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[G.R. No. 48321. August 31, 1946. ]
OH CHO, applicant-appellee, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Oppositor-Appellant.
Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo,
for Appellant.
Vicente Constantino, for Appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez & Sotelo and J.T. Chuidian as amici curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; PUBLIC LANDS; WHAT LANDS BELONG TO PUBLIC
DOMAIN; EXCEPTION. — All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be
any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors
in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest.
2. ID., ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The earliest possession of the lot by the first
predecessor in interest of the applicant for registration began in 1880. Held: He does not
come under the exception.
3. ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT, REGISTRATION UNDER; ALIEN DISQUALIFIED. — An alien
is not entitled to a decree of registration under the provisions of the Public Land Act,
because he is disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
4. ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT, BENEFITS OF; CONDITION PRECEDENT; CASE AT BAR.
— The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant’s immediate predecessors in
interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and before they could acquire
any right under such benefits, the applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest should
comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent
is to apply for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least
since July 26, 1894. This the applicant’s immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was transmissible to
the applicant. The only right,if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which,
tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to
apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
DECISION
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PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in
the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas, in the name of the applicant.
The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant’s lack of title to the lot,
and on his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to the filing of the
application for registration on January 17, 1940.
The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the
lower court committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the
applicant.
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be
applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A.
No. 141).
The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the
Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had
acquired the lot from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws,
orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by
possessory information under the Mortgage Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to
a decree of registration thereof under the provisions of the Public Land Act (C. A. No. 141).
Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain (sections 48, 49, C. A. No. 141).
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As the applicant failed to prove title to the lot and has invoked the provisions of the Public
Land Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature,
character or classification of the lot sought to be registered.
It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant’s immediate
predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had
they applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his
immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to
have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant’s
immediate predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State;
and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant’s immediate
predecessors in interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such
benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they
had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant’s immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be
called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest,
may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as
the applicant who is disqualified.
It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void.
In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement
would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in
this case where the vendors do not even object to the application filed by the vendee.
Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed,
without costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and
Rafael Lagdameo a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public, and adverse possession of their
predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. On June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the
registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because,
among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private
agricultural lands.
One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the
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land in question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or
garden. Rodolfo Tiquia, inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the
government, stated that the land, notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted,
is agricultural land in accordance with an opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of
Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:j
"1. Whether or not the phrase ’public agricultural land’ in section 1, Article XII, of
the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial
lots for purposes of their disposition.
"1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted
since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term ’agricultural public
lands’ had, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held
that the phrase ’agricultural public lands’ means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent cases. (Montano v. Ins. Gov’t., 12 Phil., 572, 574;
Santiago v. Ins. Gov’t., 12 Phil., 593; Ibañes de Aldecoa v. Ins. Gov’t., 13 Phil., 159; Ins.
Gov’t. v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, 516; Mercado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32
Phil., 271, 276; Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil., 167, 170; Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
175, 181; Jocson v. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)
"Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to
be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral,
of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
"Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell v. Durant, 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch v. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State v. Stewart, 190, p., 129)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on
August 15, 1940, overruling the opposition without much explanation and decreeing the
registration prayed for by the applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision,
and the Solicitor General appearing for appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being
a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or acquire the parcel of land in question
and that the purchase made in 1938 is null and void.
This is the question squarely submitted to us for decision. The majority, although reversing
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the lower court’s decision and dismissing the application with which we agree, abstained
from declaring null and void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for by the
appellant. We deem it necessary to state our opinion on the important question raised by
the Solicitor General. Having been squarely raised, it must be squarely decided.
The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The lower court erred in decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese
Republic.
"(a) The phrase ’agricultural land’ as used in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and in
the Public Land Act includes residential lots.
"In this jurisdiction lands of the public domain suitable for residential purposes are
considered agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase ’agricultural public
lands’ has a well settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. It means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa v. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175; Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañez de
Aldecoa v. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil, 175;
Jocson v. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa v. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme
Court, in defining the meaning and scope of that pharase from the context of sections 13
and 15 of that Act, said:
"The phrase ’agricultural public lands’ as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands.
x x x besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902)) contains only three classifications, and
"‘We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after a careful consideration of the question we are satisfied
that the only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the court below
Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale,
or other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that
is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that
the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . .’ (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10
Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)
This phrase ’agricultural public lands’ was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the
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first public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by
the Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted
in the case of Mapa v. Insular Government, supra. This is self-evident from a reading of
sections 1, 10, 32, and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase ’agricultural
public lands’ is used in any of said sections, it is invariably followed by the qualifications ’as
defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two.’
"More specifically, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa v. Insular Government, supra, the
Supreme Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is
agricultural land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of
agriculture for the simple reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted
into a rural estate, and because when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land. Because of the special
applicability of the doctrine laid down in said case, we quote at some length from the
decision therein rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel
for Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject
to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated
in favor of private individuals or corporations. . . .
x x x
"‘Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land
is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification
of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances:
makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban land that have ceased to
be agricultural land. . . .
x x x
"‘From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided
they are not destined to the use of public in general or reserved by the Government in
accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person; and
considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they are accorded,
they are called agricultural lands, urban lands and building lots being included in this
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classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and
timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such
classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates.’ (Ibañez
de Aldecoa v. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163, 164, 165, 166; emphasis added.)
"(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the
phrase ’public agricultural land’ includes lands of the public domain suitable for residential
purposes.
"Section 1. Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential enerby, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . .’ (Emphasis added.) .
"Under the above-quoted provision, the disposition, exploitation, development or utilization
of the natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain, is limited to
citizens of the Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also
clearly appears from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, are not subject to alienation.
"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act
the lands of the public domain have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or
disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable
correspond to the lands designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands,
because under section 1, Article XII, public agricultural lands are the only natural resources
of the country which are subject to alienation or disposition.
"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that the alienable or disposable public
lands shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which they are destined, into
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that
under this classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference,
however, is more apparent than real.’Public agricultural lands’ as that phrase is used in
the Constitution means alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is
equivalent to the lands classified by Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or disposable.
The classification provided in section 9 is only for purposes of administration and
disposition, according to the purposes to which said lands are especially adapted. But
notwithstanding this classification all of said lands are essentially agricultural public lands
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because only agricultural public lands are subject to alienation or disposition under section
1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would necessarily create a conflict
between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, and
such conflict should be avoided, if possible, and said Act construed in the light of the
fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.
"‘Another universal principle applied in considering constitutional questions is, that an Act
will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although such a
construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The courts may resort to an
implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go beyond the
province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute; and where the meaning is
plain, words cannot be read into it or out of it for that purpose.’ (1 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, pp. 135, 136.)
"In view of the fact that more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution the
National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141,
which is a compilation of the laws relative to lands of the public domain and the
amendments thereto, the statute so revised and compiled must necessarily conform to the
Constitution.
"‘Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised
conforms to the Constitution.’ (59 C. J., 1102; emphasis added.)
"By way of illustration, let us suppose that a piece or tract of public land has been classifed
pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by reason of
this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public land,
it will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional
provision that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable
under sections 58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution.
Therefore, the classification of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for
purposes of administration, alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the inherent
nature of all such lands as public agricultural lands.
"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase used in the law, controlling.
"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase ’public agricultural land’ is a sufficient
authority for giving the same interpretation to that phrase as used in subsequent legislation,
and this is especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has
been maintained by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to
say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague
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manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be a
sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller, J., said: "We find one
solemn determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that construction
has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put another construction on
the act on account of any supposed change of convenience." This rule of construction will
hold good even if the court be of opinion that the practical construction is erroneous; so
that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord
Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes . . . it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law should
be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of vacillation
or uncertainty." Judicial usage and practive will have weight, and when continued for a
long time will be sustained through carried beyond the fair support of the statute." (II Lewis’
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.)
"‘An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction is
the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being
adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the
legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary
and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the time
settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the authority
appointed to expound the law, just and correct conclusions; when reached, they are,
moreover, within the strongest reasons on which is founded the maxim of stare decisis.
Such a construction is publicly given, and the subsequent silence of the legislature is
strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis’ Sutherland
Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)
"Furthermore, when the phrase ’public agricultural land’ was used in section 1 of Article
XII of the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning
therefor given to it and therefore the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution,
includes residential lands and other lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and
timber lands.
"‘Adoption of provisions previously construed — ad. Previous construction by Courts. —
Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of last resort has been reenacted
in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar
with its construction, and to have adopted it as a part of the law, unless a contrary intent
clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly provided for; and the same rule
applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate statute has been
judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new statute have been
construed by the courts to have been used in a particular sense in a previous statute on
the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the absence of clearly
expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the new statute as in the
previous statute.’ (59 C. J., 1061-1063.)
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"‘Legislative adoption of judicial construction. — In the adoption of the code, the legislature
is presumed to have known the judicial construction which had been placed on the former
statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision of provisions
substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes is a legislative adoption
of their known judicial construction, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifest. So the fact
that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it had been judicially construed shows
that they had such construction in view.’ (59 C. J., 1102.) .
"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of land to the appellant
(appellee).
"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain
by reason of the long, continuous, public and adverse possession of the applicant’s
predecessors in interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection
(b), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, still the sale of said land on December 8, 1938, to the
applicant as evidenced by Exhibits B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section
5, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.’
"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; sections 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire
private agriculture land.
"In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase ’public agricultural land,’ as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase ’private agricultural land,’ as used in the above
quoted provision, can onlymean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential,
commercial or industrial. And this is necessarily so, because the phrase ’agricultural land’
used in the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform
meaning, to wit, any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is
neither mineral nor forestal.
"‘A word or phrase repeated in a statute wil bear the same meaning throughtout the statute,
unless a different intention appears. . . .Where words have been long used in a technical
sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been
adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which
they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should
be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although
to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary
from the strict literal meaning of the words.’ (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758)
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"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Constitution and laws, to wit, ’to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation.’ as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution. "The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense,
"‘A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase ’private agricultural land’ would impair helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
and defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts
steady, and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence.
patrimonial estate, to the detriment of our national solidarity, stability and independence.
Nothing could prevent the acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects . . .
of a foreign power. And yet a city or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural
land. ". . . In the preface to its report, the committee on naturalization and preservation of lands
and other natural resources said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opossed
to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently "‘International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. land and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens
The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform should be restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is
to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the afforded by the case of Texas. This state was originally a province of Mexico. In order to
words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should secure its rapid settlement and development, the Mexican government offered free land to
not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words.’ (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, settlers in Texas. Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they
pp. 721, 722.) organized a revolt against Mexican rule,and then secured annexation to the United States.
