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COMMENT
AL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

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ears jet 405 page

JULY - AUGUST - 1958

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COMMENT
ISSUED BY

DIRI:('TOR :\TE OF FI,IGIIT 5 :11'ETl-

R .C.A .F . NEADQUARTERS . OTTAWA . CANADA

HE number of recent incidents wherein oxygen has been assessed

as a cause or contributing factor is alarming . It is equally alarming
STAFF to observe that most of these occurrences have been traced to human
carelessness . Poor maintenance practices and inadequate aircrew
checks of oxygen systems indicate a growing disrespect for the import-
ante of this vital equipment.

Jl'LT ~ :1l'Gl ~'I' ) 9;, $ Editor-in-Chief In the early stages of RCAF jet experience, oxygen problems were
Squadron Leader Georye Sheahan anticipated and combatted by an aggressive indoctrination program.
Serious accidents did occur, but as each individual became aware of the
Eaitor implications of an oxygen malfunction, the frequency of such accidents
,' Il 1 T h; N T S Mr . Iack E. Nugent diminished until they virtually disappeared. Now, it seems, the cycle
is starting again.
Circulaiion

Flyinq Officer Peter Bremner In most of the recent confirmed oxygen cases we have been lucky-
aircraft and crew have returned intact . But can we afford to rely on
Arlists luck? Can we be sure that none of our obscure fatal accidents were
Mr, Jean A. Dubord relafed to oxygen problems? It is not an overstatement to say that
Editorial . 1 every oxygen malfunction is potentially lethal .
Mr . Harry K. Hames
ATC Clears Jet 405 2 ' Edilorial Assistant It is up to you-technician, supervisor, aircrew or commander-to
ensure that oxygen equipment is treated with the respect that it deserves
Good Show 5 Mrs . Nancy L, Chenier
in order that these potentially fatal situations will not arise. The
Near Miss 6 knowledge, equipment and training fatilities needed to eliminate
oxygen malfunctions are available in the RCAF. Faulty workmanship,
10 Rules for Flight Safety il inadequate supervision, and incomplete or irregular aircrew checks of
OFFICIAL INFORMATIQN
both aircraft installations and personal oxygen equipment are therefore
The Big Squeeze 12
The printinq of this publication has been np~
inexcusable.
Thrust 'n' Parry . . . . . . . . 16 proved by the Minister, Depertmenl ol
National Defence . Contributions are wel- The hazards are known and it is up to you to avoid them .
come, as are comments and cnttcisms .
Heads-Up Flying 18 Address all correspondence to the Editor,
Fhqht Comntent, Duectorate of FligF,t Safety,
19
n
ACAF Headquarters, Oltawa, Ontano . The
Hydraulics Edftor reserves lhe rtqht lo make any
chanyes in the manuscripl which he believes
Arrivals and Departures 21 will improve the rnaterial wtthoul altermq
the iniended meaning . Service orqanua-
tions may reprint articles from Flight
Commeni wilhout further authorizstion .
Non-Service orqanuatians must obtain
ofiicial permission in wrdiny from RCAF
* * * Headquariers before reprintiny any of the
contents of this puhhcation . The optnrons
expressed m Fliyht Comment are the personal
views ol conlnbutinq writers . They do not J . J. JORDAN, GROUP CAPTAIN
necessarily reflect the offrcial opinion of the
Aoyal Canadian Air Force . Unless other-
DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY
wise stated, contents should nol be con-
strued as requlations, orders or drrechves .

;" :uawnro C~octrre . CV .G ., O.A ., D .S .I' ., f~uccn's Prmtrr and Cuntculler ut 5tatiunciti Otta~ea, 1 :~a8
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~- Proper could have been avoided .

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thi s ever progressing environment,
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, evaluation a n d development of the a r t can be Problems, y e s , I w o n d e r how many are
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~1 achieved o n 1 y if there is ad~quat~ liaisor. b~ _ s~lf-i .^.flicted? Here we have acouple of eager

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tween pilot and controller, Do you accept YOUR beavers out for a spot of practice flymg . Once
\,a 1 ,~ ; . ,
5~~~ full responsibility as a member of the team? again, the flight is carefully prepared, clear-

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ance obtained a n d followed to t h e lette r --but

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Clearance Limitatiuns where to? Why, Happy Valley, naturally!

