Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

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Radiation Physics and Chemistry

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/radphyschem

Radiological Impact Assessment for hypothetical accident scenarios of a

proposed pressurized water reactor using HotSpot code
M.A. Al-Aqeel a,b ,∗, Ibrahim A. Alrammah c
a Physics Department, Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMISU), P.O. Box 90950, Riyadh, 11623, Saudi Arabia
b
Physics Department, Oliver Lodge Laboratory, University of Liverpool, Oxford Street, Liverpool L69 7ZE, United Kingdom
c
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: The radiological risks following two severe hypothetical accidents at a proposed pressurized water reactor
Nuclear power plant (PWR) in Umm Huwayd in the Eastern Coast of Saudi Arabia, have been determined using the health physics
Nuclear accident code HotSpot 3.1.2, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA. In this paper the general
Radiological impact assessment
plume dispersion code was used, the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) were estimated and the direction
HotSpot
of propagation was included the two accident scenarios for various stability classes A, B, C, D, E and F. At
Pressurized water reactor (PWR)
a closer distance to the release point the TEDE peaked faster for class A in both accident scenarios. The
maximum TEDE values received by the NPP site workers, member of public and the permanent resident were
estimated for both accident scenarios at a distance of 0.12 km, 4 km and 80 km from the released source point,
respectively. For the two accident scenarios at two distances (0.10 km and 80 km) from the release point, the
TEDE values were evaluated for different pathways (inhalation, submersion, ground shine and resuspension).
The outcomes showed that for both scenarios, at 0,10 km, the submersion pathway is the dominant intake
followed by inhalation and at 80 km distance, the most dominant pathway was found to be (inhalation)
followed by (submersion). The effective release height of 10 m, 20, 30 m and 40 m was simulated and found
to have inverse relation with TEDE and the ground deposition. Inversion layer height also was evaluated.

1. Introduction scenarios, and the radiological consequences of these releases must be

National plans are being implemented in the KSA to enable do-
mestic green energy plus the other existing national energy resources,
especially with the increase of population consumption. As during the
last 10 years, the population of the KSA is increasing with growth
rate of 21%, which is expected in 2030 to be 38.5 million with a
growth rate of 10% (Anon, 2020a). As a result, the demand on the
electricity and water will increase. This made the Government consider
of alternative solutions to support the growth such as the nuclear power
plants (NPPs), as announced by the official royal statement in 2009.
Hence, the KSA has proposed 16 NPPs to be built with 17 GWe power
generation, to address an increasing demand for domestic electrical
energy (Anon, 2020a).
The siting of locations where these NPPs will be built must be based
on several factors and criteria to ensure that the selected sites are the
most suitable with respect to safety, environmental impact, and the
economics of power generation and use. The normal operation of an
NPP will result in the release of small amounts of radioactivity to the
environment, and large releases are expected for hypothetical accident
assessed. According to the IAEA, the estimation of the concentration
of radioactive material released during normal operation and accident
conditions is one of the primary elements in the site selection of new
NPPs.
In this paper, an NPP is assumed to be constructed in the eastern
coast of the KSA and the radiological impact for hypothetical accident
scenarios will be assessed. This determination will be based on a
radiological health impact assessment for the surrounding people and
environment. This includes an estimation of the total effective dose
equivalent received by public around the nominated site as well as the
ground deposition.
2. Atmospheric dispersion models
Estimating the Radiological Environmental Impact Assessments
(REIA), based on mathematical modeling of the dispersion and dose
uptake processes, is known as the predictive method. It is the analysis of
the impact of radioactive discharges on the surrounding population and

