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Philip Goff, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness

London: Rider Books, Penguin Random House, 2019, 256 pp. ISBN:
9781846046018

Article in Journal of Consciousness Studies · December 2020

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Philip Goff

Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness

Rider Books, Penguin Random House, London, 2019, pp256.

ISBN-13: 978-1846046018

Reviewed by Kristjan Laasik

In his new book, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff

defends panpsychism, the view that ‘consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of

the physical world’ (2019, p. 23), arguing that the view is superior to the dualist and materialist

alternatives. Since Goff regards the study of consciousness as an interdisciplinary project, his

panpsychist account is concerned with re-shaping the science of consciousness, and conceived

as dependent upon the deliverances of such a reformed science. Goff also undertakes to

elucidate aspects of the broader human significance of the panpsychist outlook.

Addressed to a broad readership, the book is, indeed, very accessible. Goff does not

assume previous familiarity with the relevant topics, but clearly explains all concepts, ideas,

and historical developments that he undertakes to discuss—down to such basics as Descartes’

dictum ‘I think, therefore I am’ (ibid., p. 5), or the requirement of theoretical simplicity known

as ‘Ockham’s razor’ (ibid., pp. 48-9). Goff also confidently navigates, and lucidly explains,

highly complex scientific ideas, especially from theoretical physics and neuroscience. Where he

does judge that some readers might benefit from a more technical discussion of the issues at

hand, he provides such discussions in ‘technical appendices’. When informing the readers of the

philosophical or scientific contributions of different historical figures, he provides basic

background information, as well as an occasional colorful biographical detail. He also

chronicles some of his personal interactions with important contemporary contributors to

consciousness study, as well as aspects of his personal philosophical journey towards his

current philosophical position (ibid., pp. 111-13). His book is thus an engaging and lively read.
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Galileo’s Error is part of a resurgence of panpsychist ideas in the recent years, following a

period of comparative philosophical disfavor in the latter half of the 20th century. There now

appears to be something of a panpsychist movement in philosophy, producing not just

argumentative defenses but even manifestoes of panpsychism (Seager, 2020). Goff, too, has

contributed (at least) two philosophical manifestoes (2017, Ch. 10; 2019, pp. 172-75). Currently,

panpsychist views are either defended or at least seriously considered by prominent, well-

regarded philosophers, including David Chalmers, Galen Strawson, and many others. In this

context, Galileo’s Error makes an important contribution, being, as far as I know, the only book-

length popular discussion of panpsychism besides David Skrbina’s (2005). Goff is certainly

well-credentialed to write such a book, being an active participant in the relevant debates, and

having an impressive publication record in this area. In particular, he has already authored

another book on panpsychism, titled Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017). Many of the

themes that the reader encounters in Galileo’s Error, receive a more technical treatment in that

previous book, which also serves to defend a somewhat more specific panpsychist position than

Galileo’s Error (ibid., p. 20). The more recent book has a somewhat broader scope, in that it

provides criticisms not only of the standard materialist positions, but also of dualist views.

The outlines of Goff’s argument are easily traceable through the book’s organization into

chapters. Chapter 1 provides preliminary clarifications regarding the nature of consciousness

and science. In particular, we learn that Galileo, insofar as he regarded ‘natural science [as]

essentially quantitative’, while acknowledging that ‘the qualitative cannot be explained in terms

of the quantitative’, barred consciousness from being scientifically studied (2019, p. 21): ‘Galileo’s

error was to commit us to a theory of nature which entailed that consciousness was essentially

and inevitably mysterious’ (ibid., p. 22). This sets the stage for Goff’s endeavor to correct

Galileo’s error, by making headway towards an adequate scientific account of consciousness.

In Chapter 2, Goff provides a critique of dualism, mainly by considering the so-called

interaction problem, viz., how to account for the causal interactions between the mental and the

physical realms. He argues that in order for the dualist position to be tenable, an account of a
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fundamental psycho-physical law is needed (ibid., p. 35). He believes that the jury is still out in

regard to the acceptability of dualism, but due to the inherent complexity of dualist accounts,

there is, on balance, reason to prefer non-dualist alternatives.