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\~ \\o\\\\\\\\\90\\\\\\\\\~ Admittedly it's one of the busiest terminals in
~~~~~~ \~ the country, but we know such nice people there,
'' `~~ ~ ~\ ~ ~ Let us consider a few incidents to see where
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\\ . , \ good team work could pay off, We have urgent As t h e flight progresses, and w e listen to
~~,~~\ \ business at Shangri-La . (I wonder why pilots the R~T, terminal conditions begin to emerge,

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, , ~ :~~~ \ always have urgent business? ) The weather is The weather appear s to be border)rne V R -IFR,
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checked and the flight planned to the very last and traffic seems to be building up . True, we
detail, Everything w o r k s out fine . Granted, have been c 1 e a r c d t o Happy Valley ; one has
the distance is a bit far and the fuel a bit one's rights, after all, We can ride it through,
.
short ; b u t if the f 1 i g h t is made at 37, 000 or Proving just what?
above we can h a c k it . Flight plan f i 1 e d , we Play i t smooth ; let's call a facility enroute
strap on the burner and scream for clearance, a n d find out th e score, "Solomon Radio, Jet
T h e controller, applying the m a g i c slide 405, IFR to H appy Valley . Request terminal
rule, can't seem to f i t us in at this p r e c i s e conditions and expected approach delay ." Back
moment, "Jet 405 stand by . T h e r e will be a cornes the word : "Jet 405, weather at Happy
li,i~l~
`,',i~'~~I~V Ilir'~qi ;~,~L~i~, ~~~ur~ ~~ slight delay in your clearance ." (Couldn't you Valley 800 and 1-1/2, traffic at peak load . You
guess? Don't theyknowthc bar closes at 10 .30? can expect a thirty-minute holding ."
Come on, make with the words ! ) Let's play this one straight . It's practice
"ATC clears jet 405 to the Shangri-La Beacon we're after . No sense i n being a contributing
v i a flight-planned route, to maintain 20, 000 . cause factor . Best we land at Solomon, stretch
T a k e off r u n w a y 27 . Climb to 10, 000 o n a our legs and refuel, By that time the traffic at
heading o f 350 before proceeding o n course ." Happy Valley will have eased ; or at least wetll
by S L H . PICKARD Steady, my boy . C a r e f u 1, No d o u b t the have plenty o f fuel and get an extra letdown to
A common enou gh P hrase . We all know how
Directorate of Air Services r~cc~~~sary it is to h ave an ATC clearance for clearance is OK so far as traffic is concerned- boot
IFR flight within a controlled air s pa c e . But hut what a b o u t fuel? We wouldn't make it at. How vital is your particular flight? If only
20, 000 let alone the climb off track . "Tower, p r a c t i c e or personal whim is involved, you
what i s a clearance? What protection does it
Jet405 unable 20, 000 . Require 37, 000 or above shouldn't flight plan into high d e n s i t y areas ;
a f f o r d ? What are i t s potential limitations'?
fuelwise ." Now the c o n t r o 11 e r knows, Of b u t if you m u s t visit them, m a k e sure you
An ATC clearance is an authorization to fly
within a controlled air space in accordance with course, had we specified th e requirement for arrive over the ficld with lots of fuel on board,
37, 000 or above in the f li ght plan, confusion What a b o u t non-standard approach clear-
the instructions contained in the clearance . All
of us are reasonablv familiar with the structure
of the airwa Y s network and the means b Y which
air traffic controllers space the aircraft to keep
a 11 known IFR traffic properly separated . So
the question arises : If controllers issuc clear-
ances that d o maintain a d e q u a t e separation
between a v a r i e t y of aircraft, a n d if pilots
comply precisely with those clearances,how
could there be any possibility of danger?
The answer is that saf ety in air traffic con-
trol is dependent largely u p o n the ability and H ;r~l ~c ~pecificd tht rcquirctncnl fnr
3 ~,II(10 ur abo~~" in rh~ " IliRht plan,
cooperation of both controllers and pilots . Too confu~ion couid ha~c Lccu a~oidcd .
frequently th e individual f o r g e t s the TEAM
r
aspect of flying and attempts either to operate
as a lone wolf or to transfer all responsibility .
onto the other fellow's shoulders, ,
; .,
During r e c e nt years, the vo 1 u m e of air
traffic has doubled a n d tripled, and the intro- I
duction of h i g h performance j e t aircraft has
significantly affected the complexities of con-
trol . W i d e speed differentials, together with
critical fuel reserves, demand faster and more
accurate control procedures . As higher per-
formance a i r c r a f t become available, pilots
m ust d e v e 1 o p newer operational techniques . .
Obviously, c o n t r o 11 e r s must a 1 s o become
familiar with th e s e changes so that they may
1IIF Alll ,,nd l II1 II1F ,~n Ih~~ j~~b whcn ~nu n~ " ~ " d il . "~t~~~ " r 1~11 ." t h i n k and act in response t o the challenge of

Z
ances? 0 u r p i 1 o t, approaching destination, a clearance a n d haven't got a clear picture of
calls for further clearance . The controller is what is required, a v e r y simple "unable that
up to his proverbialelbows intrafficproblems, clearance" will avoid that half-safe condition,
"ATC clears jet 405 to the airport for a Remember, appearances s om e ti m e s to the

range approach, Cross t.he range westbound at
25, 000, descend west of the range station so as
to recross the range at 14, 000, Make penetra-
tion in the southwest quadrant so as to intercept
th e south course at 2000 or below . Report by
th e range w2 stbound and eastbound a n d upon
reaching 2000 .'r (This only r e q u i r e s a b o u t
th r e e repeats to get it straight .~ Descent to
25, 000 is commenced and the range c r o s s e d
outbound,
Now, w h a t was t h a t gobbledygook a b o u t
crossing, recrossing o r double-crossing t h e
beacon, or the range or what have you? What
altitude did he say to b e g i n penetration turn'?
Was it 2000? The situation naturallydeterior-
ates until, i n desperation, a missed approach
is initiated, Our Father which art in Heaven-
is it too late?
Far fetched, y o u say? Maybe, B u t let's
face it-the flight safety boys have records to
prove t h a t fact is stranger than fiction . W hat
can be done? To begin with, controllers must
realize and a c c e pt the fact that the jet pilot,
strapped in his crowded cockpit a n d operating
at high speeds, justcannot be expectedto follow
a complicated clearance leisurely, Jet aircraft
should b e cleared f o r standard published ap-
proaches only . In e x t r e m e situations, when
non-5 t a n d a r d procedures are essential, in-
structions must be straightforward and brief,
P i 1 o t s , if you don't thoroughly understand
uooii siion
contrary, t h e controller's chief aim in life is
t o expedite your traffic and provide maximum
safety, He can help--IF yau let him know your
difficulties,
Summary for Pilots
Give the controller ALL of the d e t a i 1 s
pertinent to your flight,
I f the clearance w i 11 create significant
alterations to your prepared fuel require-
ments, advise that you cannot accept it .
Anticipate the traffic situation into which
you are f 1 i g h t planning . Never a d d to
traffic congestion without a good reason .
r. Never pester for clearances .
, Never attempt to comply with a clearance
you can't understand, Ask the controller
for assistance .
r. Never hesitate . Wiien in doubt, u s e the
alternate .
Summary for Controllers
, Never issue clearances for non-standard
procedures .
, If the pilot is h a v i n g difficulty, keep it
simple--give him a hand,
, Never hesitate . When in doubt, u s e the
alternate . _

sH,H; :itiii aE sEEi

The P ilot of a J etbomber was fl Y m g at 30 000
~eet on a clear morning , He made a slow turn
and wa s startled to s e e three other bombers
approximately one mile away and on a collision
course with him,
Before he could react or alter the course of
his aircraft, he shot th r o u g h the formation,
missing th e nose of th e first aircraft, flying
under th e second, and over the third, As he
went over the thirdbomber, one of his engines
struck the upper part of this bomber's tail and
knocked it off .
The p i 1 o t who flew through t h e formation
r
F/L I. F. (:ADII'BELL
r1 fter takevjJ in a SnGre «ircrn/t, F; : L 1. F. C,nnrphell
e.rpcrierrced n rivlr~nt 1'arc to port a~ter selectin~ under"
crrrrirr~e "up", The rrndercrrrrin~,~e indicnturs shvuerl an
unsaJN condition, so he reduc~d pmc~r and v Pen~d the
spr~ed brnkes . lf~hcn lrc re~cyclr~d thr~ ~cnr, the inilicators
shon~crl nn unsn/e condilion u'ith lhe rtndercnrrin~'e in
the "dotcn" position., but shmr~d it locke~d in thr~ ` ;rrp"
posilion . RC('rrn3(' 0` the rrnsa/e `'rlrnrn" rcndina, he
InrrPred the rchf~cls n~nin-nnrl t)ris time t,~ot n sn f e
indicntor. Bnt just thcn his rcin~ nrnn tpporterl thnt the
aircrn/t hnrl n cock~d nosN rch~el .
F/1. ( :nmpbr>ll nPxt tricd skirldin~ 1hF nircrn/t, 6ut
this mnnrnui~rr only succePded in redurin~ tlre nn~le n/

i ~
t h e n returned t o his home bas e, landed, and
recounted his e x p e r i e n c e . Inasmuch as no
report had b e e n received from the formation
he h a d flown through, it w a s called a nd re-
quested to 1 a n d , When it landed it was found
that the formation consisted not of three aircraft
but of six . The aircraft wh o s e tail had been
hit was not significantly damaged ,
What is amazing is that neither the pilot, the
copilot nor the observer in any of the six aircraft
had seen the other bomber fly through t h e for-
mation!
Flight Safety Foundation
the cvckrd rehpcl to i,ti degrePS. ,~In etncr~errcy u~as
rhrrrrrrrl tn Station f,hathanr, nnd nll olher nirrra t rcere
/ ,
cithNr rr~crrl(Pd vr diccrtr'd. (ln thc runrcay n Jvnm strrp
rfa3 Inid, stnrti.n~ 2,i00 /eet /rnm ihc cnrl .
:1/ter hurnin~~ of~ czr" ess /rrel, F'L Cnm f~bcll landcd
thc tinbre rcith thF nose uhccl vrFr the /onmile strip, nnrl
k~/rt th~ nircrn/I strnight 6~~ nsing Ih~ hrrrkc . ('rtf orhrnateh~
the /vamitc strip tcas too short, arrrl u~hPn tire ,tinbre rnn
onto tfrc drv ramcay nt 4~ knvts, it bc~,ran n srcin~Y to tlre
right rehich hnd to Ge carrr~clr'd 6,v harsh port brnke .
,dlthoufih the nvse u~hPCl cibrated rou~hlti~, the nircrnjt
tcas kept urrder control nntil it cnme to n stop .
F/L Cnmp6cll did a conrmendnlrle. jv6 throu~hatl
the erncrgen~y, anrl the /iyin~ cvntrol nnrl ~re fe~)rtin~,
sr~ctivns o~ Stntion Chnthnm also tlesercc our cvngrntu"
lnfi~ns .
 . . , .. . , x ~'~y~:'~'~,~~
~ tNl~ .~'; ;k
quantity . But this is a keen young fellow, so c h a p s have roughly 285 chance s left b e f o r e
h e checks the oxygen system while he's a t it . getting th e chop, That is if no one else in the
Horror of horrors! The cotton-pickin' thing RCAF has made, i s making, or will make the
NEAR isn't workin' at all!
So what did he do? Strange as it seems, he
same errors, (Fat chance!)
How many of us do a complete oxygen check

MISS
put the bird u~ s and r e p o r t e d it to the NCO.
Because it was a weekend, they h a d to call in
a couple of bods, a n d they pulled the seat and
put her back together again-the right way this
time . Finally, o u r young birdman blasted off
for the f a r east, (The fact t h a t the tip tanks
every time we g o up? Most people check the
connections, contents and blinker, and that is
all, The odd one checks the normal and 100°~0
positions . How many of us push the press-to-
t e s t button in a T-Bird or a MK 4? Or t u r n
the red lever i n the MK 3? Did you know that

OXYGEN,ANYONE?
According t o Flying P e r s o n n e 1 Medical
Officers' statistics, an error has to be com-
mitted 300 times b e f o r e it k i 11 s somebody .
Here is a long sad story that proves the point
and r e d u c e s (by a conside rable amount) our
chances of getting away with an oxygen problem .
This is how it came to pa s s . A T-33 went
in for an inspection, and in the course of this
job the seat was removed . Now, when you take
the seat out of a T-Bird, the oxygen is auto-
matically disconnected . T h e line is normally
connected to the seat, and runs from there to
the pilot's mask . There a r e male and fernale
connections t h a t fit together when the seat is
i n s t a 11 c d , and which com e a p a r t when the
seat is t a k e n out, So f a r so good ; no sweat,
However, when th i s particular s e a t was put
back in, a chain of errors started ; a nd we're
very 1 u c k y that we didn't h a v e one o f those
o b s c u r e accidents and a c o u p 1 e of funeral
parades,
When the seat was re-installed in the aircraft,
a plate on the bottom of the seat was bent so that
the seat would not go down as far as it should .
The result of this was t h a t the oxygen did not
get hooked up properly, although the connection
overlapped just e n o u g h to make th e blinker
work when t h e pilot inhaled . Maybe it w a s a
bit sluggish-but who the hell w o r r i e s about
details'?
The next step in our s t o r y involved an in-
spection : 05 -1-2J i s the n a m e of the job . It
was h a n d 1 e d by a s e n i o r NCO who had had
a ~
wouldn't feed and that he had to come ba c k to you can make the blinker w o r k even when the
base an hour 1 a t e r is another story a n d has connections are 10 o s e or undone? W ell, you
nothing to do with this case .) can . The blinker merelyindicates a difference
This is a real sad story, Suppose we take a of pressure inthe regulator . The only way you
look at a list of the errors, It's quite impres- can b e sure that you're g e t t i n g oxygen is to
