India-Myanmar Relations

Background

India and Myanmar share a 1,643 km long land border as well as a mar- itime boundary
in the Bay of Bengal, and have a shared history as well as cultural and religious
connections. Burma was a province of British India until 1937, from which point it
became a separate British colony. The British famously exiled India’s last Mughal
emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, until his death in Rangoon.

While populations had moved between the two countries for centuries, the Indian
presence in Burma increased under the Raj as the British brought Indians into
administration, police and defence, and the Indian Burmese community became a
commercial elite.

India and Burma became independent in 1947 and 1948 respectively. India’s approach to
Burma/Myanmar may be divided into three distinct phases since independence, reflecting
changes in the bilateral relationship but also changes in India’s Myanmar policy. The
period 1948–62 was marked by friendship and international solidarity, while the years
1962–91 saw an unprecedented level of hostility as India embarked on its open
condemnation of the Tatmadaw. From 1991 onwards, as India’s Myanmar policy
metamorphosed into a gradual engagement with the junta, the stage was set for a new
phase in the relationship.

1948–62: friendship and international solidarity

The period 1948–62 witnessed largely cordial Indo-Burmese relations, and three themes
stand out as particularly relevant: close relations at the highest political levels, a similar
ideological affinity and co-operation in international affairs, and the situation of the
Indian diaspora in Burma. Indeed the close friendship between Jawaharlal Nehru and U
Nu resulted in almost annual official and private visits in the years 1948–62.

Carefully balancing between its larger neighbours India and China, U Nu’s Burma
nevertheless favoured India. New Delhi supplied arms to Rangoon’s counter- insurgency
efforts in 1949, and four years later U Nu and Nehru worked to counter increasing Naga
demands for independence on the volatile Indo-Burmese border. In July 1951, India and
Burma signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Peace” in Rangoon, agreeing on “everlasting
peace and unalterable friendship.” Efforts were made to revive Indo- Burmese trade, and
in 1954 Nehru cancelled significant parts of Burma’s debt to India.

Close ideological and political affinity between the political elites led to a close
alignment in international affairs. In the early post-Independence period India and Burma
sought active places in international politics, the countries’ foreign policies marked by
adherence to notions of ‘pan- Asian’ ideals, neutralism and non-alignment, as well as
socialist-inspired notions of equity and justice. The countries frequently co-operated in
forums that were central to the new Third World movement such as the UN, taking on
roles as leaders of the decolonised and decolonising countries. Indeed Burma wished to
emulate the Nehruvian approach in world politics, remaining non-aligned while at the
same time taking a leadership role.

In April 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Treaty, agreeing to principles of
peaceful co-existence, mutual non-aggression and non-interference. At Nehru’s
instigation, Burma and China agreed adherence to the same principles two months later.
India and Burma were among the initiators of the 1955 Bandung conference, which laid
the foundations for the 1961 establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

Closeness in Sino-Burmese relationship: In parallel with India and Burma’s emerging

leadership role in international affairs, however, a closer Sino-Burmese relationship
created apprehension in New Delhi. Chinese economic assistance, joint Sino-Burmese
military operations in Shan state and the 1960 signing of a Sino- Burmese border
agreement and treaty of friendship all created growing concern in India, at a time when
Sino-Indian relations were strained over the border issue.

Anti-Immigrant sentiment in Myanmar:

Early post-independence Indo-Burmese relations were also affected by problematic

issues at home, such as the fate of Burmese people of Indian origin. The number of
Indians residing in Burma at the time of independence is estimated to between 700,000
and 800,000, and these were hard hit by the early measures to nationalise land and
industry.

The colonial legacy created lasting Burmese apprehensions about India and the Indian
Burmese (or ‘kalas), due to their role in the colonial apparatus of domination & their
relative economic success. Indeed Sino- Burmese relations were also strained by similar
Burmese fears of domination, and the Chinese population in Burma also experienced
antipathy. Wishing to limit foreign economic interests, U Nu’s government introduced
the 1948 Land Alienation Act, which forbade sale of land to non-Burmese nationals, and
the 1949 Burma Land Nationalisation Bill, which reclaimed Indian-owned land. In 1953,
over 10,000 Indians were dismissed from various Burmese government services. Indian
official reactions were muted. While the government facilitated repatriation, Nehru in
1950 encouraged Indians in Burma to change nationality and settle permanently.

1962–91: from friendship to antagonism

When General Ne Win in 1962 set aside U Nu in a coup, India condemned the move.
Burma became a military one-party regime under the Burma Socialist Programme Party
(BSPP), also dominating the country’s external relations. While the setting aside of the
democracy in Burma provoked strong negative reactions in Delhi, India’s attention was
soon diverted by the October 1962 war with China. The Burmese military regime’s
neutral stand on the Sino-Indian war was in Delhi interpreted as support for China,
straining Indo-Burmese relations further.
The same year, however, China began endorsing the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
in its insurrection against the central government, making it the best armed of Burma’s
many insurgencies. China’s support for CPB created a lasting strain on Sino-Burmese
relations.

However, by the late 1970s this was reduced, and by the mid-1980s the CPB support was
no longer a matter for bilateral diplomatic relations. Eventually Beijing worked to
restrain the CPB insurgency, and in 1989 the CPB was dissolved.

General Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” entailed a comprehensive xenophobic

nationalism, limiting foreign economic and cultural participation and favouring the
dominant Burman (Bamar) identity. The autarkical economic policies brought a drastic
reduction in cross-border trade and prevention of external investments and foreign
participation in the economy. The Indian diaspora was again hard hit. Large proportions
lost their means of livelihood, while their bank accounts were simply closed down. In
addition, anti-Indian sentiments prevalent in the Burmese population flared up.

While Indo-Burmese relations were severely strained over the issue of the Indian
diaspora, In the mid-1960s Ne Win visited Delhi and Lal Bahadur Shastri visited
Rangoon Spurred on by insurgencies in north-east India, the Indo- Burmese border was
settled through a boundary agreement signed on 10 March 1967, and the period also saw
some co-operation on counter-insurgency operations in the border areas. From the mid-
1970s, however, relations again cooled. U Nu, exiled from Burma by Ne Win’s regime,
was granted political asylum by India, which in turn became a sticking point between the
countries.

Sino Burmese relations & the end of the “paukphaw” era post 1967 riots: In
comparison, Chinese diplomatic reactions to the extensive anti-Chinese riots in Burma in
1967 were strong, effectively ending the era of friendly Sino-Burmese ‘paukphaw’
(sibling or cousin) relations.

Indo-Burmese co-operation in international matters soon decreased. India officially

disapproved of the undemocratic nature of the Burmese regime, while Burma became the
subject of relative international isolation. In addition, Ne Win and the BSPP chose to lead
an isolationist policy combining economic self-reliance with nationalist seclusion,
gradually withdrawing from most of the diplomatic connections U Nu had built up. As a
result, in 1979 Burma withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement.

1987: after a hiatus of nearly 20 years, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Rangoon was the first
Indian visit on prime-ministerial level since his mother’s 1969 visit. Aiming to improve
bilateral relations, any headway created by Gandhi’s visit was, however, thoroughly
undermined by the events of 1988.

1988: suppression of pro-democracy protests in Myanmar: Indo-Burmese relations

reached an all-time low following the August 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations in
Burma and the military regime’s brutal repression of protests. India was the first and only
Asian country to criticise the new Tatmadaw junta of September 1988, the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC).

Furthermore the Indian embassy in Rangoon actively helped pro-democracy activists

during the protests, famously turning the embassy library into a makeshift hospital and
providing financial support for democracy activists. The Indian government established
refugee camps in Mizoram and Manipur states, and the government run All India Radio
(AIR) began broadcasting Burmese- language reports on the SLORC repression, read out
by U Nu’s daughter. New Delhi wished to limit involvement with Yangon, as the capital
was renamed, even more so after the regime placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest
from June 1989. Furthermore, when Suu Kyi was awarded the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize,
India’s Prime Minister Narasimha Rao lauded the recognition.

The strong Indian stance against the new regime in Myanmar – the country’s new name
from 1989 – caused considerable offence within the SLORC, creating an impetus to seek
allies elsewhere.

Thus while both Myanmar and China countries faced internal crises as well as strong
international condemnation following their crackdown on the 1988 uprising and the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests respectively, Yangon and Beijing soon built a close
relationship. As the extent of this relationship became clear, Indian security analysts and
foreign policy circles began reviewing India’s policy towards Myanmar, fearing
expanded Chinese influence in India’s neighbourhood.

1991 to today: India’s policy of engagement:

In the early 1990s, Indian security and foreign policy circles pressed for a change in the
policy towards Myanmar, opting for engagement with the Tatmadaw. In March 1993,
India’s Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit visited Myanmar, and discussed Indian concerns
with Myanmar’s military co-operation with China. The first high-level contact since the
repression of the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, Dixit’s visit was understood as a
breakthrough, confirming New Delhi’s policy change.

The policy change was desirable for a number of reasons, China’s economic growth and
increased influence in Myanmar became an overriding concern, making India’s Myanmar
policy take on new and important geostrategic dimensions.

India’s geostrategic interests in Myanmar: Writing in 2000, J.N. Dixit argued that the
main reason for the review of Indo-Myanmar relations was “Myanmar’s geostrategic
importance for India”, pointing out the shared border with the Indian north-east, China
and Bangladesh, as well as its relevance for Indian security interests in the Bay of Bengal
and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. However it was “equally important to ensure that
Myanmar does not become part of an exclusive area of influence of other powers in the
region with whom India has uneasy relations. China, for instance”.

While most countries had severed their ties to Myanmar after 1988, China quickly
became the country’s closest ally and economic partner, and its largest provider of
development aid. Spurred on by a new willingness by the SLORC regime to set aside the
dirigiste approach of the Ne Win era, Sino-Burmese co-operation grew to encompass
economic, military and infrastructure development. The alignment facilitated a massive
military expansion and rearmament in Myanmar with China as the largest supplier.

Sino-Burmese trade boomed and China invested heavily in Myanmar’s infrastructure,

also benefiting Chinese aims of using Myanmar as “a corridor for the southward flow of
Chinese goods” and opening up the western provinces. In Delhi, this development was
viewed with deep suspicion – an infrastructure corridor from Yunnan to the Bay of
Bengal could potentially transport soldiers just as easily as goods. Suspicion turned to
fear when in 1992 China was reported to have set up bases or even intelligence-gathering
facilities on the Burmese Greater Coco and Hainggyi islands.