In Chapter 3 he accordingly considers the materialist alternative, but only to determine

that it fares significantly worse than dualism, insofar as it is self-contradictory, ‘Materialists

who claim both that reality can be exhaustively captured in the quantitative language of

physical science and that there is quality-rich consciousness contradict themselves’ (ibid., p. 68).

He takes the well-known knowledge argument (involving a fictional character called Black and

White Mary) and zombie argument to amount to versions of this charge, and discusses both in

considerable detail, concluding that the materialist responses have not been convincing. That

includes the eliminativist (or “illusionist”) response, i.e., denying the reality of consciousness

and declaring it to be a mere illusion—a strategy for which Goff professes a certain amount of

grudging respect, viz., as more principled than the standard materialist accounts, which simply

want to ‘have their cake and eat it too’ (ibid., p. 105).

In Chapter 4, Goff presents a defense of the panpsychist position, reliant upon Arthur

Eddington’s and Bertrand Russell’s views to the effect that mathematical physics fails to capture

the intrinsic nature of fundamental subatomic reality, insofar as ‘[t]here is nothing beyond the

equations, and hence no resources with which to define what ‘mass’, ‘charge’, etc., are.

Mathematical physics simply does not have the resources to tell us what the basic features of

the physical world are’ (ibid., pp. 124-25). This means that physical reality is fundamentally

mysterious—unlike consciousness, which really ought to be regarded as a familiar, accessible

first-personal datum, ‘the only bit of physical reality we really understand’ (Ibid., p. 131). So,

instead of a seemingly intractable Problem of Consciousness, we really should be worried about

a Problem of Intrinsic Natures (ibid., pp. 131-32). However, a panpsychist solution is at hand:

the intrinsic nature of physical reality is consciousness. Thus, ‘the physical properties of a

particle (mass, spin, charge, etc.) are themselves forms of consciousness’ (ibid., p. 136). Yet, for

this solution to be acceptable, panpsychism needs to deal with the vexatious ‘combination
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problem’, ‘How do you get from little conscious things, like fundamental particles, to big

conscious things, like human brains’ (ibid., p. 144)? It is widely accepted as being the most

serious challenge for panpsychism, and Goff does not pretend to have a ready solution for it. He

does, however, point us to what he regards as two promising avenues, viz., involving the study

of ‘split-brain’ patients and their disunified consciousnesses, and the study of ‘quantum

entanglement’ in physics (ibid., p. 148). The main point is that although we have yet to make

decisive headway on the combination problem, it should be assessed as much more tractable

than the ‘hard’ problems of dualism and materialism, discussed in the book’s previous chapters.

Indeed, Goff regards several different versions of panpsychism as showing more promise than

either dualism or materialism (ibid., 170-72).

It remains, in Chapter 5, to discuss certain upshots of the panpsychist view. It would be

unfortunate if a book like Galileo’s Error were to leave its readers with panpsychism as merely

the least problematic solution to certain relatively arcane metaphysical and scientific problems.

Goff therefore undertakes to consider its relevance to various practical and existential issues. He

argues that it provides us with a mindset that could help deal with the ongoing global warming

crisis, insofar as embracing a panpsychist perspective will enable people to feel a greater affinity

with the universe, in stark contrast with the alienation that goes with dualism (including the

crypto-dualism of many materialists), thereby moving them to more decisively counter the

environmental problems. He next argues that panpsychism will likely prove more successful

than materialism in upholding our free will. Lastly, he also suggests that there is room for an

interesting dialogue between panpsychist philosophers and practitioners of some of the world’s

religions, to account for mystical experiences of a ‘formless consciousness’, which suggest that

at some level we are all one, and open up possibilities for grounding the objectivity of ethics

