VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, v.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot

seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the
end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a
recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second,
the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

On July 2, 2002, incumbent officials of the Puerto Princesa convened

themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of
petitioner Socrates as Mayor of Puerto Princesa. The officials designated
respondent PRA Chairman Punong Brgy. Mark David Hagedorn (Hagedorn). The
PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall and asked COMELEC to schedule a recall election.

On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed a petition to nullify and deny due course the
application for recall election. However, COMELEC ruled to give due course to
the recall election and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in
the recall election but several group filed petitions to disqualify him in the recall
election and cancel his certificate of candidacy. The petitions were all anchored on
the ground that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post.” Eventually, COMELEC declared him qualified.

ISSUE:

Whether Hagedon is qualified to run in the recall elections

HELD:

YES.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
 This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.”

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts:

1. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more
than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three-term limit rule.

2. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek

immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election
is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term

following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately
after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.

Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto
Princesa. His candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30,
2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from
seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections. Hence, he is qualified tp run in the next elections.
 REVIEW/EVOLUTION OF CASES ON THE SO-CALLED “THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERM LIMIT RULE

CASE BRIEF FACTS and DOCTRINE/RULING

CASE OF A VICE-MAYOR WHO SUCCEEDED THE DECEASED
MAYOR/ASSUMPTION BY OPERATION OF LAW
Borja, Jr. v. Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in
COMELEC, G.R. No. 1988 for a term ending in 1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by
133495, September 3, operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.
1998
Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two
more terms, from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also
a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the
ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be
ineligible to serve for another term.

COMELEC eventually declared Capco eligible to run for

mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by

operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose
of the three-term limit

HELD:

No.

Capco is still eligible to run for mayor-elect.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again
as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the
 office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of
the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of
chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should
not be counted in the application of any term limit.

INVOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT PREVENTS THE APPLICATION OF

THE THREE CONSECUTIVE TERM LIMIT RULE
Lonzanida v. Comelec, Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two
G.R. No. 135150, July consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
28, 1999 Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He assumed
office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in
1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez
who filed an election protest. COMELEC ordered Lonzanida
to vacate his post.

In May 11, 1998, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of

candidacy for mayor of San Antonio but was later on
disqualified. COMELEC found that he has already served 3
consecutive terms and he is therefore disqualified to run for the
4th term.

ISSUE:

Whether Lonzanida is qualified to run as mayor in the 1998

elections

HELD:

YES.

For the three-term limit rule to apply, the following

requirements must be present: 1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and

served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio
Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May
1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998
when he was ordered to vacate the post.

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are
absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that
he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption
of office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term
for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution
of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to
run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
RECALL ELECTION
Adormeo v. Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during
COMELEC, G.R. No. terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections,
147927, February 4, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s
2002 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May
2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001.

When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was

challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor
for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit
rule.

ISSUE:

Whether an assumption to office through a recall election

should be considered as one term in applying the three-term
limit rule

HELD:

NO.

Tagala cannot be construed as having been elected and served

for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998 elections
was considered by this Court as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years,
private respondent therein lived as a private citizen.
EFFECT OF CONVERSION OF A MUNICIPALITY INTO A CITY
Latasa v. COMELEC, Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
G.R. No. 154829, del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During his
December 10, 2003 term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component
city, to be known as the City of Digos. This event also marked
the end of petitioner’s tenure as mayor of the Municipality of
Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter,
petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as
mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the
city mayor.

In 2001, Latasa filed a certificate of candidacy for city mayor

for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is
eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for
the position of city mayor.

COMELEC eventually disqualified him in view of the

application of the three-consecutive term limit rule

ISSUE:

Whether Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of

mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos

HELD:

NO.

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be

allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article
X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in
that it limits the range of choice of the people.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running

again in for same local government post, unless two conditions
concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and
2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence

separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This
does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal
mayor would now be construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as
that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the municipality are the same as those in the city. These
inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive
for nine years.

This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his

office as municipal mayor since the said office has been
deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very
instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also
assumed office as city mayor.

Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a

 short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner
Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties
and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

EVENTUAL DISQUALIFICATION AFTER THE SERVICE OF A TERM

Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Ong and Alegre are candidates who filed certificates of
NO. 163295, January candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the
23, 2006 May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent
mayor.

In January 2004, Alegre filed with COMELEC a petition to

disqualify Ong predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule as he run during the 1995, 1998 and 2001 elections.

During the May 1998 elections, Ong won and was proclaimed
as the winner. However, Alegre filed an election protest. The
RTC ruled that Alegre was the duly elected mayor in that 1998
elections albeit the decision only came out in July 4, 2001
when Ong had already fully served his term.

COMELEC dismissed Alegre's petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Ong is qualified to run in the May 2004 elections

HELD:

NO.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials

to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (a)
that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having

been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995
and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1,
1995 - June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms
in full.

The controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,

albeit there can also be no quibbling that Ong ran for mayor of
the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation
initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San
Vicente.

The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or

 not Francis's assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive three-term limit rule.

We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,

"service for the full term", and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed
by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring
local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.

While the RTC has ruled that it was Alegre who won the 1998
mayoralty race, it must be stressed, was without practical and
legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of
the contested office has expired. Ong's contention that he was
only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a
duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a
full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
EFFECT OF THE PERIOD OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Aldovino v. Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said
COMELEC, G.R. No. office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
184836, December 23, 2004-2007.
2009
In September 2005, during his third term of office, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive
suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and
Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same

position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by petitioners
on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.

COMELEC ruled that preventive suspension is an effective

interruption because it renders the suspended public official
unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such
term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term
limit rule.

ISSUE:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an

interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term
limit rule

HELD:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not

interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA
7160).

Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government

Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or the
Ombudsman Act – is an interim remedial measure to address
the situation of an official who have been charged
administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for
eventual guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local

Government Code "when the evidence of guilt is strong and
given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence."

Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is

imposed after a valid information (that requires a finding of
probable cause) has been filed in court.

Under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the

judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong;
and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended

official is barred from performing the functions of his office
and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not
vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of
guilt or liability. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the
exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule

demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
 exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within
the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one
since no vacancy exists.

A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or

the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some
involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from
exercising the functions of his office for a time without
forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a
term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the
standard to determine effective interruption of term under the
three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in
implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions
when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving
a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of
the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-
sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
SC SET GUIDELINES (SUMMARY OF RULES)
Abundo v. COMELEC, Abundo ran for mayor in four (4) successive elections - 2001,
G.R. No. 201716, 2004, 2007, and 2010. In 2001 and 2007, he emerged winner
January 8, 2013 and assumed the post of mayor. In the 2004 election, however,
Abundo's rival, Jose Torres, was initially proclaimed winner.
Abundo protested Torres' proclamation and succeeded in the
case until he assumed the mayoralty position on May 9, 2006
or for a period of a little over one year until June 30, 2007.

In the 2010 election, the rivalry between Abundo and Torres

again ensued. Torres filed a disqualification case against
Abundo on the basis of the three-term limit.

COMELEC eventually disqualified Abundo.

ISSUE:

Whether Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive

terms

HELD:

NO.

The Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that

the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of
the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004

election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
was the duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for
the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-
term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied.

However, the facts of the case clearly point to an

involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007
term. There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-
2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election
protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only
on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for
a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently,
it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the
entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten
months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo
cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold
office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert
title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold
such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election
winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration,
following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected
candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over
one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally
contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3)
years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-
2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served
less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which

Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to
be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s
continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

In its decision, the SC also listed down the prevailing

jurisprudence on issues affecting the consecutiveness of terms
and or involuntary interruption. These are:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position
and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the
rules on succession under the Local Government Code, then
his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the
replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and
statutory provision that service cannot be counted n the
application of any term limit. If the official runs again for the
same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher
office, then his succession to said position is by operation of
law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption.
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive
terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could
be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he
had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up
to the recall election, a private citizen.
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself,
work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service.
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as
the elective officer's continued stay and entitlement to the
office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period.
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective
position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he
loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed. The break or interruption need not be for a full term
of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an
interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said
decision becomes final after said official had served the full
term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat,
should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration
of the term.