Sa Bed Colleg of Law
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
“But he said to me, “My grace is sufficient
for you, for my power is made perfect in
weakness.” Therefore I will boast all the
more gladly about my weaknesses, so that
Christ’s power may rest on me.”
2 Corinthians 12:9
PART 2
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION ONLY
ALLOWS TWO KINDS OF CHANGES.
WHAT ARE THESE TWO CHANGES
ALLOWED TO BE INTRODUCED BY
FUNDAMENTAL LAW?
● Amendments and Revisions
● Amendment is just a piecemeal
isolated change intended to delete,
to add and to improve a provision.
While a revision on the other hand
is a complete rewriting of the
document or a change of a
principle underlying the
Constitution (Lambino v.
COMELEC | Santiago v. COMELEC)
SINCE BOTH CHANGES ARE ALLOWED,
IS IT STILL NECESSARY TO DETERMINE
THE CHARACTER OF CHANGE?
● Yes, it is necessary to determine
the character of the proposed
change because different
procedure applies and initiative by
people can only propose
amendments.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners
in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino
and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
Group"), with other groups and
individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25
August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that
their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of
the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4
of Article VII (Executive Department) and
by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions." These proposed
changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Lambino Group prayed
that after due publication of their
petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for
the voters' ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino
Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's
initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through
a people's initiative.
HELD: NO. The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are
present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on
a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of
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the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment.
This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible,
given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories
had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution
directly borrowed the concept of people’s
initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States which
allow initiative petitions, the unbending
requirement is that the people must first
see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify
their assent, and that the people must
sign on an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The rationale for this
requirement has been repeatedly
explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, declared: A
signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is
that he or she is signing. Further, and
more importantly, loose interpretation of
the subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents
of an initiative petition to a potential
signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily
mislead the signer by, for example,
omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition
that might not be to the signer’s liking.
This danger seems particularly acute
when, in this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite
signatures to qualify for the ballot.
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution does not expressly state that
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant
American jurisprudence on people’s
initiative. In particular, the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission
explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing such
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people
must sign the “petition x x x as
signatories.”
The proponents of the initiative
secure the signatures from the people.
The proponents secure the signatures in
their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially
explain the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably
their proposal to the people and do not
present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather
the signatures. Thus, there is no
presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving
that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures—that the petition
contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group cites as
authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating
that “a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on
the ground that he did not understand
the nature of the act.” The Lambino Group
quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by
the people. Even the authority the
Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the
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petition. The same authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires the people to sign
on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in
American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be
incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people. In
the present initiative, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the
signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls
the rug from under their feet.
The Lambino Group’s initiative
springs another surprise on the people
who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions, provides: Section
4(4). Within forty-five days from
ratification of these amendments, the
interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of,
this Constitution consistent with the
principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. During the oral arguments,
Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is
a “surplusage” and the Court and the
people should simply ignore it. Far from
being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group’s initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift from the
BicameralPresidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system.
American jurisprudence on initiatives
outlaws this as logrolling—when the
initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a
dilemma since they can answer only
either yes or no to the entire proposition,
forcing them to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one
of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect
of logrolling is to nullify the entire
proposition and not only the unrelated
subject matter.
Logrolling confuses and even
deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985), the
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Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
“inadvertence, stealth and fraud” in
logrolling: Whenever a bill becomes law
through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was
enacted to prevent are exacerbated.
There is a greater danger of logrolling, or
the deliberate intermingling of issues to
increase the likelihood of an initiative’s
passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for “inadvertence, stealth and
fraud” in the enactment-by initiative
process. The drafters of an initiative
operate independently of any structured
or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their
proposition, while remaining silent on
other (more complex or less appealing)
provisions, when communicating to the
public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to
present their initiative to potential
petition-signers and eventual voters.
Many voters will never read the full text
of the initiative before the election. More
importantly, there is no process for
amending or splitting the several
provisions in an initiative proposal. These
difficulties clearly distinguish the
initiative from the legislative process.
The signature sheets do not
explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would
be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit,
after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only
to members of the existing House of
Representatives. An initiative that gathers
signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic
fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative
must be “directly proposed by the people
x x x in a petition”—meaning that the
people must sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation’s fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed
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amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power
of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals. The Constitution
entrusts to the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the
members of this Court do not personally
know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of
the proposed amendment is first shown
to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the
petition.
There can be no mistake about it.
The framers of the Constitution intended,
and wrote, a clear distinction between
“amendment” and “revision” of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people’s
initiative may propose only amendments
to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly
withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the
people cannot propose revisions even as
they are empowered to propose
amendments.
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there
can be no dispute that a people’s initiative
can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself
limits initiatives to amendments. There
can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of
revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from
the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.
Courts have long recognized the
distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental
difference in this manner: [T]he very term
“constitution” implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety
of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term
“amendment” implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement,
or better carry out the purpose for which
it was framed. (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and
balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of
the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative
clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a
two-part test: the quantitative test and
the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is “so
extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the
constitution by the deletion or alteration
of numerous existing provisions.” The
court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change. The qualitative
test inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change
will “accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.” Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan”
includes change in its fundamental
framework or the fundamental powers of
its Branches.” A change in the nature of
the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that “jeopardize the traditional
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form of government and the system of
check and balances.”
Under both the quantitative and
qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Group’s proposed changes overhaul two
articles—Article VI on the Legislature and
Article VII on the Executive—affecting a
total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan
of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. A change in the
structure of government is a revision of
the Constitution, as when the three great
co-equal branches of government in the
present Constitution are reduced into
two. This alters the separation of powers
in the Constitution. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of
the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and
thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone
of one chamber of Congress alters the
system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. By any legal test and
under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral
Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not
a mere amendment. On the face alone of
the Lambino Group’s proposed changes, it
is readily apparent that the changes will
radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the
Constitution.