Under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, India embarked upon a new and more pro-active
direction in foreign policy, which combined a gradual approach towards the remaining
superpower, the USA, with a turn towards East Asia and especially the ASEAN states
through the “Look East Policy” (LEP).

While often assumed to be a mainly economically motivated policy, LEP also aims for a
strategic engagement of Southeast Asia as a result of “India’s search for new friends and
partners after the loss of its superpower patron in 1991”. Thus the LEP has economic,
diplomatic and strategic aspects, and the total sum of these affect India’s relations to
Myanmar. Myanmar has come to attain a central place within the LEP due to its
geographical location, geostrategic relevance and natural resources.

India’s main objectives: security, connectivity, economic and maritime dimensions

In addition to the ‘China factor’ and India’s own orientation eastwards, four geostrategic
considerations have guided India’s Myanmar policy over the last two decades. First, a
growing Indian wish to stabilise and develop India’s northeast has made the need for co-
operation with Myanmar on cross-border security issues evident. Second, Myanmar’s
position as a connecting point between South and East Asia is central, as Myanmar is
understood as key to improving connectivity to the greater Southeast Asian region.
Third, Myanmar’s natural resources and particularly its gas and oil reserves make it an
interesting trading partner. Finally, Myanmar’s position in the Bay of Bengal littoral
region, in which India aims for regional leadership, is of key importance.

A main driver behind India’s co-operation with Myanmar remains the need to stabilise
and develop India’s north-east, which poses a significant security challenge for the
central authorities. As mentioned above, Myanmar and India share a 1,643 km border
along the Indian states of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh and
Myanmar’s Sagaing region and Chin and Kachin states. The border cuts across the
homelands of a number of ethnic communities, many of which have led insurgencies
against the central authorities in both Myanmar and India. The border is also porous, and
militant groups operate out of both India’s and Myanmar’s territory, often protected by
the local neighbourhoods or local authorities. Furthermore the “Free Movement Regime”,
which allows tribal communities to cross the border without visa restrictions, aids
trafficking in illegal goods.

Following India’s growing engagement with Myanmar, closer military co-operation in

the border areas took place from the first half of the 1990s onwards (operation golden
bird), resulting in a number of counter-insurgency operations, joint military operations
against insurgents along the border were thus resumed and strengthened in autumn 2000,
spring 2001 and autumn 2001 and became annual joint winter campaigns. Co-operation
mainly works to counter the major militant groups that oppose the Indian central
government, such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland and its two factions,
Isak-Muviah (NSCN-IK) and Khaplang (NSCN-K), the United Liberation Front of
Assam (ULFA)

Gradually, an understanding of the need to develop India’s north-east and improve

infrastructure has gained ground in Indian foreign and security policy. Enhanced
connectivity is a central objective of India in Myanmar, both in order to connect India
proper to its own north eastern states, and in order to connect to Myanmar, using its
neighbour as a gateway to the ASEAN countries.

A number of infrastructure initiatives have been established or are currently underway,

such as roads, railways and pipelines such as:

India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway project: The project aims to connect the

three countries through the construction of a highway from Moreh in Manipur state via
Mandalay and Yangon in Myanmar to Mae Sot in Thailand. The Indian side has wished
for a weekly bus service between Imphal and Mandalay for several years, with relatively
low fares and a visa-on-arrival scheme for travellers, making movement between the
countries easier.

The Kaladan multi-modal transport project has long been one of India’s flagship
projects in Myanmar. Initiated in 2003, an agreement was reached between India and
Myanmar in 2008. The project will link the ports of Kolkata (India) and Sittwe
(Myanmar) by shipping route, and link Sittwe further up the Kaladan river by boat to
Mizoram in India.

The main rationale from the Indian side has been to improve connectivity between India
proper and the north-eastern states through creating an alternative to the Siliguri corridor.

Geostrategic relevance of Myanmar: Myanmar’s importance as a connecting point

between South and East Asia has been much emphasised, and the country is often seen as
the ‘crossroads’ of Asia, or as India’s ‘land bridge’ towards South-east and East Asia. In
1996, ASEAN leaders agreed that Myanmar would be admitted as a member state, and
the following year Myanmar became a member. ASEAN’s engagement of Myanmar and
Myanmar’s 1997 ASEAN membership coincided with India’s growing engagement with
both Myanmar and ASEAN through the LEP. A strategic consensus thus emerged
between India and ASEAN on the need to wean Myanmar away from China.

The first of these was the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Econ- omic Co-operation
(BIST-EC), established in June 1997. Having attended the inaugural meeting as an
observer, Myanmar became a full member in December the same year, and the
organisation was renamed BIMSTEC.

Another similar initiative is the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, which from 2000 has
worked to improve connectivity and economic and cultural exchanges between its
member countries India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. A closer
regional co-operation has also been sought by China, such as through the 1999
“Kunming Initiative” or the BCIM co-operation between Bangladesh, China, India and
Myanmar. From 2013 onwards, however, renewed interest has emerged in the BCIM
economic or trade corridor,

Geo-Economic importance of Myanmar: Over time, India’s own economic rise has
made access to resources and markets, as well as energy security, increasingly important,
and in light of this access to Myanmar’s natural resources, gas and oil reserves are
interesting for India

While the Indian oil and gas industry is heavily involved in Myanmar’s energy sector, it
is, relative to the Chinese industry, less profitable. Moreover, it is also hampered by the
lack of oil and gas infrastructure between the two countries. While an MOU on the sale
of natural gas from the Shwe field to India was signed in 2006, India nevertheless
eventually lost out to China, as Indian attempts at establishing a pipeline between India
and Myanmar, via Bangladesh or India’s north-east, did not succeed. China, in contrast,
constructed a double pipeline between Kyakpyu and Kunming in five years, and has a 30-
year contract on the gas from the Shwe field.

