Behaviorism

Three kinds of claims about mental states

Knowledge claim
How do you know that your friend is sad?

Semantic claim
What does the word sad mean?

Metaphysical claim
What is sadness?
Three kinds of claims about mental states

Knowledge claim
How do you know that your friend is sad?

Behaviorism:
Because your friend cries
or says things like “I am sad”
Three kinds of claims about mental states

Semantic claim
What does the word sad mean?

Behaviorism:
the meanings of such words can be spelled out
in terms of behaviour.
having, or being prone to have,
behaviours such as crying or
saying things like “I am sad”
Three kinds of claims about mental states

Metaphysical claim
What is sadness?

Behaviorism:
Reduction - sadness just is a kind of behaviour
or behavioural disposition
Elimination - no such thing as a mental state
of sadness. what exists instead
are certain behaviours or
dispositions.
 Appeal of behaviorism
The question that is easy to answer
“How do I know that others have mental states?”

The question that is not easy to answer (for behaviorism)

“How do I know that I have mental states?”

How do I know that I am sad?

Answer-1:
because I am crying and uttering “I am sad”
Answer-2:
because I simply feel sad
 If behaviorism is true . . .
1. Mental privacy is a myth
Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a box”

From the point of view of someone on

“the outside” your sensations might be
very different or altogether missing
- zombie and inverted qualia thought-exp

Wittgenstein’s stronger point

Even for you, you might as well
have no sensations.
 Private language argument
Thought experiment
You devise a language with which you could keep a diary
of your own private sensations, a language that only you understand.
• Wittgenstein: No! It is impossible for there to be a language about sensations
that could only be understood by a single person.

Languages are necessarily public. The things that we refer to using language are also public.
 If behaviorism is true . . .
2. It is a category mistake to treat the mind as a kind of thing
the mistake of treating something that belongs in one logical or conceptual
category as if it belongs in another
e.g. a dance is not a thing separate from the dancer

Imagine taking your uncle on a campus tour

After the tour, your uncle says
“Thank you for showing me the library,
LHC, sports complex, hostels, etc.
But when are you going to show
me IIT Delhi?”
 If behaviorism is true . . .
3. Intelligent actions are not preceded by some episode of thinking

Ryle’s regress argument the component should be glued in this way

1. Suppose you perform an action A

2. Actions are preceded by thoughts
thought Intelligent
3. A is preceded by an act of thinking A’ episode action
4. A’ is an action
5. Actions are preceded by thoughts
6. A’ is preceded by an act of thinking A’’
7. A’’ is an action
8. …
 How to avoid the regress

Knowing-that vs knowing-how the component should be glued in this way

Thought episode: Knowing

I know that the component should be glued in this way
- propositional knowledge
Second kind of knowledge: procedural
I know how to glue the component
- knowledge from having an ability

Knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that

 Avoiding the regress
1. Suppose you perform an action A
2. To perform an action you need to know how to perform that action
3. You know how to perform action A
4. Knowledge-how is not grounded in knowledge-that
5. knowledge-how is not grounded in any thought
 First objection to behaviorism - semantic
Is an objection against the semantics of mental terms given by behaviorism
e.g. ‘fear of dogs’ = having a disposition for dog avoiding behavior
If this is a definition, 2 claims should be true
It is inconceivable that You have a fear of dogs, but you are not disposed to avoid dogs
It is inconceivable that You are disposed to avoid dogs, but you do not fear dogs
Now consider ‘red quale’ Qr= having a disposition for behaving in certain ways, Dred
If this is a definition, 2 inconceivability claims should be true
You have Qred and your friend does not have Qred, but both of you have Dred (Inv spec thought-exp)
Both you and your friend have Qred, but you have Dred and your friend does not have Dred
 Second objection to behaviorism - epistemic
Is an objection against the explanatory power of behaviorism
Behavior needs explanation. Mental states explain behavior. Else circularity.