sive-an authentic record-breaker . push the press-to-test button and get a positive
finished the check at Z0, 000 feet with the cabin ~The seat was improperly installed pressure inyour mask, In a T-Bird or a MK 4
pressure around 1 L, 000, Since this would n o t ~ The oxygen c o n n e c t i o n was not right it is a strong pressure, but in a MK 3 it is not
nncover an oxygenproblem, the testpilot signed ~ The NCO in charge of th e crew d i d not very strong .
her out a s serviceable . (We assume that a DI check before he signed Let's all r e v i e w our oxygen c h e c k s and
was carried out before the aircraft flew again ~ The NCO who did the 2J didn't throw off this "familiarity b r e e d s contem pt"
and that it was c h e c k e d and found to be OK,) ~ The supervisor d i d not check before he business, That way we may live 1 o n g enough
The next pilot to fly the T-Bird took a long signed to collect o u r pensions . In c a s e you haven't
trip do wn south at 20, 000 feet, with a cabin ~ The first pilot did not do a proper oxygen seen it lately, o r have forgotten what it looks
pressure of about 12, 000, When h e got there, check like altogether, here's that old check list that
he n o t i c e d that he had u s e d only a b o u t 50 ~ The DI could not have been done was invented to keep you breathing :
pounds o f oxygen . He thought this was a little ~ The second pilot did not do a proper oxygen
strange but didn't w o r r y about it-and didn't check ~ Check your mask and fittings
enter it in t h e L 14 ! ( Economical run, wasn't ~ The secondpilot knewthat he should have ~ Check all hoses and connections
it? ~ used more than 50 pounds of oxygen but ~ Check the contents
Along came the n e xt driver airframe, and he failed to enter it in the L14 ~ Check the b 1 i n k e r on norrnal and 100%
he went o u t on a target t r i p for two hours at ~ Another DI wasn't done ~ Check the safety pressure for sure
35, 000 feet, w i t h a c a b i n pressure of about ~ The third pilot did notdo a proper oxygen ~ Clieck the emergency bottle if you can
23, 000 . He suffered from anoxia a nd decided check see it,
ihat ii he was getting h i s fair share of the old ~ The third pilot suffered from anoxia but
OZ, h e wouldn't be f e e 1 i n g so rough . S o he didn't quarantine the aircraft ~What you have read is the Near Miss as re-
pushed the press-to-test b u tto n and began to ~ The third p i 1 o t knew he was no w h e r e p~rted . W hi 1 e the impressive list o f errors
f e e 1 better . Throughout the rest o f his jaunt near the right pressure when he pushed might be s 1 i g h t 1 y exaggerated, it was still a
h e wasn't g e t t i n g anywhere n e a r the usual th e press-to-test button . But h e didn't v e r y Near Miss indeed . We suspect that t h e
amount of pressure-but he didn't e nte r itin enter it in the L 14 . number of red-faced p e o p 1 e in the world has
the L 14 either ! Apropos of o u r opening paragraph, t h c 5 e ri~en substantially in recent days .-ED~
Well, what aboutdriver four? He was plan-
nin b~ a t r i p down e a s t a t 35, 000 feet (which
means a cabinpressure of about 23,000) . So
h e would have been a i r b o r n e for about 2 :15
b e f o r e he reached Lakehead . Now a healthy
man is good for about six o r seven minutes at
this height with no oxygen, and o u r boy would
have b e e n getting som e but not enough . A t a

nothing to do with the work done o n the "bird"
up to t h i s point . W hat it entailed w a s an in-
dependent check of certain critical systems to
eliminate errors . We wonder how he did it--
but anyway, the "bird" was signed out as servi-
ceable and put up for an air test,
N o w we 1 e a v e the groundcrew a n d start
picking o n the f 1 y b o y s . Our noble test pilot
appeared on the scene . He checked his blinker
and contents, hopped into the bird, and blasted
off . It was late inthe afternoon, you know, and
maybe he was in a bit of a h u r r y . (Excuses,
excuses,) H~~ we nt up to Z5, 000 feet and was
there f o r only a couple of minutes . T h e n he
s~
rough guess, we can assume that he might have
lastedan hour before goingbye-bye-if he fail-
ed to notice what was going vn . However, we'll
never know whether he would have done a good
oxygen check o r not, He didn't g e t a chance ;
t he travelling c o p y of the L 14 w a s so sadly
o ut of date that he insisted it be brought up to
scratch,
There w a s a certain NCO i n charge of the
duty crew that day and he said to himself,
"This guy is going on a long trip at high altitude,
so we had better check to make sure the oxygen
i s topped up ." (At last-a man w i t h a clue ! )
So he s e n d s one of his 1 a d s out to check the

6 7
WANTED : A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE
During the climb to height, the oxygen
system did not appear to be working correctly .
All connections were checked and in tight, How-
ever, with normal breathing, the blinker would
not work . Only by h o 1 d i n g the mask tight by
hand w o u 1 d the blinker move, and th e n only
slightly . Even hard inhalation would n o t keep
the blinker closed . Pressure inthe system was
j u st under 400 pounds, but there was no im-
provement when 100°~0 oxygen was tried .
Upon levelling out at 33, 000 f e e t I noticed
I w a s starting to f 1 u s h and sweat profusely .
Irnrnediately I asked the c a p t a i n to descend .
My recollections were hazy after that . When
I recovered my senses I w a s at 8000 feet and
trying to get oxygen to 100°~0, Our aircraft was
placed u~s and th e mask ta ke n to the Safety
Equipment section .
~I'he aircraft's oxygen regulator was changed .
'I'he old o n e has not b e e n checked yet, but it
appeare.d serviceable . When the mask was ex-
amined for malfunction, o n e exhalation valve
was found stuck o p e n , It is the opinion of the
SFSO t h a t , w h e n the malf unction w a s fir st
noticed during the climb, the pilot should have
levelled off o r descended t o an altitude below
8000 feet . If f u r th e r checks prove that th e
oxygen is still not functioning p r o p e r 1 y , the
pilot should return to base . From this incident
-and others which h ave happened recently-
the SF50 c a n only c o n c 1 u d e that there is a
tendency towards over-confidence in the use of
02equipment . What evcry unitneeds right now
-if this attitude is to be nipped in the bud-is
a ri~fre~her indoct,rination lecture by the SMO .
- ED~
TRANSITION TROUBLE
At approximately 1440 local, 1 was f 1 y i n g
number 2 to Lirna 1 e a d engaged in a dogfight .
Lima lead chased two Sabres into heavy haze
or cloud, a n d I was following him a b o u t 200
feet back and to starboard .
Immediately after entering this haze condi-
tion, and while I was in a steep turn at Mach .9
and 24, 000 feet, lead called up and said he was
r o 11 i n g out a n d climbing on a southeasterly
heading . H e was still visual t o me, and I at-
tempted to follow him . He then appeared to be
upside down, so I looked away from him tu check
m y instruments, I g 1 a n c e d at my artificial
horizon and noticed that the bar was in a hori-
zontal position in level flight, I looked back for
the lead, but he was not in sight ; I also noticed
the sun throu g h the haze o n my port side, and
pulled backto climb up, Only thendid I realize
that I musthave misread the artificial horizon-
for I was inan invertedposition anddescending
at Mach ,9!
(Inlv th~~n ~lid I realizc that i was
imcrtc~l and Jc~ccndin~ el Mach .9 :
I put the speed b r a k e s out, throttled back
and rolled the aircraft right side u p . I was at
16, 000 feet indicated when this was completed,
and doing Mach ,86 in a very steep dive . I pul-
led back hard with b o t h hands a n d caused an
over-G condition . I d o not remember greying
or blacking out, but the high G forced my chin
down on my chest, and I found i t very hard to
get my eyes high enough to readthe instruments .
When th e airspeed started to decrease and
the altimeter began slowing down I was a t ap-
proximately 10, 000 feet . I released pressure on
the stick a n d maintained 6G, broke c 1 o u d at
5000 feet i n a 45-degree dive with wings level
and speed approximately 380 knots, and was in
a level flying condition by 3000 . I then applied
power, brought in the speed brakes, and asked
for a check steer to b a s e . The tower replied
with a heading of 145 degrees . W ith 1500 pounds
of fuel left, I started climbing .
My norrnal trims and alternate trims were
not working, so I did a gradual climb to 20, 000
feet where I was between an overcast condit.ion
and a lower broken condition . I notified tower
of my u~s trims and asked permission to des-
cend visually . This was granted, so I immed-
iately popped my speed brakes and automatically
trimmed the aircraft-at which time I noticed
the trims were working again,
I d i d a complete c h e c k of the normal and
alternate trim system s and f o u n d them to be
completely serviceable, I then c h e c k e d my
undercarriage e x t e n s i o n and retraction and
found them to be in good working order, Upon
completion of this I asked Lima lead to do a
visual s k i n check o f the aircraft, and he re-
. A straight-
Ported t h a t all appeared normal
in approach and landing w a s then carried out,
Prior to flying on this particular day, 1 had
plenty of rest and nourishment . The 1 e a d did
not all of a sudden a p p e a r to be upside down
but seemed to roll into that position during the
roll-out to starboard and climb away . Actually
it was myself who continued the roll and became
inverted . After recovering at 3000 feet, it took
four to five seconds to relax myself and com-
mence to clean th e aircraft u p for the return
to base,
[The a b o v e is a direct quote of t h e pilot's
statement and p r e s e nt s a c 1 e a r picture of
what h a p p e n e d . The accelerometer reading
w a s approximately plus 12G, The importance
of immediate transition to instruments, and of
the need for accurate appraisal ~~f the instru-
ment presentation is obvious .- ED]
NO ONE HOME
A n all-weather Canuck f i g h t e r crew was
5c rambled to intercept an u n k n o w n aircraft,
Mission o v e r , the p i 1 o t requested a letdown
clearance a n d was d i v e r t e d to an alternate
aerodrome,
Approaching the alternatc' S r a d i o r a n g e
station, h e noticed that t h e ceiling was scat-
tered to broken, He then spottedan aerodrome
be 5ide a large city, and deciding it must be his
de stination, cancelled the IFR flight p 1 a n and
advised ATC that he was refiling VFR to the
aerodrome, Radio contact was establi$hed with
the destination control tower, landing instruc-
tions were received, and the pilot commenced a
descent from thirty thousand feet .
When he r e a c h e d one thousand f e e t , the
aerodrome was a p p r o x i m a t e 1 y eight miles
ahead, and the aircraft was lined up on a run-
1 hr aeralrome wa+ aphro~imalcl~ cight milc~
way which th e compass heading indicated was
the one in use . Three miles out, the pilot ad-
vised that h e was on "initial" and was cleared
to t h e "break" . At that point th e canopy was
c o v e r e d with mist, the sun was in the three
o'clock position, and there was scattered cloud .
Throughout his approach the pilot, knowing
that three other jet aircraft had been diverted
to this aerodrome, maintained a close lookout ;
but on the downwind leg after the "break", he
had difficulty seeing the field b e c a u s e of the
sun's glare and haze on the canopy . However,
h e cornpleted the t u r n onto f i n a 1 approach,
asked for 1 a n d i n g clearance, and understood
that he had received it .
Concentrating on the approach angle, air-
speed and altitude, the pilot h a d little time at
t h i s stage to examine the airfield . So i t was
not until after he landed and looked around that
he realized he was at an abandoned aerodrome,
Applying takeoff power he had no difficulty in
becoming airborne andclimbing backto circuit
height, Once there, h e again c o n t a c t e d his
destination aerodrome, was cleared tothe cir-
cuit, located his home f i e 1 d in a v e r y short
tim e, and m ade a no r m al landing,
Putting i n at a n abandoned aerodrome can
be a risky business-and this particular case
has been classed as a near miss for four good
reasons . In the first place the pilot was unfam-
iliar with t h e destination aerodrome and w a s
unaware that there were any other aerodromes
i n the a r e a -abandoned or otherwise, Next,
he changed his flight plan from IFR to VFR
w h e n he was not absolutely sure th a t he had
his destination in sight ; and although he checked
the heading of the r u n w a y in use against t h e
reading on h i s compass, he d i d not properly
identify the aerodrome prior to landing . Also,
in th e destination aerodrome's circuit were
other jet aircraft with the same squadron call
sign ; and during the numerous transmissions
the pilot understood wrongly that he was cleared
to land . F i n a 11 y , and m o s t important, the
crew-without questioning th e possibility that
there w a s another ianding field i n the area-
took it for granted that they were landing at the
correct aerodrome .
[An IFR flight plan should not be cancelled
until positive identification of one's destination
airfield h a s been t~iade, A n d aircrew should
never take any situation or condition for granted
but should adopt a questioning attitude until a11
the factshave been positivelyestablished .- Eo~
TIMELY WARNING
Returnmg from a multr-fighter exercise on
Canucks, w e were cleared number one f o r a
