STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
INTRODUCTION the presidential certification dispensed with the
Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29
September 1966
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest” where participants have to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can
dispense during a specific period of time. There
was no fee or consideration required to be paid,
nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be
made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the
extensive use of mail for advertising and
communications, Caltex requested clearance for
Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed
as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner
filed a petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls
under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned
by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word
“lottery” is defined as a game of chance where
the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2)
chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise”
and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift,
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind” means such
enterprise as will require consideration as an
element. The intent of the prohibition is to
suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling
spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being
I. STATUTES
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No.
115455, 25 August 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716
saying that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
reading on separate days as required in the
Constitution because the second and the third
readings were done on the same day. The
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and
requirement not only of the printing but also that
of reading the bill on three separate days.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code, has been constitutionally passed.
HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that
presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its
distribution three days before its passage but not
with the requirement of three readings on
separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2)
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill
can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved. In other words, the
"unless" clause must be read in relation to the
"except" clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To
construe the "except" clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution
three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar but it would also
negate the very premise of the "except" clause:
the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which
is certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency.
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, 14
August 1997
FACTS:
Law originated in the House of Representatives
as HB No. 7189. The bill was approved on the
third reading on Sept. 12, 1996. The bicameral
conference committee submitted its report to the
House. After recess, Javier, Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellated. Arroyo was fourth to
interpellate, and announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum although he never
did. Albano then moved to approve conference
committee report, to which Arroyo asked for
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
clarification. However, Deputy Speaker then
approved the motion. On the same day, the bill
was signed by the Speaker and Senate
President. The enrolled bill was also signed into
law by President Fidel Ramos. Petitioners claim
that there are actually four different versions of
Arroyo’s interpellation. However, Court says there
is no need to discuss this point as petitioners
have announced that to expedite resolution of
petition, they agree that the word “approved”
appears in the transcripts. Petitioner’s principal
argument is that RA No. 8240 is null and void
because:
a. It was passed in violation of the
rules of the HOR.
b. T h e s e r u l e s e m b o d y t h e
constitutional mandate in Sec.
16(3) of Art. 6 of the Constitution
stating that each House may
determine the rules of its
proceedings and that
consequently, violation of the
House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself.
c. T h e y c o n t e n d t h a t t h e
certification of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that
- In violation of Rule 8(35) and Rule 17(103)
of the rules of the House – Chair, in
submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for yeas
and nays, preventing Arroyo from
questioning presence of quorum
- In violation of Rule 19(112) – Chair
deliberately ignored Arroyo’s question
- In violation of Rule 16(97) – Chair refused
to recognized Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Albano’s motion and
declared report approved
- In violation of Rule 20(121-122), Rule
21(123), Rule 27(109) – Chair suspended
session without ruling on Arroyo’s motion
Respondents answer that:
- Court is not proper venue to enforce
House rules.
- Journal no. 39 covering sessions shows
that on Motion of Albano, there being no
objection, HB was approved.
ISSUE:
W/N Congress committed grave abuse of
discretion in enacting RA 8240.
HELD:
NO. Congress did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in enacting RA 8240.
Violation of Internal Rules of the House
It is clear that there was no violation of the
constitutional requirements for enactment of the
law, but of internal rules. As seen in cases both
here and abroad, Court has no power to inquire
into non-compliance with its own rules.
Osmena v. Pendatun: The rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them
US v. Ballin, Joseph and Co: Constitution
empowers each House to determine its rules of
proceedings. Power to make rules is a
continuous power.
City Loan Savings v. Moore: Legislative act will
not be declared invalid for noncompliance with
the rules.
State v. Savings Bank: Authority of the House
may be abused, but when the House clearly
acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would
be an unwarranted invasion of the independence
of the legislative department.
McDonald v. State: no inquiry will be permitted to
ascertain whether two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules
Schweizer v. Territory: Courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account of non-
compliance with its rules of procedure made by
itself.
According to Justice Fernando, rules are hardly
permanent in character and are subject to
revocation and modification. Mere failure to
conform does not have the effect of nullifying.
In the case at bar, there were no rights
transgressed. House rules do not affect other
rights except those in the Senate. Hence, Courts
cannot look into internal proceedings
Judicial Power
Even if judicial review has expounded in scope,
there is still a need for an actual case or
controversy. It is an established rule that courts
cannot declare act of legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself. It is not the case that the branch
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction to call for exercise of judicial review.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
Railroading of Passage
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in
the House was “railroaded” as Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Albano’s motion approved. However,
approval of conference committee report had
already been declared before subsequent
objection from Arroyo. There is no rule cited that
in cases involving a conference committee report,
a nominal voting must be held. In the approval of
the original bill, yeas and nays have already been
taken. It would have been sheer tedium to repeat
the process. When session resumed, Arroyo
made no more objection. Arroyo was prevented
from continuously questioning presence for a
quorum, for it had already been established. Out
of 111 members, only 5 are questions its manner
of execution.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Signing of Speaker and Senate President and
certification of secretaries of both Houses is
conclusive of its enactment. It is well-established
as a rule of evidence. Courts have refused to look
into allegations that enrolled bill was otherwise
than as certified by presiding officer. Enrolled bill
carries on its face a solemn assurance by
legislative and executive departments charged
with duty of enacting and executing laws. Art. 6,
Sec. 16(4) of Constitution: Each House shall keep
a journal of its proceedings:
- Journal is regarded as conclusive.
- Bill which became RA 8240 is in the journal.
Therefore, enactment is proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court to set aside a legislative act as void based
on its own rules of procedure. That would make
the Court guilty itself of grave abuse of its
discretion to do so.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed.
Alvarez v. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, 31
January 1996
FACTS:
HB No. 8817 “An Act Converting the Municipality
of Santiago into an Independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago”was filed in
the House of Representatives (HR) with Antonio
Abaya as principal author. It was then referred to
the House Committee (HC) on Local
Governments and HC on Committee
Appropriations. The Committee submitted to the
house a favorable report with amendments.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243
“An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be
Known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the
Senate with Sen. Tito Sotto as principal sponsor
just right after the HR had conducted its first
public hearing. HB 8817 was passed on 2nd
reading and approved on 3rd reading and was
thereafter submitted to the Senate. The Senate
Committee on Local Government recommended
that HB 8817 be approved without amendment
since it was on all fours with SB 1243. The
Committee Report passed the 2nd reading and
was approved on the 3rd reading. The enrolled bill
as submitted to the President and signed by him
on May 5, 1994 as RA 7720. When a plebiscite
on the Act was held, a great majority of registered
voters of Santiago voted in favor of its conversion
into a city. However, the petitioners assail the
validity of RA 7720 arguing that Santiago could
not qualify into a component city because its
average annual income for the last 2 consecutive
years falls below the required annual income of
P20Million. The bill did not originate from the
House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. [MAIN] WON the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRAs) are to be included in the computation of
the average annual income of a municipality
for the purposes of its conversion into an
independent component city.
2. WON RA 7720 can be said to have originated
from the House of Representatives
considering that Senate passed SB No. 1243,
its own version of HB 8817.
HELD:
1. YES! IRAs form part of income of LGUs.
Petitioners argue that the IRAs should not be
included in the computation to determine the
average annual income of the municipality (see
notes). The IRAs are not actually income but
transfers and/or budgetary aid from the
national government and that they fluctuate
depending on factors like population, land and
equal sharing. Following the proposed
computation the average annual income is only
about P13Million which is far below the P20
Million average income requirement. SC held
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
petitioner’s argument as untenable! Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of
LGUs. A Local Government Unit is a political
subdivision of the State which is constituted by
law and possessed of substantial control over
its own affairs. It is autonomous in the sense
that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources. Power which
used to be highly centralized in Manila, is
thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially
the peripheral local government units to
develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their own resources
and assets. The practical side to development
through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers
and increased responsibilities, an LGU must
now operate on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more
expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every LGU
is accompanied with a provision for reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers
and effectively carry out its functions. Availment
of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every LGU of:
1. the right to create and broaden its own
source of revenue;
2. the right to be allocated a just share in
national taxes, such share being in the form of
internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
3. the right to be given its equitable share
i n t h e p ro c e e d s o f t h e u t i l i z a t i o n a n d
development of the national wealth, if any, within
its territorial boundaries.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and
national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the
general fund of the local government and are
used to finance its operations subject to specified
modes of spending the same as provided in the
Local Government Code and its IRR (i.e. not less
than 20% of the IRAs must be set aside for local
development projects). Hence, for purposes of
budget preparation, the IRAs and the share in the
national wealth utilization proceeds are
considered items of income. This is also because
the Local Government Code defines income as
all revenues and receipts collected or received
forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of
the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the They
thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds. While Section 450
(c) of the Local Government Code provides that
the average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring
income, it must be noted that IRAs are a regular
recurring item of income and can’t be classified
as a special fund or transfer. Dept of Finance
Order No 35-93also defines Annual Income to
be revenues and receipts realized by provinces,
cities and municipalities from regular sources of
the Local General Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares provided for
in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but
exclusive of nonrecurring receipts, such as other
national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan
proceeds, sales of fixed assets and similar
others. Such order, constituting executive or
contemporaneous construction of a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to
full respect and should be accorded great weight
by the courts, unless such construction is clearly
shown to be in conflict with the Constitution, the
governing statute, or other laws.
