199

Mobility and ANTHONY HEATH &

SHAWNA SMITH

ethnic minorities Nuffield College, Oxford

Levels of employment are greater cause

for concern than social immobility
lthough there has been much research to be important in securing better jobs and a

A on both ethnic minorities in the labour

market and also social mobility
amongst the native British population, there
lack of local qualifications accompanied by
employers possibly putting a lower value on
foreign qualifications.
has been surprisingly little work done on If these explanations were correct, how-
intergenerational social mobility amongst ever, the experiences of second-generation
ethnic minorities in Britain. Heath and Ridge ethnic minority males – brought up in Britain,
(1983), using data from 1972, looked at social fluent in English, and most of whom have
mobility amongst first-gener- obtained British qualifications
ation male migrants, hypoth- and most likely British con-
“Native birth brings
esising that migration tacts – should be very differ-
occupational
weakens the close link improvement but ent to those of their fathers.
between father’s and son’s does little to The aim of this article is to
class positions. They found mitigate examine both the levels of
that both non-white migrants unemployment” intergenerational social
and white migrants from the mobility amongst both first-
Republic of Ireland were and second-generation
indeed less likely to maintain their parents’ migrants, and the role of intergenerational
social status. In fact, they were more likely to social mobility within ethnic groups. It should
experience downward mobility than British- be noted that this article does not deal with
born white men. social mobility within a generation or the life-
The study put forward racial discrimina- time career mobility of ethnic minority men.
tion as one possible explanation for this We have used data from General House-
downward mobility; however, because of the hold Surveys. The absolute and relative
similar nature of disadvantage experienced by measures of social mobility use the GHS
white migrants as well as non-whites, Heath pooled from the years 1985-1992, the only
and Ridge also suggested other mechanisms period during which sufficient information
that might be at work. Among those dis- was collected on the respondent’s father’s
cussed were a lack of language fluency, a lack social class. Unfortunately the numbers of
of local social contacts and connections shown second-generation ethnic minorities in the

1070-3535/03/040199 + 05 © 2003 IPPR

 200 NEW ECONOMY

pooled dataset are rather small, thus the
conclusions of this article can only be viewed
as rather tentative. Additionally, because of
the small numbers, discussion of second-
generation Pakistanis has been omitted. Our
analysis uses GHS data pooled from the
years 1991-2000; more recent data can be
used here because information on father’s
social class is not required. Again, howev-
er, sample size for second-generation ethnic
minorities, overall, remains small, and
analysis for second-generation Pakistanis is
not available.
Absolute social mobility amongst
ethnic minority men
Absolute social mobility refers to the absolute
proportion of individuals from one social
class who move into another social class – in
other words, what proportion of men were
upwardly mobile (for example, moving from
manual labour to salaried occupations),
downwardly mobile (from example from
salaried occupations to manual labour), or
remained within the same class.
Table 1 shows the absolute rates of inter-
generational social mobility for males of
White British, Irish, Caribbean, Indian, and
Pakistani descent, for both first- and second-
generations.
Overall, these results seem to contradict the
pessimistic accounts of mobility amongst
first-generation migrants. All but the first-gen-
eration Pakistanis experienced overall
upward mobility, with the large majority
remaining within a social class. These results
especially contradict the claim that ‘the first
generation of black migrants to Britain gen-
erally experienced downward mobility’
(Aldridge 2001). Our data show that first-gen-
eration Caribbeans experienced more than
twice as much upward mobility (13 per cent)
as downward mobility (6 per cent).
Across the generations, however, the data
is much less encouraging. While an opti-
mistic picture persists for the second-gener-
ations of some ethnic minorities, the
experiences of other groups are less opti-
mistic. Second-generation Irish and Indians,
for example, are both experiencing net levels

Table 1 Absolute mobility rates for ethnic minority men in Britain, by generation

Stable Up into Down from Base

salaried occupations salaried occupations
White British 34 18 10 39,116
Irish
First generation 36 17 5 443
Second generation 30 24 5 364
Caribbean
First generation 26 13 6 204
Second generation 39 5 6 187
Indian
First generation 32 19 8 591
Second generation 29 18 2 82
Pakistani
First generation 32 5 7 286

