The Cavite Mutiny in relation to Definitive History

Shiela Mae L. Suico

Richell B. Jumantoc

Jannah May A. Butalid

Kimberly May Oquiana

Lochie H. Maglinte

Cebu Normal University

Bachelor of Science in Mathematics and Filipino

Mr. Jose Fermin Crave

 Table of Contents

Introduction..................................................................................................................1

Spanish Accounts of the Mutiny ................................................................................3

Filipino Accounts of the Mutiny.................................................................................5

Governador Izquierdo’s Account of the Mutiny ......................................................7

Trinidad Pardo de Tavera’s Account ........................................................................8

Edmund Plauchut’s Account ......................................................................................9

The Execution of Gomburza.....................................................................................10

The End of the Mutiny...............................................................................................11

Stand............................................................................................................................13

References ..................................................................................................................20

Click here to enter text.

 Introduction

There can as yet be no complete closure on the cavite mutiny that occurred in

January 1872 , since the records of the trials have not yet been found . Although the

Spanish government has declared them lost , and researchers have not located any

copy in the Philippine National Archives (PNA), humors of their existence in Spain

continue to surface from time to time , but nothing has been found . It seems too that

there were once at least some records of the investigations of those accused in what

would become the PNA (Artigas y Cuerva 1911,126-28), though this perhaps perish

during the war . Nonetheless , a number of publications in recent years , together with

the surviving archival material , now make it possible to come nearer to a definitive

history of the mutiny.

Most textbooks describe it is a local mutiny of a Filipino soldiers and workers

in the arsenal , reacting to a decree of Gov. Rafael de Izquierdo suppressing the

privilege of the arsenal workers to be exempt from the tribute of the compulsory labor

obligation . Some see it as a mutiny instigated by the friars so as to complicate the

Filipino priest lead by Fr. Jose Burgos, who were calling for the restoration of the

parishes occupied by the friars to the Filipino secular clergy. Some textbooks , basing

themselves on a spurious document from Artigas , even speak of a friar resembling

Burgos going among the workers and soldiers in Cavite to spur them on to revolt.

Cavite Mutiny, (January 20, 1872), brief uprising of 200 Filipino troops and

workers at the Cavite arsenal, which became the excuse for Spanish repression of the

1
embryonic Philippine nationalist movement. Ironically, the harsh reaction of the

Spanish authorities served ultimately to promote the nationalist cause.

The mutiny was quickly crushed, but the Spanish regime under the reactionary

governor Rafael de Izquierdo magnified the incident and used it as an excuse to clamp

down on those Filipinos who had been calling for governmental reform. A number of

Filipino intellectuals were seized and accused of complicity with the mutineers. After

a brief trial, three priests—José Burgos, Jacinto Zamora, and Mariano Gómez—were

publicly executed. The three subsequently became martyrs to the cause of Philippine

independence.

2
Spanish Accounts of the Mutiny

Jose Montero y Vidal, a prolific Spanish historian documented the event and

highlighted it as an attempt of the Indios to overthrow the Spanish government in the

Philippines. Meanwhile, Gov. Gen. Rafael Izquierdo’s official report magnified the

event and made use of it to implicate the native clergy, which was then active in the

call for secularization. The two accounts complimented and corroborated with one

other, only that the general’s report was more spiteful. Initially, both Montero and

Izquierdo scored out that the abolition of privileges enjoyed by the workers of Cavite

arsenal such as non-payment of tributes and exemption from force labor were the

main reasons of the “revolution” as how they called it, however, other causes were

enumerated by them including the Spanish Revolution which overthrew the secular

throne, dirty propagandas proliferated by unrestrained press, democratic, liberal and

republican books and pamphlets reaching the Philippines, and most importantly, the

presence of the native clergy who out of animosity against the Spanish friars,

“conspired and supported” the rebels and enemies of Spain. In particular, Izquierdo

blamed the unruly Spanish Press for “stockpiling” malicious propagandas grasped by

the Filipinos. He reported to the King of Spain that the “rebels” wanted to overthrow

the Spanish government to install a new “hari” in the likes of Fathers Burgos and

Zamora. The general even added that the native clergy enticed other participants by

giving them charismatic assurance that their fight will not fail because God is with

them coupled with handsome promises of rewards such as employment, wealth, and

ranks in the army. Izquierdo, in his report lambasted the Indios as gullible and

possessed an innate propensity for stealing.

