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The European Defence Community in The U.S. Foreign Policy Context
The European Defence Community in The U.S. Foreign Policy Context
The European Defence Community in The U.S. Foreign Policy Context
Türker Arı 83
Summary
The 1930s were a nightmare for the U.S. economy and thus for the
U.S. people. Financial troubles were high, unemployment was on the rise. The
U.S. had to find ways out of this economic crisis. It had to seek new markets
1
Post-graduate student in the University of Baskent, Institute of Social Sciences.
84 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
where it could trade freely and source raw materials for domestic production.
This target has not changed for decades.
In Europe, economic structures and activities were substantially
different from those of the U.S. Although leading European countries were
losing their colonies, through a gradual process of independence, intra-trade
was prevalent, but the Second World War was approaching. The European
countries had to economise, increase savings so that they could finance the
war without having any international assistance.
But this idea did not prevail. The Second World War destroyed major
European economies, and had a negative impact on the U.S. economy. During
his speech at Harvard University, on June 5, 1947, George C. Marshall
described the European economies and their impacts on the US economy as
follows:2
2
Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “George C. Marshall, former U.S. Secretary
of State, speaking at Harvard University, 5 June 1947”,
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/m9.html; Date of publication: 11 November
2003.
3
George Marshall, above-mentioned speech.
4
Kiplinger Magazine, Issue May 1948.
M. Türker Arı 85
workers and farmers. In other words, under the Plan, monetary assistance
would be provided to the European countries, assistance which they then
spent on U.S. produced food and manufactured exports.5 The U.S. Council for
International Chambers of Commerce supported aid to Europe in either or
both of two forms: (1) U.S.-made military equipment and supplies made
available to NATO countries; and (2) goods and services produced in NATO
countries for their own forces under contract with the U.S. government and
against payment in dollars. Thus the U.S. economy would flourish and overall
U.S. exports would increase.
5
Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “Benefits of the Marshall Plan for the U.S.
Economy”, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan;
Library of Congress; http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars11.htlm; Date of
publication: 11 November 2003.
86 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
course. He stated that the U.S. appeal was, though tentatively put, a call for
European, or at least West European, unity.6
In fact, Brandt was emphasising the U.S. role in the origins of the
European integration idea and European defence attempts.
6
Library of the U.S. Congress Records, “Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany speaking at Harvard University, 5 June 1972”,
http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/m15.html; Date of publication: 11 November
2003.
7
Frank Ninkovich, p.212.
8
Ibid., p.213
9
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII,
“Eisenhower’s, letter to George Arthur Sloan, March 20, 1952”, John Hopkins
University Press, pp. 1097-1104.
10
Ibid., p.1098.
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11
Ibid., pp.1098-1099.
12
SACEUR General Eisenhower’s memorandum on October 9, 1951, on Turkey’s
membership to NATO and including it to SACEUR’s command is of utmost
importance in terms of his remarks on Mediterranean security. His assessment is as
follows: “…From the standpoint of the reputation of the Turks as excellent fighting
men, any commander would be delighted to have them in his organization. Moreover,
Turkey demonstrated determination to oppose Communistic aggression clearly makes
her a valuable addition to the NATO Organization. Beyond this Turkish strength is of
great significance to the accomplishment of the task presently assigned to me, which
is the defence of Western Europe, from Norway to Italy. The southern flank of this
front will, of course, be directly affected by developments in Eastern Europe and
Turkey, which region not only dominates the land routes to the Middle East, but
safeguards the eastern approaches of the Mediterranean. But in considering the
question of military organization and command, we are forced to consider the hard
facts of geography and distance. Despite the important contribution Turkey can make
to the defence of my southern flank, I consider it militarily impracticable to watch
over the interests and development of the Turkish armed forces from SHAPE, and to
control operations from this headquarters. I, therefore, believe that it would be in the
interests of NATO and of Turkey itself if Turkey should be included in the Middle East
Command…”; Eisenhower’s Memorandum to Alphonse Pierre Juin, William Joseph
Slim and Omar Nelson Bradley, Top Secret, October 9, 1951; The Papers of Dwight
David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII, John Hopkins University
Press, pp. 627-628.
88 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
countries was a good answer for quickly accomplishing political and financial
reforms in Europe. The U.S had to be insistent on this.13
The U.S. devised a security programme for the Defence of Europe:
NATO. The U.S. motive in creating this organisation was to inspire the
European nations to spend maximum effort in the formation of a common
security programme so that America’s donations of men, money, and
materials would not be wasted. However, Eisenhower’s considerations, which
he took as his guide in the process of delivering collective security were to
make certain:14
Based on this realistic approach, Europe and all other important areas
of the world were political and military outposts and they must serve for the
U.S. the traditional functions of outposts.15 A large amount of power was
neither necessary, nor desirable by the U.S.