∗ Corresponding author at: Physics Department, Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMISU), P.O. Box 90950, Riyadh, 11623, Saudi Arabia.
E-mail address: maaqeel@imamu.edu.sa (M.A. Al-Aqeel).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.radphyschem.2022.110717
Received 28 April 2022; Received in revised form 3 December 2022; Accepted 7 December 2022
Available online 9 December 2022
0969-806X/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah
the environment which can be done empirically as well. However, as no
PWR operating in KSA yet therefore the predictive method will only be
the possible option in the current work. There are several atmospheric
dispersion codes, such as: HPAC (Vogel et al., 2022), HYSPLIT (Draxler
and Rolph, 2010), SNAP (Jones, 2001) and HotSpot which can be
used to analyze the likely deposited activity, air concentration, ground
contamination and radioactive dose to the population under a real or
hypothetical nuclear accident scenario.
Contamination dispersion by assuming either a puff or particle
dispersion, can be simulated using the HYSPLIT (Hybrid Single-Particle
Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory) software. A Lagrangian framework
calculations are made for the diffusion. The calculations for the concen-
trations are done on a fixed (Eulerian) grid. A gridded meteorological
data defined at regular time intervals is required in HYSPLIT software.
The DTRA (Defense Threat Reduction Agency) has developed a
computer code called the HPAC (Hazard Prediction and Assessment Ca-
pability), to provide a predicting means for the atmospheric transport
and dispersion of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,
Explosive) materials, and their effects on public. This code works on
three main steps: a source term, dispersion from the source and the
effects on human (Vogel et al., 2022).
Another software for modeling the NPPs called SNAP (Symbolic
Nuclear Analysis Package). It is integrated applications designed to
simplify the process of performing engineering analysis. It is developed
by Applied Programming Technology (APT), Inc. and is sponsored by
the NRC. It provides a licensing analysis code called the RADionu-
clide, Transport, Removal, and Dose Estimation (RADTRAD), which
has a graphical user interface with pre- and post-processor capabilities
allowing users to develop RADTRAD input decks. It helps estimating
the criteria needed for siting NPPs, such as boundary radiation doses
at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Low Population Zone
(LPZ) and to assess the occupational radiation doses in the control room
(CR) and /or Emergency Offsite Facility for various loss-of-coolant
accidents (LOCA) and non-LOCA design basis accidents (DBAs). Several
researches conducted using this software such as in Hsu et al. (2017).
Many models have been developed in recent years to deal with the
evaluation of dispersion of effluents released to the atmosphere under
a variety of flow conditions and terrain characteristics. Models vary
in complexity from simple box models to complex models involving
numerical solutions of full set of flow equations. The selection of
a model for particular situation is also guided by considerations of
output requirements such as accuracy, computational capacity and
time (ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, 2008). For instance,
Complex terrain, Eddy diffusivity, Gaussian Plume Model (GPM) are
all models used for atmospheric dispersion studies, of these the latest
is the one used in this work. This model is simple in formulation and
use, as it provides reasonable accuracy in practical dispersion esti-
mates (ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, 2008). This program
provides a first-order approximation of the radiation effects associated
with the atmospheric release of radioactive materials. The HotSpot
program was created to equip emergency response personnel and plan-
ners with a fast, field-portable set of software tools for evaluating
incidents involving radioactive material. The software is also used for
safety-analysis of facilities handling radioactive material. This program
is designed for short-range (less than 10 km), and short-term (less
than a few hours) predictions. The HotSpot code use the atmospheric
dispersion Gaussian plume model (GPM) for all assessment, the module
calculates the 95th percentile of the dose distribution for up to 20
radial centerline distances in each of 16 wind direction sectors (direc-
tion dependent), and all 16 sectors (direction independent) (Homann
and Aluzzi, 2020a). It consists of four main computational modules:
