TERESITA P. FAJARDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, respondent.

(definition
of PRACTICE OF LAW)

Facts:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva
Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and
administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for
Mental Health. He asked for ₱1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his
appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman
who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the
amount of ₱500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have
cases against Teresita dismissed.

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against
Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.

Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave. Atty.
Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise. Teresita sent
a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent Atty. Alvarez, a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the
National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to privately
practice law; and
2. Whether or not the amount charged by Atty. Alvarez for attorney’s fees is reasonable under the
principle of quantum meruit.

Ruling:

Respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer’s Oath, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to
return the amount of ₱500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

1. NO. The respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession. Respondent claims that
he is authorized to practice his profession as he was given written permission by the National
Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A. Vicente, whose authority was designated under
Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, Series of 1999.
 However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and
against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent’s practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the
requirement that his practice will not be “in conflict with the interest of the Center and the
Philippine government as a whole.

There is basic conflict of interest here as the respondent is a public officer, an employee
of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.

Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Memorandum Circular
No. 17, Series of 1986, government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in
private practice of their profession unless authorized by their department heads. More
importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with
the official functions of the government official or employee:

Also, respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this
case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent.

2. NO. The respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew
people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant’s case.

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was “forced to give . . .

Respondent the amount of ₱1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he had friends
in the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with a fee.” It is because of respondent’s
assurances to complainant that she sent him money over the course of several months.

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules

1.01, and 1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. Respondent’s act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal
relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and
dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always “uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.”

In relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers “shall rely upon the merits of his [or her]
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.”

A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome
for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This act of
influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession:

Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, it

is ruled that there is enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling (the use of
position or political influence on someone's behalf in exchange for money or favors).
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
(Bar exam case regarding ADVERTISEMENT)

 Respondent is attorney-at-law, who was charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943 regarding the assistance in securing a
marriage license promptly and without delay, as well as consultation being free for the poor.
 Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
 Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
o Not just the performance in his cases but also his moral standing
o Professional capacity also includes your private life
 WON Estanislao Bayot is guilty of malpractice, and violated the ethics of his profession?
 YES. The advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being brazen solicitation of business from the public. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the
practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. Considering
his plea for leniency, and promise not to repeat the misconduct, the respondent was
reprimanded.

ADELINO H. LEDESMA V. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO (remember the dates; this will be included
in the exams)
 Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala the respondent judge.
 On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties and filed a motion to withdraw from
his position as counsel de parte.
 The respondent Judge denied him and appointed him as counsel de officio for the two
defendants.
 On November 6 1964, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio,
because the Comelec requires full-time service which could prevent him from handling the
defense adequately. The judge denied the motion. So, Ledesma institutes this certiorari
proceeding.
 Issue: Whether or not Judge Ledesma's withdrawal as counsel de officio shows a lack of
fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession?
 Decision: YES
 Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the
legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with
conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service and is not a mere trade or
 craft. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not
diminish the lawyer's zeal.
 For legal practitioners, there are times, and this is one of them when the duty to court and client
takes precedence over promptings of self-interest .

AGUIRRE VS. RANA (case where “practice of law” is defined)

 Concerned with the practice of law

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
 On 21 May 2001, a day before the mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees, Aguirre files
against Rana a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar
o Charging him with unauthorized practice of law, violation of law and grave misconduct.
o Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer,
 appeared as a counsel for a Vice- Mayoralty Candidate George Bunan before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
 Filed with the MBEC a pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor .
 Rana signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan .
o Rana was allowed to take his oath but was withheld to sign the Roll of Attorneys until he
is cleared of the charges against him. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to
investigate and its findings disclosed that the respondent actively participated in the
proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.
 WON Rana should be allowed Admission to the Bar.
 No. The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan before he took the
lawyers oath. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the
(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN.
Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as
his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. All these happened even
before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations. He has to fulfill the requisites – to take his
Lawyer’s Oath and by signing the Roll of Attorneys.
o True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer.
o The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is
not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
 o In Cayetano v. Monsod,
 The Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill.

Cayetano v. Monsod (skipped)

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.

 Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on
January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided
by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
 Back and forth argument of whether complainant is a lawyer or not
 Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his
behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention
to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner,
substance, tone of voice and how the words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!" were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate
and discredit complainant before the public.
 Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the
trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s
appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is
a lawyer. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the
moment in the course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not
be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at
losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
 Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
 We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally
his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
 by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
 In Maderada vs. Mediodea, this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus: This
provision means that in litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress --
from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys,
they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been
permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are
not considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself any
more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."
 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Alawi vs. Alauya

 Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa
& Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
 2.) Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed of Alauya’s purchase on one of the housing
units belonging to E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co
 3.) On December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising
of the termination of his contract as void ab initio. He claimed that Sophia Alawi maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without any authority and against his will.
 4.) Alawi to her response, filed a complaint accusing Alauya of:
o 4.1 “Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith
o 4.2 “Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation
o 4.3 “Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage
o 4.4 Usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
 Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous”
with “Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal”
or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.
 Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights.
 Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however
 sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous indignation or vindication of
right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of
the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alauya is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged. As regards
Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 Can a lawyer who passed the Bar practice in the Shari’a court? (RA 11054)

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking
the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.

 Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers (state positively as
a fact), among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Province of Negros
Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of
“Bachillerato Superior”; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the “Instituto de
Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the
law course graduating there as “Licenciado En Derecho”; that thereafter he was allowed to
practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
 Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations.
o This treaty was created to recognize the validity of the nationals of the two countries to
be able to practice law in within each other’s territory
 WON Garcia can practice law in the Philippines
 It could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to
practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions
in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
 It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory
it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with
Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can
practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and the aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the
Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to
repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
(See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag
for respondent. (PLEASE STUDY!)

 Overseeing of the Government – when the court not only regulate the practice of law
but admonish, change, promulgate rules
 Who can regulate the practice of law?

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to
the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
 IBP President submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval that if
the delinquency further continue, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of
 the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys.
 Court required Edillion to comment on said resolution and letter
 Edillion stated his refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
 Respondent Marcial A. Edillion was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous
with the late.
 Edillion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in
good standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a
consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions
of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
 The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no
constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively."
 The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right
to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore,
the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus
the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
 Issue/s: Whether or not Edillion should be reinstated to the Bar.
 Ruling: On the resolution dated October 23, 1980, the Court restored the membership of
Marcial A. Edillion to the bar. It was made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of
the competence of the Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal
profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. It was observed that
there is no finality as to being admitted in the Bar, as such, a loss of membership may be
acquired. To follow Cardozo, “membership to the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.”
Failure to abide with such conditions may lead to losing membership. Only if after a sufficient
time has elapsed and the transgressor has shown contrition on the matter at hand, he may
 once again be considered for the restoration of such privilege. Hence, the resolution of
reinstatement on October 23, 1980.
 The power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
 Doctrine: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities. The power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in
the Supreme Court.
 The punishment is not vindictive, but a preservative exercise to the legal profession

SALLY D. BONGALONTA vs ATTY. PABLITO CASTILLO AND ALFONSO MARTIJA

 Bongalonta filed a case against Atty. Pablito M. Castillo & Atty Alfonso M. Martija both members
of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
the complainant might obtain.

 Bongalonta filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and
Solomer Abuel. She also filed a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal
and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito
Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
 Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a sum of money based on a
promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. Gregorio Lantin
was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. The Judgement by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin due to Sps. Abuel failure to file necessary responsive pleadings. Hence, A writ of
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by complainant
was levied upon. IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution recommending Atty. Castillo be
suspended from practice of law for a period of six months while complaint against Atty. Martija
be dismissed for lack of evidence.

