MODULE FOR ETHICS (SS 24 AND PHILO 12)

Prep by GEOFFREY C. AMLOS (SSD-CAS)

spiral
(Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, into depression.
A., Mariano, Another
M.N.E., & Principe, friend,
J.D.Z. (2018).
Reedwaan Vally, says, ―You could
Ethics: Foundations for moral valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.) see it
ENGAGE

INTRODUCTION
Topic learning outcome: After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
1. Identify the ethical aspect of human life and the scope of ethical thinking;
2. Define and explain the terms that are relevant to ethical thinking; and
3. To describe the ―minimum conception‖ of ethics.

MODULE 1
Case 1. THE CHILD AND THE VULTURE (A
picture taken by Carter in Sudan, Africa at the
height of Civil War in 1993. Mr. Carter committed
suicide due to depression and drug abuse 6
months after taking the picture). What does it feel
to see the picture? Is there something w rong w ith
the picture? Does it symbolize something? Has
Mr. Carter died in vain? Do the w orld leaders
have responsibilities for the scenario? DOES IT
INVOKE our sense of w rong and correct action?
FOR Wrtier LESAK :
The Image for Carter does not simply evoke
memory of the Civil War in Sudan but portrays the
―unmerited privilege‖ he enjoys and how w estern
nations enjoy the amenities of life at the expense
of other people. The testimony of his friend Judith
is captured by Lesak. And I quote,
―Carter’s daily ritual included cocaine and
other drug use, which would help him cope
with his occupation’s horrors. He often
confided in his friend Judith Matloff, a war
correspondent. She said he would ―talk about
the guilt of the people he couldn’t save
because he photographed them as they were
being killed.‖ It was beginning to trigger a
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happening. You could see Kevin sink into a
dark fugue.‖ Denis Lesak, 2015. How the
Vulture and the Little Girl Ultimate Led to
Kevin’s Death.
Do you entertain the thought that
the picture depicts nothing but a
malnourished child, nothing more
nothing less?
Case 2: WANG YUE Phenomenon: In 2011, a
toddler from the far flung area of China w ent w ith
her parent in Foshan, Guangdong. Amazed by
the tow ering shiny buildings and the intricate
netw orks of roads, she w ent astray from the sight
of her parents. Having no know ledge about the
rules of traffic she w as run over by tw o vehicles.
There w ere 18 passersby w ho saw and skirted
the incident but did not help. The incident only
stopped w hen a utility w orker brought the girl to
the hospital. Due to the gravity of injury, Wang
Yue died 8 days later. Is this just simply
an accident since we have to mind
our own business?
Case 3. KITTY GENOVESE CASE: in 1964, Kitty
Genovese w as going home to her apartment from
w ork, w hen a criminal named Mosley appeared
from a dim corner to hold her up. Kitty ran tow ard
the entrance of the building apartment w hen she
w as stabbed on her back tw ice. Kitty created a
commotion so that one neighbor yelled ―leave the
girl alone‖ making the culprit ran aw ay. Kitty w as
bleeding and w as supposed to enter her
apartment but the door w as locked. After 10
minutes, Mosley came back and then stabbed
Kitty again multiple times and then raped her.
Nobody rushed to help her. In a research done by
Lumberto Mendoza in 2014, most of the
neighbors considered the altercations and
commotions as merely marital affairs. Some
people on the low er floors did not help also
because they have presupposed that others have
called the police or have given help already. Did
the neighbors do enough to stop the crime? Is it
wrong to do nothing when there are
grave abuses being committed?
Case 4: BUGUIAS DRIVERS’ CASE: On October
2019, four cousins w ere supposed to visit the
grave of their grandmother in Busilac, Nueva
Viscaya w hen they met an accident at the Border
of Kabayan and Bokod. It w as unknow n if the four
w ere conscious right after the accident but one
thing is sure, one of them managed to go up the
road to call for help, enduring all the pain and
disorientation. The person w as so bloody and
haggard and w as raising his hand for help only to
be ignored by passersby. Tired, hungry, thirsty,
and desperate he w ent to a simple kiosk, a
sleeping place for cow s and stayed there for 2
days. Again, the incident only caught the attention
of people w hen the MDRRMC of Kabayan
rescued the lone survivor. What does our
culture say about helping people in
distress? Have we become
apathetic also just like what
happened with Wang of China and
Kitty of the US?
Seatw ork w ill be uploaded in the Google
Classroom .
MODULE 2 (week 1 and
2)
CLARIFICATIONS AND
TERMINOLOGY (Taken From
Calano.et.al)
Recognizing the notions of good and bad,
and right and w rong, are the primary concern of
ethics. In order to start, it w ould be useful to
clarify the follow ing points.
VALUE
Ethics, generally speaking is about
matters as the good things that w e should pursue
and the bad thing that w e should avoid; the right
w ays in w hich w e could or should act and the
w rong w ays of acting. It is about w hat is
acceptable and unacceptable in human behavior.
It may involve obligations that w e are expected to
fulfil, prohibitions that w e are required to respect,
or ideals that w e are encouraged to meet. Ethics
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as a subject for us to study is about determining
the grounds for the values w ith particular and
special significance to human life.
Kinds of Valuation
Our first point of clarification is to
recognize that there are instances w hen w e make
value judgments that are not considered to be
part of ethics. For instance, I could say that this
new movie I had just seen w as a ―good‖ one
because I enjoyed it, or a song I had just heard
on the radio w as a ―bad‖ one because it had an
unpleasant tone, but these are not part of the
discussion of ethics. I may have an opinion as to
w hat is the ―right‖ dip (saw saw an) for my chicken
barbecue, or I may maintain that it is ―w rong‖ to
w ear a leather vest over a Barong Tagalog, and
these are not concerns of ethics. These are
valuations that fall under the domain of
aesthetics. The w ord AESTHETICS is derived
from the Greek w ord aesthesis (―sense‖ or
―feeling‖) and refers to the judgements of
personal approval or disapproval that w e make
about w hat w e see, hear, smell, or taste. In fact,
w e often use the w ord ―taste‖ to refer to the
personal aesthetic preferences that w e have one
on these matters, such as ―his taste in music‖ or
―her taste in clothes‖.
Similarly, w e have a sense of approval or
disapproval concerning certain actions w hich can
be considered relatively more trivial in nature.
Thus, for instance, I may think that it is ―right‖ to
knock politely on someone’s door, w hile it is
―w rong‖ to barge into one’s office. Perhaps I may
approve of a child w ho know s how to ask for
something properly by saying ―please‖ and
otherw ise, disapprove of a w oman that I see
picking her nose in public. These and other
similar examples belong to the category of
ETIQUETTE, w hich is concerned w ith right and
w rong actions, but those w hich might be
considered not quite grave enough to belong to a
discussion of ethics. To clarify this point, w e can
differentiate how I may be displeased seeing a
healthy young man refuse to offer his seat on the
bus to an elderly lady, but my indignation and
shock w ould be much greater if I w ere to see a
man deliberately push another one out of moving
bus.
We can also consider how a notion of right
and w rong actions can easily appear in a context
that is not a matter of ethics. This could also be
w hen learning how to bake, for instance. I am told
that the right thing to do w ould be to mix the dry
ingredients first such as flour or sugar before
bringing in any liquids, like milk or cream; this is
the right to do in baking, but not one that belongs
to a discussion of ethics. This could also be w hen
learning how to play basketball. I am instructed
that it is against the rules to w alk more than tw o
steps w ithout dribbling the ball; again, obeying
this rule to not travel is something that makes
sense only in the context of the game and is not
an ethical prohibition. We derive from the Greek
w ord techne the English w ords ―technique‖ and
―technical‖ w hich are often used to refer to a
proper w ay (or right w ay) of doing things, but a
TECHNICAL VALUATION (or right and w rong
technique of doing things) may not necessarily be
an ethical one as these examples show .
Recognizing the characteristics of
aesthetic and technical valuation allow s us to
have a rough guide as to w hat belongs to a
discussion of ethics. They involve valuations that
w e make in a sphere of human actions,
characterized by certain gravity and concern the