(ibid., p. 213). However, it should be added that while Goff regards such forms of spirituality as

a possible area of application for his views, he approaches them with considerable reservations

(ibid., p. 214).
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I wish to make two critical comments on the book. First, given that Goff presents

panpsychism as an alternative to materialism and dualism, the reader (not necessarily a

professional philosopher) may well wonder how the view relates to idealism, the third member

of the traditional trichotomy of metaphysical views. Is Goff’s panpsychism a kind of idealism in

disguise? Is it a fourth position beside the three traditional metaphysical camps? Can it be

combined with one or more of these three views? While Goff could have devoted a chapter to

idealism, and used it to contextualize his views with respect to swathes of traditional

philosophy, to the edification of his readers, I saw no mention of idealism at all in the book. If

we turn to Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, we find Goff defending ‘anti-idealist monism’

(2017, p. 1) and making critical remarks on idealism (ibid., p. 163). However, later in the text he

comments, with regard to what appears to be his preferred view, ‘Some might be tempted to

describe cosmopsychism as ‘idealism’. But if we can conceive of it as a form of constitutive

Russellian monism, then we can equally [sic!] describe it as a form of materialism’ (ibid., p. 235).

These remarks are certainly intriguing—especially as, in some of the recent literature, idealist

views have been regarded as attractive options for the panpsychist (Chalmers, 2020; Meixner,

2017). It could have been helpful if Goff had included the topic of idealism in the purview of

Galileo’s Error.

Second, Goff’s view is closely associated with commitments in the philosophy of science

which his readers may prefer not to incur. I glean from Goff’s discussion that, unlike the

materialist (or physicalist), the naturalist panpsychist is committed to a strong form of scientific

realism. Goff’s defense of panpsychism therefore needs to involve an argument to the effect that

his view is preferable to the structural realist and empiricist alternatives. Goff does address this

issue to some extent, e.g., as he devotes a section to arguing that ‘causal structuralism’ is an

unstable view (2019, pp. 175-81). In considering whether Goff succeeds in supporting his view,

it should be kept in mind that elsewhere in the book, he emphatically endorses Eddington’s and

Russell’s views, which are considered as forms of structural realism. However, his idea is that

their criticisms only apply to Galilean science, as opposed to a post-Galilean science which is
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able to overcome the limitations of its predecessor primarily by tapping into a new a source of

first-personal evidence, pertinent to the intrinsic nature of matter,

I have but one small window into the intrinsic nature of matter: I know that the
intrinsic nature of the matter inside my brain involves consciousness. I know this
because I am directly aware of the reality of my own consciousness. And,
assuming that dualism is false, this reality I am directly aware of is at least part
of the intrinsic nature of my brain (ibid., p. 130).
I leave it to the reader of this review to decide as to the plausibility of this crucial idea. But

clearly there are philosophers, e.g., phenomenologists in the Husserlian tradition, who take

consciousness no less ‘seriously’ than Goff, but who might not be prepared to accept his

audacious claims regarding the reach of first-personal evidence.

In order to fully address these issues, Goff might have had to considerably complicate

his discussion. Yet, one can hardly find fault with him for opting to avoid such digressive

complication in this book, and to organize his discussion of panpsychism along more

straightforward lines, to the benefit of a broad readership. Galileo’s Error is a masterfully

executed work that fills a gap in the literature on panpsychism.

References

Chalmers, D. (2020) Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem. In William E. Seager, Ed., The

Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism (pp. 353-73), New York: Routledge.

Goff, P. (2017) Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Goff, P. (2019) Galileo's Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, London: Rider.

Meixner, U. (2017) Idealism and Panpsychism. In Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla,

Eds, Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 387-406). Oxford, UK: Oxford

University Press.

Seager, W. E. (2020) Introduction: A Panpsychist Manifesto. In William E. Seager, Ed., The

Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism (pp. 1-12), New York: Routledge.

Skrbina, D. (2005) Panpsychism in the West, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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