Case Study

When Integration Goes Wrong: Learning from the

Mistakes of Practitioners
M. S. Uihlein, P.E., M.ASCE1

Abstract: This paper presents the results of research that was conducted by interviewing architects and structural engineering practitioners to
find more specificity on the topic of integration among the two fields. The responses analyzed here are those that portray the undesirable inte-
gration missteps. The results yield a framing of integration that is narrower than one might expect. Two areas of poor integration identified by
architects give particular insight into the structural engineering and architecture relationship: the improper intellectual framing of the project
and the perceived conservatism of the engineer. For engineers, the responses centered on the failure of the regular interactions of the professio-
nals and the lack of architectural leadership. Beyond the profession-specific themes, a comparison of the responses from all practitioners shows
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that integration lapses happen when the structure itself is too large or a lack of foresight causes errors to arise during construction. The opportu-
nity to review and criticize examples of bad integration, especially when contrasted with positive definitions, demonstrates that integration is
multifaceted. Small process-based missteps can color the way a practitioner views the success of integration in a project or work methodology.
In comparison to positive examples of integration, which include hope, aspiration, and aims, negative factors show that, along with the ideals,
the daily working relationship between the architect and engineer is equally important. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)AE.1943-5568.0000207.
© 2016 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Architecture; Integrated systems; Integration; Professional practice; Structural engineers.

Introduction
Integration, integrated teams, and collaboration are frequent goals in
today’s practice. Integration, for example, is a goal of such organiza-
tions as the American Institute of Architects (AIA), ASCE, and the
Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. (AGC) (AIA 2007;
ASCE 2007; NASFA et al. 2010). However, the terms are not pre-
cisely understood or delineated. A research study was conducted
with architectural and structural engineering practitioners to find
more specificity on the topic. There are many fields that contribute
to integration, and by focusing on two of them, a particular language
can be studied to gain new insights into integrated practices among
these professionals. Based on the assumption that practitioners are
knowledgeable about their experiences, structural engineers and
architects were interviewed to find characteristics of their integra-
tive work. In the interviews, both positive and negative examples
of integration were requested. The responses analyzed here are
those that portray the undesirable integration missteps. The reflec-
tions of the architects and structural engineers, analyzed separately,
demonstrate incidents of commonality—such as weaknesses in con-
struction knowledge and in critiquing traits of the others’ professions.
Differences did arise, with structural engineers citing poor daily inter-
actions as a contributing factor to poor integration, and architects
identifying the intellectual approach toward the structure within a pro-
ject as a potential problem. Taken together, the exploration of the
1
Assistant Professor, School of Architecture, Univ. of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, 117 Temple Buell Hall, 611 Lorado Taft Drive,
Champaign, IL 61820. e-mail: muihlein@illinois.edu
Note. This manuscript was submitted on June 24, 2015; approved on
November 24, 2015; published online on January 20, 2016. Discussion pe-
riod open until June 20, 2016; separate discussions must be submitted for
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Architectural
Engineering, © ASCE, ISSN 1076-0431.
negative incidents yields some insight into integration, where barriers
appear to exist, and areas for further research.
Integration Sources
The literature on integration comes from a mixture of practice docu-
ments, professional publications, and scholarly research. Most, how-
ever, do not specifically concentrate on structure and architecture or
the structural engineer and architect relationship. The need for and
elaboration of integrated building systems design comes from two
architectural sources: The Building Systems Integration Handbook,
and the more architectural Integrated Buildings: The Systems Basis
of Architecture (Bachman 2003; Rush 1986). These comprehensive
studies of multiple systems identify structure as a major component
of an integrated building, and the analysis of structure highlights its
load-carrying demands. Integrated Project Delivery: A Guide is the
introductory manual to a recently introduced project delivery or pro-
curement system developed by the AIA (2007). The document’s em-
phasis is on the importance of process in the creation of an integrated
building with the architect, the owner, and the contractor installed as
the leadership team of a project, pulling both the owner and contrac-
tor into the design activities. An improvement over the traditional
design methodology of “throw the drawing over the wall” of design
–bid–build (Elvin 2010), integrated project delivery (IPD) raises
issues of decision making, inclusion, and professional trust. What it
does not explicitly do, however, is bring forward the contributions of
engineers, who are relegated to being key supporting members.
Integrated design is supported as a way to add value to a project by
the ASCE in Quality in the Constructed Project: A Guide for
Owners, Designers, and Constructors, although few specifics are
provided beyond determining the appropriate design goals for the
team (ASCE 2012). Looking toward other engineering sources, the
American professional organization for building service engineers,
the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning

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J. Archit. Eng. 2016.22.

