Opinion
Towards a bottom-up perspective on
animal and human cognition
Frans B.M. de Waal1 and Pier Francesco Ferrari2
1
Living Links, Yerkes National Primate Research Center, and Psychology Department, Emory University, 954 North Gatewood
Road, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
2
Department of Evolutionary and Functional Biology and Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, via Volturno 39,
43100 Parma, Italy
Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive
research has focused on the pinnacles of mental evol-
ution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which
animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, lin-
guistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research
programs adopting this top-down perspective have
often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in
sharp dividing lines. Insight into the underlying mech-
anisms has lagged behind. A dramatic change in focus
now seems to be under way, however, with increased
appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition
might be shared across a wide range of species. We
argue that this bottom-up perspective, which focuses
on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive
phenomena, is more in line with both neuroscience and
evolutionary biology.
Introduction
A few decades ago, scientists focused on language – a
typically human characteristic – to see how far apes could
go with it. When attempts to teach apes speech failed,
training moved to the gestural domain and performance
exceeded expectations: symbolic communication seemed to
be within the grasp of our close relatives [1]. Definitions of
language were quickly changed, however, stressing syntax
over reference [2].
The field of animal cognition rarely shies away from
advanced faculties, leading to regular conflict regarding
the human–animal divide. But what if we were to replace
our obsession with complex cognition with an exploration
of basic processes? Instead of asking which species can do
X, the question would become how does X actually work?
What are the necessary ingredients of X and how did these
evolve? We pursue this bottom-up perspective in this
article by reviewing recent research on future planning,
imitation and altruistic behavior to demonstrate how com-
plex capacities can often be broken down into components
that humans share not just with the apes, but also with a
host of other species. We argue that to document and
understand these components at the neural level should
be our highest priority. This approach, which has been
gaining ground in the last few years, will move the field of
comparative cognition towards an understanding of
capacities in terms of underlying mechanisms and the
Corresponding author: de Waal, F.B.M. (dewaal@emory.edu).
1364-6613/$ – see front matter ß 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.03.003 Available online 1 April 2010
degree to which these mechanisms are either widespread
or special adaptations.
From a top-down to a bottom-up approach
Even if continuity among all life forms is widely accepted in
relation to anatomy, genetics, development and neuro-
science, this view remains controversial when it comes
to cognition. Proposals of discontinuity are innate in the
top-down perspective that has steered comparative cogni-
tion in the direction of the most complex expressions of any
given capacity. Do only humans have a theory of mind, or
do apes, too? Can animals have culture? What is imitation
and which species are capable of it? Do apes, in fact, ape?
Does not reciprocal exchange require scorekeeping too
demanding for any animal? Pitting humans against apes,
apes against monkeys, primates against corvids, dogs
against apes, and so on, it almost seems like a contest of
‘who is the smartest of them all?’ Scala Naturae assump-
tions remain prevalent enough that cognitive similarities
between distant taxa, such as birds and primates, are
sometimes viewed as antithetical to evolutionary theory
[3].
The absence of certain cognitive abilities in certain
taxonomic groups is critical to this approach, so negative
evidence has received unwarranted attention. Although
both positive and negative evidence risk being false, a
profound asymmetry exists: there are many more possible
reasons why an existing capacity might not be found than
why a non-existing capacity could be found. This is why
negative evidence should be treated with great circumspec-
tion. Nevertheless, failures to demonstrate certain
capacities, along with premature conclusions about their
absence, have appeared in major journals, such as the
report that nonhuman primates do not care about the
welfare of others [4], a claim contradicted by subsequent
research (see the section on Prosocial behavior and empa-
thy). Similarly, a failure to demonstrate that apes under-
stand gravity has been taken to mean that only humans
possess such an understanding [5], even though it would
seem a rather adaptive capacity for arboreal primates,
which do in fact show signs of this [6]. Debates around
theory of mind and imitation have followed similar cycles of
initial denial for nonhuman species based on negative
evidence, with subsequent partial or complete acceptance
based on experimental paradigms with greater ecological
validity (see the section on Imitation).
201
Opinion
The result is a literature of claims and counter-claims
regarding complex mental faculties with less of a focus on
underlying mechanisms than on taxonomic dividing lines.
Typical examples are the denial of imitation even in apes
given that they fail to appreciate others as intentional
agents [7], claims of ‘humaniqueness’ (i.e. key differences
between the cognition of humans and other animals)
because animals lack the ability to combine old concepts
into new ones [8], and the sweeping conclusion that ‘the
functional discontinuity between human and nonhuman
minds pervades nearly every domain of cognition’ [9,p.
110].