1st example:
“Maximum temperature in Delhi can reach 48 degree Celsius” vs
- an expression of a belief or a thought
- Thought causes speech (verbal behavior)
thought and the speech have roughly the same content
2nd example:
Difference between Genuine intentional action and involuntary reflexive motion
explained by the mental state of plaining / having an intention or goal
 Third objection to behaviorism - metaphysical
Is an objection against the way mental states are connected to behavior
e.g. You are afraid of tigers. There’s a tiger nearby. How will you behave?
Depends on whether you believe that there is a tiger nearby.
Maybe you have not seen it yet. Or maybe you think it is a prank.
‘being afraid of tigers’ ≠ tiger avoiding behavior
‘being afraid of tigers’ + ’believing there is a tiger nearby’ = tiger avoiding behavior
e.g. You believe there is a tiger near you. How will you behave?
Depends on whether: you believe tigers are friendly, you desire to pet tigers, …
’believing that there is a tiger nearby’ ≠ tiger avoiding behavior
Identifying a mental state in terms of behavior, requires appeal to other mental states, which in
turn can be identified in terms of behavior only by reference to yet other mental states
--- circularity or regress?
Knowing other minds based on knowing your mind
1. I know that I have a mind and various mental states.
2. My mental states are correlated with behaviors
3. Other human bodies display analogous behaviors
4. ∴ Other human bodies are similar to you in having a mind and mental states
The problem:
Hasty generalization: you are making a generalization about billions of people
based on only one case – your own.
Is there a need for multiple cases as long as a link between mental states and
behavior is established?
Similar effects (behavior) have similar causes (mental states) ?
Similar causes (mental states) have similar effects (behavior) ?
 Knowing other minds without appealing to
knowledge of your own mind
Why deny the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds?
1. Appeal to behaviorism
you know your own mind in the same way that you know the minds of others,
namely, via knowledge of bodily behaviours.
problem: everything wrong with behaviorism
2. Appeal to ‘inference to the best explanation’
Knowledge of minds is similar to knowledge contained in a scientific theory
Knowledge of minds is part of a theory (folk psychology)
There are mental states such as beliefs and sensations
- explains certain patterns of behavior
problem?
Mind as Brain
Mental states are identical to brain states
What kind of identity?
Numerical
What kind of knowledge is “Mind is identical to brain (M=B)”?
a posteriori knowledge (M=B is an a posteriori identity statement)
a priori / a posteriori: a distinction about the way we know truths
Knowing something a priori means to know something without appealing to
sensory experience or observation. e.g. X is identical to X.
Knowing something a posteriori means to know something only by appealing to
sensory experience or observation. e.g. X is identical to Y.
‘water=H20’, ‘heat=avg molecular kinetic energy’, ‘lightning=electrical discharge’
To Know M=B, you cannot merely rely on the meaning of the words. Only
through scientific inquiry will you come to know of its truth.
Mental states are identical to brain states
Like behaviorism, it denies dualism and is therefore a physicalist theory
Qualia are not physical properties but one and the same as certain brain properties
But unlike behaviorism, it doesn’t identify mental states with outward behavior
Mental states are “inside” the body

Negative argument for identity theory (advantages over rival theories)

1. Problems with dualism
interaction, qualia are causally inert, not consistent with scientific worldview,
why my mind has an effect only on my body? why brain damage affects only your mind?
2. Problem with idealism/solipsism/panpsychism
contrary to common sense
3. Problems with behaviorism
contrary to the fact that mental states are causes of behavior
A positive argument for identity theory
Occam’s razor
Dualism: two kinds of things/properties, Identity theory: only one
Identity theory is simpler and since simpler theories should be preferred,
identity theory is true
(assuming that the only other alternative is dualism)
Solipsism: The only thing that exists is your mind
Identity theory: You mind exists. Other minds exist. The external world exists.
Solipsism should be preferred since it is simpler.

The question of which theory is simplest is itself not so simple!

What we know about the brain
Information is relayed, processed, and stored in the nervous system
Central nervous system (brain + spinal cord): most directly involved in cognition
Peripheral nervous system relays signals between senses and muscular systems
Cerebral cortex - complex and large in humans
posterior cortex: sensory processing, especially vision
frontal cortex: motor processing and executive functions
Neurons which relay electrochemical signals to one another. Synaptic activity.
‘Firing’ – emitting of action potential. Different types of neurons.
Neuroscience: observing spared and impaired functions associated with damage,
fMRI (neurally active regions require more oxygenated blood), measuring electrical activity
from electrodes placed on the scalp or sensors inserted directly to the neurons.
Localism and holism
Are there brain regions that perform particular cognitive functions?
a specific brain region for language, a different region for memory, and still a different one for vision

Localism: Yes.
Holism: No.
Extreme version: A function is performed by the whole brain. Every part contributes.
Damage to part results in overall degradation in cognitive functioning.