radioactive source-terms generated by explosions, radioactive source-
terms generated by fires, resuspension of radioactive material, and
a Gaussian dispersion model to estimate the transport of radioactive
material in a continuous plume (puff) release (Fullwood, 2000).
2
Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717
HotSpot was used in several works. For example, 17 papers have
used it in estimating the radiological effects due to hypothetical radi-
ological dispersal devices (RDDs) (Alves et al., 2019; Andrade et al.,
2020a; Biancotto et al., 2020; Brum et al., 2021; Bulhosa et al., 2020;
Costa et al., 2019; Silva et al., 2021; Di Giovanni et al., 2014; Jeong
et al., 2013; Kamboj et al., 2009; Oliveira et al., 2020; Anon, 2020a;
Shin and Kim, 2009; Sohier and Hardeman, 2006; Thiessen et al.,
2009) or improvised nuclear devices (INDs) (Lima et al., 2019); nine
papers used it in calculations related to nuclear power plants (NPPs)
(Andrade et al., 2020b; Bogorad et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2016; Carestia
et al., 2016; Fairuz and Sahadath, 2020; Gyamfi et al., 2020; Aghdam
et al., 2018; Malizia et al., 2021; Shiuli et al., 2022); nine papers used
it in evaluations related to research reactors (Anvari and Safarzadeh,
2012; Birikorang et al., 2015; Dahia et al., 2022; Hussain et al., 2012;
Muswema et al., 2015; Raza and Iqbal, 2005; Sadeghi et al., 2013;
Trabelsi et al., 2020; Xoubi, 2020); seven papers used it in analyses re-
lated to other nuclear or radiological facilities or applications, such as:
a cyclotron facility (Cicoria et al., 2017), a hospital (Silva et al., 2021),
a reprocessing plant (Connan et al., 2014), a radioisotope production
facility (Elkhatib et al., 2021), a cement production industry (Latini
et al., 2013), a car-borne gamma spectrometry (Dowdall et al., 2012),
transportation of spent nuclear fuel (Cao and Cui, 2019); and six papers
used it in methodological studies (Cao et al., 2020; Finn et al., 2016;
Kim et al., 2013; Mandel et al., 2017; Shamsuddin et al., 2017; Silva
and Okamoto, 2016).
3. Methodology
Hypothetical accidents scenarios in the proposed PWR located at
the eastern region of KSA, was preformed using HotSpot 3.1.2 health
physics simulation software. Two accident scenarios (Table 1), and the
corresponding estimated radioactive releases (Table 2), were consid-
ered in this study. The releases are assumed to be reasonable worst
cases as severe accidents with occurring probabilities between 1 in
500,000/y to 1 in 2.5 million/y. In this work the most severe acci-
dent scenario considered ACS1 and ACS2 were simulated, which is
unmitigated Short Term Station Blackout (STSBO) and unmitigated
STSBO with Thermally-Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture (TIS-
GTR). Combining those release scenarios (or source term) for an ac-
cident at the proposed nuclear power plant location with the largest
potential impact on the land (McMahon et al., 2013). For helping the
authorities making the right decision and prepare should a radiological
accidents occur, the exposure contours (red, green, blue) were defined
as aiding tool in the planning stage, based on the info reported in Table
3 in Valentin (2005).
The proposed reactor is located in Umm Huwayd with coordinates
(25.2878, 50.5031) see Fig. 1, in the eastern region of KSA. The eastern
region is the largest geographical region in the Kingdom, and it is a
desert plain that extends from the shore of the Arabian Gulf to the Al-
Dahna desert. Its length extends approximately 1200 kilometers from
the Kuwaiti border in the north to the Empty Quarter desert, which
is the largest continuous sandy desert in the world. It occupies This
desert is the southern part of the country. The eastern region occupies
an area of 77,850 km, which represents 26% of the Kingdom’s area.
The eastern region shares common borders with Kuwait in the north,
Qatar and Bahrain in the east, and the United Arab Emirates and Oman
in the south. The eastern region is characterized by a moderate climate
in general, where the weather is usually clear and the air is fresh. In
the period between the months of May and August, the temperature
during this period reaches 46 degrees Celsius, during which the weather
is hot and humid. As for the winter, which falls during the period from
November to February, the temperature sometimes reaches 8 degrees
Celsius with some rain that is rarely heavy (Anon, 2021b). The wind
observation data near the reactor site, for the last fifty years (1973–
2021), is used from Anon (2021a) to calculate the wind speed and
direction in our scenarios. The data contains the direction angle from
M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

