Wave Security Network

1. Barriers
In the conditions of openness and audibility of accounting systems, sometimes it's pretty dif cult
to ensure such properties as con dentiality and anonymity. Some systems solve problems locally,
providing only properties they (and their users) need. Monero uses ring signatures and stealth
addresses to ensure the anonymity of counterparties, Bulletproofs as a range proofs mechanism
[1]. ZCash uses zkSNARKS [2]. MimbleWimble (Grin) - Pedersen commitments as well as
Schnorr's signature scheme (also along with Bulletproofs)
[3]. On the one hand, this is the good approach that allows focusing on the tasks that are relevant
to this system (not to provide technology for the sake of technology). On the other hand, there is a
lack of exibility that makes it necessary to reinvent / rebuild the necessary privacy technologies
for use in systems that do not coincide (or do not completely coincide) with listed ones.
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Thus, there are no protocols (and most importantly, ready implementations) suitable for
wider applications (not only payments), which allow exible use of uni ed approaches
to achieve certain privacy properties. Also, the implementation of such protocols on top
of existing smart contract platforms (like Ethereum) is often not an effective solution.
For example, in order to add veri cation of another signature algorithm when calling
contract methods, you need to add a special veri er function to the contract, which
spends additional (most often redundant resources) and does not eliminate the need
to use the native signature algorithm of the system to initiate an operation.
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 Wave Security Network
2. Mission
The purpose of Wave Security Network is
to shape common practices and provide
versatile tools for various privacy options in
the bounds of one platform.
That is, Wave Security is both a platform
for building decentralized applications with
privacy options, and at the same time a
framework for building similar private
systems (but potentially with narrower
case).

Private Solutions
As a native currency in the Wave Security Network platform
WSN token is used. It’s designed for:

- Payments between counterparties;

- Stacking for delegates and forming validators set;
- Payments for contracts execution;
- Payments for cryptographic options usage;
- Payments for decentralized store usage;
- Voting for the protocol rules changing.
3. Piece Of Tech
3.1 Basic Ingredients

3.1.1 More Built-in Crypto Options

Most often, accounting systems are limited to one basic elliptic curve on which their
cryptography works and most often use one digital signature algorithm. This approach greatly
limits the possibilities of developing solutions on top of such systems (there are ring, group,
threshold, blind, proxy signatures, etc., and each type allows you to provide some properties that
cannot be provided by others).
Moreover, users cannot choose the appropriate level of security for themselves, which they
consider necessary: there are users who consider Schnorr signatures to be more secure than
ECDSA (due to provably secure construction) or that secp256r1 is more reliable than secp256k1
(because NIST recommends). Or the followers of the theory that after the creation of a quantum
computer, all modern cryptography can be broken. Each user has their own opinion. Moreover,
various accounting systems compete with each other regarding the above indicators.
Wave Security Network is trying to reverse this paradigm.
By default, the system supports:
- ECC: secp256v1 / r1, secp384v1 and ec25519 curves.
- Signature algorithms: ECDSA, EDDSA, Schnorr and SPHINCS+ schemes
- Hash functions: SHA-256, SHA-512 and SCRYPT.
- Encryption algorithms: AES-256(GSM mode).
The list of these parameters can be expanded in the future
if supported by the community.
 3.1.2 Accounts In Wave Security Network
Each user can have an unlimited number of accounts in the system. The account
identi er is the public key with which this account is managed.
By default, accounts are not linked to each other. But at the same time, it is possible to
link them together - the user can create two key pairs and form a linking transaction
(the transaction must be signed using both keys). Then all counterparties who know one
of the user's public keys will automatically learn about his other keys and can use them.
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On the one hand, this allows you to
organize convenient addressing - like a Associarion PK1 with PK2

contact book, which is automatically

Alice
updated in case of a bunch of accounts
by your counterparty. On the other Timeline

hand, the optionality of this

functionality allows providing a higher PK1 PK2
gen PK provinding gen Blinding tx
Bob SK1 SK2
level of privacy to users who need it.
3.1.3 Transactions And Operations
There are no fundamental differences
between transactions and operations in
Wave Security Network from other systems,
except that they can be signed using any
algorithms that are supported by the
system. At the same time, some
transactions or methods of smart contracts
can be limited in advance by the available
set of signatures for use.
3.1.4 Consensus Algorithm
To reach consensus, Wave Security Network
uses the DPoS algorithm. This allows for
high throughput of the system and the
achievement of history irreversibility.
Initially, it is planned to support the network
by 21 validators (which are selected by
delegating the stake), after which their set
can be expanded if the community makes a
decision.
3.1.5 Privacy Techniques
3.1.5.1 Pedersen Commitments 1
3

