Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, 29 Sep
Finally, on 3
1966.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding
the meaning 'and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Facts:
In 1960, Caltex (Phils) Inc. conceived a promotional scheme
“Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” calculated to drum up patronage
for its products, calling for participants therein to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station
will dispense during a specified period. For the privilege to
participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid. Neither
a purchase of Caltex products is required. Entry forms were
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can
was provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, not only as amongst
the mediator publicizing the contest but also for the transmission
of communications relative thereto, representations were made
by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared
in advance for mailing, in view of sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. Such overtures were
formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated 31
October 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy
of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested
clearance.
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition
for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, praying that
judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest
not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the
attention of the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein.
Ruling:
No. Caltex may be granted declaratory relief, even if Enrico
Palomar simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given
set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest. For,
construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding
the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to
its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
In this case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably required an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein. Also, the Court is tasked to look beyond the
fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element
that the law is seeking to prevent or prohibit.
Caltex Hooded Pump Contest does not violate the Postal Law.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-
50320, 31 Jul 1981.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The Supreme Court confirms that construction is the same with
interpretation. There is no distinction between interpretation and
explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one
explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it.
Facts:
In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective
bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining
proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but
due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the
Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in
concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the
complaint, the parties continued with negotiations.
September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a
three-stage wage increase for all rank-and-file employees,
retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977,
Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May
1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance
ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was
implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company.
The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the
implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company
alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage
increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the
requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the
balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was
already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2
April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive
to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the
Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand,
maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD
525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.
On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30
May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing
the complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their
disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties
appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting
aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing
the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the
Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was
made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April
1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in
paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed
for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the
same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
WON the Commission was correct in determining the agreement
falls under the exceptions.
Ruling:
The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3
September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect,
although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April
1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage
increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the
company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k
of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected
contract nor an actual payment of said increase. There was no
grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion
expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be
noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or
representation on the part of the company. The company had
declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in
recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with
inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil
price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held
on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining
items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).
The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word
“grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its
explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be
given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to
the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same
cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation
and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where
one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it.
Thus, the construction or explanation of the Labor Undersecretary
is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of
facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the
law.
The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside
the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay,
in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123,
the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977
as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs
against the company.
WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS HEREBY
GRANTED, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT
COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE, AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY, IN ADDITION
TO THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE PROVIDED FOR IN P.D.
1123, THE NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASE OF P0.80 DAILY
EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1977 AS WELL AS ALL OTHER WAGE
INCREASES EMBODIED IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT, TO ALL COVERED EMPLOYEES. COSTS
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO, ORDERED.
Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 Apr 2014
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such
a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under
the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.
Facts:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the
Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending
money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on
May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said
pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with
an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of
even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner,
the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the
said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged (estafa) with 4 years and 2 months of Prision
Correctional in its medium period as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period as
maximum.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the
appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification on the imposable prison term, 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor,
as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a
total of 7 years.
Issue:
WON applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court may,
rather than declare the relevant statutory penalties
unconstitutional, determine the legislative intent with respect to
them and, accordingly, adjust the amount of the present fraud to
its 1932 equivalent and impose the proper penalty.
Ruling:
NO. The Court cannot modify the range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. The legislature's failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through the Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. The Court should apply the law in a manner that
would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law
is clear as to its intent and purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari of petitioner
Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 102858, 28 Jul 1997.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or
even construction; Where a law speaks in clear language, there is
no room for interpretation, there is room only for application.
Article 10 of the Civil Code - In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44
of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
However, during the pendency of his petition, Abistado died.
Hence, his heirs – Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado – represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substituted as applicants.
The land registration court dismissed the petition “for want of
jurisdiction”. It was found that the applicants failed to comply with
the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring publication
of notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
Initial Hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court
of Appeals which set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of general circulation
is merely procedural, hence dispensable. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was denied.
The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, thus
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an
original land registration case mandatory or directory.
Ruling:
YES. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of notice of initial hearing both in the Official Gazette
and in a newspaper of general circulation shall be followed. The
Land Registration Case is an in rem proceeding, meaning the
applicant must prove his title over the land against all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and ‘to all whom it my concern.’ He must
prove his title against the whole world. The notice of initial hearing
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be
granted.
The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done
by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter’s
receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said term denotes an imperative and this indicates the mandatory
character of a statute.