human w ell-being or human life itself. Therefore,
matters that concern life and death such as w ar,
capital punishment, or abortion and matters that
concern human w ell-being such as poverty,
inequality, or sexual identity are often included in
discussions of ethics. How ever, this general
description is only a starting point and w ill require
further elaboration.
One complication that can be noted is that
the distinction betw een w hat belongs to ethics
and w hat does not is not alw ays clearly defined.
At times, the question of w hat is grave or trivial is
debatable and sometimes some of the most
heated discussions in ethics could be on the
fundamental question of w hether a certain sphere
of human activities belongs to this discussion. Are
clothes alw ays just a matter of taste or w ould
provocative clothing call for some kind of MORAL
JUDGEMENT? Can w e say that a man w ho
verbally abuses his girlfriend is simply show ing
bad manners or does this behaviour deserve
stronger moral condemnation?
Other books of ethics say that ethics is a
pursuit of know ledge that delves on the study of
HUMAN ACTS or those actions of the human
person that involve KNOWLEDGE,
DELIBERATION (voluntary), AND WILL(free) . It
is because these components determine if a
person is MORALLY RESPONSIBLE, and thus
should be imputed w ith punishment and guilt
w hen results are bad.
Know ledge refers to a good range of facts
available to an agent. For instance, a child has no
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intricate possession of facts on killing, a professor
of BSU does. So in terms of know ledge, the BSU
professor possesses more range of facts and
therefore liable for violation and punishment if
he/she commits it.
Deliberation refers to the voluntariness of
a person in doing a human act. It means the
person desired the end of the act. If the act is not
desired, then the w hole human act becomes
imperfect.
Will on the other refers to the freedom
involved in choosing the act. This means that the
human agent has a breadth of choices and yet
chooses a certain act w ithout compulsion from
another person or agent. So in cases w hen a
person is forced to a marriage both morally and
legally, the marriage is not valid and binding.
In general then as a rule, the absence of
one component makes an act to be imperfect
thus, the agent cannot be imputed or given w ith
punishment and responsibility.
Ethics and Morals
Our second point of clarification is on the
use of the w ords ―ethics‖ and morals‖. This
discussion of ethics and morals w ould include
cognates such as ethical, unethical, im m oral,
am oral, m orality, and so on.
In the introduction w e sometimes referred
to ethics and at other times to moral philosophy.
Are these synonymous? Some w ould say not,
holding that ethics is a broader subject than moral
philosophy. As w e proceed, w e should be careful
particularly on the use of the w ord ―not‖ w hen
applied to the w ords ―moral‖ or ―ethical‖ as this
can be ambiguous. One might say that cooking is
not ethical, that is, the act of cooking does not
belong to a discussion of ethics; on the other
hand, one might say that lying is not ethical, but
the meaning here is that act of lying w ould be an
unethical act. Let us consider those w ords further.
The term ―morals‖ may be used to refer to specific
beliefs or attitudes that people have or to describe
acts that people perform. Thus, it is sometimes
said that an individual’s personal conduct is
referred to as his morals, and if he falls short of
behaving properly, this can be described as
immoral. How ever, w e also have terms such as
―moral judgement‖ or ―moral reasoning‖, w hich
suggest a more rational aspect. The term ―ethics‖
can be spoken of as the discipline of studying and
understanding ideal human behaviour and ideal
w ays of thinking. Thus, ethics is acknow ledged as
an intellectual discipline belonging to philosophy.
How ever, acceptable and unacceptable
behaviours are also generally described as
ethical and unethical, respectively. In addition,
w ith regard to the acceptable and unacceptable
w ays of behaving in a given field, w e have the
term ―professional ethics‖ (e.g., legal ethics for the
proper comportment of law yers and other people
in the legal profession; medical ethics for doctors
and nurses; and media ethics for w riters and
reporters).
Therefore, various thinkers and w riters
posit a distinction betw een the terms ―moral‖ and
―ethics‖ and they may have good reasons for
doing so, but there is no consensus as to how to
make that distinction. So, in this module, w e w ill
be using the terms ―ethical‖ and ―moral‖ (likew ise,
―ethics‖ and ―morality‖) interchangeably.
Descriptive and Norm ative
Our third point of clarification is to
distinguish betw een a descriptive and a normative
study of ethics. A descriptive study of ethics
reports how people, particularly groups, make
their moral valuations w ithout making any
judgement either for or against these valuations.
This kind of study is often the w ork of the social
scientist: either a historian (studying different
moral standards overtime) or a sociologist on an
anthropologist (studying different moral standards
across cultures). A normative study of ethics, as
is often done in philosophy or moral theology,
engages the question: What could or should be
considered as the right w ay of acting? In other
w ords, a normative discussion prescribes w hat
w e ought to maintain as our standards or bases
for moral valuation. When engaging in a
discussion of ethics, it is alw ays advisable to
recognize w hether one is concerned w ith a
descriptive view (e.g., noting how filial piety and
obedience are pervasive characteristics of
Chinese culture) or w ith normative perspective
(e.g., studying how Conf ucian ethics enjoins us to
obey our parents and to show filial piety).
A philosophical study of morality is very different
from a sociological or anthropological study, or a
study from the perspective of biology or
psychology. One important difference is that in
moral philosophy w e do not distance ourselves
from our ow n moral view s in the w ay w e w ould if
w e w ere engaged in a study of one of these other
kinds. We do not take the fact that people,
including ourselves, have moral view s as merely
a datum to be explained. Our goal is not merely to
explain data of this kind, w hether it be the
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distribution of moral beliefs and attitudes, or the
occurrence of selfish or altruistic actions. Rather,
in moral philosophy, the correctness or cogency
or defensibility of moral claims, convictions, and
attitudes, and the probity of various behaviors,
are among the things at issue.
We need to go further. A philosophical
discussion of ethics goes beyond recognizing the
characteristics of some descriptive theory; also, it
does not simply accept as correct any normative
theory. A philosophical discussion of ethics
engages in critical consideration of the strengths
and w eaknesses of these theories. This w ill be
our primary concern throughout this module.
Issue, Decision, Judgement,
and Dilemma
As the final point of clarification, it may be
helpful to distinguish a situation that calls for
moral valuation. It can be called a m oral issue.
For instance, imagine a situation w herein a
person cannot afford a certain item, but the then
the possibility presents itself for her to steal it.
This is a matter of ethics (and not just law ) insofar
as it involves the question of respect for one’s
property. We should add that ―issue‖ is also often
used to refer to those particular situations that are
often the source of considerable and inconclusive
debate (thus, w e w ould often hear topics such as
capital punishment and euthanasia as moral
―issues‖.)
When one is placed in a situation and
confronted by the choice of w hat act to perform,
she is called to make a m oral decision. For
instance, I choose not to take something I did not
pay for. When a person is an observer w ho
makes an assessment on the actions or
behaviour of someone, she is making a m oral
judgem ent. For instance, a friend of mine
chooses to steal from a store, and I make an
assessment that it is w rong.
Finally, going beyond the matter of
choosing w hat is right over w rong, or good over
bad, and considering instead the more
complicated situation w herein one is torn betw een
choosing one of tw o goods or choosing betw een
the lesser of tw o evils: this is referred to as m oral
dilem m a. We have a moral dilemma w hen an
individual can choose only one from a number of
possible actions, and there are compelling ethical
reasons for the various choices. A mother may be
conflicted betw een w anting to feed her hungry
child, but then recognizing that it w ould be w rong
for her to steal is an example of a moral dilemma.