The express intent of the framers
and the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Group’s theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and
plainly stated, courts do not deviate from
such categorical intent and language. Any
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
theory espousing a construction contrary
to such intent and language deserves
scant consideration. More so, if such
theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of
government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any
jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino
Group’s position. Any theory advocating
that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not
constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.
We can visualize amendments and
revisions as a spectrum, at one end green
for amendments and at the other end red
for revisions. Towards the middle of the
spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties
arise in determining whether there is an
amendment or revision. The present
initiative is indisputably located at the far
end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation
of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring
far-reaching amendments in several
sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only
to a specific provision of the Constitution
without affecting any other section or
article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing
the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is
an amendment and not a revision.
Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from
100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.
There can be no fixed rule on
whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word
“republican” with “monarchic” or
“theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the
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entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case,
depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances,
and the underlying ideological basis of the
existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution
affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative
body with recorded proceedings is best
suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions
to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people’s
initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the
Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions states: Section
2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary
system of government, in which case,
they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is
that if a later law is irreconcilably
inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However,
the Lambino Group’s draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its
head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of
government.” The effect is to freeze the
two irreconcilable provisions until the
earlier one “shall be amended,” which
requires a future separate constitutional
amendment.
The present petition warrants
dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct
and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need
to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms
and conditions” to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present
petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution. This
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling
involving the constitutionality of a statute
if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the
well-settled doctrine that courts will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute if the case can be resolved on
some other grounds.
Even then, the present initiative
violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
requires that the “petition for an initiative
on the 1987 Constitution must have at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as
signatories.” Section 5(b) of RA 6735
requires that the people must sign the
“petition x x x as signatories.” The 6.3
million signatories did not sign the
petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed
with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino,
Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for “Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
Petitioners.” In the COMELEC the
Lambino Group, claiming to act “together
with” the 6.3 million signatories, merely
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attached the signature sheets to the
petition and amended petition. Thus, the
petition and amended petition filed with
the COMELEC did not even comply with
the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the
Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group’s logrolling
initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA
6735 stating, “No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The
proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
Provisions, mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter,
RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus,
even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino
Group’s initiative will still fail.
No amount of signatures, not even
the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered
by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific
modes that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, prescribed when they ratified
the Constitution. The alternative is an
extra-constitutional change, which means
subverting the people’s sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one
act the Court cannot and should never do.
As the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and
protect the Constitution, which embodies
the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s
sovereign will,” or “let the people decide”
cannot override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as prescribed
in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution—the people’s fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability
to our society—becomes easily
susceptible to manipulative changes by
political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the
Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of
the nation’s stability.
IN THE CASE OF LAMBINO v. COMELEC
THERE ARE TWO PROPOSED CHANGES
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SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED BY THE
LAMBINO GROUP. WHAT ARE THESE
TWO CHANGES?
● Changing the government from
presidential to parliamentary and
Conversion of congress from
bicameral to unicameral congress.
CAN THE PETITIONERS SIGN FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER?
● No because the petitioners must
directly author the proposal and
must personally sign the petition.
WHAT IS THE TWO-PART TEST THAT
WAS USED BY THE SC TO DETERMINE
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS
PROPOSAL?
● Quantitative and Qualitative test
HOW IS QUANTITATIVE TEST APPLY?
● By asking whether or not the
change is extensive in number. The
court will just count the number of
provisions in the constitution
affected by the proposal if a
substantial number of the
provisions will be affected with the
proposal the proposed change is
revision. Otherwise it is
amendment
IN QUALITATIVE TEST?
● The court will look into the
substantive effect of the proposal
of the constitution if the proposal
will change the general
governmental structure that is in
the nature of revision otherwise it
is only amendment.
APPLYING THESE TWO TEST TO THE
LAMBINO GROUP, CAN WE SAY THAT
THE PROPOSAL IS INDEED
AMENDMENT?
● The SC said that 105 provision of
the 1987 constitution will be
affected by the proposal therefore
under the Quantitative test, the
proposal is a Revision. Applying the
Qualitative test, the proposal is
within the nature of revision also
because there will be a change in
the governmental structure.
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● So since the petition is in the
nature of revision under the
two-part test, it cannot be
proposed through the system of
initiative because what can be
proposed under the system of
initiative are Amendments.
TRUE OR FALSE THE CONGRESS CAN
AMEND OR REVISE THE
CONSTITUTION?
● False. The Congress cannot amend
or revise the constitution. The
Congress can only propose
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution because amendment
and revision process involves two
steps proposal and ratification.
The Congress as an institution can
only do the first one but not the
second. But members of Congress
can participate as citizens but not
as an institution
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention
GONZALES v. COMELEC
FACTS: The Congress passed 3 Congress, but as component elements of
resolutions simultaneously. The first,
proposing amendments to the
Constitution so as to increase the
membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution,
to a maximum of 180. The second, calling
a convention to propose amendments to
said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be
elected in the general elections. And the
third, proposing that the same
Constitution be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to become
delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed
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a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, became Republic Act No. 4913
providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned resolutions be submitted,
for approval by the people, at the general
elections. The petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the said law
contending that the Congress cannot
simultaneously propose amendments to
the Constitution and call for the holding
of a constitutional convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress can
simultaneously propose amendments to
the Constitution and call for the holding
of a constitutional convention?
HELD: The power to amend the
Constitution or to propose amendments
thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress
(Sec. 1, Art, VI, Const.) It is part of the
inherent powers of the people - as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican
state, such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.)
— to make and hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such
power (Sec. 1, Art. XV, Const.). Hence,
when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of
a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution,
unlike the people, when performing the
same function, for their authority does
not emanate from the Constitution - they
are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution
itself.
