GENERAL PRINCIPLES CASES:

1) STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RADSTOCK SECURITIES

LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
[ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD, Intervenor]
(G.R. No. 178158, Dec. 4, 2009)

LUIS SISON v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and

RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED (G.R. No. 180428)

FACT: Asiavest, a judgment creditor of PNCC, filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File the Attached Opposition and Motion-in-Intervention before the CA.

Sison, also a stockholder and former PNCC President and Board Chairman, filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement before the CA

The CA dismissed Sison’s petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul a final and
executory judgment also rendered by the Court of Appeals. In the same resolution, the Court of
Appeals also denied Asiavest’s urgent motion. It also denied STRADEC’s motion for
intervention on the ground that the motion was filed only after the Court of Appeals and the trial
court had promulgated their respective decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying the Motions for intervention filed by Asiavest
and STRADEC? Whether the CA erred in dismissing Petition for Annulment of Judgment
Approving Compromise Agreement filed by SIson?

RULING: SC GRANTED the intervention of Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad in G.R. No.
178158 but DECLARE that Strategic Alliance Development Corporation has no legal standing to
sue.

Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.

The rule is not absolute. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court completely available for justice. It is aimed to
facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims, overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing of the claims.

This Court (2008 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing) has ruled:

[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of

the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even
beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial
court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final
and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed
by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and
injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In Collado v. Court of Appeals, this Court reiterated that exceptions to Section 2, Rule 12
could be made in the interest of substantial justice. Citing Mago v. Court of Appeals,23
the Court stated:

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal
xxx the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to
review said judgments is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are
obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule
12 of the Rules of Court.

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a
rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted
to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.

STRADEC

Concededly, STRADEC has no legal interest in the subject matter of the

Compromise Agreement. Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
states:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
STRADEC’s interest is dependent on the outcome of Civil Case No. 05-882. Unless
STRADEC can show that RTC Branch 146 had already decided in its favor, its
legal interest is simply contingent and expectant.

________________________________________________________________
ASIAVEST

However, Asiavest has a direct and material interest in the approval or disapproval
of the Compromise Agreement. Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in G.R.
No. 110263 and a court has already issued a writ of execution in its favor.
Asiavest’s interest is actual and material, direct and immediate characterized by either
gain or loss from the judgment that this Court may render.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement involves the disposition of all or

substantially all of the assets of PNCC, Asiavest, as PNCC’s judgment creditor,
will be greatly prejudiced if the Compromise Agreement is eventually upheld.

______________________________________________________________________
SISON

Sison has legal standing to challenge the Compromise Agreement. Although there was
no allegation that Sison filed the case as a derivative suit in the name of PNCC, it could
be fairly deduced that Sison was assailing the Compromise Agreement as a stockholder
of PNCC. In such a situation, a stockholder of PNCC can sue on behalf of PNCC to
annul the Compromise Agreement.

A derivative action is a suit by a stockholder to enforce a corporate cause of

action. Under the Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to
sue is lodged with its board of directors or trustees. However, an individual
stockholder may file a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to protect or
vindicate corporate rights whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue,
or are the ones to be sued, or hold control of the corporation. In such actions, the
corporation is the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, on behalf of the
corporation, is only a nominal party.

In this case, the PNCC Board cannot conceivably be expected to attack the validity of
the Compromise Agreement since the PNCC Board itself approved the Compromise
Agreement. In fact, the PNCC Board steadfastly defends the Compromise Agreement
for allegedly being advantageous to PNCC.