A new increase of alien landholding in Mexico has brought about a desire to prevent a
"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his repetition of the Texas affair. Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our limitations on the right of aliens to hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by profit from this example.’
hereditary succession."cralaw virtua1aw library
. . .
The argument holds water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the
real intent of the Constitutional Convention. "It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed
principle of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and
One of our fellow members therein. Delegate Montilla, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the
"The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to or desired goal are: (1) same reasons the Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of
the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of prohibiting the transfer or assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in case of
our commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the hereditary succession." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605,
complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our 606.) .
God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. . . . Lands and
natural resources are immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention,
persons’s body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening agree with the Solicitor General’s position and concur in the result of the case, although
of life. If we do not completely nationalize these two or our most important belongings, I we go as far as the outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appellee is null
am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our and void.
independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have
if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (2 Aruego, The BRIONES, M., con quien estan conformes PARAS y TUASON, MM.,
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.) disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
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 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
El solicitante en este expediente pide el registro del solar de que se trata como terreno de
propiedad privada, y tan solo con caracter supletorio invoca las disposiciones del capitulo
8. de la Ley No. 2874 sobre terrenos publicos (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 3.)
Por su parte, el Director de Terrenos se opone a la solicitud en virtud de tres fundamentos,
a saber: (1) porque ni el solicitante ni sus predecesores en interes pueden demonstrar
titulo suficiente sobre dicha parcela de terreno, no habiendose adquirido la misma ni port
titulo de composicion con el Estado bajo la soberania de Espana, ni por titulo de
informacion posesoria bajo el Real Decreto de 13 de Febrero de 1894; (2) porque el citado
solar es una porcion de los terrenos de dominio publico pertenecientes al Commonwealth
de Filipinas; (3) porque siendo el solicitante un ciudadano chino, no esta capacitado bajo
las disposiciones de la Constitucion de Filipinas para adquirir terrenos de caracter publico
o privado (idem, pags. 5 y 6).
Tanto el solicitante como el Director de Terrenos practicaron sus pruebas ante un arbitro
nombrado por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas. Con vista de tales pruebas,
el Juez Magsalin, del referido Juzgado, dicto sentencia a favor del solicitante, de la cual
transcribimos las siguientes porciones pertinentes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"La represetnaciond el opositor Director de Terrenos trato de probar por medio del
testimonio del Inspector del Buro de Terrenos que el terreno objeto de la solicitud es parte
del dominio publico y ademas el solicitante es ciudadano chino, pero dicho testigo afirmo
que el terreno objeto de la presente solicitud es un solar situado dentro de la problacion
del municipio de Guinayangan, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales
fuertes y careciendo de merito esta oposicion debe desestimarse la misma.
CASES 2A_2023
plantea ninguna cuestion de hecho; plantea solo una cuestion de derecho. Por eso que
en la reconstitucion de este expediente — el original se quemo durante la guerra — no ha
habido necesidad de incluir las notas taquigraficas ni las pruebas documentales, y de
hecho hemos considerado y decidido este asunto sin dichas notas y pruebas. El abogado
Constantino, del apelado, en la audiencia para la reconstitucion de los autos, hizo esta
manifestacion: "In view also of the fact that the questions involved here are only questions
of law, this representation waives the right to present the evidence presented in the trial
court . . . ." Por su parte, el Procurador General, al explanar el caso en representacion del
apelante Director de Terrenos, principia su alegato con la siguiente
declaracion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature
pending in the trial courts.
"Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is the only
question raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
which sustained the affirmative and decreed the registration of the said property in favor
of the applicant who, by his own voluntary adimission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
This question is raised in connection with the constitutional provision that no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners except in cases of hereditary
succession." (Pags. 1, 2, alegato del apelante.)
Habiendose apelado de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion

"Por tanto, previa desestimacion de la oposicion del Director de Terrenos, se adjudica con
sus mejoras la parcela de terreno objeto de la presente solicitud descrito en el plano Psu-
109117, a favor del solicitante Oh Cho, ciudadano chino, mayor de edad, casado con Yee
Shi, y residente en el municipio de Guinayangan, Tayabas, Islas Filipinas." (Decision, pag.
8, Record on Appeal.)

De lo transcrito se infiere de una manera forzosa lo siguiente: (a) que el tribunal inferior
desestimo de plano la oposicion del Director de Terrenos fundada en el supuesto de que
el solar cuestionado es parte del dominio publico; (b) que el mismo tribunal rechazo el otro
fundamento de la oposicion, esto es, que siendo el solicitante ciudadano chino esta
incapacitado bajo nuestra Constitucion para adquirir terreno, ya publico, ya privado,
aunque sea un solar de caracter urbano; (c) que, segun el fallo del Juez a quo, no siendo
publico el terreno cuestionado, es necesariamente terreno privado.

El Director de Terrenos, no estando conforme con la sentencia, apelo de ella para ante el
Tribunal de Apelacion y hace en su alegato dos senalamientos de error, ninguno de los
cuales pone en tela de juicio la calidad de privado del terreno cuestionado. El apelante no
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 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
2.
G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIÑO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R.
No. 29218, which affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional
Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name
of the private respondent.
The facts that matter are as follows:
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cariño, filed with the then Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with
an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less,
forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala,
Cabuyao, Laguna.
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of
his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño, became co-owners of Lot
No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952,
among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of
extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private
respondent.4
Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands
Management), disclosed:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title
is situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as
described on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0,
CASES 2A_2023
Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature and the
improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango
trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;
2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation,
riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim
and conflict;
3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila
squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land
application and no patent or title has been issued therefor;
4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive
possession of the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased
mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July
26, 1963 which applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the
hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;
xxx xxx x x x5
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as
the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of
the evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and
confirmation of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952,
identical to Cadastral Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in
the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area
of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square
Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to
Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address at Biñan,
Laguna.
After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree
of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.6
From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which,
on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.
8|Page
 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:
I titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR
PROOF OF POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME
REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT
TITLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE
LAND IS A PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to
said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present
muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a
concession especial or special grant, a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or
a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or "possessory
information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.10
In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not
produced a single muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership. 11 The Court has
therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration
of subject land under Act 496.
Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public
land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same
fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the
private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner,
in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect
title.
Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No.
3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15,
1975, provides:
CASES 2A_2023
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim
and the issuance of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless
the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.13
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land
registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought
to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:
. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose
the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to
the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts
are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because
there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition,
deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that
the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the
land which he is attempting to have registered.15
There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles
over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16
The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated
in Republic vs. Lee:17
9|Page
 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less
than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure
to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications
to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as
dominus. . . .18
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor
the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the
burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought
for registration, for at least (30) thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition
for confirmation of title.19
In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of
subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue
of an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly
effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only
twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To
bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as
possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion,
private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation
that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.1âwphi1.nêt
Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General
statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice.20
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration
covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the
private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño. The same was followed by Tax
Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two
Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in
the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven
Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration
for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not
CASES 2A_2023
appear to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration
1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22
The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon
this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the
findings by the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of private respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be
disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated thus:
This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of
the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the
appellate court based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina
Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No.
68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to this Court.'
and—
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering
such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not
assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision.24
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it
examined the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land
involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax
receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are
mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26
. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been
in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin?
For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.27
As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother
had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and
inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept
10 | P a g e
 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
of owner", by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that
of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.
The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive
and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and
duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant
evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28
In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Law; holding as follows:
Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the
filing of the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept
of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction
of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years
found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have
presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such
possession. . . .30
In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was
likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:
We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de
dueño. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they
declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they
filed their application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peñaflor, to testify on his
alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had
tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that
the applicants had possessed the land as owners.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be
concluded that they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they
had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of
the public domain.32
CASES 2A_2023
Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any
occupant of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the
conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his possession
since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by
the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property. 34 To
reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his
petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present
convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueño for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of
his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed
under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990,
of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot
No. 6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a
public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of
Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
11 | P a g e
 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
3.
G.R. No. 150000 September 26, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
TRI-PLUS CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 dated September 14, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60671, which affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Metro Cebu in LRC Case No. N-21 granting herein respondent's application
for registration of title to Lots Nos. 1061 and 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion,
Cebu.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation2, through its president, Euclid C. Po, filed with the
MTC of Consolacion, Metro Cebu,3 an Application for Registration of Title over two parcels
of land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu,
containing an area of 3,939 and 4,796 square meters, respectively, and located at
Barangay Tayud, Consolacion, Cebu.4 In its application, Tri-Plus alleged that it is the
owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including the improvements thereon,
having acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in actual, continuous, public,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of
an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-interest.5 The case
was docketed as LRC Case No. N-21.6
On September 4, 1997, the trial court received an Opposition to the Application for
Registration filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on the grounds that neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title submitted
by the applicant which consists, among others, of tax declarations and receipts of tax
payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant may no longer be
CASES 2A_2023
availed of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate application for registration
in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and that the
subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation.7
On September 19, 1997, Tri-Plus presented documentary evidence to prove compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements of the law. On even date, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed by the heirs of Toribio Pepito praying that they be given a period of 10 days within
which to file their written opposition.8 However, the oppositors failed to file their written
opposition on time. The trial court then commissioned its clerk of court to receive evidence
from the applicant and directed the former to submit a report thereon. Accordingly, a
Commissioner's Report was submitted on the proceedings taken.9
In its Judgment dated February 26, 1998, the MTC made the following finding and
conclusion:
The totality of the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, of the applicant
clearly shows that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, public,
exclusive and continuous possession in concept of owner of the parcels of land
above-mentioned for no less than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the instant
petition for registration of its imperfect title. This being so, the applicant is entitled
that its title be confirmed under the provisions of the Torrens System of
Registration.10
Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the applicant TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION the exclusive and absolute owner
of Lot 1061 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as shown on plan Ap-
07-002362 (Exhibit "J") and described in its corresponding technical description
(Exhibit "K"), and Lot 1062 of the Cadastral Survey of Consolacion, Cebu, as
shown on plan Ap-07-002366 (Exhibit "O") and described in its corresponding
technical description (Exhibit "P").
Once this decision becomes final, let an Order for the issuance of the decree of
registration for Lots 1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cadastre, be issued in the name
of TRI-PLUS LAND CORPORATION.