Pedersen's commitment is one of the most used Commit Verification

?
C = r*G+v*H
commitment schemes for zero knowledge proofs.
Alice Commitement C Bob
The main task of commitments is to establish
some value, while ensuring its con dentiality 2

from other parties to the protocol (there is no Reveal (r,v)

possibility of changing the statement after

sending the commitment)
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3.1.5.2 Stealth Addresses

The main purpose of stealth addresses is to hide the recipient of coins, tokens, data, etc. The
main idea is that the sender can generate a one-time address that cannot be associated with the
recipient's public key / address, but only the recipient can spend funds from such an address.
It is planned to add ISAP [5] and tx

DKSAP [6] schemes as a OTKs Platform

Alice
reference implementation.
ISAP is a simpler scheme that
does not impose additional tx

requirements on users - the

Carol Dave
recipient needs to have only one
key pair, based on the public key of
which a stealth address can be Untraceability

generated. tx
Bob
Alice Accounting system Bob
But in this case, the user needs to
r < - random b - secret keys
R = r*G B - public keys
use his own private key to search
for transactions that relate to him,
and this is not the safest and most
c = H (r*B)
convenient approach (the user must
be guaranteed to trust the owner of
Transaction
address: c*G+B for each tx
the auditor node or raise his own).
c = H (b*R)
?
Sign Therefore, the second option is to
address= c*G+B with c+z
use the DKSAP algorithm.
 Alice Accounting system Bob

This approach allows the use of a r < - random b, z - secret keys

R = r*G B, Z - public keys
search key to validate all
transactions. At the same time,
you can delegate this secret to c = H (r*B)

another party, which will be able to

parse the belonging accounts, but Transaction
address: c*G+Z
at the same time cannot take for each tx
c = H (b*R) Sign
possession of the coins. ?
address= c*G+Z with c+z
3.2 Signatures
In addition to the simplest option, which involves signing a transaction with a single key
(as in the majority of accounting systems), Wave Security Network supports the following
types of signatures by default.

3.2.1 Multisignatures
In this case, it is worth distinguishing between 3 types of multisignatures. The rst type
is classic - the use of one type of signature and several keys to calculate the signature of
a transaction (like a multisignature in Bitcoin). In this case, the transaction contains a
set of signatures and a set of public keys with which they must be veri ed.

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 tx tx
Body
Body

Sig1 pk1

Multisig
Sigaggr pkaggr

Multisig
The second type is multisignature with support Sig2 pk2

for public key aggregation and signature value. Sig3 pk3

This is how Schnorr signatures work. Regardless … …

of the number of signers, the transaction will

Agregation
contain only one (aggregated) value of the pk1, pk2, pk3…
pk1, pk2, pk3…
public key and signature. The same signature algorithm Union multisig with aggregation supporting

The third type is multisignatures, which contain tx

signatures computed using various algorithms. Body

That is, in fact, you can lock the possibility of SigECDSA pkECDSA
initiating an action between users who use

Multisig
SigSchnorr pkSchnorr
various signature algorithms. In this way, for … …
example, swaps can be implemented.

pk1, pk2, pk3…

Different signature algorithms
3.2.2 Ring Signatures
Ring signatures provide anonymity for the signer of a transaction. This can be
used to anonymize the sender of the payment, vote, etc. As a reference
implementation, Wave Security Network will support simpli ed traceable ring
signatures [7] for all supported curves.

3.2.3 One-time Signatures

Wave Security Network will implement OTS [8] and WOTS[9] schemes for one-
time signatures. These signatures are the basic primitives for implementing post
quantum hash-based signature algorithms. In the future, it is planned to add
HORS [10] and HORST [11] algorithms to expand the functionality and the list of
available post-quantum hash-based algorithms.

