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Zach Antin

Kickass Title

“Be not afraid of greatness. Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and others have greatness thrust

upon them,” (Shakespeare). At the time of his death in 323 BC Alexander III of Macedon was the greatest general

and conqueror the world had yet known; when the Diadochi gained control of the empire they had extremely large

(actually fairly modest size) sandals to fill. Without a clear leader, each of the Diadochi wanted to amass as much of

the empire under their regency as possible. Each of the former Satraps or generals aspired to greatness, to

Alexander, and the first step towards greatness lay in consolidating power for themselves. While the kings and

dynasts of the Diadochi would prefer to exercise control over every polis possible, that was simply infeasible and as

such the Diadochi would choose poleis that augmented their resources, positioning, and prestige. But, the empire’s

landscape had changed where poleis were not easily conquered and collected in the world’s largest and most brutal

game of chess, rather through a widespread campaign of propaganda and posturing the Diadochi attempted to

acquire poleis like constituencies in an enormous election. One of the largest and most brutal elections in human

history. In this paper, I will argue that the Antigonid dynasty’s use of soft power and diplomacy in the war of

perception created a new relationship between king and subject, one that allowed the ruler to alter the fundamental

identity of each individual polis while maintaining the basic shape of said polis.

The Antigonid dynasties successful utilization of soft power—as seen in propaganda and diplomacy—

made them very powerful in the war of perception. None of Alexander’s Succesors could hope to match the

manpower and prestige he wielded, but Antigonus understood the war of perception was nearly as important as

physical warfare. Antigonus’s foray into the battlefield of the heart and mind began in 315 with his denunciation of

Cassander: “He posed as champion of the ‘freedom of the Greeks’, a posture which he and his son Demetrius

subsequently sought to maintain consistently…it seems clear, however, that his principal consideration was tactical

—to embarrass his rivals, especially Cassander, and to win popularity with the Greek cities,” (35 commentary).

Antigonus needed the Greek cities “an essential source of manpower, skills, and revenues” on his side because he

had neither a hereditary claim nor a large enough army to conquer poleis a sea away from his section of the empire.

Austin does not fully believe Antigonus believes in “freedom of the Greeks,” but Austin does point out Antigonus’s

willingness to adhere to the cause as long as he stood to benefit from the position. One of Antigonus’s most blatant
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uses of propaganda appears in his letter to Scepsis in 311: “We displayed [zeal for the] freedom [of the Greeks] and

made [for this purpose] many considerable concessions…How great is the zeal we have displayed over this will, I

think, be clear/to you from the actual dispositions taken…it was no small matter to give up part of the goal for which

we had taken great trouble and spent much money,” (38 a lot). These fifty-nine words are excerpts from a sub two-

page letter, yet they mention the strife and self-injurious policies endured by the Antigonid dynasty multiple times.

Beyond mere repetition Antigonus reuses the same words to hammer home his claim that the Antigonid’s are the

only real losers of the peace, but losers because they are giving up their own desires to prioritize the Greeks over

themselves. Propaganda and diplomacy often go hand-in-hand, Antigonus was no exception to the rule; so, when

Demetrius arrived at Athens “[h]e proclaimed through the voice of a herald near him that his father had sent him

with prayers for his success to free the Athenians, expel the garrison and restore to them their laws and ancestral

constitution,” (90% down 42). Austin again notes Plutarch “a patriotic Greek” would take Antigonus’s promise at

face-value, nevertheless history shows Antigonus as the liberator of the Athens. Was the fanfare surrounding the

proclamation necessary? No, but in the war of perception a demonstration of power, magnanimity, and prestige are

never to be overlooked. Athens was “the schoolhouse of Greece,” a place of learning and wealth and beauty; many

in the Greek world and beyond would hear of Demetrius’s generosity and thus when the Antigonids came for them,

rather than being met with spears and anger they would be met with flowers and joy (except from enemy garrisons).