SO ORDERED.11
The OSG appealed the trial court's judgment with the CA.12
12 | P a g e
 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
Subsequently, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), through its Director on Registration,
submitted a Report dated August 6, 1998 to the MTC, pertinent portions of which read as
follows:
1. Two (2) parcels of land described as Lots 1062 and 1061, Cad. 545-D,
Consolacion Cadastre on Plan Ap-07-002366 and Ap-07-002362, both situated in
the Barangay of Tayud, Municipality of Consolacion, Province of Cebu, are being
applied for original registration of title;
2. After examining the afore-said plan discrepancy was noted in the bearings and
distances of line 3-4 and 4-5 of Lot 1061, Ap-07-002362, being S.57 deg. 19'W
8.02m. and S.52 deg. 10'W 18.24, which do not conform with the bearings and
distances (N. 52 deg. 01'E., 18.00m) and (N. 52 deg. 47'E., 17.71m.) along lines
12-13 and 11-12, respectively of plan Rs-07-01-000358, lot 1508, Consolacion
Cad. 545-D, decreed in LRA (NALTDRA) Record No. N-60851.
3. That the above discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Regional
Technical Director, DENR, Land Management Services, Region VII, Mandaue City,
for verification and correction in a letter dated 7 July 1998.
4. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcels of land
subject of registration are already covered by land patent.13
On September 14, 2001, the CA rendered the presently assailed Decision finding no
reversible error in the appealed judgment, thereby, affirming the same.14
Hence, herein petition based on the following assignments of errors:
I Anent the last assigned error, petitioner contends that since the applicant failed to
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO
HEAR AND DECIDE THE CASE, BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND
REMAINS UNCERTAIN.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
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THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT IS DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING LANDS
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.15
As to the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the CA erred in relying on the original
survey plan approved by the Lands Management Services of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when it ruled that the applicant was able to
duly establish the identity of Lot 1061. This reliance, petitioner argues, is mistaken
considering that the Report of the Director on Registration of the LRA pointed to a
discrepancy in the bearings and distances of the boundaries which separate Lot 1061 from
an adjoining land, Lot 1058. This discrepancy, petitioners submit, casts doubt on the
identity of the land subject of the application for registration. Petitioner then concludes that
if there is uncertainty in the metes and bounds of the property sought to be titled, the trial
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Hence, the
proceedings before the trial court, including its decision granting the application for
registration, are void.
As to the second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the CA erred in holding that
the applicant was able to prove that the subject properties are alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Petitioner contends that a mere notation appearing in the
survey plans of the disputed properties showing that the subject lands had been classified
as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963 is not sufficient to establish the nature and
character of these lands. Petitioner asserts that there should be a positive act on the part
of the government, such as a certification from the DENR, to prove that the said lands are
indeed alienable and disposable. Petitioner further contends that even if the subject
properties were classified as alienable and disposable on June 25, 1963, the law,
nonetheless, requires that such classification should have been made on June 12, 1945
or earlier.
discharge the burden of proving that the subject properties are alienable and disposable,
there is no basis for the CA to rule that these properties are private lands.
In its Comment, respondent contends that it was able to prove the identity of Lot 1061 with
certainty. While it admits the discrepancy in the bearings and distances which form the
boundary between Lot 1061 and the adjoining Lot 1058, respondent contends that such
discrepancy is merely technical in nature because Lots 1058 and 1061 remain the same
and that there is neither an increase nor decrease in the area of the subject lot sought to
be titled; and that what was required by the LRA in its Report was for the applicant to
correct and adjust the bearings and distances of Lot 1061 in order to conform to the
boundaries of Lot 1058.
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Respondent also argues that the notations appearing in the survey plans of the subject
properties serve as sufficient proof that these lands are alienable and disposable.
Respondent asserts that the survey plans were duly approved by the DENR, Lands
Management Services whose official acts are presumed to be in accordance with law.
Lastly, respondent argues that its predecessor-in-interest's continuous, actual, adverse
and peaceful possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner for a period
of more than 30 years, coupled with the fact that they declared these lands in their name,
gives a strong presumption in respondent's favor that the subject properties no longer form
part of the public domain.
Parties filed their respective Memoranda.16
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
At the outset, however, the Court does not agree with petitioner's contention in its first
assigned error that respondent failed to properly identify Lot 1061 which is one of the lots
sought to be titled.
Insofar as the identity of the land subject of an application for original registration is
concerned, this Court has laid down the rule, as follows:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the
Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of
the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that
it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure
to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration.17
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals18 and in the more recent cases
of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the Philippines19 and Republic of the Philippines v.
Hubilla20, the Court ruled that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands (now the
Lands Management Services of the DENR), blueprint copies and other evidence could
also provide sufficient identification. In the present case, respondent submitted in evidence
a blueprint copy of the Advance Plan of Lot 106121 and a Technical Description22 thereof,
both of which had been duly certified and approved by the Lands Management Services
of the DENR. The Court finds these pieces of evidence as substantial compliance with the
legal requirements for the proper identification of Lot 1061. The discrepancy in the
common boundary that separates Lot 1061 from Lot 1058, as contained in the LRA Report
does not cast doubt on the identity of the subject lot. As the CA correctly held, the
discrepancy is not substantial because it does not unduly increase or affect the total area
CASES 2A_2023
of the subject lot and at the same time prejudice the adjoining lot owner. It is only when
the discrepancy results to an unexplained increase in the total area of the land sought to
be registered that its identity is made doubtful. Besides, only a portion of the many
boundaries of Lot 1061 has been found to bear a discrepancy in relation to the boundary
of one adjoining lot and the LRA Report simply recommends that the Lands Management
Services of the DENR verify the reported discrepancy and make the necessary corrections,
if needed, in order to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcels
of land.
Petitioner's argument that, on the basis of the LRA Report, the MTC should have dismissed
respondent's application for registration for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, is
without merit. The MTC could not have possibly done this because said Report was
submitted to the trial court more than five months after the latter rendered its Decision. A
copy of the LRA Report attached to the present petition shows that it is dated August 6,
1998 while the MTC decision was rendered much earlier on February 26, 1998. In fact,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) perfected its appeal by filing a notice of appeal
of the MTC Decision on April 2, 1998, which is also prior to the submission of the LRA
report. Hence, by the time the LRA report was submitted to the MTC, the latter has already
lost jurisdiction over the case, not on the ground cited by petitioner but because the appeal
to the CA was already perfected, vesting jurisdiction upon the appellate court.
In any case, while the subject lands were properly identified, the Court finds that
respondent failed to comply with the other legal requirements for its application for
registration to be granted.
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b)
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945.23
In the present case, the Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that respondent failed
to prove the first requirement that the properties sought to be titled forms part of the
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied
in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to any ownership of land.24 All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25 Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to
a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.26
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It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.27
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required
by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. 28 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable.29 In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation
was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to
submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject
for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
As to the second requirement, testimonial evidence were presented to prove that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject lots in the
concept of an owner for the period required by law. The first witness was Thelma Pilapil
who claims to be the daughter of Constancia Frias from whom respondent bought Lot 1061.
Pilapil testified that her family has been in possession of Lot 1061 since her birth. 30 When
her testimony was offered on October 7, 1997, she was 40 years old.31 Deducting 40 years
from 1997, it means that her family started possession of Lot 1061 only in 1957. The
second witness who was presented was Tomas Frias from whom respondent bought Lot
1062. Frias testified that he was 67 years old at the time that his testimony was taken on
October 7, 1997.32 He claims that he started owning the subject lot when he was 17 years
old and had been in possession of the same since then.33 Hence, by simple arithmetic, the
testimony of Frias proves that he came to possess Lot 1062 only in 1947. While he testified
that Lot 1062 was previously owned by his father and that he inherited the property from
his parents, no evidence was presented to show that the latter indeed previously owned
the said property and that they had been in possession of the same on or before June 12,
1945.
Moreover, other pieces of evidence presented by respondent to prove the period of its
possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest show that the subject properties were
declared for taxation purposes beginning only in 1961.34 This date may be considered as
relatively recent considering that respondent's predecessors-in-interest claim to have been
in possession of the subject properties as early as 1947. While belated declaration of a
property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
CASES 2A_2023
for a property that is not in his actual, or at least, constructive possession.35 In the present
case, respondent failed to explain why, despite the claim of its predecessors-in interest
that they possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1947, it
was only in 1961 that they started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest failed to
prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject properties under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, as
required by law.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law. 36 In the
present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, the legal requirements that the lands sought to be titled are alienable and
disposable and that its predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject
lots since 1945 or earlier.
As to the last assigned error, respondent having failed to prove that the subject properties
are alienable and disposable public lands, the Court agrees with petitioner that there would
be no basis in concluding that these lands have already become private. The presumption
remains that said properties remain part of the inalienable public domain and, therefore,
could not become the subject of confirmation of imperfect title.
Finally, while it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of
alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social
justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they
fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony.37 The Court must not,
therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 14, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 60671 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Tri-Plus Corporation's application for registration and issuance of title to Lots
1061 and 1062, Consolacion Cad-545-D, in LRC Case No. N-21 filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Consolacion, Metro Cebu, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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4.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF
KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO
YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS
PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
CASES 2A_2023
nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches
and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The
island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s
three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing
an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular
did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.
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The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed
by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable
and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island;
(2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands
in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in
Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were
issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly
situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws
and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
CASES 2A_2023
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The
Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections
8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands
in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads
and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and
other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
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Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested
right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the
island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT
OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS
OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS
THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST
AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
CASES 2A_2023
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE
PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR
LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR
SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY
AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring
supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their
right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
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 NAT RES & ENVI LAW
106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive
acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands
of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving the government great
leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest
of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the
Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.52
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The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law
and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth
in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted
into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert
to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;
(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
(4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American
rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain
in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural,
mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of
mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902,
the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x
x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded
title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens
system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which
was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or
lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
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On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known
as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation
of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing
general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894.
However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6)
months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording
of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act
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declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old
cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not
have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural
lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided
the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain.
Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had
no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by
an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases
of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
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xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public
Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which
there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines
the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and
alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified
as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out
of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to
the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their
land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned
by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a
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question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it
is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land.
There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of
the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact,
we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or
the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We
believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority
of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular
land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof.
Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by
the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp]
is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land.
It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in
the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for
itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests
have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for
itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the
facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act
No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts
no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court
of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts
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then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands.
When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The
Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential
lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old
cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years
under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they
may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
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cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping
and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of
the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may
seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As
a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on
the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands
of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks,"
do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
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A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains
or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber
land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay
Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not
been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued
by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private
claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into
an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island
an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas
declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas
but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes
that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under
CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest
Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when
it provides:
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Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify
Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to
ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the
areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment.
Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in
Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island
in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay
Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised
the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to
existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered
open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
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Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of
public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without
running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the
Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the
same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the
land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
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prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for
forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other
forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest
lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of
forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain,
does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public
forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not
convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine
Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of
the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government
grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied
for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law
itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter
how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
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We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession
of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island
into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a
vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of
Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island
their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at
ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this
does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas
they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily
mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
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More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open
up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should
be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have
spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute
a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill
effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust
bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods
that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways –
not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written
down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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5.
G.R. No. 218418. November 08, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION IV, MANILA, PETITIONER,
V.
THE HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA, AS HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
MEYNARDO CABRERA, JR. AND ALMA RODRIGUEZ CABRERA, THE HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION DIMACULANGAN CABRERA, AS HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
ALEXANDER CABRERA, MANIBI CABRERA, MILAGROS CABRERA GARA, AND
RAUL CABRERA, JACKSON CINCO DY, LORETA AGBAYANI, GLORIA SORIANO,
CRIS CALMA, NORA LIWANAG AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL
MINDORO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court against the Decision[2] dated July 18, 2014 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution[3]
dated May 20, 2015 (Assailed Resolution) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) Eleventh Division and Special Former Eleventh Division, respectively.
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the Decision[4] dated
December 5, 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43 (RTC) in Civil Case No. C-358, dismissing the complaint for cancellation of free
patent and reversion filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) against the Heirs
of Meynardo Cabrera (Heirs of Meynardo), the Heirs of Consolacion Dimaculangan
Cabrera (Heirs of Consolacion), Jackson Cinco Dy (Dy), Loreta Agbayani (Agbayani),
Gloria Soriano (Soriano), Cris Calma (Calma), Nora Liwanag (Liwanag), and the Register
of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro (ROD) (collectively, Respondents).[5]
The Facts
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free Patent concerning an 8,072[6]
square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.[7] In said
application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in possession of such parcel of land since
1936, through his predecessor-in- interest Marcelo Cabrera.[8]
In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of
Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated as: (i) Lot 1 with an area of 3,591 square
meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square meters.[9] On the basis of said patent,
the ROD issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193) covering both lots
in Meynardo's name.[10]
CASES 2A_2023
Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A[11] was transferred to
Consolacion.[12] Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16580
covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name.[13] Later still, Consolacion sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and
Liwanag.[14]
Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De Castros),
claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, filed before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging DENR to conduct an
investigation to determine Lot 1-A's land classification status.[15]
Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report[16] (DENR Final Report) dated
November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of the DENR Land Management Office
(LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas
Properties), was declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of
the public domain. The pertinent portions of the DENR Final Report read:
Sensing that they don't have any chance in the court to prove their better right to occupy
and possess [Lot 1-A] x x x the [De Castros] addressed their petitions to the DENR basing
their claim on the weight of a certification of [the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority (NAMRIA)] x x x. The [De Castros] are now seeking administrative
remedies for the issue which they have already brought to the attention of the court and
wherein they have failed to prove their priority right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A].
Granting that [the Roxas Properties constitute] forest land and [Free Patent No. 516197]
issued in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered null and void [ab] initio, it (sic) doesn't
warrant that they have better right to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A] because [Meynardo,
through his predecessors-in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A] since the year 1943 and have
exercised their ownership over the same x x x.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition of [the De Castros]
be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal action be instituted for the cancellation of Free
Patent No. 516197 issued in favor of Meynardo x x x for the same covers land of the public
domain which is certified by the proper authority as public forest.[17] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region IV,
issued an Order[18] dated August 8, 1997 declaring Free Patent No. 516197 null and void.
Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic filed against the Respondents a complaint
(Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No.
RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for the reversion of the
Roxas Properties in the State's favor.[19]
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The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA certifications
dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and October 3, 1994, all stating that the Roxas
Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been reclassified as forest land as early as November
24, 1949. The statements in these documents were, in turn, based on the inscriptions
appearing on Land Classification Map No. 209 (LC Map 209) dated March 6, 1924
covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while LC Map 209 indicates
that the parcels of land thereunder were classified as alienable and disposable at the time
it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made thereon indicates that they were
reclassified as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus become inalienable.[20]
In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot 1-A forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as evidenced by the original
statements appearing on LC Map 209; (ii) the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 do
not serve as sufficient proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which had been purportedly
reclassified as forest land was not properly identified since the Republic failed to present
the technical description corresponding thereto.[21] In addition to these common
assertions, respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag further averred that they
acquired portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith, and have, since then, been in
actual, exclusive, open, and continuous possession of their respective portions as
owners.[22]
On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas Properties
(including Lot 1-A) have been reclassified as forest land. Citing Republic v. Animas,[24]
(Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove reversion of alienable and disposable land to
forest land, a positive government act evincing the same is necessary.[25]
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the RTC's Order
dated October 18, 2011.[26]
CA Proceedings
Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).
In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be applied to
the present case, since, in the former, the fact sought to be established was the
CASES 2A_2023
classification of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other way around,
as in this case.[27] Further, the Republic averred that fraud must have necessarily
attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 and TCT No. 16580,
owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land.[28]
On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[29]
According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and reclassify) lands
of the public domain with the President. On this score, the CA held that the annotations
appearing on LC Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas Properties deserve
scant consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any executive directive.
Consequently, the NAMRIA certifications and DENR Final Report relied upon by the
Republic are insufficient to sustain its cause, as they are, in turn, based solely on said
annotations.[30]
The Republic filed an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed Resolution dated
May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on June 8,
2015.[31]
On June 19, 2015, the Republic filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review, praying for an additional period of twenty-five (25) days from June 23, 2015, or
until July 18, 2015 within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. Subsequently, the
Republic filed a Second Motion for Extension, praying for a five (5)-day extension.[32]
Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic filed the present Petition, to which Respondents
filed their Compliance and Comment dated December 16, 2016.[33]
Thereafter, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28, 2017, adopting
the Petition as its reply to Respondents' Compliance and Comment.[34]
The Issue
The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it held that a
positive act of government is necessary to evince the reclassification of land from alienable
and disposable to forest.
The Court's Ruling
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In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not have the
effect of making a positive executive act a necessary requirement for the purpose of
proving the reclassification of alienable and disposable land.[35] Instead, the Republic
posits that Animas affirms its right to institute reversion proceedings in instances where
portions of forest land are erroneously included within the scope of land patents.[36]
Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State should not be
made to bear the burden of proving that the land in question constitutes public domain (i.e.,
forest land).[37] In any case, the Republic posits that the documentary and testimonial
evidence it had presented sufficiently proved such fact.[38]
The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it affirmed the
RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that the Roxas Properties were classified
as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.
The Republic's Petition and Respondents' Compliance and Comment should be admitted
in the interest of substantial justice.
At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different stages of the
proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of the Rules of Court (Rules).
For its part, the Republic filed two (2) motions which sought for an aggregate period of
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial thirty (30)-day period prescribed by the
Rules for the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. The Respondents, on the other
hand, sought the admission of their Compliance and Comment, filed more than seven (7)
months after the filing of the Petition.[39]
Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack of
evidence showing that neither the Republic's nor the Respondents' requests for
accommodation had been impelled by any ill-motive, the Court resolves to admit in the
interest of substantial justice the Republic's Petition and the Respondents' Comment with
Compliance.
The Court's ruling in Animas does not apply to the present case.
The Republic's Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in ruling in favor of
Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously relied on Animas.
In Animas, the Republic filed an action for reversion against respondent therein, claiming
that the Free Patent issued in the latter's favor covered forest land. The Court of First
Instance dismissed the Republic's action on the ground that the original certificate of title
covering said land had become indefeasible, the same having been issued more than one
(1) year prior to the filing of the Republic's action. Hence, the issue brought before the
Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one (1)-year period had the effect of
precluding the State from initiating reversion proceedings to recover land which had been
unlawfully registered, either through fraud or oversight. Resolving the issue, the Court held
that public land fraudulently or erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates
CASES 2A_2023
of title may be recovered by the State through reversion proceedings, in accordance with
the Public Land Act.
While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect to
fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does not, in any manner, lay down the facts
that must be established for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the RTC and
CA's reliance on the Animas ruling is misplaced.
Nevertheless, such erroneous reliance on Animas, as will be discussed below, does not
advance the Republic's cause, since the principle which serves as basis for the decisions
of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit attributed to the wrong case.
The power to classify and reclassify land lies solely with the Executive Department.
The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of the State's
property regime,[40] and has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions;[41] it espouses that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
that, as a consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land necessarily
traces back to the State.[42]
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into five (5) categories — forest lands, agricultural lands, timber lands, mineral
lands, and national parks. The Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v.
Republic,[43] instructs that in the absence of any prior classification by the State,
unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category of forest lands not open to
disposition.[44]
In turn, the classification of unclassified lands of the public domain, and the reclassification
of those previously classified under any of the categories set forth in the 1987 Constitution
(such as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth Act No. 141[45] dated
November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Sections 6 and 7 thereof
provide:
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable
public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
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Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation - the classification and
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,[46] and is exercised by the latter
through the President, or such other persons vested with authority to exercise the same
on his behalf.[47]
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts, effected
without executive authority, are void, and essentially ultra vires.
In reversion proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving that the property in
question was inalienable at the time it was decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant.
A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant confirms title to
real property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership.[48] Accordingly, the applicant is bound to establish,
through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered had been declared
alienable or disposable through a positive act of the State.[49]
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to revert
land to the mass of the public domain;[50] it is proper when public land is fraudulently
awarded and disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations,[51] or when a
person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which
cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the public domain.[52]
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable decision
therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be owned by private
individuals. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Development Resources Corporation[53] is
instructive:
Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through the
cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate from it, the State bears a heavy
burden of proving the ground for its action. x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa[55] (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of the
Republic's action for reversion is proper since the Republic failed to establish that the land
subject thereof was classified as forest land at the time the cadastral decree in favor of the
defendant was issued:
[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was subsequently
issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding,
Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
CASES 2A_2023
registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant,
was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property in the cadastral proceedings.
xxxx
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in
Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully
included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the
State to prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it
was decreed to Espinosa. To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to prove
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable
to presume that Espinosa, from whom [the present owner] derive[s] her title, had already
established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she
succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove
that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title
because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof
rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
the affirmative of an issue.[56] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the documentary and
testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are sufficient to sustain its cause.
The Complaint should be dismissed as the Republic failed to show that the Roxas
Properties (including Lot 1-A) were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No.
516197 was issued in Meynardo's favor.