 Engineers (ASHRAE), has a technical committee, issues publications,
and offers professional development seminars on the topic of integrated
building design (ASHRAE 2013a, b; ASHRAE and IESNA 2011).
These efforts demonstrate an organizational dedication to the topic and
public commitment to teaching their professional members how to act on
these standards. The Structural Engineering Institute, the Council of
American Structural Engineers, and National Council of Structural
Engineering Associations do not yet have equivalent publication types.
Research on integration can be underscored by three examples,
each of which uses a similar methodology to this paper—interviewing.
Griffin et al. (2010) consider the barriers to the use of sustainable
structural materials. Although the focus is on implementation and
adoption of these materials in practice, the work identifies the im-
portance of research on nontechnical barriers in design practices.
Kim and Dossick (2011) delineate five elements that contributed to
the project delivery of their case study: project culture, team orga-
nization, adoption of lean principles, the use building information
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modeling, and the contractual agreement among team members.
Another finding was that, whereas these five parts created success,
the interrelation of the factors was equally significant. Baiden et al.
(2006) list the 10 components of an integrated team, including “eq-
uitable team relationships and respect for all” and “unrestricted
cross-sharing of information.” Interestingly, the teams that were
identified as performing integrative work did not have all 10 com-
ponents, but only some of them. Nevertheless, team integration
occurred. This research team concludes that larger practice struc-
tures would need to change to remove “existing organizational and
behavioral barriers” for continued improvement of the industry as
a whole. When examined as a group, these three studies support
the chosen methodology of interviewing to gain access to specifics
of this topic. As Griffin et al. (2010) stated, “Without the use of
interviews, authors describe the problems that might exist rather
than barriers that actually existed.” These three articles also con-
firm that communication, relationships, and access to information
are essential components of integrated design, with structural engi-
neers and architects as part of the teams that do that work.
Perhaps the best source or taxonomy for the pulling together of
structure and architecture comes from the aptly named Structure as
Architecture: A Source Book for Architects and Structural
Engineers (Charleson 2015). Providing examples, case studies, and
categorizations, the book is intended to inform architects about the
potential for the architectural use of structure and to open the eyes
of engineers to other priorities to be included in structural design.
The participation of structure in building form, structural detailing,
and structure as an expression of architectural concepts are all
addressed. The work not only introduces structural integration, but
also provides a depth to the subject that does not exist elsewhere.
Although the intent of Charleson’s book is to attract and educate
practitioners on the subject, the needed day-to-day interactions that
make integrated design happen are not explored. Therefore, the
existing sources provide encouragement to do integrated design,
process steps for architects but not engineers, requirements for inte-
grated project teams, or architectural vocabulary for structure. What
appears to be missing is a detailed examination of how structural
engineers and architects work together or, what barriers prevent
them from doing so. The topic can best be explored from the differ-
ing perspectives of the two professions and the subtleties identified
by using a qualitative approach to the research.
Defining Integration
A large amount of data were collected in this study, making it neces-
sary to segment the findings. Previously published work found that
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participants were more forthcoming when asked to provide positive
examples and were more ambitious with how they defined success
(Uihlein 2014, 2015). Both professions desired an open, inclusive
process in which each professional was able to contribute to the
ideas and discussion. A trusting relationship was found to be needed
for this type of partnering, and coincides with known characteristics
of integrated teams. How the architect and structural engineer devel-
oped, studied, and designed the final project was as important as the
finished building. Both professionals understood that an integrated
structure was one that was often exposed to view and designed with
intentionality toward the structure. The ultimate integration was
when structure and architecture were merged or inseparably inter-
twined, and this was often mentioned as a goal, yet was difficult to
achieve. Similarly, when describing positive instances, structural
engineers and architects spoke of the substantial goals of integration
that ran the gamut from solving technical challenges to using struc-
ture to support the architectural design, or from creating multiple
uses for structure to seeing structure as one of the integral pieces in a
holistic project. The common theme is that the two professions saw
that integration was a complex skill, an aspiration, and an endeavor
for which one strove—not easily obtainable, but a worthy achievement.
In contrast to the responses to the question seeking positive
examples, the answers providing negative examples seem smaller
and less principled. This supports the notion that, similar to archi-
tecture, where examples of the best of the profession have been ti-
tled “architecture with a capital A,” integration has its idealistic
form in its more common application. Therefore, integration with a
capital I is partly based on an aspirational level of design work with
a sophisticated synthesis of disciplinary goals. At the same time,
there was concurrently a blurring of the meaning of integration and
coordination, which is not surprising given that there are not univer-
sally accepted definitions of the two terms. For the purpose of this
paper, integration is the merging of two or more disciplines to create
a greater whole. Coordination is ensuring that multiple building
components do not conflict or interfere with each other, the use of
space, or the function of the building technology. Upon combining
the positive and negative aspects of the two interpretations, integra-
tion becomes the merger of the imagination of the ideal, the abilities
of the professionals to join a collaborative process, and the practi-
cality of construction.
