A Proposed Solution

to a Puzzle about Belief

RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

I n “A Puzzle about Belief”’ Saul Kripke discusses a predicament that is generated

by the theory of direct reference for names taken in conjunction with a plausible
disquotation principle relating belief to assent. His thesis is that “the puzzle is a
puzzle.” In this paper I will propose a solution (or partial solution). My proposal
has ramifications which will be mentioned, but a more complete discussion of those
ramifications will be postponed for a subsequent paper.

1. THE PUZZLE
The plausible disquotation principle is as follows:
A. Let us assume throughout that all assent is sincere and reflective. If a
normal English speaker assents to “p’ and ‘p’ is a sentence of English, then
he believes that p.
In the theory of direct reference for names, the value of a name is fixed; that
value just is the object to which it refers. But a speaker may assent to
1. Cicero was bald.
and seemingly coherently fail to assent to
2. Tully was bald.
and seemingly coherently assent to
3. Tully was not bald.
On principle A, if he assents to 1 and fails to assent to 2, then although i t
follows that he believes that Cicero was bald, it appears that it does not follow that
he believes that Tully was bald. If he assents to 1 and 3, then he believes that Cicero
was bald and he believes that Tully was not bald. Yet on the theory of direct refer-
ence, 1 and 2 have the same semantic content, and they are incompatible with 3.

501
502 RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

How can a speaker seemingly coherently believe that Cicero was bald and, appar-
ently, fail to believe that Tully was bald? How can someone, seemingly coherently,
believe that Cicero was bald and believe that Tully was not bald? Does he or does
he not believe that Cicero was bald?
Kripke sharpens the question with other examples. Consider a speaker who
knows something about a pianist Paderewski. On the assumption that no musician
would ever be a politician, he might, on learning from sources he takes to be re-
liable that some person Paderewski is a politician, assent t o
4. Paderewski is a politician.
and to
5. Paderewski is not a politician.
Now whatever the speaker’s knowledge or beliefs about musicians and about
whether ‘Paderewski’ occurring in 4 names the same thing as the occurrence of
‘Paderewski’ in 5, on the theory of direct reference those occurences do in fact
name the same thing. Does he or does he not believe that Paderewski is a politician?
The puzzle is brought into sharpest focus by using a bilingual example. Here a
plausible principle of translation is also assumed.
B. If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any
translation of it into another language also expresses a truth in that other
language.
In the bilingual case Pierre, a native Frenchman, from what he has heard or read
about the attractiveness of Londres, assents to
6. Londres est jolie.
He emigrates to England where he takes up residence in a neighborhood in London
which he finds ugly. There he learns English by exposure, without recourse to trans-
lation manuals, dictionaries, and the like. He now assents to
7. London is not pretty.
From A and B it follows that he believes that London is not pretty and he be-
lieves that Londres is pretty. Since ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ have the same semantic
value, the puzzle is, what does Pierre believe? He has used ‘jolie’ and ‘pretty’ appro-
priately. He has committed no logical blunders. He is not conceptually muddled. He
can even produce perfectly coherent grounds of a familiar sort for assent to 6 and as-
sent to 7. Nor does it appear that he abandoned a belief that London is pretty for a
new belief that London is not pretty. He has not changed his mind about London.
Kripke sees the puzzle as a paradox in that plausible and intuitively acceptable
principles about assent, belief, translation, and naming may lead us t o a baffling
conclusion.
My attempt at a solution will focus on the disquotation principle A. I will not
quarrel with the theory of direct reference for proper names. I advanced such a
theory2 before the detailed and subtle arguments of Kripke, Donnellan, Putnam,
and others advanced its acceptance against entrenched views.
 A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF 503

