GRAY VS. GRAY (1934) spousal relation between her and Mr.

Gray and
Elserce A. Gray v. Frank M. Gray
RULE: If there is no ground of action in the
sovereignty where a tort is alleged to have
occurred, there is none anywhere.
Rules and conduct have no force to
regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction
which made the rules, save as their
operation is enforced by control over
parties found within the jurisdiction.
Facts:
The parties are husband and wife and
residents of New Hampshire. The couple went
to Maine where they met an automobile
accident while the husband was driving and as
a result of such accident, the wife was injured.
Under the Maine law, spouses are barred from
maintaining an action a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r .
H e n c e , M r s . G r a y f i l e d a su i t a g a i n s t
M r . G r a y i n N e w Hamsphire to recover
damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by the defendant's negligence.
The defendant contended that "Under the laws
of state of Maine, the plaintiff being the wife of
said defendant is barred from maintaining this
action.
so she resort to file an action in New
Hampshire, being a resident thereto where no
such prohibition exists.
However, Her argument fails to distinguish
between status and the incidents which local
law attaches to the status. Being husband and
wife, they took such status with them into
Maine where defendant's delict act occurred.
That incidents of that status are those
prescribed by the law of the place where
transactions took place and, in this case,
spousal incapacity to sue under Maine state
law.
(Moreover, the court upheld that in the great
majority of cases, complaints of conduct are
adjusted in the jurisdiction where the conduct
took place. It is desirable that the remedy be
the same, wherever the action is brought.)
Upon examination of Maine law shows that
there is not only a prohibition of suit, but that
acts complained of do not give rise to any
cause of action.
Hence, If there is no ground of action in the
sovereignty where a tort is alleged to have
occurred, there is none anywhere and remedy
cannot be had.

Issue: Whether or not in an action arising from

tort lex loci should govern

Ruling: Yes. A settled rule that If there is a

conflict between lex fori, the law of the
country in which an action is brought, and lex
loci, the law of the country where the action
was commited, lex loci governs in tort
cases in respect to the legal effect and
incidents of the act. (It means whatever
would be a defense to this action if it had been
brought in Maine is a defense here (New
Hampshire), EXCEPT IF: the cause of action
had arisen in New Hampshire state.)

Mrs. Gray’s argument only reason that a

recovery could not be had in Maine is the
ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R.R. CO. VS. efficiency beyond state lines. Only Mississippi
CARROLL could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim
97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1893) (Law of the place of injury).
McClellan, J.
As for an argument that the Railroad
FACTS: (Defendant) was under a contractual duty to
Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in Alabama, the
Carroll is a resident of Alabama and was a Alabama law will govern only occurrences of
brakeman employed by the defendant, which is the employment relationship and not with any
an Alabama specific contractual obligations. Decision is
corporation and operated a railroad from reversed and remanded.
Tennessee through Alabama to Mississippi.
The contract of
employment was entered in Alabama.
Carroll was injured in Mississippi as a result of
failure to spot a defective link between two
freight cars which the defendant’s employees
were under
duty to inspect.

Under the Mississippi law, Carroll could not

recover against his employer because the
negligence was caused by the act of a fellow
servant. Under Alabama law, absolute liability
was imposed on the company for injuries
suffered by employees in the course of their
employment.

The trial court ruled in favor of Plaintiff Caroll.

Defendant appealed the said decision.

ISSUE:

Can the plaintiff recover damages against the

employer for injury sustained under Alabama
law?

HELD:

No. The general rule is that recovery cannot be

made in one state for the injuries to the person
sustained in a different state unless the
infliction of the injuries is actionable under the
law of the state where the injuries were
received.