Methodology
The study relied on a series of focused interviews conducted with a
total of 84 structural engineering and architectural practitioners,
with 46 and 38 professionals in the respective professions. The
research was limited to these two professions, even though multiple
disciplines are needed for a whole building. Each field has a unique
discipline and relationship with architecture, and the study was con-
ducted not to falsely limit integration, but rather to find precise traits
that occur between architecture and building structure. The partici-
pants came from four cities: San Francisco, New York, Los
Angeles, and Chicago. The professionals were initially identified
through their project work or from their firm’s approach to integra-
tion. Other participants were added as recommendations were
given. The average number of years in practice was 21, with experi-
ence needed in the interaction between the two fields. At the time of
the study, the practitioners worked in a range of firms: small (1–9
employees), medium (10–49), and large (50þ). A majority of prac-
titioners came from larger firms, and the least amount came from
the smaller firms. The focused interviews used a script and allowed
for questioning to flow with the experience of the practitioners
(Zeisel 2006). The result was more than 50 h of interviews, resulting
J. Archit. Eng.
 in over 500 transcribed pages. The interview questions ranged from
basic information about the individual or firm to questions about the
inclusion of structure in the design process. Integration was
addressed by asking the practitioners to provide examples, both pos-
itive and negative, from their work. Participants and their quotes are
identified by a number to keep promised anonymity. For example, a
quote or idea from an architect might be labeled “Architect 58” or
abbreviated A#58. Structural engineers are identified by an “E.”
The analysis of the data was supported by the use of a qualitative
analysis software package that enabled the responses to be coded
and compiled. Axial coding was used to conduct an inductive,
grounded approach of investigation (Corbin and Strauss 1990;
Groat and Wang 2002; Seidman 1991). Smaller categories, such as
construction, time, or exposed structure, were identified. These sub-
themes were then collected together to create larger themes. Memos
or brief paragraphs were written to test and define the themes, often
being rewritten to refine the understanding of each. The themes
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were then compiled to create a more detailed articulation of the inte-
gration between architecture and structure.
The findings presented here come from the negative examples of
integration. The responses from the participants generally tend to ei-
ther an initial circumspective view that something does not get inte-
grated on every project, or the defensive answer that poor integra-
tion does not happen on their projects, and if it does, then it does not
harm the overall project. Practitioners were resistant or hesitant to
the question itself, which asked for negative examples of integra-
tion. Although the inquiry was asked in a manner to give the practi-
tioners room to answer without assigning blame, the starting lan-
guage used (“please provide an example”) often needed to be
followed by asking the practitioners to provide instances or details
when poor integration occurred. Even with the additional probing,
some participants declined to discuss or remember moments when
integration did not occur. Although some practitioners were willing
to share their experiences, the tone of many of the responses indi-
cated that the examples demonstrated issues of inadequate coordi-
nation rather than a failure to integrate, as shown later. In other
words, on the whole, their projects were integrated through the mul-
tiple disciplines working together, but some items had been missed
during the design process, such as a discussion of the finish quality
of an exposed structural steel connection.
Architectural Perspectives
Comments by architectural practitioners included self-reflection
and direct criticism of their structural engineering partners. There
were instances of common themes, such as data not being provided
in a timely manner (A#74) or team members not listening to each
other (A#5). Also, the issue of willingness to support integration
was raised. If the owner or various project participants were not
interested in investing in an integrated design—financially or con-
ceptually—then the project would not be integrated (A#30, A#58).
The will of the architect could not obtain a larger budget or the skill
sets needed once the team had been decided. Through the architec-
tural practitioners’ responses, two specific areas of poor integration
yielded particular insight into the structural engineering and archi-
tectural relationship: the intellectual framing of the project, and the
perceived conservatism of the engineer.