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again,
thisCourt has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court granted the decision of the
Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of Land Title to
the respondents without prejudice.
Secretary of the DPWH and District Engineer Contreras v.
Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 21 Apr 2015.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is the application of
the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
for only when such literal application is impossible.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed
by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it
being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to
modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
To entertain other formula for computing just compensation,
contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would
open varying interpretations of economic policies - a matter which
this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Time and
again, we have held that no process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application. Equity and equitable principles
only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and
jurisprudence.
Facts:
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
took respondents-movants' subject property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur
Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents-
movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the
subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then
District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the
DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy
Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per Resolution of the
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied
with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their
property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair
market value.3 Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession
with damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-
movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject
property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%)
per annum.
Petitioners thus elevated the matter to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari. The only issue resolved by the Court in the
assailed decision is the amount of just compensation which
respondents-movants are entitled to receive from the government
for the taking of their property. Both the RTC and the CA valued
the property at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00)
per square meter, plus six percent (6%) interest from the time of
the filing of the complaint until full payment.
Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby move for the
reconsideration of said decision on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT MAY LOOK INTO THE "JUSTNESS"
OF THE MISERABLE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION BEING
AWARDED TO THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS; and
THE HONORABLE COURT MAY SETTLE FOR A HAPPY
MIDDLE GROUND IN THE NAME OF DOCTRINAL PRECISION
AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
Issue:
WON the just compensation should be based on the value of the
property at the time of taking in 1940 and not at the time of
payment
Ruling:
YES. The Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the
value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for
purposes of compensation. With that, the payment of just
compensation was reckoned from the time of taking.
“The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it
was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings.” For
where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation
proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may
have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the
time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it
is taken.
Regarding Interest, the uniform rule of this Court, is that this
compensation must be, not in the form of rentals, but by way of
‘interest from the date that the company [or entity] exercising the
right of eminent domain take possession of the condemned lands,
and the amounts granted by the court shall cease to earn interest
only from the moment they are paid to the owners or deposited in
court.
The Court held that the government agency’s illegal occupation of
the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely resulted
in pecuniary loss to the owner. Such pecuniary loss entitles him to
adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on
the value of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full
payment. This is based on the principle that interest “runs as a
matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the
date of the taking.”
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 Aug 1967.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case
The law is clear that there is no exemption for a secret Agent.
“Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that the application is impossible or inadequate, the
court need not squabble over what the law meant. No
construction or interpretation is necessary.
Facts:
Defendant Mario Mapa was accused and on a violation of Sec.
878 in connection Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code
as amended by C.A No. 56 and as further amended by R.A No.4
which is the illegal possession of firearm of one home-made
revolver (paltik) Cal.22 without serial number, with six rounds of
ammunition.p
Defendant admitted the possession of firearms, provide his
evidences for his appointment as secret agent of Hon. Feliciano
Leviste, Governor of Batangas, and cited the case of People v.
Macarandang as his defense.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the
crime illegal possession of firearms and sentencing him to
imprisonment for one year and one day to two years.
The appeal was elevated to the supreme court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition?
Ruling:
No, the court held that the law is explicit and clear. No provision is
madefor a secret agent to legally possess a firearm. The accused
reliance on people v. Macarandang is misplaced since
Macarandang was a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaign which sufficiently put him within the
category of a statutory provision for the first and fundamental duty
of courts is to apply the law. “Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. Thus, the conviction of
the accused must stand.
Wherefore, the judgement appealed from is affirmed

People v. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, 18 Jan 1996.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The duty of the Court or other inferior courts is merely to interpret
and apply the law. Any modification or amendment of the law is
exclusive to legislation. DURA LEX SED LEX—sympathy for any
accused has no room in the court. The courts’ decision and
application is entirely dependent on what is stated in the
provisions of the law.
Facts:
In 1989, Amigo murdered Benito Suy in the public where many
people have seen the act firsthand. Amigo stabbed Uy with a
knife several times. Suy was still delivered to the hospital, but
unfortunately died after three weeks of confinement due to
Sepsis.
The Court a quo convicted Amigo for murder with evident
premeditation and intent to kill. Amigo was therefore sentenced to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with death penalty as its
maximum punishment pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Amigo wanted to have the decision reversed arguing that the trial
court made an error in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He argued that under the 1987 Constitution death penalty (or
capital punishment) has been abolished;
Hence, Amigo argued that the computation of penalty should be
regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death
penalty. In other words, Amigo implicates that the appropriate
penalty for him is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to
reclusion temporal since death penalty does not take effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made an error in the imposition of
penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1) of
Art. III of the 1987 constitution was already in effect when the
offense was committed.
