No.

L-44640, 73 SCA 333 [Oct 12, 1976]

Political questions are associated with the wisdom

and not the legality of an act.

“[A constitutional amendment] proposed today has

relation to the sentiment and felt needs today, and
that, if not ratified early while the sentiment may
fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded
as waived…”

Facts:

In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a

referendumplebiscite two questions: “(1) Do you want martial law to
be continued?; “(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be
continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? xxx” Petitioners now seek to declare void the presidential
decrees which submitted the aforementioned issues to the people in a
plebiscitereferendum. They aver that the incumbent President has no
constitutional grant of constituent power to propose amendments to
the Constitution; consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal
basis. They now seek to enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.

Issues:

(1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the assailed

presidential decrees political or justiciable?

(2) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to

the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
sufficient and proper?

Held:

(1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending in this case

is in the form of a delegated and hence a limited power so that the SC
is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly
associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the
case at bar,] what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the
Constitutional authority of the President to perform such acts or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of
that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
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(2) Yes. In abnormal times,* the separation of powers may form an

insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action xxx. The power
of the State in crisis xxx must be freed from the normal system of
constitutional and legal limitations so that the crisis may be ended and
normal times restored. The presidential exercise of legislative powers
in times of martial law is now a conceded valid act.** There is, thus, no
reason why the President cannot discharge validly the function of the
Int. Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is
but adjunct to its gross legislative power. For the President to decline
to undertake the amending process, in the absence of the Int.
Assembly, would leave a governmental machinery at a stalemate,
thereby impeding the objective of a crisis govt “to end the crises and
restore normal times”.
(3) Yes. Three weeks (period from the issuance of presidential decrees
to referendum-plebiscite) is not too short for free debates and
discussions. The questions are not new. They are issues of the day. All
that the 1973 Constitution provides is that the plebiscite “xxx shall be
held not later than 3 months after approval of such amendment
xxx”.*** Citing Jameson: “An alteration of the Constitution proposed
today has relation to the sentiment and felt needs today, and that, if
not ratified early while the sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed.”

* There are two periods contemplated in the Constitutional life of a

nation: (1) the period of normalcy, and (2) the period of transition
(abnormal times). xxx In times of transition, amendments maybe
proposed by a majority vote of all the members of the Int. National
Assembly upon special call by the Int. Prime Minister (Art XVII, Sec 15,
1973 Const.) (Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCA 333)

** 1973 Const., Art XVII, Sec 3: “(1) The incumbent President xxx shall
initially convene the int. National Assembly and shall preside over its
sessions until the int. Speaker shall have been elected. He shall
continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the 1935
Const. and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister
under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister,
who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution. “(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated xxx by the incumbent President shall be part of the
law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even
after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution xxx”
*** Art XVI, Sec 2. The 1987 Const. now requires the plebiscite to “be
held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days xxx” – Art XVII, Sec
4.