The congress, acting as a
constituent assembly may directly
propose amendments to the constitution,
and simultaneously call a constitutional
convention to propose the needed
amendments. Atty. Juan T. David, as
amicus curiae maintains that Congress
may either propose amendments to the
Constitution or call a convention for that
purpose, but it cannot do both, at the
same time. This theory is based upon the
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fact that the two (2) alternatives are
connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a
weak one, in the absence of other
circumstances — and none has been
brought to our attention — supporting
the conclusion drawn by the amicus
curiae. In fact, the term "or" has,
oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or
vice-versa, when the spirit or context of
the law warrants it.
It is also noteworthy that R.B.H.
Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provisions on Congress, to
be submitted to the people for ratification
on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No.
2 calls for a convention in 1971, to
consider proposals for amendment to the
Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is
different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.
Moreover, the amendments proposed
under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be
submitted for ratification several years
before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R.B.H.
No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same
date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after the other. In other
words, they were not passed at the same
time.
In any event, we do not find, either
in the Constitution, or in the history
thereof, anything that would negate the
contested of different Congresses to
approve the contested Resolutions, or of
the same Congress to pass the same in
different sessions or different days of the
same congressional session. And, neither
has any plausible reason been advanced
to justify the denial of authority to adopt
said resolutions on the same day.
Ratification of the constitution
may be held simultaneously in a general
election. There is in this provision nothing
to indicate that the "election" therein
referred to is a "special," not a general
election. The circumstance that three
previous amendments to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely
shows that Congress deemed it best to do
so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the
viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the
proposed amendments, that the same be
submitted to the people's approval
independently of the election of public
officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits
and demerits of proposed amendments is
likely to be overshadowed by the great
attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general
elections, particularly when provincial
and municipal officials are to be chosen.
But, then, these considerations are
addressed to the wisdom of holding a
plebiscite simultaneously with the
election of public officers. They do not
deny the authority of Congress to choose
either alternative, as implied in the term
"election" used, without qualification, in
the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Such authority becomes
even more patent when we consider: (1)
that the term "election," normally refers to
the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote; and (2) that
the word used in Article V of the
Constitution concerning the grant of
suffrage to women is, not "election," but
"Plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term
"election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV
of the Constitution, should be construed
as meaning a special election Some
members of the Court even feel that said
term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
without any "election," general or special,
of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in
general, if not always, of such importance,
if not transcendental and vital nature as
to demand that the attention of the
people be focused exclusively on the
subject-matter thereof, so that their votes
thereon may reflect no more than their
intelligent, impartial and considered view
on the merits of the proposed
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least,
undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious
factors, let alone the partisan political
considerations that are likely to affect the
selection of elective officials.
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This, certainly, is a situation to be

his group tried to prevent Senator
hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of
Tanada from delivering his privileged
which should be promoted. The ideal
speech. During that session when
conditions, are, however, one thing. The
Senator Tanada was about to deliver his
question whether the Constitution
privileged speech, because at the time
forbids the submission of proposals for
there were 22 senators present, 2 were
amendment to the people except under
absent, one was in a hospital, and
such conditions, is another thing. Much
Senator Cuenco who was in the United
as the writer and those who concur in
States. When Sen. Tanada was about to
this opinion admire the contrary view,
deliver his privileged speech 10 senators
they find themselves unable to subscribe
walked out which means that only 12
thereto without, in effect, reading into
remained and continued transacting
the Constitution what they believe is not
business and they declared all seats
written thereon and can not fairly be
vacant. So the issue there is does 12
deduced from the letter thereof, since the
constitute a quorum to transact
spirit of the law should not be a matter of
business? The Supreme Court said that
sheer speculation.
quorum to transact business is
“majority of the House” as distinguished
CAN THE CONGRESS EXERCISE 2
from “majority of all the members of the
POWERS AT THE SAME TIME, THE
house”. Supreme Court said “majority of
POWER TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE
all the members of the house” is
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS AND AT
different from “majority of the House”.
THE SAME TIME CALL A
One of these two terms is fixed. One is
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
variable. One is bigger. The other is
DESPITE THE USE OF THE
smaller. So which of these two terms is
DISJUNCTIVE “OR”?
smaller and bigger, which is a fix and
● YES. Sometimes “or” means “and”
which is valuable. The fixed and the
and vice versa
bigger number is “majority of all the
● In the absence of expressed
members of the House”. So which
constitutional provision “or” means
means that the “majority of the House”
“and”, thus, Congress can directly
to constitute a quorum is variable and
proposed amendments or
the smaller number. 12 is a quorum of
revisions to the Constitution and
not 22 but of 23. In determining the
at the same time call a
quorum “all the members of the House”
constitutional convention
who are we being the coercive
jurisdiction of the House shall become
WHAT IS THE REQUIRED VOTE TO
counted. Since was one absent but in
DIRECTLY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
the Philippines and another was absent
OR REVISIONS TO THE
but outside the Philippines, the basis
CONSTITUTION?
should be 23 because quorum is just
● 3/4 of all its Members
“majority of the House” as distinguished
from “majority of all the members of the
ATTY GAB: Let's take the case of House”.