I want you to consider the
following examples by detecting the
issues being pinpointed by the
authors, the possible moral
dilemmas, and how they had
evaluated the situation (ethical
valuation).
Case 5: SOCIAL EXCLUSION
DANNY PILARIO· MONDAY, JUNE 22, 2020
After three months of intensive relief operation,
#VincentHelps now seeks and moves to serve the
most vulnerable groups. They are not only
oppressed; they are not only impoverished; they
are totally excluded by the system that produced
and continually reproduces them. They have no
addresses, no identification cards, no names in
the barangay list, not eligible for assistance and
social services, etc. For this society, they do not
exist. They are nobodies.
Now that people have some mobility and can go
to w ork in limited capacities (GCQ), there w ill be
alw ays people w ho remain excluded. They are
suffering the same hunger and pain as they did
during the total lockdow n (ECQ) - street people,
the sick, the elderly, those living under bridges,
those w ho have no homes, etc. But even before
the COVID-19 crisis, these same people at the
margins have alw ays felt the same hunger and
pain. If it is difficult for many of us to economically
recover, it is all the more difficult, almost
impossible, for all of them.
Every institution, every social arrangement tends
to exclude, marginalize, and push the w eak to the
peripheries. Every system because it is a system
produces its w aste. In the present economic
system, these "w astes" are people -- w ith their
beautiful stories, w ith their visions and dreams of
the future, w ith their hopes and concrete plans for
their lives. But because society has excluded
them, those hopes dimmed, those dreams die.
They w ere turned into w aste, and like all w astes,
are throw n aw ay. The great sociologist Zygmunt
Bauman calls them "the w aste of capital".
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―Tragically, in our ow n time, even as ostentatious
w ealth accumulates in the hands of the privileged
few , often in connection w ith illegal activities and
the appalling exploitation of human dignity, there
is a scandalous grow th of poverty in broad
sectors of society throughout our w orld. Faced
w ith this scenario, w e cannot remain passive,
much less resigned. . . . To all these forms of
poverty w e must respond w ith a new vision of life
and society.‖ (Pope Francis, First World Day of
the Poor, 11/19/17)
Listen to the Pope’s post-pandemic vision: ―Go
dow n into the underground, and pass from the
hyper-virtual, fleshless w orld to the suffering flesh
of the poor. This is the conversion w e have to
undergo. And if w e don't start there, then
there w ill be no conversion.”
Case 6: The Pandem ic Response
Teddy A. Casiño is w ith Jul Li and Cir Bynch.
June 20, 2020
WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR COVID-19
RESPONSE?
Despite the government imposing the longest
lockdow n period in the w orld and having billions
borrow ed and spent to address the pandemic,
w hy is there a continued surge in Covid-19 cases
in the country?
I think there are four things that account for this:
1. Governm ent dow nplayed the threat and
acted too late. The w hole month of February
should have been the time to ramp up our
capacity to test, trace, isolate and treat the
expected surge of patients but it w as not done. By
end February, the DOH w as still boasting that the
health system w as fully prepared for the
pandemic. Eh sa PPE pa lang dumapa na sila.
When the outbreak w as in full sw ing in NCR,
government even advocated a balik probinsya
program bringing possible carriers to areas
w ithout any Covid-19 cases.
2. Mass testing w as never taken seriously,
even until now . Our locally-made test kits
developed by UP w as snubbed by our ow n
government. It w as only on April 14 that the IATF
adopted mass testing as a policy and yet it w as
just empty w ords. In fact, the target 30,000 tests
per day by end of May remains a pipe dream.
Just today, Gen. Galvez again said w e need to
ramp up our laboratories, something that he has
been saying for the last tw o months. Without
mass testing, w e simply cannot achieve the kind
of contact tracing, isolation and treatment that w e
need to defeat the virus.
3. Instead of quickly scaling up m ass testing,
contact tracing, and building quarantine and
treatm ent facilities, governm ent becam e
obsessed w ith m ilitarist lockdow n measures to
control the movement of persons. So many
checkpoints w ere set up that did not even have
the capacity to simply check temperatures, much
more identify and bring to a quarantine or
treatment facility the suspected or probable
cases. The IATF w as dominated by military and
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police officials trained in controlling people, not
the virus.
4. Lastly, and m ore im portantly, President
Duterte failed to provide the decisive and
com petent leadership needed to address the
pandem ic. His late night rants do not provide any
clear direction or innovative solutions to the crisis.
He appears to be totally dependent on his inner
circle of generals and sycophants and oblivious to
the demands of ordinary people, including LGU
officials and frontliners on the ground. His effort to
appear decisive on the issue of stranded OFWs,
overpriced PPEs, or unpaid frontliners actually
reveal his administration's gross failures.
Duterte's handling of the Covid-19 crisis is
reactive, directionless and incompetent.
.
Case 7: Red Tagging of Activists

Legitim ate Criticism vs Disinform ation

Richard Heydarian
GMA7 Resident Political Analyst
Writer, Contributor and Author of Books
Former Professor at La Salle University
February 6, 2020

In principle I agree that w e should place some guardrails around certain types of discourse
or rhetorical exercise w ith clear and present national security implications. For instance, you
can't make BOMB JOKES in airports, nor are slander or libelous rhetoric acceptable in most
countries w ith rule of law . In the same vein, dapat may regulation laban sa "deliberate" and
"systematic" attempts at sow ing "panic and alarm" in times of crisis, including outbreak of an
epidemic.

At the same time, how ever, w e should make sure that such legislations and policies are
NOT w eaponised for political purposes, selectively targeting opposition or certain sections of
the society. I also suggest that the DOJ and NBI look at Fake New s and DISINFORMA TION
campaigns that DOWNPLAY the crisis and its potential implications. The only thing w orse
than PANIC is RECKLESS COMPLA CENCY. For instance, w e should not only emphasize
fatality rates, but also transmission rates (if a virus is highly transmittable even a 2 percent
fatality could mean millions of victims). More crucially, w e should not create false notions of
available vaccines, w hen it takes months if not a year before a full, mass-market version is
available (you need to go through animal and human trials, among others, first). Those kind
of deliberate dismissive disinformation should also be regulated.