Besides, the circumstances in this case are peculiar. Sison, as former PNCC President
and Chairman of the PNCC Board, was responsible for the approval of the Board
Resolution issued on 19 June 2001 revoking the previous Board Resolution admitting
PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans. Such revocation, however, came after Radstock
had filed an action for collection and damages against PNCC on 15 January 2001. Then,
when the trial court rendered its decision on 10 December 2002 in favor of Radstock,
Sison was no longer the PNCC President and Chairman, although he remains a
stockholder of PNCC.
When the case was on appeal before the Court of Appeals, there was no need for Sison
to avail of any remedy, until PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise
Agreement, which disposed of all or substantially all of PNCC’s assets. Sison came to
know of the Compromise Agreement only in December 2006. PNCC and Radstock
submitted the Compromise Agreement to the Court of Appeals for approval on 10
January 2007. The CA approved the Compromise Agreement on 25 January 2007. To
require Sison at this stage to exhaust all the remedies within the corporation will render
such remedies useless as the Compromise Agreement had already been approved by
the Court of Appeals. PNCC’s assets are in danger of being dissipated in favor of a
private foreign corporation. Thus, Sison had no recourse but to avail of an
extraordinary remedy to protect PNCC’s assets.

Besides, in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, such as the
nature and importance of the issues raised in this case, this Court must take cognizance
of Sison’s action. This Court should exercise its prerogative to set aside technicalities in
the Rules, because after all, the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever
the interest of justice requires is well recognized.

In Solicitor General v. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,32 this Court held:

Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of
its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules
concerning ‘pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.’ In proper cases, procedural
rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise
may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. xxx

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.xxx
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
OTHER DIGEST

FACTS:

 Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was incorporated in 1966.

 It was granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.
 CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from
Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni).
 A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans although there was no CDCP
Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of guarantee.
 CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately
owned and managed.
 In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned 90.3% of PNCC and only
9.70% is under private ownership.
 Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.
 On 20 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC Board)
passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni.
 Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for
the Marubeni loans.
 In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities Limited
(Radstock), a foreign corporation.
 Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC.
 PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement.
 Under this agreement, PNCC shall payRadstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00
in full settlement of PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP Mining’s debt allegedly totaling
P17,040,843,968.00 (judgment debt asof 31 July 2006).
 To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1) "assign to a third party assignee to
be designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed real properties of PNCC;
(2) issue to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at
par value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3)
assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the
gross toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporation.
 Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for reconsideration.
STRADEC alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National
Government’s shares, receivables, securities and interests in PNCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock is valid in
relation to the Constitution, existing laws, and public policy

HELD:
 Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.
 Its office address is at Suite 14021Duddell Street, Central Hongkong.
 As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown,
Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to
Section3, Article XII of the Constitution.
 Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the
Philippines. Contrary to the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of
any land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself.
 Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign
private corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer
the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot own the land itself.
 It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the
time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or
buyer.

 The Corporation Code defines a sale or disposition of substantially all assets and property of
a corporation as one by which the corporation "would be rendered incapable of continuing
the business or accomplishing the purpose for which it was incorporated" - any sale or
disposition short of this will not need stockholder ratification, and may be pursued by the
majority vote of the Board of Directors.
2) DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, ET. AL. &
LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORP (G.R. No. 153690, August 26, 2008)
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM, KELLY
LU YM, and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. DAVID LU (G.R. No. 157381,
August 26, 2008)
JOHN LU YM and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS OF CEBU CITY (former Twentieth Division), DAVID LU, ROSA
GO, SILVANO LUDO & CL CORPORATION (G.R. No. 170889, August 26, 2008)

FACTS: In their motion for reconsideration, the Lu Ym father and sons assailed the denial of
their application for preliminary injunction and, in addition thereto, they questioned the
sufficiency of the docket fees paid by David, et al. in the RTC where the original complaint was
filed.
On December 8, 2005, the appellate court did not reconsider its earlier resolution. As to the
sufficiency of the docket fees, it ruled that the matter be raised in their appellants’ brief and that
the issue be threshed out in the appeal on the merits.40 Hence, this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 170889.
ISSUE: Whether the original complaint filed before the RTC should have been dismissed for
non-payment of the correct docket fees?
RULING: No. In short, John and LLDC seek the dismissal of the initial complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction occasioned by the insufficient payment of docket fees.

A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The
importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and
fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of
each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail
tremendous losses to the government in general and to the judiciary in particular.

In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed for because of the following
reasons:

First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the
correct docket fees were paid.

Second, John and LLDC are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
because of their active participation in the proceedings below, and because the issue of
payment of insufficient docket fees had been belatedly raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e.,
only in their motion for reconsideration.