In April 1995, the first India–Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was implemented.
Since then three border trading posts connecting Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland have
been put into place. The bilateral trade increased from USD 87 million in 1990–91 to
USD 1.9 billion in 2012–13 to USD 2.16 billion in 2016 . India is one of the main
importers of Myanmar’s agricultural items, and the main exporter of pharmaceuticals to
Myanmar & India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar.

Chinese economic presence in Myanmar: According to ADB (2016) data, continuously

since 2001 China has been the leading source of Myanmar’s import. It reached 3.04
billion USD in 2015 and constituted 28 percent of all Myanmar’s imports. Once the gas
and oil pipelines became operational, China became the main export destination in 2014
and the value of export reached 7.72 billion USD (43 percent of all Myanmar’s export)

Defence cooperation between India-Myanmar: The maritime domain is an area where

Indo-Burmese co-operation has been relatively successful, achieving extensive
collaboration. Important objectives on the Indian side have been to acquire intelligence
on the claimed Chinese presence in Myanmar, and more particularly the alleged Chinese
bases on Burmese islands.

Joint yearly naval exercises have been held since 2003, and the Myanmar navy, or
Tatmadaw Yay, takes part in the annual MILAN exercises led by the Indian navy. The
close co-operation has intensified during Thein Sein’s government, and Myanmar naval
vessels in 2013 made their first port calls to mainland India. Following the port call, the
two navies conducted joint exercises and patrolled their joint maritime boundary. India
decided to supply several offshore patrol vessels to Myanmar, and give training to
officers of the Myanmar navy.

The increased Indian willingness to support the Myanmar navy was later interpreted as
central to a conscious change in Indian defence policy, originating within the military,
intelligence and foreign policy circles in South Block, and taking place in the latter half
of 2013. Using India’s military branches, the main aim is seen as furthering India’s
interests in the immediate and strategically important neighborhood, also
countering China’s influence.

Barriers to India’s achievement of its objectives in Myanmar:

While India’s engagement with Myanmar in the maritime domain has been relatively
successful, India’s achievement of its objectives in the areas of security and economic
development, trade and connectivity has been hampered by a number of constraints.
Despite the radical turn- around in India’s Myanmar policy in 1991, in practice it took
several years before India managed to implement a powerful policy. It was not until the
early 2000s that tangible results were seen in the form of several bilateral agreements,
and defence and security co-operation was carried out on a more regular basis.

Particular importance has been accorded to Jaswant Singh’s period as India’s Foreign
Affairs minister in 1998–2002, and his “Eastern Strategy”. In part, it took a long time to
establish a basic trust following the strong Indian condemnation of Myanmar in 1988.
Also, the BJP government placed greater emphasis on trade as a foreign-policy tool,
lending greater support to Indian investment in Myanmar than the previous governments.
In addition, the BJP added a cultural dimension to the engagement with Myanmar,
emphasizing the Indian roots of Buddhism.

In 2004 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) junta’s leader Senior General
Than Shwe visited India – the first head of state visit for 20 years. After BJP lost the
2004 Indian elections, Manmohan Singh’s United Progressive Alliance government
(2004–2014) continued and intensified the policy of engaging with Myanmar.

A main obstacle for the Indian projects in Myanmar has simply been problems of
implementation. As shown by several projects such as the Kaladan project, the “India-
Myanmar Friendship Road” and the Trilateral highway, several years have gone by
between establishment and finalisation of projects. It is implied that these projects have
not received the necessary support from government circles in Delhi, whose approach
towards the infrastructure projects in particular has been termed ‘lackadaisical’ by Indian
observers. Lack of security in border areas and on the main Indian roads to the
border areas is also a main reason why cross-border trade remains low.

The democratisation process and the ‘Sino-Indian Great Game’ in Myanmar: From
late 2010 onwards Myanmar’s political landscape underwent significant changes:
national and local elections were held, a new parliament was convened, and Thein Sein
was elected President. Eventually the SPDC was dissolved. Aung San Suu Kyi was
released from house arrest; The National League for Democracy (NLD) re-emerged as a
legal political party and won 43 seats in parliament in 2012. The changes prompted
enthusiastic responses from supporters of a greater Indian engagement with Myanmar, as
well as internationally.

A dominant line of argument was that India needed to strengthen its approach and
engagement, in light of China’s comparative strategic advantages. Again, the notion of a
‘Sino-Indian Great Game’ in Myanmar came centre stage – on the Indian side.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Myanmar in 2012, significantly supporting

both the new semi-civilian government and its opposition through meetings with Thein
Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi.