2. YES! It cannot be denied that HB No. 8817
was filed in the House of Representatives first
before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
Petitioners themselves cannot disvow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April
18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May
19, 1993.The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus
precursive not only of the said Act in question
but also of SB No. 1243. Furthermore,
petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB
No. 8817 was already approved on Third
Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate
when the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. The filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local
application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate
does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill. SC Final Words: On the side of
every law, there is a presumption of
constitutionality. Hence, for RA 7720 to be
nullified it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
merely a doubtful and equivocal one; the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petition DISMISSED.
Casco v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, 28
February 1963
FACTS:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the
margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the
Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank
refused to pass in audit and approved the said
refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par.
18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this
statute reads: “The margin established by the
Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of
the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.”
ISSUE:
W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by
law from the payment of the margin fee.
HELD:
The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of
RA 2609 refers to the finished product as
expressed by the National Institute of Science
and Technology, and is distinct and separate from
“urea and formaldehyde” which are separate
chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic
resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished
product, while the ones imported by the
Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not
exempt from the imposition of the margin fee.
Mabanag v. Vito, G.R. No. L-1123, 5 March
1947
Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. L-29658, 27
February 1969
FACTS:
In the Senate, HB 6951 was amended by Sen
Rodrigo, inserting the phrase “has served as
officer in the Armed Forces” the now Sec 10 of
RA 6951. However, when the bill was published,
the phrase “who has served the police
department of a city or” was dropped and only
the Rodrigo amendment was retained. Petitioner
showed certified photostatic copies of the draft
approved by Congress to back his claim. A
memo was also adduced showing that Sec 10
was recast for clarity. The change was not made
during the legislative proceedings making the
omission of the phrase invalid.
ISSUES:
W/N the court can investigate the matter.
HELD:
NO. Court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to
discover what really happened. The respect due
to the other branched of Government demands
that Court act upon the presumption that other
branches did its official duty. The investigation is
better done in Congress, not by the Court. The
signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and by the President of the
Senate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation
by the two houses that such bill is the one that
has passed Congress. And when the bill thus
attested is signed by the President and deposited
in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete
and unimpeachable. In all cases, journals must
yield to the enrolled bill. With respect to matters
not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of
any discrepancy.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsiderations
are denied.
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, 30 April
1974
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House
of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo
Tolentino made substantial amendments which
were approved by the Senate. The House,
without notice of said amendments, thereafter
signed its approval until all the presiding officers
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
of both houses certified and attested to the bill.
The President also signed it and thereupon
became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a
press statement that the enrolled copy of House
Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill
because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved by the Senate.
Both the Senate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced RA
4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the
authentication of the presiding officers of the
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted
and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief
Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the
court declared that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become a law. The
Constitution requires that each House shall keep
a journal. An importance of having a journal is
that in the absence of attestation or evidence of
the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to
the journals of the Congress to verify such.
“Where the journal discloses that substantial
amendment were introduced and approved and
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President for signature, the court can declare
that the bill has not been duly enacted and did
not become a law.”
United States v. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, 12
August 1916
Facts:
Appeal from judgment of Court of First Instance
of Manila charging Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons,
and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium. On April 5 or 6 of 1915, 25
barrels of “wine” arrived at Manila from Spain on
board the Spanish mail steamer, Lopez y Lopez.
They were consigned to Lasarte. The barrels
were delivered to Beliso’s warehouse in Calle San
Anton. Five of the barrels were delivered to Pons
by one of Beliso’s men. Customs authorities
conducted an investigation on the shipments of
merchandise from Spain which were manifested
as wine and were consigned to persons who
were not listed as merchants – this led them to
the barrels of “wine” in Beliso’s warehouse and
those which were delivered to Pons. The
Customs authorities found the five barrels in
Pons’ house but they were already opened and
were empty; they also found 5 large empty tins
(corresponds in size to the heads of the barrels)
and 77 tins of opium; they then ordered three of
the barrels in Beliso’s house to be returned to the
customhouse and then found each barrels
containing a large tin like the ones found in Pons’
house. Each tin contains 75 tins of opium. Upon
a r re s t , P o n s v o l u n t a r i l y c o n f e s s e d h i s
participation in the smuggling of opium. Pons
was found guilty of the crime of illegal
importation of opium and was sentenced to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for two years and pay a
fine of P1,000.00. Pons appealed the decision,
contending that the court erred in:
1. Denying his counsel’s motion
alleging and offering to prove that
the last day of the special
session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was on
February 28; that Act No. 2381,
under which Pons must be
punished if guilty, was not
passed/approved on February 28
of that year, rather on March 1;
that therefore, Act No. 2381 is
null and void.
2. Finding that the legal evidence of
record establishes his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
Issues:
1. W/N the Court can take judicial notice of
legislative journals
2. W/N the date of adjournment of the
Legislature could be proved by legislative
journals or by extraneous evidence
a. W/N Act No. 2381 is null and
void because it was approved
while Philippine Commission was
not in session
3. W/N the plaintiff is guilty of the crime of
illegal importation of opium
Held:
1. YES, the court can take judicial notice of
legislative journals.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
Sec. 275, Code of Civil Procedure:
existence of official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States
and of the Philippine Islands shall be
judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but
the court may receive evidence upon
any of the subjects in this section
states, when it shall find it necessary
for its own information, and may
resort for its aid to appropriate
books, documents, or evidence.
Sec. 313, Code of Civil Procedure:
“Official documents may be proved
as follows:
o (2) The proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of
any legislative body that may
be provided for the
Philippine Islands, or of
Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either
house thereof, or by
published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their
order:
Provided, That in the case of
Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in
existence a copy signed by the
p re s i d i n g o ffi c e r s a n d t h e
secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act and of the
due enactment thereof.”
Well settled in the United States that
legislative journals may be noticed by the
courts in determining the question of
whether a particular bill became a law or
not.
2. The date of adjournment of the Legislature
could be proved by legislative journals.
Legislative journals are conclusive
evidence of the date of adjournment of
the Legislature.
o “Conclusive evidence” is that
which establishes the fact o
Appellant depends on memory or
recollection of witnesses in proving
his contention while legislative
journals are the acts of the
government itself
Records of the
Legislature are as
important as those of the
judiciary and to inquire
into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they
are clear and explicit
would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of
the organic laws by
which the Philippine
Government was brought
into existence, to invade
a coordinate and
independent department
of the Government, and
to interfere with the
legitimate powers and
functions of the
Legislature
Altering the probative
force and character of
legislative record and
making the proof of
legislative action depend
upon uncertain,
imperfect evidence such
as what appellant
contends with would
result in an unstable
foundation of the laws
a) NO, Act No. 2381 is valid; it was
approved while Legislature was in
session.
The journals, which are
conclusive evidence, are
clear in saying that the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS

Legislature adjourned at Assembly adjourned

12MN on February 28, 1914 sine die at 12 o'clock
and not March 1, 1914 as midnight on February
stated by the appellant’s 28, 1914
witnesses
3. YES, the plaintiff is guilty beyond reasonable
Page 793 of Vol. 7 of doubt of the crime of illegal importation of
the Commission opium as established by the facts found by
Journal for the the trial court.
ordinary and special The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
sessions of the Third
P h i l i p p i n e Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208560, 19
Legislature: “The November 2013

J o u r n a l f o r. . . Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 3 February

February 28, 1914, 2015
was approved... The
hour of midnight FACTS:
having arrived, on Petitioners claim that the DAP contravenes Sec
motion of 29(1) Art VI of the Consti by allowing the
Commissioner Executive to allocate public money pooled from
Palma, the un/programmed funds in the guise of the Pres.
Commission, as a exercising his consti authority under Sec 25(5) -
Chamber of the where he can transfer funds out of savings to
P h i l i p p i n e augment the appropriations within the Exec.
L e g i s l a t u re , Branch of gov’t. Complicated because there were
adjourned sine die.” alleged transfer of funds to agencies/offices
outside the Executive.
State ex rel. Herron vs.
Smith: “Imperative reasons of
public policy require that the Antecedents of the controversy
authenticity of laws should Sept 25 2013: Sen Jinggoy Estrada delivered a
rest upon public memorials privilege speech in the Senate to reveal that
of the most permanent some Senators, himself included, had been
character. They should be allotted an additional P50M each as “incentive”
public, because all are for voting in favor of CJ Corona’s impeachment
required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, Where DAP funds come from acc. To Sen
that right acquired to-day Estrada:
upon the faith of what has (1) U n re l e a s e d a p p ro p r i a t i o n s u n d e r
been declared to be law shall Personnel Services
not be destroyed to-morrow, (2) Unprogrammed funds
or at some remote period of (3) Carry-over appropriations unreleased
time, by facts resting only in from the previous year
the memory of individuals.” (4) Budgets for slow moving items or
projects that had been realigned to
Journal of support faster-disbursing projects
proceedings was
published in Acc. to DBM, funds came from:
compliance with Sec. (1) Pooling of unreleased appropriations like
7, Act of Congress, unreleased funds from:
and it was stated > Personnel Services appropriations,
therein that the > slow-moving projects
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
> discontinued projects per zero-based
budgeting findings
(2) withdrawal of unobligated allotments also
for slow-moving programs and projects
earlier released
DBM’s legal bases for DAP’s use of savings:
• Sec 25(5) Art VI of 1987 Constitution
o President’s authoirty to augment
an item for his office in the Gen.