2. SOME REMARKS ABOUT

DISQUOTATION AND DIRECT REFERENCE
The assumption in A, that a speaker is reflective, is supposed to dispose of those
cases where someone might assent to a sentence that on reflection is seen to be con-
ceptually or linguistically confused, and hence should not carry over into a belief.
In such cases Kripke says, “NO further information (beyond reflection) is required.”
His example, in which he attributes linguistic or conceptual confusion to someone
who assents to ‘Some doctors are not physicians’, shows that something more must
be said in such cases. The idiolect of a speaker who takes ‘doctor’ and ‘physician’ to
be synonyms is different from the idiolect of one who does not take them to be
synonyms (me for example). A lexical decision or a lexicon that normalizes the use
of such nouns is information of a kind and required if we are to be able to com-
municate our beliefs. Such normalization of the language is therefore a condition
that should be added to A. But that modification does not address the puzzle at
hand. An encyclopedia, a biographical “dictionary,” a “dictionary” of names and
their variants are not definitive with respect to proper names-nor can there be a
decision to “normalize” the use of proper names in an arbitrary way by agreeing
on a lexical entry.j On the theory of direct reference, it is the case that for all
normal speakers, whatever their idiolect, the semantic value of proper names
remains fived as compared with nouns like ‘physician’ and ‘doctor’ which may
differ in use in different “idiolects.” I t is also the case that an encyclopedia, a
biographical “dictionary,” or a “dictionary” of names might, unbeknownst to any
speaker, be mistaken in telling us two names name the same or different things.
Imagine, for example, such a “dictionary” or encyclopedia prior to the discovery
that Hesperus is Phosphorus. It might deny that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ were
variant names of the same heavenly body. Or imagine an instance of “mistaken
identity,” for example, some variation on Twelfth Night modified to make the
point, where it is believed that the expressions ‘Cesario’ and ‘Sebastian’ are names
of the same person whereas Cesario and Sebastian are in fact not identical.
Nor is a translation manual, such as the one that tells us that ‘Londres’ and
‘London’ are intertranslatable, immune to those possibilities. Imagine that an
English-speaking anthropologist Smith studies the original account of a journey of
an explorer Jones, written in the quite distant past. Jones recorded his discovery of
an island which he named ‘Lebensville’. Subsequent to that journey, no one has at-
tempted to locate Lebensville again, although accounts of the journey to Lebensville
are included in historical texts as well as celebrated in song and story. Jones’s log in-
cludes some description of the island. He also states that although there were ample
signs of human habitation, his destination was elsewhere and he could not stay long
enough to seek out the occupants. Smith sets out to find Lebensville. Using Jones’s
log he follows what he believes to be a correct route and comes upon an island that
seems to fit Jones’s description. He sets up camp and stays long enough to meet the
occupants and learn their language. They call their island ‘Glyph’. Smith returns
home and prepares an English-Glyphian manual in which it is stated that ‘Lebensville’
and ‘Glyph’ are intertranslatable. But of course any such manual is mistaken.
504 RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

If Pierre had prepared a translation manual, he would have claimed that

‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are not intertranslatable, and he would have been mistaken.
The referent of a proper name on a given occasion of use is fixed by the language
viewed as a historical institution evolving over time. I want t o argue that if the
object of a belief has as constituents the fixed values of proper names, then if the
speaker assents to a Sentence that is incompatible with that valuation, the assent
does not carry over into a belief. A modification of the disquotation principle is
required. But first some preliminaries.