GCI/GCA stream approach to runway I 1 . Ceil-
ing at Comox w a s reported as "t w o thousand
ahcad . feet overcast, visibility ten miles" . Twelve to
9
 15 miles out, we broke into the clear with base
and the town o f Comox clearly visible . There
appeared to be about the same cloud conditions
over Georgia Strait, although Powell River was
not. visible . At this point we cancelled IFR and
requested a low GCA approach and overshoot .
On completion of the overshoot w e climbed
to 1500 feet, and orbitted to port over Georgia
Strait w i t h the intention o f proceeding down-
wind and remaining well clear of the approach
t,o r unway 11 until t h e othe r a i r c r a f t of the
mull .i-fighter section completed their GCIj GCA
letdowns,
During the latter h a 1 f of the t u r n , and on
d o w n w i n d , the crew encounte red a lowering
clnud condition which forced them to descend
in o r d e r to maintain VFR f 1 i g h t . The turn
downwind was made o n instruments, the alti-
meter reading 1500 to 2000 feet . On the down-
wind 1 e g , a quick check of t h e altimeter was
interpreted as 1500 f e e t wtren a c t u a 11 y the
Canuck must have been at 500 . A s h o r t time
later the aircraft was so low that the navigator
s h o u t e d "pull-up ! " The p i 1 o t immediately
climbed into the overcast at two thousand feet,
returned t o the c i r c u i t and 1 a n d e d safely .
A commendation is due the navigator in this
instance, a n d his action would suggest that in
future a 11 navigators should monitor the alti-
meter and call off the altitude below 1500 feet
at ni~ht or in cloud, For even the experienced
pllots, we would r e p e a t the o 1 d warning "In
marginal conditions, 5 ta y on instruments"-
and be s u r e of VFR conditions b e f o r e can-
celling IFR !
UNUSUALSNAG
I was taking off o n runway 24 a n d had just
applied takeoff power wh e n the Canuck swung
slightly to the left, By this time the nosewheel
was clear of the runway . Consequently, when-
ever I put on starboard rudder to hold the air-
craft straight, the nosewheel returned forcibly
to t h c runway . Each time it h a p p e n e d , th~~
aircraft felt as t h o u g h it was b e i n g brake.d .
I'H11PIL-11:11~6F111 ST:1LhS
WtIE'fl you p u t a pencil mark on a n exhaust
~;ystc~m component, you have really marked it .
For a failure, that is,
If it' ~ i n an area that gets g o o d and hot-
and that's practicallyall over-the carbon from
10
7'1u~ nuii  ator ~hout~~d "Pull uE~ :''
Finally, with only about 1000 feet of runway
left, the nosewheel came unstuck again and thc
Canuck jumped into the air . I flew back to St,
Hubert and landed without difficulty ; but while
I was t a x i i n g in to the line, the s a m e thing
occurred every time I tried a turn to the right .
I t was then that I discovered what had been
happening, The p o c k e t on the left leg o f my
flying s u i t was bulging with m a p s and a let-
down book, Whenever I a p p 1 i e d right rudder
o n the t a k e o f f , my left 1 e g would naturally
move backward-and my pocket would promptly
catch on the emergency brake! So little pres-
sure was needed to apply considerable braking
actionthat Ifelt no dra g whatsoever on my leg .
I would recomrnend that this b r a k e handle
be made shorter i n length and mounted higher
on the sidewall of the c o c k p i t . In any event,
either the left pocket of the flying s u i t should
be kept free of bulky items or a flap should be
sewn over the lip of it so that the brake handle.
will not be able to catch it so readily,
the pencil graphite (almost pure carbon) is ab-
sorbed by t h e stack material, which rr~akes a
localized spot of high carbon steel extra hrittle,
Then expansion, contraction, and vibration
cause the area to crack . The crack is not con-
fined to the area of the pencil mark, but spreads,
An innocentdeposit of suchfree carbon on a
hot pipe can start an insidious chain of events,
Exhaust stacks should be marked with chalk or
grease pencil, or tagged .
lll Nides t'or FT.IGH'P SAI'ETY
S L T. WALLNUTT
ver y' few of us have had to assess the cause
cif flying accidents ; hence w e seldom, if ever,
read the instructions inAFAO 21 .56/0~1 on how
to c o d e accident causes . However, we would
do well to lookat them-particularlythe Cause
Factor Code, willch tells us i n a nutshell how
everyday flying accidrnts occur,
The C o d e is a comprehensive summary of
the basic causes of accidents, a nd frorn it wz
should be able to make up a set of broad Flight
Safety Rules to c o v e r all a s p e c t s of flying .
The Code i ~ reprcduced here for the readerts
cunvenience .
" F'ilot Error : Errors attributable to o n e
ar mclre of the following :
Error in judgment, Failure to make
(1)
t.he correct decision under prevailing cir-
cumstances after intellibent appraisal of
the s i t u a t i o n in relation to a 11 known
f a c t o r s in t h e light of experience and
trainino . Sometimes the lack of any de-
cision would refer,
(2) Poor technique, Poor operation re-
sulting from lack of skill and coordination .
(3) Carelessness . W h e r e the p i 1 o t
know~ better, but because of inattention,
wlrich is usually the result of preoccupa-
tion or depression, fails to do the right
thing,
(4) Negligence . E r r o r s by omission
rather t h a n commission, u s u a 11 y the
result of forgetfulness or absent-minded-
ness .
(5) Disobedience of orders . Intentional
and unintentional ; usually the result of
refraction a n d ignorance respectively .
. Other Crew Error : Errors due to same
factors outlined under Pilot E r r o r but com-
mitted by aircrew other than the pilot,
" Maintenance : F' a u 1 t y workmanship o r
n o n -compliance w i t h rnaintenance o r d e r s .
" M3teriel : Faulty materiel, d e s i g n, or
i_i_~llt ;'iiCtor Il~alntenanCC .
" Ground : E r r o r s on the p a r t of flying
c cr n t r o 1 ~r tarmac personnel, ground facili-
tic~ ancl general aerodrome conditions .
. 1'~riefin~, : Faulty or lack of instructions,
inad~:quate supervi~ion, inrorrectmeteorologi-
cal forecasts, etc,
. Acceptable : An accidentwhich is caused
b y knuwn hazardous conditions when the flight
ha~ f~cen authorized as a necess~ry operation .
. Obscure : Cause unknown .
It can b e seen that under Pilot Error there
are five basic errors c o m m i t t e d by pilots,
B e c a u s e these errors also a p p 1 y to "other
crews", we can wrap them in one package with
the 1 ab e 1 "Aircrew Errors" . Now, if we ex-
press these five errors in positive terms, we
come up with some pretty sound advice on how
to avoid flying accidents, In fact, we can con-
dense these five points of advice into simple
rules for flying, and call them "The Five Basic
Aircrew Flight Safety Rules" :
. Exercise good flying judgment
. Maintain flying proficiency
. Be careful-pay attention
. Be diligent in all flyinf; procedures
.
Obey all flying orders .
Carryina on down through the Cause Factor
Code, we see that t h e r e are additional areas
o f weakness w h i c h produce accidents, They
can be expressed in similar p o s i t i v e term s
from whichFlight Safetyrules may be derived .
Such rules are more directly applicable to sup-
portino personnel and g r o u n d organizations,
and are largely beyond the s c o p e of aircrew .
Nevertheless, aircrew s t i 11 have a very real
responsibility to help maintain-through their
interest and coolleration-the efficiency of the
ground organizations and other agencics which
support them in the air, Ti~us w ~ may expand
our list of rules for flying safely, basing it on
the rem zining five areas which cause accidents,
starting with maintenance . These rnay be cal-
led "The Five Secondary Flight Safety Rules" :
" Reportallmaintenance unserviceabilities
a n d discrepancies in t h e L 14, a n d general-
ly help to promote maintenanceefficiency
" R a i s e UCRs on all faulty or poorly de-
signed materiel
. Report on, and assist ground flight facili-
ties to promote efficiency
. Ensure adequate instructions, briefing,
~rltd supervision
. Make extra preparation a g a i n s t known
i~ ; ;L~rl'dS .
Kc:ep these ten simple Flight Safety rules in
mind before, after, and d u r i n g every flight,
and you will b e doing your p a r t in promotin ;
safety inthe RCAF . These rules are based truly
on the best teacher in the world-Fast Experi-
ence-which i s accurately represented i n the
Cause Factor Code whose design h a s evolved
from ,nany years of experience in assessing and
classifying flying accidents as to cause . From
the se cause f a c t o r s we d e v i s e corrective
measures from t i m e to time-why not rules'?
ItEMEMBER THESE TEN F L 1 G H i SAFE'TY
RULES -AND USE 'I'HEM !
il

!JD
;C~,~ ~5;~~
S L W. McLEISH
CEPE RCAF Station Uplands
Th e AAE Type 340 a r r e s t r n g engine, or
"water squeezer" as it is affectionately known
to barrier types, has recently b e e n buried in
the over-run areas of a 11 CF bases, (Here is
the one case where a burial has b e e n marked
by barrier p o s t s instead of th e conventional
last post,)
This latest piece of jet ground support gadg-
etry, which should s p e 11 the end of over-run
accidents a t CF bases, consists of t w o corn -
ponents : the arrestina cable engaging mech-
anism and th e arresting engine, T h e names
are impressive but they really only describe a
length of cable and nylon webbing, a few hundred
feet of pipe filled with water and glycol, and a
couple of pistons .
Engaging Mechanism
F i g u r e 1 illustrates t h e engaging device
which t h r o w s the arresting cable i n t o your
main gear after the nose oleo has triggered the
cable . It w o r k s like this : As the n o s e oleo
engages the horizontal piece o f webbing adap-
ter, the n o s e wheel runs o v e r the arrestin g
cable which 1 i e s on the ground, and the cable
is lifted up behind the nose gear by the verti-
cal nylon risers of the adapter . '1'hese risers
tear apart systematically, freeing the cable so
that it can m o v e up and forward and be over-
taken by the main oleos . The lower extremities
of the risers free themselves from the anchor
'_IP1 . -- 4~
r,
.
: :i;~l~i~r
i.
plates once th e cable is released, the ends of
th e horizontal webbing strap shear out f r o m
their end f i tt i n g s , and the webbing stream s
back from the nose oleo like the bow-wave of a
ship .
Arresting Engine
The energy absorbingdevice or squeerer is
illustratedinfigure l, It workslike this : When
the arresting cable connects with the main gear,
i t tightens to e n s u r e a positive engagement ;
then its pretensioning pendants shear out, al-
lowing t h e cable to t r a n 5 f e r its load to the
p u r c h a s e cable and th e n c e to the pistons .
Wnile the pistons are travelling through the
roughly 300 f e e t of d r y tubing, the purchase
cable is supplyingthe initialretardation exert-
ed by the fluid friction on the cable . When the
p i s t o n s dive into the f 1 u i d , the drag really
starts to build up ; and it continues to increase
after the pistons encounter the smaller diameter
tubing . The initial piston drag is created when
the fluid flowspast the piston ; butas the tubing
narrows, a n orifice a c t i o n is set up and the
fluid is 1 i t e r a 11 y squeezed past the pistons .
Hence the name . Finally a higti fluid pressure
is built up near the e n d of the stroke, and the
arrest comes to a smooth stop .
Notice that a retrieving rope i s fastened to
the pistons for r e s e tting the gear . This i s
achieved by a truck or j e e p in a few minutes,
.
.'
r
DFS Ll~2~E'~Y j
, LIBf'~ARY COPY -this
' pub must be returne.d.
.-
:
._
once the arrcraft is released from the arrestmg
cable. .
Pilot's Reaction
From his office in the CF, the pilot senses
the arrest as a steady sustained G which feels
about the same a s harsh braking in a car, but
sustained for a longer p e r i o d . The a r r e s t
ta k e s 15 seconds, plus o r minus a couple of
seconds, depending on the engaging speed . As
for the distance covered, an aircraft will always
c o n s u m e 1000 feet of the over-run because wheel may run down the net and rip it out with-
this is a design characteristic of the squeezer, out picking up the cable .
The variable is the G imposed on the pilot and T h e squeezer h a s rather good directional
the CF, At low speeds, say ?0 knots or less, characteri stics, b u t it might pull t o one side
there is a c}-rance of ripping off the nose wheel if th e over-run surface happens to be uneven,
rear door, But, nq sweat ; it just sounds like a If this should occur, just sit tight ; the aircraft
fender being torn from a car, will be stopped before the pilot has a chance to
react, even by instinct .
Reliability T h e barrier has b e e n tested at an energy
c o n d i t i o n of 25 x 106 foot-pounds, which in
U s i n g only one Canuck throughout, CEPE round f i g u r e s is 34, 000 pounds of CF at 130
has conducted 56 trials on the webbing, and knots, At the low-speed end, the barrier can
2Z runs on th e squeezer . The webbing can be be engaged down to 35 knots,
engaged in any weather, night or day, with the
aircraft off centre up to 30 feet, and yawing up Aircraft Damage
to 15 degrees,
The brakes cannot be used durin b7 the en gg
7a e- The main o 1 e o doors are usually damaged
ment because the extra load c o u 1 d strip t h e when t h e Canuck runs into a b arrier, but the
oleos . If at allpossible, avoidstriking a verti- extent of the damage varies with th e height of
cal r i s e r with the nose wheel ; otherwise t h e t h e cable on the 1 e g s . (Figure 3 is a typical
r
~~~!cs~l.~~~ " °~
` .- ~, -y~r
` ".~,tj i
c
Biq Squeeae (cont'd)

