POLITICS

Conflict Phase (August 24, 1946-December 19, 1955): The Hukbalahap Movement (Huks) headed
by Luis Taruc rebelled against the government beginning on August 24, 1946. President Manuel
Acuña Roxas survived an attempted assassination in Manila on March 10, 1947. The U.S. government
provided military assistance (weapons, equipment, 58 military advisors) to the government of the
Philippines beginning on March 14, 1947. President Roxas declared the Hukbalahap Movement as a
“subversive organization” on March 6, 1948. President Roxas died on April 16, 1948, and
Vice-President Elpidio Rivera Quirino of the PLP was sworn in as president on April 17, 1948.
President Quirino granted a general amnesty to Huk rebels from June 21 to August 15, 1948, during
which government and Hukbalahap Movement representatives held negotiations in Manila. Twelve
individuals, including the widow of former President Manuel Acuña Roxas, were killed by Huk rebels
north of Manila on April 28, 1949. Legislative elections were held on November 8, 1949, and the
PLP won 60 out of 100 seats in the House of Representatives. President Quirino of the PLP was
re-elected with 51 percent of the vote on November 8, 1949, and he was inaugurated for a four-year
term on December 30, 1949. Some 34 individuals were killed in election-related violence. The
government suppressed a Nacionalistas rebellion led by General Medrano in the Batangas province
between November 19, 1949 and January 4, 1950. Huk rebels attacked targets near Manila on March
29-April 3, 1950. Government troops and Huk rebels clashed north of Manila on April 14-15, 1950,
resulting in the deaths of some 320 rebels. Huk rebels attacked Camp Macabulos-Tarlac on August
26, 1950, resulting in the deaths of twenty-five government soldiers and several civilians. Some 300
Huk rebels led by Pedro Caguin attacked targets near Manila on August 26, 1950, resulting in the
deaths of 15 rebels and three government soldiers. Some 1,268 Huk rebels were killed by government
troops between April and December 1950. The Philippines government signed a mutual defense
agreement with the U.S. government on August 30, 1951. Some 2,000 Huk rebels were killed by
government troops in 1951. William Pomeroy, one of the leaders of the Huk rebellion, was captured
by government soldiers on March 14, 1952, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on June 18,
1952. Government troops and Huk rebels clashed north of Manila on December 8, 1952, resulting in
the deaths of 14 individuals. Carlos Romulo established the Democratic Party (DP) on May 29, 1953.
Legislative elections were held on November 10, 1953, and the PLP won 59 out of 102 seats in the
House of Representatives. The Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista – PN) won 31 seats in the
House of Representatives. Ramon Magsaysay of the PN-DP coalition was elected president on
November 10, 1953. Some 20 individuals were killed in election-related violence. Luis Taruc
surrendered to government troops on May 17, 1954. Government troops finally suppressed the Huk
rebellion on December 19, 1955. Some 11,300 individuals, including 9,700 rebels and 1,600
government soldiers, were killed during the conflict.
Post-Conflict Phase (December 20, 1955-March 28, 1969): President Magsaysay was killed in an
airplane crash on March 17, 1957, and Vice-President Carlos Garcia of the PN was sworn in as
president on March 18, 1957. Legislative elections were held on November 12, 1957, and the PN
won 82 out of 102 seats in the House of Representatives. The PLP won 19 seats in the House of
Representatives. President Garcia was re-elected with 41 percent of the vote on November 12, 1957,
and he was inaugurated for a four-year term on December 30, 1957. Legislative elections were held
on November 14, 1961, and the PN won 74 out of 102 seats in the House of Representatives. The
PLP won 29 seats in the House of Representatives. Diosdado Macapagal of the PLP was elected
president with 55 percent of the vote on November 14, 1961, and he was inaugurated as president on
December 30, 1961. Eighteen individuals were killed in election-related violence in 1961. Legislative
elections were held on November 9, 1965, and the PLP won 61 out of 104 seats in the House of
Representatives. The PN won 38 seats in the House of Representatives. Ferdinand Marcos of the PN
was elected president with 52 percent of the vote on November 9, 1965. Forty-eight individuals were
killed in political violence between October 1 and November 9, 1965. The Communist Party of the
Philippines – Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML) was established by Jose Maria Sison in opposition to the
government on December 26, 1968. Government troops and communist rebels clashed in Bataan
province on January 9-10, 1969, resulting in the deaths of 17 rebels and one government soldier.
Government troops and communist rebels clashed near Santa Rosa on January 12, 1969, resulting in
the deaths of four rebels. Some 500 individuals were killed in political violence between December
1955 and March 1969.