3. ATTITUDES TOWARD STATES OF AFFAIRS

Knowing and believing have been characterized as “propositional attitudes.” The
vagaries of the many uses of ‘proposition’ have been a considerable source of epis-
temological confusion. There is a seemingly naive as well as much maligned view, to
which I subscribe, RusseU’s for example, where knowing and believing are attitudes
toward states of affairs (not necessarily actual), which may have individuals and
attributes as constituents. The “propositional content” of a sentence on an occasion
of use is (are) the (those) stat&) of affairs that would make that sentence true.
States of affairs may be actual, not actual, possible, necessary, even imp~ssible.~
Possible states of affairs are those which obtain in some world; in some struc-
ture. An impossible state of affairs obtains in no world or structure. Hence the
“propositional content” of ‘Tully is bald and Cicero is not bald’ is not a possible
state of affairs since it is not possible (metaphysically) that Tully be simultaneously
bald and not bald in some one world or structure. Similarly for ‘London is pretty
and London is not pretty’. That there are impossible states of affairs conforms to
common usage; but there are no worlds that include such impossible states.
We will take knowing and believing to be epistemological attitudes toward
states of affairs (or if you like, propositional contents). I t is generally held that if
someone knows that p, then as contrasted with belief, p is the case in that episte-
mological subject’s world. p obtains, p is actual, or, if we use “true” for proposi-
tional contents as well as sentences, p is true. A basis for that claim is the widely
shared intuition that if someone claimed t o know that p, he would say, on dis-
covering that p did not obtain, was not actual in his world, was not, if you like,
true, that he was mistaken in claiming t o know that p. His clinging t o his know-
ledge claim on the known falsity of p (on the knowledge that the state of affairs
does not obtain) would be seen as a conceptual or linguistic confusion. Whether
someone knows that p is therefore partly dependent on the way things are.
Suppose, assuming the principle of translation B, our bilingual Pierre claims
also to know that London is pretty and claims to know that London is not pretty.
If necessary conditions for knowing p are that p be believed and p be true, then
there is a consequent puzzle about knowledge. If we cannot answer the question
what does Pierre believe, how can we answer the question what does Pierre know?
The consequent puzzle about what Pierre knows seems less paradoxical for
he cannot, whatever his beliefs, know that London is pretty and know that London
 A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF 505

is not pretty. But the question about knowledge retains inherited baffling features;
for the puzzle about belief is that there are particular propositions which Pierre
seems both to believe and not to believe, and, even if such a proposition were true,
has the belief condition for knowing that p been fulfilled, i.e., does Pierre believe
that p?
There is an intuition about belief which I have (as do others) but which is not
so widely shared. That intuition suggests a modification of the disquotation principle.
Suppose that someone were to claim that he believes Hesperus is not identical
with Phosphorus or that Tully is not identical with Cicero, o r that Londres is not
the same as London where in those contexts of use the names of the “pairs” in
question do, on the theory of direct reference, refer to the same thing. I t is my
(non post-hoc) intuition that on discovery that those identities hold, and conse-
quently that the associated name pairs name the same thing, I would not say that I
had changed my belief or acquired a new belief to replace the old, but that I was
mistaken in claiming that I bud those beliefs to begin with. After all, if I had be-
lieved that Tully is not identical with Cicero, I would have been believing that
something is not the same as itself and I surely did not believe that, a blatant im-
possibility, so I was mistaken in claiming to have the belief. Nor am 1 insisting that
I did not have any belief, but only that it was not the belief that Hesperus is not the
same as Phosphorus, that Tully is not the same as Cicero, that Londres is not the
same as London. Perhaps what I believed was that the thing named by the expression
‘Hesperus’ was different from the thing named by the expression ‘Phosphorus’
which eludes the puzzle. Russell and others a t times suggested that those very des-
criptions are the preferred ones which should always be surrogates for ordinary
proper names. But I am not urging that conclusion. Perhaps it is still something else
that I believed; there are other alternatives. Perhaps I had no belief at all.
The analogy between this intuition about belief claims and the more univer-
sally accepted ones about knowledge is close. Just as a condition for knowing that
p is that p obtains, so a condition for believing is
C. If x believes that p, then possible p.
The link between belief and possibility also suggests a modification of the disquota-
tion principle A as follows.
D. Again assuming that assent is sincere and reflective, if (i) a normal English
speaker assents to ‘p’ and (ii) ‘p’ is a sentence of English and (iii) p is pos-
sible, then he believes that p.
I t follows from C and D given all the assumptions, that
E. If a speaker assents to ‘p,’ then he believes that p if and only if p is possible.
I will leave open the question of the strength of the “if and only if” in E.
The additional condition in D captures some intuitions about the divergence
of assent and belief. Consider the account of Pierre who before departing for Eng-
land assented to 6, i.e., ‘Londres est jolie’. The grounds for that assent were per-
fectly reasonable; he saw pictures, heard or read reports, and so on. Since it is pos-
506 RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