Appropriations Law
• Sec 49 (Authority to Use Savings for
Certain Purposes)
• Sec 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations
• Chap. 5 Book VI of Exec. Order 292
(Admin Code of 1987)
• General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of
2011, 2012, 2013
o Use of savings
o Meanings of savings and
augmentation
o Priority use of savings
ISSUES
Procedural Issue:
W/N certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are
proper remedies to assail the constitutionality &
validity of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC)
No. 541, and all other exec. Issuances. YES.
> Is a controversy ripe for judicial determination?
YES.
> Is there a standing of petitioners? YES.
Substantive Issues:
(1) W/N DAP violates Sec 29 Art VI of 1987
Constitution, which says “NO money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” NO.
(2) W/N the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP violate Sec 25(5) Art VI of the 1987
Constitution insofar as: YES. IT’S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
They treat unreleased app. & unobligated
allotments withdrawn from gov’t agencies as
“savings” as the term is used Sec 25(5)
(a) They authorize the disbursement of funds
for projects or programs not provided in
the GAAs for Exec. Dept YES.
(b) They “augment” discretionary lump sum
appropriations in the GAAs YES.
(3) W/N the DAP violates
(a) Equal Protection Clause lacks factual and
legal basis for this
(b) system of checks and balances Yes.
(c) Principle of public accountability enshrined in
the 1987 Consti considering that it authorizes the
release of funds upon the request of legislators
Yes.
Luna argues implementation of the DAP was
"unfair & selective" because the funds released
under the DAP was:
> not made available to all the legislators, with
some of them refusing to avail themselves of
the DAP funds
> others being unaware of the availability of
such funds.
OSG counters the challenges, stating that the
supposed discrimination in the release of funds
under the DAP could be raised only by the
affected Members of Congress themselves, and if
the challenge based on the violation of the Equal
Protection Clause
W/N factual and legal justification exists to issue
a temporary restraining order to restrain the
implementation of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all
other exec. Issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP.
For oral arguments:
(4) W/N the release of unprogrammed funds
under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs. No.
Invalid.
(5) W/N the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable. YES.
HELD:
Re: Procedural Issue
(1) Petitions under Rule 65 are proper
remedies
(2) Requisites for the exercise of the power
of judicial review were complied with
✩ Actual justiciable controversy
> conflict b/w legal rights
> entailed allocation and expenditure of
huge sums of public funds
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
✩ Ripe for adjudication
> challenged executive acts were already
being implemented by DBM
> moot and academic?
→ court: does not agree that the
termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that mooted the cases
→ court exercises its power of jud review
when there was a grave violation of Consti,
paramount public interest, capabale of repetition
✩ Proper Party
> De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
Personal stake in the outcome
> People v. Vera
Direct injury test
> personal and substantial interest
> transcendental importance
> David v. Macapagal Arroyo
Citizen and taxpayer have standing in
public actions
✩ constitutionality - earliest opportunity & lis
mota
Araullo & Belgica: assert right as citizens
> enforcement and observance of constitutional
limitations on the political branches of gov’t
PHILCONSA: Legal standing long recognized
Luna: Additional capacity as lawyer
IBP: Avowed duty to work for the rule of law
Substantive Issues
Overview of the Budget System
Origin of the Budget System
> greatly influenced by western public financial
institutions
Objectives:
→ carry on all gov’t activities of the budgetary
status of the gov’t
Evolution of the PH Budget System
Jones Law → 1935 Consti → CA No. 246 (1st
budget law - line item budget framework) → RA
992 (performance budgeting) → 1973 Consti PD
1177 and 1405 (Ministry of Budget) → EO 711
Office of Budget and Management → EO 292
(DBM)
PH Budget Cycle
(1) Budget Preparation
Budget Call by DBM
Agency Budget Proposals
Budget Hearings
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing (BESF)
National Expenditure Program (NEP)
Program, Activity or Project (PAP)
2 categories of gov’t expenditures:
> Capital expenditures / outlays
> current operating expenditures
(2) Budget Legislation
Congress receives President’s budget
Appropriations Committee in Congress
GAB: General Appropriations Bill
Bicameral Conference with Senate
(3) Budget Execution
Agencies submit Budget Execution Documents
(BED)
Allotment Release Program (ARP) & Cash
Release Program (CRP) by DBM
(4) Accountability
> ensures that gov’t funds have been effectively
and efficiently used
> performance targets and outcomes →
budget accountability reports → review of
agency performance → audit conducted by
the Commission on Audit(COA)
Nature of DAP as a fiscal plan
(a) DAP was a program designed to promote
economic growth
(b) History of the implementation of the DAP,
and sources of funds under the DAP
(c) DAP was not an appropriation measure;
hence, no appropriation law was required
to adopt or to implement it
> no law was necessary for the adoption and
implementation of the DAP because of its
being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a
program or an administrative system of
prioritizing spending
> and that the adoption of the DAP was by
virtue of the authority of the President as the
Chief Executive to ensure that laws were
faithfully executed.
(Issue 2) Unreleased appropriations & withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP were not
savings, and the use of such appropriations
contravened Sec 25(5) Art VI of the 1987 Consti
> Although executive discretion and flexibility
are necessary in the execution of the budget,
any transfer of appropriated funds should
conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
> Requisites for the valid transfer of
appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings
generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment
an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices.
> First Requisite – GAAs of 2011 and 2012
lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers of
funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under
the DAP were unconstitutional
> Second Requisite – There were no savings
from which funds could be sourced for the
DAP. Were the funds used in the DAP actually
savings?
Court agrees with petitioners that the
unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments were not actual savings
within the context of Section 25(5)
Belgica: savings should be understood refer to
the excess money after the items that needed
to be funded have been funded, or those that
needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to
the budget.
O S G re p re s e n t s t h a t " s a v i n g s " w e re
"appropriations balances”
> being the difference between the
appropriation authorized by Congress and
the actual amount allotted for the
appropriation
definition of "savings" in the GAAs:
set only the parameters for determining when
savings occurred
Principles presented to construe savings strictly
against expanding the scope of the power
to augment. It is then indubitable that the
power to augment was to be used only when
the purpose for which the funds had been
allocated were already satisfied, or the need for
such funds had ceased to exist, for only then
could savings be properly realized.
> Third Requisite – No funds from savings
could be transferred under the DAP to
augment deficient items not provided in the
GAA
> an appropriation for any PAP must
first be determined to be deficient before it
could be augmented from savings.
Note is taken of the fact that the 2013 GAA
already made this quite clear, thus:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of
the Philippines, the Senate President, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads
of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby
authorized to use savings in their respective
appropriations to augment actual deficiencies
incurred for the current year in any item of their
respective appropriations.
> Third Requisite – Cross-border
augmentations from savings were prohibited
by the Constitution
→ the phrase "respective offices" used in
Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire
Executive, with respect to the President
→ should be limited to the specific offices
Bengzon v. Drilon:
Judiciary, Constitutional Commission &
Ombudsman → independence and flexibility
re: Consti duties
Cross-border Transfers / Cross-border
Augmentations:
→ funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient
item or items.
(Issue 3) Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges
> argument that the release of funds under the
DAP effectively stayed the hands of the
legislators from conducting congressional
inquiries into the legality and propriety of the
DAP is speculative
> guesswork and speculation cannot
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
overcome the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed executive act
Luna argues implementation of the DAP was
"unfair & selective" because the funds released
under the DAP was:
> not made available to all the legislators, with
some of them refusing to avail themselves of
the DAP funds
> others being unaware of the availability of
such funds.
OSG counters the challenges, stating that the
supposed discrimination in the release of funds
under the DAP could be raised only by the
affected Members of Congress themselves, and if
the challenge based on the violation of the Equal
Protection Clause
Re: Checks and balances
> Luna: the grant of the funds under the DAP
to some legislators forced their silence about
the issues and anomalies surrounding the DAP
> Belgica: unjust encroachment on Exec. branch
→ by allowing the legislators to identify PAPs,
authorized them to take part in the
implementation and execution of the GAAs, a
function that exclusively belonged to the
Executive
Re: Accountability
> DAP was repugnant to the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the Constitution,
because the legislators relinquished the power
of appropriation to the Executive, and
exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the
legality of the DAP
(Issue 4) Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets not
having been exceeded was invalid
"unprogrammed appropriations"
→ appropriations that provided standby
authority to incur additional agency obligations
for priority PAPs when revenue collections
exceeded targets, and when additional foreign
funds are generated
→ present controversy on the unprogrammed
funds was rooted in the correct interpretation
of the phrase "revenue collections should
exceed the original revenue targets”
● Petitioners: the total revenue collections
must exceed the total revenue target
stated in the BESF
● Respondents: understand the phrase to
refer only to the collections for each
source of revenue as enumerated in the
BESF, with the condition being deemed
complied with once the revenue
collections from a particular source
already exceeded the stated target
(Issue 5) Doctrine of operative fact was
applicable
Article 7 of CC: Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
> When the courts declared a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
> Doctrine of operative fact explained in De
Agbayani v. PNB
→ ‘When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.’
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws of the Constitution
> Justice Brion: Doctrine of operative fact
→ can only apply in situations where the
nullification of the effects of what used to be a
valid law would result in inequity and injustice
→ but where no such result would ensue, the
general rule that an unconstitutional law is
totally ineffective should apply
→ cannot apply to the authors, proponents
and implementors of the DAP
Court partially grants the petitions
> declares the acts & practices under DAP, NB
Circular No. 541 & related exec. Issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
For being in violation of Sec 25(5) of Art. VI of
1987 Consti & doctrine of separation of
powers:
(a) Withdrawal of unobligated allotments
from implementing agencies, and the
declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments
> without complying w/ statutory
definition
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
of savings
(b) Cross-border transfers of the saving of
the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside
the Exec.