In this case, up to the time the train passed

from Alabama, no injury had resulted.
Although it is claimed that the negligent
conduct was done in Alabama, the injury
sustained creates the cause of action and not
the negligence. The Alabama statute has no
  most significant contacts or relationships
Most Significant Relationship Rule- with the parties:
 A test upon which the rights and (a) The place where the injury occurred;
liabilities of the parties with respect to an (b) the place where the conduct
issue in tort are determined by the local occurred;
law of the state which has the most (c) the domicile, nationality, place of
significant relationship to the occurrence incorporation, and
and the parties (d) the place where the relationship, if
 The state where the conduct occurred is any,
most likely to be the state of most between the parties is centered.
significant relationship when in addition
to the injured person being domiciled or
residing or doing business in the state,
the injury occurred in the course of an
activity or of a relationship
 most significant factors are: parties’
domicile, location of the tort and parties’
forum selection clause in any applicable
agreement
Grouping of contacts theory
 it is a principle of conflict of laws that in
case of choice-of-law questions, the law
of the jurisdiction which has the most
significant relationship to the transaction
or event applies.
 It requires the court to examine five
factors in order to determine which state
law to apply in contract cases involving
choices of law. These factors include (1)
the place of contracting, (2) the place of
negotiation of the contract, (3) the place
of performance, (4) the location of the
subject matter of the contract, and (5)
the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties.
center of gravity doctrine
 choice of law solution by giving
governing effect to the law of that state
which is most significantly interested
and effected by the outcome of the
particular legal controversy.
 which requires the court of the forum
state to examine the contacts which
each of the involved states have with the
parties, and also the effect which the
litigation of this particular legal issue will
have in the respective states. The court
of the forum must then apply the law of
that state which has the most
"significant" contacts or relationships.
 AUTEN VS. AUTEN (1954)
Auten v. Auten - 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99
(1954)
RULE:
Under either the "center of gravity" or the
"grouping of contacts" theory of the
conflict of laws, instead of regarding as
conclusive the parties' intention or the
place of making or performance, emphasis
is upon the law of the place that has the
most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute.
FACTS:
The Autens were married in England in 1917
and live there until 1931, when the husband
deserted his wife and children and moved to
New York. Wife went to New York where a
separation agreement was executed in 1933.
Under the agreement, he had to pay 50 pounds
a month through New York trustee for the
support of his wife and children; parties lived
separately and promised not to bring any
action relating to their separation. Mr. Auten
failed to give financial support, so his wife
brought a suit for legal separation in England,
on ground of adultery. Mr. Auten was serve
with the process, the case never went to trial
and Mrs. Auten received nothing.
Hence, the present action was brought in New
York to enforce the agreement. Husband
argued that the wife’s institution of the English
separation was a violation of thereof and thus,
his obligation was extinguished. The lower
court applied the New York law, and held in
favor for the defendant.
Margarite appealed from the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the grant of
defendant Harold's motion for summary
judgment and dismissal of the complaint on the
issue of payment of support and maintenance
installments to plaintiff under a separation
agreement.
ISSUE:
Was the New York law applicable in the
case at bar?
ANSWER:
1) No.
Ratio:
Most of the cases rely upon the generally
accepted rules that ‘’All matters bearing
upon the execution, the interpretation and
the validity
of the contracts are determined by the law
of the
place where the contract is made while all
matters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law of the place where the
contract, by its terms, is to be performed. What
constitutes a breach of the contract and what
circumstances excuse a breach are considered
matters of performance, governable,
within this rule, by the law of the place of
performance.
The merits of its approach are that it gives to
the place having the most interest in the
problem paramount control over the legal
issues arising out of a particular factual
context, thus allowing the forum to apply the
policy of the jurisdiction most intimately
concerned with the outcome of the particular
litigation.
In the case at bar, examination of the
respective contract with New York and England
compels the conclusion that it is the English
law which must be applied to determine the
impact and effect to be given the wife’s
institution of the separation suit.
Notes:
Under the Agreement, Harold was obligated to
pay to a trustee, for the “account of” the wife,
who was to return to England, a certain
monthly sum for the support of herself and the
children.
In addition, the agreement provided that the
parties were to continue to live separate and
apart, that neither should sue “in any action
relating to their separation,” and that the wife
should not “cause any complaint to be lodged
against the husband, in any jurisdiction, by
reason of the said alleged divorced or agreement, summary judgment should have
remarriage.” not been granted.