The 1953 presidential elections

In the early 1950s, for example, President Elpidio Quirino was widely seen as having won
election in 194940 through unparalleled electoral fraud and violence which held many parts of the
Philippines in a ‘virtual reign of terror’ at the height of the campaign.41 Reports of rampant electoral
manipulation and blatant voter intimidation led to widespread disaffection with the electoral process
as evidenced by several post-election protests, including an armed uprising in a province close to
Manila,42 an unprecedented number of official election protests, and countless complaints of
terrorism and fraud.43 Quirino’s subsequent suspension of the elected mayors of Manila, Cebu and
Iloilo – then the most important cities in the Philippines – signalled similarly reckless disregard for the
existing rules of electoralism. A series of post-1949 developments in the realms of internal security
and economic policy provided further evidence of Quirino’s willingness and ability to expand – and
abuse – his executive prerogatives. For example, the merger of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) with
the Army removed PC forces from the political discretion of provincial governors.44 Moreover,
Quirino’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, essentially implemented to keep alleged Huk
sympathisers detained, was decried as ‘the hallmark of totalitarian dictatorships and the last resort of
corrupt … governments’.45 In the sphere of economic policy, the Quirino administration’s imposition
of exchange controls and involvement in corruption scandals (especially regarding the implementation
of such controls and the management of government-owned corporations) triggered criticisms of
arbitrary executive interference in the Philippine economy.46 Such charges of corruption, as well as
opposition to expanding government controls and credits in the first place, were identified with the
powerful sugar bloc and its politicking to secure continued access to the US market and to the
Philippine presidency after the 1953 national elections.47 Beyond corrupt implementation and
partisan jockeying lay the deeper concentration of government power in the realm of economic policy
institutionalised with the inauguration of the Central Bank in 1949. As a result, Quirino’s presidency
was the first under which the government, through the Central Bank, exercised enormous powers and
discretion in determining who should get import licences and allocations of foreign exchange; in
formulating the criteria on goods whose entry should be curtailed or banned; and in determining who
should get tax exemptions and other incentives. This presidential usurpation of powers in the early
1950s coincided with the previously noted problems of popular political participation which the
introduction of universal suffrage failed to resolve. In fact, the expansion of the political franchise
with formal independence in 1946 took place within a social context characterised by a deepening
‘disintegration of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship’ in the countryside due primarily to the
ongoing commercialisation of agriculture.49 In addition to market forces, the Second World War also
‘temporarily but severely weakened the gravitational pulls of the old Philippine institutional structure’
and, as a result, ‘pre-war vertical ties between gentry patrons and their peasant clients had become
unstuck during the occupation’.50 The expansion of formal political participation and the dislodging
of traditional patron–client ties presented the Philippine oligarchy with a dilemma stemming from the
need to incorporate peasants into political parties while preventing elections from serving as vehicles
for popular collective mobilisation. Significantly, after the 1946 congressional elections, six elected
candidates closely identified with peasant organisations and guerrilla networks in the densely
populated and intensively cultivated rice-bowl region of Central Luzon – and enjoying the support of
the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and the Civil Liberties Union – were barred from taking
their respective seats. The massive fraud and rampant violence visited upon Central Luzon during the
1947 local and 1949 national elections were linked to deliberate and concerted efforts at demobilising
the most significant counter-hegemonic challenge to locally entrenched oligarchic rule in the
Philippines at the time Against this backdrop of presidential continuismo and radical mobilisation, the
1953 elections saw the emergence of a transformist resolution to the emerging crisis. First of all,
Quirino found himself confronted by a ‘reformist’ candidate for the presidency in the person of
Ramon Magsaysay, a public figure widely credited with service as a guerrilla leader during the World
War II Japanese Occupation and with success in defeating the Huks during his tenure as Quirino’s
Secretary of Defense. Closely linked with CIA operative Col. Edward Landsdale and strongly backed
by the US Embassy, Magsaysay enjoyed enthusiastic American backing in terms of finance and
favourable media coverage as well as the nomination of the opposition Nacionalista Party (NP) and
the support of segments of the oligarchy fed up with and/or frightened by Quirino’s presidency.
Second, and in tandem with the Magsaysay-for-President-Movement (MPM), the National Movement
for Free Elections (NAMFREL) sounded the battlecry ‘protect the ballot and save the nation’ in the
early 1950s. In the months leading up to the 1953 presidential contest, NAMFREL organised
activities ranging from civic-consciousness caucuses and clean-election rallies to voter-registration
drives and election-watch efforts.55 Counting some ‘60 chapters in the provinces and chartered cities,
and about 500 municipal chapters with a total membership of 5,000 members’, this NAMFREL
campaign enjoyed considerable success in mobilising public support from among so-called
‘secondary associations’ at home, as well as in focusing media attention from both the international –
especially the American – and national press corps.56 With his votes protected by NAMFREL,
Magsaysay succeeded in defeating Quirino by a hefty margin and assuming the presidency in early
1954. Subsequent years saw the resumption of the pattern of colourless machine politics and
oligarchical rule which had preceded Quirino’s emergence and entrenchment and the Huks’
mobilisation in Central Luzon. The Magsaysay presidency (1954–57) saw the successful
demobilisation – and relocation – of the Huk insurgents, some rather tame efforts at reform (including
land reform legislation), and, with Magsaysay’s untimely death in an airplane accident in 1957, the
resumption of regular presidential turnover. Magsaysay’s vice-president, Carlos Garcia, was elected to
the presidency in November 1957 and served until his defeat at the hands of Diosdado Macapagal in
1961. Macapagal, in turn, failed in his bid for reelection in 1965, losing to Ferdinand Marcos, who
assumed the presidency in January 1966.