While Myanmar’s opening up has seemingly created new opportunities for bilateral
contact and co-operation, it could, however, also constitute a new turning point for
India’s Myanmar policy. Myanmar’s democratisation process is likely to make it
easier for Indian politicians to agree on a coherent Myanmar policy, not marked by
conflicting loyalties towards the different political actors in Myanmar. The
November 2015 elections in Myanmar, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy’s overwhelming victory, have been warmly welcomed in India. At the same
time, however, the democratisation may make it all the more urgent for India to utilise its
established relation to Myanmar, as the number of Myanmar’s potential co-operation
partners has increased rapidly since 2011, and will increase even further with NLD in
power. In comparison to the years of international sanctions, Myanmar is now in a
position to pick and choose, which leaves India as just one of many potential suitors.

Myanmar is now attracting considerable funding, an example being the Japanese

assistance to and co-operation with Myanmar. In 2013 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited
Myanmar, and Japan soon after cancelled Myanmar’s USD 3.7 billion debt. Increased
Japanese engagement is understood as motivated by a wish to counter Chinese
influence.

Furthermore President Thein Sein’s 2011–2012 suspensions of the Chinese funded

Myitsone Dam project and the Letpadaung copper mine have widely been
interpreted as a sign that Myanmar will work to limit the Chinese dominance –
particularly by the Indian press.

Security ties & the related challenges for India-Myanmar relations:

 • India’s border with Myanmar is densely forested the cover of which is used by
insurgents to pursue anti-India agendas, sometime without the knowledge of
Myanmarese authorities.

• Myanmar presents what Samir Das calls a “frontier dilemma” for India’s Look
East policy.

• However, in recent times, Myanmar government has taken several steps against
Indian insurgent groups. U. Thein Sein reassured India that Myanmar will not let
its territory be used by insurgent groups from the Northeast against India.

• Mechanism of regular Joint Consultative Committee meetings between the two

countries affirms the shared commitment to fight terrorism and insurgent activity.
In a recent meeting the need for enhanced cooperation between security forces
and border guarding agencies was emphasized

• At least half a dozen Indian insurgent groups including the United Liberation
Front of Asom (Ulfa) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
faction, are alleged to have training camps in northern Myanmar

• It is critical to note that the most significant long term connection that northeast
insurgents have enjoyed, that with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) which is
closely aligned with China.

• UWSA is the largest source of weapons for Northeast insurgents including the
NSCN (K). For China, its linkage with the UWSA is a strategic priority, even
more so than its relationship with the Myanmar government which is gradually
democratizing

• Breaking these covert Chinese connections with insurgent groups like the UWSA
with the help of Myanmar is a priority for long term stability in the Northeast.

Civil war and ethnic conflicts within Myanmar:

• Struggles for ethnic and sub-national autonomy has pitted the dominant Burmese
community disproportionately represented in the Government against the other ethnic
minority groups

• Panglong Agreement: Agreement signed in 1947 by General Aung San and

different tribes which promised full autonomy for internal administration in frontier
regions where Kachin, Chin, Shan and other tribes lived. However, with
establishment of military rule, the agreement was abandoned which resulted in
emergence of autonomous armed groups directly challenging the government

• Since 2011, the government has opened negotiations with warring factions and
entered into ceasefire negotiations & there is a demand for developing new Panglong
 Agreement that calls for true federalism and respect for human rights. The success of
peace-building in Myanmar is hinged on its ability to resolve the ethnic crisis

• In a bid to stabilize the situation, President Thein Sein sought for all round cease fire
with autonomous militant groups to ensure peaceful environment for elections in
2015

• The United Wa State Army, believed to be the largest and best equipped of the
country’s armed ethnic groups, has remained largely on the sidelines of the peace
process and did not sign the latest nation-wide cease fire agreement. Also missing is
the Kachin Independence Organization, which controls vast areas of Kachin State, in
Myanmar’s northeast.

• It has been reported that these two groups, which operate on the Myanmar-China
border, had come under pressure from China not to sign. China has denied these
allegations

The ‘Second Coast’ and its implications for Northeast India

• Myanmar’s 2,276 km long coastline in the Bay of Bengal has the potential to provide
the ‘second coast’ to China to reach the Indian Ocean and achieve strategic presence
in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Especially transportation logistics to the
‘second coast’ from landlocked south west Chinese provinces like Yunnan have both
economic and strategic benefits.

There have been reports of Chinese built SIGINT listening stations in the Andaman
Sea at least at Manaung, Hainggyi, Zadetkyi and the Coco Islands in Myanmar.
Additional reports indicate that the Chinese maybe pushing Myanmar for a listening
facility on Ramree Island, Rakhine state, which also holds the deep sea Kyaukpyu
port developed for oil and gas transportation. China is building an integrated
transport system linking the Kyaukpyu port to Yunnan Province in South West China
with the sole aim of reducing energy shipping through the Malacca Strait and South
China Sea. The plans include a railroad project from Kunming, the capital of
Yunnan, to Kyaukpyu to complete the logistics loop to the ‘second coast’

Further north from Kyaukpyu port is the capital Sittwe of Rakhine state where China
has assisted the Myanmar Navy built a naval base. Interestingly, India’s northeast
serving Kaladan River Multi modal transport system feeds off the Sittwe port being
developed by India, being the closest to the Kolkata port.