Moreover, in a democracy, legitimate and sincere criticism of intended, perceived or real

shortcoming and ineffectiveness of public officials should also be protected as a fundamental
right and inalienable exercise of basic civil liberties. Ultimately, in a democracy elected
officials should be accountable to the voters, not dictate their thinking or, as the Chinese
Communist Party puts it, engage in "public opinion guidance". That's not how modern
democracies operate.

In fact the lesson of the 20th century (and, considering China, even 21st century) is t hat
open democratic systems are more efficient in avoiding and dealing w ith crises, precisely
because of the existing feedback loops, something dangerously lacking in authoritarian
regimes, hence the recurrent epidemics, among other major catastrophes, in China.

We need to definitely strike a balance betw een responsible freedom of expression and
public safety.

Case 8:The Danger of Vilification (The Death of Porquia)

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Vilification refers to the act of putting a group or a person in a bad light. In the Philippine
context, it refers to the act of brandishing progressive groups (mga aktibista) as communists.
Communist as a group has become the ascription of those w ho w ant to destabilize the
government through arm struggle. Though from the history of the group, there w ere really
summary executions of members and abuses against the poor people w hom they w ant to
stage revolution. The problem how ever lies on tw o fronts. First is its political use by referring
any activist and human right advocate promoting justice and equity in the governance
system. Starting w ith the WAR ON TERROR by the US that classifies many revolutionary
groups as terrorists, it has become easy for the Philippine Government to adopt the binary
thinking w ithout considering legitimate groups w orking for just access to services and goods.
It just plainly refers to them as communists. So ―communist‖ has become a semantic of
brandishing any opposing group to a certain pow er.

Second, brandishing is not helpful as it fails to recognize that the real problems are the
social injustices perpetrated by governance (ex. corruption blatantly happens so that basic
services do not trickle dow n to the everyday person). In the case of the Philippines, to
become a communist has been politically used to refer to all progressive groups to the
extent of exposing them to extrajudicial killings and even broad day light murder by the
policemen. The w orst scenario is, even if a person is not a communists, the enemy can
easily suite his interest by vilifying the other person. Please consider the narrative of
Porquia’s child.

Case 9: Fake new s/m anipulation

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Case 10: COVID 19: Has this pandem ic m ade us better people in caring for each
other? Read this poem and see the picture below . It catches COVID Managem ent of
the Phil Governm ent through the death Michelle Silvertino.

(Kindly research the net on the story of Ms. Silvertino.)

She is a young mother of four

GRIEF WITHOUT WORDS Eager to see her brood

Grief to be dignified After w eeks of lockdow n

Should be marked In the big city.

By silence,

Said my friend The idyllic village w here she lives

Explaining the cadenced stillness In faraw ay Calabanga in Bicol

Betw een notes Is named Burabod

Of Mozart Fantasy. Which means spring

In her native tongue.

I tend to be cautious

About my grief Weeks earlier

Careful not to look She took a chance

Overdraw n or at best taw dry For a ride home

Like the amplified sorrow In a Cubao bus station

Of hapless heroes and heroines And there w as none.

In afternoon teleseryes.

She w alked from Cubao

Moreover To the Pasay bus station

There is momentary stillness Still looking for a ride home.

In my psyche And there w as none.

As I look at the lifeless body

Wrapped in dark cloth Gone w ere the five days

Given last moments Patiently w aiting in that bus station

With very little to eat

In a cemetery With just a bottle

Near the busy bus station. Of mineral w ater

To keep her alive.

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 Have taken their toll.

She w as advised to ask help

From the local barangay hall I could see her

But she balked. Breathing her last

―It’s supog,‖ * said she. And thinking of her young kids

Before she closed her eyes

She preferred For good.

To go hungry

Than ask help She w ill never feel again

From total strangers. The summer w inds

Rustling the bamboo trees

After another w eek of her native Burabod

Waiting for a ride In faraw ay Calabanga.

People found her

Slumped on the cold cement Her story is real.

With her modest luggage. It is grief w ithout w ords.

Without the music.

-- Pablo Tariman

She w as rushed to a nearby hospital June10,2020

But hunger and fatigue

* **

―Supog‖ means an inherent sense of shame or

just simply being shy..

Images: The burial of Michelle Silvertino, her last

photo at the bus station and picture of her kids in
her native Burabod village in Calabanga,
Camarines Sur.

Photos from the post of Nathanael Alim Alviso‎

and shared by Alex Vincent Medina

Albert B. Casuga Sarah Raymundo Babeth

Lolarga Lhot Lourdes Jd-o Mary Anne Espina
Najib Mabaning Ismail Gerry S. Rubio Victoria
Atilano Domingo Ron Magbuhos Lui Queano
Abet Umil Ricky Calderon