Most notable was the Retail Nationalisation Law enacted in the Philippines in 1954. Such
‘anti-Chinese’ policies persisted in the Philippines, Yoshihara argues, long after Bangkok’s strongman
General Sarit had embarked on a liberalisation of the Thai economy, hampering the potential for
Chinese-Filipino businessmen to deliver the same levels of investment and growth as their Sino-Thai
counterparts. Yet Yoshihara’s thesis looks far less persuasive if we consider the ease of assimilation,
possibilities for naturalisation, and opportunities for evasion open to Chinese-Filipino businessmen in
the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the dramatic easing of restrictions on naturalisation which came under
the Marcos regime in tandem with the recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1975. Political
office has long been open to the (naturalised) children of Chinese immigrants like the Chiongbian
brothers (shipping tycoons and Mindanao politicians) in the pre-martial law era and Alfredo ‘Freddy’
Lim (Manila Mayor, 1992–98) in more recent memory, and, countless ‘Chinese’ businessmen have
received special privileges thanks to the favour they enjoyed with Filipino presidents, as the case of
Lucio Tan during the Marcos and Estrada administration suggests.

SOURCE: https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/philippines-1946-present/
https://www.philstar.com/business/2018/10/24/1862529/forex-controls-1950s-philippine-economic-hi
story

https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/03_02_08.pdf

ECONOMY

Economic Development in the Philippines in the 1950s and 60s

Import restrictions stimulated the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing net domestic product (NDP)
at first grew rapidly, averaging 12 percent growth per annum in real terms during the first half of the
1950s, contributing to an average 7.7 percent growth in the GNP, a higher rate than in any
subsequent five-year period. The Philippines had entered an import-substitution stage of
industrialization, largely as the unintended consequence of a policy response to balance-of-payments
pressures. In the second half of the 1950s, the growth rate of manufacturing fell by about a third to
an average of 7.7 percent, and real GNP growth was down to 4.9 percent. Import demand outpaced
exports, and the allocation of foreign exchange was subject to corruption. Pressure mounted for a
change of policy. *