Table 1
Description of accident scenarios modeled in this study.
Source-term identifier Description (release scenario) Probability
of occurrence
Unmitigated short term station blackout (STSBO).
In this accident, the station loses all sources of AC power,
ACS1 1 in 500,000/y
but battery backups will function safety systems
for around four hours until the exhaustion of batteries.
Unmitigated STSBO with thermally-induced steam generator tube rupture (TISGTR).
This accident is of a very low-probability. While the reactor core is overheating and
ACS2 1 in 2.5 million/y
boiling off the existing water, very hot steam and hydrogen flow out and cause a rupture
to steam generator tube (SGT). This is a ‘‘bypass event,’’ in which radioactive sources
released to the environment without a structural failure in the ‘‘containment’’.

Table 2
Estimated radioactivity amounts released to the environment through atmospheric dispersion due to two accident scenarios
(McMahon et al., 2013).
Nuclide Group Half-life Estimated activity released to the environment (GBq)
ACS1 ACS2
Kr-85 Noble gas 10.7y 2.00E+07 3.00E+07
Kr-85 m Noble gas 4.48 h 6.00E+08 7.00E+08
Kr-87 Noble gas 76.3 min 1.00E+09 1.00E+09
Kr-88 Noble gas 2.48 h 2.00E+09 2.00E+09
Rb-86 Alkali metal 18.63d 1.00E+04 4.00E+04
Mo-99 Alkali metal 66.02 h 0.00E+00 8.00E+06
Te-127 Metalloid 9.35 h 2.00E+06 3.00E+06
Te-127 m Metalloid 109d 3.00E+05 4.00E+05
Te-129 Metalloid 69.6 min 8.00E+06 9.00E+06
Te-129 m Metalloid 33.6d 1.00E+06 2.00E+06
Te-131 m Metalloid 30 h 4.00E+06 5.00E+06
Te-132 Metalloid 78.2 h 4.00E+07 4.00E+07
Sb-127 Metalloid 3.89d 2.00E+06 3.00E+06
Sb-129 Metalloid 4.31 h 8.00E+06 9.00E+06
I-131 Halogen 8.04d 3.00E+07 4.00E+07
I-132 Halogen 2.30 h 4.00E+07 5.00E+07
I-133 Halogen 20.8 h 5.00E+07 8.00E+07
I-134 Halogen 52.6 min 6.00E+07 9.00E+07
I-135 Halogen 6.61 h 5.00E+07 7.00E+07
Xe-133 Noble gas 5.25d 4.00E+09 5.00E+09
Xe-135 Noble gas 9.09 h 1.00E+09 1.00E+09
Cs-134 Alkali metal 2.06y 8.00E+05 3.00E+06
Cs-136 Alkali metal 13.2d 2.00E+05 9.00E+05
Cs-137 Alkali metal 30y 5.00E+05 2.00E+06
Total activity released (GBq) 8.92E+09 1.01E+10

which the wind is blowing, and the speed rate (𝑚𝑝ℎ). The hourly
wind direction varies throughout the year, prevalently blowing from
N direction on September, as shown in the wind rose Fig. 2. In the
two accident scenarios considered, it is assumed that the releases will
follow Gaussian plume model. The average wind speed was assumed of
3.30 m/s and the wind directing is 10◦ from the North. The receptor
height was assumed as 1.5 m and the breathing rate is 3.33E−04 m3 /s.
4. Results and discussion
Fig. 3 shows the plume centerline TEDE ((Sv) as a function of
downwind distance for ACS1 accident scenario. Different curves in this
figure represent various stability classes: A: for very unstable weather
conditions; B: moderately unstable; C: slightly unstable; D: neutral; E:
slightly stable; and F: moderately stable. It shows that class A (very
unstable weather) results in a faster TEDE peak at a closer distance to
the release point, followed by classes: B, C, D, E and F, respectively.
Also, these classes are sorted by the same descending order in terms
of maximum TEDE value. The same behavior is also shown for ACS2
accident scenario as in Fig. 4. Comparing the simulation results of ACS1
and ACS2 (Figs. 3 and 4, respectively), it is shown that, as expected in
Table 2, that ACS1 results in higher TEDE (Sv) and ground deposition
( )
kBg∕m2 .
Assuming the release will last for 7 days, Table 3 summarizes the
simulation results of HotSpot for the two accident scenarios considered.
It shows the values of TEDE (Sv) for ACS1 and ACS2 at various
distances from the release point and arrival times. It reveals that the
maximum TEDE (Sv) was found at around 0.12 km from the released
source point for both scenarios, in which very acute TEDE of around
1.70E+02 Sv and 2.00E+02 Sv will be received by a worker in the
perimeter of the NPP site due to ACS1 and ACS2, respectively. At 4 km
from the release point, which a maximum exposed member of public
could exist, TEDE of around 1.3 Sv and 1.5 Sv will be received due to
ACS1 and ACS2, respectively. Beyond 80 km from the release point,
which a maximum exposed permanent resident could exist, TEDE of
around 13mSv and 16mSv will be received due to ACS1 and ACS2,
respectively. Table 4 (ARPANSA, 2019; Markina et al., 2017) gives
suggested generic criteria for protective actions and other emergency
response actions to lessen the stochastic effects risks.
Table 5 shows the committed dose (Sv) for different pathways
(inhalation, submersion, ground shine and resuspension) of the two ac-
cident scenarios at two distances (0.10 km and 80 km) from the release
point. It reveals that for both scenarios, at 0,10 km, the dominant intake
pathway is submersion, followed by inhalation. It is worthy to mention
that the contribution of submersion and inhalation pathways decreases
with increasing the distance from the release point, in which the contri-
bution of ground shine and re-suspension pathways increase, although
the dominance is kept for submersion and inhalation contribution to
the total committed dose. This agrees with the findings of Dahia et al.
(2022). At 80 km distance from the NPP nominated site, it is found that
(inhalation) is the most dominant pathway in case of ACS2, followed
by (submersion).