(c) Funding of projects, activities and
programs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the GAA
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15
September 1989
FACTS:
The Marcos regime had a profound effect on the
political, economic, and other aspects of national
life. In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
"people power" revolution and forced into exile.
In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consolidation
of power have not been unchallenged. The failed
Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders
of Mr. Marcos. The takeover of television station
Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with
the support of "Marcos loyalists". The
unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
s u r re p t i t i o u s l y re t u r n f ro m H a w a i i w i t h
mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a
Lebanese arms dealer. There are also the
communist insurgency and the seccessionist
movement in Mindanao which gained ground
during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that
the communists have set up a parallel
government of their own on the areas they
effectively control while the separatist are virtually
free to move about in armed bands. The efforts at
economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino
assumed office, have yet to show concrete
results in alleviating the poverty of the masses.
The recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses has remained elusive.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. Pres. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation
of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to
bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE:
Whether the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines, in the exercise
of powers granted by the Constitution – YES
Whether the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that
the Marcoses’ return poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare – NO
HELD:
Regarding the Petitioners’ Assertions + Court’s
Ruling
Their return is guaranteed under provisions of
Article III, Sections 1 and 6 of the Constitution.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
The Court is not bound by the narrow confines in
arriving at a solution to the controversy. It would
not do to view the case within the confines of the
right to travel and the import of the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases
of Kent v. Dulles and Haig v. Agee.
The individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries
or within the Philippines.
The right to return to one's country is not among
the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is the Court’s well-
considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.]
The President is without power to impair liberty of
abode of the Marcoses because only a court may
do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor
may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
As discussed, Bill of Rights includes right to
travel and liberty of abode. Petitioner’s assertion
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
of right to return is inapplicable as it is not stated
in the provisions. OSG claims that the President’s
power to impair the Marcoses’ right to travel is a
political question. Under international law, the
right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
Right to return is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection
under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights.
Regarding the First Issue
The Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President.
Art. VII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." However, it does
not define what is meant by executive power.
Court was reminded by petitioners’ allegations of
the U.S. institution of the U.S. Presidency after
which ours is legally patterned.
- Corwin - Article II (Executive) is the most
loosely drawn chapter of the
Constitution.
- Schlesinger - For the American
Presidency was a peculiarly personal
institution. It changed shape, intensity
and ethos according to the man in
charge.
- Clark Clifford – The executive branch was
a chameleon, taking its color from the
character and personality of the
President
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution.
Whatever power inherent in the government that
is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive (Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands).
Regarding the Second Issue
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines.
Having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest.
Article II, Sections 1, 4 and 5 consist of ideals
that the President must take into consideration.
The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The Congress’ Resolution does not even
question the President's power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines,
rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die
in his country.
Regarding Judicial Review
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Court cannot agree with the OSG that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The
question for the Court to determine is whether or
not there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. The
Court finds that there exist factual bases for
the President's decision. The President has
determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and
lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of
the state of the economy, the Court cannot argue
with that determination.
Petition is Dismissed.
Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 8
November 2016
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016
Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow
the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte
won the May 9, 2016 elections.
Aug. 7, 2016 – Defense Secretary Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief
of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the
interment of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
Aug. 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army
on the Funeral Honors and Service for President
Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with the Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance and implementation of the
assailed memorandum and directive violated the
Constitution, and domestic and international laws
HELD:
Procedural Issues
1. Political Question
The Court agrees with the OSG that President
Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question
that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
excercise of his powers under the Constitution
and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a
land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness.
2. Locus Standi
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because they failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as
a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They
merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be
interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the
Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury
which they may suffer as a result of the act
complained of. Their interest in this case is too
general and shared by other groups, such that
their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more,
is inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal
standing.
Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of
transcendental importance. At this point in time,
the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and
declared a national shrine would have no
profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life considering that
more than twenty-seven (27) years since his
death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have
already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to
demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their
fundamental constitutional rights.
As to petitioners Senator De Lima and
Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that
the burial of Marcos encroaches on their
prerogatives as legislators.
3. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Petitioners violated the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim
of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, petitioners should be
faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of
National Defense should be given opportunity to
correct himself, if warranted, considering that
AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his
order. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with
the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate
the matter before the Office of the President
which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense (DND).
4. Hierarchy of Courts
Not an exceptional case; no direct resort to the
Court; should be filed first with the RTC
The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also
resolve questions of law in the exercise of its
original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has
the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
Substantive Issues
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
I. The President’s decision to bury Marcos
at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence
- Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution
(Public office is a public trust) is not a self-
executing provision considering that a law
should be passed by the Congress to clearly
define and effectuate the principle embodied
therein.
- speculative until the specifics of the
Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV a
nd Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is
also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to
the constitutional duty of educational
institutions in teaching the values of
patriotism and nationalism and respect for
human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a
transitory provision on sequestration or
freeze orders in relation to the recovery of
Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with
respect to these provisions, there is no direct
or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at
the LNMB.
- The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is
likewise not violated by public respondents.
Being the Chief Executive, the President
represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his or her
department. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take
"necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law. The mandate is self-
executory by virtue of its being inherently
executive in nature and is intimately related
to the other executive functions.
A. No violation of RA 289
- Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal
and historical bases as to their supposition
that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are
one and the same. The National Pantheon
(singular interment place for the mortal
remains of all Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes, and patriots) does not exist
at present.
- To apply the standard that the LNMB is
reserved only for the "decent and the brave"
or "hero" would be violative of public policy
as it will put into question the validity of the
burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers since the
allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on
the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations.
- Court shares the view of the OSG that the
proposed interment is not equivalent to the
consecration of Marcos' mortal remains.
- Petitioners’ repeated reference to a "hero's
burial" and "state honors," without showing
proof as to what kind of burial or honors that
will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is
interment have been finalized by public
respondents.
B. No violation of RA 10639
- With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a
provision specifically proscribing Marcos'
interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for
the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs).
The law is silent and should remain to be so.
This Court cannot read into the law what is
simply not there.
- The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under
R.A. No 10368 will not be impaired by the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB as it has no
causal connection and legal relation to the
law.
C. No violation of International Human
Rights Laws
- The nation's history will not be instantly
revised by a single resolve of President
Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
- Whether petitioners admit it or not, the
lessons of Martial Law are already engraved,
albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and
minds of the present generation of Filipinos.
II. The President’s decision to bury Marcos
at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias (no grave abuse of
discretion)
The LNMB was not expressly included in the
national shrines enumerated in PD 105
- The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly
covered in the catchall phrase "and others
which may be proclaimed in the future as
National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1)
As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior
to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the
birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death
of great and eminent leaders of the nation,";
and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB
has been a military shrine under the
jurisdiction of the PVAO.
- Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the
descriptive words "sacred and hallowed"
refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each
and every mortal remains interred therein.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for
military memorials. The PVAO, which is
empowered to administer, develop, and maintain
military shrines, is under the supervision and
control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the
Office of the President.
- The presidential power of control over the
Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and
does not require statutory implementation,
nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why
President Duterte is not bound by the alleged
1992 Agreement between former President
Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos
Norte.
- Under the Administrative Code, the President
has the power to reserve for public use and
for specific public purposes any of the lands
of the public domain and that the reserved
land shall remain subject to the specific
public purpose indicated until otherwise
provided by law or proclamation.
- President Duterte's determination to have
Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was
inspired by his desire for national healing and
reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails over
petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation
that, in the guise of exercising a presidential
prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of
gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the
Marcoses.
• AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be
sustained
- In the absence of any executive issuance or
law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G
161-375 remains to be the sole authority in
determining who are entitled and disqualified
to be interred at the LNMB.
- Marcos should be viewed and judged in his
totality as a person
- Aside from being eligible for burial at the
LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G
161-3 7 5
o Not convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude
o Marcos was honorably discharged from
m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . P VA O e x p re s s l y
recognized him as a retired veteran
pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended
The Supreme Court denied the petitions.
White Light Corporation v. Manila, G.R. No.
122846, 20 January 2009
FACTS:
03 Dec 1992 – Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law
the Ordinance which prohibits short-time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses, and similar establishments in the
City of Manila.
15 Dec 1992 – Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC), owner and operator of
Victoria Court in Malate, filed a complaint for
declaratory relief w/ prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the RTC of
Manila. They claimed that the ordinance, with
motels and inns concerned, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional, since the MTDC was
authorized by PD 259 to admit short-time
admissions and wash-up rates
21 Dec 1992 – Petitioners (White Light Corp,
T i t a n i u m C o r p , S t a . M e s a To u r i s t a n d
Development Corp) filed for a motion to
intervene, on the ground that the ordinance
directly affects their business interests as
operators of the drive-in hotels and motels in
Manila.
14 Jan 1993 – RTC issued a TRO directing the
City of Manila to cease enforcement of the
Ordinance; 08 Feb 1993 – Court issued writ of
preliminary injunction to cease enforcement of
Ordinance
20 Oct 1993 – After submission of the case
without trial since this was a purely legal
question, the RTC declared the Ordinance void.