Lastly, assuming that the docket fees paid were truly inadequate, the mistake was committed by
the Clerk of Court who assessed the same and not imputable to David; and as to the deficiency,
if any, the same may instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter be
rendered.
The Court had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.65

In the current controversy, the main purpose of the complaint filed before the RTC was the
annulment of the issuance of the 600,000 LLDC shares of stocks because they had been
allegedly issued for less than their par value. Thus, David sought the dissolution of the
corporation and the appointment of receivers/management committee.66 To be sure, the
annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of
receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of
money. If, in the end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be
the consequence of such principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable
of pecuniary estimation.

Accordingly, John’s and LLDC’s contention cannot be sustained. And since David paid the
docket fees for an action the subject of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, as
computed by the Clerk of Court, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Even assuming that the subject in the instant case is capable of pecuniary estimation, still, the
case should not be dismissed because the insufficiency of the fees actually paid was belatedly
raised; David relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and if there is a deficiency,
it may instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may hereafter be rendered.

While it is true that this Court had previously dismissed complaints for non-payment of docket
fees, as in the early case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,70 these
cases uniformly involved bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, such that the correct amount of
damages claimed was not specifically stated. The Court, in such cases, concluded that there
was bad faith on the part of the complainant and a clear intent to avoid payment of the required
docket fee, thus, the dismissal of the cases was warranted.

It may be recalled that despite the payment of insufficient fees, this Court refrained from
dismissing the complaint/petition in Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v.
Alonzo-Legasto,71 Yambao v. Court of Appeals72 and Ayala Land, Inc. v. Carpo.73 In those
cases, the inadequate payment was caused by the erroneous assessment made by the Clerk of
Court. In Intercontinental,74 we declared that the payment of the docket fees, as assessed,
negates any imputation of bad faith to the respondent or any intent of the latter to defraud the
government. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent, and there
was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In Yambao,75 this Court concluded that petitioners cannot be faulted for their failure to pay the
required docket fees for, given the prevailing circumstances, such failure was clearly not a
dilatory tactic or intended to circumvent the Rules of Court. In Ayala Land,76 the Court held that
despite the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fees, the appellate court still
has the discretion to relax the rule in meritorious cases.
In the instant case, David paid the docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Even if the
amount was insufficient, as claimed by John and LLDC, fraud and bad faith cannot be attributed
to David to warrant the dismissal of his complaint. Consistent with the principle of liberality in the
interpretation of the Rules, in the interest of substantial justice, this Court had repeatedly
refrained from dismissing the case on that ground alone. Instead, it considered the deficiency in
the payment of the docket fees as a lien on the judgment which must be remitted to the Clerk of
Court of the court a quo upon the execution of the judgment.
AUGUST 4, 2009 DECISION

 The Decision of this Court dated August 26, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
 From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of mainly in real
actions. Hence, when David, et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis pendens on
the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had filed affected a title to
or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least, they must have been fully
aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the realties involved. Their
silence or inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court who computed their docket fees,
therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient for this Court to conclude that
they have crossed beyond the threshold of good faith and into the area of fraud. Clearly,
there was an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees.
Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

FEBRUARY 15, 2011 DECISION

 Upon a considered, thorough reexamination, the Court grants David Lu's Motion
for Reconsideration. The assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and September
23, 2009, which turn turtle settled doctrines, must be overturned. The Court
thus reinstates the August 26, 2008 Decision wherein a three-tiered approach was
utilized to analyze the issue on docket fees:

In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed forbecause of the
following reasons: First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Hence, the correct docket fees were paid. Second, John and LLDC
are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because of their
active participation in the proceedings below, and because the issue of payment of
insufficient docket fees had been belatedly raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e., only
in their motion for reconsideration. Lastly, assuming that the docket fees paid were truly
inadequate, the mistake was committed by the Clerk of Court who assessed the
same and not imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any, the same may
instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter be rendered.
[20]
(italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 Whatever property, real or personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders would
be a mere consequence of the main action. In the end, in the event LLDC is dissolved,
David, et al. would not be getting the value of the 600,000 shares, but only the value of
their minority number of shares, which are theirs to begin with.
 The complaint filed by David, et al. is one for declaration of nullity of share issuance.
The main relief prayed for both in the original complaint and the amended complaint is
the same, that is, to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and
unissued shares to Lu Ym father and sons, et al. for a price of 1/18 of their real value, for
being inequitable, having been done in breach of director's fiduciary's duty to
stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders' rights, and with unjust enrichment.