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M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

Fig. 1. Google Earth view of the nominated site.

Fig. 2. Wind rose at Umm Huwayd showing the average wind direction and speed during September for the last 50 years.

Investigating the impact of effective release height (burst height),
Figs. 3 and 5–7 show different scenarios assuming effective release
height of 10 m, 20, 30 m and 40 m, respectively. It is revealed that
increasing the effective release height leads to decreasing the TEDE
and the ground deposition. This confirms that higher effective release
height leads to lower integrated concentrations at ground level. If the
effective release height cannot be estimated or calculated, the actual
physical release height (height of the stack) or zero for ground-level
release would be assumed. This will almost yield a conservative esti-
mate, i.e., higher radiation doses for all downwind receptors (Homann
and Aluzzi, 2020b).
Inversion layer height elevation at which the temperature gradient
is inverted (temperature to increase with increasing altitude). The
inversion layer represents a blanket that limits the vertical mixing of
the released radioactive. The region below the inversion layer is also
to as the mixing layer (Homann and Aluzzi, 2020b).

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M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

Fig. 3. ACS1 assuming: 10 m effective release height, no inversion and no rainout.

Fig. 4. ACS2 assuming: 10 m effective release height, no inversion and no rainout.

Fig. 5. ACS1 assuming: 20 m effective release height, no inversion and no rainout.

Fig. 6. ACS1 assuming: 30 m effective release height, no inversion and no rainout.

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M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

Fig. 7. ACS1 assuming: 40 m effective release height, no inversion and no rainout.

Fig. 8. ACS1 assuming: 10 m effective release height, no inversion, and wet deposition with rain rate of 10 mm/hr or rainout coefficient of 1.00E−03 1/s.