Retric~in~ Iul

Fillin~,~ vap and

fluid lr~rl iu~lir~alnr

:lrrrstinF hit

t)rti~ piltt "

1 IG, 3 . T~ piral rxamplcs of thc ilama~e in0irtrd on thc
t<~,t I: :uruek Juring barrirr trial~ at R( ::1F ~lation lpland~,

example .~ A p a r t from that, t h e cable, or a

damaged door might rub against a tire, wear-
Arre.,tinl ; tube ing it pretty c 1 o s e to the i n s i d e air ; or, as
a/f mentioned earlier, at low speeds the rear nose
.
,
door can make expensive noises,
.1rrr~linR r~l)lr ~Or, .

>
Engine Power

tiwi~~rl rouplin~ Duringthe CEPE trials, the CF was arrested

yhra~~c
many times with idle-power on, but pilots are
advised to close the HP cocks . Should you run
o u t of time, throttle back to idle and hang on,

Flf,. 1, Arrcxtin; en~ine

Resetting the Gear

Present barrier installations have no remote T -33, With the Sabre, p r o c e d u r e s are the
facility for r a i s i n g or lowering the adapter ; same for both barriers, IN A T-33, REMEM-
hence the barrier wi11 be up at all times at the B ER TO R E T R A C T THE S P E E D BRAKES
w i n d w a r d end of the strip, a n d down at the BEFORE ENGAGING .
downwind e n d . After an a r r e s t , it take s an
experienced crew at 1 e a s t 30 minutes to free BARRIER DO'$ AND DQN'TS
an aircraft, retrieve th e pistons and put up a
new net ; however, i f a 180-degree wi nd shift DO flame out if possible .
Rrlriecr rohr roil takes place, then the reset time for putting one
barrier up and th e other down is the time re- DO select idle RPM if flameout is
quired to drive out to each button . irnpossible .

Words of Wisdonn DO leave your canopy dosed,

Some of you will be tempted to ride into this DO attempt to stay close to the centre
gear just for laughs -so herets a word of line if you have ony directional control.

r
~.Oll6lillll 111hr ~rr11011
caution : the number two man might really need
it ; or maybe the next section will have an abort DO consider the man behind you.
o n takeoff, Keep the o t h e r guyt s welfare i n
tilrp dr~~reat ;in~
1(axinuun pipr 4rrtinn pihr ~rrliunr~ mind, and dontt use the b a r r i e r gear unless DON'T hit the webbing riser with the
Diinituum Iuhr ~rction you really require it . Remember that it takes nose wheel,
30 minutes or more to reset it .
Another point worth considering is the under- DON'T apply brakes during arrest .
shoot problem, Several tests w e r e conducted
t o ascertain what happens if an aircraft r u n s DON'T hit the barrier when airborne .
o v e r the retracted barrier, The answer was
"nil problem", DON'T undershoot on top of the retracted
The water squeezer type b a r r i e r has the downwind barrier.
flf, 2, ('.roes~seetion of arrestinR en`ILe . s a m e engaging mechanism as t h e chain type
barrier, and is also suitable for the Sabre and DON'T use it unless you need it,