To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint
for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii) NAMRIA certifications; and (iii) LC Map 209.
However, these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not evince a
positive act of reclassification by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by the CA:
In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certifications], the [DENR Final Report]
and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with an inscription that the [Roxas Properties]
[were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on November 24, 1949. However, it
appears that the findings of the CENRO and the NAMRIA are based solely on such
mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen (18) hectares, including the location therein of the
[Roxas Properties], [were] reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano] Mendez[57]
testified that:
xxxx
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Q: Q:
So you don't have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to forest land on So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted from alienable and
November 24, 1949? disposable to forest zone, there should be a basis for the same, like proclamation or law.
A: From your experience, presidential decrees?
Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir. A:
Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of certain land use. But
PROS. MARCO: in this particular area, the land is swamp land.

x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion of land was reverted Q:
back from timber land to forest land on November 24, 1949? But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law, executive order,
A: presidential proclamation declaring this parcel of land from alienable and disposable to
Our files and records. forest zone?
A:
I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or order reverting this land
Q: to forest zone. x x x
What are these files and records? Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation is required
A: before a certain parcel of land is reclassified from alienable and disposable to forest land.
As indicated in [LC Map 209]. His insistence that because the land was (originally) swamp land that reclassification was
Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order or act reverting the made (sic), is not supported by any presidential or legal pronouncement or by practice and
classification of the subject property from alienable and disposable to forest land, thus: tradition x x x Unfortunately, the Republic failed to present any law, presidential
proclamation, order or act to prove that the subject property was indeed within the area
Q: which is reclassified as forest land. Even an administrative order from the Bureau of
Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable to forest land on Forestry was not presented to show that the subject property had been reclassified as
November 24, 1949? forest land.[58] (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A:
Yes, sir. The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, confirms that the alleged
reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as it was done by Engineer
Q: Mendez on his sole account, without any prior directive from the President, or a duly
What were the basis? authorized officer from the Executive Department. In fact, the annotation appearing on LC
A: Map 209 upon which the Republic relies does not even state upon whose authority the
Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp land? alleged reclassification had been made,[59] placing the annotation's validity, veracity and
worth in serious doubt.
Q:
Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other basis? Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) were
A: classified as forest land when they were decreed in Meynardo's favor in 1971. Thus, in
Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis. accordance with the Court's ruling in Development Resources Corporation and Espinosa,
the present Petition must be, as it is hereby, denied.
Q:
Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the basis of reverting WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
this parcel of land to forest zone on November 24, 1949? Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2014 and Resolution dated May
A: 20, 2015 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 are hereby AFFIRMED.
I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land but not in this particular
area. SO ORDERED.
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6.
G.R. No. 152613 & No. 152628 June 23, 2006
APEX MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., the mines adjudication board,
provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO), MONKAYO INTEGRATED
SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO VILLAFLOR, BALITE
COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, DAVAO UNITED MINERS
COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO, PUTING-BATO GOLD MINERS
COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG,
RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO, EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION,
MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY
ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN,
LETICIA ALQUEZA and joel brillantes management mining
corporation, Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152619-20 June 23, 2006
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE, petitioner,
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, APEX MINING CO., INC.,
the mines adjudication board, provincial mining regulatory board (PMRB-DAVAO),
MONKAYO INTEGRATED SMALL SCALE MINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ROSENDO
VILLAFLOR, DAVAO UNITED MINERS COOPERATIVE, ANTONIO DACUDAO,
PUTING-BATO GOLD MINERS COOPERATIVE, ROMEO ALTAMERA, THELMA
CATAPANG, LUIS GALANG, RENATO BASMILLO, FRANCISCO YOBIDO,
EDUARDO GLORIA, EDWIN ASION, MACARIO HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO
CARUBIO, ROBERTO BUNIALES, RUDY ESPORTONO, ROMEO CASTILLO, JOSE
REA, GIL GANADO, PRIMITIVA LICAYAN, LETICIA ALQUEZA and joel brillantes
management mining corporation, Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152870-71 June 23, 2006
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR O.
RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and
DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member), petitioners,
CASES 2A_2023
vs.
SOUTHEAST MINADANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 27 February 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation No. 369,
establishing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve consisting of approximately
1,927,400 hectares.1
The disputed area, a rich tract of mineral land, is inside the forest reserve located at
Monkayo, Davao del Norte, and Cateel, Davao Oriental, consisting of 4,941.6759
hectares.2 This mineral land is encompassed by Mt. Diwata, which is situated in the
municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel. It later became known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area." It has since the early 1980’s been stormed by conflicts brought about by the
numerous mining claimants scrambling for gold that lies beneath its bosom.
On 21 November 1983, Camilo Banad and his group, who claimed to have first discovered
traces of gold in Mount Diwata, filed a Declaration of Location (DOL) for six mining claims
in the area.
Camilo Banad and some other natives pooled their skills and resources and organized the
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (Balite).3
On 12 December 1983, Apex Mining Corporation (Apex) entered into operating
agreements with Banad and his group.
From November 1983 to February 1984, several individual applications for mining
locations over mineral land covering certain parts of the Diwalwal gold rush area were filed
with the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG).
On 2 February 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) filed 16 DOLs or mining claims
for areas adjacent to the area covered by the DOL of Banad and his group. After realizing
that the area encompassed by its mining claims is a forest reserve within the coverage of
Proclamation No. 369 issued by Governor General Davis, MMC abandoned the same and
instead applied for a prospecting permit with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
On 1 July 1985, BFD issued a Prospecting Permit to MMC covering an area of 4,941.6759
hectares traversing the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel, an area within the forest
reserve under Proclamation No. 369. The permit embraced the areas claimed by Apex
and the other individual mining claimants.
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On 11 November 1985, MMC filed Exploration Permit Application No. 84-40 with the BMG.
On 10 March 1986, the BMG issued to MCC Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP 133).
Discovering the existence of several mining claims and the proliferation of small-scale
miners in the area covered by EP 133, MMC thus filed on 11 April 1986 before the BMG a
Petition for the Cancellation of the Mining Claims of Apex and Small Scale Mining Permit
Nos. (x-1)-04 and (x-1)-05 which was docketed as MAC No. 1061. MMC alleged that the
areas covered by its EP 133 and the mining claims of Apex were within an established and
existing forest reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) under Proclamation
No. 369 and that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 463,4 acquisition of mining rights
within a forest reserve is through the application for a permit to prospect with the BFD and
not through registration of a DOL with the BMG.
On 23 September 1986, Apex filed a motion to dismiss MMC’s petition alleging that its
mining claims are not within any established or proclaimed forest reserve, and as such,
the acquisition of mining rights thereto must be undertaken via registration of DOL with the
BMG and not through the filing of application for permit to prospect with the BFD.
On 9 December 1986, BMG dismissed MMC’s petition on the ground that the area covered
by the Apex mining claims and MMC’s permit to explore was not a forest reservation. It
further declared null and void MMC’s EP 133 and sustained the validity of Apex mining
claims over the disputed area.
MMC appealed the adverse order of BMG to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
On 15 April 1987, after due hearing, the DENR reversed the 9 December 1996 order of
BMG and declared MMC’s EP 133 valid and subsisting.
Apex filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the DENR which was subsequently denied.
Apex then filed an appeal before the Office of the President. On 27 July 1989, the Office
of the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Cancio C.
Garcia,5 dismissed Apex’s appeal and affirmed the DENR ruling.
Apex filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
92605 entitled, "Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia."6 On 16 July 1991, this Court rendered a
Decision against Apex holding that the disputed area is a forest reserve; hence, the proper
procedure in acquiring mining rights therein is by initially applying for a permit to prospect
with the BFD and not through a registration of DOL with the BMG.
On 27 December 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. issued Department
Administrative Order No. 66 (DAO No. 66) declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by
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the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small-scale
mining purposes.
As DAO No. 66 declared a portion of the contested area open to small scale miners,
several mining entities filed applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA).
On 25 August 1993, Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners Association (MISSMA) filed
an MPSA application which was denied by the BMG on the grounds that the area applied
for is within the area covered by MMC EP 133 and that the MISSMA was not qualified to
apply for an MPSA under DAO No. 82,7 Series of 1990.
On 5 January 1994, Rosendo Villaflor and his group filed before the BMG a Petition for
Cancellation of EP 133 and for the admission of their MPSA Application. The Petition was
docketed as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. Davao United Miners Cooperative (DUMC) and
Balite intervened and likewise sought the cancellation of EP 133.
On 16 February 1994, MMC assigned EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100% -owned
subsidiary of MMC.
On 14 June 1994, Balite filed with the BMG an MPSA application within the contested area
that was later on rejected.
On 23 June 1994, SEM filed an MPSA application for the entire 4,941.6759 hectares under
EP 133, which was also denied by reason of the pendency of RED Mines Case No. 8-8-
94. On 1 September 1995, SEM filed another MPSA application.
On 20 October 1995, BMG accepted and registered SEM’s MPSA application and the
Deed of Assignment over EP 133 executed in its favor by MMC. SEM’s application was
designated MPSA Application No. 128 (MPSAA 128). After publication of SEM’s
application, the following filed before the BMG their adverse claims or oppositions:
a) MAC Case No. 004 (XI) – JB Management Mining Corporation;
b) MAC Case No. 005(XI) – Davao United Miners Cooperative;
c) MAC Case No. 006(XI) – Balite Integrated Small Scale Miner’s Cooperative;
d) MAC Case No. 007(XI) – Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miner’s Association,
Inc. (MISSMA);
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e) MAC Case No. 008(XI) – Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines;
f) MAC Case No. 009(XI) – Rosendo Villafor, et al.;
g) MAC Case No. 010(XI) – Antonio Dacudao;
h) MAC Case No. 011(XI) – Atty. Jose T. Amacio;
i) MAC Case No. 012(XI) – Puting-Bato Gold Miners Cooperative;
j) MAC Case No. 016(XI) – Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative;
k) MAC Case No. 97-01(XI) – Romeo Altamera, et al.8
To address the matter, the DENR constituted a Panel of Arbitrators (PA) to resolve the
following:
(a) The adverse claims on MPSAA No. 128; and
(b) The Petition to Cancel EP 133 filed by Rosendo Villaflor docketed as RED Case
No. 8-8-94.9
On 13 June 1997, the PA rendered a resolution in RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94. As to the
Petition for Cancellation of EP 133 issued to MMC, the PA relied on the ruling in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,10 and opined that EP 133 was valid and subsisting. It also
declared that the BMG Director, under Section 99 of the Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order implementing Presidential Decree No. 463, was authorized to issue
exploration permits and to renew the same without limit.