Ruling:
No. The court held that there is nothing which expressly declares
the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it, and if already imposed, shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
Amigo, the accused-appellant, claims that reclusion perpetua is
too cruel and harsh and pleads the court for sympathy.
However, Courts are not the setting to plead for sympathy. DURA
LEX SED LEX. It should be noted that penalties are prescribed by
statutes and are essentially and exclusively legislative. The court
can only interpret and apply the law, disregarding any feeling of
sympathy or pity for the accused. Hence, the Court can do
nothing but apply the law pursuant to Sec. 19 (1) Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, as confirmed in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed.
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, 22 Jun 2010.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in
the Legislature and as a general rule, the Legislature cannot
surrender or abdicate such power since it is unconstitutional.
Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated, a power
that is not legislative in character may be delegated.
Facts:
Petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. was the second nominee named
under the certificate of nomination filed on March 29, 2007 by the
Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), an organized group
duly registered under the party-list system of representation that
manifested an intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections.
However, prior to the elections, CIBAC, through its president,
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, who was also the first nominee,
filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list previously submitted, whereby it withdrew the nominations
of Lokin and two others and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as
one of the nominees. Said certificate resulted in naming Cinchona
C. Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee, instead of being the
third nominee on the certificate previously filed.
On June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) transmitting therewith the signed petitions
of more than 81% of the CIBAC members to confirm the
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin and the substitution of
Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed
with the COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the proclamation of
Lokin as its second nominee. Such motion was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued a resolution whereby it
resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and two others and the
substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing.
On July 18, 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution
proclaiming CIBAC as entitled to an additional seat.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc approved the
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin and proclaimed Cruz-
Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-
Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of
CIBAC on September 17, 2007.
Such proclamation was contested by Lokin alleging that Section
13 of the Resolution No. 7804, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRRs) of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (otherwise
known as Party-List System Act), expanded Section 8 of the said
Act since it provided an additional ground wherein a party-list
organization could substitute another person in place of the
nominees whose names were already submitted to the
COMELEC.
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 enumerated only three grounds,
namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated. However, Section 13 of the IRRs
provided an additional ground: when his nomination is withdrawn
by the party.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC can issue IRRs that provide additional
ground, not written in the Republic Act No. 7941, for the
substitution of a party-list nominee.
Ruling:
No, the COMELEC cannot expand the provisions provided by the
Republic Act No. 7941 through its issuance of the IRRs.
The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express
legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of
a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is
rather administrative in nature. The power of administrative
agencies is confined to implementing the law and administrative
regulation cannot extend the law or amend a legislative
enactment.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the
Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the
authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the
law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs issued should
always accord with the law implemented, and should not override,
supplant, or modify the law.
Hence, the Court declared that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
is invalid and of no effect and ordered the COMELEC to proclaim
Lokin as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 Oct 1990.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
Legal Ethics A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics
CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS
Facts:
1. The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Castellano, the legal counsel of the accused-petitioner, with
finality, as the MR did not contain the certified true copies of the
assailed order.
2. Atty Castellano filed a complaint in the Office of the President
accusing all the five Justices of the Court’s Second Division with
"biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
judgments or resolution”, believing that it is the fault of the
Justices of the Supreme Court that the dismissal of petition was
based more on money reasons and were so strict or inhumane
and so inconsiderate that there despensation of genuine justice
was too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant.
Issue:
WON Atty Maglasang violated Canon 11
Ruling:
The court ruled on the affirmative. It is clear that the case was lost
not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but
simply because of his inexcusable negligence and incompetence.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court
for the counsel's failure to fully comply with the requirements laid
down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious disposition of
cases.
CANON 11—A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to
smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the
confidence of his client. It is emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is
not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."
Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very
strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents" is but
a last-minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and
irresponsible accusation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of
CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPERCONDUCT as a
member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality
of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or
SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine
seasonably, and
SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines
for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with
a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be
dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered
in Atty. Castellano's record, and be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive
Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the
country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallaria, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
9 Nov 1998.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
It appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types
of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are like those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type
of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of
the so-called “midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was
held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated
in his bid for reelection, became no more than a “caretaker”
administrator whose duty was to “prepare for the orderly transfer
of authority to the incoming President.”