sible that London is pretty, then in accordance with D Pierre believes that London
is pretty. After emigrating to London and acquiring English he, on reasonable
grounds, assents to 7, ‘London is not pretty’. Given the possibility of such a state
of affairs, i.e., London’s not being pretty, it follows in accordance with D that
Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
If Pierre is not conceptually or linguisdcdy confused as we suppose he is not,
given his assents to 6 and 7, and his bilingualism, he would also ussent to
8. London is not pretty, and Londres is pretty.

and as a consequence (or presupposition) of his assent to 8, would assent to

9. London is not identical to Londres.
and
10. The expression ‘London’ and the expression ‘Londres’ name different
things.
He would not assent to
11. Londres is not pretty.
12. London is pretty.
13. Londres is not pretty, and LonGon is pretty.
Nor would he assent to the outright contradictions
14. London is not pretty, and London is pretty.
15. Londres est jolie et Londres n’est pas jolie.
In accordance with the modified disquotation principle, 9 does not carry over
into a belief. I t is at the root of our intuition that if someone were to discover an
identity, he would say he was mistaken in claiming to believe that it did not obtain.
If Pierre should discover that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ name the same thing, he
would say that he was mistaken in claiming that he believed that London and
Londres are not the same, for how can something fail to be the same as itself?
Does assent to 10 go over into a belief? Since 10 is about expressions, it goes
over into a belief. The expression ‘London’ has, for example, been used to name
a city in Ontario. But what of 8, ‘London is not pretty, and Londres is pretty’.
We have seen on D that assent to each of the conjuncts goes over into a belief, but
assent to 8 does not. If Pierre were to “learn” that 9 was false, i t . , that London
was the same as Londres, he would if he shared my intuitions say he was mistaken
in claiming, if he did so claim, that he believed that London is not pretty and
Londres is pretty. For, 8, unlike 11 and 12, is sensitive to the identity of the values
of the names. In 8, the possibilie condition of D is not fulfilled. Nor is it suggested
that every sentence containing two names for the same thing is sensitive to the
identity of the values of those names. The sentence ‘Tully is a Roman and Cicero
is an orator’, if assented to, could go over into a belief. Nor is it suggested that
every sentence containing one or more occurrences of the same proper name,
 A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF 507

