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    Le Bohec, Yann - The Encyclopedia of The Roman Army EAS - POL. 2-Wiley Blackwell (2015)

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    This ction ist published 2015 ©2015 John Wiley & Sons, ed Registered Offce John Wiley Son, Lu, The Aria, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, POID-85Q, UK torial Officer 550 Main tec, Mallen, MA 02148-8020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4-2D0, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester West Sussex, POIB-8SQ, UK For deal of ou global editorial fies, fr customer services and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material inthis book plese se our website at wwncwilecom? vvikey-backwel The right of Yana Le Bohes, Giovanni Bria, ekhard Descher rb, Geofrey Greater, Boris Rankow, and Michel Redd o be identified a the authors ofthe editorial materi in ths work has een asserted In accondance withthe UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Ac 988 All ght eserved. No part ofthis publication may be eproduce, stored in a eeteieal system, oF tranemited nen form or by any mean, clctoni, meshanesl,photoeaping, recording oe others ‘excep as permitted bythe UK Copyright, Design and Paten's Act 1988, without the prior permission af the publisher Wiley also publishes its books na varity of lectronic formats Some content that appears in pint may not be aalable in elctronic books, Limit of Lisblty/ Disclaimer of Wacrany: While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts prcparng this book, they make no representations o warranties with respect othe aecuracy oF completes ofthe contents ofthis Book and specially disclaim any implied warranties of ‘merchantability or fines or a particular purpose. ts sold on the understanding tha the publisher not ‘gaged in rendering professional services. If professional aie or other exper asitaneisrequred the Services ofa competent professional should be sought trary of Congres Cotalaging-n-Publication Data ‘The encyclopedia ofthe Roman army/ general eto, Yann Le Bohec: associat editors, Govan Bia eta] pcm, Includes bibliographical reference and index. ISBN 978-1-4051-7619-1 (bk. alk paper) 1. Rome-Amy-Eneyelopedas. 2. Miltary set 1d science-Rome-Encylopediag 3, Rome-Mistry Miltary-Encjclopedias 1. Bohec, Yann Le Bria, Govan, 196 1u3s:s0 2013 355.00937102-de23, ‘catalogue cr for this ook is availa fro the Betis Libary “Thumbnail eve images, clockwise from top lft Roman reli officer and sors ofthe Prastolan Gvard, nd century AD, The Ar Archive! Musée Louvre Pais/ Gian Dag Ort detail obastle ‘between Romans nd Ostrogoths, Lada sarcophagus, © Dedgostia SuperStock; cl rom sarcophagus, 170 AD, © Tristan Lalranchis/ ag smages deta of Pravin Guard, © Deagotini SuperStock Cover design by Cyan Design ‘etn 95/1.5p¢ Minion by SP Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed and bound in Singapore by Markono Print Medis Pe Lid 1 ans Volume I List of Entries List of Mastations [Notes on Contributors Preface and Acknowledgments Abbreviations and Bibliography Chronology Map AcEas Volume IT Eas-Pol Volume UL Pol-z. Indes Contents bi 351-70 hat EASTERN AUXILIARIES: Eastern Auxiliaries: Late Empire astern ausiliaies inthe Roman army came to play an increasingly Important rol asthe empee expanded int territory less sulted to heay nfan- try an cavalry from the Ist century BCE fn the Late Republic and Early Empire, Rome’ former clientkingdoms and enemies in the est supplied infantry (cohortes and cohortes equtata) and especialy cavalry (alae), which were foemally organized into auxiliary units attached 0 the Roman army. The cavalry and archery skills of the taops servingin these units were of consider able importance to the Roman army's military city inthe east and theoughout the empire up to the early th eemtury CE. The status of some of these troops especialy the auiliay alas, becane ‘igifcant asa result, While the st tus of the auniiry units themscles appears 10 ave been downgraded in the Ath century CE troops drawn from eastern border regions such as Armenia and Isausa and Arab tba ais soch as the Ghassanidsaids continued to ply imp tantroles into the 7th century CE in newly formed ‘crack units attached tothe Roman sey The versatility and skis of the auxiares ‘became so important to the Roman army espe cially in frontier regions, that some argue they ‘were tactically equal to the legions by the end of the 2nd century CE (Strobel 2007. 