The two Spaniards deemed that the event of 1872 was planned earlier and was

thought of it as a big conspiracy among educated leaders, mestizos, abogadillos or

3
native lawyers, residents of Manila and Cavite and the native clergy. They insinuated

that the conspirators of Manila and Cavite planned to liquidate high-ranking Spanish

officers to be followed by the massacre of the friars. The alleged pre- concerted signal

among the conspirators of Manila and Cavite was the firing of rockets from the walls

of Intramuros.

According to the accounts of the two, on 20 January 1872, the district of

Sampaloc celebrated the feast of the Virgin of Loreto, unfortunately participants to

the feast celebrated the occasion with the usual fireworks displays. Allegedly, those in

Cavite mistook the fireworks as the sign for the attack, and just like what was agreed

upon, the 200-men contingent headed by Sergeant Lamadrid launched an attack

targeting Spanish officers at sight and seized the arsenal.

When the news reached the iron-fisted Gov. Izquierdo, he readily ordered the

reinforcement of the Spanish forces in Cavite to quell the revolt. The “revolution” was

easily crushed when the expected reinforcement from Manila did not come ashore.

Major instigators including Sergeant Lamadrid were killed in the skirmish, while the

GOMBURZA were tried by a court-martial and were sentenced to die by

strangulation. Patriots like Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Antonio Ma. Regidor, Jose and

Pio Basa and other abogadillos were suspended by the Audencia (High Court) from

the practice of law, arrested and were sentenced with life imprisonment at the

Marianas Island. Furthermore, Gov. Izquierdo dissolved the native regiments of

artillery and ordered the creation of artillery force to be composed exclusively of the

Peninsulares.

On 17 February 1872 in an attempt of the Spanish government and

Frailocracia to instill fear among the Filipinos so that they may never commit such

4
daring act again, the GOMBURZA were executed. This event was tragic but served as

one of the moving forces that shaped Filipino nationalism.

Filipino Accounts of the Mutiny

Dr. Trinidad Hermenigildo Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino scholar and researcher,

wrote the Filipino version of the bloody incident in Cavite. In his point of view, the

incident was a mere mutiny by the native Filipino soldiers and laborers of the Cavite

arsenal who turned out to be dissatisfied with the abolition of their privileges.

Indirectly, Tavera blamed Gov. Izquierdo’s cold-blooded policies such as the

abolition of privileges of the workers and native army members of the arsenal and the

prohibition of the founding of school of arts and trades for the Filipinos, which the

general believed as a cover-up for the organization of a political club.

On 20 January 1872, about 200 men comprised of soldiers, laborers of the

arsenal, and residents of Cavite headed by Sergeant Lamadrid rose in arms and

assassinated the commanding officer and Spanish officers in sight. The insurgents

were expecting support from the bulk of the army unfortunately, that didn’t happen.

The news about the mutiny reached authorities in Manila and Gen. Izquierdo

immediately ordered the reinforcement of Spanish troops in Cavite. After two days,

the mutiny was officially declared subdued.

Travera believed that the Spanish friars and Izquierdo used the Cavite Mutiny

as a powerful lever by magnifying it as a full-blown conspiracy involving not only the

native army but also included residents of Cavite and Manila, and more importantly

the native clergy to overthrow the Spanish government in the Philippines. It is

noteworthy that during the time, the Central Government in Madrid announced its

intention to deprive the friars of all the powers of intervention in matters of civil

5
government and the direction and management of educational institutions. This

turnout of events was believed by Tavera, prompted the friars to do something drastic

in their dire sedire to maintain power in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, in the intention of installing reforms, the Central Government of

Spain welcomed an educational decree authored by Segismundo Moret promoted the

fusion of sectarian schools run by the friars into a school called Philippine Institute.

The decree proposed to improve the standard of education in the Philippines by

requiring teaching positions in such schools to be filled by competitive examinations.

This improvement was warmly received by most Filipinos in spite of the native

clergy’s zest for secularization.