Table 3 classes A, B, C, D, E and F. The results showed that among these classes
TEDE (Sv) for two accident scenarios at various distances from the source.
the TEDE value was higher in class A for both ACS1 and ACS2. The
Distance (km) Arrival time (hr:min) TEDE (Sv)
TEDE values also were estimated for different group of people (NPP site
ACS1 ACS2
workers, public members and permanent resident) around the released
0.03 <00:01 3.40E−02 3.70E−02 source point at distances of 0.12 km, 4 km and 80 km respectively. The
0.1 <00:01 1.70E+02 2.00E+02
0.2 0:01 1.40E+02 1.50E+02
amount of TEDE received by the first group found to be 1.70E+02 Sv
0.3 0:01 8.00E+01 9.00E+01 and 2.00E+02 Sv resulting from ACS1 and ACS2 respectively. While
0.4 0:02 5.10E+01 5.80E+01 the public member at 4 km distance will be exposed to a maximum
0.5 0:02 3.60E+01 4.10E+01
value of 1.3 Sv and 1.5 Sv resulting from ACS1 and ACS2 respectively.
0.6 0:03 2.70E+01 3.00E+01
0.7 0:03 2.10E+01 2.30E+01 The last group, permanent resident, which will be at 80 km distance
0.8 0:04 1.70E+01 1.90E+01 away from the released source point, will receive 13 mSv and 16 mSv
0.9 0:04 1.40E+01 1.60E+01
of TEDE values resulted from ACS1 and ACS2 respectively, which is
1 0:05 1.20E+01 1.30E+01
2 0:10 3.80E+00 4.30E+00 below the annual regularity limits. Different pathways of receiving the
4 0:20 1.30E+00 1.50E+00 TEDE (inhalation, submersion, ground shine and resuspension) were
6 0:30 7.20E−01 8.20E−01 evaluated at 0.10 km and 80 km distance away from the released
8 0:40 4.80E−01 5.40E−01
10 0:50 3.40E−01 3.90E−01
source point for both accident scenarios. The most dominant pathway
20 1:41 1.20E−01 1.40E−01 found to be submersion followed by inhalation at 0.10 km distance
40 3:22 4.20E−02 5.00E−02 and at 80 km the inhalation comes first then submersion. The relation
60 5:03 2.10E−02 2.60E−02
between the TEDE and ground deposition at various effective release
80 6:44 1.30E−02 1.60E−02
height of 10 m, 20 m, 30 m and 40 m were investigated and found
to be in an inverse relationship. The inversion layer height was the
last studied and presented effect in this work. To conclude, proper
Investigating the effect of wet depositions by comparing Figs. 3, 8 means of communication should be in place to alert and inform the
and 9, in which the assumptions are: no rain, 10 mm/hr and 20 mm/hr
surrounding inhabitants in risk. To evacuate the endangered people,
rain rate, respectively. It is confirmed that higher rainout coefficient
appropriate modes of transportation should be in place. Some new
leads to higher deposition and TEDE.
shelter houses should also be built to accommodate the evacuated
5. Conclusions people. Annual census around the risky zones, can be conducted to
keep an accurate track of the number of inhabitants, along with the
The radiological risk of the proposed (PWR) has been assessed by distribution of critical group so that estimation of required number of
modeling two hypothetical accidental scenarios for different stability vehicles or other measures can be done properly.

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M.A. Al-Aqeel and I.A. Alrammah Radiation Physics and Chemistry 204 (2023) 110717

Table 4
Suggested protective actions for each affected zone.
Intervention level Protective actions
(in terms of projected effective dose)
100 mSv in the first 7 days Immediate evacuation; permanent relocation; iodine thyroid blocking
50 mSv in the first 7 days Evacuation
Sheltering; prevention of inadvertent ingestion; restrictions on food, milk
and drinking water and restrictions on the food chain and water supply;
10 mSv in the first 7 days
restrictions on commodities other than food; contamination control;
decontamination; registration; reassurance of the public

Table 5
Committed dose for different pathways of two scenarios at two distances from the release point.
Scenario Committed dose at 0.10 km (Sv) Committed dose at 80 km (Sv)
ACS1 ACS2 ACS1 ACS2
3.26E+01 4.54E+01 5.00E−03 7.00E−03
Inhalation
18.82% 23.25% 39.57% 43.54%
1.29E+02 1.31E+02 5.87E−03 6.13E−03
Submersion
74.45% 67.08% 46.46% 38.13%
1.14E+01 1.85E+01 1.72E−03 2.88E−03
Ground Shine
6.58% 9.47% 13.61% 17.91%
2.61E−01 3.89E−01 4.46E−05 6.71E−05
Resuspension
0.15% 0.20% 0.35% 0.42%
Total 1.73E+02 1.95E+02 1.26E−02 1.61E−02

Fig. 9. ACS1 assuming: 10 m effective release height, no inversion, and wet deposition with rain rate of 25 mm/hr or rainout coefficient of 2.00E−03 1/s.

Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
influence the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
No data was used for the research described in the article.
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