278). The Palmyrenes area good example of eastern aii ries whose sills im desert and frontier warfare resuled in their employment isthe 2nd and 3rd ‘enturies in frontier regions all over the empire Including Numi, Dacia northers England and ‘on the Euphrates Diocletian’ and Constantines reforms saw the reduction of the strength of 2 legion to 1,000 me and the establishment of ea alry vexllations of 500 in order to: make them more versatile This structure resembled that of the old ausliseycobortes and alae in numerical, terms. Another element of the reforms tothe army in the early 4th century CE was thatthe cohorts and ale based onthe frontiers became part of the ripenses and lintel. They are generally held to have been inferior to the legions and cavalry venillatons (Southern & Dixon: 35-37), LATE EMPIRE 351 Diocleian’ estsbishment of the Strate Diocletiana inthe 290s sae some auxiliary units sshace arginal nomenclature were both eastern and western in origin based at varios forts located aloag the aulitry road. The western tones wore mostly rased ealie and at the end of the 3rd century CE: they probably comprised rmastly loca, eastern recruits. The Nottie Dignitatun, thought to reflect the situation in the east in e400) and @ structure which wis broadly unchanged since Dioeletian time, Iss rnomerous cohorts and alte throughout the eastern provinces wih western les clearly established much ealir such as sohore 1 lpia Dacorum in Sia. Others such a8 colors XIV Valeria Zaenorum, which was clearly eastern ‘origin and raised in Diocletian reign, were still based in the province of Mesopotamia a century late, Another development inthe early 4h century CE was the emergence of the scholae palatine, which were crack raps closely connected to the emmpotor. In the east he schol were drain frm “Armenia and remained an important element of the eastern army in frontier regions wich as Bithynia and ‘Thrace until the reign of Leo 1 ones, LRE: 613-6.4). From Leos reign, the sholae were replaced by the excubitoes and became litle moe than parade-ground troops by Justinian reign. Wren Leo reruited Isaurans from southeastern Anatoli, some wete broght Imo the excubito.L2o appointed one of them, Zeno, as magister midtum in Thrace, who in 474 ascended the throne. Daring the th cemury CE, Roman armies were bolstered by troops known as oederat who served ‘onder their own national leaders. These weve nt formally incorporated units and were simile tthe rmunsriof the caer centuries lnthevast, Saracens accompanied Julian on his Persian campaiga i 363 and. Armenia supplied troops in simile fashion. Laterin the sth century andalso inthe th «century CE, oops krown as lator genes were raised from people hat had besa sted within Roman borders. Some became foderati but others were reruitetetl nt the lgions. By lustinian’ reign, the foederatt were the most valued cavalry units in the regular army and while stil drawn mostly from foreign group, they also coriained recruits from within the empire (Lee 2008: 117). In the 6th century 852, PASTERN AUXILIABIBS! LATE EMPIRE CE, the most significant contubutions 0 the eastern focderati (or symmachoi) were from Arab ibes. Arethas (al-Harih), the Jafnid ruler of the Ghassanids, was mide commander fof the Arab foederati by Justin an in $29 with the tlle of patrkios and phylarch and fought ‘with Justinian’ armies against the Persians. He Jed an army of 5,000 cavalry in the Battle of CCallinicum in 531 and later fought in numerous other battles with Justiniar’s army. ‘The GGhassanids continued to supply foederaté into the 7th century CE and were the most impor {ant ofthe eastern foederat to eraclus. They fought with the army of Oriens during the inva sons ofthe Persian Shahanshah, Khuseo I, and ‘were significant In Heracluss recovery of the territories lst othe Persians, Ghassanid troops ‘were also an important component of ‘the Byzantine army which lost tothe Muslims at the Battle of Yarmulk in 636 CF. ‘Seealso ALi: PRINCIPATH; ALLIES LATE EMPIRE; [ARANS ARCHERS, SAGITTARI PRINCIPAT; ARCHERS, [REFERENCES ‘es, A. (2005) The empire at war In M. Maas) The Cambridge Companion 10th ge of ust (pp. 13-153), Combed ‘bel K (207) Srategy and army truce betwen ‘Septmiun Severus and Constantine the Great (pp. 287-285) In Fadkamp, CRA FURTHER READING Southern (1989) The ame ofthe Rom pri Treadgel (199) By an Army: Stanford Eboracum “Town and camp in Britain, moden-day York. Sev von ‘Ecnomus (Cape Ecnomus) Site of bate against Carthaginiarsin 256 BCE. Seeruwte wans. Economic Warfare: Republic Profitable war actions that Rome fought during the Republic in aly and in the Mediterranean not only generated a considerable redistribution {by land assignment and colonization) of prop ecty within the annexed teritories but also Improved, hanks tthe booty from pillaged cit, jes and the enslavement of war prisoners, the economic conditions of Rome, which in due time emerged asthe most powerful city-state in the west Taxes and grain both from the frst, provinces and, later, from Carthage partially enabled the Roman government to supply its armies even in war expeditions overseas for as Tong ae needed Polybis frequently underlines the importance of economic issues, in both Roman diplomacy and military intervention ard he isthe fst his torian who, pervaded by a piri of utiitarianism, specifically refers to the fundamental link [between warfare and the economy of Rome in the period of the violent confits vith Carthage, reece, Macedonia, ad the Hellenistic est 118 Is. work, where the greatest: Mediterranean expansion under the Republic is represented not ‘merely a the result ofa strietly econome model ‘of decision making by the Roman Senate, that provides information about, among other things, the revenues fom this exploitation alone; inthe 2nd ceatury BCE, Spain was eventualy subdued bby Rome andthe mines at New Carthage - where shout 400 miners were employed ~ yielded to the Roman state each day the equivalent of some 115 kilograms of siver A number of passages from Greek and Roman intllctuale alter Polybius ~ some of which also give important indiations aboot the immense resources of some successful war campaigns from the Middle tothe Late Republic) and theieffecs on Roman society, a they contain records of the amounts of gold, silver and slaves caried to Rome, Nevertheless, isimposible to substantiate the conditions ofthe ancient economy daring war, as yell as the ‘magoitade of Rome revenues callected hy tax collectors, much of which was war tebutes and tsxeffom newly conquered areas itcan be estimated ECONOMIC WARFARE: PRINCIPATE 353 only approximately, that i, about some hundred million sesterti.a year in cash, not counting ee ens in kind. Since income exceeded expenditure, both plunder and war indemnities, a well as the taxes find heavy tributes imposed on the defeated enemies, were spent mostly on the army and navy of onthe urban development of both Rome and Italic towns, o largely seinvested in land in aly. Sometimes the amount of war income was substantial enough to have very significant eco omic effects, incuding the sttlement of the longterm debt ofthe Roman state: thanks tothe war plunder in 167 BCE, after the victory against Perseus of Macedonia, the tibutun was abo! ished and, in 60 BCE, the Italian harbor dacs (portoria) were voided. Taxes and interest rates ‘could thus be accordingly reduced although the price of precious metals or of land could rise or lrop. Finally the contral of impeoved trade routes to new markets, exploited progressively by a number ofboth Roman and Italian traders, was an additonal remunerative consequence of Roman triumphal warfare during the Republic See alo Locisnics: RepuRLIC; Losistes: FURTHER READING. edkamp P (199) Huger the Son Warf ad Fol Supply» Ronan Repubcon War, Amsterdam, Scheid, W. Morris Salle R (eds) 2007) The Cambridge Fromme Histry of the Creo Wold Cambridge Economic Warfare: Principate ‘ANN LEBOHEC [kis difficult to speak about “economic warfare fin Antiquity, becaise the Romans di not regard economy and war as we do, Destruction snd ruzder were viewed not a= weapons used to destroy enemies, but a5 punishment. But in fat the Romans killed their adversaries and destroyed all their possessions in order to weaken ther "Texts say hitle about i, because these acts were neither glorious