10

Case 11: Elizabeth Angsioco on Com m ents
that 4Ps beneficiaries are lucky to receive
Assistance from the Governm ent during the
Pandem ic
April 8,2020
―It pains me to see friends expressing disdain, at
times, anger at those w ho have the least in life—
the so called poorest of the poor. They are
prioritized in terms of assistance because this is
the right thing to do.
I know that everyone is affected by this pandemic
BUT the poorest Filipinos are not the enemy.
They already have the least in terms of
opportunities be it education or livelihood.
Being poor is NOT a choice. Many are so
because of intergenerational poverty. People are
born into it and this means it takes a lot more to
break the chain. Some of us are fortunate by
virtue of education, strength of character, and
yes, luck. But many are not and they continue to
be shackled by poverty. Please do not take it
11
against them that they need more than w e do
from others.
You portray them as good-for-nothing. To those
of us w ho w ere poor in our youth, please look
back. It w asn’t our choice. We knew how it w as to
not have enough food on the table, to give up on
some things w e w anted because w e had no
means to have them, to be envious of w hat others
had that w e couldn’t. We dreamt and w orked and
some of us succeeded. Good for us.
But the many w ho didn’t and w hose families
remain poor do not deserve disdain or anger. I
grant that there are those w ho do not w ork as
hard BUT many do. They are, how ever, unable to
make a living now because of the situation.
Like it or not, w e are in this together, rich, middle
class, and the poor. It’s a fact that the health (or
lack of it) of the poorest of the poor impacts yours
and mine. If many of them get sick, this pandemic
w ill not end even if w e stay put in the comfort of
our homes. So, let us help them stay home, too.
Let’s be thankful that w e do not depend on others
for w hat w e need. But try to put yourselves in
their shoes. Imagine the despair, the
helplessness, the frustration and sadness of
seeing your family go hungry.
Show some sympathy. If you can, HELP. But
don’t blame them for poverty. Government is
duty-bound to help them. Would you rather be in
their position?
Please stop the hatred.‖
MODULE 3 (week3)
EXPLAIN
The follow ing are some examples of issues,
arguments, and justifications on ethical issues.
Reasoning
Why do w e suppose that a certain w ay of
acting is right and its opposite w rong? The study
of ethics is interested in questions like these: Why
do w e decide to consider this w ay of acting as
acceptable w hile that w ay of acting, its opposite,
is unacceptable? To put it in another w ay, w hat
reasons do w e give to decide or to judge that a
certain w ay of acting is either right or w rong?
 A person’s fear of punishment or desire for
rew ard can provide him a reason for acting in a
certain w ay. It is common to hear someone say: ―I
did not cheat on the exam because I w as afraid
that I might get caught,‖ or ―I looked after my
father in the hospital because I w anted to get a
higher allow ance.‖ In a certain sense, fear of
punishment and desire for rew ard can be spoken
of as giving someone a ―reason‖ for acting in a
certain w ay. But the question then w ould be: Is
this reason good enough? That is to say, this w ay
of thinking seems to be a shallow w ay of
understanding reason because it does not show
any true understanding of w hy cheating on an
exam is w rong or w hy looking after a member of
my family is in itself a good thing. The promise of
rew ards and the fear of punishments can certainly
motivate us to act, but are not in themselves a
determinant of the rightness or w rongness of a
certain w ay of acting or of the good or the bad in
a particular pursuit. It is possible to find better
reasons for finding a certain w ay of acting either
acceptable or unacceptable?
I am in a situation w herein I could obtain a
higher grade for myself by cheating. I make the
decision not to do so. Or I know that my friend
w as in a position to get a better grade for herself
by cheating. She refuses to do so; I then make
the judgement of praising her for this. In making
this kind of moral decision or moral judgement,
the question can be asked: Why?
Asking the question ―w hy‖ might bring us
to no more than a superficial discussion of
rew ards and punishments, as seen above, but it
could also bring us to another level of thinking.
Perhaps one can rise above, but it could also
bring us to another level of thinking. Perhaps one
can rise above the particulars of a specific
situation, going beyond w hatever motivation or
incentive is present in this instance of cheating (or
not doing so). In other w ords, our thinking may
take on a level of abstraction, that is, detaching
itself from the particular situation and arriving at a
statement like, ―Cheating is w rong‖, by
recognizing proper reasons for not acting in this
w ay. Beyond rew ards and punishments, it is
possible for our moral valuation- our decisions
and judgements- to be based on principles. Thus,
one may conclude that cheating is w rong based
on a sense of fair play or a respect f or the
importance and validity of testing. From this, w e
can define principles as rationally established
grounds by w hich one justifies and maintains her
moral decisions and judgements.
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But w hy do w e maintain one particular
principle rather than another? Why should I
maintain that I should care for fair play and that
cheating is, therefore, w rong? Returning to the
case of fraternity hazing w here w e started this
chapter, w hy is it w rong to cause another person
physical injury or take another’s life? We can
maintain principles, but w e can also ask w hat
good reasons for doing so. Such reasons may
differ. So, for example, w hat makes the death of
Cris such a tragedy? One person may say that life
is sacred and God-given. Another person may
declare that human life has a priceless dignity.
Still another may put forw ard the idea that taking
another’s life does not contribute to human
happiness but to human misery instead. How
exactly do w e arrive at any of these claims? This
is w here w e turn to theory. A moral theory is a
systematic attempt to establish the validity of
maintaining certain moral principles. Insofar as a
theory is a system of thought or of ideas, it can
also be referred to as a framew ork. We can use
this term, ―framew ork‖, as a theory of
interconnected ideas, and at the same time, a
structure through w hich w e can evaluate our
reasons for valuing a certain decision or
judgement.
Ethics or Moral philosophy is the study of
w hat morality is and w hat it requires of us. As
Socrates said, it’s about ―how w e ought to live‖—
and w hy. It w ould be helpful if w e could begin w ith
a simple, uncontroversial definition of w hat
morality is, but unfortunately w e cannot. There
are many rival theories, each expounding a
different conception of w hat it means to live
morally, and any definition that goes beyond
Socrates’s simple formulation is bound to offend
at least one of them. There are different
framew orks that can make us reflect on the
principles that w e maintain and thus, the
decisions and judgements w e make. By studying
these, w e can reconsider, clarify, modify, and
ultimately strengthen our principles, thereby
informing better both our moral judgements and
moral decisions. This should make us cautious,
but it need not paralyze us. In this module, w e w ill
describe the ―minimum conception‖ of morality. As
the name suggests, the minimum conception is a
core that every moral theory should accept, at
least as a starting point
ELABORAT E
We w ill examine some moral controversies having
to do w ith handicapped children. This discussion
w ill bring out the features of the minimum
conception.
First Exam ple: Baby Theresa
Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, an infant know n
to the public as ―Baby Theresa,‖ w as born in
Florida in 1992. Baby Theresa had anencephaly,
one of the w orst genetic disorders. Anencephalic
infants are sometimes referred to as ―babies
w ithout brains,‖ but that is not quite accurate.
Important parts of the brain—the cerebrum and
cerebellum—are missing, as is the top of the
skull. The brain stem, how ever, is still there, and
so the baby can breathe and possess a
heartbeat. In the United States, most cases of
anencephaly are detected during pregnancy, and
the fetuses are usually aborted. Of those not
aborted, half are stillborn. Only a few hundred are
born alive each year, and they usually die w ithin
days.
Baby Theresa’s story is remarkable only
because her parents made an unusual request.
Know ing that their baby w ould die soon and could
never be conscious, Theresa’s parents
volunteered her organs for immediate transplant.
They thought that her kidneys, liver, heart, lungs,
and eyes should go to other children w ho could
benefit from them. Her physicians agreed.
Thousands of infants need transplants each year,
and there are never enough organs available. But
Theresa’s organs w ere not taken, because
Florida law forbids the removal of organs until the
donor has died. By the time Baby Theresa died,
nine days later, it w as too late—her organs had
deteriorated too much to be harvested and
transplanted.
Baby Theresa’s case w as w idely debated.
Should she have been killed so that her organs
could have been used to save other children? A
number of professional ―ethicists‖—people
employed by universities, hospitals, and law
schools, w ho get paid to think about such
things—w ere asked by the press to comment.
Most of them disagreed w ith the parents and
physicians. Instead, they appealed to time-
honored philosophical principles to oppose taking
the organs. ―It just seems too horrifying to use
people as means to other people’s ends,‖ said
one such expert. Another explained: ―It’s
13
unethical to kill person A to save person B.‖ And a
third added: ―What the parents are really asking
for is, Kill this dying baby so that its organs may
be used for someone else. Well, that’s really a
horrendous proposition.‖
Is it horrendous? Opinions w ere divided.
These ethicists thought so, w hile the parents and
doctors did not. But w e are interested in more
than w hat people happen to believe. We w ant to
know w hat’s true. Were the parents right or w rong
to volunteer their baby’s organs for transplant? To
answ er this question, w e have to ask w hat
reasons, or arguments, can be given on each
side. What can be said for or against the parents’
request?
The Benefits Argum ent.
The parents believed that Theresa’s organs w ere
doing her no good, because she w as not
conscious and w as bound to die soon. The other
children, how ever, could be helped. Thus, the
parents seem to have reasoned: If w e can
benefit someone w ithout harming anyone else,
w e ought to do so. Transplanting the organs
w ould benefit the other children w ithout harming
Baby Theresa. Therefore, w e ought to transplant
the organs.
Is this correct? Not every argument is
sound. In addition to know ing w hat arguments
can be given for a view , w e also w ant to know
w hether those arguments are any good.