The friars, fearing that their influence in the Philippines would be a thing of

the past, took advantage of the incident and presented it to the Spanish Government as

a vast conspiracy organized throughout the archipelago with the object of destroying

Spanish sovereignty. Tavera sadly confirmed that the Madrid government came to

believe that the scheme was true without any attempt to investigate the real facts or

extent of the alleged “revolution” reported by Izquierdo and the friars.

Convicted educated men who participated in the mutiny were sentenced life

imprisonment while members of the native clergy headed by the GOMBURZA were

tried and executed by garrote. This episode leads to the awakening of nationalism and

eventually to the outbreak of Philippine Revolution of 1896. The French writer

Edmund Plauchut’s account complimented Tavera’s account by confirming that the

event happened due to discontentment of the arsenal workers and soldiers in Cavite

fort. The Frenchman, however, dwelt more on the execution of the three martyr

priests which he actually witnessed.

6
Governador Izquierdo’s Account of the Mutiny

According to Izquierdo, the revolt was to begin in the early hours after

midnight in Manila , with the signal to be rebels in Cavite being given by skyrockets .

It has been said that the rebels in Cavite mistook the fireworks from the sampaloc

fiesta for the agreed upon signal (Montero y Vidal) ,but, in any case , they went to

arms between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening , instead of waiting for the signal from

Manila . The plan was to set fires in Tondo so that , while the authorities were

occupied with extinguishing them , the artillery regiment and part of the infantry

stationed in Manila will take possession of Fort Santiago and signal to those of Cavite

by means of canon shots (contrary to what he had said above about the signal being

given by skyrockets). All Spaniards were to be killed, including the friars , except the

women , and they would proclaim the independence of the country. The artillery and

marines in Cavite would rise, to be supported by 500 men under the pardoned bandit

chief, Casimiro Camerino, who were waiting in Bacoor . This reinforcements were

prevented from joining the rebels though the latter had signaled to them by to come

by the navy stationing a gun both in front of the narrow strip of land joining Bacoor to

Cavite.

News of the uprising only got to Izquierdo about 1:00 A.M., through a

message brought by the navy , those who attempted to bring the news by land having

been killed , apparently by men of Camerino . He immediately summoned the forces

to arms , and by 8:00 a.m. they set out for Cavite .

Izquierdo had no need of such a story to put him on the alert , for on 19

January had already received an anonymous letter, as had the acting commander of

the navy , telling of a revolt planned for that night or the next , simultaneously in

Manila ,and he was still on alert. The content could hardly be more explicit:

7
 I make known to you that , as i was informed this very night , in the market

here [Cavite] ant in the walls [Intramuros] on friday or saturday of this week they

will fire a cannon shot in the fort of manila, the sign of a revolt against the spaniards .

They are taking this occasion since the squadron is not here . The one who is acting

as the head of the revolt is the very referend father burgos in manila, and in cavite the

artillery sergeants and the corporals of the native marines.

It may well be there for that he review the troops that night and thus instilled

in them fear that they had been discovered so that those committed to the revolt held

back . That is what happened with the 300 men of the regiment no. 7 in Cavite who

were pledged to the revolt . When the revealing marines and artillery men invaded

their barracks and called on them to join them, their commander rallied them instead

to drive the rebels out of the barracks and send them back into Fort San Felipe . They

will be the loyal forces fighting the rebels through the night till the regiments from

Manila joined them . Thus , all three regiments , in Manila and in Cavite , remained

loyal to Spain , and the men expected from Bacoor were prevented from joining the

rebels period without these forces , the mutiny was inevitably doomed, though the

rebels held out in the fort until it was taken by storm on 22 January.

Trinidad Pardo de Tavera’s Account

The event was just a simple mutiny since up to that time the Filipinos have no

intention of separation from Spain but only secure materials and education

advancements in the country. However, the mutiny was used at a powerful level.

Also, in this time, the central government deprived friars of the powers of

8
involvement in civil government and in governing and handling universities. This

resulted in the friars' fear that their leverage in the Philippines would be a thing in the

past, took advantage of the mutiny and reported it to the Spanish government as a

broad conspiracy organized throughout the archipelago with the object of abolishing

Spanish sovereignty. The Madrid government without any attempt to investigate the

real facts or extent of the alleged revolution reported by Izquierdo and the friars

believed the scheme was true.