Framing the Structure
From the start of the project, if the architect and engineer do not
frame their approach to building structure similarly, integration is
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J. Archit. Eng. 2016.22.
more difficult to achieve. For example, in one project, the architect
had established a clear geometry for the form, but the structural
engineer provided an organization pattern to the structure that
ignored the architect’s geometry. In the end, a hybrid system had to
be developed, but the structure was viewed not only as out of line
with the project, but more costly and difficult to construct. Architect
5 evaluated this experience:
And that was a project where we did not have a bad engineer,
we had a good engineer … and he did a great job and we
have a great building but I thought there were a few things
that could have been done … that could have been much
more fulfilling …
It was not that the engineer did not have the skill, or that the pro-
ject was terrible. The struggle that occurred, caused by the disso-
nance in the conceptualization of the structure, hampered the ability
to do integrative work, and potentially harmed the project fiscally.
On another occasion, the architect knew that structure was needed,
but failed to consider it at all. Structure was an afterthought,
although it inevitably had to be incorporated, almost forcibly so.
Architect 54 commented on one such experience. Here, structure
was not a driver of the design, and was only viewed functionally:
I think [an example of poor integration was] where structure
is maybe not as important, if it’s just an office tower and
you’re trying to hide the structure, you can’t really hide the
structure. So I think there’s a lot of times where we don’t
take it into consideration—you know [we] sell a concept of
a floating box in the middle of space. It never works out that
way. We try to hide it as long as it can, but it doesn’t work.
In this case, there was acknowledgment of the structure, but not
the will to integrate it. When this participant used the word hide, it
meant literally concealing the structure, but also could be interpreted
as hiding from the actuality of it. Because the architect was grudg-
ingly forced to confront structure at later stages, rather than incorpo-
rate structural ideas from the beginning, the incorporation of the
structure became unpleasant. This example also illustrates the di-
chotomy between an architectural vision and the technology needed
to construct a building. Floating boxes, where the structure carries
load and recedes in the background, have been built, but only after
careful consideration of the size, color, and location of building structure.
In each of these examples of structural integration, missteps hap-
pened because the architect and structural engineers were out of
sync. The engineer did not understand the architectural intent for the
structure, did not receive an elaboration, or did not determine the
priorities for the project. The result was that the architectural geo-
metric moves were not a regulating parameter for the engineer. In
contrast, when the architect ignored the structure, no space was pro-
vided in the process for the architect and engineer to jointly define
the structure. For the architect, the building structure was not recog-
nized as impacting the architectural design until it became a prob-
lem, and yet the engineer continued to design a structural system for
the project. The architect and structural engineer may work in isola-
tion, or the architect may view the structure as a necessary burden.
The intent of the structure was not discussed, nor was a framework
of its inclusion decided together. The separation between the two
professionals led to an incongruence between the systems.
Structural Engineers and Conservatism
Architectural practitioners repeatedly critiqued the conservatism and
conventionality of the structural engineer. The design approach of
the engineer was noted as preventing the integration of architecture
J. Archit. Eng.
 and structure (A#5, A#10, A#57). When an engineer was described
as conservative, this applied to the members they sized and their
work methodologies. Architects found that an engineer’s considera-
tion of a project could be based on a predefined work methodology.
Engineers suggested solutions that were familiar to them and resisted
exploration. Integrated structural design requires a uniting of archi-
tecture and engineering through the combining of skills of the profes-
sionals. Poor integration results occurred when engineers refused to
move from their tried and true or conventional solutions. Architect
#8 phrased it this way: “… what is most frustrating … is [the engineer
saying] ‘I have been doing this for thirty years—this is the way you
do it.’” The architect was reacting to the engineer’s insistence that
there was only one proper solution when alternatives clearly existed,
and simultaneously recognizing that the architect’s own suggestions
were not being taking seriously. In each case, the engineer’s
approach was preventing a more integrative project. The reflections
of the architectural practitioners also suggested that engineers were
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using prescriptive methodologies, and this type of design, where one
reads values from a table to size members, was viewed as limiting
more refinement than performative analytics (A#8). Architects
attributed conservatism to the engineer who only wanted to design
something once, or to an engineering practitioner who did not have
the technical skills needed for the project. Both of these causes can be
tied to the perception of the low level of engineering fees.
Architects additionally shed light on a familiar phrase and the
belief by architects that they have to push the engineer (A#8,
A#57, A#63). Engineers, architectural participants noticed, were
reticent and had to be put under pressure from the architect for the
engineering solutions to come in line with the project. A clear use
of this idea comes from Architect 8, reflecting on an example in
which integrative results could have been better: “… we mostly
just realized after the fact that we did not push the structural engi-
neer hard enough to reduce the size of the stuff.” The correct design
was intuitively possible and had been achieved on previous proj-
ects, and part of this architect’s methodology was to lean on the
engineer to get the desired results. The architectural participants in
this study confirmed that this belief is present in practice. Overall,
the analysis by the architectural profession and the need for archi-
tects to insert themselves into the engineering design process are a
response to the underlying issue of professional trust. Architects
push or lean on the structural engineer because they do not trust
that the engineer is providing the most accurate member design, or
that the engineer has the best interest of the project in mind.
