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Westlaw India Delivery Summar1
Westlaw India Delivery Summar1
R. (on the application of H) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care
30 July 2019
Case Analysis
Where Reported [2019] EWHC 2095 (Admin); [2019] 7 WLUK 840; Official Transcript;
Case Digest Subject: Family law Other related subjects: Human rights
Summary: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s.35 , which provided that
where a child's birth mother was married to a man who was not the genetic father, the
husband was to be treated as the father unless he had not consented to the pregnancy,
and s.38 , which provided that no other person was to be treated as the father in those
circumstances, did not breach the ECHR art.8 and art.14 rights of a child born through a
surrogacy arrangement.
Abstract: A child sought a declaration that the inability of her genetic father to be named
on her birth certificate, by reason of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s.35
and s.38 , breached her rights under ECHR art.8 and art.14 .
The child had been born through a surrogacy arrangement. The genetic mother was an egg
donor. The genetic father's same-sex partner was the child's litigation friend in the instant
proceedings. The birth mother was married to a man. Relations between the genetic father
and the birth mother broke down during the pregnancy. The birth mother and her husband
were named on the child's birth certificate as mother and father. A court later ordered that
the genetic father and his partner should have parental responsibility for the child alongside
the birth mother and her husband, and ordered that the child should live with the genetic
father and his partner. Section 35 provided that where a birth mother was married to a man
who was not the genetic father, the husband was to be treated as the father unless he had
not consented to the pregnancy. Section 38 provided that no other person was to be
Compatibility of s.35 and s.38 with child's art.8 rights - The sections were not
incompatible with the child's rights. Any legal scheme concerning surrogacy had to draw
complex balances to protect the children concerned and to take into account the wider
ethical dimensions. At various points, the scheme would necessarily give precedence to
one policy priority over another. There was a wide divergence of approach among Council
of Europe states . The balance struck in Mennesson v France (65192/11 unreported was
between giving states a margin of appreciation and ensuring that the children's rights were
extremely carefully considered. There had been full consideration of the law in 2008, and
the issues raised had not fundamentally changed since then. Further, the specific issue of
whether a genetic father should be named on a birth certificate in place of the surrogate's
husband had been raised in Parliament during the passage of the 2008 Act and had
Parliament in the setting of the statutory provisions, R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v
Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] A.C. 657, [2014] 6 WLUK 769 followed. A
breach of art.8 had been found in Mennesson because of the absolute inability of children
in France to have their genetic father accorded legal status. In the UK, genetic fathers
could establish legal parenthood through the parental order provisions in s.54 . The child
could not rely on s.54 because the surrogate parents did not consent, but she had not
argued that s.54 and the consent requirement were incompatible with her rights (see paras
75-80 of judgment).
Compatibility with art.8: justification for interference with rights - Section 35 and s.38
did not interfere with the child's family life: there were no practical consequences, as the
child lived with the genetic father and his partner and they had day-to-day responsibility for
her life. However, a statutory scheme which provided that the surrogate's husband could be
recorded on the birth certificate rather than the genetic father, particularly where the genetic
father strongly wished to be named, interfered with the child's private life. Genetic or
responsibility orders did not accord the holder the status of legal parent. However, the
regulation of surrogacy was a legitimate aim and was necessary. The scheme was justified
by the need for legal certainty so that the child had at least one and no more than two
parents. It would be possible to devise a scheme with legal certainty that allowed the
genetic father to be the legal parent, but the existence of another way to meet the
legitimate aim did not mean the existing scheme was incompatible, Gallagher's Application
for Judicial Review, Re [2019 ] UKSC 3, [ 2019 ] 2 W.L.R. 509, [ 2019 ] 1 WLUK 261
followed. A further justification was ensuring that gamete donors should not be forced to
become legal parents. Further, there was an overarching objective of ensuring that
surrogacy arrangements were not enforceable. If the genetic father could require himself to
be named on the birth certificate in place of the husband, that would tip the balance
towards a more enforceable position. It was open to Parliament to create a scheme which
Compatibility with art.14 - There was no breach of art.14. Although the facts fell within
art.14, the comparators suggested by the child were not analogous. A child born of a
sexual encounter was not analogous, M v F (Legal Paternity) [2013] EWHC 1901 (Fam),
[2014] 1 F.L.R. 352, [2013] 7 WLUK 161 applied. In cases of artificial insemination or or
assisted reproduction without the husband's consent, the husband would not be named on
the birth certificate, but those situations were not analogous. The fact that the husband had
consented to the treatment was fundamental to the ascription of legal parenthood. If he had
not consented, the balances struck in the scheme would be different (paras 90-91).
Judge: Lieven J
Counsel: For the claimant: Richard Alomo (Direct Access), Dr Chelvan. For
the defendant: Sarah Hannett, Nathan Roberts. For the interested parties:
[2019] UKSC 3; [ 2019] 2 W.L.R. 509; [ 2019] 3 All E.R. 823; [ 2019] N.I.
123; [ 2019] 1 WLUK 261; [ 2019] H.R.L.R. 6; Times, February 25, 2019;
[2014] UKSC 38; [2015] A.C. 657; [2014] 3 W.L.R. 200; [2014] 3 All E.R.
B.H.R.C. 465; (2014) 139 B.M.L.R. 1; Times, June 26, 2014; SC; 25 June
2014
M v F (Legal Paternity)
[2013] EWHC 1901 (Fam); [2013] 7 WLUK 161; [2014] 1 F.L.R. 352; [2014]
[2019] UKSC 3; [ 2019] 2 W.L.R. 509; [ 2019] 3 All E.R. 823; [ 2019] N.I.