Edmund Plauchut’s Account

Plauchut traced the immediate cause to a peremptory order from the

Governor-General Izquierdo, exacting personal taxes from the Filipino laborers in the

engineering and artillery corps in the Cavite arsenal, and requiring them to perform

forced labor like ordinary subjects. Until then, these workers in the arsenal had been

enjoying exemptions from both taxes and forced labor. January 20, the day of the

revolt, was payday and the laborers found the amount of taxes as well as the

corresponding fee in lieu of the forced labor deducted from their pay envelopes. It

was the last straw. That night they mutinied. Forty infantry soldiers and twenty men

from the artillery took over command of Fort of San Felipe and fired carronades to

announce their moment of triumph. It was a short-lived victory. Apparently, the

mutineers had expected to be joined by their comrades in the 7th infantry company

assigned to patrol the Cavite plaza. They became terror-stricken, however, when they

beckoned to the 7th infantry men from the ramparts of the fort and their comrades did

not make any move to join them. Instead, the company started attacking them. The

rebels decided to bolt the gates and wait for morning when support from Manila was

expected to come. He gave a dispassionate account of it and its causes in an article

9
published in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1877. He traced that the primary cause of

the mutiny is believed to "be an order from Governor-General Carlos de la Torre

(Izquierdo's predecessor) to subject the soldiers of the Engineering and Artillery

Corps to personal taxes, from which they were previously exempt. The taxes required

them to pay a monetary sum as well as to perform forced labor called, polo y servicio.

The mutiny was sparked on January 20, 1872, when the laborers received their pay

and realized the taxes as well as the falla, the fine one paid to be exempt from forced

labor, had been deducted from their salaries.

Different accounts in the Cavite mutiny also highlighted other probable causes

of the "revolution" which included a Spanish revolution which overthrew the secular

throne, dirty propagandas proliferated by unrestrained press, democratic, liberal and

republican books and pamphlets reaching the Philippines, and most importantly, the

presence of the native clergy who out of animosity against the Spanish friars,

"conspired and supported" the rebels and enemies of Spain.

In addition, accounts of the mutiny suggest that the Glorious Revolution in

Spain during that time added more determination to the natives to overthrow the

current colonial Spanish government.

The Execution of Gomburza

One of the most important factors in the emergence of Filipino nationalism in

the second half of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly the struggle for the rights

of the Filipino clergy which culminated in the martyrdom of Fathers Burgos, Gómez,

and Zamora in 1872. What had been an intra-Church dispute between secular and

regular clergy over the parishes, dating back to the seventeenth century, became a

nationalist movement, which joined forces with the lav reformists who had come into

10
the open during the period following the accession of Governor-General Carlos María

de la Torre in 1869. The tragic climax to the movement was the execution of the three

priests and the exile of many of their priest and lay associates. It put a temporary stop

to nationalist activity, but it was crucial in giving a direction to subsequent Filipino

nationalism. The most striking testimony to this is Rizal's witness:" Were it not for

1872, Rizal would now be a Jesuit and instead of writing the Noli Me Tangere, would

have written the contrary...." Examples could be multiplied; it was the survivors of

1872, their pupils, brothers, and sons who were to be the leading figures of the

Propaganda Movement and even of the Revolution and the Malolos Republic-Marcelo

del Pilar, Fr. Mariano Sevilla, Felipe Buencamino, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, José

María Basa, Gregorio Sanciangco and Paciano Rizal, to name a few.

The Spanish government shrouded the events of 1872 in mystery, and the

records cf the trial of the three priests have remained un-available even until today,

presumably in the Archivo General Militar in Segovia. On the other hand, various

versions of the events of 1872

The End of the Mutiny

The assault began at 6:00 a.m. and an hour later the fort was taken . They

found the commander of the fort dead, as well as a maid , and his wife wounded . In

the same room was a friar of San Juan de Dios, who had been visiting the commander

and whom " those evil men respected , no doubt because of the consideration for the

habit he wore."

Izquierdo also mentions that "two officers who were under arrest in the fort

were found , the one dead and the other seriously wounded." Although he did not

11
identify them or say why they were in that condition , Antonio Regidor would

declared that the Spanish lieutenants were named Morquccho and Jose Montesinos,

and that at the urging of Friar Rufian they had commanded the revolting artillerymen.