14 1~

ketters to and frorn the Editor
The Road Back
E v e r s ince man m a d e his f i r s t monkey
wrench a n d thereby became n u r s e m a i d to
various and s und ry forms of machinery, his
greatest preoccupation has b e e n the problem
of ensuring that all the pieces go back into the
right place-a n d in t h e intended manner . In
othc~r words, f i tt e d , tolerance-checked, and
locked . By the nature of things this is a par-
ticularly c r i t i c a 1 problem f o r the airc raft
technician .
Once a technician commences a repair job,
the ide.al situation would b e for him to remain
o n it until h e is completely finished, thereby
eliminating a s m u c h as possible the chances
o f crror which automaticall y occur each time
a t<-~chnician's continuity of e f f o r t is broken .
It is obvious r h o w e v c r , that continuity of
effort to t h i s extent is impossible to achieve ;
for no matter to what extent management strives
towards t h i s aim, the technician will always
be faced withthe problem of "picking up" where
hE~ "lcit off'' or-what is more difficult-picking
up where someone else left off . . I1'11CS ST . HCBERT!
T h e r e are dozens o f r e a s o n s w h y this
happens and a11 of them are valid . F'or example :
nature's demands and pay parades ; restricted
h o u r s for ord~~rly r o o m s , supply sections,
accounts st: ctions, M I R S and m e s s e s ; and
m u s t e r parades, 1 a c k of spares, sicknes s,
accidents and leave .
Under the circumstances, then, the tech-
nician must not only possess a high degree of
skill and sound work habits ; he must also have
,g ood supervision and a good memory, The latter
i s 1~articularly important if th e technician is
working on complicated and critical equipment
such as aircraft andtheir components ; for when
he returns to a job, he must remember exactly
whcre he 1 e i t off in order to k n o w precisely
where to start in again .
It should be obvious to anyone, howeve r, that
even with the most conscientious tradesmen
and the m o s t expert supervisors, here i s an
area o f great potential hazard wherein lie un-
limited possibilities for error . Here lies the
" R o a d B a c k" which every technician must
traverse mentally before he lays hand on a
wrench and continues with his job .
16
What, t h e n can be done to as sist the tech-
nician to regain th at continuity of thought and
action which guided his work up to the moment
he put down his wrench and pushed off ? A re-
minder of some sort willhave to be devised so
t h a t , on rc~turning to h i s job, the technician
will have his attention directed immediately to
the last area or item on whichhe was working .
There is more than one means of achieving
this, b ut perhaps some forrn o f visual signal
would b e most effective-an eye-catching and
unrnistakable rerninder which would assist the
t c c h n i c i a n t o rea, ;tivate that all-important
train of thought which p r o m p t e d his actions
such
P rior to his leaving the work . Adrnittedly
a requirement would not be necessary for every
it
J'ob undc~rtaken on an aircraft ; but certainly
should be considered for use where maintenance
is being done on h i g h 1 y critical linkage, fuel
and electrical systems .
The most suitable visual signal would be the
t YP e whichhas proved so successful in marking
undercarriage pins and externalcontrol locks-
red streamers . Just b e f o r e packing up, the
technician could a tt a c h such a marker to the
item on which he is working . There it would
remain, standing out like a sore thurnb to assist
hirn to get going when he r~>turns .
These streamers should be long enough to
ensure (a) that they would not accidcntally be
left in place after a job is completed, and (b)
that even in relatively inaccessible areas they
would still be plainly v i s i b 1 e , Their prime
purpose should be to catch the eye and jog the
memory-instantly .
After all, adrninistrators have their memo
pads . Why not r e m i n d e r s for technicians ?
W. E. Edser, W C
AFHQ
W/C Edser's remarks comprise a pertinent
sequel to two accident reports which appeared
recently in Flight Cornment ("Hev, Jack! " and
" D r i v e That Bolt! "-page L 2 , March-April
issue) . If the a u t h o r' s excellent suggestion
had been in actual use at the time, those two
a c c id en t s might never have occurred . --ED
About Buttons
You report a near accident under the heading
"It Happened Again" on page Z6 of your Jan-Feb
issue . Evidently the pilot pressed the wrong
b u t t o n , which was located where the correct
button had been in another type of aircraft with
which he was familiar .
I must disagree with your conclusion that
"there is no logical excuse for p r e s s i n g the
wrong button," There was avery good excuse,
which experimental psychologists would sub-
sume under the heading of "negative transfer"
or "h a b i t interference" . I therefore suggest
that the faultybehaviour you reported should be
classified as Design Error rather thanas Pilot
Error .
C. H. Baker, Chief
Applied Experirnental Psychology Section
Defence Research Medical Laboratories
Toronto, pntario
Ou r statement ("there is no logical excuse
for pressing th e wrong button") was certainly
inaccurate in t h e light of y o u r comments on
"negative transfer" and "habit interference" .
However, w e must, in o u r turn, disagree
with your conclusion that the behaviour reported
should be classified as "Design Error" rather
than as "Pilot F,rror" . Where you use the term
, s
Apropos of thr arrompan~ina sea photn , uur ~t . Ilubrrt enrrc~pnnrlent ha~ a~kcd u~ tn pa~s the
follninp mc~~aRr alon~ to thc Irnnps (rlir) . "~r~nn pilot, wnuld tasi IhrouRh thi, lakc ; othcr~ w~nuld
att~~mp1 t~ land un it . Ilnt EI)s ad~i~r agaimt ilitelunt; a jct airrraft . So wh~~ tr+~ it? Call thc tit . I(ubcrt
Alarinc Eicseue Ser~ice at Ineal ~11i . Go ID .(1 .A .'1'. and be ~ure."
"Design E r r o r" , w e would employ "Design
Difference"-andreflectthatwhena manmoves
from o n e line of endeavour t o another, there
are differences which h e must overcome if he
is to master the new job .
There are valid reasons forthe assessment
we have made . In the first place, the standard-
ization of c o c k p i t s is impossible because of
(1) d i v e r g e n c e i n manufacturer's policies
(2) operational differences b e t w e e n aircraft
(wherein the role which a t yp e is t o perform
dictates the cockpit design that must be used)
and (3) thetime lapse betweendesigns . In the
second p 1 ac e , the standardization committee
o f the R C A F , RAF and U S A F have already
agreed (for the above r e a s o n s ) that cockpits
cannot be standardized .
ThE~ RCAF's only "fix" f o r such a problem
isto "train out" a pilot's habits onone aircraft
type, and "train in" the habits he must acquire
to fly the new type . This "transition trainmg"
is intensive, and i s designed t o assist a pilot
i n overcorning errors o f the sort we are dis-
cussing . H e n c e , when a pilot has completed
h i s transition to a n e w type, we must therc~-
after class errors via negative transfer or habit
interference as "unacc~~ptable" .
We are grateful for your interest in our work,
and p 1 e a s e d that you would t a k e the time to
write us , Your c o m m e n t s will cause us to
scan o u r copy more critically in future . -1:D
Flyboys, Ahoy!
The enclosed photograph show s the lake that
f o r cn e d on t h e button of runway L4 at RCAF
Station S t . Hubert d u r i n g this year's spring
run-off . A f t~ w pilots tended to disregard the
dange rs of' 1 a n d i n g or taking off through this
amount of water (to their sorrow-ED) , Hence
the photographs plus caption .
J, C. Cottrell, F 0
RCAF 5tation St . Hubert
17
HFaD~ - CP ~~L11~1'~
El~~~lries Ouf, Erosl In
F/0 V,H . Gilchrist, pilot, and F/0 D,K .
Munro, n av i g at o r , w e r e climbing through
5000 feet in a Canuck out of Comox, B .C,
when the over-ternp warning light for the port
alternator illuminated , T h e navigator pulled
the c i r c u i t breake r and reset it, but the light
remained on, The port engine was closed down,
and unnecessary electrical units were shut off .
Comox was alerted to the difficulty and the pilot
continued his climb on a single engine through
cloud to 31, 000 feet .
The aircraft was diverted to Calgary because
the loss of windscreendemist and defrost would
have made t h e letdown a n d landing at Comox
a hazardous operation inadverse weather con-
ditions , A s e c o n d aircraft w a s sent out to
accompany the Canuck and maintain close sur-
veillance and positive radar fixes . To provide
forward visibility, F / 0 Gilchrist continually
had to rub a hole in the frost onthe windscrc~en,
These conditions were at their worst during the
approach to Calgary, when a heavy frost formed
inside the canopy . Despite this tough situation,
the aircraft was landed safely, Investigation
revealed a faulty over-temperature thermostat
in the alternator .
T h e method in which t h i s emergency was
h a n d 1 e d speaks highly of the a i r c r e w , the
squadron, and the entire radar retwork, Pos-
itive direction and assistance was given to the
pilot, and c 1 o s e surveillance was maintained
throughout the trip .
Sacccss Slory
W 1 C T . T . Scovill was flying a wheel-equipped
Otter on a local training exercise approximately
ZO miles east of Whitehorse . At 6000 feet on the
east leg of the radio range, he noticed the engine
t h r o w i n g oil . Then the windscreen became
misted, seriously cutting d o wn forward vis-
ibility . Although oil temperature and pres sure
18
and cylinder head temperatures were normal,
W/C Scovilldecidedto flytowards Whitehorse .
Fifteen miles from the airport the engine started
to run rough and a serious loss of power
appeared imminent,
At the time of the incident, the aircraft was
being flown up a valley . Because there were
two mountain ridges 6000 feet ASL between the
Otter and the airport, W/C Scovill elected to
fly down the valley to try to reach Marsh Lake
and the Alaska Highway, the only area suitable
for a possible forced landing . Enroute to Marsh
Lake his engine became r o u g h e r and he was
compelled to reduce power,
T h e Otter finally arrived over t h e lake at
about 1000 feet, Although t h e engine was de-
livering s o m e power, W/C Scovill decided to
force 1 and on the lake, f o r no other suitable
terrain existed between Marsh Lake and White-
horse , He spotted open water at the northwest
corner of the lake and decided to land to the
s o uth e a s t (where the ice would be thickest)
about a half-mile f r o m shore w h e r e the ice
w a s more windswept and 1 e s s snow could be
expected .
R e a c h i n g out o f the p o r t window with a
handkerchief, W / C Scovill managed t o clear
the windscreen sufficiently to set up a forced
landing pattern . W h e n the engine failed sud-
denly at l00 feet, he made a dead stick landing
straight ahead, th e Otter remaining in a tail-
down attitude, with n o tendency to nose over ,
The snow itself was eight inches deep with very
little ridging or crusting, and the ice was thick
e n o u g h to support the weight of the airc raft ,
Later investigation disclosed that t h e oil loss
was c a u s e d by failure o f the push rod at the
c r a n k c a s e end of n u m b e r eight c ylinde r .
W /C Scovill performed a r e a 1 feat of air-
manship in m a k i n g a successful ernergency
landing with a fixed undercarriage, whe.el
equipped aircraft on d i f f i c u 1 t terrain and in
winter conditions ,
HYDRAULICS
Directorate of
Maintenance ffngineering
Ever Y aircraft in g eneral use t od a Y~ with purpose is to maintain pressure during simul-
a few minor exceptions, is equipped with some taneous ope ration of services (e,g, under-
kind of hydraulic system, A number of types, carriage and f 1 a p s ) . The attached drawings
like the Chipmur~k, have only hydraulic brakes . will explain how i t o p e r a t e s . A secondary
Others like the Sabre and Comet, have complete function is to cushion the sudden pressure
hydraulic operation f o r everything including c h an g e s which occur whenever the pressure
the fly"ing controls , regulator cuts in,
There are t wo main reasons for using hy- Hydraulic jacks (or rams) to operate each
draulic powere first, to r e 1 i e v e the pilot (or service, These maybesingle acting(pressure
crew) of the physical effort of operating such in one direction only) or double acting (pressure
units a s the undercarriage and flaps b y hand ; in either direction depending upon the position
and second, to simplify the actuating system, of a selector valve) .
because plumbing can b e installed in wings or Selector valves of various kinds to control
other confined areas much more easily than a the flow o f fluid and pressure t o t h e desired
mechanical svstem of rods or cables . service .
There are,other wa Y s of achievin g the same The hydraulic fluid itself .
results-electric and pneumatic systems have
beenused extensively-butthe hydraulic system
is n o w almost u n iv e r s a 1 , There are govd
reasons f o r its wid e adoption : the system is
comparatively light and c o m p a c t ; it c a n be
made as powerful as is necessary ; maintenance
requirements are low ; and reliability is very
good,
Parts of the System
A representative hydraulic s y s t e m would
consist of the following components ;
, A tank or reservoir to hold spare fluid .
An engine-driven pumpto build up
pressure .
A pres sure regulator , I t maintains the
p r e s s u r e between the normal maximum and
minimum limits a s specified by t h e designer
and is sometimes built into t h e engine-driven
pump . '1'hc hr~arl of Ihc main h~draulie >~~Icm in~Iallcd in a CI19 . 'fhc Li~
A pressure accumulator . Its main lank, callr~d nn "accumulalu~', i+ Ihr n~~enuir fur h~druulic Iluid .
19