RTC said that the ordinance is unconstitutional
because it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual which is guaranteed and protected by
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
the State; the court likened the ordinance of the
present case with the ordinance in Ynot vs IAC
City of Manila filed for review on certiorari with
the SC, but SC treated petition as petition for
certiorari and referred this to the CA
In the CA, the City (of Manila) asserted that
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Sec 458 (4) (iv) of the Local
Government Code, which bestows upon the city
g o v e r n m e n t t h e p o w e r t o re g u l a t e t h e
establishment, operation, and maintenance of
xxx motels, inns, xxx, and other similar
establishments.
City also used Art III, Sec 18 (kk) of the Revised
Manila Charter which states that ordinances
necessary and proper for promotion of morality,
etc
Petitioners: Ordinance is unconstitutional
because it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; that it is an invalid
exercise of police power; it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference with their business
CA reversed RTC decision (because a. not a
violation of right to privacy: ordinance penalizes
the operators nd owners, b. police power is
constrained through a lawful object-curb immoral
activities-obtained through a lawful method-
establishments were still allowed to operate, c.
adverse effects justified by well-being of
constituents of Manila, d. liberty is regulated by
law, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators
Association vs City Mayor of Manila)
ISSUES:
(Procedural) Do the establishments have the legal
standing to plead for the protection of their
patrons’ equal protection rights?
(Substantive) Is the Ordinance that was passed
by the City of Manila government constitutional?
HELD:
Ordinance Unconstitutional.
(Procedural) YES, the establishments have the
legal standing to plead for their patrons’ equal
protection rights.
Locus standi is the ability of one party to
demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to
and harm from the law/action challenged to
support the said party’s participation in the case.
The extancy of a direct and personal interest
presents the cause and standard for the
petitioner’s standing.
The rule on locus standi has several exceptions:
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, 3rd party
standing, and the issue of transcendental
importance. In this case, the concept of the third
party standing and the overbreadth doctrine are
the exceptions to the rule on locus standi.
Requisites for recognition of the right of the
petitioners to bring actions in behalf of 3rd parties:
- Petitioner must have suffered injury-in-fact,
giving him sufficient concrete interest in the
outcome of the issue at hand
- Petitioner must have a close relation to the 3rd
party
- There is a hindrance between the 3rd party and
his ability to protect his own interests
It is clear that the petitioners (WLDC, etc) in this
case are affected by the ordinance, based on the
said requisites needed for 3rd party standing.
The overbreadth doctrine permits challengers to
government action to raise the rights of 3rd
parties. This doctrine applies when a statute
needlessly restrains constitutionally-guaranteed
rights. The Ordinance suffers from ovebreadth.
(Substantive) NO, the Ordinance passed by the
City of Manila government is not constitutional.
**In deciding the substantive issue, the Court
discussed police power, due process, validity of
an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds, definition of liberty, and legitimacy of
the ordinance as police power.**
Police power – has no exact definition to
underscore its comprehensiveness and to
provide enough room for efficient and flexible
response as the conditions require
This is based on the necessity of the State and its
right to protect itself and its people
The goal of the ordinance to eliminate the use of
the said establishments for illicit purposes falls
within the police power of the State.
But the end does not justify the means, since the
means must align with the Constitution (which
safeguards the rights it guaranteed to its people).
Due Process – also has no precise definition
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
Purpose of due process is to prevent arbitrary
encroachment of right to life, liberty, property by
the government
This is a guarantee against arbitrary seizure or
regulation
Two restrictions on government; procedural and
substantive due process
Procedural due process: procedures the
government must follow in before it deprives a
person life, liberty, or property; concerned with
how the government should adhere to specific
procedures upon intruding into the private sphere
Substantive due process: inquires WoN the
government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property
**due process tempers police power
Test of the validity of an ordinance – from US vs
Carolene Products
The judiciary shall defer to the legislature unless
there is discrimination against a minority or there
is infringement of a fundamental right
Two standards of judicial review: strict scrutiny
for laws dealing with freedom of mind/political
process, and rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation (3rd: immediate scrutiny)
In the present case, rational basis test as applied:
the petitioners suffer economic injury because
the ordinance makes them lose their patrons
Strict scrutiny as applied: the petitioners have the
standing to sue for their patrons; this is because
the ordinance restricts their (patrons’) right to
liberty
Liberty is not a list of what can or cannot be done
Rather, it is an atmosphere of freedom where
people interact with others, the society, and
nature without harming others
Definition of Liberty
From City of Manila vs Hon. Laguio, Jr.
Liberty is the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary detention (as defined by Malcolm)
The animus (spirit) behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior, since the city
government asserts that the subject
establishments harbor such ‘prostitution,
adultery, and fornications’ by providing a location
to do such things.
BUT regardless of the truth of such claim,
l e g i t i m a t e s e x u a l b e h a v i o r, w h i c h i s
constitutionally protected, will be curtailed as well
Other legitimate activities, that maybe impaired
by the Ordinance, cannot be discounted
Legitimacy of the Ordinance as police power
The interests of the public that requires
interference with private rights of individuals must
have reasonably necessary means, and must not
unduly oppress private rights
There is no other alternative for accomplishment
of purpose that is less intrusive of private rights
There must be a reasonable relation between
purposes of the measure and the means for its
accomplishment because personal rights and
private property rights must not be arbitrarily
invaded
THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER IS
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHEN LIFE,
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY IS AFFECTED.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail
is already prohibited; can be diminished by
existing laws
Individual rights may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest and welfare.
Promotion of sense of morality has full
endorsement of the judiciary, so long as such
measures do not trample upon rights that the
Court swore to protect.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771, 21 April 2015
FACTS:
● June 13, 2002 - Government of the
Philippines (DOE) entered into a Geophysical
Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with
JAPEX .
○ involved geological and geophysical studies
of the Tañon Strait
● December 21, 2004 - DOE and JAPEX
formally converted GSEC- 102 into SC-46
○ exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources of Tañon Strait
● May 9 to 18, 2005 - JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait
● JAPEX committed to drill exploration well in
Aloguisan and Pinamugajan (declared
protected seascape) ← Agreed to comply with
the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree
No 1586
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS

● January 31, 2007 - the Protected Area
Management Board of the Tañon Strait
(PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No.
2007-001
○ a d o p t e d t h e I n i t i a l E n v i ro n m e n t a l
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX
○ recommended the approval of JAPEX’s ECC
application
● March 6, 2007 - the EMB of DENR Region VII
granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX
● Nov 16, 2007 - Feb 8, 2008 - JAPEX drilling
of exploratory well
Proceedings
● Petitioners : filed 2 separate petitions (Dec
17, 2007)
● Court: Consolidated the 2 cases (April 2008)
● R espondent (JAPEX): “Case is moot”
○ because it had stopped exploration actvities
in the Tañon Strait in 2008
○ A real party in interest, given until Apr 21,
2012 to file memorandum
Petitioner’s Allegations
1. The seismic survey has reduced fish
catch in the area.
a. Reduced by 50-70%, 15-20
kilos to 1-2 kilos of harvest a
day
b. Caused by the destruction of
the “payao”
2. Incidences of “Fish kill” because of
seismic survey
3. ECC obtained by JAPEX invalid
a. Lacked requirements
b.
4. Exceeded its 1.5 km radius exclusive
zone stated in IEE
5. Omly PAMB-Tañon Strait Resolution
and ECC was given to the fisherfolk,
despite several requests for all
documents on the Tañon Strait
project
existing lass and regulations
4. Respondents may not be compelled to
furnish copies of all documents
5. Petitoners not entitled to injunctive
relief
6. Moot and academic - SC-45 mututally
terminated effective June 21, 2008
ISSUE:
1. Mootness Issue
2. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi
3. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No.
46.
HELD:
1. Mootness Issue -> NOT MOOT
a. Exceptions to Mootness:
i. Grave violation of the Constitution;
ii. Exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest
iii. Constitutional issue raised
iv. Capable of repetition yet evading review.
b. Despite the termination of SC-46,
i. Enironmental and livelihood issues affect
public interest
ii. Constitutionality of SC-46 quesioned
iii. Capable of repitition
2. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi -> HAVE
STANDING
a. Petitioners Argue:
i. Resident Marine Mammals through their
Stewards
- Stand to be benefited or injured by judgment
of the suit
- Citing Oposa v Factoran Jr - Right to sue for
faithful performance of
international and municipal environmental laws

Public Resondents’ Counter-Allegations ii. Stewards

1. Petitioners have no legal standing - Have stakes as forerunners of a campaign to
build awareness among
2. SC-46 does not violate the those affectted in Tanod Strait
Constitution - As stewards of the environment since the
Gov’t has failed in its duty
3. ECC was issued in accordance with to protect the envirnment
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
b. Respondents Argue:
i. Resident Marine Mammals have No standing
- parties have to be natural or juridical persons
(Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court)
- Oposa doesn’t apply
-Petitioners were all natural persons
-Albeit some were still unborn
ii. Stewards No standing
- Represent animals whicih cannot be parties
- Not real party in interesT
- Cannot benefit or be injured by decision
iii. President Arroyo No standing -> THIS IS
CORRECT. SHE CANNOT BE
IMPLEADED AS A RESPONDENT
1. No proof of her disapproval to SC-46
2. Acts remain to be her own
c. COURT JUDGMENT:
i. Stewards are REAL PARTIES
- Filipino citizens are stewards of nature
- May bring a suit to enforce environmental
laws
- Not just in representation of the marine
mammals
ii. Sierra Club v . Rogers C.B . Morton (Justice
Douglas)
- Simplified if law allws “environmental issues
to be litigated before federal agencies or
federal courts in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or
invaded by roads and bulldozers and where
injury is the subject of public outrage.”