Structural Engineering Perspectives
For the structural engineers, it was not necessarily the ideals of inte-
gration, but the nitty-gritty of daily work that led to integration fail-
ures. The noted mistakes were not focused on the conceptualization,
but actualization. When engineering participants spoke of positive
examples of their work, they invoked the more ambitious definition
of integration, including their aspirations for an integrated project.
With the problems, engineering respondents leaned toward the
more practical meaning of coordination. Issues of cost and time
were noted where the design information came from the architect
too late for the engineers to thoroughly incorporate (E#09, E#31,
E#90). An obvious failure of integration was the observed exclusion
of the engineer, where the design was not flexible and the structure
had to be made to work or forced into it (E#44, E#49, E#52). For
those projects where integration was a priority, more frequent
results focused on the failure of the regular interactions of the pro-
fessionals and the lack of architectural leadership.
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Quotidian Communication
Daily interactions between architects and engineers were described
as key causes of poor integration, which might be a result of some-
thing as broad as the relationship itself or unspoken expectations.
For example, an architectural/engineering relationship hiccup could
be caused by a mismatch of team members. Individually, each pro-
fessional is competent and eager to participate, but the personal dy-
namics meant that they were not able to communicate with each
other and mishaps were common (E#2). In the worst cases, relation-
ships deteriorated into boxing or screaming matches with no one on
the team wanting to work together (E#2). Ordinary communication
problems, such as sharing information or delivering promised work,
were exacerbated by the atmosphere under which these daily inter-
actions occurred. The emphasis here is that engineers viewed every-
day interactions as having a significant cumulative impact.
Engineers noted that poor integration could also result from pre-
sumed assumptions or reluctant acceptance of one party by the other
without thorough communication on the subject. The deciding fac-
tors or concerns went without elaboration. Engineer 13 relayed an
instance of a column that was ultimately intrusive. The column was
proposed by the engineer, and the architect included it in the plans.
In this case, the engineer was not challenged and the column was
used. Engineer 13’s reflections on this result were as follows:
I think that there are too many times where [engineers] put
out an idea that we think is needed structurally and we think
that the architect’s acceptance of that is appreciating it,
when in fact they have sort of given up …Very often when
an engineer gets frustrated with a job and they start going
back and forth with an architect, I will say to them “Be
careful that you have not just beaten them into submission”
because they will come to me and say “see they accepted it,
it is fine, and everything is going to work out.” It is not just
about business—it is about relationships.
The engineer in question believed that the column location
was reviewed and found acceptable by the architect. The architect
understood that that precise location was absolutely needed. The
result was a product that everyone found unpalatable. Although
the column location was desirable for structural reasons, it was
not for the larger picture, and alternative locations for the column
may have been acceptable structurally. The causal factor was that
a thorough investigation did not occur as a result of incorrect
assumptions made about each other’s conclusions. At the same
time, the architect had placed trust with the engineer, assuming
that the engineer knew the larger architectural picture and all
options had been exhausted. Although unintentional, during their
daily interactions, the architect and the engineer did not consider,
discuss, or examine the column from a combined viewpoint. In
this instance, the communications were hampered not by an initial
bad professional relationship, but by tacit agreement of the exper-
tise of the engineer. The engineer’s standing was used to reinforce
a purely structural solution, and the architect yielded to the engi-
neer. The two individuals missed the opportunity to integrate, and
the professional relationship, which is valued by engineers, was
subsequently strained.
Absent Leadership
The critique of the architect as the prime professional was observed
by structural engineers and cited as harming the overall quality of a
project. It was noted that, at times, the project architect did not have
the skills to lead, be they technical, design, or multidisciplinary.
J. Archit. Eng.
 Overall weak leadership meant that decisions were not made in a
timely fashion (E#42), decisions were changed frequently (E#90),
or that the decision-making responsibility was abdicated with the
team left to flounder (E#85). The realization of the architectural
design was made more difficult because architects did not under-
stand the technical requirements, and perhaps caused problems
rather than facilitating a solution. For example, building forms were
created without knowledge of the movement of the loads through a
building; the necessary structure then conflicted with the use of the
space below (E#62). Another striking example went back to the de-
velopment of the conceptual design for several buildings, where the
failure to comprehend the implications of design choices occurred.