' v
luthing, if not rompHcati " d! 1'arl uf Ihi~ h~drauli~ s~~tcm rc " pon-
~ible iur rai~in~ and lu~~" rinR thc un~lcmarriagc un r ( :-119,
A great numb e r of bits and pieces : for
e x a m p 1 e, restrictor valves, one-way valves,
gauges, thermal relief valves, and miles upon
miles of plumbing .
Dependability
As m e n t i o n e d earlier, t h e system is in
like anyother
g eneralvery reliable . However,
mechanical d e v i c e , i t has weaknesses, and
there is always the possibility of failure . There
are two main causes of trouble in the system :
external 1 e a k a g e or internal failure of some
component . External leakage i s easy to spot ;
the fluid i s a bright red in color and does not
evaporate . Internal failure of components is
also r e a d i 1 y noticeable-something doesn't
work when it should--but the result of the failure
depends entirely upon the location and purpose
of t h e failed part . h' a i 1 u r e o f the pump or
r e g u 1 at o r affects t h e entire system, while
failure of, s a y , a flap jack ordinarily means
a flapless landing . No sweat there . Leakage
of t h e reservoir in t h e T-33 causes the pilot
to complain bitterly because the f 1 u id enters
the air intake of the engine, and is forced into
the cockpitthrough the heat and pressure lines .
Aircraft always have an alternate system of
o p e r at i o n for t h e undercarriage in case of
emergencies . The S a b r e i s equipped with a
pump which is driven by an e 1 e c t r i c motor ,
The Canuck has a compressed air system pro-
viding one "down" selection only for both landing
gear and flaps ; and there is also a power pack
which, althoughused primarilyby maintenance
as a device for checkingthe system, will serve
in some emergencies . Older aircraft such as
Harvards and Dakotas employ a hand-operated
pump . Twin- ormulti-engined aircraftusually
have two purnps for insurance a g a i n s t pump
failure, butthis is no safeguard against system
failure f r o m other causes . T h e emergency
system, hand o r electric, is also used during
maintenance to checkthe condition and operation
20
of the normal system .
Everymonththere are seven or eight accid-
ents or incidents caused byfailure of some part
o f the hydraulic system, Roughly one third of
these are the result of inadequate maintenance-
leaking connections, tanks not filled, parts not
properly assembled-and two thirds arise
through internal f a i 1 u r e o f some part of the
system .
Hydraulic equipment operates at very high
pressures--3000 pounds per square inch in
s ~
some aircraft-so that even a very small leak
can cause the 1 o s s o f all the fluid in a short
time . A n additional hazard may b e provoked
through overheating o f the pump i f it i s per-
mitted to run without fluid ; engine f i r e s have
been caused in this manner,
0 n most t w in - or multi-engined aircraft,
both pumps operate as part of a common system ,
In c a s e of a n engine failure, the system will
still operate on one pump but at a slower speed ;
that is, undercarriage and flaps will take much
longer to extend and retract . A recent example
of this was the case of a C-11q which suffered
an engine f a i 1 u r e . T h e unde rcar riage was
1 o w e r e d rather 1 a t e in the approach-at an
altitude of about 4 0 0 feet-and w a s not com-
pletely down when the a i r c r a f t arrived over
the button . T h e pilot attempted an overshoot
but was unsuccessful, andthe aircraftsuffered
"A" category d a m a g e in t h e ensuing crash .
Accessibiliiy
Except intransport type aircraft, the entire
hydraulic system is inaccessible duringflight .
In Dakotas and North Stars, some of the system
i s accessible, and rninor repairs have occas-
ionally been made while these transports were
ai rborn e . Leaking systems have been cor-
rected ; and reservoirs have been replenished
with some weird and wonderful fluids, including
fruit juice . Apparentlythe onlylimitation here
is the skill and ingenuity of the flight engineer .
Aboard smaller aircratt, very little can bE~
done to correct any difficulty, so the only aid
to the s u c c e s s f u 1 conclusion of a flight is a
thorough knowledge o f the n o r rn a 1 hydraulic
system and of the capabilities and limitations
of the emergency system . After that, a pilot's
accurate report of any trouble in the L14 will
help maintenance t o isolate and rectify an un-
serviceability before the aircraft again takes
to the air .
Airborne a i r c r a f t hydraulic emergencies
have happened before and will happen again . If
it happens to you, and y o u know your aircraft
and e m e r g en c y procedures, your problems
will b e greatly simplified . Naturally you will
declare an emergency so that technical per-
sonnel can be made a v a i 1 a b 1 e on the ground
to give y o u a hand-and p o s s i b 1 y provide a
solution to yourproblem, This sort of collab-
oration between a i r and ground can k e e p an
incident from becoming an accident .
r d/
~t . ~ _
f-~Y'
Zb
~RRIVALS and DEPARTURES
Bad Aetor
A student was briefed to carry out a short
night crosscountry trip in a T-33 at 10, 000 feet .
He stated in part in the D14 that he made a
n o r m a 1 takeoff and climbed to 25, 000 feet to
have a look around . After looking around, he
decided to do a beacon letdown ; and af t e r the
letdown, he overshot at 1200 feet on the runway
heading .
Dissatisfied with hia rate of descent inbound,
h e tried a few more , First he m a d e a rated
descent a t b00 feet p e r minute, overshot and
climbed away ; then another one at 400 fpm, he
believed-or maybe it was 200 . Continuing to
have difficulty, he carried on .
On the next letdown, as he was beginning to
overshoot, there was a b 1 i nd i n g flash . The
studentdidn't recall what happened immediately
after this, b ut when he settled down, the air-
craft was at 3000 feet and climbing on full
power . H e then checked the aircraft and dis-
covered that the undercarriage would not lock
up, and thatthe flaps were stuck at about 20° .
Rather than d e c 1 a r e an emergency, because
he claimed the aircraft was fully under control,
he carried out a straight-in landing .
Evidence revealedthatthe aircraft had flown
D F S LIBR/~RY
LIBRARY COPY " thi~
pub must be returned.
~-MY
into wires stretched across railroad tracks at
a height o f 25 feet . The a c c id e n t occurred
18 miles north of the beacon . A witness at the
scene, who saw the aircraft just before it struck
the wires, established the fact that the aircraft
had b e e n flown along the tracks at a very low
altitude . H a d the aircraft not been pulled up
immediately, i t could have struck a telephone
post 40 feet high and located 60 yards from the
wires along the flight path of the aircraft .
This is a c a s e of an accident looking for a
place t o happen-and i t always happens . It is
remarkable that this student lived to tell his
tale . He ignored the briefing for the exercise,
andhe ignored localpilot orders by descending
below 3000 feet above ground level . As we've
mentioned in an earlier Flight Comment, Rus-
sian Roulette i s child's play compared to this
type of flying . As for the student, although he
i s still alive, h e has severed his connections
with the honourable profession of flying,
Student pilots, hear this! No matter where
you are or what you maybe thinking, remember :
no real pilot e v e r knowingly breaks the rules
of safe flight .
Foreign Object and Fire
A T-33 was in a climbing turn at 16,000
feet when smoke began pouring out o f the heat
and vent system . The dump valve was operated
but heavy smoke filled the entire front cockpit
in a matter of seconds . Within a minute, flames
were noticed under the front cockpit panel near
the centre p e d e s t a 1 . The pilot declared an
emergency at once and turned the aircraft to-
wards base .
I n a short time the f o r w a r d fire warning
1 i g h t came on in the rear cockpit . The front
warning light was invisible because of smoke .
21
The aircraft was climbed and the tower was
advis ed that the two pilots were ejecting .
F o r t u n a t e 1 y the warning light went out just
then, so the p i 1 o t in the rear seat once again
headed towards base, set up a flameout landing
pattern, and touched dou~n successfully . The
c anopy was c r a r. k e d open and both pilots got
out of the a i r c r a f t , which w a s still on fire .
Atechnicalinvestigationwas set upto deter-
mine the cause of this i n c id e n t , and initial
examination revealed extensive f i r e damage
to the electrical wiring behind the front instru-
ment p a n e 1 . For this reason i t was thought
at the t i m e that t h e cause of the f i r e was a
short circuit i n the electrical w i r i n g in that
area . H o w e v e r , as t h e investigation pro-
gressed, an air d rill was found in the rear
cockpit, jammed between the negative terminal
of the loadmeter and the canopy remover adaptor
tracks . The drill had b e e n lost by pcrsonnel
22
o f a Mobile Repair Party while a rework was
being done to Mod EO 05-50C-6A/281,
The negative wire f r o m the r e a r cockpit
1 o a d m e t e r was scorched a n d burned to the
right-hand aft lower instrument panel discon-
nect, and from the r i g h t - h a n d aft terminal
panel terminal strip up t o the front loadmeter
disconnect on the right-hand side of the forward
lower instrument p a n e 1 . This negative wire
is contained in bundles of various s i z e s , and
these were badly scorched from the rear cockpit
~ i
to the disconnect cannon plug on the front cockpit
lower instrument panel .
The fire had c e n t e r e d on t h e right-hand
side of the front cockpit (see attached photos),
and the heat was so intense that it burned wiring
bundles beyond recognition, damaged instru-
ments, and ignited rubber inserts on clamps
a n d rubber terminal covers , The wiring was
also scorched and burned from the right-hand
forward lower instrument panel disconnect to
the right-hand forward floor disconnect, and in
t h e sub-cockpit a r e a . Here the evidence of
burned and s c o r c h e d wire was less , but the
i n s u 1 a t i o n on the wires to the lower engine
junction box wasblistered at uneven intervals,
The action taken by the pilots was in accord-
anc e with s t a n d a r d emergency proc edures .
It was f o r t u n a t e that t h e fire warning light
went out, and thatthe pilots were able to remain
with the aircraft and effect a successful landing .
1
Otherwise a positive accident cause factor might
never have been established .
Leaving an air d rill in the f u s e 1 a g e of an
aircraft following a modification is so serious
an oversight that it borders on criminal neg-
ligence . The incident has been brought t o the
attention of all controlling agencies .
Split Flap
While carrying out an air test in a T-33, the
pilot r a n into difficulty as he w a s simulating
a final turn stall (wheels and flaps down) . At
an altitude of 14,500 feet, and while flying at
a n indicated airspeed o f 155 knots, h e felt a
jolt and suddenly found it n e c e s s a r y t o use
excessive aileron control in order to stay in a
turn to the right .
The pilot completed a check and realized
that he had a split flap condition ; only the right
one was operative , f~ handling check indicated
that with the r i g h t flap selected, the airc raft
could be held level down to 130 knots . A flap-
less landing was made withoutfurther incident .
The driving sleeve of t h e flap actuator had
failed atthe inboard end ofthe internal threads
to cause the split f 1 a p . Although this sort of
failure happens o n 1 y rarely, it points out the
a d v a n t a g e of selecting flap before initiating
the final turn for landing . Some pilots believe
that a split flap condition can't happen ; s o you
non-believe rs takc note ; i t c a n a n d i t d i d .
Feather Folly
liave you ever f 1 o wn a glider'? Likely not
many of us have, because our Air Force doesn't
use them . However, two of our pilots rect~ntly
improvised and made a g 1 i d e r out o f an I~.x-
peditor . T h e a i r c r a f t handled w e 11 and a
s u c c e s s f u 1 forced landing ended their first
unpowe red flight .
This a 11 happened while. t h e y werc having
instrument practice under the hood . The air-
craft wa s being flown on a sinRle engine, and
w h e n the c a P t a i n reached t o unfeathe r, he
depressed the wrong button . When he realized
his mistake, he pulled t h e button . But it was
too late ; the engine had feathered . Every effort
was made t o unfeather, but t o no avail . The
aircraft was landed wheels up in an open field .
Now why wouldn't the engine stop feathering
when the button was pulled out? This cuts the
power to the feathering pump, and in fact d~es
stop the feathering action . To find out why, we
t o o k up a C-45 and t r i e d a few experiments
(o n e engine operating) . U s i n g l5" and 1800
rpm we depressed the feathering button and
pulled it out immediately . The rpmdecreased,
then returned to the constant speed range . We
depressed the button again, leaned back in the
seat, and then reached out and pulled the button .
Too late ; the engine rpm w a s passing through
700, and it fell to 40U rpm after the button was
released . T h e prop t h e n became fixed pitch
and would not unfeather .
It is important to note that if the feathering
action h a s f o r c e d the blade changing mech-
anism past the change in t h e slope of the cam
slot, which is just beyond the full coarse posi-
tion, the propelle r c a n n o t be returned to the
c o n s t an t sp4ed range unless t h e ft:athering
and u n f e a t h e r i n g cycle is completed . The
button wa s reselected and the propeller fully
feathered .
Further e x p e r i m E~ n t s proved that if you
activate the wrong feathering button, you have
approximately t h r e e s e c o n d s to rectify the
error . If you're not fast enough on the draw,
you'd better take some glider lessons . When-
ever two e n g i n e s are feathe red, the batte ry
has insufficie.nt power to unfeather . But then--
who would want to feather both engines?
R'c didn't ~ct to prr,~s 4oon enouttlt' Jast befnrc thc ]uhau~
i~cu~ Ha~ turntl o~i " r tn lhc printer, a report urri~ed tcllin,q o!
anotltrr :tceidcnt Hhich ncrurrcd Hhen a pilol fenthered both
eugine, in an Expeditor (sec lohcr photo) .
23
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D F S LI~RARY
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UBRARY COPY-diis to lZ3 to assist him in climbing onto the wing .