As judiciously discussed in the Court's August 26, 2008 Decision, the test in determining
whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation is by
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. It explained:

x x x To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the
appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in
the recovery of a sum of money.If, in the end, a sum of money or real property would be
recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal action. Therefore, the
case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation.[22](italics in the original,
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 IN FINE, the Court holds that David Lu, et al.'s complaint is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, hence, the correct docket fees were paid.
3) ELDEFONSO G. DEL ROSARIO AND JOSEFINO R. ORTIZ, VS. CRISTINA OCAMPO
(G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016)
 JURISDICTION CASES

1) UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. SPS. ALISON ANG-SY AND GUILLERMO SY,
RENATO ANG, NENA ANG, RICKY ANG, AND DERICK CHESTER SY (G.R. No. 204753,
March 27, 2019)
Other Issues Discussed:

 There was no voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the part of
respondents Sps. Sy, et al.

Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.[25]
According to the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. However, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance.[26]

As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that the filing of motions to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered voluntary submission
to the trial court's jurisdiction.

 As explained by the Court in the aforesaid case, citing Philippine Commercial

International Bank v. Spouses Dy, et al.,[30] a special appearance operates as an
exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance when the defendant explicitly and
unequivocably poses objections to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[31]

The Court in Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. explained that while at first glance, the therein
respondents may be seen to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by
praying for an affirmative relief, there was an explicit objection made by the parties, in an
unequivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of invalid service of
summons. This convinced the Court that the therein respondents never recognized and
did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the RTC despite the fact that the said party
prayed for an affirmative relief.[32]

Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, while it is true that respondents
Sps. Sy, et al. did pray in their Motion to Dismiss for a suspension of the proceedings
due to a Stay Order issued by a different court, which is an affirmative relief, such WAS
NOT TANTAMOUNT TO A VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE as respondents Sps. Sy, et
al., in an explicit and unequivocal manner, posed vehement objections to the jurisdiction
of the RTC over their persons due to improper service of summons.[33] Therefore,
following what is already settled jurisprudence, the general rule that asking for an
affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court
should not be applied in the instant case.
 Respondents Sps. Sy, et al. plainly and unmistakably questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC over their persons due to improper service of summons. Hence petitioner UCPB's
theory lacks any jurisprudential support.

As a final note, petitioner UCPB also made the argument that the CA purportedly
committed an error of law because it held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction with
respect to the therein defendant corporations even when such corporations failed to
question the RTC's Order before the CA.

Such argument fails to convince. The courts may dismiss an action when there is
lack of jurisdiction, even though the issue of jurisdiction was not raised by the
pleadings or not even suggested by the parties. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject
to the whims of the parties.[39] Even if a party does not question the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide the pending action, the courts are not prevented from
addressing the issue, especially where the lack of jurisdiction is apparent and
explicit.
2) LEILA M. DE LIMA VS. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE (G.R. No. 227635, October
15, 2019)
OTHER DIGEST

FACTS:

 May 9, 2016: Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President
of the Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless national
crackdown on illegal drugs.
 August 2, 2016: Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate
calling a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the
crackdown.
 Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo
Roa Dutete from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security
through his public statements:
 August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte: “I know I’m the favorite
whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But, I have a special
ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan
in public and I will have to destroy her in public.” Incidentally, in the same event,
President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was
keeping surveillance of her. “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So
while all the time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy,
and with the help of another country, listening to them.
 The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August
17, 2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government
office he referred to earlier at the same time accused her of living an immortal life
by having a romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved
in illegal drugs. “There’s one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very
immoral life, taking his driver as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya
nagging hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association. You know, when
you are an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married. So you live with the
driver, its concubinage.
 The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized her
intimate and personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual
escapades; that told of her being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities
that included her construction of a house for her driver/lover with financing from
drug-money
 Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and demeaned her
womanhood and humanity. If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I’ll hang
myself. Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female
is being serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-resign. You resign. And “De
Lima better hang yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo. Any other woman
would have slashed her throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang
x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos ng shooting, nakangiti…”
 Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered President
Durterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called “Davao Death
Squad.”