As per Indian Navy’s assessment, China’s control of Myanmar’s ports from Sittwe in
the north to Cheduba, Bassein and a string of other military assets on the ‘second
coast’ can enable it to enforce anti-access/area denial to deny the Indian Navy the
ability to operate in its littoral waters in the Bay of Bengal. Such escalating scenarios
have grave implications for Northeast India from clandestine arms shipments that
pass through these waters for the insurgent groups in the region. Contraband arms
shipments seized in the past from Chittagong port and Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh
originated through arms traffickers in Cambodia and Thailand ports.

The coastal border points between Bangladesh and Myanmar have become a haven
for contraband arms transit due to inadequate patrolling of their huge coastline in the
past by these two countries. These shipments can land on the coasts of South
Bangladesh and Northwest Myanmar and then smuggled inland in smaller
consignments into Northeast India. The neighboring transit state in Myanmar namely
Rakhine has rampant ethnic strife and Chin state has ethnic insurgencies and is not
fully controlled by the Myanmar government.

India needs to put in place a well-coordinated approach to secure the maritime and
land neighborhood of the Bay of Bengal and Northeast India. This would include
strengthening naval and coastal patrol assets in the littoral waters off the Andaman
and Nicobar islands as well as enhanced strategic assets at the Northeastern borders
opposite the ‘second coast’.
India has to work with Bangladesh, which faces a huge national security threat as the
landing zone of trafficked arms through the Bay of Bengal by conspiring foreign
terrorist organizations operating from its soil with support of local elements. The
Myanmar government is challenged by insurgent militias still running loose, who are
aided and abetted externally for short sighted strategic gains inside the country. India
needs to support Myanmar in establishing the firm rule of the laws of its government
throughout its length and breadth. India would need earnest diplomatic efforts to
push relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar in a mutually supportive security
partnership against common foes of all the legitimate stakeholders in this strategic
theatre.

Thus it may be too early to predict Naypyidaw’s preferred policy towards China vis-à-vis
other potential cooperation partners. In addition, Burmese nationalism and xenophobia
have been and remain powerful drivers in the country’s politics and international
relations, particularly in relation to China and India, and may remain so in the future.

Recent literature has aimed to ‘deconstruct’ this notion of a ‘Sino-Indian rivalry’ in

Myanmar, as China’s leverage far outweighs India’s, and as the Tatmadaw’s position
nevertheless prevents either country’s manipulation of Myanmar. It has also been argued
that the triangular relationship between India, China and Myanmar might be better
understood “in terms of respective spheres of influence rather than direct confrontation

Views of prominent scholars:

Rajiv Bhatia
While India views Myanmar as its gateway to ASEAN, Myanmar saw ASEAN as its
bridge to South Asia.

On major political issues, India was forthright in its support to Myanmar, especially to its
fledgling democratic institutions, the initiative for national reconciliation and peace, and
the ongoing economic and political reform process under difficult circumstances. New
Delhi has offered to share India’s own experiences in evolving parliamentary rules,
procedures and practices as well as managing Union-State/Region relations, allocation of
powers and resources between the Union and States etc

A way to deepen the bilateral is by activating a proposal to establish an India-Myanmar

Foundation, tasked with expanding people-to-people exchanges. A China-Myanmar
Foundation is already underway; India should not be far behind.

President Htin Kyaw has set the stage for a new level of bilateral engagement. To
concretise this, Indian leaders may have to await in-depth interactions with Suu Kyi who
is now routinely portrayed by media as the de facto prime minister of Myanmar.

Harsh V. Pant

Indian diplomacy has a tough job at hand as all major powers are now wooing Myanmar.
China and Myanmar pledged to forge closer ties as “blood brothers” and enhance trade.
Even the Obama administration views Myanmar’s transition to democracy as one of its
key foreign policy achievements

Myanmar’s transition to a civilian government has given India more strategic space to
manoeuvre. But as in the past, the future of bilateral ties will not be determined by just
democracy

C. Raja Mohan

Modi has his task cut out in bridging the growing gap between the potential and reality of
India’s partnership with Myanmar. The problem in Delhi is not in the lack of a vision for
the future of the relationship, but India’s problems in translating that into practical
outcomes over the last two decades.

The new dynamic of international position of Myanmar offers both challenges and
opportunities for the Modi government. For one, India no longer has a privileged access
to the markets in Myanmar. It has to compete with global businesses in the country. At
the same time, as Thein Sein told the PM, Myanmar wants to take full advantage of
India’s prospects for rapid economic growth under Modi. As its diversifies its
international relations, India remains an important political partner for Myanmar.
 India Myanmar Relations- Rohingya crisis

What is the Rohingya issue in Myanmar?

Considered by the United Nations as the “most persecuted minority group in the world”, the
Rohingyas are a stateless group of people concentrated in western Myanmar and facing
brutal assaults from the Burmese state and military. The Rohingya see themselves as
(Muslim) natives of Arakan (Rakhine), a state in Myanmar, whereas Myanmar’s
government and the majority Buddhist community sees them as Bengali Muslims from
Bangladesh who migrated there during the colonial period and continue to do so.
The Rohingyas were stripped of their Burmese nationality by the 1974 Emergency
Immigration Act and then the 1982 Citizenship Act. There are numerous restrictions on
them, including on their movement, access to the economy, education, health and other
rights. This results in their legalised persecution by the government.
Myanmar has been under severe attack from the international community in recent times for
what is being considered as ‘genocide’ against the Rohingya Muslims.
In the aftermath of the recent incidents of terrorism in the state by the Rohingya militant
group, ARSA, a fresh wave of refugees have made their way to Bangladesh and other
countries in the region
— adding to the Rohingya refugee population in these countries. Some 40,000 Rohingyas
have also found their way to India.