Generally speaking, an argument is sound if its
assumptions are true and the conclusion follow s
logically from them. In this case, the argument
has tw o assumptions: that w e should help
someone if no harm w ould come of it, and that
the transplant w ould help the other children
w ithout harming Theresa. We might w onder,
how ever, about the claim that Theresa w ouldn’t
be harmed. After all, she w ould die, and isn’t
being alive better than being dead? But on
reflection, it seems clear that, in these tragic
circumstances, the parents w ere right. Being alive
is a benefit only if you can carry on activities and
have thoughts, feelings, and relations w ith other
people—in other w ords, if you have a life .
Without such things, biological existence has no
value. Therefore, even though Theresa might
remain alive for a few more days, it w ould do her
no good.
The Benefits Argument, therefore, provides a
pow erful reason for transplanting the organs.
What arguments exist on the other side?
The Argum ent That We Should Not Use
People as Means.
The ethicists w ho opposed the transplants offered
tw o arguments. The first w as based on the idea
that it is w rong to use people as means to other
people’s ends. Taking Theresa’s organs w ould be
using her to benefit the other children; therefore, it
should not be done.
Is this argument sound? The idea that w e should
not ―use‖ people is appealing, but this idea is
vague. What exactly does it mean? ―Using
people‖ typically involves violating their autonomy
—their ability to decide for themselves how to live
their ow n lives, according to their ow n desires and
values. A person’s autonomy may be violated
through manipulation, trickery, or deceit. For
example, I may pretend to be your friend, w hen I
am only interested in going out w ith your sister; or
I may lie to you so you’ll give me money; or I may
try to convince you that you w ould enjoy going to
a movie, w hen, really, I only w ant you to give me
a ride. In each case, I am manipulating you in
order to get something for myself. Autonomy is
also violated w hen people are forced to do things
against their w ill. This explains w hy ―using people‖
is w rong; it is w rong because it thw arts their
autonomy.
Taking Baby Theresa’s organs, how ever, could
not thw art her autonomy, because she has no
autonomy—she cannot make decisions, she has
no desires, and she cannot value anything. Would
taking her organs be ―using her‖ in any other
morally significant sense? We w ould, of course,
be using her organs for someone else’s benefit.
But w e do that every time w e perform a
transplant. We w ould also be using her organs
w ithout her permission. Would that make it
w rong? If w e w ere using them against her
w ishes, then that w ould be a reason for
objecting—it w ould violate her autonomy. But
Baby Theresa has no w ishes.
When people are unable to make decisions for
themselves, and others must step in, there are
tw o reasonable guidelines that might be adopted.
First, w e might ask, What w ould be in their ow n
best interests? If w e apply this standard to Baby
Theresa, there w ould be no problem w ith taking
her organs, for, as w e have already noted, her
14
interests w ill not be affected. She is not
conscious, and she w ill die soon no matter w hat.
The second guideline appeals to the person’s
ow n preferences: We might ask, If she could tell
us w hat she w ants, w hat w ould she say? This
sort of thought is useful w hen w e are dealing w ith
people w ho have preferences (or once had them)
but cannot express them—for example, a
comatose patient w ho signed a living w ill before
slipping into the coma. But, sadly, Baby Theresa
has no preferences about anything, nor has she
ever had any. So w e can get no guidance from
her, even in our imaginations. The upshot is that
w e are left to do w hat w e think is best.
The Argum ent from the Wrongness of Killing.
The ethicists also appealed to the principle that it
is w rong to kill one person to save another.
Taking Theresa’s organs w ould be killing her to
save others, they said; so, taking the organs
w ould be w rong.
Is this argument sound? The prohibition against
killing is certainly among the most important moral
rules. Nevertheless, few people believe it is
alw ays w rong to kill—most people think there are
exceptions, such as killing in self -defense. The
question, then, is w hether taking Baby Theresa’s
organs should be regarded as another exception.
There are many reasons to think so: Baby
Theresa is not conscious; she w ill never have a
life; she is going to die soon; and taking her
organs w ould help the other babies. Anyone w ho
accepts this w ill regard the argument as flaw ed.
Usually, it is w rong to kill one person to save
another, but not alw ays.
There is another possibility. Perhaps w e should
regard Baby Theresa as already dead. If this
sounds crazy, bear in mind that our conception of
death has changed over the years. In 1967, the
South African doctor Christiaan Barnard
performed the first heart transplant in a human
being. This w as an exciting development; heart
transplants could potentially save many lives. It
w as not clear, how ever, w hether any lives could
be saved in the United States. Back then,
American law understood death as occurring
w hen the heart stops beating. But once a heart
stops beating, it quickly degrades and becomes
unsuitable for transplant. Thus, under American
law , it w as not clear w hether any hearts could be
legally harvested for transplant. So American law
changed. We now understand death as occurring,
not w hen the heart stops beating, but w hen the
brain stops functioning: ―brain death‖ is our new
end-of-life standard. This solved the problem
about transplants because a brain-dead patient
can still have a healthy heart, suitable for
transplant.
Anencephalics do not meet the technical
requirements for brain death as that term is
currently defined; but perhaps the definition
should be revised to include them. After all, they
lack any hope for conscious life, because they
have no cerebrum or cerebellum. If the definition
of brain death w ere reformulated to include
anencephalics, then we w ould become
accustomed to the idea that these unfortunate
infants are stillborn, and so taking their organs
w ould not involve killing them. The Argument from
the Wrongness of Killing w ould then be moot.
On the w hole, then, the arguments in favor of
transplanting Baby Theresa’s organs seem
stronger than the arguments against it.
Second Exam ple: Jodie and Mary
In August 2000, a young w oman from Gozo, an
island south of Italy, discovered that she w as
carrying conjoined tw ins. Know ing that the health-
care facilities on Gozo couldn’t handle such a
birth, she and her husband w ent to St. Mary’s
Hospital in Manchester, England. The infants,
know n as Mary and Jodie, w ere joined at the
low er abdomen. Their spines w ere fused, and
they had one heart and one pair of lungs betw een
them. Jodie, the stronger one, w as providing
blood for her sister.
No one know s how many sets of conjoined tw ins
are born each year, but the number seems to be
in the hundreds. Most die shortly after birth, but
some do w ell. They grow to adulthood and marry
and have children themselves. How ever, the
outlook for Mary and Jodie w as grim. The doctors
said that w ithout intervention the girls w ould die
w ithin six months. The only hope w as an
operation to separate them. This w ould save
Jodie, but Mary w ould die immediately.
The parents, w ho w ere devout Catholics,
opposed the operation on the grounds that it
w ould hasten Mary’s death. ―We believe that
nature should take its course,‖ they said. ―If it’s
God’s w ill that both our children should not
survive, then so be it.‖ The hospital, hoping to
save Jodie, petitioned the courts for permission to
perform the operation anyw ay. The courts
15
agreed, and the operation w as performed. As
expected, Jodie lived and Mary died.
In thinking about this case, w e should distinguish
the question of w ho should make the decision
from the question of w hat the decision should be .
You might think, for example, that the parents
should be the ones to decide, and so the courts
w ere w rong to intrude. But there remains the
separate question of w hat w ould be the w isest
choice for the parents (or anyone else) to make.
We w ill focus on that question: Would it be right or
w rong to separate the tw ins?
The Argum ent That We Should Save as Many
as We Can.
The rationale for separating the tw ins is that w e
have a choice betw een saving one infant or
letting both die. Isn’t it plainly better to save one?
This argument is so appealing that many people
w ill conclude, w ithout further thought, that the
tw ins should be separated. At the height of the
controversy, the
Ladies’ Home Journal commissioned a poll to
discover w hat Americans thought. The poll
show ed that 78% approved of the operation.
People w ere obviously persuaded by the idea that
w e should save as many as w e can. Jodie and
Mary’s parents, how ever, believed that there is an
even stronger argument on the other side.
The Argum ent from the Sanctity of Hum an
Life.
The parents loved both of their children, and they
thought it w ould be w rong to kill one of them even
to save the other. Of course, they w ere not alone
in thinking this. The idea that all human life is
precious, regardless of age, race, social class, or
handicap, is at the core of the Western moral
tradition. In traditional ethics, the prohibition
against killing innocent humans is absolute. It
does not matter if the killing w ould serve a good
purpose; it simply cannot be done. Mary is an
innocent human being, and so she may not be
killed. Is this argument sound? The judges w ho
heard the case did not think so, for a surprising
reason. They denied that the operation w ould kill
Mary. Lord Justice Robert Walker said that the
operation w ould merely separate Mary from her
sister and then ―she w ould die, not because she
w as intentionally killed, but because her ow n
body cannot sustain her life.‖ In other w ords, the
operation w ouldn’t kill her; her body’s w eakness
w ould. And so, the morality of killing is irrelevant.
This response, how ever, misses the point. It
doesn’t matter w hether w e say that the operation
caused Mary’s death, or that her body’s
w eakness did. Either w ay, she w ill be dead, and
w e w ill know ingly have hastened her death.
That’s the idea behind the traditional prohibition
against killing the innocent.
There is, how ever, a more natural objection to the
Argument from the Sanctity of Life. Perhaps it is
not alw ays w rong to kill innocent human beings.
For example, such killings may be right w hen
three conditions are met: (a) the innocent human
has no future because she is going to die soon no
matter w hat; (b) the innocent human has no w ish
to go on living, perhaps because she has no
w ishes at all; and (c) this killing w ill save others,
w ho can go on to lead full lives. In these rare
circumstances, the killing of the innocent might be
justified.
Third Exam ple: Tracy Latim er
Tracy Latimer, a 12-year-old victim of cerebral
palsy, w as killed by her father in 1993. Tracy lived
w ith her family on a prairie farm in Saskatchew an,