In 1962 the government devalued the peso and abolished import controls and exchange licensing.
The peso fell by half to P3.90 to the dollar. Traditional exports of agricultural and mineral products
increased; however, the growth rate of manufacturing declined even further. Substantial tariffs had
been put in place in the late 1950s, but they apparently provided insufficient protection. Pressure
from industrialists, combined with renewed balance of payments problems, resulted in the
reimposition of exchange controls in 1968. Manufacturing recovered slightly, growing an average of
6.1 percent per year in the second half of the decade. However, the sector was no longer the engine
of development that it had been in the early 1950s. Overall real GNP growth was mediocre,
averaging somewhat under 5 percent in the second half of decade; growth of agriculture was more
than a percentage point lower. The limited impact of manufacturing also affected employment. The
sector's share of the employed labor force, which had risen rapidly during the 1950s to over 12
percent, plateaued. Import substitution had run its course. *

To stimulate industrialization, technocrats within the government worked to rationalize and improve
incentive structures, to move the country away from import substitution, and to reduce tariffs.
Movements to reduce tariffs, however, met stiff resistance from industrialists, and government
efforts to liberalize the economy and emphasize export-led industrialization were largely
unsuccessful.

1950s to the 1960s: import substitution and exclusivistic economic nationalism. Even these
developments could not forestall balance of payments problems that would lead to import and
exchange controls. These controls would introduce and perpetuate incentives for inward-looking
development. They would create and strengthen incentives for more protection despite persistent BOP
problems being promoted.

The succession of presidencies of Elpidio Quirino (who succeeded the first president, Manuel Roxas),
Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal (and even beyond) would administer and
embellish this period of inward-looking import substitution. During this time, the growth of import
substitution would also see the rise of exclusivistic economic nationalism in which efforts were made
to displace or minimize foreign participation in the economy.

Magsaysay’s attempts at social and economic reform failed largely because of the conservative
outlook of the legislature and the bureaucracy. When Magsaysay died in a plane crash in 1957,
leadership of the country fell to his vice president, Carlos P. Garcia.

The 1950s were an era of foreign exchange and import controls for the Philippines. This lasted
for a solid one decade during which the country undertook to rehabilitate from the war and
move toward political and economic independence.
Sources:
https://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Philippines/sub5_6g/entry-3916.html
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024483
https://econ.upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=4671
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/46642/1/544227565.pdf