When the loyal troops took the fort, Montesinos was killed , together with Seargent

Lamadrid , the leader of the rebels , while Morquecho put a gun to his head , but only

died sometime later . They have been identified now more accurately as Lts. Manuel

Montesinos and Vicente Lopez Morquecho, both officers of regiment no.7 , who were

logical men to aid the rebels, who had no officer higher than Seargent Lamadrid. It

appears that Izquierdo was reluctant to admit that there were Spanish officers among

the rebels , and choose to pass over the rule in silence . In fact , however , at the

solemn funeral of the fallen Spaniards , the name of Montesinos was not found on the

honoring wreaths. Their motivation will be discussed below in connection with the

true character of the uprising.

In view of several later accounts that place the caused off the uprising in the

suppression of the exemption of the arsenal workers from the tribute and compulsory

labor , and even making the arsenal workers to have taken part in the revolt , it may be

noted that Izquierdo mentioned is suppression , but as a mere pretext that the

instigators of the revolt had used. Contrary to this accounts , he describes the revolt as

purely military— excluding does the participation of the arsenal workers, much more

the contention that their strike , which in fact only occurred several months later , led

to the revolt . The origin of these accounts and their definite refutation have been

established in meticulous detail by Tormo , who notes that the decree revoking the

exemption of the arsenal workers was published only 20 days before the revolt , too

soon for the extensive preparation preceding the revolt , as will be seen .

12
 It has also been said that "some individuals of the navy" took part in the

rebellion . This misinformation undoubtedly came from the formal addresses

Izquierdo published on 22 January , just after the suppression of the mutiny . No

doubt the mistake was based on early reports speaking of the marines , who in fact

had revolted . But both Carballo and Izquierdo, explicitly refute this preliminary

assertion and their later documents. In fact , the navy cooperated in putting an end to

the revolt .But months later it will develop that the crew of the frigate Berenguela

indeed had been committed to revolt , but apparently , like the men of the regiment

no.7 , they were rallied by their commander and remained loyal.

Similarly , Izquierdo's early address said that the rebels "scarcely reached 200

men" . But in his later account he specifies less: 38 artillerymen and 54 marines .

Stand

Since 1898, the 12th of June has been a significant occasion for all Filipinos.

The entire nation of the Philippines and Filipino communities all over the world

gather on this day to commemorate the Philippines' independence. 1898 became a

very important year for all of us, just like 1896, when the Philippine Revolution began

because the Filipino people wanted to be free from the oppression of the Spanish

colonial regime. However, another year—1872—is just as significant as the previous

two.

Across the four accounts of the 1872 Mutiny, there were some fundamental

facts that remained the same: First, the employees of the arsenal and members of the

native army were dissatisfied when Gen. Izquierdo revoked their privileges. Second,

Gen. Izquierdo enacted rigid regulations that drove Filipinos to flee and reject the

Spanish government with contempt. Thirdly, the central government relied solely on

13
public opinion and reports from Izquierdo and the friars rather than conducting an

investigation into the actual events. Fourthly, in 1872, the Spanish Central

Government made the decision to deprive the friars of their authority to intervene in

matters pertaining to the government as well as the supervision and management of

schools, which prompted the friars to rush to extend their stay and authority. Fifthly,

members of the Filipino clergy actively participated in the secularization campaign in

order to permit Filipino priests to take over parishes across the nation, putting them in

danger of facing the wrath of the friars; Sixth, Filipinos opposed what they perceived

as injustices and were active participants at the time; Last but not least, the execution

of GOMBURZA was a failure on the part of the Spanish authorities because it put an

end to Filipino hostility and inspired Filipino patriots to demand reforms and,

ultimately, independence. There were many stories about the Cavite Mutiny in 1872,

but one thing is certain: It set the stage for a landmark year 1898.

Many unnamed patriots sacrificed their lives for reforms and independence,

and the road to independence was rough and difficult. Even though the 12th of June

1898 was a glorious occasion for us, we should not forget that our ancestors endured

enough hardships before we achieved victory. As we enjoy our freedom, may we have

a better future by being more aware of our history. And may we "not forget those who

fell during the night," as Elias wrote in Noli me Tangere.