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Leaping into the saddle, h e put the mule in
pub must be returned .
BIRD WATCNERS'CORNER
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gear, released the automatic clutch, and poured p ~`

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on the oats . The clutch a p p e a r e d to slip at f~< , r
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first as the mule bucked on s t a r t i n g , but it ..;f` ~ !~1 :- .

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did move ahead a little before coming to a . !~ i.

stop . W h e n he had t o a p p 1 y more gas, the ,; .

I ~i~1/ . ~,' ,- /~
,'
a a

airman merely concluded that the clutch really . .\ X'

l
Py,~,1S,;,
+ .',, ' -/ !,_`.,, ;?~ .` ~
needed an overhaul, As the mule backed away :1~

a ;",~, ~ _. '
slightly, ou r hero opened up th e throttle and , .~ ~ s. ~ :.rl
~ ;t < <~ ~ ~'
~ ; ~.~`. .
.`,,, ., ;~r,f r~
the mule b u c k e d in earnest, By t h i s time, ,~~, . . ,j
rCY"

Hangar Hassle p e o p 1 e were appearing from every nook and 'C ~!, A.:
v.'i .~
cranny in t h e hangar to investigate the noise .  x~.;?! .,;: ~°'~y f
(~,

A n airman driving a m u 1 e towed a Dakota The airman couldn't hear because of th e roar I,'~ . ly~~ ~~~'~

/
f~ /

into the hangar and parked it facing the doors ,
Two other Dakotas, positioned to the right and
left of it, were also facing forward .
After placing the aircraft where he wanted it,
the airman got o f f the shop mule t o report to
the flight sergeant for any further details . He
left the tow bar attached to the aircraft and the
mule .
A s the mule driver opened th e door to the
FS's office--and before he could say a word-
the FS t u r n e d to another a i r m a n and s aid,
"Check the f u e 1 in aircraft N o . 123 ." (This
aircraft was in the rear facing the door .) The
airman t o whom h e gave the order must have
had Wheaties f o r breakfast and lunch because
he scampered out the door on the double . He
spied the mule and decided to position it close
of the mule's engine .
Likely yo u' v e guessed the rest, Aircraft
No . 1 w a s trying to plow i t s way through the
other two Dakotas . It was a jackpot, all right-
three Dakotas badly bent!
Between sobs the following day, the CTSD
enlarged on the story . I t was h a r d to follow
the details because the WQnext door was making
a lot of racket beating his head against a wall . ..
The FS swinging a large bull whip around the .
hangar didn't help matters either . ~'
.
The m o r a 1 of t h e story is ; Don't leave a
mule attached to an aircraft after it has been
positioned ; d o n' t use a mule i n a hangar for
anything except towing an aircraft ; and don't
drive o f f in a m u 1 e until you've made an ex-
ternal check .

' ~ ~,~i~
~ ~ I (,I~i
,, ..
,.,

HAZE-HATING HEDGE-HOPPER
This bird is determined to take off VFR and bore holes in haze and low lyinq cloud
enroute to destination when weather conditions dictate that the trip should be made
IFR or not at all . Qualifications of the Haze " Hater include no instrument rating
and a high degree of determination to get somewhere in a hurry . Destination is
occasionally a nest in a hole in the ground or an insecure perch on some high tree or
power line . The bird is a constant headache to UICP Flight of Station Saskatoon,
which, through continued struggle, is end~avouring to control its birth rate .

CALL : I'MLOOKINGFORTHESUNNYSIDESUNNYSIDESUNNYSIDE

Thenks to F L J. R. Wriaht

24
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"A place for everything and everything in its
place," goes an old saying . Its opposite is
"foreign object" something that isn't in its
place . Where property and human lives are
involved, a foreign object can be as destructive
as a foreign agent .

~~~~-a a I ~~"~~I M r