With respect to the adverse claims on SEM’s MPSAA No. 128, the PA ruled that adverse
claimants’ petitions were not filed in accordance with the existing rules and regulations
governing adverse claims because the adverse claimants failed to submit the sketch plan
containing the technical description of their respective claims, which was a mandatory
requirement for an adverse claim that would allow the PA to determine if indeed there is
an overlapping of the area occupied by them and the area applied for by SEM. It added
that the adverse claimants were not claim owners but mere occupants conducting illegal
mining activities at the contested area since only MMC or its assignee SEM had valid
mining claims over the area as enunciated in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia.11 Also, it
maintained that the adverse claimants were not qualified as small-scale miners under
DENR Department Administrative Order No. 34 (DAO No. 34),12 or the Implementing
Rules and Regulation of Republic Act No. 7076 (otherwise known as the "People’s Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991"), as they were not duly licensed by the DENR to engage in the
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extraction or removal of minerals from the ground, and that they were large-scale miners.
The decretal portion of the PA resolution pronounces:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the validity of Expoloration Permit No.
133 is hereby reiterated and all the adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are
DISMISSED.13
Undaunted by the PA ruling, the adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB). In a Decision dated 6 January 1998, the MAB considered erroneous the
dismissal by the PA of the adverse claims filed against MMC and SEM over a mere
technicality of failure to submit a sketch plan. It argued that the rules of procedure are not
meant to defeat substantial justice as the former are merely secondary in importance to
the latter. Dealing with the question on EP 133’s validity, the MAB opined that said issue
was not crucial and was irrelevant in adjudicating the appealed case because EP 133 has
long expired due to its non-renewal and that the holder of the same, MMC, was no longer
a claimant of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve having relinquished its right to
SEM. After it brushed aside the issue of the validity of EP 133 for being irrelevant, the MAB
proceeded to treat SEM’s MPSA application over the disputed area as an entirely new and
distinct application. It approved the MPSA application, excluding the area segregated by
DAO No. 66, which declared 729 hectares within the Diwalwal area as non-forest lands
open for small-scale mining. The MAB resolved:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated
13 June 1997 is hereby VACATED and a new one entered in the records of the case as
follows:
1. SEM’s MPSA application is hereby given due course subject to the full and strict
compliance of the provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations;
2. The area covered by DAO 66, series of 1991, actually occupied and actively
mined by the small-scale miners on or before August 1, 1987 as determined by the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB), is hereby excluded from the area
applied for by SEM;
3. A moratorium on all mining and mining-related activities, is hereby imposed until
such time that all necessary procedures, licenses, permits, and other requisites as
provided for by RA 7076, the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations and all other pertinent laws, rules and regulations are complied with,
and the appropriate environmental protection measures and safeguards have
been effectively put in place;
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4. Consistent with the spirit of RA 7076, the Board encourages SEM and all small-
scale miners to continue to negotiate in good faith and arrive at an agreement
beneficial to all. In the event of SEM’s strict and full compliance with all the
requirements of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and
the concurrence of the small-scale miners actually occupying and actively mining
the area, SEM may apply for the inclusion of portions of the areas segregated
under paragraph 2 hereof, to its MPSA application. In this light, subject to the
preceding paragraph, the contract between JB [JB Management Mining
Corporation] and SEM is hereby recognized.14
Dissatisfied, the Villaflor group and Balite appealed the decision to this Court. SEM,
aggrieved by the exclusion of 729 hectares from its MPSA application, likewise appealed.
Apex filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Petition for Intervention predicated on its right to
stake its claim over the Diwalwal gold rush which was granted by the Court. These cases,
however, were remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition pursuant to Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals consolidated the remanded
cases as CA-G.R. SP No. 61215 and No. 61216.
In the assailed Decision15 dated 13 March 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the PA and declared null and void the MAB decision.
The Court of Appeals, banking on the premise that the SEM is the agent of MMC by virtue
of its assignment of EP 133 in favor of SEM and the purported fact that SEM is a 100%
subsidiary of MMC, ruled that the transfer of EP 133 was valid. It argued that since SEM
is an agent of MMC, the assignment of EP 133 did not violate the condition therein
prohibiting its transfer except to MMC’s duly designated agent. Thus, despite the non-
renewal of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, the Court of Appeals deemed it relevant to declare EP
133 as valid since MMC’s mining rights were validly transferred to SEM prior to its
expiration.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that MMC’s right to explore under EP 133 is a property
right which the 1987 Constitution protects and which cannot be divested without the
holder’s consent. It stressed that MMC’s failure to proceed with the extraction and
utilization of minerals did not diminish its vested right to explore because its failure was
not attributable to it.
Reading Proclamation No. 369, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act 137, and Sections 6, 7,
and 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the Court of Appeals concluded that the issuance
of DAO No. 66 was done by the DENR Secretary beyond his power for it is the President
who has the sole power to withdraw from the forest reserve established under
Proclamation No. 369 as non-forest land for mining purposes. Accordingly, the segregation
of 729 hectares of mining areas from the coverage of EP 133 by the MAB was unfounded.
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The Court of Appeals also faulted the DENR Secretary in implementing DAO No. 66 when
he awarded the 729 hectares segregated from the coverage area of EP 133 to other
corporations who were not qualified as small-scale miners under Republic Act No. 7076.
As to the petitions of Villaflor and company, the Court of Appeals argued that their failure
to submit the sketch plan to the PA, which is a jurisdictional requirement, was fatal to their
appeal. It likewise stated the Villaflor and company’s mining claims, which were based on
their alleged rights under DAO No. 66, cannot stand as DAO No. 66 was null and void.
The dispositive portion of the Decision decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation is GRANTED while the Petition of Rosendo Villaflor, et al., is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated 13 June 1997 is AFFIRMED in toto
and the assailed MAB Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and declared as NULL and VOID.16
Hence, the instant Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Apex, Balite and MAB.
During the pendency of these Petitions, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002. This proclamation excluded an area of
8,100 hectares located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as
mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area. Subsequently, DENR
Administrative Order No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an emergency situation in the
Diwalwal gold rush area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.
Thereafter, Executive Order No. 217 dated 17 June 2003 was issued by the President
creating the National Task Force Diwalwal which is tasked to address the situation in the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
In G.R. No. 152613 and No. 152628, Apex raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING’S [SEM] E.P. 133 IS
NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE FAILURE OF MARCOPPER TO COMPLY WITH THE
TERMS AND CONDITIONS PRESCRIBED IN EP 133.
II
WHETHER OR NOT APEX HAS A SUPERIOR AND PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO STAKE
IT’S CLAIM OVER THE ENTIRE 4,941 HECTARES AGAINST SEM AND THE OTHER
CLAIMANTS PURSUANT TO THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE IN MINING LAW THAT
"PRIORITY IN TIME IS PRIORITY IN RIGHT."17
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In G.R. No. 152619-20, Balite anchors its petition on the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE MPSA OF SEM WHICH WAS FILED NINE (9) DAYS LATE
(JUNE 23, 1994) FROM THE FILING OF THE MPSA OF BALITE WHICH WAS FILED ON
JUNE 14, 1994 HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THAT OF BALITE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL BY THE PANEL OF ARBITRATORS OF THE
ADVERSE CLAIM OF BALITE ON THE GROUND THAT BALITE FAILED TO SUBMIT
THE REQUIRED SKETCH PLAN DESPITE THE FACT THAT BALITE, HAD IN FACT
SUBMITTED ON TIME WAS A VALID DISMISSAL OF BALITE’S ADVERSE CLAIM.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTUAL OCCUPATION AND SMALL-MINING OPERATIONS
OF BALITE PURSUANT TO DAO 66 IN THE 729 HECTARES WHICH WAS PART OF
THE 4,941.6759 HECTARES COVERED BY ITS MPSA WHICH WAS REJECTED BY
THE BUREAU OF MINES AND GEOSCIENCES WAS ILLEGAL.18
In G.R. No. 152870-71, the MAB submits two issues, to wit:
I Decree No. 463 and Republic Act No. 7942 impose upon the claimant the obligation of
WHETHER OR NOT EP NO. 133 IS STILL VALID AND SUBSISTING.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE
ISSUANCE OF DAO NO. 66, PROCLAMATION NO. 297, AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 217
CAN OUTWEIGH EP NO. 133 AS WELL AS OTHER ADVERSE CLAIMS OVER THE
DIWALWAL GOLD RUSH AREA.19
The common issues raised by petitioners may be summarized as follows:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity and
continuous existence of EP 133 as well as its transfer to SEM;
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II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the DENR Secretary
has no authority to issue DAO No. 66; and
III. Whether or not the subsequent acts of the executive department such as the
issuance of Proclamation No. 297, and DAO No. 2002-18 can outweigh Apex and
Balite’s claims over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
On the first issue, Apex takes exception to the Court of Appeals’ ruling upholding the
validity of MMC’s EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM asserting that MMC failed to
comply with the terms and conditions in its exploration permit, thus, MMC and its
successor-in-interest SEM lost their rights in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Apex pointed
out that MMC violated four conditions in its permit. First, MMC failed to comply with the
mandatory work program, to complete exploration work, and to declare a mining feasibility.
Second, it reneged on its duty to submit an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Third,
it failed to comply with the reportorial requirements. Fourth, it violated the terms of EP 133
when it assigned said permit to SEM despite the explicit proscription against its transfer.
Apex likewise emphasizes that MMC failed to file its MPSA application required under
DAO No. 8220 which caused its exploration permit to lapse because DAO No. 82 mandates
holders of exploration permits to file a Letter of Intent and a MPSA application not later
than 17 July 1991. It said that because EP 133 expired prior to its assignment to SEM,
SEM’s MPSA application should have been evaluated on its own merit.
As regards the Court of Appeals recognition of SEM’s vested right over the disputed area,
Apex bewails the same to be lacking in statutory bases. According to Apex, Presidential
actually undertaking exploration work within the reserved lands in order to acquire priority
right over the area. MMC, Apex claims, failed to conduct the necessary exploration work,
thus, MMC and its successor-in-interest SEM lost any right over the area.
In its Memorandum, Balite maintains that EP 133 of MMC, predecessor-in-interest of SEM,
is an expired and void permit which cannot be made the basis of SEM’s MPSA application.
Similarly, the MAB underscores that SEM did not acquire any right from MMC by virtue of
the transfer of EP 133 because the transfer directly violates the express condition of the
exploration permit stating that "it shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee
or his duly authorized agents." It added that while MMC is the permittee, SEM cannot be
considered as MMC’s duly designated agent as there is no proof on record authorizing
SEM to represent MMC in its business dealings or undertakings, and neither did SEM
pursue its interest in the permit as an agent of MMC. According to the MAB, the assignment
by MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM did not make the latter the duly authorized agent of
MMC since the concept of an agent under EP 133 is not equivalent to the concept of
assignee. It finds fault in the assignment of EP 133 which lacked the approval of the DENR
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Secretary in contravention of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 794221 requiring his approval
for a valid assignment or transfer of exploration permit to be valid.