ISSUE: W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled to court
HELD: Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
YES.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
 Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e.
permanent or temporary
 Extent:
 Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his
actions fell within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary
rather than ministerial – conduct or the action performed must not involve
insignificant or routinely office work but rather the challenged action must involve
personal judgment. It attaches to the function instead of the office.
 Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to
prove that at the time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a
good faith that his actions were lawful – subjective element determined with the
two-tier test:
 If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the
alleged wrongful action
 Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
 Duration:
 Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law
suits that arise out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
 Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating
even private suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers
 Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former President,
President Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to implead
President Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual bases for Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of national emergency
and called out the Armed Forces of the Philippines in her capacity as Commander-in-
Chief to maintain law and order throughout the country and to suppress acts of lawless
violence, insurrection or rebellion.
 Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010): Court
upheld the exclusion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, maintaining that
presidential immunity from suit despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987
Constitution and declared that the President could not be sued during her tenure in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo against military, police personnel and the
Office of the Ombudsman and including President Arroyo.
 Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court ruled that
RTC had erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be invoked in amparo
proceedings
 While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981
constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential
immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided
for immunity at two distinct points in time: 1. Immunity during the tenure of the President
2. Thereafter. Framer’s intended during tenure.
 Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. It is not intended to
immunize the President from liability or accountability.
 Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No.
82585, 82827, 83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions fee from any hindrance of distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
 Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
 attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is
not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and
that is by impeachment.
 Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President’s behalf and that it was the President who had gone to
court as the complainant
 If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every
complaint brought against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on
a case to case basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the
President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in the discharge of his duties
– would very well be defeated.
 Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except
an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his
tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.
3) A.M. No. MTJ-04-1543. May 31, 2004, ATTY. AUDIE C. ARNADO, complainant, vs.
JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Branch 1, Tacloban City, respondent

 The power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case is defined as
jurisdiction. Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
jurisdiction over the person. Clearly, respondent judge is not cognizant of the difference
as he blatantly confused one with the other.

 Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is so

essential that erroneous assumption of such jurisdiction carries with it the nullity of the
entire proceedings in the case. At the first instance or even on appeal, and although the
parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, courts are not precluded from ruling that
they have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter if such indeed is the situation.

 In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's or
accused's voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its
coercive processes.6 To prevent the loss or waiver of this defense, the accused must
raise the lack of jurisdiction seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself or his
person to that jurisdiction.7 In other words, jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike
jurisdiction over the subject-matter which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred
by consent of the parties.

 Also basic is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is ascertained by considering the
allegations of the complaint or information.

______________________________________________________________________

 Hence, jurisdiction over the criminal cases against the complainant lawyer pertains to
the Regional Trial Court. Respondent judge, therefore, gravely erred in taking
cognizance of the two criminal cases and, worse still, in issuing warrants for the
complainant's arrest.

 As a last-ditch effort to make the respondent see the light, complainant submitted on
March 11, 2002 a motion to quash alleging lack of jurisdiction. The exercise proved to be
futile. Respondent judge denied the motion on April 5, 2002 nonetheless, thereby
manifesting his gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance.9

 Consequently, respondent's argument that complainant had submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court by posting a bond is evidently erroneous.
4) [G.R. No. 133365. September 16, 2003.]
PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. JOSE M.
PANLILIO, Respondent.

 Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case. In
general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter,
over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.

 Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred by law. It is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff is acquired from the time he files his complaint; while
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person.

 Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does not
depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the
correctness of its decisions.

 In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilio’s collection case docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the
Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Diokno’s order granting the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the
court which issued the said order.

Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction.

 Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein.

 Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in
the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise
of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide
the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.