What has been the response of the new government in Myanmar?

There has been no change in the government’s policy towards the Rohingya community,
as positioning itself against the Buddhist majority whose leaders are vociferously anti-
Rohingya, is considered a risky political move.
Even Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Laureate who fought for decades for democracy and
reform in Myanmar, has been conspicuously quiet on the issue.

Despite the return of democracy in 2015, the military continues to have a strong hold over
the civilian government in Myanmar, especially on key issues such as defence, border
affairs and home affairs.
An Independent and Representative Advisory Commission led by former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan was allowed by the government to seek “lasting solution” to the
Rohingya crisis. This was the first time any concrete initiative was undertaken by the
Myanmar authorities after the 2012 Rakhine State riots between the Rakhine Buddhist
majority and the Rohingya Muslim minority.

How has the international community responded to the crisis?

While Human Rights Watch has called the military crackdown on Myanmar a case of ‘ethnic
cleansing,’ the UN’s office of Human Rights has declared that the crisis in the South
East Asian country ‘could tantamount to crimes against humanity’.
Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State submitted its report to the State
Counsellor and de facto Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi. The Commission, appointed
last September, strongly recommended a review of the 1982 citizenship laws and specifically
 pointed to the slow and sporadic process of citizenship verification, which has covered only
10,000 Rohingya since 2014. Suu Kyi has termed the Annan report as constructive.
The assault on the Rohingyas has also been fast gaining attention from Jihadists around the
world, making the ground ripe for extremism. The West has been particularly wary about the
possibility of a breeding ground for religious terrorism as a response to Myanmar’s brutality
and has been urging neighbouring Muslim majority countries to strongly resist the repression
of the Rohingyas.
In addition, there have been protests rallied out in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and
Bangladesh to denounce the military assault in Myanmar and the inaction of Su Kyi.
India’s Stand on the issue

India primarily considers it as an internal affair of Myanmar.

Even as Delhi has maintained a cautious stance, it has been receiving Rohingya refugees and
allowing them to settle in different parts of the country over the years particularly after the
communal violence in Rakhine state in 2012. There are approximately 40,000 Rohingya
estimated to be living across India as illegal immigrants. Even if they possess UNHCR
certificates, the government doesn’t recognise them as it is not a signatory to the Refugee
Convention. The government has a plan to deport them back to neighbouring Myanmar. The
government's plan has, however been challenged in the Supreme Court.
In the joint statement issued by India and Myanmar on Modi’s visit, the previous
formulations towards were repeated whereby India condemned the recent incidents as
terrorist attacks. It also noted that the problem in Rakhine is also one of lack of economic
development, and India has promised assistance.
Reasons behind India’s Rohingya-Myanmar policy:
Under the neighbourhood first and look East policies, Myanmar assumes a key
role to connect with southeast Asia and cut off China from the Bay of Bengal.
India’s criticism of the military junta for its suppression of the democracy
movement in the 80s and 90s had an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship for
years.
Moreover, India has real security interests too, like those concerning the Naga rebels,
which depend on the goodwill of the Myanmar regime.

With the political and military establishment in Myanmar more or less on the same page on the
Rohingya question, PM Modi’s reiteration of the Rohingya as primarily a security issue
rather than a human rights issue of a stateless and persecuted minority, was a welcome
respite to both sides of the Myanmarese leadership, beleaguered as they are by the blunt
international criticism on this front.
Meanwhile, in keeping with its Myanmar policy, at the World Parliamentary Forum on
Sustainable Development in Bali, India abstained from the Bali Declaration because of a
reference to “violence in Rakhine state”.
However, India’s security and diplomatic establishments have been concerned at events in
Myanmar since 2012 and the “disproportionate response” by the security forces since last
year, for their potential to radicalise the Rohingya.
India believes “quiet diplomacy” is its only option but is worried it will be increasingly
drawn into the situation.
Impact of Rohingya crisis on India

The issue has raised four important issues for India's consideration.
1. First, the initial stirrings of jihadi group activity is more than apparent in violence
hit areas of Myanmar. For India, the problem is that ARSA (a Rohingya militant
group responsible for the recent attacks) has a definite Pakistani link, with some
reports noting that the group may have been trained there, or even in Afghanistan.
2. The second issue for India, arises from the first. The movement of Rohingyas across
the subcontinent underlines that the community is well-networked throughout the
region. This raises serious fears about ingress of terrorists in the guise of refugees.
This trend is already apparent in Europe where Islamic State terrorists hid among
entering the continent and launch attacks in Paris that killed more than a hundred and
thirty.
3. The third issue for India is the stability of Bangladesh. Coping with nearly a
quarter of a million refugees is a difficult task for even the most advanced
economies. For Bangladesh, the human catastrophe is a nightmare.
4. The fourth issue is overall relations with Myanmar at a time when it is being wooed
by China and Russia. India has not backed the call for a Commission of Enquiry,
reasonably noting that the present Myanmar government has hardly had a year in
office and needs time to work through a problem that is more than four decades old.
China, on the other hand, has condemned the terrorist attacks, and has not hesitated
to offer mediation between Myanmar and Bangladesh. China and Russia had earlier
blocked a UN Security Council statement expressing concern at the humanitarian
crisis. Recent statements by Myanmar's officials indicate that they would be again
seeking support from these countries, as well as Turkey. With India still grappling
with north east insurgent camps based in Myanmar, the room for manoeuvre seems
limited.
On the other side, there are also factors that provide for India’s intervention in the issue:
A hefty dose of humanitarian assistance will provide the underbelly for strengthening the
much talked about "soft power" of the Indian state. Just being soft will however hardly draw
results. In the longer term, it is useful to remember that the Rakhine State was once a hub of
commercial trade with natural links to the subcontinent. At a time of a search for
connectivity across the continent, this should be a thrust for both stabilisation efforts and
commercial outreach by Indian institutions and Ministries alike.