Avelino v. Cuenco in order to determine
the difference between the terms “of all So to better understand this let's
the members of Congress” and “of the distinguish paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Congress”. In Avelino v. Cuenco, there Section 16 of Article 6. Paragraph 1 of
was a session in the Senate at the time. section 16 of articles 6 deals with the
Prior to that session, Senator Tanada election of the Senate President and the
has already registered his right to Speaker. Paragraph 2 deals with
deliver a privileged speech, the subject quorum. Note the difference “to elect a
of the privilege of speech is to discuss Senate President, the Senate needs
the abuses and violations of law by then majority of all the members of the
Senate President Avelino. On that Senate” but to constitute a quorum the
session day the Senate President and constitution only requires “majority of

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the Senate”. Currently we have 23
senators because of the appointment of
Senator Cayetano as Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Supposing these 23-man Senate is
about to determine quorum. What is
required vote? Is it 1/2 plus 1 of 23 or
1/2 plus 1 of 24? Assuming that all the
senators are in the Philippines. So to
constitute the quorum the Senate only
needs 1/2 plus 1 of 23. But how about
the election of Senate President? 1/2
plus 1 of 24 because the Constitution
requires “majority of all the members of
the Senate” as distinguished from
“majority of the Senate”
SEC. 1 OF ART 17 WAS COPIED FROM
ART. 15 OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO
PROVISIONS IS THAT ART. 15 OF THE
1935 CONSTITUTION IS VERY SPECIFIC
IT PROVIDES THAT THE CONGRESS IN
JOINT SESSION ASSEMBLY BY A VOTE
OF ¾ OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE
SENATE AND ¾ OF ALL THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
VOTING SEPARATELY MAY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
OR CALL A CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION. ART. 15 PROVIDES HOW
THE TWO HOUSES WILL MEET, IT ALSO
PROVIDES THE MANNER OF VOTING IN
DIRECTLY PROPOSING THE
CONSTITUTION VOTING SEPARATELY.
THESE PHRASES WERE NOT INCLUDED
IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. SINCE
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION DID NOT
COPY ALL ART. 15 OF THE
CONSTITUTION DOES IT MEAN THAT
OUR PRESENT CONSTITUTION
INTENDED A JOINT VOTING?
● NO. In interpreting doubtful
provisions we have to apply the 3
tools provided under the case of
Francisco v. HOR. The first two
cannot be applied because we
cannot know the meaning of
manner of voting by just reading
the Constitution because we
cannot determine how should the
Congress vote but we can apply
the 3rd tool ut magis valeat quam
pereat. Under this tool, doubtful
provisions of the Constitution
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
must be interpreted in harmony
with other provisions of the
Constitution. Sections 1 and 3 of
Article 17 can be interpreted in 2
ways. As to the manner of voting,
sections 1 and 3 of Article 17 can be
interpreted to mean voting jointly
or voting separately. Those are the
two possible interpretations of
Sections 1 and 3 of Article 17. If we
interpret the sections 1 and 3 to
mean voting jointly, there will be
other provisions of the
Constitution that will be rendered
nugatory or ineffective like the
provision on Section 1 of Article 6
which calls for the creation of two
Houses of Congress under the
principle of checks and balances. If
we interpret the sections 1 and 3 of
Article 17 to mean voting
separately, it will harmonize the
entire document. Therefore this is
the interpretation that should be
given to Sections 1 and 3 of Article
17 - voting separately.
CAN THE CONGRESS ACTING AS A
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION?
● YES based on the doctrine of
necessary implication. Under the
doctrine of necessary implication,
the grant of an express power
carries with it by necessary
implication all other necessary
powers in order to implement the
express power
CAN THE CONGRESS ACTING AS A
LEGISLATIVE BODY PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTING DETAILS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION?
● YES. The power to provide
implementing details on the
Constitution Convention is not
exclusive to the Congress acting as
a constituent assembly. The power
to provide for the implementing
detail is also available to the
Congress acting as a legislative
body because implementing detail
is essentially legislative in
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character so therefore it is
inherent in Congress.
WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE WHENEVER
THE CONGRESS PASSES
IMPLEMENTING DETAILS ACTING AS A
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ACTING
AS A LEGISLATIVE BODY?
● The difference is if the Congress
provides for the implementing
details acting as a constituent
assembly there is no need for the
approval of the President, mere
resolutions will do as long as it will
pass the 3/4 vote. But if it is in
exercise of the legislative power
under Section 27, Article 6 of the
Constitution it must require the
approval of the President
IMBONG v. FERRER
FACTS: Petitioners Manuel Imbong and
Raul Gonzales, both interested in running
as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, filed separate petitions for
declaratory relief, impugning the
constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that
it prejudices their rights as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which
called for the Constitutional Convention
to propose Constitutional amendments.
After its adoption, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914
implementing said resolution, restating
entirely the provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution
No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by
providing that “xxx any other details
relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and
the holding of the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an
implementing legislation xxx”
Congress, acting as a legislative
body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing
Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly
repealing R.A. 4914.
ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a
legislative body enact R.A.6132 to
implement the resolution passed by it in
its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
HELD: While the authority to call a
constitutional convention is vested by the
present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact
the implementing details, which are now
contained in Resolution Nos. 2 and 4 as
well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not
exclusively pertain to Congress acting as
a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within
the competence of Congress in the
exercise of its comprehensive legislative
power, which power encompasses all
matters not expressly or by necessary
implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as long as such statutory
details do not clash with any specific
provision of the Constitution, they are
valid.
Unlike in the apportionment of
representative districts, the Constitution
does not expressly or impliedly require
such apportionment of delegates to the
convention on the basis of population in
each congressional district. Congress,
sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may
constitutionally allocate one delegate for
each congressional district or for each
province, for reasons of economy and to
avoid having an unwieldy convention.
Do not be mistaken that the
Constitution Convention is also the
Congress. Constitutional convention is
a body separate and distinct from the
Congress. Members of the
Constitutional Convention are also
elected but unlike the Congress that
term of office of the Constitutional
Convention is either fixed on time or
fixed on purpose.
LIKE THE CONGRESS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IS
ALSO A COLLEGIAL BODY. IT CONSISTS
OF SEVERAL DELEGATES. WHAT IS
REQUIRED VOTE FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO
APPROVE A PROPOSAL? BECAUSE
BEFORE THE PROPOSAL WILL BE
SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE FOR
THEIR RATIFICATION, THE
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
ITSELF MUST FIRST APPROVE THE
PROPOSAL. SUPPOSING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
CONSISTS OF 100 DELEGATES. WHAT IS
THE REQUIRED VOTE FOR THE 100
DELEGATES IN ORDER THAT THE
PROPOSAL IS DEEMED APPROVED?