SEM, on the other hand, counters that the errors raised by petitioners Apex, Balite and the
MAB relate to factual and evidentiary matters which this Court cannot inquire into in an
appeal by certiorari.
The established rule is that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the
Court not being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court.22 This
rule, however, admits of exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) [w]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.23
Also, in the case of Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,24 the Court in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, deemed it proper to look deeper into the factual circumstances of
the case since the Court of Appeal’s findings are at odds to those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Just like in the foregoing case, it is this Court’s considered
view that a re-evaluation of the attendant facts surrounding the present case is appropriate
considering that the findings of the MAB are in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals.
I and conditions in granting exploration permits to qualified entities. Thus, in the grant of EP
At the threshold, it is an undisputed fact that MMC assigned to SEM all its rights under EP
133 pursuant to a Deed of Assignment dated 16 February 1994. 25
EP 133 is subject to the following terms and conditions26 :
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1. That the permittee shall abide by the work program submitted with the
application or statements made later in support thereof, and which shall be
considered as conditions and essential parts of this permit;
2. That permittee shall maintain a complete record of all activities and accounting
of all expenditures incurred therein subject to periodic inspection and verification
at reasonable intervals by the Bureau of Mines at the expense of the applicant;
3. That the permittee shall submit to the Director of Mines within 15 days after the
end of each calendar quarter a report under oath of a full and complete statement
of the work done in the area covered by the permit;
4. That the term of this permit shall be for two (2) years to be effective from this
date, renewable for the same period at the discretion of the Director of Mines and
upon request of the applicant;
5. That the Director of Mines may at any time cancel this permit for violation of its
provision or in case of trouble or breach of peace arising in the area subject hereof
by reason of conflicting interests without any responsibility on the part of the
government as to expenditures for exploration that might have been incurred, or
as to other damages that might have been suffered by the permittee; and
6. That this permit shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the permittee or his
duly authorized agents and shall be used for mineral exploration purposes only
and for no other purpose.
Under Section 9027 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the applicable statute during the
issuance of EP 133, the DENR Secretary, through Director of BMG, is charged with
carrying out the said law. Also, under Commonwealth Act No. 136, also known as "An Act
Creating The Bureau of Mines," which was approved on 7 November 1936, the Director of
Mines has the direct charge of the administration of the mineral lands and minerals, and
of the survey, classification, lease or any other form of concession or disposition thereof
under the Mining Act.28 This power of administration includes the power to prescribe terms
133 in favor of the MMC, the Director of the BMG acted within his power in laying down
the terms and conditions attendant thereto.
Condition number 6 categorically states that the permit shall be for the exclusive use and
benefit of MMC or its duly authorized agents. While it may be true that SEM, the assignee
of EP 133, is a 100% subsidiary corporation of MMC, records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. For a contract of agency
to exist, it is essential that the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act
on its behalf, and the agent consents so as to act.29 In the case of Yu Eng Cho v. Pan
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American World Airways, Inc.,30 this Court had the occasion to set forth the elements of
agency, viz:
(1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
(2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself;
(4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The existence of the elements of agency is a factual matter that needs to be established
or proven by evidence. The burden of proving that agency is extant in a certain case rests
in the party who sets forth such allegation. This is based on the principle that he who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.31 It must likewise be emphasized that the
evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing.32
In the instant Petitions, it is incumbent upon either MMC or SEM to prove that a contract
of agency actually exists between them so as to allow SEM to use and benefit from EP
133 as the agent of MMC. SEM did not claim nor submit proof that it is the designated
agent of MMC to represent the latter in its business dealings or undertakings. SEM cannot,
therefore, be considered as an agent of MMC which can use EP 133 and benefit from it.
Since SEM is not an authorized agent of MMC, it goes without saying that the assignment
or transfer of the permit in favor of SEM is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms
and conditions of the grant of EP 133.
Furthermore, the concept of agency is distinct from assignment. In agency, the agent acts
not on his own behalf but on behalf of his principal.33 While in assignment, there is total
transfer or relinquishment of right by the assignor to the assignee.34 The assignee takes
the place of the assignor and is no longer bound to the latter. The deed of assignment
clearly stipulates:
1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the
ASSIGNOR from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and
CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in
the area situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as
Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan
del Sur respectively.35
Bearing in mind the just articulated distinctions and the language of the Deed of
Assignment, it is readily obvious that the assignment by MMC of EP 133 in favor of SEM
did not make the latter the former’s agent. Such assignment involved actual transfer of all
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rights and obligations MMC have under the permit in favor of SEM, thus, making SEM the
permittee. It is not a mere grant of authority to SEM, as an agent of MMC, to use the permit.
It is a total abdication of MMC’s rights over the permit. Hence, the assignment in question
did not make SEM the authorized agent of MMC to make use and benefit from EP 133.
The condition stipulating that the permit is for the exclusive use of the permittee or its duly
authorized agent is not without any reason. Exploration permits are strictly granted to
entities or individuals possessing the resources and capability to undertake mining
operations. Without such a condition, non-qualified entities or individuals could circumvent
the strict requirements under the law by the simple expediency acquiring the permit from
the original permittee.
We cannot lend recognition to the Court of Appeals’ theory that SEM, being a 100%
subsidiary of MMC, is automatically an agent of MMC.
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of
succession and the powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence.36 It is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal
entity to which it may be related.37 Resultantly, absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM
is a separate and distinct entity from MMC.
The Court of Appeals pathetically invokes the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to
legitimize the prohibited transfer or assignment of EP 133. It stresses that SEM is just a
business conduit of MMC, hence, the distinct legal personalities of the two entities should
not be recognized. True, the corporate mask may be removed when the corporation is just
an alter ego or a mere conduit of a person or of another corporation. 38 For reasons of
public policy and in the interest of justice, the corporate veil will justifiably be impaled only
when it becomes a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity committed against a third
person.39 However, this Court has made a caveat in the application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil. Courts should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied.
Only in cases where the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice,
fraud or crime was committed against another, in disregard of its rights may the veil be
pierced and removed. Thus, a subsidiary corporation may be made to answer for the
liabilities and/or illegalities done by the parent corporation if the former was organized for
the purpose of evading obligations that the latter may have entered into. In other words,
this doctrine is in place in order to expose and hold liable a corporation which commits
illegal acts and use the corporate fiction to avoid liability from the said acts. The doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle to commit prohibited
acts because these acts are the ones which the doctrine seeks to prevent.
To our mind, the application of the foregoing doctrine is unwarranted. The assignment of
the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to circumvent the condition of non-transferability of
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the exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the
validity of the assignment is tantamount to sanctioning illegal act which is what the doctrine
precisely seeks to forestall.
Quite apart from the above, a cursory consideration of the mining law pertinent to the case,
will, indeed, demonstrate the infraction committed by MMC in its assignment of EP 133 to
SEM.
Presidential Decree No. 463, enacted on 17 May 1974, otherwise known as the Mineral
Resources Development Decree, which governed the old system of exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources through "license, concession or lease"
prescribed:
SEC. 97. Assignment of Mining Rights. – A mining lease contract or any interest
therein shall not be transferred, assigned, or subleased without the prior approval of the
Secretary: Provided, That such transfer, assignment or sublease may be made only to a
qualified person possessing the resources and capability to continue the mining operations
of the lessee and that the assignor has complied with all the obligations of the lease:
Provided, further, That such transfer or assignment shall be duly registered with the office
of the mining recorder concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)
The same provision is reflected in Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which is the new law governing the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources, which provides:
SEC. 25. Transfer or Assignment. - An exploration permit may be transferred or assigned
to a qualified person subject to the approval of the Secretary upon the recommendation of
the Director.
The records are bereft of any indication that the assignment bears the imprimatur of the
Secretary of the DENR. Presidential Decree No. 463, which is the governing law when the
assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the transfer or assignment of mining
rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the prior approval of the
Secretary of DENR. Quite conspicuously, SEM did not dispute the allegation that the Deed
of Assignment was made without the prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Absent the
prior approval of the Secretary of DENR, the assignment of EP 133, was, therefore, without
legal effect for violating the mandatory provision of Presidential Decree No. 463.
An added significant omission proved fatal to MMC/SEM’s cause. While it is true that the
case of Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia40 settled the issue of which between Apex and
MMC validly acquired mining rights over the disputed area, such rights, though, had been
extinguished by subsequent events. Records indicate that on 6 July 1993, EP 133 was
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extended for 12 months or until 6 July 1994.41 MMC never renewed its permit prior and
after its expiration. Thus, EP 133 expired by non-renewal.
With the expiration of EP 133 on 6 July 1994, MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right to the said area because
the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have not acquired
any vested right over the 4,941.6759 hectares which used to be covered by EP 133.
II
The Court of Appeals theorizes that DAO No. 66 was issued beyond the power of the
DENR Secretary since the power to withdraw lands from forest reserves and to declare
the same as an area open for mining operation resides in the President.
Under Proclamation No. 369 dated 27 February 1931, the power to convert forest reserves
as non-forest reserves is vested with the DENR Secretary. Proclamation No. 369 partly
states:
From this reserve shall be considered automatically excluded all areas which had already
been certified and which in the future may be proclaimed as classified and certified lands
and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.42
However, a subsequent law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, otherwise known as "The Mining
Act" which was approved on 7 November 1936 provides:
Sec. 14. Lands within reservations for purposes other than mining, which, after such
reservation is made, are found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than for the
purpose for which the reservation was made, may be withdrawn from such reservations
by the President with the concurrence of the National Assembly, and thereupon such lands
shall revert to the public domain and be subject to disposition under the provisions of this
Act.
Unlike Proclamation No. 369, Commonwealth Act No. 137 vests solely in the President,
with the concurrence of the National Assembly, the power to withdraw forest reserves
found to be more valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the
reservation was made and convert the same into non-forest reserves. A similar provision
can also be found in Presidential Decree No. 463 dated 17 May 1974, with the
modifications that (1) the declaration by the President no longer requires the concurrence
of the National Assembly and (2) the DENR Secretary merely exercises the power to
recommend to the President which forest reservations are to be withdrawn from the
coverage thereof. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 463 reads:
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SEC. 8. Exploration and Exploitation of Reserved Lands. – When lands within reservations,
which have been established for purposes other than mining, are found to be more
valuable for their mineral contents, they may, upon recommendation of the Secretary be
withdrawn from such reservation by the President and established as a mineral reservation.