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, the President signed appointments of Hon.
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were
deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec
15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The appointments were received at the chief justice chambers on
May 12, 1998.
The issue was raised at the JBC meeting March 9, 1998
Appointments were signed on March 11, 1998 the day before the
commencement of ban.
Issue:
WON the President can appoint positions to the judiciary during
the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Ruling:
No. The President is neither required to make appointments to
the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein
unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that
the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every
six years.: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made
for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments
made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and
are like those which are declared election offenses in the
Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments
prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called
“midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that
after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected
President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his
bid for reelection, became no more than a “caretaker”
administrator whose duty was to “prepare for the orderly transfer
of authority to the incoming President.
Therefore, in this case the Supreme court moved to resolve and
DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, and to order them, forthwith on
being served with notice of this decision, to forthwith CEASE AND
DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to
which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998.
De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191149, 17 Mar 2010.
Doctrine/Brief Description of the Case:
The prohibition against presidential appointments under Section
15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
Statutory Construction: Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so—they could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions.
Stare decisis means that a principle underlying the decision in
one case is deemed imperative authority, controlling the decisions
of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the
same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is
reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The
[Supreme] Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided,
but is not controlled by precedent.
Facts:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno will have his compulsory
retirement by 17 May 2010. It occurs seven (7) days after the
2010 presidential election which is on 10 May 2010. The
President will then appoint his successor.
But because of the Sec. 15, Article VII (Executive) of the
Constitution, the provision prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the election and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Sec. 4, Article VIII (Judiciary) mandates, on the other hand, the
appointment of a successor for the Chief Justice position be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence of vacancy.
On 18 January 2010, JBC passed a resolution wherein the
Council unanimously agreed to commence the process to fill up
the CJ position. The Council called for applications or
recommendations.
The position is not yet vacant but the Judicial and Bar Council
began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list
of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President because of the dilemma posed. Several petitions were
filed and consolidated with regards to the case.
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively
commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149 as special
civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be
compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least
three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for
prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its
search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of
Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC
to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be
vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17,
2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the
prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive
Department.
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, petitioner Estelito M.
Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the
Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article
VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 191342, which the Court consolidated on March 9,
2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern
Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from
submitting a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to
the President for appointment during the period provided for in
Section 15, Article VI.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March
30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
(Valenzuela), by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII
prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed. The doctrinal
pronouncement in Valenzuela was abandoned by the Court in this
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the incumbent President has the appointing power
during the election ban the successor of CJ Puno when he retires
on 17 May 2010?
Whether or not the JBC has violated any constitutional provisions
when the Council commenced the process to fill the position to be
vacated?
Whether or not the Court made an error in abandoning
Valenzuela under the principle of stare decisis?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 15, Art. VII prohibition against presidential
appointments does not extend in the appointments in the
judiciary. It is devoted to the Executive Department, as well as
Sec 14, 15 and 16. Article VIII, on the other hand, is dedicated to
the Judicial Department. Sec. 4 and 9 provide particularly for the
appointment of the SC Justices. If the framers intended to extend
the prohibition in Art. VII to the judiciary, they could have explicitly
done so. The usage of “shall” in Sec. 4, Art. VIII constitutes that
the appointment for a vacant position in the SC within 90 days
from occurrence is an imperative duty of the President. The
Constitutional Commission intended to make Sec 4. Art. VIII
independent from other provisions. The enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
No. JBC has the mandate to submit a list of names of nominees
to the President, as stated in Sec. 8, 9, Art. VIII. And since the
JBC has already commenced the process, mandamus was not
necessary. The duty of the JBC to submit a list fall under their
ministerial functions. Its selection of candidates lies within their
discretionary functions. JBC has no discretion to withhold the
submission of the list of nominees to the President.
No. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided
but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court is not obliged
to blindly follow a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination, to call for a rectification. The Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or
reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division. Valenzuela case ruling was
reversed because it undermines the intent of the Constitution of
ensuring the independence of the three branches of the
Government in recognition of the principle of separation of
powers. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for
the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate
for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect
that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in
stronger negative language.” Such interpretation even turned out
to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional
Commission’s deliberations. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela
should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been
exposed.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No.
191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in
G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and
G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly,
directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17,
2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President
the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance
with this decision.