of these
imitations?”
“I am, and you speak truly, that the same men are not able to
do it. Nor can they be rhapsodists5 and actors at the same
time.”
“True.”
follows from both Socrates’s discussion of singularity of occupation and
the ethical considerations (Duncan 1945, 484).
 ‐7‐
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳδοῖς οἱ [395β]
αὐτοί: πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὔ;
μιμήματα.
καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα
κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος
εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ
τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα.
ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
εἰ ἄρα τὸν πρῶτον λόγον διασώσομεν, τοὺς φύλακας ἡμῖν τῶν
ἄλλων πασῶν δημιουργιῶν ἀφειμένους δεῖν εἶναι [395ξ]
δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως πάνυ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν
ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅτι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, οὐδὲν δὴ δέοι ἂν
αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμεῖσθαι: ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται,
μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀνδρείους,
σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ
ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ
ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι
[395δ] ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ
νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται
καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;
6
coinage metaphor – “minted in even smaller coins” (Plato 2013, 259)
“But neither can the same men act both for comedies and for
tragedies. [395b] But all these are imitations. Are they not?”
“They are imitations.”
“And still, oh Adeimantus, it seems to me that the nature of
mankind has been cut up into smaller piece6 than these, so that
he is not able to imitate many things well or to create the same
things which the imitations are supposed to resemble.”
“Most true,” he said.
“If we preserve the first argument then, it is necessary that our
guardians are discharged from all other trades. [395c] They are
to be exact tradesmen of the liberty of the entire city, and they
must not pursue anything else that does not carry this out. It
would be necessary that they do nothing else, not even by
imitating. But if they imitate, they should imitate the correct
things that are present for them from childhood: masculinity,
soundness of mind, righteousness, freedom, and all such things.
But things against freedom they shouldn’t do, nor should they
be clever at imitating them, nor any other of the dishonorable
things, lest from the imitation of them they find enjoyment.
[395d] Or have you perceived how those imitations, if pursued
from youth onward, become a habit, in the mind, in the body,
and in concepts and thought?”
 ‐8‐
καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὧν φαμὲν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν
αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα μιμεῖσθαι ἄνδρας
ὄντας, ἢ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν, ἢ ἀνδρὶ λοιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς
θεοὺς ἐρίζουσάν τε καὶ μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἰομένην [395ε]
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἢ ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσιν καὶ θρήνοις
ἐχομένην: κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρῶσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν, πολλοῦ καὶ
δεήσομεν.
παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
οὐδέ γε δούλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττοντας ὅσα δούλων.
οὐδὲ τοῦτο.
οὐδέ γε ἄνδρας κακούς, ὡς ἔοικεν, δειλούς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία
πράττοντας ὧν νυνδὴ εἴπομεν, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ
κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἢ
[396α] καὶ νήφοντας, ἢ καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις
καὶ ἐν ἔργοις ἁμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὑτούς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους, οἶμαι
δὲ οὐδὲ μαινομένοις ἐθιστέον ἀφομοιοῦν αὑτοὺς ἐν λόγοις
οὐδὲ ἐν ἔργοις: γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ
πονηροὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων
οὐδὲ μιμητέον.
7
For more on Socrates’s view of women, see Book 1, [350e]
8
Plato’s inclusion of slaves in the ideal city – Vlastos argues that, because
Socrates openly admits radical changes between reality and the ideal city
“Very much,” he said.
“We will not allow,” he said, “those we affirm to care about
who must become good men to imitate women7, although they
are men, either young or old, a wife being abused or quarreling
with the gods and boasting, thinking to be good, [395e] or
being possessed by wailing and grief and sorrow: sickness or
labor or love, we will lack much.”
“Altogether then,” he said.
“Nor male slaves and female slaves doing the tasks of slaves.8”
“Not this.”
“Not bad men, as it seems, cowardly and doing the opposite of
the things which we now spoke of – they abuse and treat poorly
each other and speak evil, drunk or even [396a] sober, or in
other things they both in words and in deeds make mistakes for
themselves and for others, but I think that they must not be
accustomed to making themselves like furious men either in
words or in deeds: for one must know men and women both
enraged and oppressed by toils, and nobody must be made to
imitate these people.”
(such as the education of women), he must not have intended to remove
slavery (Calvert 1987, 367).
 ‐9‐
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.
τί δέ; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: χαλκεύοντας ἤ τι ἄλλο δημιουργοῦντας,
[396β] ἢ ἐλαύνοντας τριήρεις ἢ κελεύοντας τούτοις, ἤ τι ἄλλο
τῶν περὶ ταῦτα μιμητέον;
καὶ πῶς; ἔφη, οἷς γε οὐδὲ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτων οὐδενὶ
ἐξέσται;
τί δέ; ἵππους χρεμετίζοντας καὶ ταύρους μυκωμένους καὶ
ποταμοὺς ψοφοῦντας καὶ θάλατταν κτυποῦσαν καὶ βροντὰς καὶ
πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἦ μιμήσονται;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπείρηται αὐτοῖς, ἔφη, μήτε μαίνεσθαι μήτε μαινομένοις
ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.