● Only the majority of the members
of the Constitutional Convention is
needed to approve a proposal
(Occena v. COMELEC)
OCCENA v. COMELEC
The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by
the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on
Amendments. When, therefore, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call
of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent
body, it acted by virtue of such
competence. Its authority to do so is
clearly beyond doubt. It could and did
propose the amendments embodied in
the resolutions now being assailed. It may
be observed parenthetically that as far as
petitioner Occena is concerned, the
question of the authority of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments is not new.
And whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution
and propose an entirely new Constitution
based on an ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment;
because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification. Once ratified by
the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one * * * is no argument
against the validity of the law because
‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or
total overhaul of the entire Constitution.
At any rate, whether the Constitution is
merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people. There is here the
adoption of the principle so well known in
American decisions as well as legal texts
that a constituent body can propose
anything but conclude nothing. We are
not disposed to deviate from such a
principle not only sound in theory but
also advantageous in practice.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when
it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be
proposed. That is not a requirement as far
as a constitutional convention is
concerned. It is not a requirement either
when, as in this case, the Interim
Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the
assumption that the requirement of
three-fourth votes applies, such
extraordinary majority was obtained. It is
not disputed that Resolution No. 1
proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
naturalized in a foreign country to own a
limited area of land for residential
purposes was approved by the vote of 122
to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to
the Article on the Commission on
Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention. Where then is the alleged
infirmity?
As to the period, the Constitution
indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: “Any amendment to,
or revisions of, this Constitution shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
The three resolutions were approved by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as
a constituent assembly on February 5 and
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27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22,
the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7,
1981. It is thus within the 90-day period
provided by the Constitution. Thus any
argument to the contrary is unavailing.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be
represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this
right.
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention, or by
a majority vote of all its Members,
submit to the electorate the question
of calling such a convention
TWO MODES OF CALLING A initiative
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION?
1. 2/3 vote of all the members of
Congress; or
2. Majority vote of all its members
and refer to the people the
question of calling such
constitutional convention
CAN WE SAY THAT SECTION 2 OF
ARTICLE 17 GIVES THE PEOPLE POWER
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION?
● NO. Section 2 of Article 17 did not
give the people a power but limits
the power of the people because
the power to change the
Constitution is inherent in the
people as they are the source of
sovereignty itself. The
quintessential essence of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
sovereignty is the power to do
anything without accountability
● Even without Section 2 of Article
17, the people can change their
constitution but Section 2 article
17 only clips the power of the
people in changing the
Constitution by only proposing
amendments to the Constitution
WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION?
1. The petition must be signed by at
least 12% of the total number of
registered voters and every
legislative district shall be shall be
represented by at least 3 % of the
registered voters in that legislative
district
2. There must be an implementing
legislation
DO WE HAVE A SUFFICIENT ENABLING
LEGISLATION TODAY?
● YES. RA No. 6735.
● While the Supreme Court in
Santiago v. COMELEC categorically
declared RA 6735 as insufficient in
order to implement the right of
the proposed
amendments to the Constitution,
in the Resolution of the Supreme
Court in Lambino v. COMELEC the
Court noted that 10 Justices of the
Supreme Court in their separate
concurring opinion voted that RA
6735 is sufficient. While in the
body of the majority decision the
ponentia did not tackle anymore
the sufficiency of RA 6735 because
in the majority opinion, the
Supreme Court said that there is
no need to revisit the Santiago
ruling because the question can be
resolved merely by determining
the nature of the proposal whether
it is an amendment or revision.
Since it has already declared that it
is a revision, there is no need to
determine whether RA 6735 is
sufficient or insufficient.
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HOW SOON CAN THE PEOPLE
EXERCISE THIS RIGHT FROM THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION?
● It may be exercise 5 years from
effectivity of the 1987 constitution
and once every 5 years thereof
WHAT ARE THE ADDITIONAL
REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED IN
LAMBINO FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF
INITIATIVE?
1. The people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their
behalf.
2. As an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
FACTS: Private respondent Delfin filed
with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend
the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People’s
amendments to the Constitution granted
under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. The proposed
amendments consist of the submission of
this proposition to the people—“Do you
approve the lifting of the term limits of all
elective officials, amending for the
purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section
4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the
Philippine Constitution?” The COMELEC
issued an order directing the publication
of the petition and the notice of hearing
and thereafter set the case for hearing. At
the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya- Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-
oppositors. Senator Roco moved to
dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground
that it is not the initiatory party
cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil
action directing respondents COMELEC
and Delfin’s petition to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art.
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
raise the following arguments:
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
1. The constitutional provision on people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress. No such law has been
passed.
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative. It only
provides for the effectivity of the law after
the publication in print media indicating
that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the
latter takes effect only upon ratification
and not after publication.
3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300,
adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the
“conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws”, is ultra vires insofar as
initiative or amendments to the
Constitution are concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules
and regulation for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only the Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass
the implementing law.
4. The people’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, to the
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
the term limits constitutes a revision and
is therefore outside the power of the
people’s initiative.
5. Finally, Congress has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative,
neither the COMELEC nor any other
department, agency or office of the
government has realigned funds for the
purpose.
The Supreme Court gave due
course to this petition and granted the
Motions for Intervention filed by
Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP,
LABAN, and Senator Roco.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision?
2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient
statutory implementation of the said
constitutional provision?
HELD: Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of
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initiative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution
has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
The conclusion then is inevitable
that, indeed, the system of initiative on
the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory. Has Congress “provided”
for the implementation of the exercise of
this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the
private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way
for Congress to implement the exercise of
the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act.
