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UDC 341.1/.8 Juridical Sciences

THE UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION AS A WAY OUT OF

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEADLOCK

Rad’ P.V.
Student of the Faculty of International Relations
of the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv
Lviv, Ukraine
Russian invasion into Ukraine has caused debates over the issue of
Russia’s membership and its veto power in the United Nations Security
Council. During the last few months of the large-scale warfare in the
centre of Europe the Security Council has not been able to take any
further steps regarding the resolution of this conflict, because of veto
power which is regularly misused by the Russian Federation. In this
context some Ukrainian and foreign international lawyers decided to
resort to the Uniting for Peace Resolution issued by the General
Assembly as a possible way of unblocking the Security Council through
omitting Russia’s veto power. The goal of this paper is to analyze the
provisions of the Resolution and to figure out whether such a step would
be possible.
First things first, it is needed to understand under what
circumstances this resolution was issued. During the first years after the
United Nations was established, the Security Council deadlock went
through two phases due to the Cold War. As Michael P. Scharf points
out, in the first (1946-1965), when the most members of the United
Nations were West-leaning, the Soviet Union vetoed 106 resolutions,
while the United States vetoed none. In the second phase (1966-1989),
when former colonies joined the United Nations as newly independent
states, the United States vetoed 67 Security Council Resolutions, while
the Soviet Union vetoed only 13 [7, p. 6].
The frequent using of the veto at that time was a significant issue,
which was causing a paralyzing effect on the Security Council. On
November 3, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted by an overwhelming vote (52 to 5) the Uniting for Peace
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resolution as a means of circumventing further Soviet vetoes during the
course of the Korean War. The resolution stipulates that either the
General Assembly or Security Council can initiate an Emergency
Special Session where because of a “lack of unanimity of the permanent
members”, the Council “fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security”. In such a case the
General Assembly “shall consider the matter immediately with a view
to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective
measures, including the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression
the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security” [8], [1].
As far as, it has been explained why the Uniting for Peace
Resolution was issued, it is necessary to resort to cases, when the
Resolution has been used. It was used for the first time on February 1,
1951, when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 498 (V), calling
upon states to support UN military actions in Korea, including to repel
Chinese aggression. [9] The Uniting for Peace Resolution was next used
in 1956 when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, prompting Britain,
France, and Israel to attack Egypt in order to regain western control of
the Canal. The U.K. and France vetoed Security Council resolutions
mandating immediate withdrawal of armed forces. The United Nations
resorted to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, calling an emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly. The Assembly adopted
Resolution 997, calling for immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops
[10]. Within a week armed forces of Britain and France were withdrawn.
Since the first use of the Resolution in 1951, it has been invoked only
eleven other times – seven times by the Security Council and four times
by the General Assembly. In each case the General Assembly
recommended non-use of force measures [7, p. 10].
However, the question of constitutionality of the resolution arises.
The main issue is the General Assembly’s ability to recommend the use
of force against states and its clash with the prohibition against the threat
or use of force contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. The provisions of
this article are considered to be a jus cogens rule which has taken on
customary legal status. There are only two exceptions when military
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force can be used: in case of collective measures being taken by the
Security Council under Chapter VII, and the exercise of self-defence by
members in response to an armed attack pursuant to article 51. It has
accordingly been argued that recommendation by the General Assembly
that states take forcible measure against another state would provoke a
violation of the prohibition of the use of force which is stated in article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter [3], [12]. But, as Michael P. Scharf points out,
some scholars argue that a General Assembly recommendation for use
of force under the Uniting for Peace Resolution can have the same legal
affect as a Security Council authorization because the prohibition on the
use of force binds members and not the United Nations organization [7,
p. 12].
Until the 2022 invasion of Russia, the Security Council had not
referred any matter under the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1982,