123; [ 2019] 1 WLUK 261; [ 2019] H.R.L.R. 6; Times, February 25, 2019;
[2018] CSOH 117; 2019 S.C. 230; 2019 S.L.T. 1; [2018] 12 WLUK 209;
Department
[2018] EWHC 1834 (Admin); [2018] 1 W.L.R. 6000; [2018] 7 WLUK 402;
[2015] UKSC 57; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3820; [2016] 1 All E.R. 191; [2015] 7
WLUK 921; [2015] H.R.L.R. 19; 40 B.H.R.C. 19; [2015] E.L.R. 455; SC; 29
July 2015
Coventry v Lawrence
[2015] UKSC 50; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3485; [2016] 2 All E.R. 97; [2015] 7
WLUK 727; [2015] 4 Costs L.O. 507; [2015] H.R.L.R. 16; 40 B.H.R.C. 734;
[2014] UKSC 38; [2015] A.C. 657; [2014] 3 W.L.R. 200; [2014] 3 All E.R.
B.H.R.C. 465; (2014) 139 B.M.L.R. 1; Times, June 26, 2014; SC; 25 June
2014
M v F (Legal Paternity)
[2013] EWHC 1901 (Fam); [2013] 7 WLUK 161; [2014] 1 F.L.R. 352; [2014]
[2013] EWHC 1418 (Fam); [2013] 5 WLUK 682; [2013] 2 F.L.R. 1357;
[2013] 3 F.C.R. 532; [2013] Fam. Law 962; (2013) 163(7563) N.L.J. 19;
B.H.R.C. 137; Times, April 25, 2013; (2013) 163(7564) N.L.J. 20; ECHR
[2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam); [2011] Fam. 106; [2011] 2 W.L.R. 1006; [2010]
12 WLUK 229; [2011] 1 F.L.R. 1423; [2011] Fam. Law 241; FAM; 08
December 2010
[2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 A.C. 173; [2008] 3 W.L.R. 76; [2008] N.I. 310;
[2008] 6 WLUK 424; [2008] 2 F.L.R. 1084; [2008] 2 F.C.R. 366; [2008]
H.R.L.R. 37; [2008] U.K.H.R.R. 1181; 24 B.H.R.C. 650; Times, June 23,
2008; [2008] Fam. Law 977; (2008) 105(25) L.S.G. 25; HL (NI); 18 June
2008
[2007] UKPC 48; [2007] 1 W.L.R. 2825; [2008] 1 All E.R. 1; [2007] 7 WLUK
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza
[2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 A.C. 557; [2004] 3 W.L.R. 113; [2004] 3 All E.R.
411; [2004] 6 WLUK 427; [2004] 2 F.L.R. 600; [2004] 2 F.C.R. 481; [2004]
H.R.L.R. 31; [2004] U.K.H.R.R. 827; 16 B.H.R.C. 671; [2004] H.L.R. 46;
[2005] 1 P. & C.R. 18; [2005] L. & T.R. 3; [2004] 2 E.G.L.R. 132; Times,
June 24, 2004; [2004] Fam. Law 641; [2004] 27 E.G. 128 (C.S.); (2004)
101(27) L.S.G. 30; (2004) 154 N.L.J. 1013; (2004) 148 S.J.L.B. 792; [2004]
[2003] UKHL 40; [2004] 1 A.C. 816; [2003] 3 W.L.R. 568; [2003] 4 All E.R.
97; [2003] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 491; [2003] 7 WLUK 303; [2003] H.R.L.R. 33;
2003; (2003) 100(35) L.S.G. 39; (2003) 147 S.J.L.B. 872; HL; 10 July 2003
Pensions
[2002] EWHC 978 (Admin); [2002] 3 All E.R. 994; [2002] 5 WLUK 653;
Times, May 24, 2002; Daily Telegraph, May 30, 2002; (2002) 99(26) L.S.G.
[2002] EWCA Civ 271; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 617; [2002] 4 All E.R. 1136; [2002] 3
WLUK 126; [2003] 1 F.C.R. 713; [2002] H.L.R. 39; [2002] N.P.C. 34; CA
[1995] 1 A.C. 321; [1994] 3 W.L.R. 970; [1994] 3 All E.R. 407; [1994] 6
WLUK 319; Times, July 13, 1994; (1994) 91(39) L.S.G. 38; (1994) 144
[1993] A.C. 593; [1992] 3 W.L.R. 1032; [1993] 1 All E.R. 42; [1992] S.T.C.
898; [1992] 11 WLUK 389; [1993] I.C.R. 291; [1993] I.R.L.R. 33; [1993]
R.V.R. 127; Times, November 30, 1992; Independent, November 26, 1992;
(1993) 143 N.L.J. 17; [1992] N.P.C. 154; HL; 26 November 1992
[1974] A.C. 765; [1974] 2 W.L.R. 208; [1974] 1 All E.R. 609; [1974] 1 WLUK
Bradlaugh v Gossett
Stockdale v Hansard
112 E.R. 1112; (1839) 9 Ad. & El. 1; (1839) 3 St. Tr. (N.S.) 723; [1839] 1
Burdett v Abbot
104 E.R. 501; (1811) 14 East 1; [1811] 1 WLUK 1; KB; 01 January 1811
Significant Legislation
Cited
ECHR art.8
ECHR art.14
ECHR
ECHR art.8
ECHR art.14
(SI 2018/1412)