εἰ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μανθάνω ἃ σὺ λέγεις, ἔστιν τι εἶδος λέξεώς
τε καὶ διηγήσεως ἐν ᾧ ἂν διηγοῖτο ὁ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς [396ξ]
κἀγαθός, ὁπότε τι δέοι αὐτὸν λέγειν, καὶ ἕτερον αὖ ἀνόμοιον
τούτῳ εἶδος, οὗ ἂν ἔχοιτο ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ διηγοῖτο ὁ ἐναντίως
ἐκείνῳ φύς τε καὶ τραφείς.
ποῖα δή, ἔφη, ταῦτα;
9
reference to stage machinery or theatrical imitations (Plato 2013, 261)
“Most true,” he said.
“But what,” I said? “Must they imitate blacksmiths, or some
other craftsmen, [396b] or those who navigate triremes, or
commanders of these men, or something else related to these
occupations?”
“But how?” He said, “since nobody is allowed to pay attention
to these things?”
“But how!? Will they imitate the neighing of horses and the
bellowing of bulls and the splashing of rivers and the crash of
the sea and thunder and again all such things?9”
“But for them it has been forbidden,” he said, “either to be mad
or to become like a mad man.”
“If,” I said, “I understand the things which you are saying,
there is some form of diction and of narration in which a good
[396c] and noble man would describe what is going on,
whenever something is necessary for him to say, and again
another form dissimilar to this, which one would always carry
who was born and brought up the opposite way to that good
one.”
“What kind are these?” he said.
 ‐ 10 ‐
ὁ μέν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηται ἐν
τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν
ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ
τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος [396δ] τὸν ἀγαθὸν
ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἧττον ἢ
ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἤ τινος
ἄλλης συμφορᾶς: ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατά τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον,
οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα
κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν
ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ
δυσχεραίνων αὑτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ [396ε] ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς
τῶν κακιόνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς
χάριν.
εἰκός, ἔφη.
οὐκοῦν διηγήσει χρήσεται οἵᾳ ἡμεῖς ὀλίγον πρότερον
διήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἡ λέξις
μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμήσεώς τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δέ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως;
ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;
καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οἷόν γε ἀνάγκη τὸν τύπον εἶναι τοῦ τοιούτου
ῥήτορος.
“He seems to me,” I said, “the moderate man, when he reaches
in the narrative some word or business of a good man, he will
be willing to narrate it, making himself imitate it most greatly
as if he is the other man, and he will not feel shame at such an
imitation, [396d] being a steadfast man and one who acts
rational, and the inferior and the lesser one having been
overthrown by sickness or love or drink or some other harm:
but whenever he becomes someone not worthy of himself, he
will not be willing to copy himself quickly to an inferior one, if
not briefly whenever something useful is done, but he will be
ashamed, at the same time, because he is untrained at imitating
such men, and he is unable to mold himself and conform to the
images of worse men, esteeming them lightly in thought,
except when he is joking around.”
“Seemingly,” he said.
“Then the narrative he gives is of the sort we briefly explained
before about the lines of Homer, and the diction he partakes of
is both, both of imitation and of narration, or of a small portion
of imitation? Or am I saying nothing?”
“And very much so,” he said, “is the necessary model of a
public speaker.”
 ‐ 11 ‐

“[397a] Not then,” I said, “the one again who is cheaper than
him. For he will describe everything more, and he will think
[397α] οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος αὖ, ὅσῳ ἂν
nothing is unworthy of him, with the result that he will attempt
φαυλότερος ᾖ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον διηγήσεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἑαυτοῦ
to imitate everything hastily and before many people, and the
ἀνάξιον οἰήσεται εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρήσει μιμεῖσθαι
things which now we are saying – thunder and the noise of
σπουδῇ τε καὶ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν,
wind and hail and axles and pulleys and war trumpets and
βροντάς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαζῶν καὶ ἀξόνων τε
flutes and a shepherd’s pipe and all sounds of instruments and
καὶ τροχιλιῶν, καὶ σαλπίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων καὶ
still the noise of dogs and cattle and birds. [397b] And the
πάντων ὀργάνων φωνάς, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ
diction of this is all according to the sound of the imitation and
ὀρνέων φθόγγους: [397β] καὶ ἔσται δὴ ἡ τούτου λέξις ἅπασα
its form, or some small part of the narrative?
διὰ μιμήσεως φωναῖς τε καὶ σχήμασιν, ἢ σμικρόν τι διηγήσεως
ἔχουσα; “It is necessary,” he said, “and this.”
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, καὶ τοῦτο. “These things now,” I said, “are the two forms of diction.”
ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔλεγον τὰ δύο εἴδη τῆς λέξεως. “For indeed they are,” he said.
καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἔφη. “Then does one have a small variation10, and if someone would
give to the diction a clear arrangement and rhythm, is it
οὐκοῦν αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ ἐάν τις
possible for the one speaking correctly and in one arrangement
ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξει, ὀλίγου
– for the variations are small – also to speak even in [397c] the
πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ
same rhythm?”
ἁρμονίᾳ—σμικραὶ γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί—καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν [397ξ]
ῥυθμῷ ὡσαύτως παραπλησίῳ τινί; “Precisely then!” he said. “This is the case.”
κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει. “But what of the other forms? Is the opposite not necessary, of
all arrangements and of all rhythms, if one intends to speak
τί δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου εἶδος; οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν
appropriately, to conform according to every kind of
ἁρμονιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέλλει αὖ οἰκείως λέγεσθαι,
variation?”
διὰ τὸ παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν;

10
metabole used in music to denote change from one harmony to another
(Plato 2013, 265)
 ‐ 12 ‐

καὶ σφόδρα γε οὕτως ἔχει. “And this is very much the case.”
ἆρ᾽ οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἵ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων “Then do all poets and those who speak hit upon one of these,
ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν τύπῳ τῆς λέξεως ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων either one or a blend of each?”
τινὶ συγκεραννύντες;
“It is necessary,” he said.
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
“[397d] What then will we do?” I said. “Will we receive both
[397δ] τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν into the city, all of these and one of the mixed type, or just the
πάντας τούτους παραδεξόμεθα ἢ τῶν ἀκράτων τὸν ἕτερον ἢ mixed?”
τὸν κεκραμένον;
“If I should succeed in saying,” he said, “the unmixed imitator
ἐὰν ἡ ἐμή, ἔφη, νικᾷ, τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον. of the suitable type.”
ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ “But, oh Adeimantus, the mixed is also pleasing, and more
ἥδιστος παισί τε καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς ὁ ἐναντίος οὗ σὺ αἱρῇ καὶ τῷ pleasing to boys and pedagogues, but a large crowd seizes the
πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. opposite.”
ἥδιστος γάρ. “For it is most pleasing.”
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν ἁρμόττειν φαίης τῇ [397ε] “But perhaps,” I said, “you would say it is not fitting to our city
ἡμετέρᾳ πολιτείᾳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ [397e] because there is no double-manifold man among us,
πολλαπλοῦς, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἓν πράττει. since each does one thing.”
οὐ γὰρ οὖν ἁρμόττει. “For, then it is not fitting.”
 ‐ 13 ‐
οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει τόν τε σκυτοτόμον
σκυτοτόμον εὑρήσομεν καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτην πρὸς τῇ
σκυτοτομίᾳ, καὶ τὸν γεωργὸν γεωργὸν καὶ οὐ δικαστὴν πρὸς τῇ
γεωργίᾳ, καὶ τὸν πολεμικὸν πολεμικὸν καὶ οὐ χρηματιστὴν
πρὸς τῇ πολεμικῇ, καὶ πάντας οὕτω;
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.
[398α] ἄνδρα δή, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνάμενον ὑπὸ σοφίας παντοδαπὸν
γίγνεσθαι καὶ μιμεῖσθαι πάντα χρήματα, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀφίκοιτο εἰς
τὴν πόλιν αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποιήματα βουλόμενος ἐπιδείξασθαι,
προσκυνοῖμεν ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερὸν καὶ θαυμαστὸν καὶ ἡδύν,
εἴποιμεν δ᾽ ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ ἐν τῇ πόλει παρ᾽
ἡμῖν οὔτε θέμις ἐγγενέσθαι, ἀποπέμποιμέν τε εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν
μύρον κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καταχέαντες καὶ ἐρίῳ στέψαντες,
αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιητῇ [398β]
χρῴμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ
ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς
τύποις οἷς κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα, ὅτε τοὺς στρατιώτας
ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν.
καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖμεν, εἰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἴη.
νῦν δή, εἶπον ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ
περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους παντελῶς διαπεπεράνθαι: ἅ τε γὰρ
λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.
καὶ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη.
11
The deification of poets, a reference to the prior discussion of justice in
Book 1, [336a] – “any other of the wise and blessed”
12
Wrapping in wool typically directed toward a statue or image of a god
(Plato 2013, 269)
“Then on account of these things in only such a city will we
find a leather cutter being a leather cutter and not a pilot being
a shoemaker, and a farmer tilling the ground and not a being
judge in the tillage, and a fighter fighting and not acting as the
money-gatherer in war, and everything in this way?”
“True,” he said.
[398a] “A man, as it seems, capable through wisdom of
understanding every type of thing and imitating every craft, if
he should arrive in the city itself with the poems which he
wishes to exhibit, we should prostrate him as sacred11 and
wonderful and pleasant, and we should say that there is not
such a man in all the city, nor is he permitted to be living
among us, and we should send him off to another city after
pouring perfume down his neck and wrapping him in wool12,
and we ourselves should consult the harsh and distasteful poet
[398b] and storyteller for help, who would imitate the fitting
diction and the speeches in those manners which from the
beginning we framed – that of attempt to bring up soldiers.13”
“And greatly we should do that, if it is for us to do it,” he said.
“Now,” I said, “oh friend, we dare so say that we have
absolutely finished the discussion concerning words and
muses: for the things which must be said are said.”
“And it seems to me,” he said.
13
Aesthetics serve the function of promoting a political goal; therefore, a
poet of greater utility is promoted above a poet who is more skillful or
pleasing (Rucker 1966, 169)
 ‐ 14 ‐

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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