Source: GHS 1985-1992

 MOBILITY AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 201

of upward mobility. In contrast, second-gen- and class inequalities within each ethnic group.
eration Caribbeans and first-generation Pak- Relative rates of mobility, unlike absolute rates,
istanis both experienced net levels of are not measured in terms of percentages but
downward mobility, with five per cent mov- rather measure mobility in terms of odds ratios
ing up into salaried occupations, and six per – for example, the odds of a male from work-
cent moving down from salaried occupa- ing class origins gaining access to salaried
tions. Second-generation Pakistanis followed work within each ethnic group.
a similar pattern, with five per cent moving For ethnic minorities, relative rates of
into salaried work, and seven mobility illustrate the role of
per cent moving out. social class stratification with-
“Ethnic minority
Absolute rates of mobility, in each ethnic group, and can
groups appear to be
however, can be misleading in tell us whether class origins
as internally
that they will be affected by operate in the same way with-
stratified as the
individuals’ starting points. If, in each minority group as
White British...
for example, the first genera- they do among British-born
common ethnic
tion actually came from man- Whites. Are ethnic minority
minority status does
ual or farming backgrounds, not appear to males as internally stratified
there would be a great deal of dampen the effect of by social class as White
room for upward mobility, and social class origins” British males, or is it possible
less for downward mobility. that ethnic minority status
As it has been well-document- (and perhaps the disadvan-
ed that first-generation ethnic minorities were tage that come with this status) overrides
more likely to have working-class or farming class, leading members of an ethnic minori-
origins than were British whites, higher levels ty to experience similar occupational for-
of social mobility may simply reflect lower start- tunes irrespective of social class origins?
ing points. Thus in
order to gain a more
Table 2 Relative mobility rates for men, by generation
accurate under-
standing of social
mobility amongst Salaried : working class Base
ethnic minorities, odds ratio

these starting points White British 5.5 25,038

need to be taken into Irish
account during our First generation 10 219
analysis. Second generation 5 233
Caribbean
Relative mobility First generation 5 105
amongst ethnic Second generation 20 134
minorities Indian
Examining relative First generation 6 223
rates of mobility is Second generation 7 38
one way of account-
Pakistani
ing for different start-
First generation 15 137
ing points, and also
allows us to exam- Source: GHS 1985-1992
ine social mobility
 202 NEW ECONOMY

Table 2 shows the odds ratios of a male of in gaining and sustaining higher levels of
working class origin gaining access to salaried employment and are clearly a sector of the
work from each ethnic background. This data ethnic minority population disadvantaged
provides little evidence of ethnicity ‘trumping’ within the labour market.
class, as most of the odds ratios, especially once
the 95 per cent confidence intervals are con- Assessing inequalities between
sidered, are not significantly different from the ethnic groups
odds ratios for White British males. Ethnic While relative mobility rates tell us about the
minority groups appear to be as internally extent of class inequalities within each group,
stratified as the White British. In other words, they do not tell us about inequalities of oppor-
ethnic minority sons from salaried back- tunity between groups – or, in other words,
grounds have many of the same competitive they cannot tell us whether ethnic minorities
advantages over their working class coethnics with the same qualifications as their white
as White British sons from counterparts have the same
salaried backgrounds have chances of entering salaried
“a programme of
over the White British working work. Our analysis, however,
affirmative action in
class. Overall, common ethnic allows us to examine this
Britain may prove to
minority status does not comparison.
be worth considering
appear to dampen the effect of in attacking high The first column of Table 3
social class origins. levels of shows the coefficients for eth-
Breen and Whelan (1999) unemployment nic minority access to salaried
found similar results in their amongst ethnic work after controlling for age,
research on relative social minority groups” educational attainment, and
mobility amongst Catholics marital status. Coefficients
and Protestants within North- indicate the log odds of an
ern Ireland. Given that within Northern Ire- individual attaining access to salaried work
land, religion functions in much the same way compared to a similarly-qualified British-
as ethnicity does in Britain, this would appear born white male. If there is no difference
to add further credence to the idea that even between the likelihoods of white and ethnic
common identities associated with disad- minority men, the coefficient would equal
vantage do not trump social class origins in zero. Negative coefficients indicate a lower
determining intergenerational mobility. likelihood for the ethnic minority group. Sta-
Nonetheless, the high odds for second-gen- tistically significant results (figures that devi-
eration Caribbeans and first-generation Pak- ate from zero by a significant amount,
istanis show some cause for concern, as they considering the size of the sample analysed)
appear to indicate that lower working class are those shown in bold in the table.
males find it particularly difficult to escape Only two of the coefficients in the first col-
from disadvantage. With regard to the first- umn of Table 3 are significant, indicating that
generation Pakistanis, there is little doubt at only two groups – the first generation Indi-
least some of this disadvantage comes as a ans and the first generation Pakistanis and
results of the factors discussed earlier (lack of Bangladeshis – were denied access to salaried
English fluency, British qualifications, social jobs despite having qualifications at or above
networks and so on). Second-generation Black the level of salaried white British men. Each
Caribbean males, on the other hand, have of the second-generation minorities
been well-documented in their struggle to (Caribbeans, Indians and Irish) appeared to
obtain higher levels of education as well as have closed this gap.
 MOBILITY AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 203

Table 3 The chances of occupational destinations for ethnic British-born whites.