Inherent in this work was the establishment of building massing and
floor-to-floor heights. Without engineering input or the knowledge
of building systems, the architect’s design left the structural team
with 50.8 mm (2 in.) for their members (E#51). From the start, the
design team was left in an untenable situation by the architect as a
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result of a lack of knowledge of the systems needed.
Engineers also noted that mistakes happened when architects
did not see integration as a priority. Although necessary for any
building, there were times when even basic coordination by the
architect did not happen. Engineer 44 expressed frustration in one
such project:
[It was] an issue based on the associate architect not wanting
to dive into the problem and just said, “You have to make this
work,” and then [the architect] went away for nine months.
The engineering team was relying on the architect to take control
of the situation, and to use his or her influence as contractual head
of the project. Instead, multiple engineers were left to try and find a
solution without any architectural input on this aspect of the build-
ing project. In another instance, coordination did not occur within
the design team, and then the general contractor passed the problem
down to the subcontractor (E#86). Architects were viewed by the
engineers as the originators of the building design and the ones to
ensure that the entire project comes together. In all of these
examples, the architect was missing in this crucial role. The
underlying connotation was that no one was piloting the project.
An integrated solution requires an exchange of ideas as well as
the commitment and the know-how to implement these combined
intentions. When the architectural leadership was deficient or
absent, whether in pulling together the team members or building
systems, the basic level of coordination may not have occurred
and integration was an impossibility.
Joint Areas of Concern
Beyond the profession-specific themes, a comparison of the
responses from all practitioners finds that there are common areas
where integration lapses happen. Architects and engineers agreed
that there were occasions when the structure itself was too large or a
lack of foresight caused errors to arise during construction. These
shared categories were interpreted through the lens of each
profession.
Bulky Structure
For architects, conservative engineers were blamed for making
structure overly complex or for failing to simplify the system. Size
implications referred to members and connection details being out
of proportion within a particular room, space, or building (A#8,
A#54, A#63). Terms like large, overwrought, and humongous were
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used. The impact of the larger structural members was recognized
not only by the architects, where it was noticeable in the articulation
of their architectural design, but also by owners. Architect #67
described one difficult conversation:
[We are] asked to respect what an engineer does to a
project and the burdens that they carry in terms of
keeping the building up and how safe and secure it has
got to be … but I’ve been put in situations where a client
has driven me to a competitor’s project and brought back
to our project and [the owner] said, “You’ve built me a
nuclear reactor.”
A comparable project was used by the architect’s client to demon-
strate that different options were available for the size of the struc-
tural system. The quote also raised the issue of risk, the responsibility
of the engineer to design a robust and safe structure, and trust, where
the architect is continually being asked to place faith in the engineer
as a professional. Much like the owner/architect relationship, the
structural engineer was viewed as having an expert status where the
architect does not, and the architect must have faith that the engineer
will honor this professional responsibility by serving the best needs
of the architect. When it came to sizing members for a particular ar-
chitectural vision, Architect 67 felt that the structural engineer had
taken advantage of his or her position to oversize the members. The
sizing of the members was noted as part of the substantial risk the
engineers undertake, but the actuality of the constructed member was
judged in the context of the current project and other similar projects.
Large and conservative sizing could easily be seen by the architects
and, as indicated earlier, the owner.
The engineers noted, just as the architectural respondents had,
that there were times when they had obtained the wrong size in
terms of scale and use. When this happened, the engineering
respondents regretted the interference of the structure in the
space, and the distraction from the whole that the structure
caused. These types of realizations happened when they walked
into a building they had designed. Engineer 23 reacted to such an
occurrence with, “Uh, this is a little heavy…What could I have
done to make this look less heavy?” The exposed structure was
perceived and experienced by the engineer, who judged it as too
prominent and too dominant. Questions were raised about the use
of color, the length-to-width ratio of the room, and how the engi-
neer could have refined the work and calculations. Engineers also
recognized that details could be too large, heavy, or even ugly.
Structure that was too large or out of place signified to both the
architect and engineer that the requisite refinement had not
occurred.
Construction Surprises
Architectural and structural conflict occurred when team mem-
bers did not understand the entire conditions of the construction.
The problems arose when the building structure was not under-
stood in toto; the finish quality was not specified, or drawings
(design and shop) were found to be unaligned. In the first
instance, architects were surprised by the discovery of structural
members in unexpected places (A#10) or with the finished
appearance of the structure (A#3). The use of the kickers, diago-
nal structural bracing members, was called out on the structural
drawings as part of a typical condition. The architects did not
fully comprehend the use of the kickers in the structural drawings,
and the engineer did not alert the architect of their location.