- “Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in
litigation.”
iii. Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
- Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws.
- on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature.
- May be retroactively applied to this case
iv. Oposa case
- Allowed suit be brought in the name of the
unborn
- Right to balanced healthful exology
assumed to exist fromt eh
- inception of humankind
3. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract
No. 46 -> SC-46 NULL AND VOID
a. Sec 2, Art XII of the Constitution
i. Par. 4 The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration , development , and
utilization of minerals , petroleum , and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country.
ii. Par 5 The President shall notify the Congress
of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision , within thirty days from its
execution.
b. ConCom Deliberations - Par 4 as an
exception to Par 1
i. Par 1 agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance
= Service contracts
ii. In these contracts,
- The foreign contractors provide the capital,
expertise, technology
- BUT Governement exercises control and
supervision over the enire
operation
c. THERE IS A General Law on Oil
Exploration -> COULD HAVE BEEN VALID
i. No merit in Petitioners claim that SC-46 is
prohibited because no general law on oil
exploration existed
ii. Presidential Decree 87 or the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972
- cannot be impliedly repealed so lightly
- It is the general law BUT only through a law
by Congress
d. BUT President was not the signatory to
SC-46 and the same was not submitted to
Congress -> THEREFORE NULL AND VOID
i. Even if in complieance with PD 87, still needs
to conform to CONSTITIUTION
ii. Signed ONLY DOE Secretary Perez Jr.
● No proof of President’s approval
iii. “Alter ego doctrine” CANNOT hold
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
● Required by Constitution to act in person
iv. Not simply formailites
● Play a much bigger role
● As Safeguards to eliminate the abuses
prevalent during martial law
● Unenforeable if not complied with
e. SC-46 vis-a-vis Other Laws -> STILL NOT
VALID
i. The Environmental Impact Statement System
(EISS)
- Established in 1978 under Presidential
Decree No. 1586
- Need ECC secured and EIA made to operate
in protected areas
declared by Proclamation No 2146
ii. National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act)
- Established system of integrated protected
areas
- EXCEPTION under its SECTION 12 and 14:
allows the exploration of protected areas for
the purpose of information-gathering on
energy resources
iii. IN THIS CASE:
- Tañon Strait is an environmentall critical area
(Proclamation 2146)
- Needs ECC secured and EIA made
(PD 1586)
- Not exempted because of purpose of
surveying for energy resources
(NIPAS ACT , Sec 12 and 14)
a. Section 14 does not exempt the EIA
b. It provides additional requisites
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19
November 2001
FACTS:
• Sept. 23, 2003: Court issued its resolution in
the above-numbered case.
o Petition for certiorari by Estrada,
acting through counsel Atty. Alan F.
Paguia against the Sandiganbayan
o It prayed that CJ Davide and the
other members of the SC to
disqualify themselves from hearing
and deciding the petition; the
assailed resolutions be set aside, and
the criminal cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction
o Atty. Paguia asserts that inhibition of
the SC members from hearing the
petition is called for under Rule 5.10
of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(prohibition against justices or judges
from participating in any partisan
political activity), which they violated
by attending the EDSA 2 rally & by
authorizing PGMA’s assumption into
Presidency, violating the 1987 Consti.
Called Estrada v. Arroyo a “patent
mockery of justice and due process”.
• May 30, 2003: Hearing of the Omnibus
Motion; petitioner presented to court several
portions of the book Reforming the Judiciary
by J. Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the
evidence for the defense.
• June 9, 2003: Petitioner filed a motion
pleading, stating among other things that
Estrada be granted opportunity to prove truth
in statements from the book, and for the
Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of CJ Davide (going to
EDSA, authorizing [ground: permanent
disability] and proclaiming VP Arroyo’s
assumption into presidency).
• July 2, 2003: Sandiganbayan issued an order
denying the motion.
• P e t i t i o n e r fi l e d a M o s y o n g
Pangrekonsiderasyon, stating that three
justices of the special division made their
bias against his client known
o Chico-Nazario: foul & disrespectful
language, “Magmumukha naman
kaming gago”
o De-Castro: characterized the motion
as insignificant before prosecution
could file its comments or opposition;
granting Estrada’s motion = chaos
and disorder
• July 14, 2003: He filed a motion for
disqualification, but received the two assailed
resolutions, denying this motion and his
earlier Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon. They
noted that Atty. Paguia has a history
“exhibiting similar conduct towards the SC.
• Oct. 10, 2003: He repeated his earlier claim
of political partisanship against the member
of the Court in a three-page pleading upon
order to show-cause.
ISSUE:
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
W/N Atty. Paguia should be suspended from the
practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of court.
HELD:
Atty. Paguia has violated Canon 11 and Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
• Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer
should observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and judicial officers and
insist on similar conduct by others
o Atty. Paguia succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct, and
pervert the dispensation of
justice by “liberally imputing
sinister and devious motives by
questioning the impartiality,
integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court”.
• Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the
bar from making such statements on a
case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party
o Atty, Paguia has persistently
ignored this (ex. His article in the
Sept. 7, 2003 issue of the Daily
Tribune, calling Estrada v. Arroyo
unconstitutional and void and
accusing the Justices of partiality
to GMA)
• The SC will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of the
people’s faith in the judicial system by
those who have been privileged to
practice law.
Atty. Alan Paguia is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED
from the practice of law.
Re: The Court’s “partisan political activities”
Assailed presence of other justices of Court at
GMA’s oath-taking is no different from their
official functions such as attending the SONA by
the President. Hence, there is no partisanship at
play.
Partisan political activities = acts designed to
cause success or defeat of a particular
candidate/candidates in an election
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,
15 December 2004
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29
December 1986
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners
in demanding the publication of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had
not been published, as required by the law.
Government argued that while publication is
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise provide”, as the decrees
themselves declare that they are to become
effective upon approval.
SC, in its April 24, 1985 decision of the case,
affirmed the necessity of the publication of
the presidential issuances which are of
general application. Petitioners then moved
for a motion for reconsideration/clarification
asserting the following questions:
i. What is meant by “laws of public nature”
or "general applicability”?
ii. Must a distinction be made between laws
of “general applicability” and laws which
are not
iii. What is meant by publication?
iv. Where is the publication to be made?
v. When is the publication to be made?
Issue:
Wether or not publication is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of presidential
issuances.
Held.
Yes. Publication is an indispensable
requirement.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides
“laws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.” The clause “unless it otherwise
provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication which
cannot in any event be omitted. The reason
being such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny public
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it.
The term “laws” should refer to all laws not
only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. Therefore, all statues
including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different date of effectivity is fixed by the
legislature.
In the case at bar, SC held that all
presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the president in the exercise
of the legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the
Constitution shall be published. However,
interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not to be published.
Therefore, the court declared that all laws
shall be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after
fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R.
No. 84111, 22 December 1989
Philippine Internal Trading Corp. v. COA, G.R.
No. 132593, 25 June 1999
II. CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION
Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29
September 1966
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest” where participants have to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can
dispense during a specific period of time. There
was no fee or consideration required to be paid,
nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be
made in order to join the contest. Foreseeing the
extensive use of mail for advertising and
communications, Caltex requested clearance for
Respondent Postmaster General but was denied
citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed
as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Hence, Petitioner
filed a petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls
under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned
by the Postal Law.
HELD:
No, said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word
“lottery” is defined as a game of chance where
the elements of which are (1) consideration, (2)
chance, and (3) prize. The term “gift enterprise”
and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal
Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift,
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money or any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind” means such
enterprise as will require consideration as an
element. The intent of the prohibition is to
suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling
spirit and to corrupt public morals. There being
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-39419, 12 April 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Mrs. Aisporna was charged with
violation of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act for
allegedly acting as an insurance agent without
first securing a certificate of authority to act as
s u c h f ro m t h e o ffi c e o f t h e I n s u r a n c e
Commissioner. Mrs. Aispor na, however,
maintained that she was not liable because she
only assisted her husband, and that she did not
receive any compensation.
ISSUE:
W/N the receipt of compensation is an
essential element for violation of Sec. 189.
HELD:
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
Receipt of compensation is essential to be
considered an insurance agent. Every part of a
statute must be considered together with the
other parts, a kept subservient to the general
intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. The term “agent” used in par. 1 of
Sec. 189 is defined in par. 2 of the same section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in
par. 2 to the agent in par. 1 would give harmony
to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. 189.
A statute must be construed so as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions wherever
possible. Every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
Endencia v. David, G.R. No. L-6355-56, 31
August 1953
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a
public officer shall be considered exempt from
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed
by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution
states that judges shall receive compensation as
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office. Petitioners question
the legality of RA 590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a
judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation
is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office”, by
the Legislature. Through the separation of
powers, such a task must be done by the
Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes
on his salary not for his own benefit but for the
public, to secure and preserve his independence
of judicial thought and action.
Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. 78780, 23 July 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their
emoluments and compensations as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10,
Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during
their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased”, even as it is anathema to the
ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is
subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers.
HELD:
Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is
subject to the general income tax. According to
Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the
diminution of judges’ salaries because “the
independence of judges is of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries”. Endencia vs. David
confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both
decisions must be discarded because the
framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox,
Concepcion, and Bernas), as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8
of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the
salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable.