and the General Assembly had not invoked it since 1997. Christian
Tomuschat believes this reluctance reflected concern that the Uniting for
Peace Resolution “has a potential that could subvert the well-
equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations”[4]. Larry
Johnson has argued that the Uniting for Peace Resolution is no longer
needed. He points out that since the General Assembly has exercised the
powers of the Uniting for Peace Resolution a number of times without
invoking the Resolution, such as in calling for voluntary actions, the
Resolution is not a necessary predicate to such action [6].
In any case, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 the United States decided to use the Resolution once
again. On February 27, 2022, eleven members of the Security Council
voted in favor of the U.S.-sponsored resolution, while Russia opposed
and three other members (China, India and the United Arab Emirates)
abstained [11]. The Special Session resulted in the adoption of
Resolution ES-11/1 by a large majority – 141 in favor, 5 against and 35
abstentions. However, the Resolution did not go so far as some of the
prior Uniting for Peace Resolutions [5]. It did not call for sanctions,
peacekeepers, or collective use of force. But it characterized Russian
invasion as a crime under international law.
This finding has already had an effect in the Ukraine v. Russia case,
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where the International Court for Justice drew upon Resolution ES-11/1
to support the ordering of provisional measures to protect the rights of
Ukraine from being subject to the use of force by Russia based upon
false allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention.
In conclusion it is worth saying that the General Assembly’s resort
to the Uniting for Peace Resolution for the first time since 1982 reflects
the failure of the Security Council to fulfill the main objectives of the
United Nations. When the Security Council is paralyzed again by the
veto, states shifted to the General Assembly. However, General
Assembly’s powers are limited to making recommendations as
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses
case [2]. The General Assembly lacks the ability to take enforcement
action, which is exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. So such
a resolutions issued under the Uniting for Peace mechanism can only
play a supportive role in condemning invasion and causing more legal
and political pressure on the Russian Federation.
References:
1. 377 (V). Uniting for Peace : Resolution of 03.11.1950.
URL: https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/otherdocs/GAres377A(v).pd
f (date of access: 03.11.2022).
2. Advisory opinion of The International Court of Justice of
20.07.1962 in Certain expenses of the united nations. URL:
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/49/049-19620720-ADV-
01-00-EN.pdf (date of access: 03.11.2022).
3. Andrew J. Carswell. Unblocking the UN security council: the
uniting for peace resolution. Oxfrod Academic. Journal of conflict &
security law. URL: https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/18/3/453/86-
4898 (date of access: 03.11.2022).
4. Christian Tomuschat. Uniting for peace. United Nations
Audiovisual Library of International Law. URL: https://legal.un.org/
avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf (date of access: 03.11.2022).
5. ES-11/1. Aggression against Ukraine : Resolution of 02.03.
2022. URL: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N22/
293/36/PDF/N2229336.pdf?OpenElement (date of access: 03.11.2022).
6. Larry D. Johnson. “Uniting for peace”: does it still serve any
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useful purpose? | american journal of international law | cambridge
core. Cambridge Core. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals
/american-journal-of-international-law/article/uniting-for-peace-does-
it-still-serve-any-useful-purpose/90BD2F453491596D637D6C94DE-
621953 (date of access: 03.11.2022).
7. Michael P. Scharf. Power shift: the return of the uniting for
peace resolution. Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Scholarly Commons | Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Research. URL: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=3153&context=faculty_publications (date of access:
03.11.2022).
8. Michael Ramsden. Uniting for peace: the emergency special
session on ukraine. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL. URL: https://harvardilj.org/2022/04/uniting-for-peace-the-
emergency-special-session-on-ukraine/ (date of access: 03.11.2022).
9. Resolution 498 (V) : Resolution of 01.02.2022. URL:
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0
/744/45/PDF/NR074445.pdf?OpenElement (date of access: 03.11.
2022).
10. Resolution 997 : Resolution of 02.11.1956. URL:
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/208414 (date of access: 03.11.2022).
11. Ukraine: vote on draft “uniting for peace” resolution* : what's
in blue : security council report. Security Council Report. URL:
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/ukraine-
vote-on-draft-uniting-for-peace-resolution.php (date of access:
03.11.2022).
12. United Nations Charter : Statute of 26.06.1945.
URL: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text (date of
access: 03.11.2022).

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