minority men
Policy
Salaried occupation Unemployed implications
Irish Both first and sec-
First generation -0.33 0.23 ond-generation eth-
Second generation 0.14 0.31 nic minorities have
Caribbean come from relative-
First generation -0.48 0.60 ly disadvantaged
Second generation 0.04 0.69 backgrounds com-
Indian pared to their white
First generation -0.57 0.26 British-born coun-
Second generation 0.49 0.68 terparts, although
Pakistani/Bangladeshi for relatively differ-
First generation -1.59 0.48 ent reasons. First-
g e n e r a t i o n
Source: GHS 1991-2000 minorities came
from a higher pro-
portion of farming
Again, the analysis shows a fairly opti- or self-employed backgrounds, reflecting dif-
mistic picture for the second generation eth- ferentials in the occupational structures of the
nic minorities, and appears to corroborate the countries from which they migrated; second-
findings of other researchers that second- generation minorities were typically more
generation ethnic minorities have been able likely to have working-class parents, per-
to close the gap with regard to access to haps reflecting the disadvantage their parents
salaried work, as well as with regard to earn- had experienced within the British labour
ings, thus reducing so-called ‘ethnic penalties’ market.
in terms of occupational attainment. Our findings, however, indicate that, with
The second column of Table 3 shows, how- the exception of second-generation Caribbean
ever, the coefficients for unemployment. This males, second-generation ethnic minorities
picture is much less sanguine than the picture have by and large been able to close the gap
of economic optimism painted by the initial with the white British in terms of absolute
results of this article. Compared to equally mobility and access to salaried employment.
qualified whites, second-generation Caribbean Our findings also show that, for both gener-
and Indian men, as well as first-generation ations, social class origins operated in much
Caribbean, Indian, and Pakistani and the same way among ethnic minorities as
Bangladeshi men all have significantly higher among the white British, showing no sign that
chances of unemployment. This result echoes migration disrupted the process of intergen-
the findings of various other research con- erational social persistence.
ducted on ethnic penalties, which indicate that Overall, and again with the exception of the
many ethnic minorities, including second-gen- second-generation Caribbean males, these
eration minorities, are still at a disadvantage in findings present an optimistic picture of eth-
the labour market when it comes to levels of nic minorities and their mobility within the
employment. In fact, the unemployment rates labour market, and replicate findings by oth-
of ethnic minorities have been shown to be as ers that have shown reduced ethnic penalties
much as twice the rates of similarly qualified for second-generation minorities. However,
 204
this optimism only applies to those ethnic
minorities in work. As these findings have
also shown, nearly all second-generation eth-
nic minority groups (with the exception of the
Irish) are significantly more likely to be unem-
ployed. This finding echoes other research
which has shown that even amongst second-
generation minorities, substantial disadvan-
tages still exist in regard to finding work.
Looking at the overall picture our findings
appear to corroborate Model’s (1999) con-
clusion that ‘Native birth brings occupation-
al improvement but does little to mitigate
unemployment’ for the children of immi-
grants..
Drawing again on parallels between Britain
and Northern Ireland, the level of second-
generation ethnic minority unemployment in
Britain is actually quite similar to that expe-
rienced by Catholics in Northern Ireland.
Borooah (1999) found that although Catholics
were similar to Protestants in respect to occu-
pational attainment and wages, their unem-
BOROOAH VK (1999)
‘Is There a Penalty to Being a Catholic in Northern
Ireland? An Econometric Analysis of the
Relationship Between Religious Belief and
Occupational Success’ European Journal of Political
Economy 15
BREEN R AND WHELAN CT (1999)
‘Social mobility in Ireland: A comparative analysis’
in Heath AF, Breen R and Whelan CT (eds) Ireland
North and South: Perspectives from Social Science
Oxford University Press
NEW ECONOMY
ployment rates were nearly double those of
Protestants, just as ethnic minority unem-
ployment rates tend to be double those of
whites.
In order to rectify these high rates of
unemployment amongst Catholics, since
1988 the Fair Employment Commission of
Northern Ireland (now the Equality Com-
mission) has undertaken a programme of
affirmative action, reaching either legally
enforceable or voluntary agreements with
employers to increase the proportion of an
under-represented community within their
labour force. Preliminary evaluation of this
programme will be published shortly, and
it may prove to be the case that this kind of
affirmative action is both acceptable to
employers and effective in increasing work-
place integration. If so, a similar programme
of affirmative action in Britain may prove
to be worth considering in attacking high
levels of unemployment amongst ethnic
minority groups 
FIELDING AJ (1995)
‘Migration and social change: a longitudinal study
of the social mobility of immigrants in England and
Wales’ European Journal of Population 11
HEATH AF AND RIDGE JM (1983)
‘Social mobility of ethnic minorities’ Journal of
Biosocial Science Supplement 8
MODEL S (1999)
‘Ethnic inequality in England: An analysis based on
the 1991 Census’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 22