 The Supreme Court agreed with the IBP Board of Governors findings, under the code that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
 The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who alleged in
her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and
in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
 consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to see to it that he
pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he practices before the courts, as
required by the Supreme Court.
 Thus, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo found guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to suspend him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or
similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID

 The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson.
 The complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation
 After the investigation the Solicitor General rendered his report finding the respondent guilty of
professional misconduct and recommending disciplinary action
 Complainant asked the respondent for the official tax receipt from paying the inheritance and
real estate taxes but was never given said receipt because there was no payment of said taxes
 Respondent made several promises to return the money which he never complied. Neither had
he done anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson up
to the present
 Respondent also did not care to testify which can be seen from failing to appear in the court
hearings multiple times
 Respondent David is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years from the date this decision become final, without prejudice to a more severe action if the
sum misappropriated is not refunded within one month from the same date.
 On February 28, 1950, the respondent filed a plea in the case of Tan Tek Sy vs. Maliwanag, not
as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy, but with the following words: "for and on behalf of Tan Tek Sy" The
Court of Appeals decided in favor of Tan Tek Sy. Subsequently, Atty. David filed a motion for
execution.
 Respondent executed these acts in civil case no 3658 in the Manila Court of First Instance
o The respondent filed a brief requesting an order for the demolition of the defendants'
houses
o Filed a motion requesting that the Sheriff of Manila be authorized to pay "the amount or
such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time"
o He filed another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another demolition order
o Signing the three writs as counsel for the plaintiff
o Exhibits B through B-34 show that he was receiving payments of amounts from
various defendants as counsel for the plaintiff
 To present a plea and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of
lawyer. The fact that the lawyer had not stated in his motion requesting execution that he was
acting not as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of the plaintiff, does not alter the nature of
his services, which are certainly professional lawyer services. Exercising the profession of lawyer
is practicing the acts of that profession. Preparing and presenting motions requesting the
execution of the sentence, the demolition of the defendants' houses, asking the court to order
the Sheriff to deliver the amounts collected, are acts that are part of the practice of the legal
profession; to present a plea and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the
profession of lawyer, because an agent cannot do it.
  The fact that he had not put in his motion seeking a writ of execution in Malayan Saw Mill, Inc.
against Tolentino, who was acting as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of Philippines
Sawmill and Construction, does not alter the nature of his services which are certainly
professional lawyer services; but, hiding that he was acting as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy and
pretending that he was only an agent, his situation worsens: he who, covered with a mask,
shoots at his enemy is more guilty than he who does so with his face uncovered and in full view
of the public; hence the criminal law imposes a more severe penalty in the first case.
 The evidence in the case file shows that the respondent Felix P. David practiced the profession
of lawyer intentionally disobeying the decision of this Court of September 30, 1949,
Administrative Case No. 35
 Therefore, he is disqualified from practicing the profession of lawyer in the Philippines, the
certificate issued in his favor to practice the profession is declared canceled and he is ordered to
return it to the Clerk of this Court.
 Doctrine: Generally, to engage in the practice is to do any of those acts which are
characteristics of the legal profession. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training, and experience.

Laput vs. Bernabe

 This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judge of the first branch of the municipal
court of the City of Manila to recognize the right of an accused person to avail himself of the
services of an agent or friend, not a licensed attorney-at-law, to aid him in the litigation.
 It appears from the pleadings that Catalino Salas was charged in the municipal court of the City
of Manila with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence.
 Laput, it may be observed, is a law student and, accordingly, not a recognized member of the
Philippine Bar. The written appointment of Laput was duly presented in court, but the
respondent judge before whom the case was to be tried refused to allow Laput to act as the
counsel of Salas, hence, this petition for a writ of mandamus.
 The Judiciary Law, Act No. 136, enacted in 1901, "The existing courts of justices of the peace in
the City of Manila shall be continued as now organized, and with the same jurisdiction as is now
by law conferred upon them, and shall so continue until special provisions shall be made by law
for the organization of inferior civil and criminal tribunals for the City of Manila." The Manila
Charter, Act No. 183, approved in the same year, created municipal courts with criminal
jurisdiction and justice of the peace courts with civil jurisdiction.”
 The question now is, as to whether or not the existing municipal court of the City of Manila
may be considered a court of a justice of the peace within the meaning of section 34 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
 When the Code of Civil Procedure was placed on the statute books, there were in the City of
Manila justice of the peace courts to which section 34 naturally applied. In these justice of the
peace courts, there could have been no question that a party could conduct his litigation with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose. When the justice of the peace
courts were abolished, the law was made to provide for a municipal court which was to have the
same jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, and the same incidental powers "as are at present
conferred by law upon municipal courts and justice of the peace courts of the City of Manila."
 Is it not self-evident that if "court of a justice of the peace," at the beginning of section 34 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, includes the municipal court of the City of Manila, the expression
"justice of the peace courts," as used in the proviso to the said section, must also include the
 same municipal court? There is no possible ground for the conclusion that the term "court of a
justice of the peace" or "justice of the peace court" has one meaning in the first part of the
section and another meaning' in the second part.
 The expressions referred to evidently have the same meaning throughout the section, and they
are used in contradistinction to the expression "any other court" found near the close of the
section, where it is declared that "In any other court a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of a lawyer and his appearance must be either personal or by the aid of a
duly authorized member of the bar." In the light of these considerations it is evident to the
undersigned that section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be interpreted as
imposing on the judge of the municipal court the duty of permitting a friend or agent who is not
a lawyer to appear for any litigant.