People v. Macarandang, G.R. No. 12088, 23
December 1959
FACTS:
Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal
possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant,
admitting the ownership and possession of the
firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal
excuse the appointment issued to him by
Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the
Governor’s letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for
having shown good faith by previously
surrendering to the office of the Governor a
firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET
AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and is authorized to hold
and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order falls among
those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no
authority to issue any firearm license or permit
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
but section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted
from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment
sufficiently put him in the category of “peace
officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police
expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the
decision appealed from is reversed and the
Defendant acquitted.
People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 August
1967
FACTS:
Defendant was accused of illegal possession of
firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was
an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial
Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted
as the case of People v. Macarandang used the
same defense providing evidences of his
appointment.
ISSUE:
W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized
to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any
clearer. The law does not contain any exception
for secret agent therefore holding this position
would not constitute a sufficient defense to a
prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the
conviction of the accused must stand. The
Court’s ruling overturned that of People v.
Macarandang.
People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27
February 1974
SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, 27 April
2015
People v. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143, 31 August
1988
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violating a municipal
ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes
worth P362.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of
repeated demands. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. 4
Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager
of fishponds in places within the territorial limits
of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in
the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on
part thereof per annum.” He admits to the non-
payment of the taxes but contends that the
ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its
constitutionality that it does not apply to him as
he is a lessee not an owner or manager.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the ordinance is null and void
because it is ambiguous and uncertain.
2. W / N t h e o rd i n a n c e a p p l i e s t o
Accused.
HELD:
No, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way
may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted
with vagueness. It is unmistakable from the
above provision that the Accused falls within the
coverage. As the actual operator of the
fishponds, he comes within the term “manager”.
While it appears that the National Government is
the owner of the fishpond, the Government never
shared in the profits they generated. It is
therefore, logical that Accused alone shoulders
the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. And
obviously, the word owner cannot be construed
to include the Government because of the
ancient principle that the government is immune
from taxes.
Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 January
2004
FACT:
• Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Bula, CamSur
passed Resolution 49 (1998) authorizing PET
Canet to establish, operate and maintain a
cockpit in Sitio Cabaya, San Roque, Bula,
Camarines Sur.
• Subsequently, SB passed Ordinance 001
(1999): “An Ordinance Regulating the
Operation of Cockpits and Other Related
Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality of
Bula and Providing Penalties for any Violation
of the Provisions Thereof.” Upon transmittal to
RESP Mayor Decena, it was noted that Ord.
001 does not contain rules and regulations on
cockfighting and other related game fowl
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
activities and a separability clause so it was
returned to the SB who then withdrew, set
aside, and shelved indefinitely Ord. 001.
• Canet, relying on SB Reso. 49, applied for a
mayor’s permit to operate, establish and
maintain a cockpit. Mayor Decena denied the
application on the ground that, among others,
under the LGC, the authority to give licenses
for establishment, operation and maintenance
of cockpits as well as the regulation of
cockfighting and commercial breeding of
gamecocks is vested in the SB. Thus, she
cannot issue the permit inasmuch as there
was no ordinance passed by the SB
authorizing the same.
• Canet filed a complaint for Mandamus and
Damages with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction (PMI) against Mayor Decena before
the RTC. Mayor Decena filed MTD. RTC
denied the MTD and issued a writ of PMI upon
posting of 50K bond by Canet. Mayor Decena
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the CA. CA issued a TRO and then,
afterwards, reversed the RTC. MR denied.
ISSUES:
WON Mayor Decena, can be compelled to
issue the permit absent a municipal ordinance
which would empower her to do so
HELD:
NO
Canet: There is no ordinance in Bula which
authorizes the grant of a mayor’s permit to
operate and maintain a cockfighting arena,
however, SB’s Reso. 49 authorized him to
operate a cockpit. Furthermore, Municipal Tax
Ordinances 01 (1989) and 05 (1993) generally
provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for
the operation of businesses.
SC:
• Municipal Tax Ordinances 01 and 05 contain
general provisions for the issuance of
business permits but do not contain specific
provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to
be paid in the operation of cockpits and other
game fowl activities.
• It was Ord. 001 which provided for the
collection of application filing fees, ocular
inspection fees, mayor’s permit fees, filing
fees for the institution of complaints, entrance
fees and special derby assessments for the
operation of cockpits. This, however, was
withdrawn by the SB. Hence, there being in
effect no ordinance allowing the operation of a
cockpit, Reso. 49 authorizing petitioner to
establish, operate and maintain a cockpit
cannot be implemented. To compel Mayor
Decena to issue the mayor’s permit would not
only be a violation of LGC Sec. 447 (a) (3) (v),
but would also be an undue encroachment on
Mayor Decena’s administrative prerogatives.
• To read into the ordinances objects which
were neither specifically mentioned nor
enumerated would be to run afoul of the
dictum that where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended
to other matters. The express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes
all others – expressio unius est exlusio
alterius. What is expressed puts an end to
what is implied – expressium facit cessare
tacitum. This proceeds from the premise that
the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations, if it had the intention
not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
• Even if there was a legislative gap caused by
such an omission, neither could the Court
presume otherwise and supply the details
thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot
be filled by judicial fiat. Courts may not, by
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute
and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they
think the legislature would have supplied if its
attention has been called to the omission.
Courts should not, by construction, revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform
with what they think should be the law.
• F u r t h e r m o r e , c o c k fi g h t i n g , a l t h o u g h
authorized by law, is still a form of gambling.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the
aims of enhancing national productivity and
self-reliance. A statute which authorizes a
gambling activity or business should be
strictly construed, and every reasonable doubt
resolved so as to limit rather than expand the
powers and rights claimed by franchise
holders under its authority.
Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-16197, 12
March 1920
FACTS:
Private Respondent contracted with
Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years, a
supply of all sugar cane produced on her
plantation, which was to be converted later into a
right in rem and recorded in the Registry of
Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and
binding to all future owners of the same. The
Respondent refuses to push through with the
contract thinking it might violate Act No. 2874,
“An Act to amend and compile the laws relating
to lands of public domain, and for other
purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the
capital stock of the corporation is held and
owned by persons who are not citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States. The
land involved is a private agricultural land.
ISSUE:
W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to
agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which
are privately owned.
HELD:
The limit and purpose of the Legislature
in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its
application to lands of public domain and that
lands held in private ownership are not included
therein and are not affected in any manner
whatsoever thereby.
Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject, and that subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.”
Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.
People v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-42050-66, 20
November 1978
FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed
charging the respective Defendant with “illegal
possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the
information because it did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It
failed to state one essential element of the crime,
viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of
the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of,
connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness
or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a
perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities
and that they are essentially malum prohibitum
penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities.
HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and
interpretation of a legislative measure is to search
for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor.
Because of the problem of determining what acts
fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or
“whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or
events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Cebu, G.R. No.
L-14526, 31 March 1965
FACTS:
The Petitioner contends that the
ordinance implemented by Respondent should
be declared null and void because the ordinance
seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage
from vessels which dock at the public wharves of
piers located in the said City but owned by the
National Government. According to Respondent,
the legislature made no distinction between those
owned by the City of Cebu and the National
Government and that consequently, both fall
within the scope of the power granted.
Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it
may have bearing on the right to charge
wharfage.
ISSUE:
W/N the City of Cebu, through its
ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages
from docks which are owned by the National
Government.
HELD:
The term “public” refers to the nature of
use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to
impose wharfage rests on a different basis and
that is ownership. The Court also referred to the
previous subsection of the questioned portion of
the ordinance pointing out that it implies a
distinction with regard to those docks that are
owned by the City and those of the National
Government. The Court states that only those
which are constructed by the City shall be
considered as its property.
US v. Hart, G.R. No. L-8848, 21 November 1913
FACTS:
Respondent was caught in a gambling house and
was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes
“every person found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible
means of support”. The said portion of the law is
divided into two parts, separated by the comma,
separating those caught in gambling houses and
those straying through the country without means
of support. Though it was proven that Hart and
the other Defendants had “visible means of
support”, it was under the first part of the portion
of law for which they were charged with. The
prosecution persisted that the phrase “without
visible means of support” was in connection to
the second part of the said portion of Act No.
519, therefore was not a viable defense.
ISSUE:
How should the provision be interpreted?
HELD:
The construction of a statute should be based
upon something more substantial than mere
punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning
which is reasonable and is in apparent accord
with legislative will, it may be as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words in the statute as thus punctuated. An
argument based on punctuations alone is not
conclusive and the court will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary to give
the act the effect intended by the legislature,
d i s re g a rd i n g s u p e r fl u o u s a n d i n c o r re c t
punctuation marks, or inserting others when
necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, “visible
means of support” and that the absence of such
was necessary for the conviction for gambling
and loitering in saloons and gambling houses,
defendants are acquitted.
People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 39085, 27 September
1933
FACTS:
Defendant was convicted for homicide. While
serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He
was consequently charged for murder. After
conviction, he was punished with the maximum
period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of
the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
HELD:
No. Respondent relied on the word “another”
appearing in the English translation of the head
note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is
applicable only when the new crime committed
by a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. According
to him, his conviction for murder is not different
because it involved homicide. No such deduction
is warranted from the text itself, or from the
Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear
and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to
the preamble, heading, epigram or head note of a
section for interpretation of the text, which are
mere catchwords or reference aids, consulted to
remove, not create doubts
People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, 26
November 1948
FACTS:
Abilong was found guilty of attempted robbery in
April 1946 and ordered to serve 2 years, 4
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
months, and 1 day of destierro during which he
was prohibited from entering any place within the
radius of 100 km from the City of Manila. In
September 1947, he “willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously” evaded the service of this sentence
by going beyond the limits made against him and
committing vagrancy. He pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of
prision correccional. He appealed from the
decision, arguing that Article 157 of the RPC
does not cover evasion of service of destierro
and only applies to persons imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty
(hence the use of the word “imprisonment” in the
provision). The Solicitor General argued that the
RPC’s original text, in Spanish, did not confine
Article 157 to cases of “imprisonment.”