nor exceptional. When an army entered foreign tervtory the ‘soldiers began plundering, especially foodstlfs: war feeds war. A scene an ‘Traja’s Column shows a soldier harvesting the wheat of Dacians: others carry sacks (ceres 82 and 83), The ‘enemy and al ts belongings became spoils and nobody complained about this custom, which ‘was supported by jurists (Galus fast. 269) “Animals were taken for fond or as & means of transportation, and humans were taken 3s slaves Soldiers killed livestock and humans and destroyed everything that they could not take With them, The soldiers” progres could be fal- Towed by the tal of smokeand fires left in their wake houses, vineyards, orchards, and whole Farms wereset alight "Whe they create desert” sid a king of the Caledonians, “they call it peace” (Tae. Agr 30.7). ‘Altera battle, the victors possessed new mass of aves and goods (Joseph. BJ 67.2362). They released humans to show nese, mostly dating civil wars oF when they corsidered them useless ‘or no saleable. Or they kept them to boost their part ofthe spoils this wa: the cse they raped ‘he women and shared the ren, cate, nd goods among themselves. Otherwise they simply led everybody and destroyed everything Thus when generals announced in ther speeches before 8 Tate thatthe soldiers were fighting to defend {heir families and thie posession, was not 3 metaphor but reality ‘We must not dramatize too much, however: ‘even if wa inchided many horrors, the Romans did not carey out “total wae" ~ 4 coneept unknown to them. The eeality in ancient times ‘was that advancing armies left a thin stip of evastation;civillans who were lucky enough to be outside this path of destruction were spared, This concept of war was accepted by every ‘one, a we can see from the 2nd-century jurist, Gaius, Imesnational treaties did not exist, and war was supported as a lew, one Uhat can be called international, unwten, and based on the ctistom of the time. This law was an accepted part of life fora lang period, as can be seen from an effort, recorded by Augustine, t0 comfort the victims of the Goths! sacking of omen 410by telling them that they had been subjected to the tradition and the law of war (Civ Dsi 1.1, 6,7, and 24), 354 ECONOMIC WARFARE: PRINCIPATE See also BOOTY: REPUBLIC; BOOTY: PRINCIPATE: {HE LATE REPUMLIC, 133-31 BCE: WARS OF THE _PRINCIPATE: WARS OF THE RD CENTURY CF; WARS FURTHER READING Hanson, VD. (198) The sto Wap Wis London. Sabin (2000) The face of Roman be JS 90 Vendrand-Voye, | (198) Norm crest mtr alii Rome: Clermont Fran Economic Warfare: Late Empire tis as dificult to speak of “wonomie warfare in the Late Empire as it is under the Principat, because the Romans did not understand the com cept of economy and war Inthe way that i understood toda. However, they thought that destruction and kling weakened the enemy and therefore were inportant military goals, Two aims seemed vite men and goods. When the Romans were theaggressors they could wipe out ‘the enemy as they cid withthe Lentienses (Am, Mare. 15.1), oF they could immediately start plundering on entering their adversary’s terior. ‘This as primarly done to achieve theie own goals = increase theie wealth and weaken the enemy, "What belonged tothe defeated” suid the Roman la, "beecmes the property ofthe visto Aller the Bathe ef Argenorate (Strasbourg; 357 CCE), dhe Romans passed through the county of the Alamanai ard destroyed the vii the hile tovens along thei path (Amm. Mar, 16.15 Zos. 3.4) In this case, they lle al ving beings theie way, humans and animal, and they burned everything es, houses and buiings, As soon as the Germans heat about the oncoming Romans, they id away inthe forest Roman soldiers encountered two types of enemy, those who were poor like the Germans tnd the others who were rich lke the Iranians (Persians as they zalled them). Julian plundered thoi farms (Ame. Mate, 28.34 and 6 28.23 and 9) to feed his men and to enrich bis army. But wheat was dificult to find because of the Iranians’ tactics of burning lands this was sg nificant cause of Julians problems infighting tie Iranians. In Syria, the Romans surrounded each ‘water point with a small itch or built a rampart nearby. This all changed from the second half of the 4th century onwards asthe tend was new reversed: it ws the Romans who were killed aad plundered. The lac pounced om Lugudurum, fund the inhabitants owed ther salvation to the solidity of their gates (Amm. Mare. 16.4 and 5). The situation was made worse when the ‘enemy was numerous ad attacked the empire ‘on several figats at the same time: the Jathungi Plundered Helvetia and Racia, the Saxons attacked two shores of the North Sea, the ‘Quad attacked the Danubian provinces a the Franks attacked the north of Gaul (Amin, Mare 172.162; 708. 