This document summarizes the evolution of investment law and protection in India over three phases from 1947 to the present. The first phase from 1947-1991 welcomed foreign investment but some sectors faced nationalization. The second phase from 1991-2011 liberalized foreign investment policies. The third phase from 2011 onward saw India cancel existing bilateral investment treaties and issue a new model bilateral investment treaty in 2015 that aims to balance investor protections with policy space. The document also discusses theories around the impact and risks of foreign investment to host countries.
This document summarizes the evolution of investment law and protection in India over three phases from 1947 to the present. The first phase from 1947-1991 welcomed foreign investment but some sectors faced nationalization. The second phase from 1991-2011 liberalized foreign investment policies. The third phase from 2011 onward saw India cancel existing bilateral investment treaties and issue a new model bilateral investment treaty in 2015 that aims to balance investor protections with policy space. The document also discusses theories around the impact and risks of foreign investment to host countries.
This document summarizes the evolution of investment law and protection in India over three phases from 1947 to the present. The first phase from 1947-1991 welcomed foreign investment but some sectors faced nationalization. The second phase from 1991-2011 liberalized foreign investment policies. The third phase from 2011 onward saw India cancel existing bilateral investment treaties and issue a new model bilateral investment treaty in 2015 that aims to balance investor protections with policy space. The document also discusses theories around the impact and risks of foreign investment to host countries.
India Indian policy towards foreign investment and its protection have transformed overtime under three phases. The First Phase of Investment Protection (1947- 1991) The changes in the first phase were gradual with variations. During pre-independence, the British Government policy encouraged investors from Great Britain, undertook steps for their promotion and protection and actively discouraged domestic Indian investments and investors. The British funded industry associations showed complete indifference to the needs of Indian businesses and expectations. During World War –II, the Indian shipping industry was requisitioned and control was handed over to those protecting British shipping interests. Besides the hostile regulatory framework towards Indian investors, the market conditions were maintained unfavourably through other means. With independence, India became host to a large body of foreign capital; it was ¾ British, almost entirely private owned, featuring a fairly typical investment in a colonial economy. Having faced discrimination at the hands of the British Government, there was resentment towards foreign investment in the Indian domestic industry. It was insisting that all foreign investments be bought and their control from foreign hands be taken away. It was felt that the existing foreign investments particularly in natural resource extraction were retarding the nation's development. The newly formed government of independent India did accept this approach; rather, it especially in 1950s and 1960s was receptive of and welcomed foreign investment, with a view to get technology, skill and control transferred to the Indian nationals. In 1961, the Government of India established India Investment Centre with offices in major capital exporting countries with a view to disseminate information and advice on profitability of investing in India. The peculiar characteristic of India was absence of mass scale nationalization of foreign business, as was done in other newly independent countries. However, nationalization was undertaken sector wise in India, applicable without discrimination towards foreign investors. In some cases foreign investors were excluded from such measures. Air transport was nationalized in 1953, Imperial Bank was nationalized in 1955, life insurance in January 1956 and Kolar Gold Fields in December 1956. The period between 1965-1981 was turbulent, as it was a time of economic difficulty for India and economic disparity within India. Inward-looking protectionist measures were adopted, which made foreign investors lose faith in the economy. It was the time of second wave of nationalization, targeting domestic companies and excluding foreign investors. Privately owned commercial banks were unwilling to lend to crucial sectors like agriculture and small-scale industry. The Government decided to nationalize the banking sector, though foreign banks were excluded. Nationalization of coal sector took place to control rampant and unregulated coal mining. The Foreign Investment Board (FIB) was set up in 1968 to regulate incoming foreign investment. Along with the already existing protectionist policy, another rigid approach taken through the enactment of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973 further antagonized foreign investors. Shareholding of foreign firms in various sectors was largely controlled. As per the industrial policy of 1977, foreign companies were required to dilute their equity up to 40% to get NT. The Second Phase of Investment Protection (1991-2011): The trigger point for giving up the protectionist domestic policy and heavy regulatory framework was the balance of payment crisis. FDI up to 51% was permitted in crucial sectors and 100% in energy sector. Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB)was set up. The FERA was amended to treat foreign companies with more than 40% of foreign equity at par with domestic companies. The Third Phase of Investment Protection (2011 Onwards): The third era started with India losing the first investment case filed by an Australian investor White Industries in 2011. The case exposed the vulnerability of India to investment claims. A swathe of notices were lodged against Indian government for various actions, including some made against the decision of the Supreme Court (e.g., Centre for Public Interest Litigation v Union of India, 3 SCC 1 (2012)). The Government of India through the Ministry of Commerce prepared a paper on India’s BIT programme. It concluded that ‘there was a need to rethink the role of BITs in attracting foreign investment in India’. Further, it was stated that ‘when developing countries enter into BITs, a balance between investor’s rights and domestic policy must be ensured.’ The existing Indian BITs lack balance between investor protection and regulatory freedom of India; and a need to review the BITs was expressed. Owing to a number of BIT claims levelled against India, it decided to put all then ongoing stand- alone BIT negotiations on hold. In 2015, a draft Model BIT was issued which would become the basis of negotiation for future BITs and all the existing BITs were cancelled in 2017. The Model BIT represents a major shift of India towards investor protection through BITs. It introduced the concept of sustainable development in the preamble for the first time and emphasized the need of conserving regulatory space for undertaking regulations for public interest. A shift from ‘asset-based’ to ‘enterprise-based’ in the Model BIT indicates that India proposes a narrow ‘enterprise-based’ definition for investment, whereby only direct investments are protected under the treaty. Further, the model BIT completely omits the “fair and equitable treatment” standard. The well-recognized doctrines of “MFN” (Most- Favoured Nation) and “legitimate expectation” are also absent. In the model BIT taxation measures have been exempted from the protections offered under the BIT. Model BIT also removed umbrella clause as well. The draft Model BIT was far reaching since it severely curtailed the dispute resolution standards by introducing the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies rule. The model BIT seems more like a restatement of international law on sovereignty rather than a treaty meant to protect cross-border commercial transactions. Theories of Foreign Investment Law Theoretical conflicts have had an impact on shaping legal attitudes to foreign investment. The conflict is between two extreme theories, one of which maintains that foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the host state while the other maintains that, unless a state veers away from dependence on foreign investment, it cannot achieve development. All theories focus attention on the economic development of the host state, particularly the host developing state. The classical theory on foreign investment The classical economic theory on foreign investment presents that foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the host economy. The fact that foreign capital is brought into the host state ensures that the domestic capital available for use can be diverted to other uses for the public benefit. The foreign investor usually brings with him technology which is not available in the host state. There is new employment created, whereas, without foreign investment, such opportunities for employment would be lost. The labour that is so employed will acquire new skills associated with the technology introduced by the foreign investor. Skills in the management of large projects will also be transferred to local personnel. Infrastructure facilities will be built either by the foreign investor or by the state, and these facilities will be to the general benefit of the economy. The upgrading of facilities such as transport, health or education for the benefit of the foreign investor will also benefit the host society as a whole. The dependency theory The dependency theory is diametrically opposed to the classical theory, and takes the view that foreign investment will not bring about meaningful economic development. It was a theory popularised by Latin American economists and political philosophers, though work based on it has been done in other parts of the world. The proposition is that the subsidiary devises its policies in the interests of its parent company and its shareholders in the home state. The dependency theory comes to the diametrically opposite conclusion to that of the classical theory, in that it holds that foreign investment is uniformly injurious. It holds that, rather than promoting development, foreign investment keeps developing countries in a state of permanent dependency on the central economies of developed states. The middle path Many states have seen more wisdom in a pragmatic approach to the problem than in ideological stances. The fear that multinationals pose a threat to the sovereignty of developing states has receded with the increasing confidence of the developing states in managing their economies. Multinational corporations