Against this backdrop, the Europeans had been floating the idea of a
European Defence structure, and it had parallels with the U.S. global design.
The U.S., which had been pushing for political and economic unity in Europe,
was supportive of the idea of using NATO as a tool to enforce the Defence
and security architecture of the continent According to U.S. long – term
strategic thinking, as the goals were attained in Europe, U.S. expenditures
would fall to a maintenance level and U.S. troops could gradually be brought
back to the U.S. In a conversation that he had with the Foreign Minister of
Belgium, Van Zeeland, Eisenhower said that he would be glad to accept a
“European Army” in his command. However, Foreign Minister Strikker of
Holland, with whom Eisenhower had previously had a similar talk, got the
13
Eisenhower’s letter to George Arthur Sloan…; p. 1102.
14
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XIII,
“Eisenhower’s letter to Lewis Williams Douglas, May 20, 1952”, John Hopkins
University Press, p. 1228.
15
Ibid., p.1230.
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16
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower; NATO and the Campaign of 1952: XII,
“Eisenhower’s letter to William Averell Harriman, June 12, 1951”, John Hopkins
University Press, pp.344-347.
17
To see the text of the Paris Treaty setting up the European Defence Community,
visit the web site of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
www.france.diplomatie.fr/archives.gb/dossiers/schuman , Date of publication: 23
October 2003.
18
www.france.diplomatie.fr/archives.gb/dossiers/schuman/module05_2.html, Date of
publication: 23 October 2003.
19
Some parts of the E.D.C. Treaty which are of military importance can be found at
the end of this paper.
90 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
20
William R. Keylor, “Twentieth-Century World, An International History: The
Bipolar World in the Truman-Stalin Era (1945-1953), Oxford University Press,
1992, p. 291.
21
Ibid.
22
Jean Monnet spent a certain portion of his life in the U.S. He was a member of
U.S.-led German war reparations commission in 1926 and close to U.S. military
planning circles. See John Gillingham, “Jean Monnet and the European Coal and
Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal” in “Jean Monnet: The Path to European
Unity”, Edited by Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, St. Marten’s Press New
York, 1991.
23
For Monnet’s thoughts on the European Defence and Security, see Jean Monnet,
Mémoires, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1976, Chapter 14 : “Naissance de deux
traités”, , pp. 393-434.
24
Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, An Atlantic Monthly Press
Book, 1973, p. 163.
25
Ibid.
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At this point, the U.S. felt obliged to support the French public to
alleviate their anxiety. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was
determined to see the integration of Germany inside the community of the
European nations. He, in fact, had promised his friend, Dr. Adenauer that it
would be done.
Mosley argues that for this aim, CIA funds were used to exert
pressure on France, so that the French demonstrated their willingness to
welcome the Germans back. Mosley further claims that from the CIA
Director’s discretionary fund, the Director (Allen Welsh Dulles – brother of
J.F. Dulles) paid one member of the French Cabinet $ 30.000 a year for
himself, and, during the French Parliament’s discussion on the E.D.C. project,
handed him another $ 500.000 to distribute among his fellow members.29
Also, Dulles did not hesitate to fly to Paris to push forward the ratification of
the E.D.C. Treaty.
U.S. pressure was also exerted on the U.K. With a view to obtaining
British support for the E.D.C., Dulles arrived in London on 3 February 1953.
Dulles entreated British decision makers to give a “little thinking” to basic
26
For example the “Spofford Proposals” on the E.D.C. Treaty by the U.S.
27
Ninkovich, p. 233.
28
Jarkko Tuominen, The European Defence Community 1950-1954, The Second
uneasy step towards the United States of Europe,
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kvtok/1997/3181.htm, Date of publication: 23.10.2003.
29
Leonard Mosley, Dulles, A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles
and Their Family Network, Dell Publishing Co., September 1979, p. 352.
92 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
American relations with Europe “if France, Germany and England should go
their separate ways.” Mosley asserts that the implication here was that both
the Marshall Plan aid and the U.S. commitment to NATO had been based on
the condition that Europe, including Britain, must quickly achieve
institutional unity.30
The position of the U.K. government towards the E.D.C. changed
over time and therefore this issue should be further elaborated. The U.K.
position evolved from “coolness” to “general support”. However, British
support to the Community was critical, because of the mutual security
assurance sought by France which required the involvement of the U.K. The
U.K. position was shaped against the backdrop of U.S. pressures and the
French insistence on the mutual security assurance. At a later stage, the
E.D.C. Treaty linked the Community very closely to NATO, with whom
protocols of mutual guarantees have been exchanged.