3611-3). In order to limit damage to their teriton: the Romans had always been prepared to grant subsidies to ncighboring nations, and this cox tinued in Late Antiguity. Thus, the esstein empire was obliged to pay substantial sums 10 the Huns of Attila in the 440, andthe govert rent regularly gave substantial sums to te Sassanian Persians in order to maintain pease fon the eastern frontier policy that was suc ‘esi in the Sth century but eso in the sth, These subsidies could also be used as leverage for example, when Anastasius refused to offer any payments to Kavadh in the 490, therety hoping to destabilize his position, but in the end tiggering war. See also woOry: pRINcIPATE; BOOTY: LATE WARS OF THE 38D CENTURY CE) WARS OF THE FURTHER READING ‘lock (1992 as Roman For al: L {Cae eas, No 2008 Pr Sa Sabin (200) the face of Roman bate R59: [= hts, (0993) Ube cpa Ha the Roms Sacked ces In Rich & G. Shipley (ds) War ad ‘Shey in dhe Roman Wd (pp 49-91), London, ECONOMY AND THE ARMY: REPUBLIC 355, Economy and the Army Republic [MAURO DE NARDIS Permanent warfare was the malin feature of the Hellenistic age. Therefore, the main conceen of kingdoms and states was how to secure a regular income in money and Kind that in addition ta wor dividends (plunder, inderontig and 200), ould Finance their troops, most of which were mercenary, as well as their military supply net- works and machinery: Consequently, the central Function of Hellenistic monarchs bureaucracy ‘was to cary out and supervise the withdrawal of surplus from producers and to transfer, by ‘imposing a system of tributes and tithes on thelr subjets, part of thei wealth frm the local com ‘iis to the seat of government It was customary in the Hellenistic world for the initial cost of any military action to be repaid to the Roman treasury through the immedite sources. of remenerative income and supply Ancient Hterary sources refer to hoaty,contribu- ion, plage, and lind reqisitonss typical om= pensation in the wars Rome Irequcrtly wot in centralsouth Italy. The major spoils captured were displayed at the time of trump, during the solemn procession ofa Roman magistrate andthe general himself who had son a major vistory on {he baled. In fact, fe lok a the sursing entries of the Capitoline st recording the ames fof both the victorious Roman generals and the subjugated peoples (Fatt riumphals) from the arly tothe Late Republic, we can se tha on aver age triumphs were celebrated every other year if not anally. Te addition. fees (turn were collected on occasion from all Roman property covers, gonerally ata rate of 01 percent to 02 percent, to ase resources for military campaigns Jn. 264 BCE, the war expedition o Sky was voted fon and completly supported bythe Roman peo ple because thy hoped to make huge profits fom 8 short and succesfl mltary action there. But the Fist Punic War endod as a turning point: omic war costs increased significantly, not only because troops had tobe ket in the fed ouside lly year-round, but also because forthe fst time Romans had to mobilize large war lest a fight ‘atest sca the Meet sulfred heavy losses, Aer the First and Second Punic Wars Roman peoples hopes of enrichment were based om the wars in Spain and in the east. The scien literary sources testi to jst hove mich ‘wealth was brought to Rome through large sar indemmnites. Wheress in 209 BCE, when the Second Punic Wr ws nearly a its end, Rome public coffers were recorded. #8 having only 1,800 kilograms of gold, in 157 BCE they con: tained 7,900 kilograms of gold ingots and 10,000 lulograms of silver ingots, a sell 9 27,685,200 Sulograms in coins; in 8¢ BCE, the amount of golden ingots rose 10 735,197. kilograms {although the text here is corrspted). At any sate, Rome’ sole teiumph over Macedonia (167 BCE) is