i.e., name with fixed semantic value, is insensitive to the value of the name. In the
Paderewski example, 4 and 5 each go over into a belief but not an assent to ‘Pader-
ewski is a politician and Paderewski is not a politician’. Although the speaker here,
if he is not conceptually or linguistically muddled, would also have to assent to
‘The first occurrence of ‘Paderewski’ names something different from the second
occurrence of ‘Padcrewski’,’ he would be in error and the conjunction, which de-
signates an impossible state of affairs, does not carry over into a belief.
It is clear that on the above analysis, that belief, like possibility, does not al-
ways factor out of a conjunction. Now there are less puzzling counterexamples to
the factoring principle of belief, and comparing the cases is illuminating. There is the
lottery example in which some very large number of tickets have been sold t o a, ,
.
a2, . . a,.,, and although we might believe that for each al that ai won’t win, we
do not believe that a, won’t win and a2 won’t win . . . and an won’t win. In fact
we believe the opposite. On the surface, the lottery case is not comparable with the
case of Pierre, because the assenting would not be analogous. I t is perhaps doubtful
that we would assent to each of the conjuncts since assent is categorical and belief
allows degrees.’ But even if we assented to each of the conjuncts in the lottery
case, we would, unlike Pierre who assented to 8, not assent to the conjunction. Still
on the theory of direct reference and its consequences for epistemology, the cases
are in some interesting respects comparable. In the lottery case knowledge of the
impossibility of a state of affairs in which n o one wins precludes assenting to the
conjunction. In Pierre’s case he is ignorant of the impossibility of a state of affairs
that supports the conjunction. Hence, although he assents to 8, the associated
belief cannot be ascribed. What accounts for his ignorance of that impossibility is
his ignorance of many facts including the fact that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ have
the same semantic value.
The analysis brings into relief some of the distinctions between pure epis-
temological notions and those which hook into the world. Pierre, given his ignor-
ance, assents to each of 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as well as their conjunction. He finds
their conjunction conceivable. But conceivability is independent of metaphysical
possibility. The stat&) of affairs that are the “propositional content” of such a
conjunction is (are) not realizable in any world or structure. Therefore, however
cogent Pierre’s reasons for assent, they cannot justify belief. We see that the possi-
bility condition has considerably weakened the connection between assent and
belief by strengthening the connection between belief and “reality,” i.e., possible
worlds or structures.
Returning now to Kripke’s question; does Pierre or does he not believe that
London is pretty? There seem to be no grounds for denying either that Pierre
believes London is pretty or that Pierre believes London is not pretty. Therefore,
.
says Kripke,6 “we must say that Pierre has contradictory beliefs. . . But,” he
goes on, “there seem to be insuperable difficulties with this alternative as well. We
may suppose that Pierre . . . is a leading philosopher and logician. He would
.
never let contradictory beliefs pass. . . He lacks information, not logical acumen.
He cannot be convicted of inconsistency.”
508 RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

If we take seriously that the objects of beliefs are states of affairs, then for a
speaker to believe that p he must be in a certain psychological and behavioral state
relative to that state of affairs. He thinks, behaves, has dispositions to respond as if
he believed that that state of affairs obtained. If he is a language user, if he is not re-
ticent, and other normal conditions prevail, then, where he believes that p, among
his dispositions are dispositions to assent to some sentences descriptive of that state
of affairs and to dissent from some sentences that describe states of affairs incom-
patible with p. But something more must be added. Recall that Pierre under certain
clear and predictable conditions will think and behave as if he believed that London
was pretty. Under other clear and predictable conditions he will think and behave as
if he believed that London was not pretty. Belief, then, relates a subject, a set of
conditions, and a state of affairs. The conditions under which he believes that Lon-
don is pretty include the ones under which he is also disposed to assent to ‘Londres
est jolie’. Among the conditions under which he believes that London is pretty are
other beliefs he may have such as the belief that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ name dif-
ferent cities, or the belief that the pretty pictures of London he saw in France were
representative of the entire city, or his belief that the accounts of the beauty of
London he heard prior to his emigration were true accounts, and so on. Similarly,
the conditions under which he believes that London is not pretty include the ones
which he assents to ‘London is not pretty.’
In summary, on such an account we would say that under a given set of condi-
tions Pierre believes that London is pretty, i.e., he thinks, behaves, has dispositions
to respond as if he believed that state of affairs obtained. Under other conditions he
believes that London is not pretty. Since London’s being pretty cannot obtain and
not obtain in the same world or structure, we say that his beliefs are incompatible,
but he has those beliefs nevertheless. A knowledge of certain facts will lead Pierre to
give up one of those beliefs. (The assumption of Kripke’s paper is that prettiness is
a property a thing has or does not have.) But although prior to such knowledge
Pierre would have assented to ‘Londres is pretty and London is not pretty’, he
would (should?) say on discovering the facts that it was a mistake to claim he had
such a belief. If my intuitions here are correct, there is a rationalist principle that
constrains what we count as a belief.
Of course Pierre would not report his beliefs using the sentences ‘I believe
that London is pretty’, ‘I believe that Londres is not pretty’, but he has them never-
theless.