Although this project was highly integrative in other aspects, the
placement and use of the kickers had gone unnoticed by both
J. Archit. Eng.
 teams (A#10). Engineers have also been caught off guard by the
requirements for the finished structure. In one extreme instance, a
gusset plate connecting two seismic braces ended up being taller
than the engineer making the site visit (E#39). In addition to
appearing excessive, the gusset plate interfered with the routing
of other building services and could be seen from the exterior. No
one, primarily the engineer, had reviewed the structural detail
that correlated plate sizes with the size of the braces to antici-
pate the finished dimensions, nor does it appear that the size of
the gusset plate was caught on the review of the shop drawings
by either discipline. In these two examples, a general condition
had been used appropriately by the contractor, although neither
professional had recognized when it would be triggered. For
structure and architecture to be coordinated or integrated in the
built form, an awareness of the structure in its complete three-
dimensional configuration is needed, including that called out
by typical details.
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The final condition of the details was often noted as a place
where integrated ideas fell short of being manifested. Architectural
participants pointed out that they had not known to ask for the level
of refinement that they wanted. Architect 3 relayed an instance
when the refinement was not explicitly called out, nor was the archi-
tect conscious that there were other options available. The results
were disappointing: “… why are the gusset plates so large? How
come they did it so beautifully over at [another] project, and they
did it so miserably over here on our building?” In another described
instance, stitch welds were provided per the structural drawings
(A#28). The intermittent weld was strong enough for the structural
demands, but when it was built, water infiltration was possible. The
architect had expected the weld to be continuous. The structural
engineer was potentially saving cost by reducing the amount of
weld and, like the architect, had not recognized that another type of
weld was needed. It was a misunderstanding of expectations as well
as an incomplete comprehension of how what would be built in the
end would affect the rest of the project.
Shop drawings, graphic tools used by the contractor to com-
municate the pieces to be assembled, were another area where a
lack of attention and knowledge could harm an integrated project
(A#67). The creation of the structural shop drawings (such as
those by the steel fabricator) can highlight discrepancies between
the architectural and structural drawings. Sometimes, however,
the fact that the structural drawings were in conflict with the ar-
chitectural drawings was missed by all. In one case, a beam ran
through the exit stair at the incorrect elevation, making the stairs
unusable (E#39). Even though the design had passed through
several sets of eyes, the error was not caught until it was con-
structed. At other times, structure was unintentionally exposed
through a window, or the slab edge was not in the correct loca-
tion. These types of errors fall under the how in the world did
anybody miss this descriptor (E#39). Likely, one portion of the
design took precedence, and when completed, the detail was not
evaluated against the whole by the engineer or the architect. In
contrast, this lack of integration of data can happen even if the
design drawings are thorough (A#67). The packaging of work—
masonry walls by masons, the precast concrete planks by con-
crete subs, and steel pieces by fabricators—means that dedicated
effort by the architect and structural engineer is needed in the
construction phase to ensure that the final result is as intended.
Without being aware of the connectivity of the members through
multiple submittal packages, each could be reviewed independ-
ently and the design standard could fall. A combination of deci-
sions being made without construction being considered, unela-
borated expectations, and the segmentation of construction
© ASCE 05016001-6
J. Archit. Eng. 2016.22.
based on trades meant that the built condition of the structure
was not at the level of quality intended.
Discussion
Returning to the initial idea that integration with a capital I sug-
gests that the process, the goals, and the team are aligned,
responses analyzed here identified situations where the process
felt flat. The negative responses provided a narrower definition of
integration than when respondents were asked to think about the
positives. Poor integration examples or integration missteps had
harmed the overall quality of the project, but few cited project
aspirations at fault. Given exemplars indicated such problems
were caused by a lack of information or assumptions not being
shared. A relationship could sour, resulting in information being
withheld, or in the final stages of a project, connection details
were assumed to be constructed in a particular way, but not
detailed to this standard. Shop drawings were not coordinated,
and the built condition revealed a lack of refinement. Architects
spend a great deal of time envisioning a project from its conceptu-
alization to the final built form, but the quality of the desired
work did not always get enunciated. Certainly, an active ques-
tioning of assumptions has been found to be important.
Architects did not always recognize the composition of the entire
structural system, nor did the structural engineer always under-
stand which portions of the engineering design needed further
study. Failures were listed by each discipline in understanding
the completed, constructed structural system. With blame attrib-
uted to both sides, there was agreement that the structural engi-
neer did not always understand how the structural design related
to the architecture. Many of the given examples were couched in
terms of forgetting or the busyness of design. Multiple disci-
plines, people, and needs create an atmosphere in which it is quite
difficult to catch everything, and yet this all-encompassing analy-
sis is foundational to integration.