Contrary to the assertion of public
respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the
Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said
section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and
Policy.—The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Italics supplied) The inclusion of the
word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section,
which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That
section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to “directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution”
through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”
While the Act provides subtitles
for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as
to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local
laws.
We cannot accept the argument
that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification
is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character.
It is “national initiative,” if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
national law, or a law which only Congress
can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is
proposed to be adopted or enacted is a
law, ordinance, or resolution which only
the legislative bodies of the governments
of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can
pass.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735
exerted utmost diligence and care in
providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to
do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. There
was, therefore, an obvious downgrading
of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus
delivered a humiliating blow to the
system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a
reluctant lip service. The foregoing brings
us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
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incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on
this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by “empowering” the
COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of [the] Act.
The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to
the President under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; (2)
Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the
people at large; (4) Delegation to local
governments; and (5) Delegation to
administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an
administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under
No. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid.
It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard—the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and
determinable—to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his
functions. A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
It logically follows that the
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated
by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the
“completeness” and the “sufficient
standard” tests.
DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE
POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION
ACCORDING TO THE CASE OF SANIDAD
v. COMELEC?
● YES. The Supreme Court sustained
the authority of President Marcos
to exercise the power to propose
changes to the 1973 Constitution
because under the 1973
Constitution legislative power
rests on the Interim National
Assembly during a period of
transition and during a period of
normalcy the regular National
Assembly. The power to propose
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution also rests on the
Interim National Assembly during
transition and National Assembly
during a period of normalcy but
the 1973 Constitution vests the
power to the President to call or to
convene the Interim National
Assembly which means that if the
President does not call the Interim
National Assembly then they
cannot discharge their power.
● The power to propose
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution is adjunct to the
legislative power of the Interim
National Assembly. Since the
President is already discharging
the legislative power of the Interim
National Assembly with reason
that he can also discharge the
power of the Interim National
Assembly to propose amendments
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to the Constitution. But note that
the ruling of the Supreme Court in
this case saying that the power to
propose amendments is just an
adjunct to the legislative power of
interim national assembly should
only be taken within the factual
circumstances of this case. This
cannot be considered as a
doctrine. This cannot be taken as a
judicial precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis because
during the Sanidad v. COMELEC
case there were only two
operating departments - the Office
of the President which discharges
legislative and executive powers
and the Supreme Court. So the
Supreme Court said that definitely
the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution is alien to the
judicial powers of the Supreme
Court. Again by default the
President was given that authority
just because there was no other
department existing at that time
that can discharge that power. So
the exigencies to require the
President to act because if the
President shirked away with this
responsibility then he will do
injustice to the Filipino people.
SANIDAD v. COMELEC
FACTS: President Marcos issued P.D. 991
calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period
for the exercise by the President of his
present powers.
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued,
amending P.D. 991 by declaring the
provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the
manner of voting and canvassing of votes
in barangays for the national referendum-
plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033
was also issued, declaring therein that the
question of the continuance of martial law
will be submitted for referendum at the
same time as the submission of his
(President) proposed amendments to the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Constitution through a plebiscite on
October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction,
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from
holding and conducting said
Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitution,
there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution, hence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no legal basis.
Petitioner Guzman filed another
action asserting that the power to
propose amendments to or revision of the
Constitution during the transition period
is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII
of the Constitution.
A similar action was instituted by
petitioners Gonzales and Salapantan
arguing that:
1. Even granting him legislative powers
under the martial law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent
assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution
2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
3. The submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of
time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity,
4. To lift martial law, the President need
not consult the people via referendum,
and
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would
amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of
suffrage to those citizens of the
Philippines 18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General, in his comment for
respondent COMELEC, maintains that:
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
2. The issue raised is political in nature,
beyond judicial cognizance of the court
3. At this state of the transition period,
only the incumbent President has the
authority to exercise constituent power
4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.
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ISSUE: Does the President possess the
power to propose amendments to the
Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the
procedure for the ratification of his
proposal, in the absence of an interim
National Assembly?
HELD: The amending process, both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases
where the power of the Presidency to
initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted.
What is in the heels of the Court is
not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such
act or assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process
confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question.
Whether, therefore, that
constitutional provision has been
followed or not is indisputably a proper
subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves—of course—who exercise no
power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power
which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional
norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before
the submission to and ratification by the
people.
—There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of
the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy,
the amending process may be initiated by
the proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds
of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be
submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
members of the National Assembly. In
times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim National
Assembly upon special call by the interim
Prime Minister.
This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC
had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative
of discretion as to when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly.
In general, the governmental
powers in crisis government—the
Philippines is a crisis government
today—are more or less concentrated in
the President. According to Rossiter,
“(t)he concentration of government power
in a democracy faced by an emergency is
a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation
of powers. x x x There are moments in the
life of any government when all powers
must work together in unanimity of
purpose and action, even if this means the
temporary union of executive, legislative,
and judicial power in the hands of one
man. The more complete the separation
of powers in a constitutional system, the
more difficult and yet the more necessary
will be their fusion in time of crisis. x x x
The power of the state in crisis must not
only be concentrated and expanded; it
must also be freed from the normal
system of constitutional and legal
limitations.” x x x The rationale behind
such broad emergency powers of the
Executive is the release of the
government from the “the paralysis of
constitutional restraints” so that the crisis
may be ended and normal times restored.
The presidential exercise of
legislative powers in times of martial law
is now a conceded valid act. That sun
clear authority of the President is saddled
on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the
Transitory Provisions.
Would it then be within the
bounds of the Constitution and of law for
the President to assume that constituent
power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis
his assumption of that body’s legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the
President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of
the interimAssembly, there is no reason
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why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is
but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to
say that the President has converted his
office into a constituent assembly of that
nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the
interimNational Assembly not convened
and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the
President to act as agent for and in behalf
of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution. x x x The President’s
action is not a unilateral move. As early as
the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already
rejected the calling of the interim
National Assembly.