4. THE STRENGTHENED DISQUOTATION PRINCIPLE

Kripke considers additional elaborations on the puzzle about belief if we also as-
sume the converse of A. It seems to me a wholly unacceptable principle, whether
we so strengthen A or D or E. There are of course the indexical counterexamples in
which, for instance, I may correctly report that Pierre believes that my native city is
New York although Pierre is a native Parisian. Kripke excludes indexical beIief
claims, but the strengthened principle remains unacceptable.
 A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF 509

Pierre believes that London is pretty, but he does not assent accordingly.
Indeed the strengthened principle suggests that believing always entails assenting.
Higher animals and infants seem clearly to have beliefs, however rudimentary. To
deny higher animals beliefs is as absurd as Descartes’s denying them pain. There-
fore, even if we confine our epistemological subjects to normal language users, there
is no reason to suppose that for every belief they have there is a sentence that
“captures” the belief and to which they would assent.

5 . SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

I t should be clear that there is an independent motivation for modifying the dis-
quotation principle. The principle was strengthened not in response to the puzzles
about belief but in response to intuitions about when we would say we were
mistaken in claiming we had a belief as opposed to saying that we had discarded a
belief.
The additional condition is strong and goes beyond puzzles about belief and
proper names. If mathematical truths are necessary, then we cannot believe them
false. We might w e n t to the negation of such a truth, but we would revise our
judgement about whether we bad believed it if its truth were disclosed to us. In
accordance with the Kripke-Putnam theory about natural kind terms and the
modified disquotation principle, we cannot believe that water is not H,O. That is a t
the heart of the claim which seems so absurd; that if someone in a linguistic communi-
ty assented to ‘water is not H,O’ and if the state of affairs so described is a proper
object of belief, i.e., a possible state of affairs, then he is not just a normal English
speaker with a variant idolect, but not an English speaker at all. One could of
course restrict the condition on possibility in D and E, but that is another long story.

Notes
1. InMcaningand Use, ed. A. Margalit (Dordrecht, 1979), pp. 234-83.
2. In “Modalities and Intensional Languages,” Synthssc 13 (1961):303-22,I propound a
theory of direct reference for proper names as well as the principle of the necessity of identity.
I say, on p. 310,that “this tag, a proper name, has no meaning. It simply tags.” I mark some
now widely accepted differences between standard uses of singular descriptions and proper
names and claim that although one might discover empirically that the evening star is the mom-

-
ing star, it is nevertheless the case that if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are proper names of that star, then neces-
sarily a b. I also note that a description can come to be used purely referentially and say on p.
309. “it often happens, in a gowing changing language that a descriptive phrase comes to be
used as a proper name-an identifying tag-and the descriptive meaning is lost or ignored.” I
note that sometimes we use certain devices such as capitalization and dropping the definite
article to mark the shift in use (a foreshadowing of Donnellan’s “Reference and Defmitc Des-
criptions,” Philosophical Review 7 5 I19661 :284-304).
In the discussion of that paper by Quine, Kripke, McCanhy, Follesdal, and Marcus in
Synthese 14 (1962):13243,I argue that the intension-extension duality for all terms is an un-
necessary proliferation of entities. However, my suggestion, on p. 138, that the duality was
motivated by “a passion for symmetry” seems in retrospect a bit of rhetorical hyperbole.
It is of some historical interest that in his “Comments,”Synthcse 13 (1961):327,Quine
says “I see trouble anyway in the contrast between proper names and descriptions as Professor
510 RUTH BARCAN MARCUS