RELIGION

CATHOLIC CHURCH VS RIZAL LAW

In 1956, the Philippine government passed the “Rizal Law,” requiring that all universities provide
mandatory courses on José Rizal and his works. This was opposed by the Catholic Church, which
continued to resent its portrayal in Rizal’s novels despite the Filipino clergy’s early association with
the nationalist movement. Church leaders accused the bill’s proponent, Senator Recto of being a
communist and anti-Catholic. The final bill included a provision allowing Catholic students to refrain
from reading Rizal’s works, citing conscientious objections.
In the campaign to oppose the Rizal bill, the Catholic Church urged its adherents to write to their
congressmen and senators showing their opposition to the bill; later, it organized symposiums. In one
of these symposiums, Fr. Jesus Cavanna argued that the novels belonged to the past and that teaching
them would misrepresent current conditions. Radio commentator Jesus Paredes also said that
Catholics had the right to refuse to read them as it would "endanger their salvation".[1]
Groups such as Catholic Action of the Philippines, the Congregation of the Mission, the Knights of
Columbus, and the Catholic Teachers Guild organized opposition to the bill; they were countered by
Veteranos de la Revolucion (Spirit of 1896), Alagad ni Rizal, the Freemasons, and the Knights of
Rizal. The Senate Committee on Education sponsored a bill co-written by both José P. Laurel and
Recto, with the only opposition coming from Francisco Soc Rodrigo, Mariano Jesús Cuenco, and
Decoroso Rosales.[2][3]
The Archbishop of Manila, Rufino Santos, protested in a pastoral letter that Catholic students would
be affected if compulsory reading of the unexpurgated version were pushed through.[4] Arsenio
Lacson, Manila's mayor, who supported the bill, walked out of Mass when the priest read a circular
from the archbishop denouncing the bill.[5]
Rizal, according to Cuenco, "attack[ed] dogmas, beliefs and practices of the Church. The assertion
that Rizal limited himself to castigating undeserving priests and refrained from criticizing, ridiculing
or putting in doubt dogmas of the Catholic Church, is absolutely gratuitous and misleading." Cuenco
touched on Rizal's denial of the existence of purgatory, as it was not found in the Bible, and that
Moses and Jesus Christ did not mention its existence; Cuenco concluded that a "majority of the
Members of this Chamber, if not all [including] our good friend, the gentleman from Sulu" believed in
purgatory.[3] The senator from Sulu, Domocao Alonto, attacked Filipinos who proclaimed Rizal as
"their national hero but seemed to despise what he had written", saying that the Indonesians used
Rizal's books as their Bible on their independence movement; Pedro López, who hails from Cebu,
Cuenco's province, in his support for the bill, reasoned out that it was in their province the
independence movement started, when Lapu-Lapu fought Ferdinand Magellan.[4]
Outside the Senate, the Catholic schools threatened to close down if the bill was passed; Recto
countered that if that happened, the schools would be nationalized. Recto did not believe the threat,
stating that the schools were too profitable to be closed.[1] The schools gave up the threat, but
threatened to "punish" legislators in favor of the law in future elections. A compromise was
suggested, to use the expurgated version; Recto, who had supported the required reading of the
unexpurgated version, declared: "The people who would eliminate the books of Rizal from the
schools would blot out from our minds the memory of the national hero. This is not a fight against
Recto but a fight against Rizal", adding that since Rizal is dead, they are attempting to suppress his
memory.[6]
On May 12, 1956, a compromise inserted by Committee on Education chairman Laurel that
accommodated the objections of the Catholic Church was approved unanimously. The bill specified
that only college (university) students would have the option of reading unexpurgated versions of
clerically-contested reading material, such as Noli Me Tángere and El Filibusterismo.[1][4][6] The bill
was enacted on June 12, 1956,[4] Flag Day.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rizal_Law

https://news.usc.edu/25835/The-1950s-Powerful-Years-for-Religion/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rizal_Law
https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-philippines-an-overview-of-the-colonial-er
a/
https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/colegio-de-dagupan/random/4/16376371
https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2006/10/05/historical-overview-of-pentecostalism-in-philippine
s/

SOCIETY
The '50s were a time of prosperity and growth in many places around the world—the
Philippines included. Manila, specifically, had almost recovered from the Battle of Manila and was
entering its golden age as it was tagged the "Pearl of the Orient."

INTELLECTUAL
The work of John Schumacher, S.J., prompts reflection on the attempt to foment a new Propaganda
Movement in the early 1950s. Various individuals and social movements vied for influence or control
over the state and nationbuilding process by connecting their present to the late-nineteenth century.
Discourses on heroes and an "unfinished revolution" were deployed to maintain a momentum of
change in the wake of the defeat of the communist-led Huk rebellion. Two key actors of this period
were Jose Lansang and Fr. Horacio de la Costa, S.J. Lansang, who served as speechwriter of Pres.
Elpidio Quirino, rejected armed struggle, sought to instill national pride through the study of history,
and evoked a hew Propaganda Movement. De la Costa perceived a power vacuum with
decolonization and strategized for the Catholic Church to "go to the masses" to prevent a communist
success. Lansang's group and the church would coalesce in supporting Magsaysay for the presidency
in 1953.

ARTS
the 1950s saw the first golden age of Philippine cinema,[65][66] with the emergence of more artistic and
mature films, and significant improvement in cinematic techniques among filmmakers. The studio
system produced frenetic activity in the Philippine film industry as many films were made annually
and several local talents started to gain recognition abroad. Award-winning filmmakers and actors
were first introduced during this period. As the decade drew to a close, the studio system monopoly
came under siege as a result of labor-management conflicts.

Movie themes consisting primarily of war and heroism had proven to be a huge hit among local
audiences. The 1950s saw the first golden age of Philippine cinema, with the emergence of more
artistic and mature films, and significant improvement in cinematic techniques among
filmmakers.