Consequently, Margarite filed a petition for

separation in an English court, charging Harold
with adultery. Harold was served in New York;
he was then required to pay alimony pendente
lite.
Nothing resulted from this action; hence,
Margarite instituted the present suit to recover
the sum of $26,564, which represented the
amount allegedly due her under the
agreement.
Since, then, the law of England must be
applied, and since, at the very least, an issue
existed as to whether the courts of that country
treat the commencement of a separation action
as a repudiation of an earlier-made separation
agreement, summary judgment should not
have been granted. Thus, the judgment of the
Appellate Division and that of Special Term
insofar as they dismiss the complaint should be
reversed.

The court at Special Term and the Appellate

Division, applying New York law, dismissed the
complaint, holding that under such law,
Margarite’s commencement of the English
action and the award of temporary alimony
constituted a rescission and repudiation of the
separation agreement.
Ruling 2:

The Court of Appeals of New York held that the

examination of the respective contacts with
New York and England compelled the
conclusion that it was English law which must
be applied to determine the impact and effect
to be given the wife’s institution of the
separation suit.

According to the Court, it was England

which has all the truly significant contacts,
while the State of New York’s sole nexus
with the matter in dispute was that it was
the place where the agreement was made
and where the trustee, to whom the moneys
were in the first instance to be paid, had his
office.

The agreement was made between British

subjects, who had been married in England,
had children there and lived there as a
family for 14 years. Since the law of
England must be applied, and since at the
very least, an issue exists as to whether the
courts of that country treat the
commencement of a separation action as a
repudiation of an earlier-made separation