Morcus draws it. Her paradigm for the assigning of proper names is tagging. We may tag the
planet Venus some fme evening with the proper name ’Hesperus’. We may eag the ssme planet
.goin some day before sunrise with the proper name ‘Phosphorus’. When at last we discover we
have tagged the same planet twice, our discovery is empirical. And not because the proper
names were descriptions.” Having put the matter so succinctly. Quine goes on to conclude, in
the discussion, Synthesr 14 (1962):142, “The distinction between proper names and descrip-
tions is a red hemng. So are tags.” As it turned out, the theory of direct reference for proper
names was a very stubborn red herring.
3. In the discussion mentioned in note 2, Syntbese 14 (1962):142, I say, “We can and do
attach more than one name to a single object. We are talking here of proper names ... tpgs
and not descriptions. Presumably if a single object has more than one tag, there would be a way
of finding out such as having recourse to a dictionary or some analogous inquiry, which would
resolve the question as to whether two tags denote the same thing.” But of course as I now see,
recourse to a “dictionary” is not a solution. Of course a “dictionnry”of ubbrcuiutions is defini-
tive. However, in an abbreviation we are not giving the object another name, but rather agree-
ing on a convention to use one expression in place of another.
4. The dominance of Fregen views in recent years, in which reference was always detoured
through senses, meanings, thoughts, has obscured the fact that Russell’s essential position has
never been wholly abandoned by some philosophers. It has been subscribed to by R. Chisholm,
“Events and Propositions,” N o h 4 (1970):15-24 and “States of Affairs Again,” N o i s 5 (1971):
179; F. Fitch, “The Reality of Propositions,” Review of Metaphysics 9 (1955):3-13 and “Pro-
positions as the Only Realities,” American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971):99-103. Alvin
Plsnringa’s The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1976), is a systematicand elaborate effort to take
propositions as states of affairs or something very much like them. TNC propositions are states
of affairs that obtain in the actual world. Similarly for the pairs ‘false’ and ‘does not obtain in
the actual world’, ‘necessary’ and ‘obtains in all possible worlds’ and ‘impossible’ and ‘obtains
in no possible world’. For Plantinga, a world is itself a state of affairs that is a maximal “con-
junction” of states of affairs. “Adding” an additional state of affairs to such a structure would
vitiate its worldhood-would make it impossible. I am not here defending the plausibility of
that extension, but only noting an attempt to take states of affairs as basic.
If we take states of affairs as basic, a sentence like ‘Tully is bald‘ is about Tully and bald-
ness and not about the constituents of other sentences with which it is logically equivalent. But
possible world semantics does not differentiate those “contents.” and that creates the familiar
difficulties of substitution of logical equivalents in the context of propositional attitude verbs.
There is altogehter a Hegelian implausibility to possible world semantics. As in Tennyson’s
flower in the crannied wdl; sentence, if I understood you, I would know all possible worlds.
A detailed and adequate semantics grounded in states of affairs has, until recently, not
been developed. Some of David Kaplan’s work including his unpublished Locke lectures are a
move in that direction. Jon Barwkc and John Perry’s “The Situation Underground,” unpub-
lished, and their “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations,” this volume, pp. 3 87-
403, and Jon Banvise’s “Scenes and Other Situations,” unpublished, are full-fledged effom.
5. There are further divergences between assent and belief, since assent seems categorical. I
might assent to ‘I have a pain’ but not to ‘I believe I have a pain’, since the latter suggests the
possibility that I might be mistaken. Similarly for my assent to Tully is bald or Tully is not
bald’. But such considerations are not relevant here.
Since belief comes in degrees, degrees of belief will presumably be correlated with cer-
tain systematic variations in the subject’s thoughts and behavior with respect to the relevant
state of affairs under the relevant conditions. Betdng behavior, for example. So under the con-
ditiotu where Pierre assents to ‘Londres s t jolie’ he would bet in its favor. Under the condi-
tions where he m e n t s to ‘London is not pretty’ he would bet in the latter’s favor, although
those states of affairs are incompatible. Since they are incompatible and he had placed both
bets, the bets would cancel each other,
6. See footnote 1, p. 257.