ISSUE:
Does Article 157 apply when the penalty is
destierro?
HELD:
YES. Inasmuch as the RPC was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish
text governs. “It is clear that the word
‘imprisonment’ used in the English text is a wrong
or erroneous translation of the phrase ‘sufriendo
privacion de libertad’ used in the Spanish text. It
is equally clear that although the Solicitor General
impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though
partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was
deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila.” A person escapes from the restrictions
of the penalty of destierro when he enters the
prohibited area.
APPEAL DENIED
Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 28771, 31
March 1971
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent.
During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were
married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his
sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every
donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not
covered by the prohibition because the donation
was made at the time the deceased and
Respondent were not yet married and were
simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between
live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as what is
written. Since the reason for the ban on
donations between spouses during the marriage
is to prevent the possibility of undue influence
and improper pressure being exerted by one
spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the
donation made by the deceased to Respondent
does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will
have exclusive rights to the disputed property
because the relationship between Felix and
Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-8888, 29
November 1957
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, 31 July
1962
Akbayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, 26
March 2001
Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, 21
September 1993
FACTS:
The Private Respondents filed an administrative
complaint with the Ombudsman against the
Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the
Ombudsman filed an order directing the
preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who
were employees of the national center for mental
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive
suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec.
24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of
Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while the
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
only recommend to the Heads of Departments
and other agencies the preventive suspension of
officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to
preventively suspend government officials
working in other offices other than that of the
Ombudsman pending the investigation of
administrative complaints.
HELD:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend
the employees of the said institution may it be in
punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of
the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its
punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties
in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770
grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges. This statute is procedural
and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and
efficient investigation on cases filed against the
officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment but a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15
September 1989 - Dissenting
Dissents:
Gutierrez, J. (relevant)
Main point: With all due respect for the
majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum
on the right to travel. I do not think we
should differentiate the right to return home
from the right to go abroad or to move
around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to
come home must be more preferred than
any other aspect of the right to travel. It was
precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the
right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino,
Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other
"undesirables" and "threats to national
security" during that unfortunate period
which led the framers of our present
Constitution not only to re-enact but to
strengthen the declaration of this right.
Media often asks, "what else is new?" I
submit that we now have a freedom loving
and humane regime. I regret that the Court's
decision in this case sets back the gains that
our country has achieved in terms of human
rights, especially human rights for those
whom we do not like or those who are
against us.
• The Court has permitted a basic freedom
enshrined in the Bill of Rights to be taken
away by Government.
• The issue before us is one of rights and not
of power. Mr. Marcos is insensate and
would not live if separated from the
machines which have taken over the
functions of his kidneys and other organs.
To treat him at this point as one with full
panoply of power against whom the forces
of Government should be marshalled is
totally unrealistic. The Government has the
power to arrest and punish him. But does it
have the power to deny him his right to
come home and die among familiar
surroundings?
• The Court should view the return of Mr.
Marcos and his family solely in the light of
the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
abode and the citizen's right to travel as
against the respondents' contention that
national security and public safety would
be endangered by a grant of the petition
• Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states
categorically that the liberty of abode and
of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law may be impaired only
upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an
executive officer. Not even by the
President. Section 6 further provides that
the right to travel, and this obviously
includes the right to travel out of or back
into the Philippines, cannot be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
• There is no law setting the limits on a
citizen's right to move from one part of the
country to another or from the Philippines
to a foreign country or from a foreign
country to the Philippines. The laws cited
by the Solicitor General immigration,
health, quarantine, passports, motor
vehicle, destierro probation, and parole are
all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr.
Marcos and family is concerned. There is
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
absolutely no showing how any of these
statutes and regulations could serve as a
basis to bar their coming home.
• There is no disrespect for a Presidential
determination if they grant petition. They
would still be applying the Constitution
o Opposition to the
government, no matter how
disgusting, is not sufficient to
deny or ignore a
constitutional right.
o The Government has more
than ample powers under
existing law to deal with a
person who transgresses the
peace and imperils public
safety. But the denial of
travel papers is not one of
those powers because the
Bill of Rights says so. There
is no law prescribing exile in
a foreign land as the penalty
for hurting the Nation.
Cruz, J.
• It is my belief that the petitioner, as a
citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to
return to and live — and die — in his own
country. I say this with a heavy heart but
say it nonetheless. That conviction is not
diminished one whit simply because many
believe Marcos to be beneath contempt
and undeserving of the very liberties he
flaunted when he was the absolute ruler of
this land.
• I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty
that I taught for more than three decades
as a professor of Constitutional Law. These
principles have not changed simply
because I am now on the Court or a new
administration is in power and the shoe is
on the other foot.
• Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also
wanted to come back to the Philippines
against the prohibitions of the government
then, Marcos is entitled to the same right
to travel and the liberty of abode that his
adversary invoked. These rights are
guaranteed by the Constitution to all
individuals, including the patriot and the
homesick and the prodigal son returning,
and tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels
of every stripe.
Paras, J.
• The issue as to whether or not former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos should be
allowed to return to the Philippines may be
resolved by answering two simple
questions: Does he have the right to return
to his own country and should national
safety and security deny him this right?
o There is no dispute that the
former President is still a
Filipino citizen and both under
the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1987
Constitution of the
Philippines, he has the right to
return to his own
country except only if
prevented by the demands of
national safety and national
security.
• It is therefore clear to me, all other opinions
to the contrary notwithstanding, that the
former President should be allowed to
return to our country under the conditions
that he and the members of his family be
under house arrest in his hometown in
Ilocos Norte, and should President Marcos
or any member of his family die, the body
should not be taken out of the municipality
of confinement and should be buried within
ten (10) days from date.
Padilla, J.
• Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such,
entitled to return to die and be buried in
this country;
• Respondents have not shown any "hard
evidence" or convincing proof why his
right as a Filipino to return should be
denied him. All we have are general
conclusions of "national security" and
"public safety" in avoidance of a specific
demandable and enforceable constitutional
and basic human right to return;
• The issue of Marcos' return to the
Philippines, perhaps more than any issue
today, requires of all members of the Court,
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS
in what appears to be an extended political
contest, the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." It is only thus that we fortify the
independence of this Court, with fidelity,
not to any person, party or group but to the
Constitution and only to the Constitution.
Sarmiento, J. (relevant)
• I also find quite strained what the majority
would have as the "real issues" facing the
Court: "The right to return to one's
country," pitted against "the right of travel
and freedom of abode", and their
supposed distinctions under international
law, as if such distinctions, under
international law in truth and in fact exist.
o There is only one right
involved here, whether under
municipal or international
law: the light of travel,
whether within one's own
country, or to another, and
the right to return thereto.
o The Constitution itself makes
no distinctions; let then, no
one make a distinction. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.
• While the Chief Executive exercises
powers not found expressly in the Charter
but has them by constitutional implication,
the latter must yield to the paramountcy of
the Bill of Rights.
• According to Fernando: "A regime of
constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a
bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists
to assure that in the discharge of the
governmental functions, the dignity that is
the birthright of every human being is duly
safeguarded. To be true to its primordial
aim a constitution must lay down the
boundaries beyond which he's forbidden
territory for state action”
• There is no law banning the Marcoses from
the country; neither is there any court
decree banishing him from Philippine
territory.
• Admittedly, the Chief Executive is the
"sole" judge of all matters affecting
national security and foreign affairs; the Bill
of Rights precisely, a form of check against
excesses of officialdom is, in this case, a
formidable barrier against Presidential
action. (Even on matters of State security,
this Constitution prescribes limits to
Executive's powers as Commander-in-
Chief.)
• We would have betrayed our own Ideals if
we denied Marcos his rights. It is his
constitutional right, a right that cannot be
abridged by personal hatred, fear, founded
or unfounded, and by speculations of the
"man's "capacity" "to stir trouble" Now
that the shoe is on the other foot, let no
more of human rights violations be
repeated against any one, friend or foe. In
a democratic framework, there is no this as
getting even.
Philippine Sugar Central Agency v. Collector
of Customs, G.R. No. L-27761, 6 December
1927
FACTS:
Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in
-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Ma-ao Sugar
Central Co. shipped 5,124,416 gross kilos of
centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on
Pulapandan, Occidental Negros on steamship
Hannover. Wharf was built and maintained solely
by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant
collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf.
ISSUE:
W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage
dues on wharves not owned by government.
HELD:
Yes. The Government can be allowed to
collect because not to do so “would overthrow
and destroy the whole system of the
Government, in and by which millions of pesos
have been levied and collected and expended in
the construction of Government wharves, and it
would have defeated the construction of the
Government wharf at Pulapandan.”
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - COMPILED DIGESTS

Dissenting Opinion:

Historically, wharves not owned nor

operated by government cannot be taxed or
levied upon.

Lazatin v. Disierto, G.R. No. 147097, 5 June

2009

Ient v. Tullet, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017