A complete and "definitive" history of the GomBurZa tragedy and the events

of 1872 still needs to be written as we commemorate the 151st anniversary of the

GomBurZa execution. The circumstances that elevated the three priests to hero status

were the subject of baffling studies. But were they innocent or guilty?

14
 The sources contain nothing novel. In any case, the reevaluation of the

realities might give another point of view toward the occasions of 1872.

The following are the bare facts about this incident: the emergence and

expansion of a liberal movement in the Philippines, which was supported by a lenient

governor-general and then crushed by a brutal one; the problem of secularization,

which was eventually recognized as one of the first acts of nationalism in our history;

the January 1872 military mutiny in Fort San Felipe, Cavite, by disgruntled workers

and soldiers; the sedition charge leveled against the three priests. Frs. Gomes, Burgos,

and Zamora's garrote-based execution.

But what really happened? Even after 150 years, we still do not have the trial

records of the three priests and the other liberal movement defendants. These records

couldn't be tracked down in the Philippine Public Documents or the Spanish files.

How and why these records have vanished to this day remain a mystery.

After documents and a reexamination of published sources revealed that the

mutiny and the execution of the three Filipino priests appeared to be more than what

actually happened, Jesuit historian John Schumacher stated in 2011 that the writing

of a definitive history of the Cavite mutiny is required. The following are some

historical facts that should be noted:

1. The planned separatist revolution that took place in Cavite was not a mutiny.

2. After committed Filipino troops defected to the Spanish side, the revolution failed.

3. The three priests were aware of the revolt but had nothing to do with it. It was

anything to do with the businesspeople, lawyers, and priests who were sent to the

Marianas.

4.The accounts of the revolt and its causes that come from Antonio Regidor are not

accurate.

15
5.Although it contributed to the unrest, the arsenal workers' exclusion from tribute

and compulsory labor was not the cause of the revolt.

Schumacher was correct when he said that the "mutiny" was actually a failed

separatist revolution led by liberals and a military of Filipino soldiers. The Cavite

incident was not even referred to as a "motin," or a mutiny, in any of the documents,

including the letter from Governor-General Rafael Izquierdo to the Overseas Minister

in Spain. Instead, it was referred to as an insurrection.

Even though Izquierdo wasn't yet in the country when the Tayabas Regiment

mutinied in 1843, Spanish officials were suspicious of native regiment activities at a

time when liberalism was becoming more prevalent. Later, Izquierdo said that he had

already heard about and heard rumors about a planned uprising involving the Manila

and Cavite regiments. He and his officers met with the soldiers to get them to stay

loyal to Spain and tell them what would happen if they rebelled against the

government. Their efforts worked, but only a few native soldiers revolted and ended

up fighting their own comrades who stayed loyal to Spain or switched their loyalty to

Spain.

Schumacher also deduced that Antonio Maria and two liberals worked

together to prevent a major uprising from turning into a mutiny by a few disgruntled

officers and arsenal workers Joaquin Pardo de Tavera and Regidor. Both men were

sentenced to exile in the Marianas after being accused of sedition in connection with

the Cavite revolt. Regidor, in particular, attempted to minimize the incident as a

mutiny rather than a rebellion. claiming that the Spaniards exaggerated the incident in

order to implicate secular priests and liberals in Manila.

Are the three Filipino priests liable for their part in the failed uprising? The

evidence that the three were suspected of anti-Spanish activities prior to the so-called

16
"mutiny" cannot be discounted. Fr. In 1849, Mariano Gomes and Fr. were involved in

the initial secularization efforts. Archbishop Jose Aranguren even confronted Pedro

Pelaez about "his subversive acts." acts that Gomes denied, but which, regrettably, did

not dispel suspicions about him.

Fr.'s detention In Philippine history, Jacinto Zamora was portrayed as a case of

mistaken identity. In his book Los Sucesos de 1872, Artigas y Cuerva says that the

original name on the arrest warrant was for a priest. Jose Zamora, and when the

arrested priest claimed that he wasn't on the order, the arresting officer simply

substituted "Jacinto" for "Jose." This seemed to have sealed Fr.'s fate when combined

with the phrase "powder and bullets." Zamora.

This story was problematic because it sounded absurd. Why should it be

renamed? Was it simply laziness on the part of the arresting officer to look for the

actual suspect? Additionally, this "Jose Zamora" was never mentioned again in the

narrative of the Cavite revolt. He was also not mentioned in the months that followed

the 1871 incident. Fr. Dominican historian, on the other hand, confirms his existence.