Moderate version:
E.g. damage in a visual cortex affects ability to consciously perceive the
shapes of objects. Other aspects of vision not affected. Non-visual cognition
not affected.
Neural correlates of experience
We are not only interested to know where in the nervous system conscious
mental states are localized, but also what sorts of neural activity are most
closely correlated with these states.
e.g. Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC)
”pain and c-fibre firing”
There is agreement that
consciousness can be localized somewhere in the cortex.
There is disagreement about
where mental states are localized? (or also what kind of neural activity?)
E.g. Is visual experience localized only in the posterior cortex or whether
it also involves some areas in the frontal cortex?
First argument against Mind–Brain Identity Theory
Type / token distinction
Two possible answers to the question How many words in ”The dog bit the cat”
5: there are five word tokens
4: there are four word types
Jack and Jill have both been bitten by wasps and are in pain.
Identity theory is not saying that Jack’s pain = Jack’s c-fibre firing
Possible that Jill’s q-fibres are firing
Jack’s pain and Jill’s pain are
two mental state tokens of the same mental state-type.

The mind–brain identity theory is a thesis about types.

M=B means M-type is (numerically) identical to B-type
Multiple realizability
Difference between water and container with water
Containers are multiply realizable. Water is not.
Containers have multiple physical realizations - glass, copper, steel, etc.
Only one physical way to realize water - chemical structure H20
‘sample of water’ type = ‘sample of H20’ type
‘container’ type is not identical to any specifiable type
Suppose ‘container’ type = ‘thing made of steel’ type
If so, every token of ‘container’ is also a token of ‘thing made of steel’
But there are containers not made of steel
So ‘container’ type ≠ ‘thing made of steel’ type
Second argument against Mind–Brain Identity Theory
Are minds/mental states more like water or containers?
Minds, like containers, are multiply realizable
Incredibly different nervous systems
Physical property that gives rise to pain
Human: c-fibre firing
Octopus: o-fibre firing
The human and the octopus are in the same type of mental state.
They are both in pain
Since a mental state type ≠ a physical state type, the identity theory is false.
Third argument against Mind–Brain Identity Theory
Statements of mind–brain identity are a posteriori
“Morning star” (MS) – a bright heavenly object that rises in the morning
“Evening star” (ES) – a bright heavenly object that rises in the evening
Neither is actually a star. They are one and the same as the planet Venus.
“The morning star is identical to the evening star”
- Is this statement know a priori or a posteriori?
If it is known a posteriori, MS and ES don’t have the same meaning
- Expressions MS and ES refer to distinct properties
MS refers to “Venus being a bright heavenly object that rises in the morning”
ES refers to “Venus being a bright heavenly object that rises in the evening”
Two distinct properties associated with every a posteriori identity statement
Third argument against Mind–Brain Identity Theory
Mental states are identical to brain states (M=B)
- an a posteriori identity statement
There are the two distinct properties associated with M=B
e.g. pain = c-fibre firing
‘c-fibre firing’ refers to a certain property, say P1
P1: some electrochemical property detectible via scientific methods
‘pain’ refers to another distinct certain property, say P2
P2: subjective painfulness
- pain quale
But this is property dualism!
Property Dualism
Tension between 2 ideas

Qualia vs Physicalism (all properties are physical properties)

Physicalist: Mental properties are really just a kind of physical property

- just a special kind of brain property
 Experience of red

Experience of red
Explanatory gap arguments for property dualism
Explanatory gap arguments for property dualism
Explanatory gap arguments for property dualism
Explanatory gap arguments for property dualism
Explanatory gap arguments for property dualism
 Thought experiments
that motivate property dualism
In science, we use empirical experiments
Thought experiments are based on the same principle
But the variables being tested in thought are altered only conceptually
or in imagination.
Not the same as thinking or imaging conducting an empirical experiment

Empirical expts – knowledge from empirical observation or data

- knowledge of the natural world
Thought expts – knowledge from merely thinking about imagined scenarios
- empirical knowledge?
The real experiment