In the Philippines, a republican and
unitary state, sovereignty “resides in the
people and all government authority
emanates from them.” x x x This is the
concept of popular sovereignty. It means
that the constitutional legislator, namely,
the people, in sovereign. In consequence,
the people may thus write into the
Constitution their convictions on any
subject they choose in the absence of
express constitutional prohibition.
The Sanidad v. COMELEC did not
establish a new doctrine. The doctrine
remains in Gonzales v. COMELEC, this
is still the controlling doctrine, that the
power to propose amendments or
revisions is not inherent in Congress. It
is a constituent power that can only be
exercised by Congress upon an express
provision of the Constitution
UP TO WHAT EXTENT MAY ANY
CONTROVERSY OR MAY ANY
CHALLENGE ON THE AMENDMENT OR
REVISION PROCESS BE ELEVATED TO
THE COURT OF JUSTICE FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW BEYOND THAT, NO MORE,
EVEN IF THERE IS A DEFECT IN THE
STEPS UNDERTAKEN BY THE
CONGRESS?
● Before the ratification of the
proposal. Meaning, once the
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
proposals are ratified any
challenge on the steps leading to
ratification are already cured. It
must be made a priori, meaning
prior to the ratification. Once the
ratification is done then the
sovereign will of the people has
corrected all the defects attendant
in the amendment or revision
process. This is also the principle
involved in the case of Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary.
CAN THE PRESIDENT GUARANTEE
THAT NEEDED CHANGES TO THE
CONSTITUTION WILL BE
IMPLEMENTED?
● NO. If the President does not have
the power to propose changes to
the Constitution with more reason
that the President does not have
the power to guarantee that
changes to the Constitution shall
be implemented. (Province of
Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel of
Ancestral Domain)
DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE
PRESIDENT IS TOTALLY WITHOUT ANY
PARTICIPATION IN AMENDMENT OR
REVISION PROCESS?
● NO. The President can participate.
While the President does not have
legislative powers, the President
can recommend to the Congress
the needed laws to be
implemented. Similarly, while the
President does not have the power
to propose changes to the
Constitution, the President can
recommend to the Congress the
needed changes to the
Constitution as long as it is still
incumbent upon the Congress
whether to adopt or to reject the
recommendations of the President.
Similarly while the President, as a
public officer, cannot exercise the
right of initiative because the right
of initiative must be exercised
directly by the people, the
President can also suggest to the
people the needed changes to the
Constitution as long as the
participation of the Office of the
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President shall cease upon the
suggestion. the Office of the
president cannot set aside budget
for the gathering of signatures
because this is now an
interference on the initiative on
the Constitution. (Province of
Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel of
Ancestral Domain)
PROVINCE OF COTABATO v. GRP
PEACE PANEL
FACTS: When President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the
military offensive against the MILF was
suspended and the government sought a
resumption of the peace talks. The MILF,
according to a leading MILF member,
initially responded with deep reservation,
but when President Arroyo asked the
Government of Malaysia through Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help
convince the MILF to return to the
negotiating table, the MILF convened its
Central Committee to seriously discuss
the matter and, eventually, decided to
meet with the GRP.
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur
on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
facilitated by the Malaysian government,
the parties signing on the same date the
Agreement on the General Framework for
the Resumption of Peace Talks Between
the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
thereafter suspended all its military
actions.
Formal peace talks between the
parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from
June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and
agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect,
Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
Domain Aspect. With regard to the
Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in
Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed
“that the same be discussed further by
the Parties in their next meeting.”
A second round of peace talks was
held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7,
2001 which ended with the signing of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Security
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
leading to a ceasefire status between the
parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
Development Aspects of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, which was signed on
May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence
of violence between government forces
and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat
Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and
he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was
then the chief peace negotiator of the
MILF. Murad’s position as chief peace
negotiator was taken over by Mohagher
Iqbal.
In 2005, several exploratory talks
were held between the parties in Kuala
Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting
of the draft MOA-AD in its final form,
which, as mentioned, was set to be signed
last August 5, 2008. Before the Court is
what is perhaps the most contentious
“consensus” ever embodied in an
instrument – the MOA-AD which is
assailed principally by the present
petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are
the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North
Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel
Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete
and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other
petitions by other parties. The Court
ordered the consolidation of the
petitions.
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ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the
people’s right to information on matters
of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987
Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
OF 1991?
HELD: YES. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v.
Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the
statutory right to examine and inspect
public records, a right which was
eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public
documents, as enshrined in both the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution,
has been recognized as a self-executory
constitutional right.
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon.
Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled that
access to public records is predicated on
the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern
since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the
pubic has a legitimate interest in matters
of social and political significance. The
incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be
no realistic perception by the public of
the nation’s problems, nor a meaningful
democratic decision-making if they are
denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable
the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly
observed: “Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
since, if either process is interrupted, the
flow inevitably ceases.”
In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their time,
access to information of general interest
aids the people in democratic
decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting
the nation, so that they may be able to
criticize and participate in the affairs of
the government in a responsible,
reasonable and effective manner. It is by
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains
responsive to the changes desired by the
people.
DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE
POWER TO CREATE COMMITTEES? IS
THE POWER OF THE CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEEDED
CHANGES TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
AND TO RECOMMEND THE NEEDED
CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTIONAL?
● The power to create the
committee rests from the
“take-care-power” of the President
under Section 17 of Article 7 the
power to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed so the power of
the President to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed gives him
the authority to create fact finding
committee - ad hoc committee in
order to study the implementation
of the law and the study of the
Constitution
● As long as the work of the
Consultative Committee is only
recommendatory it is not binding
on the Congress which means that
the Congress is free whether to
adopt or to reject the proposal of
the consultative committee
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than
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ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2
hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
HOW ARE PROPOSED CHANGES TO
THE CONSTITUTION, WHETHER
AMENDMENT OR REVISION RATIFIED?