Against the backdrop of the applicable statutes which govern the issuance of DAO No. 66,
this Court is constrained to rule that said administrative order was issued not in accordance
with the laws. Inescapably, DAO No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered by
the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest land open to small-scale mining
operations, is null and void as, verily, the DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest
reserves into non-forest reserves.
III
It is the contention of Apex that its right over the Diwalwal gold rush area is superior to that
of MMC or that of SEM because it was the first one to occupy and take possession of the
area and the first to record its mining claims over the area.
For its part, Balite argues that with the issuance of DAO No. 66, its occupation in the
contested area, particularly in the 729 hectares small-scale mining area, has entitled it to
file its MPSA. Balite claims that its MPSA application should have been given preference
over that of SEM because it was filed ahead.
The MAB, on the other hand, insists that the issue on who has superior right over the
disputed area has become moot and academic by the supervening events. By virtue of
Proclamation No. 297 dated 25 November 2002, the disputed area was declared a mineral
reservation.
Proclamation No. 297 excluded an area of 8,100 hectares located in Monkayo,
Compostela Valley, and proclaimed the same as mineral reservation and as
environmentally critical area, viz:
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 369, series of 1931, certain tracts of public land
situated in the then provinces of Davao, Agusan and Surigao, with an area of
approximately 1,927,400 hectares, were withdrawn from settlement and disposition,
excluding, however, those portions which had been certified and/or shall be classified and
certified as non-forest lands;
WHEREAS, gold deposits have been found within the area covered by Proclamation No.
369, in the Municipality of Monkayo, Compostela Valley Province, and unregulated small
to medium-scale mining operations have, since 1983, been undertaken therein, causing in
the process serious environmental, health, and peace and order problems in the area;
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WHEREAS, it is in the national interest to prevent the further degradation of the
environment and to resolve the health and peace and order problems spawned by the
unregulated mining operations in the said area;
WHEREAS, these problems may be effectively addressed by rationalizing mining
operations in the area through the establishment of a mineral reservation;
WHEREAS, after giving due notice, the Director of Mines and Geoxciences conducted
public hearings on September 6, 9 and 11, 2002 to allow the concerned sectors and
communities to air their views regarding the establishment of a mineral reservation in the
place in question;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the President may,
upon the recommendation of the Director of Mines and Geosciences, through the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and when the national interest so
requires, establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken by
the Department directly or thru a contractor;
WHEREAS, as a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between
socio-economic growth and environmental protection, the President may, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586, as amended, proclaim and declare certain areas in the
country as environmentally critical;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby exclude
certain parcel of land located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley, and proclaim the same as
mineral reservation and as environmentally critical area, with metes and bound as defined
by the following geographical coordinates;
xxxx
with an area of Eight Thousand One Hundred (8,100) hectares, more or less. Mining
operations in the area may be undertaken either by the DENR directly, subject to payment
of just compensation that may be due to legitimate and existing claimants, or thru a
qualified contractor, subject to existing rights, if any.
The DENR shall formulate and issue the appropriate guidelines, including the
establishment of an environmental and social fund, to implement the intent and provisions
of this Proclamation.
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Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State assumed a more dynamic role in
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. 43 With
this policy, the State may pursue full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country’s natural mineral resources. The options open
to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.44 Thus, Article XII,
Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically states:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands,
all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
xxx
xxxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization
of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Recognizing the importance of the country’s natural resources, not only for national
economic development, but also for its security and national defense, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 7942 empowers the President, when the national interest so requires, to
establish mineral reservations where mining operations shall be undertaken directly by the
State or through a contractor.
To implement the intent and provisions of Proclamation No. 297, the DENR Secretary
issued DAO No. 2002-18 dated 12 August 2002 declaring an emergency situation in the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining operations therein.
The issue on who has priority right over the disputed area is deemed overtaken by the
above subsequent developments particularly with the issuance of Proclamation 297 and
DAO No. 2002-18, both being constitutionally-sanctioned acts of the Executive Branch.
Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full
CASES 2A_2023
control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration, development and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreements with qualified entities, viz:
SEC 5. Mineral Reservations. – When the national interest so requires, such as when there
is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national development,
or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President may establish
mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the
Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral reservations and such other reservations
as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a
contractor x x x .
It is now up to the Executive Department whether to take the first option, i.e., to undertake
directly the mining operations of the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. As already ruled, the State
may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only
plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. The
State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling on this option, as
well as its material and logistic feasibility.45 The State can also opt to award mining
operations in the mineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex and
Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department over
which courts will not interfere.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions of Apex, Balite and the MAB are
PARTIALLY GRANTED, thus:
1. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 13 March 2002, and hereby declare that EP 133 of MMC has EXPIRED on
7 July 1994 and that its subsequent transfer to SEM on 16 February 1994 is VOID.
2. We AFFIRM the finding of the Court of Appeals in the same Decision declaring
DAO No. 66 illegal for having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretary’s
authority.
Consequently, the State, should it so desire, may now award mining operations in the
disputed area to any qualified entity it may determine. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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7.
G.R. No. 86953 November 6, 1990
MARINE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(MARCAPI), ROBERTO GAYA, DAVID ZAFRA and SEGUNDO P. LUSTRE,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAINERIO O. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), HON. JOSE LUIS ALCUAZ, as
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and HON.
ROSAURO SIBAL, as Chief of the Telecommunications Office (TELOF) of
DOTC, respondents.
F. Reyes Cabigao for petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners are self-described "Filipino enterpreneurs deeply involved in the business
of marine radio communications in the country. 1 They are also operators of "shore-to-ship
and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio stations, 2 and are holders of certificates of
public convenience duly issued by the National Telecommunications Commission. Among
other things, they handle correspondence between vessel passengers or crew and the
public. 3
Sometime in July, 1988, the Department of Transportation and Communications unveiled
an P880-million maritime coastal communications system project, designed to "ensure
safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of efficient communication
facilities between coast stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in
navigational routes at sea." 4 It was set out to provide, among other things, ship-to- shore
and shore-to-ship public corresponding, free of charge. 5
On August 1, 1988, Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao, in his capacity as counsel for the petitioner,
Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines, Inc., addressed an appeal
to then Secretary Rainerio Reyes, in the tenor as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
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But you undoubtedly would understand their fears. It was their feeling that
entry of the government into their line of business would certainly spell for
them financial ruin as it would put into serious doubt the viability of the
entire marine radio communications industry. They say that, as it is today,
the industry is not viable enough. What more, they ask, if the government
steps in and eventually dips its strong fingers into the pie? 6
xxx xxx xxx
On August 17, 1988, the Secretary forwarded a reply, denying Atty. Cabigao's request, for
the following reasons:
xxx xxx xxx
MARCAPI's main business concern is public correspondence. This means
that MARCAPI handles only correspondence between passengers or crew
on board ship and their respective offices or residences. On the other hand,
the Maritime Coastal Communications System Project to be implemented
by 1989 will offer services in watch and distress signal, medical and
meteorological services, port services, and public correspondence, in their
order of priority.
You will note that public correspondence is only fourth in the order of
priority of services to be offered by the present maritime project. Primarily,
it will offer distress and safety communications service which is obligatory
in the maritime mobile service. This consists of monitoring by coast
stations of distress signal from ships in trouble and relaying the messages
to the Philippine Coast Guard which will undertake the search and rescue
operations. It also includes safety communication which refers to weather
broadcast and typhoon signals that will be broadcast by the coast stations
regularly. These services are offered to the public for free.
It is worth noting, as it is significant, that the confidence of the public in the
competence of private firms to carry out the aforecited objectives has
already been eroded. After that tragic incident of the sinking of MV Dona
Paz, the National Telecommunications Commission and MARINA
conducted constant monitoring by sending distress signals. Out of 1,000
licensed private operators only one (1) responded to the signal. 7
On February 20, 1989, the petitioners brought the instant suit, alleging, in essence, that
Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
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On June 7, 1990, the Court issued a Resolution, in view of the departure of Secretary
Rainerio Reyes, requiring the present incumbent, Secretary Oscar Orbos, to inform the
Court whether or not the Department is adopting the action of Secretary Reyes. On August
16, 1990, Assistant Secretary Wilfredo Trinidad informed us that Secretary Orbos is
adopting the action complained of.
The petitioners hold that the Department can not compete in the business of public
correspondence, and rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution,
which states:
Sec. 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed
investments.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, submits that in spite of the above provision, the
Government "cannot abandon its ministerial functions of rendering public services to the
citizenry which private capital would not ordinarily undertake, or which by its very nature is
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than by any private individual or entity. 8
There is no merit in this petition.
9
The duty of the State is preeminently "to serve . . . the people, and so also, to "promote
a just and dynamic social order . . . through policies that provide adequate social
services. . . . and an improved quality of life for all. 10
The objectives of government, as expressed in the Charter, are, among other things, "a
more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth . . . [and] a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people . . . "11 With respect in particular to property, the Constitution decrees:
Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic
agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations,
shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands. 12
There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public corresponding, free of
charge. It is compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution, and
certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less.
CASES 2A_2023
The petitioners can not legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the
Constitution, to defeat the act complained of. The mandate "recogni[zing] the
indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an acknowledgment of the
importance of private initiative in building the nation. However, it is not a call for official
abdication of duty to citizenry.
The novel provisions of the Charter prescribing private sector participation, especially in
the field of economic activity, 13 come, indeed, no more as responses to State monopoly
of economic forces which has unfairly kept individual initiative from the economic
processes and has held back competitiveness in the market. The Constitution does not
bar, however, the Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the
domain of public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief economic
caretaker of the nation.
The principle of laissez faire has long been denied validity in this jurisdiction. In 1969, the
Court promulgated Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, 14 where it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
... The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter optionally and only
because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than in
any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted
as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice. 15
The requirements of social justice and the necessity for a redistribution of the national
wealth and economic opportunity find in fact a greater emphasis in the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the novel concepts inscribed there. 16 And two decades after this Court
wrote it, ACCFAs message remains the same and its lesson holds true as ever.
The Court is not of the thinking that the act complained of is equivalent to a taking without
just compensation. Albeit we have held that "[w]here the owner is deprived of the ordinary
and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there
is taking within the constitutional sense, 17 it does not seem to us that the Department of
Transportation and Communication, by providing for free public correspondence, is guilty
of an uncompensated taking. Rather, the Government merely built a bridge that made the
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boat obsolete, although not entirely useless. Certainly, the owner of the boat can not
charge the builder of the bridge for lost income. And certainly, the Government has all the
right to build the bridge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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