The advantages and disadvantages of the U.K.’s participation in the
E.D.C. were discussed at length in 1952. In a Top Secret memorandum from
the British Foreign Secretary to the British Cabinet31 it was stated that the
European Defence Community might never become established unless some
more specific guarantee were given to it by the United Kingdom. The
memorandum further stressed that if Western Germany was attacked by the
Soviet Union, it would almost certainly be the signal for a Third World War
and the U.K. would have to go to Germany’s aid whether it was committed by
a formal undertaking or not. Therefore, it was proposed that the U.K. endorse
the Foreign Secretary’s proposal to extend U.K. security commitments to the
European Defence Community. This was what eventually happened.
However, the U.K. was cautious and adopted a reserved attitude, not
only because it thought that the French might have second thoughts on
creating a Third Force. The Following advantages and disadvantages were
enumerated in a secret paper prepared by the British Ministry of Defence in
November 1951:32
Advantages
The U.K. would be able to influence the policy of the
E.D.C., and particularly Germany, more directly than it
could through NATO channels.33
30
Mosley, p. 164.
31
U.K. declassified document ref: CAB 21/3583;
www.pro.gov.uk/inthenews/defence_community/E.D.C.3.htm. Date of publication:
23.10.2003.
32
U.K. declassified document ref: CAB 21/3583;
www.pro.gov.uk/inthenews/defence_community/E.D.C.3a.htm. Date of publication:
23.10.2003.
33
Germany was not a NATO member then.
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Disadvantages
An E.D.C. is a step towards Federation. Her Majesty’s
Government do not wish to become a part of a federated
Europe, as this would: (i) involve a derogation of
sovereignty, (ii) weaken the ties between the U.K. and the
rest of the Commonwealth, and consequently, impair the
international standing of the U.K., particularly vis-à-vis
the United States.
The U.K. would be handicapped in adapting politically or
strategically, to any changes in international affairs.
When the European Defence Zone is defined, there will
be pressure to include the U.K. within it. This would
involve placing forces for the defence of the U.K. in the
E.D.C.
The U.K. would not be able to maintain larger forces
outside the E.D.C. than those it contributed to it.
The U.K. forces committed to the Continent could only
be withdrawn in the event of national emergency with the
approval of the Commissioner, Supreme Commander and
the Council of Ministers.
In the short term, there would be a risk that the high
efficiency of a British contribution would be impaired by
inclusion in a new and inexperienced organization.
The morale of British Units in the European Defence
Forces would be likely to suffer as a result of becoming
94 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
Conclusion
34
Some argue that Britain’s reluctance to join the E.D.C. destroyed the E.D.C. plan.
“The Reluctant Partner?”, http://www.european-defence.co.uk/article6.html.
35
The reasons of the failure of the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty are beyond the
scope of this Article and require a separate research.
36
See, for example, David N. Gibbs, “Washington’s New Interventionism: U.S.
Hegemony and Inter-Imperialist Rivalries”, International Socialist Magazine,
September 2001, pp. 15-37.
M. Türker Arı 95
37
H. Stuart Hughes and James Wilkinson, Contemporary Europe: A History, Prentice
Hall, NJ 07632, p.445.
38
Ibid., p.446.
39
James Lee Ray, Global Politics”, International Organizations and Transnational
Actors: Federalism Versus Neofunctionalism, Houghton Mifflin Company Fifth
Edition. p.400.
96 The European Defence Community in the U.S. Foreign Policy Context
ANNEX
Summary of some parts of the EDC Treaty which are of military importance
Article 1B:
Article 2:
The Community will work in harmony with all free nations and with
whatever organizations have similar aims.
Article 3:
Article 5:
Article 6:
No Member State will maintain forces other than those mentioned in this
Article.
Member States may recruit and maintain forces necessary to meet their non-
European commitments.
Member States may raise their forces to meet commitments arising from
their agreements with NATO, e.g. in Berlin and Austria.
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Article 7:
The sea, land and air forces which constitute the E.D.F. are to be organized
as defined in the Protocol.
Land Forces
Army corps are to be composed of basic units from different countries, other
than in exceptional cases for tactical or organizational reasons, where high authority
and SACEUR agree upon its necessity. A unanimous veto of the council may veot
such agreement.
The formations which support the basic units either tactically or logistically
are to be integrated; the national elements of these formations are to be in a similar
proportion to the basic units.
Basic units and their supporting elements mat at times be introduced into
NATO army corps, and conversely, NATO divisions may be introduced into
European army corps.
Air Forces
Every basic unit will be composed of elements of one nationality, each basic
unit is to be equipped with combat aircraft of one type.
European basic units and their supporting elements may be introduced into
NATO Commands and, conversely, NATO units may be introduced into European
Commands.