HAAG VS. BARNES (1961)
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The more modern
view is that "the courts, instead of regarding as
conclusive the parties' intention or the place of
making or performance, lay emphasis rather
upon the law of the place `which has the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute'".
EMERGENCY RECITATION: Haag met
Barnes in New York while Barnes was in a
business trip. They became friends since
Barnes hired Haag as a law secretary.
Eventually, Haag became pregnant. As a
result, they had an agreement executed in
Illinois, since Illinois was the principal place of
work of Barnes, wherein it provided the terms
of support, that Haag releases Barnes from any
action, and that their agreement will be govern
by the laws of Illinois. Eventually, Haag
instituted a complaint in New York for the
alleged violation of Sec. 64 of the New York
City Criminal Courts Act.
In dismissing the complaint and ruling in favor
of Barnes, the court said that the Illinois laws
would apply since it has the most significant
contacts with the matter in dispute because: (1)
both parties are designated as being “of
Chicago, Illinois”; (2) the child was born in
Illinois; (3) the agents to act in behalf of the
parties are all Illinois residents; and (4) support
were always made from Chicago, Illinois.
Facts:
The complainant Dorothy Haag was a law
secretary and had been hired by the defendant
through an agency to do work for him while he
was in New York on one of his business trips.
They had affair and resulted to pregnancy and
a child born out of wedlock. Haag went to live
in California with her sister to await the birth of
her child, however, she returned to Chicago
before the child was born and, upon attempting
to communicate with the defendant, was
referred to his attorney. The latter told Dorothy
to choose a hospital in Chicago, which she did,
and the baby was born there in December,
1955, the defendant paying the expenses.
Thereafter, the parties entered into an agreement
in Illinois in which Barnes agreed to pay $275 per
month to support Haag and the child. At the time
of the agreement, Haag and Barnes both resided
in Illinois. The agreement was drafted in Illinois,
by Illinois attorneys, identified Illinois residents as
agents to act on behalf of the parties, was
executed in Illinois, and provided that it would be
governed by Illinois law.
Haag and the child moved to New York. Barnes
continued to reside in Illinois and made payments
pursuant to the agreement in Illinois.
Although Barnes had, to that point, paid far more
to Haag than he was required to under the
agreement, Haag filed suit in New York state
court seeking child support.
The complainant contended that since the
agreement was not court approved, it may not be
held to be a bar to her suit under New York law in
aid of public policy.
The trial court granted Barnes’s motion to dismiss
the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed.
Issue: Whether the law of New York applies?
Ruling: No. The traditional rule is that the law
governing a contract must be determined by the
intent of the parties while in modern view the
intent of the parties is no longer conclusive,
however, and the courts will look to the law of the
place having the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute.
Applying the principle of significant contacts
based from the agreement, it clearly expressed
that parties want to have their agreement
governed by Illinois Law as: The agreement
was made in Illinois, where both parties resided
at the time, and it specifically provided that it
should be interpreted, construed and governed
by the laws of that state. Consequently, under
Illinois law, the agreement amounted to an
absolute bar to a suit.
The issue here is not whether the New York
statute reflects a different public policy from
that of the Illinois law, but whether enforcement
of the contract under Illinois law represents an
affront to New York’s public policy.
Wherefore, Haag could not upset a support
agreement, which was itself perfectly
consistent with the public policy of New York
Note:
The important factors are taken together with
other of the "significant contacts" in the case,
they likewise point to Illinois law. Among these
other Illinois contacts are the following:
o both parties are designated in the
agreement as being "of Chicago,
Illinois", and Barnes’ place of business
is and always has been in Illinois;
o the child was born in Illinois;
o the persons designated to act as
agents for the principals (except for a
third alternate) are Illinois residents, as
are the attorneys for both parties who
drew the agreement; and
o all contributions for support always
have been, and still are being, made
from Chicago.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New
York contacts are of far less weight and
significance. Chief among these is the fact that
child and mother presently live in New York
and that part of the "liaison" took place in New
York.
BABCOCK VS. JACKSON
RULE: The "center of gravity" or "grouping of
contacts" doctrine adopted by the court in
conflicts cases involving contracts impresses
the court as affording the appropriate approach
for accommodating the competing interests in
tort cases with multi-state contacts.
Justice, fairness, and the best practical result
may best be achieved by giving controlling
effect to the law of the jurisdiction which,
because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest
concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation.
The merit of such a rule is that it gives to the
place having the most interest in the problem
paramount control over the legal issues arising
out of a particular factual context and thereby
allows the forum to apply the policy of the
jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the
outcome of the particular litigation.
FACTS: In 1960, plaintiff Georgia Babcock and
her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all
residents of Rochester, New York, left that city
in Jackson's automobile, Babcock as guest, for
a week-end trip to Canada. Some hours later,
as Jackson was driving in the Province of
Ontario, he apparently lost control of the car; it
went off the highway into an adjacent stone
wall, and Babcock was seriously injured. Upon
her return to New York, Babcock brought the
present action against William Jackson,
alleging negligence on his part in operating his
automobile.
At the time of the accident, there was in force
in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle
operated in the business of carrying
passengers for compensation, is not liable for
any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury
to, or the death of any person being carried
in ... the motor vehicle." Even though no such
bar is recognized under New york State's
substantive law of torts, defendant Jackson
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the law of the place where the accident
occurred governs and that Ontario's guest
statute barred recovery.
The court at Special Term, agreeing with
defendant, granted the motion, and the
Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of
dismissal.
ISSUE: Will Babcock, a guest passenger, be
barred from recovering damages for a wrong
committed in Ontario, Canada before the court
of New York?

RULING: No. The reviewing court reversed its

prior choice of law rule for torts, which was
based on the law of the place of the tort, and
held that the applicable choice of law rule
should also reflect a consideration of other
factors relevant to the purposes served by the
enforcement or denial of the remedy hence in
this case, New York law.

Comparison of the relative "contacts" and

"interests" of New York and Ontario in the
action made it clear that the concern of New
York was unquestionably greater and more
direct, and the interest of Ontario was at best
minimal.

Ontario's interest was insignificant, and it has

been pointed out that its law prohibiting suit
may have been enacted primarily to discourage
fraudulent claims by guest-passengers acting
in collusion with the host-drivers.

New York's "contacts" were undoubtedly

numerically superior. The injuries were suffered
by plaintiff as a result of defendant's negligent
operation of an automobile garaged, licensed
and insured in New York. Furthermore, the
journey began and was to end in New York.
Yet, none of these factors was held conclusive;
the policy served by the enforcement or denial
of the remedy was also to be considered.

In this case, grouping contacts was used to test

qualitative significant contacts rather than
quantitative.