• Do things look a little darker out of one and

lighter out of the other?
• Is there a slight shift in the colors?
The real experiment
The real experiment
 Inverted spectrum thought experiment
You wake up one morning and notice a
systematic change in the colours of objects

No one else seems to notice this difference

The meaning of your colour vocabulary

starts to change
 Inverted spectrum thought experiment

Now imagine you get amnesia and forget about have noticed the systematic
change in colours that you perceive
You talk about colours and discriminate colours like everyone else!
What if you were born that way?
Inverted spectrum thought experiment

What norma perceives

What Ingrid perceives

Inverted spectrum thought experiment

What norma perceives

What Ingrid perceives

Inverted spectrum based modal argument for
property dualism
Philosophical zombie thought experiment

Ingrid
Norma

Not just behaviorally similar. Internal brain states are also similar.
• Ingrid’s lack of qualia in no way prevents her from acting the way Norma does.
Like Norma, when shown a lime and asked its color, Ingrid will reply “green.”
- consider the information processing that takes place in a calculator or a computer
- does not give rise to conscious experiences and their associated qualia
Philosophical zombie thought experiment

Ingrid
Norma
Philosophical zombie thought experiment

Ingrid
Norma
Philosophical zombie based modal argument
for property dualism
 How do you know you are not a zombie?
Property dualism about qualia makes you wonder whether others are zombies

• zombies can have lots of other aspects of mentality, aspects such as thought,
judgment, and belief
Can you have such mental states without being conscious?
How do you know you are not a zombie?
 Mary’s room thought experiment

Mary knows all the scientific facts about the colour red including its neuroscience
However, Mary has never seen the colour red
Mary’s room thought experiment

Is there anything that, in never having had an experience of red,

Mary doesn’t know?
How do we come to know about Qualia?
Knowledge by description
e.g. Suppose you have not seen the Japanese flag and doesn’t
know what it looks like. I can describe the flag to you and you
can identify it when shown pictures of different flags.
Knowledge by acquaintance
e.g. Suppose I attempt to explain the Japanese flag to a person
who is congenitally blind. Would this person be able to identify
red?
We can come to know what it is like (redness), but only by undergoing
the experience ourselves. Thus, we know it only by acquaintance.
Mary’s room based knowledge argument for
property dualism
Objections against the knowledge argument
Against premise 1 (If physicalism is true, Mary knows everything…)
Is all knowledge, knowledge of facts (“knowledge-that”) ?
Perhaps Mary lacks procedural knowledge (“knowledge-how”)
Mary lacks know-how of recognizing or imagining red

Against premise 2 (Mary does not know everything…)

Mary’s neuroscientific knowledge does suffice for her to know what it’s
like to have experiences of red even though she hasn’t yet undergone
those experiences.
What if we accept property dualism?
Similar to the interaction problem for substance dualism

Qualia can’t do anything

– causally inert or non-efficacious
e.g. a ball’s colour is not causally efficacious for breaking the window
What if we accept property dualism?

- too contrary to common sense?

Solipsism, Idealism and
Panpsychism
Solipsism
Is solipsism true?
First argument for solipsism

Premise 2 alone cannot establish solipsism. Why?

Second argument for solipsism

What’s the problem with premise 1?

What about premise 2?

Is nihilism a simpler hypothesis?
Descartes: I know for certain that I exist
- include in the argument for solipsism?
First argument against solipsism

What is “patterns of regularity in experience”?

What is the best explanation of patterns of regularity in experience?

“An appeal to something in experience won’t give an explanation of experience”

Second argument against solipsism
What do these arguments establish?

Something external to my mind must exist

Is it necessary that it is something physical?

Arguing against solipsism by appealing to science
Idealism
Everything is mind-dependent
everything that exists is either itself a mind or is some idea depending on a mind
(or some other mentally dependent thing).

Some things are mind-dependent

some (though not all) things are either minds or depend for their existence on minds.
- trivial cases
- “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.”
no one is beautiful unless someone perceives him or her as beautiful.

what would realism about beauty be?

First argument for idealism
Berkeley’s argument from pain
When wounded by a knife, painfulness exists in the mind of the person who is wounded
Second argument for idealism

Berkeley’s argument from perceptual relativity

Third argument for idealism

Berkeley’s argument from resemblance

Fourth argument for idealism

Berkeley’s master argument

we cannot even conceive of anything existing mind-independently
Fourth argument for idealism

Can you imagine or conceive of a tree (or any material object) existing
without it being thought about?