TEOFILO PAAR, Petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO ET AL., Respondents.

 Teofilo Paar is charged in Manila with treason before the People's Court and prayed that he be
assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a member of the bar. The People's
Court denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.
ISSUES: WON non-members of the bar are allowed to represent the accused in litigation proceedings.
(NO)
 Section 3 and 4 Rule 112 are as follows:
 SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform the defendant of his right to have an attorney. - If the defendant
appears without an attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of an attorney. If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
 SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney `de oficio'. - The attorney so employed or assigned must
be a duly authorized member of the Bar. But in provinces where duly authorized members of
the bar are not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit or assign a person, resident in
the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to aid the defendant in his defense,
although the person so admitted or assigned be not a duly authorized member of the Bar.

 Section 29 and 31 of Rule 127 read:

 SEC. 29. Attorney for destitute litigants. - "A superior court may assign an attorney to render
professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty
of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused there from by
the court for sufficient cause shown.
 SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
 It is clear from these provisions that in Manila where there are many members of the Bar;
defendants in the People's Court may be assisted only by members of the bar.
 o Counsel de oficio – counsel appointed/assigned by the court, from amount such
members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, and
may adequately defend the accused.
 Attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a criminal
action or to represent a destitute party in a case.
 Does not need to be a lawyer; if a lawyer is not available, the court may appoint
any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability,
to defend the accused.
 Connotes little or no other choice than the acceptance by the indigent party of
whoever is appointed as his counsel and, unless excused therefrom by the
court, the discharge by the designated attorney of the duty to faithfully and
conscientiously render effective legal assistance in favor of such party.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA

 On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Polce of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
 The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that
he would not receive any payment for his services.
 Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
o Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
 Whether or not City Atty. Ariston Fule violated the practice of law which bars certain attorneys
from private practice?
 “In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal
case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
 Respondent counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that “no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.”
 He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice.
 We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
 As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecutions of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the
duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private
prosecutor in this criminal case.
 Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
  Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law.
 “Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.”

Hilado vs. David (case regarding the elements that measure if there is an attorney-client
relation)

 It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by
Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
 On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant;
and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as
counsel for the plaintiff.
 On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party
defendant.
 On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the
defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from
the case.
 On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him
about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney
Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion,
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo OTI June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the
court, wherein the case was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
 "Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party."
 The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney
Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for
his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was allowed even on
appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment.
 It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is
it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. Also, an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act
as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former
client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment.
  "An attorney is employed—that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor—when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his
client's cause in open court."
 "Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and
received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the
part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the
latter." (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. & Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co 8 A. L. R., 1.)
 Canon 15
o Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
o Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect
of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
 In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely one
of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point,
to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such
papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like
 Professional capacity only.
o if as a friend - no atty client relationship*
o if prof-student - no atty client relationship*
o Unless approached for advise as professional (yung lumapit ka talaga as client and
lawyer sya

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

(outlines the dual citizenship to practice law in the Philippines and requisites to be able to
practice the law in the Philippines)
 This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
 Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
 On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
 allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
 Whether or not petitioner Benjamin Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004?
 Whether or not a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship can still practice law in the
Philippines?
 Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume
the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
 Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
o SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
 The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP; payment of the annual professional tax; compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement; faithful observance of the rules and ethics
of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because " all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
 Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer
who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must
first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
o (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
o (b) the payment of professional tax;
o (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
o (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
 Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.