Canada. One Sunday morning w hile his w ife and
other children w ere at church, Robert Latimer put
Tracy in the cab of his pickup truck and piped in
exhaust fumes until she died. At the time of her
death, Tracy w eighed less than 40 pounds, and
she w as described as ―functioning at the mental
level of a three-month-old baby.‖ Mrs. Latimer
said that she w as relieved to find Tracy dead
w hen she arrived home. She said that she ―didn’t
have the courage‖ to do it herself.
Robert Latimer w as tried for murder, but the
judge and jury did not w ant to treat him harshly.
The jury found him guilty of only second-degree
murder and recommended that the judge ignore
the mandatory 10-year sentence. The judge
agreed and sentenced him to one year in prison,
follow ed by a year of confinement to his farm. But
the Supreme Court of Canada stepped in and
ruled that the mandatory sentence must be
imposed. Robert Latimer entered prison in 2001
and w as paroled in 2008.
Legal questions aside, did Mr. Latimer do
anything w rong? This case involves many of the
issues that w e saw in the other cases. One
argument is that Tracy’s life w as morally precious,
and so her father had no right to kill her. In his
defense, it may be said that Tracy’s condition w as
16
so catastrophic that she had no prospects of a
―life‖ in any but a biological sense. Her existence
consisted in pointless suffering, and so killing her
w as an act of mercy. Considering those
arguments, it appears that Robert Latimer acted
defensibly. His critics, how ever, made other
points.
The Argum ent from the Wrongness of
Discrim inating against the Handicapped.
When the trial court gave Robert Latimer a lenient
sentence, many handicapped people felt insulted.
The president of the Saskatoon Voice of People
w ith Disabilities, w ho has multiple sclerosis, said:
―Nobody has the right to decide my life is w orth
less than yours. That’s the bottom line.‖ Tracy
w as killed because she w as handicapped, he
said, and that is unconscionable. Handicapped
people should be given the same respect and
accorded the same rights as everyone else.
What are w e to make of this? Discrimination is
alw ays a serious matter, because it involves
treating some people w orse than others, for no
good reason. Suppose, for example, that a blind
person is refused a job simply because the
employer doesn’t like the idea of hiring someone
w ho can’t see. This is no better than refusing to
hire someone because she is Hispanic or Jew ish
or female. Why is this person treated differently?
Is she less able to do the job? Is she less
intelligent or less industrious? Does she deserve
the job less? Is she less able to benefit from
employment? If there is no good reason to
exclude her, then it is w rong to do so.
Should w e think of the death of Tracy Latimer as
a case of discrimination against the
handicapped? Robert Latimer argued that Tracy’s
cerebral palsy w as not the issue: ―People are
saying this is a handicap issue, but they’re w rong.
This is a torture issue. It w as about mutilation and
torture for Tracy.‖ Just before her death, Tracy
had undergone major surgery on her back, hips,
and legs, and more surgery w as planned. ―With
the combination of a feeding tube, rods in her
back, the leg cut and flopping around and
bedsores,‖ said her father, ―how can people say
she w as a happy little girl?‖ At the trial, three of
Tracy’s physicians testified about the difficulty of
controlling her pain. Thus, Mr. Latimer denied that
Tracy w as killed because of her disability; she
w as killed because she w as suffering w ithout
hope of relief.
The Slippery Slope Argum ent.
When the Canadian Supreme Court upheld
Robert Latimer’s sentence, the director of the
Canadian Association of Independent Living
Centres said that she w as ―pleasantly surprised.‖
―It w ould have really been the slippery slope, and
opening the doors to other people to decide w ho
should live and w ho should die,‖ she said.
Other disability advocates echoed this idea. We
may feel sympathy for Robert Latimer, it w as said;
w e may even think that Tracy Latimer is better off
dead. How ever, it is dangerous to think in this
w ay. If w e accept any sort of mercy killing, w e w ill
slide dow n a ―slippery slope,‖ and at the bottom of
the slope, all life w ill be held cheap. Where w ill w e
draw the line? If Tracy’s life is not w orth
protecting, w hat about the lives of other disabled
people? What about the elderly, the infirm, and
other ―useless‖ members of society? In this
context, Hitler’s program of ―racial purification‖ is
often mentioned, implying that w e w ill end up like
the Nazis if w e take the first step.
Similar ―slippery slope arguments‖ have been
used on other issues. Abortion, in vitro fertilization
(IVF), and human cloning have all been
denounced because of w hat they might lead to.
Sometimes, in hindsight, it is evident that the
w orries w ere unfounded. This has happened w ith
IVF, a technique for creating embryos in the lab.
When Louise Brow n, the f irst ―test tube baby,‖
w as born in 1978, there w ere dire predictions
about w hat might be in store for her and for
society as a w hole. But none of those predictions
came true, and IVF has become routine. Since
Louise Brow n’s birth, over 100,000 American
couples have used IVF to have children.
Without the benefit of hindsight, how ever, slippery
slope arguments are hard to assess. As the old
saying goes, ―It’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.‖ Reasonable people
may disagree about w hat w ould happen if mercy
killing w ere allow ed in cases like Tracy Latimer’s.
Those inclined to defend Mr. Latimer may find the
dire predictions unrealistic, w hile those inclined to
condemn him may find the predictions sensible.
It is w orth noting that slippery slope arguments
are easy to abuse. If you are opposed to
something but have no good arguments against
it, you can alw ays make up a prediction about
w hat it might lead to; and no matter how
implausible your prediction is, no one can prove
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you w rong. That is w hy w e should approach such
arguments w ith caution.
Reason and Im partiality
What can w e learn from all this about the nature
of morality? For starters, w e may note tw o points:
first, moral judgments must be
backed by good reasons; and
second, morality requires the
impartial consideration of each
individual’s interests.
Moral Reasoning.
The cases of Baby Theresa, Jodie and Mary, and
Tracy Latimer are liable to arouse strong feelings.
Such feelings might be admirable; they might be
a sign of moral seriousness. How ever, they can
also get in the w ay of discovering the truth. When
w e feel strongly about an issue, it is tempting to
assume that w e simply know w hat the truth is,
w ithout even having to consider the arguments.
Unfortunately, how ever, w e cannot rely on our
feelings, no matter how pow erful they may be.
Our feelings may be irrational; they may be the
products of prejudice, selfishness, or cultural
conditioning. At one time, for example, people’s
feelings told them that members of other races
w ere inferior and that slavery w as God’s plan.
Moreover, people’s feelings vary. In the case of
Tracy Latimer, some people feel strongly that her
father deserved a long prison term; other people
support the father passionately. But both of
these feelings cannot be correct. If w e assume
that our view m ust be correct, sim ply because
w e hold it, then w e are just being arrogant.
Thus, if w e w ant to discover the truth, w e must let
our feelings be guided as much as possible by
reason. This is the essence of morality. The
morally right thing to do is alw ays the thing best
supported by the arguments.
This is not a narrow point about a small range of
moral view s; it is a general requirement of logic
that must be accepted by everyone. The
fundamental point is this: If someone says that
you ought to do such-and-such, then you may
legitimately ask w hy; and if no good reason can
be given, then you may reject the advice as
arbitrary or unfounded.
In this w ay, moral judgments are different from
expressions of personal taste. If someone says, ―I
like coffee,‖ she does not need to have a
reason—she is merely stating a fact about her
preferences. There is no such thing as ―rationally
defending‖ one’s like or dislike of the taste of
coffee. On the other hand, if someone says that
something is morally w rong, he does need
reasons, and if his reasons are legitimate, then
other people should accept their force. By the
same logic, if he has no good reason for w hat he
says, then he is simply making noise and may be
ignored.
Of course, not every reason that may be
advanced is a good reason. There are bad
arguments as w ell as good ones, and much of the
skill of moral thinking consists in discerning the
difference. But how do w e tell the difference?
How do w e go about assessing arguments? The
examples w e have considered point to some
answ ers.
The first thing is to get one’s facts straight .
This may not be as easy as it sounds. Sometimes
key facts are unknow n. Other times, matters are
so complex that even the experts disagree. Yet
another problem is human prejudice. Often w e
w ant to believe something because it supports
our preconceptions. Those w ho disapprove of
Robert Latimer’s action, for example, w ill w ant to
believe the dire predictions of the slippery slope
argument, w hile those w ho approve of his action
w ill w ant to reject them. It is easy to think of other
examples: People w ho do not w ant to give to
charity often say that charities are inefficient and
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corrupt, even w hen their evidence for this is
w eak; people w ho dislike homosexuals may say
that gay men are all pedophiles, even though very
few are; and people w ho support one political
party w ill say that the other party is to blame for
things in Washington, even w hen they don’t follow
the new s. The facts exist apart from our w ishes,
and if w e w ant to think intelligently, then w e need
to try to see things as they are.
Next, w e can bring moral principles into play. In
our examples, a number of principles w ere
involved: that w e should not “use” people; that
w e should not kill one person to save another ;
that w e should do w hat w ill benefit the people
affected by our actions; that every life is sacred;
and that it is w rong to discrim inate against the
handicapped. Most moral arguments consist of
principles being applied to particular cases, and
so w e must ask w hether the principles are
justified and w hether they are being applied
correctly.
It w ould be nice if there w ere a simple recipe for
constructing good arguments and avoiding bad
ones. Unfortunately, there is not. Arguments can
go w rong in many w ays, and w e must alw ays be
open to encountering new kinds of error. Yet this
should come as no surprise. In every field of
study, the rote application of routine methods is
no replacement for critical thinking.
Let us cite some examples of bad
arguments which should also guide
our moral reasoning.
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The Requirem ent of Im partiality.