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 3.2.4 Post-quantum Signature Algorithms
The SPHINCS+ [12] digital signature algorithm, submitted to the NIST post-
quantum crypto project [13], will act as the initial implementation of post-quantum
cryptography algorithms (the algorithm proved to be quite good at all stages of the
competition). Also, due to the basic cryptographic protocols embedded in Wave
Security Network, this algorithm can be quickly and ef ciently implemented.

3.2.5 Future
The community will be responsible for managing the system. The community can
expand the list of supported hash functions, encryption algorithms, signatures
(including types of signatures such as adding proxies, threshold or blind signatures),
and the algorithms that are based on them.
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 3.3 Zero Knowledge Proofs
Naturally, one of the most demanded
mechanisms for ensuring privacy is zero
knowledge proofs. The most common cases are
range proofs and proofs of the occurrence of
certain data in the general set. However, the key
challenge for Wave Security Network is to provide
tools that are potentially suitable for any use
case. Therefore, one of the rst such tools will be
Bulletproofs [14] and Merkle Trees [15]. In the
future, the project community will work to provide
tools for narrower cases with the aim of usability
and optimization of the required resources.
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3.4 Decentralized Store
Wave Security Network also supports
decentralized storage. It will be based on
IPFS [16]. Each validator, together with the
system node, will have to raise the IPFS
network node and store additional data
( les, media data, calculation results, etc.).
The storage of such data will be paid
separately by the users for the period of their
storage. To prove that the data itself is really
stored by validators, the latter will publish
the corresponding proofs to the system.
4. Bridges
5. Operations
Providing the functionality described above on
top of smart contracts in Ethereum is quite and Contracts
problematic and much less ef cient than in
Another distinctive feature of Wave Security
Wave Security Network (including due to the
Network is the constant preset cost for using
size of current fees). However, at the same
cryptographic primitives supported by the
time, it should be possible to transfer the
system. All other contract logic is calculated in
assets created in ProjectX to other public
the same way as in other contract platforms.
networks. For this, Wave Security Network
Such an element motivates users to use built-in
implies the presence of native bridges for cryptographic mechanisms, which are much
ERC20 and ERC721 tokens on Ethereum and cheaper than in similar platforms. The cost of
Flow. Thus, tokens with privacy options can be using various operations can be changed by the
created inside Project and, if necessary, community.
transferred to other systems.
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6. Use Cases
Wave Security Network is designed for building solutions for:
- Ensuring the con dentiality of data transferred between
counterparties and their integrity at the blockchain level;
- Ensuring the anonymity of the sender / receiver of off-chain data with the ability to add tags
to the chain, allowing counterparties to learn about the events associated with their sending;
- Ensuring the con dentiality of transfer amounts with protection
against double-spending attacks;
- Ensuring the anonymity of the sender / recipient of the NFT;
- Decentralized applications with privacy requirements: voting
systems, registries, etc.
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7. Roadmap
 - 3 Managers

- 14 Software Enineers
& DLT Experts
8. Team
- 3 Designers

- 2 Biz Dev &

Communication
9. References
[1] https://www.getmonero.org/
[2] https://z.cash/
[3] https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin
[4] https://web.archive.org/web/20170811001441/
https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/201.pdf
[5] https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/
msg03613.html
[6] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.00951.pdf
[7] Fujisaki, E., and K. Suzuki, "Traceable Ring Signature", 2007
[8] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/constructing- digital-
signatures-one-way-function/
9. References
[9] Chris Dods, Nigel Smart, and Martijn Stam. Hash based digital signature schemes. In
Cryptography and Coding, pages 96–115. Springer Verlag LNCS 3796, November 2005.
[10] https://www.cs.bu.edu/~reyzin/papers/one-time-sigs.pdf
[11] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/933.pdf
[12] https://sphincs.org/data/sphincs+-paper.pdf
[13] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
[14] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1066.pdf
[15] Merkle, R. C. (1988). "A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption
Function". Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '87. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
293. pp. 369–378. doi:10.1007/3-540-48184-2_32. ISBN 978-3-540-18796-7.
[16] https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmV9tSDx9UiPeWExXEeH6aoDvmihvx6jD5eLb4jbTaKGps