You might think you have succeeded in conceiving of a tree that is not being
thought about

But in the process of conceiving the tree, you are thinking about it!
Fourth argument for idealism
Berkeley’s master argument
P1: If material objects exist, then material objects exist independently of any mind’s
thinking of them.
P2: If material objects exist independently of any mind’s thinking of them, then it is
conceivable that material objects exist without any mind thinking of them.
P3: If material objects exist, then it is conceivable that material objects exist without
any mind thinking of them. [from P1 and P2: hypothetical syllogism]
P4: It is not the case that it is conceivable that material objects exist without
any mind thinking of them.
C: It is not the case that material objects exist [from P3 and P4: modus tollens]
Arguments against idealism
Panpsychism

• mind is a fundamental aspect of reality

Opposing view: Mentality is not fundamental

- there is no mentality at all (eliminativism)
- mentality emerges from the physical (emergentism)

The challenge:

You avoid the explanatory gap issue by adopting panpsychism

First argument for panpsychism
Analogy argument

Other animals are sufficiently analogous in their structure and behavior

to regard as having minds.- perception, memory, will (decision-making)

What about plants and single-celled organisms such as bacteria?

First argument for panpsychism
Analogy argument

What about inanimate objects?

First argument for panpsychism
Analogy argument

What about inanimate objects?

If women can be railroad workers in Russia,
why can’t they fly in space?

X is like Y

X is similar to Y in every way?

X is relevantly similar to Y
Valentina Tereshkova
Second argument for panpsychism
Nothing can come from nothing argument

The universe is made of fundamental particles studied by physicists

particles like the protons, neutrons, and electrons. They make up the
chemicals in your brain and rest of your body.

Each particle in your brain individually lacks consciousness. However, by

being arranged in a special way, those particles thereby give rise to your
consciousness.

• how can a bunch of particles, each of which by itself does not have a
mind, combine to give rise to my mind?
Fallacy of composition

Inferring that something is true of the whole

from the fact that it is true of some or all
parts of that whole

Atoms cannot be seen with the naked eye

This table is made up of atoms

So, this table cannot be seen with the naked eye

Third argument for panpsychism
Evolutionary argument

In this historical progression where we can “draw a line” separating the

minded from the un-minded?
Line-drawing fallacy

P1: 1 grain of sand does not make a heap.

P2: If 1 grain of sand does not make a heap, then 2 grains don’t.
P3: If 2 grains of sand don’t make a heap, then 3 grains don’t.
…
P4: If 999999 grains of sand don’t make a heap, then 1 million grains of sand don’t.
C: One million grains of sand don’t make a heap.

A concept is vague when it can generate a sorites argument

heap, bald, tall, old

mind?
Argument against panpsychism
The combination problem: nothing can come from nothing argument
applied against panpsychism

Panpsychism asks: how can a bunch of particles, each of which by itself

does not have a mind, combine to give rise to my mind?
Their view is: individual particles that make up my body and brain
each have their own consciousness - a simpler form of
consciousness.
Panpsychism’s response to the problem
Substance dualism
Arguments that employ Leibniz’s law
• Leibniz’s law: For any entities x and y, if they’re identical, then any
property one of them has, the other has too.

• What kind of identity?

• What kinds of entities?

• What kinds of properties?

• Does the law rule out the possibility of a things changing properties
over time?
Applying Leibniz’s law

1. The person who made the graffiti on the wall is right-handed

2. I am not right-handed
3. So I am not the person who made the graffiti on the wall

“x is F, but y is G, so x isn’t identical to y” – application of Leibniz’s law?

Maybe x and y are both F and G

If x does have some property F, we should be checking whether y lacks that

property F
Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism
1. Physical objects (brains, bodies) all take up space.
2. But minds are mental.
3. So minds are not physical objects.

1. Physical objects (brains, bodies) all take up space.

2. But minds do not take up space.
3. So minds are not physical objects.

1. The holy text says that God exists

2. Nothing that is written in the holy text is false
3. So God exists.
Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism
1. Minds are capable of thoughts and sensation.
2. But physical objects aren’t capable of thoughs and sensation.
3. So minds are not identical to any physical object.