have also left behind the role of being instruments of the foreign policy of their home states. On occasions, they have even formed alliances with developing countries to the detriment of their home states. Some of the larger multinational corporations are capable of conducting foreign policy for their own benefit. While supporting the view that foreign investment through multinational corporations could have harmful results in certain circumstances, the studies of UNCTC showed that, properly harnessed, multinational corporations could be engines that fuel the growth of the developing world. Risks in foreign investment The risks to foreign investment increased after the end of the colonial period. Where investment was taken into countries which were not under colonial domination, protection was secured through diplomatic means, which often involved the collective exercise of pressure through the threat of force or economic sanctions by the home states of the investor. In the absence of protection through the exercise of military power (e.g., gun-boat diplomacy), there has been an increase in the risks to foreign investment in the modern world. The principal risks to foreign investment come from certain uniform and identifiable forces, resulting from either regime change or changes to the existing political and economic policies of the host state. The right of a state to change its economic policy is recognised though that right may now come to be circumscribed by the increasing number of treaties on international investment. Risk factors in foreign investment Ideological hostility: Communist ideology is opposed to private capital and private means of production. Communist states are experimenting with mixed systems that permit the influx of foreign investment even into sectors of the economy that are controlled by state entities provided the foreign investor makes a joint venture with these entities. In states which are opening their doors to foreign investment, there are still political forces which remain antagonistic to foreign investment either because they are socialist or because they resent the possibility of foreign control of business sectors. Where groups with ideological beliefs opposed to foreign investment come to power, there will be a definite threat to foreign investment. Nationalism: Nationalistic sentiments pose a threat to foreign investments, particularly at times when the host economy is in decline, prosperous foreign investors who are seen to control the economy and repatriate profits will be easy targets of xenophobic nationalism. They are ready targets for opportunistic politicians who may see advantage in such a situation to bring about a change of government. In 1952, when the Mossadegh government sought to nationalise foreign owned assets in Iran, it was overthrown by the joint efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States. The monarchy, which favoured foreign capital, was reinstated. The Iranian revolution of 1979 was both nationalist and fundamentalist, which resulted in the taking of US business interests. SPP v Egypt ((1992) 8 ICSID Rev 328.) is an arbitration which illustrates the manner in which nationalistic feeling may engineer foreign investment disputes. Ethnicity The role of the ethnic structure of the host state on foreign investment has become a focus of attention. This situation of ethnic nationalism poses a threat to foreign investment. The institutions of the free market and democracy are not effectively mediated in developing states, as they are in the developed world. Some states (like Malaysia and South Africa) have sought to deal with the problem through constitutional means to ensure that the majority community has the opportunity of sharing the economic cake in proportion to its size. Changes in industry patterns Where there are changes in an industry throughout the world, those changes will likely affect ownership patterns within that industry, and this will affect the foreign investor’s interests throughout the world. The oil crisis in the 1970s was provoked by the concerted effort on the part of the oil-producing nations to take control of the oil industries in their states and to fix the price of oil. Contracts made by previous regimes Incoming governments may wish to change the contracts made with foreign investors by previous governments. This may take place where there are allegations of corruption in the making of contracts, or where the legitimacy of the previous government is doubted on objective grounds by the incoming government. Onerous contracts
Foreign investment contracts, which become too
onerous to perform, are also subject to the risk of government intervention. In these circumstances, states will reduce the loss that could be suffered by the state or the state agency by interfering legislatively with the contract. The law-and-order situation Instability in the law-and-order situation in a state poses a threat to foreign investment. Where the political situation foments animosity against foreigners and targets their property, difficulties will arise. These usually arise when the government is unable to contain marauding mobs and gangs of criminals or when the government itself foments uprisings against foreigners, Actors in the field of foreign investment •The multinational corporations •State corporations •International institutions •Non-governmental organisations •Sovereign wealth funds