The dynasty’s success in the war of perception allowed them to approach the relationship between

conqueror and conquered very differently. The Antigonids position as liberators and generous rulers caused the

poleis they conquered to treat them as grand godlike figures, thus altering the fundamental relationship between

ruler and ruled. In response to Antigonus’s letter to Scepsis the Scepsians decreed honors to him: “The earliest

instance known so far in the age of the Succesors of divine honours offered by a Greek city to a living ruler.

Precedents are however known for both Philip and Alexander,” but “[t]here is no hint of any request for religious

honours by rulers themselves (as there may have been in the case of Alexander),” (commentary 39). Antigonus’s

successful battles on land and sea as well as in the heart and mind fueled his swift rise to “king” (a title that should

have belonged to a dead child). Additionally, attempting to maintain his immaculate veneer Antigonus did not ask

for the divine honours (he did however act and promote himself in such a way as to receive the same divine honours

he did not ask for), but the benefits of his “honours” were widespread and impossible to completely account for.

Logic suggests Antigonus’s elevated status would lead to even greater perception of him, easier relations with his
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conquered territory, and as a result greater resources from his allies. Antigonus rise propelled him so high he

managed to receive the title of king from Athens, “They were the first to give the title of king to Demetrius and

Antigonus, although they had otherwise avoided the name up till now,” and “[c]onsecrated the spot where

Demetrius had first stepped down from his chariot, placed an altar there and called it the alter of Demetrius

Catabates (the descending god),” (End of 42). Again, Athens was the foremost of the Greek states (excluding

Macedon), and where Athenian loyalties lay were very important for the whole of Greece. The world’s first

democracy calling a figure king should not be overlooked as hyperbole, Antigonus truly was a trailblazer for future

king-polis relationships. The war of perception did not only matter in relation to larger states, the war is fought on

all fronts and Sicyon exemplifies this: “They called the city Demetrias, voted to celebrate every year sacrifices,

festivals and also competitions in his honour and to grant him the other honours of a founder,” (Halfway through

49). Demetrius rescued the Sicyonians who honored him with “sacrifices, festivals and…other honours of a

founder,” Poliokretes simply doing what he does best managed to become the most important figure in a polis’s

history. A relationship that gave the Antigonid’s both an ally and propagator until their fall at Ipsus, but a long-term

ally nonetheless.

The dynasty’s different perception and relationship to the people allowed the king to alter the fundamental

identity of individual poleis at his discretion. The Antigonid’s successful utilization of soft power led to their

exalted perception, which in turn gave the dynasty the ability to alter poleis’ under their control. Again, every polis

is different, so, the amount of shaping the Antigonid’s were able to do varied from polis to polis, but shape they did.

One of the simplest ways for the Antigonids to shape poleis were through synoecisms; a clear example of the

shaping process appears in Antigonus’s letters to Teos, where he writes as if he were a responding mediator rather

than the architect and enforcer: “The [laws] that have been agreed on (by you) should be sent to me,” (49-51 48).

Antigonus here is writing in reference to the future laws of the new polis, he hides his desires to shape the laws by

claiming someone from either city will try to cheat the other, and in the event of cheating he will step in and punish

the unfair lawmaker and abandon the law. A possibly reasonable power for a mediator to have, but the synoecism

was imposed by Antigonus himself and the power is quite liable to unintended usage (striking down laws

he/Antigonus does not want in the new polis). Synoecism was not the only way Antigonus could make desired

adjustments to individual poleis, “Demetrius moved the Sicyonians to the acropolis and razed the part of the city

which adjoined the harbor, as it was strategically a very weak spot…but the Sicyonians having moved to a much
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better site, have continued to inhabit it up to our time,” (49 much of middle and end). Did Demetrius moving the

Sicyonians to a different area fundamentally change the polis? Yes, and no. Yes, the newly defensible position and

improved accessibility to water forever changed the city of Sicyon. No, the city of Sicyon did not become

something completely new (other than in name), the people maintained a similar economy, history, and government.