1. My brain weighs 1.4 kg

2. My mind doesn’t weigh 1.4kg.
3. So my mind is not identical to my brain.

1. My brain has parts (it “is divisible”).

2. My mind doesn’t have parts.
3. So my mind is not identical to my brain.
Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism
1. My pet cat is in my mind — I’m thinking of him right now.
2. My pet cat is not in my brain — how could he fit? Go ahead and cut it
open, I guarantee you won’t find him there.
3. So my mind has a property — having my pet cat in it — that my brain lacks.
4. So my mind is not identical to my brain.
“My pet cat is in my mind” vs “My pet cat is not in my brain”
My pet cat is in my mind vs My pet cat is not in my brain
In 1, “in my mind” = thinking about
Equivocation
In 2, “ not in the brain” = not spatially inside
Non-dualist: you must “in” consistently, with a single meaning
 Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism
1. My mind is thinking about my cat
2. My brain can’t think about my cat – because it is physical.
3. So my mind has a property — thinking about my cat — that my brain lacks.
4. So my mind is not identical to my brain.

If you are simply stating a property that the mind has but physical objects lack
(or what property it is that physical objects have but the mind lacks),
the argument is going to be question-begging

When it’s seemed otherwise, it was because the dualist was equivocating.
 Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism
1. I have some special (privileged or “first personal”) access to my own mind.
I and only I can know my own mind’s properties without evidence, observation, or
inference.
No one can be in a better position than me to know what mental properties I have.
I can’t be mistaken about my own mind’s properties.
I can’t intelligibly doubt whether my own mind exists: that is, I can’t imagine
everything seeming the same right now, but my mind not existing.
2. I don’t have that kind of access to anyone else’s mind, nor to facts about my brain or
body or physical environment.
3. So my own mind has a property — being accessible to me in this special way — that
physical objects lack.
4. So my mind is not identical to any physical object.
1. Physical bodies are spatial minds are not.
1. Physical bodies are spatial minds are not.
2. Minds are thinking things, physical bodies are not.
3. Minds have intentionality, physical bodies don’t.
4. Minds have phenomenal properties. Not bodies.
5. Minds can be know with certainty. Not bodies.
 Using Leibniz’s law to argue for dualism

1. I can’t intelligibly doubt whether my mind exists right now. Obviously it exists: and even if my
mind somehow managed to doubt whether it existed, it would have to exist in order to do so
2. I can intelligibly doubt whether physical objects exist right now. Maybe I’m in some kind
of Matrix, and everything seems real, but it’s all an illusion. That at least makes sense.
3. So physical objects are such that I can intelligibly doubt their existence — I can at
least imagine them not existing even though everything seems the same — but my mind
lacks that property.
4. So my mind can’t be identical to any physical object.
The intensional fallacy
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Justification vs Explanation
Giving reasons for believing that it occurs
Explaining why a particular phenomenon occurs
P: Distant galaxies are receding away from us at high velocities
Is P true?
Light from those galaxies are red shifted [evidence]
why is P true?
Big Bang [understanding]
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Qualia
Red vs Experience of red
The intrinsic quality of mental states
Introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives

Suppose q is the qualia of M(C) – mental state M with content C

M: perceptual experience, bodily sensation, emotion, mood, etc.
Is q a property of M?
Is q a property of C?
Is q a property of the relation between M and C?
Is q something else?
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Arguments that appeal to explanatory gaps
Problem with arguments that appeal to
explanatory gaps
Problem with arguments that appeal to
explanatory gaps
Modal Arguments
Modal Arguments
Problem with modal Arguments

Reply:
The interaction problem for substance dualism
The interaction problem for substance dualism
The interaction problem for substance dualism
 Responses to the interaction problem for
substance dualism
• Deny that the mind- interacts with the body

• Occasionalism: God intervenes at each step in a version of continual creation.

• Parallelism: God created 2 parallel streams – mental and physical
Assuming God exists, are there any problems for this view?
May be the mind is not a substance?

Substance: bearer of properties

Perhaps you are just one “thing” or substance.

- physical properties
- mental properties (what we refer to as mind or mental aspects)

Dualism about properties

- mental properties are not identical to physical properties
- mental properties are not reducible to physical properties