attested to have yielded the remarkable sum of 120,000,000 sestrt For Romans ofl clsses, therefore, success wars represented & significant reed, since they helped finance the consecration of new temple, erection af monumental publicand privat bil ings and their ornamentation, organization of special games, and building of those famous roads across Italy (vie), which aimed both at raking armies’ movements and military trans ports easier, and at maintaining Roman control ‘over the peninsula, In addition, victorious gener als could receive handsome rewards (which they spent locally), and they made important politica connections in Rome and in Haly. Moveoves, those ealised in the legions, compared to the homeless and starving clillan poor, might act ally become rich they were lucky and their con ‘manders were ready toshare part ofthe war booty ‘orto offer cash danatives, As fr the later, ne significant change took place in 187 BCE. when the proconsul Marcus Fulvius Nobillo celebrated Ins trnmphover the Actaansanel Cephanians From his war booty, instead of the bronze coins casually given by victorious general, he distib- ‘ted silver denarii among bis troops: 25 to the fo soldiers, 50 to the centurions, and 75 to the cavalry the same reward was given to the lac allies. But the proconst] Gnacus Maalius Vulso ‘who cclbrate inthe same year a thump oer the Galatians in Asia gave upto 42 silver dena to the foot solers, 8 0 the centurion, and 126 lo the cavleyimen, Discharged troops were revved with even higher donatives (as much as 5,200-6,000 denari) by the leading generals and warlords ofthe Ist centory BCE 356 ECONOMY AND THE ARMY: REPUBLIC (On the other hand, the cots of wae for Rome itself were partially reduced thanks to both the supplies andthe tops (a fixed number of men ‘mobilized by local magistrates and, apart from food supplies, ald by thele own eo contributed by all the Ralicallies, Rei to-contibute more soldiers to ess pi they were eventually badly affected. Because of the recurrent state of waar, this burden increas ingly worsened: in 209 BCE, 12 ofthe 30 Latin colonies complained to the Roman Senate that they could ne longer provide money snd troops for the Roman war effort against Hannibal. After the Second Punie War the number af allies serv- Ing as Romans doubled and shortly before the Social War (80-88 RCE) they were forced to make up two-thtds of Rome’ armies ‘iter a number of succesful war campaigns From the Sed othe Istcentury BCE Roman trio ‘al power expanded considerably. This was quickly allowed by new logistics ofthe Roman army both Jntermsof scale and timespan. When Roman con Uwolof both subdued reglonsand military conquests developed into a fullgrown system of provincial administration, Rome increasingly improved a ‘supply system for is troops that was based on taxation ofthe annexed teritries (the province). namely ether tribute sol (ue, the thes, «fixed ‘proportion ofthe production of wheat and bale) ‘or vecigalcertu (a Bixed levy collected iter in money ori kind), Therefore the burden ofthe war cass aid on the newly conquered areas was chiefly ‘made up of grain, money, mineral resources, ad taxes in-kind, and managed by provi gover rors wh could as necessary. lb impose ad hoc levies on both locaaliesand subjected peoples. On ‘occasion, the governors even seized for themselves the regions reserve stocks af food crops, a portion of which they might give to loyal communis or cites Ofcourse, through their supreme power, the ‘mpriu, consul and proconsuls could take the same measures during military actions. Needless to say, the consequences of such administrative practice were significant for locel and central economic and socal stuctares ‘Through provineal taxation, the Roman government was able allocate to any mobilized army in a provinclal ares Gincuding garrison fovces) apart of ts surplas production intended for the civilian markets, in addition toa share of. the wealth rom that provincia. The Roman Senate played central role in managing thecom plex network of gilts contributions, and purchases ff grain both from laly and Roman provinces, as well as from other states or cts (some of which might have been allied), and it authorized thse in

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