● majority of the votes cast
ATTY GAB: Do not use majority of the
registered voters because the
Constitution only requires that the
proposal shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast
CAN THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
CONSTITUTION BE SUBMITTED TO
THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR RATIFICATION
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A GENERAL
ELECTION?
● YES. The proposed changes to the
Constitution can be submitted to
the people for their ratification
simultaneously with the general
election. (Gonzales v. COMELEC)
● In Gonzales v. COMELEC, the SC
said that the The Constitution
used the word election which can
either be special or general. The
Constitution does not qualify.
IS THAT DOCTRINE STILL APPLICABLE
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION? CAN
WE SAY THAT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
DOES NOT QUALIFY? THE 1987
CONSTITUTION DID NOT USE THE
WORD ELECTION BUT USED THE
WORD PLEBISCITE. PLEBISCITE
DEFINITELY IS NOT A GENERAL
ELECTION BUT A SPECIAL ELECTION.
SO CAN WE SAY NOW THAT THE
CONSTITUTION MAKES A DISTINCTION
SINCE THE CONSTITUTION SPECIFIES
THE TYPE OF ELECTION? THE
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE
SUBMITTED TO THE PEOPLE FOR
THEIR RATIFICATION
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A GENERAL
ELECTION?
● YES
HOW CAN WE RECONCILE THEN THE
WORD PLEBISCITE AND AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE RULING OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN GONZALES
THAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT
SPECIFY THE TYPE OF ELECTION?
● The word plebiscite under Article
17 should be interpreted to mean a
process. It is a process whereby a
question is submitted to the
people for their approval or
rejection. The word plebiscite
under Section 4 of Article 17 does
not refer to a day. It refers to a
process, the day of the holding of
that process which is called
plebiscite shall be held not earlier
than 60 days but not later than 90
days either after the approval if it
is through Section 1 or a
certification by the COMELEC if it
is through Section 2. Since it refers
to a process, not a day, there can
be two separate processes held in
the one day. Thus on the day of the
election there is a special election
which is the plebiscite and a
general election. So on that day
every registered voter shall receive
two ballots. One for the election of
their representatives and another
for the ratification of the
Constitution.
CAN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OR THE CONGRESS
ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
SUBMIT TO THE PEOPLE THE
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
CONSTITUTION AHEAD OF OTHER
PROPOSALS? CAN THERE BE
PIECEMEAL SUBMISSION?
● NO. Under the doctrine of proper
submission, all the proposed
changes to the Constitution,
whether it is a revision or
amendment, shall be submitted all
at once to the people in one
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election in order to give the people
a proper frame of mind in making
an intelligent decision
● Another aspect of the doctrine in
proper submission which is
already constitutional lies is that
the people shall be given sufficient
time to study the proposal. It is
already institutionalized because
Section 4 of Article 3 specifies the
date which is not earlier than 60
days but not later than 90 days
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
FACTS: A Constitutional Convention was
called upon to propose amendments to
the Constitution of the Philippines, in
which, the delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by
virtue of resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof,
Republic Act 6132. The Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1,
amending section one of article 5 of the
Constitution of the Philippines so as to
lower the voting age to 18. Said resolution
also provided in its Section 3 that the
partial amendment, which refers only to
the age qualification for the exercise of
suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed
in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the
amended Section or on other portions of
the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is
that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the
other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention
have no force and effect as laws insofar as
they are in contravention to Section 1
Article XV of the Constitution. Under the
said provision, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from
each and all of the other amendments to
be drafted and proposed by the
Convention.
ISSUE: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act
of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
HELD: The Court holds that there is, and
it is the condition and limitation that all
the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single “election” or
plebiscite.
In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must
provide the voter not only sufficient time
but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal
of the nature of the amendment per se as
well as its relation to the other parts of
the Constitution with which it has to form
a harmonious whole. In the context of the
present state of things, where the
Convention has hardly started
considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the
people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this
requirement. Under Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution, a proposal to
amendment the Constitution should be
submitted to the people not separately
from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention.
SUPPOSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION SUBMITS ALL THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OR
REVISIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION
ALL AT ONCE TO THE PEOPLE IN A
PLEBISCITE FOR THAT PURPOSE. CAN
THE PEOPLE CHOOSE WHAT
PROPOSAL TO REJECT AND WHAT THE
PROPOSAL TO RATIFY? OR IS IT A YES
TO ALL OR NO TO ALL? CAN THE
PEOPLE PARTIALLY APPROVED
PARTIALLY REJECT THE PROPOSAL?
● It depends on the nature of the
proposal.
● There are two kinds of formal
changes to the Constitution either
amendment or revision and the
difference is that an amendment is
a piecemeal isolated change while
a revision is a complete overhaul of
the Constitution. If the proposal is
just an amendment and an
amendment is an isolated change
to the Constitution the people can
choose what proposal to ratify. But
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if the proposals are in the nature

of revision the people can just
accept all or reject all because in
revision the approval or rejection
of one has an effect on the other
proposal because the Constitution,
in a revision, is considered as
being rewritten.

WHO HAS THE POWER TO SUBMIT THE

PROPOSAL TO THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR
RATIFICATION? IS IT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION? IS IT
THE PRESIDENT? IS IT THE COMELEC?
● The proposal shall be submitted to
the people in a plebiscite which is
a special election. And plebiscite as
an electoral process requires a
budget. Who has the power to
schedule an election? Who has the
power to appropriate funds for the
election? Answer to both questions
is the Congress. So since it is the
Congress that has the power to set
the date of the plebiscite and the
power to appropriate budget then
the Congress has the power to
submit the proposal to the people
for their ratification.

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