Almost every important moral theory includes a commitment to impartiality. To be impartial is to treat
everyone alike; no one gets special treatment. By contrast, to be partial is to show favoritism. Impartiality
also requires that w e not treat the members of particular groups as inferior. Thus it condemns forms of
discrimination like sexism and racism.

Impartiality is closely related to the idea that moral judgments must be backed by good reasons. Consider
the racist w ho thinks that w hite people deserve all the good jobs. He w ould like all the doctors, law yers,
business executives, and so on, to be w hite. Now w e can ask for reasons; w e can ask w hy this is thought
to be right. Is there something about w hite people that makes them better fitted for the highestpaying and
most prestigious jobs? Are they inherently brighter or harder w orking? Do they care more about themselves
and their families? Would they benefit more from such employment? In each case, the
answ er is no; and if there is no good reason to treat people differently, then the discrimination is
unacceptably arbitrary.
The requirement of impartiality, then, is at bottom nothing more than a rule against treating people
arbitrarily. It forbids treating one person w orse than another w hen there is no good reason to do so. Yet if
this explains w hy racism is w rong, it also explains w hy some cases of unequal tr eatment are not racist.
Suppose a movie director w ere making a film about Fred Shuttlesw orth (1922–2011), the heroic African-
American civil rights leader. This director w ould have a good reason not to cast Bryan Cranston in the
starring role—namely, that Cranston is w hite. Such ―discrimination‖ w ould not be arbitrary or objectionable.

The Minim um Conception of Morality

We may now state the minimum conception: Morality is, at the very least, the effort to guide one’s conduct
by reason—that is, to do w hat there are the best reasons for doing—w hile giving equal w eight to the
interests of each individual affected by one’s action.
This paints a picture of w hat it means to be a conscientious moral agent. The conscientious moral agent is
someone w ho is concerned impartially w ith the interests of everyone affected by w hat he or she does; w ho
carefully sifts facts and examines their implications; w ho accepts principles of conduct only after

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scrutinizing them to make sure they are justified; w ho is w illing to ―listen to reason‖ even w hen it means
revising prior convictions; and w ho, finally, is w illing to act on these deliberations.
As one might expect, not every ethical theory accepts this ―minimum.‖ This picture of the moral agent has
been disputed in various w ays. How ever, theories that reject the minimum conception encounter serious
difficulties. This is w hy most moral theories embrace the minimum conception, in one form or another.

Quizzes and seatworks for this set of modules will be uploaded in

the Google Classroom.

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