A collective understanding of professional attributes also
played a role in poor integration. Engineers were conceived as
being hesitant or even blocking integration as a result of conser-
vativism in their design decisions. Engineers were credited with
evaluating risk, but were regularly criticized for choosing the
extra-large size. This type of experience has been frequently
noticed by architectural practitioners, so much so that there is a
belief that engineers need to be pushed to refine their work and
produce integrative designs. The design methodology of the
architect has developed to include strategies for dealing with reti-
cent engineers, where they fall short of being conceived of as
partners with the architect. It is not one engineer that is the prob-
lem but the belief that structural engineers on the whole tend to-
ward conservatism. Although the architects suggested some rea-
sons that this conservatism/pushing occurs, more research is
needed to understand its causes, its implications, and the validity
of the perception. In contrast, the project delivery system often
places the architect at the head of the design work. Structural
engineers rely on the architects for the leadership of the project.
When the architect failed to take on this mantle, the engineer was
left struggling, and basic coordination faltered. Although not ex-
plicitly stated, the structural engineering practitioners acknowl-
edged that they had a more limited role in the project and were in
no position to guide the whole team. For the engineer, the archi-
tect’s primary leadership was crucial for the success of the pro-
ject, and it was sometimes observed as missing. The structural
engineers are also bound by the architects’ expectation that the
engineers will be overly conservative and at the same time held
J. Archit. Eng.
 proprietary knowledge on which the architects depend. Structural
engineers walk the fine line of providing safe structures without
taking advantage of the trust of their architectural clients. At
times, this professional knowledge hierarchy, left unchallenged,
meant that the architect and project were left with undesirable
results. In contrast, architects must consider their position in a
project as conceptual and logistical leader to examine how they
contribute to a poor working relationship through establishing
team dynamics or their own lack of technical knowledge. Project
leadership comes with responsibilities to the owner, building
users, and their engineering partners.
Conclusion
The opportunity to review and criticize examples of bad integration,
especially when contrasted with positive definitions, demonstrates
that integration is multifaceted. The small process-based missteps
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can color the way the practitioner views the integration success of
the project and work methodology. Yet, there is a mythology to
integration where positive examples include hope, aspiration, aims,
and ideals. Somewhere there is a perfectly integrated building
designed by a seamless team in a thoughtful and rewarding process
with practitioners ever seeking to be part of this project. It is there-
fore interesting that the negative examples are more closely related
to the classification of coordination, where systems come together
at a minimum to avoid prohibiting the use of the building. The
responses from the practitioners give credence to the notion that
there is not a collective understanding of the difference between
coordination and integration.
Nevertheless, architects and engineers still express differences
in how they define integration, even in the negative form, with the
interpretations based on the collective interests of the profession,
such as efficiency or design clarity. For the architect, there were
the design efforts to get structure and architecture to unify. Errors
occurred when the role of the structure was not considered. If an
architect did not want to spend significant time on the structure,
the contribution of the engineer was neither valued nor expected
to be integrative. Engineers might not appreciate that their under-
standing of the architecture impeded their participation.
However, although the relationship between architecture and
structure was important to the architect, the professional relation-
ship between the architect and engineer was more valuable to the
engineer. A good relationship between the two professionals
meant that the engineer would have improved project conditions
and an increased ability to contribute to the whole project. Where
there was agreement as to how structure was being treated, archi-
tects believed that engineers understood the design approach or
values of the project.
For both professions, the biggest missed item was the communi-
cation of expectations. Exchanges between the architect and engi-
neers were full of unexplored assumptions. Each profession works
with a vision of the design but, in these exemplars, did not necessar-
ily share it among the team or perhaps recognize its existence in
their own work. It might not be surprising that the failure to fully
share or fully appreciate the architectural intentions of a project
results in the lack of integration. The engineer might progress in
one direction, whereas the architect prefers another, with neither
practitioner elaborating his or her approach to the other. It is also
vital to note the ways in which the personal communication and
unspoken assumptions speak to the importance of daily interactions
of the engineer and the architect. Integrated buildings are made with
considerable effort to establish unified aims for the team, but also
very much in the day-to-day minutia. Whereas the ideation
© ASCE 05016001-7
J. Archit. Eng. 2016.22.
component of integration with a capital I is critical to developing an
integrated project, so is the working relationship between the archi-
tect and structural engineer.
Acknowledgments
The author is thankful to the practitioners for their time,
reflections, and generosity. In addition, this study could not have
been completed without the assistance of a College of Fine and
Applied Arts Creative Research Award and the University of
Illinois’ Campus Research Board grant.
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