Fidel Villarroel, speaking of a "Fr. Jose Zamora" was a regimental chaplain in the

Spanish military who, when the governor-general's order was given, could have easily

been arrested.

Artigas y Cuervas's story, which was probably based on Regidor, seemed

unbelievable because, like his two friends, Govenor-General De la Torre was also

suspicious of Zamora. The Spanish colonial authorities censored his mail. This also

indicated that he was aware of the Burgos' activities because he was Burgos' fellow

priest in the Manila Cathedral.

Burgos was under suspicion for his political involvement in the secularization

movement as early as 1869. “On the political unreliability of the Filipino secular

17
clergy, and the necessity of opposing any anti-Friar movement as being essentially

anti-Spanish,” Governor-General De La Torre had warned his successor in writing.

considered by his fellow religious to be Fr. Pedro Pelaez, Burgos proved to be a more

"radical" advocate for the secular clergy's rights after Pelaez's death in the 1863

earthquake. In fact, he joined the liberal priests, giving the movement political flavor.

Fr. Schumacher, a Jesuit superior, was mentioned. Burgos was warned not to mix

with liberals by Pedro Bertran. Also known is that Fr. Gomes disassociated himself

from Burgos' leadership once he realized the repercussions.

Are the three priests aware of the planned uprising? They might not have been

directly involved, as Schumacher correctly pointed out. The three priests may have

been aware of the plan, however, given Burgos's close ties to liberals, Zamora's work

with Burgos, and Spanish evidence like a boat with guns found near Gomes' house in

Bacoor that was thought to belong to the Camerino group that was involved in the

uprising. Aside from stating, in accordance with Regidor's account, that the three

priests were falsely implicated, no historian had provided an answer to the question of

why Burgos' name and that of the two priests appeared in the planning of the revolt,

as mentioned by the Filipino soldiers Francisco Zaldua and Bonifacio Octavo. But if

the other guilty parties appeared to have been in the same predicament, why did

GomBurZa receive the harshest punishment—execution? Why them, and not any of

the other Filipino priests who were taken into custody on suspicion of being involved

in the uprising?

As all three were taken into custody in their homes shortly after the uprising

was put down, it appeared that the GomBurZa were aware of or suspicious of the

potential for trouble in the city. However, they were unaware of any specifics

18
regarding the uprising. They might have been forced to flee because the Spaniards

thought they were part of the plot. However, they didn't.

In conclusion, consider the following aspects of 1872: One, the Cavite

"mutiny" at Fort San Felipe was a failed revolt, not a mutiny; two, Fathers Zamora,

Burgos, and Gomes were not entirely innocent of the charges of sedition against them.

The secularization movement's politicization placed them in the center of Spanish

authorities' suspicion. We think that the three priests, especially Burgos, may have

known something about the uprising, but they did not know enough to be concerned

or even take action.

GomBurZa were always portrayed as innocent victims of Spanish colonial

oppression in our portrayal. However, we hope to alter that viewpoint. The three

priests weren't just unfortunate bystanders. In addition, the three priests should be

regarded as our forefathers' heroes because they sparked the first acts of nationalism

in the Philippines in the 19th century and paid the ultimate price for their beliefs,

identity, and human dignity.

19
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https://libguides.fau.edu/science-resources/article-structure#:~:text=A%20scholarly

%20article%20generally%20consists,its%20references%20or%20works%20cited.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/42635001?searchText=cavite+mutiny&searchUri=

%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dcavite

%2Bmutiny&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-

default%3Ad306891e72b8503e6fedd3f58e9622e8&seq=18

https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/university-of-southern-mindanao/

accountancy/how-did-governor-general-izquierdo-describe-cavite-mutiny/29396949?

fbclid=IwAR1Zt1ubjoKJ26o1jbWmAtqCVSpa_x0b4R0Osd3Ivd9EfwgGO7qOs14l6

M4

https://nhcp.gov.ph/the-two-faces-of-the-1872-cavite-mutiny/

https://www.britannica.com/event/Cavite-Mutiny

https://www.jstor.org/stable/42634842?read-now=1&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1872_Cavite_mutiny

20