However, the city of Sicyon in 303 and the city of Demetrias in 301 cannot be considered the same, similar yes,

same no, and the Antigonids were the men who shaped the city (likely to favor themselves in the future). Changing

smaller poleis would not drastically alter the future, but adjusting a polis the size and prestige of Athens would be

far more significant, “They added two more tribes (to the ten existing ones), Demetrias and Antigonis, and raised the

numbers of the council from 500 to 600, since each one of the new tribes was providing 50 councillors,” (42 end).

Demetrias and Antigonis would not completely reshape Athens nor even Greece (especially with Athens decline and

the rise of Rome), yet the change would alter Athenian governance and society for decades and centuries to come.

The idea that during the period of the Succesors the polis as a structure fundamentally changed does not seem to be

what Antigonus is trying to do, rather he is trying to shape or transform the fundamental identity of each individual

polis, be it through synoecism, relocation, or added councilors to the government. Antigonus is attempting to do

something before unseen in empire building, he is allowing the conquered to conserve government and rule however

they desire (for the most part), but he is shaping the core of the polis with respect to geography or social structure in

an attempt to maintain good relations and influence control over the city.

The dynasty’s different perception, relationship, and alteration to the polis were not products of fabulous

PR, rather they required a fundamental change to the way Macedonian, Persian, or Greek kings had ruled over their

newly acquired territory. “The rise to power of Macedon, and the predominance after Alexander of individual rulers,

raised an insoluble political problem which persisted in one form or another throughout the Hellenistic period: how

to reconcile the Greek cities wish for autonomy with the domination of the kings,” (35 beginning commentary).

Macedonian kings added territory to their empire in typical historical fashion, essentially redrawing the boundaries

of Macedonia with little to no change for Macedon, but wholesale change for the conquered. Persian Kings

acquired land and were far more understanding of local customs, but still required much of the conquered (soldiers,

money, strategic positioning). Greek kings (limited as they were) usually ended up with truces that would be of no

importance within a new generation. Antigonus’s adaptation of various styles allowed him to shape poleis while

retaining good-will relations with the denizens of the polis. But, Antigonus was not able to attain these benefits
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without some costs on his part. Antigonus’s policy of “freedom of the Greeks” led to a slower, costly, and

inevitably failed attempt at securing the whole of mainland Greece, “The abundant resources they had gathered

together in humbling the barbarians they now spent in search of glory and honour on the Greeks…and declared that

goodwill was a fair and unshakeable stepping-stone to Greece,” (middle of 42). Antigonus knew he could never

hold Alexander’s entire empire together through force (Alexander failed at holding his empire together), but what he

could do is work various poleis and make them his quasi-vassals. The consistency and fairness of his policies

helped relations with many of the poleis he conquered; however, to keep relations optimal Antigonus had to

maintain certain policies, which were not always beneficial to the Antigonids. Demetrius to be seen as

magnanimous and maintain the positive alliance personally helped build the city of Demetrias, “He joined with the

body of citizens in the construction work and restored them their freedom,” (49 middle). To be exalted as a god,

work as a man of the people, and fight as a soldier in battle allows the Antigonids a certain distinction among poleis

they had or ever would interact with. The consequences of the relationship should not be trivialized; the Antigonid

empire was never able to truly expand into central and northern Greece and Antigonus died in battle at Ipsus in 301.

A direct representation of the Antigonids was not enough, the dynasty needed to present the whole of the empire and

its direct representatives the same as the leaders themselves, “Since Antigonus has sent Acius who [in every respect

shows himself to be] well disposed [to our city] and continues to [maintain his zeal] and [requests] that the city

declares to him its demands,” (2-4 39). The world was changing and the Antigonids adapted to the times by

changing the features of ruling, the territory they acquired better resembles colonies of the 18th and 19th centuries

than say of the Macedonian empire in 323 BC.