India-Myanmar-Bangladesh Complexities

The Rohingya issue has always cast a shadow on relations between Myanmar and
Bangladesh, who share a 271-km-long border over the provinces of Chin and Rakhine.
Bangladesh has seen the influx of Rohingya refugees before, but the current numbers were
perhaps last seen only in the early 1990s and has faced the political and security fallout of the
largest influx of refugees ever since its independence.
In 1978, more than 200,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh following a security crackdown
prior to a national census. Most of them returned home after a bilateral pact was signed
under pressure from China, the US and the UN.
The Indian prime minister’s remarks during the recent visit were in line with the previous
Indian foreign policy position on the Rohingya issue – which has become so aligned with
Myanmar that India does not even use the term ‘Rohingya’.
However, Indian statements made in Myanmar – while Bangladesh had to face the
fallout of thousands of refugees across the border – led to complications.
When the Indian Prime Minister’s visit took place, the security situation was the main
focus. Since then, the number of refugees have increased at an alarmingly fast pace.
There was rising public anger in Bangladesh about India’s position which led to Dhaka’s
diplomatic overdrive because of which New Delhi had to modify its position on the
Rohingya issue, to also acknowledge that there is now a refugee crisis. Pushed by
Bangladesh, India had to ask Myanmar for “restraint” in its military operations against the
Rohingya in its Rakhine state. This was the first time that India acknowledged that there is an
ongoing refugee crisis, rather than just talk about violence perpetrated by Rohingya militants.
For the Bangladesh state, the perennial Rohingya issue is viewed through a lens of multiple
threats, as concerns over terrorism, disquiet over vulnerability to entrenchment of foreign
terror groups and domestic political equations being influenced by the Rohingya issue. There
is also a risk of merging with local populations, which poses a high degree of hidden threats
to communities.
There is also a particular belief in Bangladesh that India was “privileging” its strategic
goals in Myanmar. This is because India has been keen not to give more diplomatic capital
to China than it already has with Myanmar over the Rohingya issue. Earlier this year,
China had offered to mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh.
India was in a “catch-22 situation” on the Rohingya issue. Both Myanmar and Bangladesh
are crucial for fighting insurgency in the northeast, as well as for India’s ‘Look East’ policy
and connectivity projects. Faced with India’s support for Myanmar, Bangladesh could grow
closer to the Islamic bloc of countries.
Bangladesh’s reliance is now rather shifting towards UN, the West and Muslim members of
ASEAN.

REFUGEES IN INDIA
Refugee crises may be caused by any number of reasons but the most common, in Indian
context, are war (Bangladesh), domestic conflicts (Tibet, Sri Lanka), natural disasters
(famine), environmental displacement, human trafficking and—this one will turn up at all
our doorsteps soon—climate change.

Composition of Refugees in India

According to the UNHCR, there were 204,600 refugees, asylum seekers and “others of
concern” in India in 2011.
India is the largest refugee receiving country in South Asia. Refugee groups that have sought
asylum in India include Tibetans, the Tamil from Sri Lanka, Partition refugees from
erstwhile East and West Pakistan, the Chakmas from Bangladesh, Bhutanese refugees from
Nepal, Afghans, Rohingya and other refugees from Myanmar and refugees from Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan.
As per 2015 data:

Tibetan Sri Lankan Myanma Afghanista Other

Tamils r n Countries

100,00 73,000 16,300 13,200 2100

0

India’s policy on refugees

India is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol and does not have a
national refugee protection framework. However, it continues to grant asylum to a large
number of refugees from neighbouring States and respects UNHCR’s mandate for other
nationals, mainly from Afghanistan and Myanmar. While the Government of India deals
differently with various refugee groups, in general it respects the principle of non-
refoulement for holders of UNHCR documentation.
Since India does not have any specific laws to deal with refugees, the policy has been
traditionally based on a combination of judicial pronouncements and ad hoc executive
policies. In India, the law that deals with entry and exit of foreign nationals is the
Foreigners Act, 1946. It does not recognise refugees as a special category needing
humanitarian protection. The process of deciding who is a refugee is also unclear.
While the Indian government deals with asylum-seekers from Tibet and Sri Lanka, the
office of UNHCR in New Delhi deals with asylum-seekers from other countries.
The three principles underlying India’s treatment of refugees was spelt out in
Parliament by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959 with reference to Tibetan refugees. They
include:
refugees will be accorded a humane welcome;
the refugee issue is a bilateral issue; and
the refugees should return to their homeland once normalcy returns there.