Others, however, have defended Darwin’s view of men-
tal continuity [10] or explained why cognitive similarity
between distant species poses no problem for evolutionary
theory. Tool use, for example, might have evolved inde-
pendently to serve extractive foraging in the great apes,
capuchin monkeys and New Caledonian crows. But even
though a sound case for convergent evolution can be made
[11], this does not necessarily imply independent neural
mechanisms. The intriguing possibility exists of deep hom-
ologies in the cognitive domain, much as shared genetic
instructions underlie the eyes or limbs of animals as dis-
tant as flies and rodents [12]. Re-evaluation of avian brain
evolution has indicated that even though a layer-like
organization is absent from the pallium, this structure
might nevertheless derive from the same reptilian telen-
cephalic structure as the mammalian neocortex [13]. If
both structures accomplish similar functions, many avian
and mammalian cognitive capacities could share homolo-
gous mechanisms.
The distinction between homology (i.e. shared ancestry)
and analogy (i.e. independently evolved functional paral-
lels) is less clear-cut in the cognitive domain than is often
assumed [5]. Developed by anatomists, this distinction is
easiest to apply to highly defined morphological and beha-
vioral traits with a traceable phylogeny, such as fixed
action patterns and facial expressions [14]. The same
distinction is much harder to apply to traits that escape
precise definition and measurement, such as cognitive
capacities. Moreover, analogous traits often contain hom-
ologous elements in the same way that the wings of birds
and bats are products of convergent evolution yet contain
homologous bones. When shaping cognitive capacities,
evolution often seems to act on behavioral predispositions
and motivations while retaining core learning mechanisms
[15]. Only if we know their genetic and/or neural under-
pinnings can capacities be confidently classified as either
analogous or homologous. Recent research on face recog-
nition in humans and other primates, for example, strongly
suggests a shared neural background, and hence homology
[16,17]. Until more such evidence is available, the most
parsimonious Darwinian assumption is that if closely
related species – whether they be squid and octopus or
humans and apes – show similar solutions to similar
problems, they probably involve similar cognitive mech-
anisms [18].
The overwhelming tendency outside of biology to give
human cognition special treatment is commonly justified
by pointing to our outsized cerebral cortex. The latest
neuroanatomical evidence lends little support to this view,
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.14 No.5
however, because our brain seems to be a linearly scaled-
up primate brain [19]. Excessive attention to so-called
higher cognitive functions and the corresponding neglect
of subcortical processes in cognitive science have been
criticized as ‘corticocentric myopia’ [20]. Some have gone
so far as to label the fascination with uniquely human
capacities as non-evolutionary, together with a warning
against ‘hopeful monsters’, that is, the belief that a brief
evolutionary time interval could have produced a well-
integrated set of novel capacities [21]. Every species, in-
cluding our own, comes with an enormous set of evolutio-
narily ancient components of cognition that we need to
better understand before we can reasonably focus on what
makes the cognition of each species special. Are cognitive
specializations due to new capacities or rather to new
combinations of old ones? Bottom-up approaches focus
on these building blocks and represent a new Zeitgeist
as reflected in the latest treatments of future planning
[22], reciprocal altruism [23], theory of mind [24] and
comparative cognition in general [25]. Another good
example is the field of numerosity, which has moved from
the all-or-nothing question ‘Can animals count?’ to a more
diversified approach, noting how numerical skills are
rooted in ‘nonlinguistic biological primitives’ [26].
Cognitive capacities are never all-or-nothing phenom-
ena. Often they integrate a range of mechanisms and many
species can be expected to show some but not all those
underlying theory of mind, self-awareness, culture,
language, reciprocal altruism, planning, and so on. An
outcome-based science stresses differences, whereas a
focus on process makes one wonder how deep these differ-
ences go and how outcomes are achieved. Theoretically, it
is possible that different species achieve similar outcomes
in different ways or use similar cognitive mechanisms to
achieve different behavioral ends. Outcomes are important
from an evolutionary perspective in that they determine an
organism’s success at dealing with its environment, but
from a cognitive perspective they are mere surface
phenomena. Unique outcomes do not always reflect unique
processes. Even if humans produce cathedrals and sym-
phonies, the underlying processes include social learning,
tool use, musical appreciation, a sense of rhythm, and
large-scale synchronization and cooperation, all of which
we share with other animals.
The dissection of basic components of cognition, now
more practicable with advanced technologies, aims to pro-
vide an understanding of how specific neural and beha-
vioral mechanisms contribute to the organization of a given
cognitive process and whether the same mechanisms oper-
ate across species. Mirror neurons are a case in point (Box
1). Unfortunately, however, entire books and treatises on
animal intelligence barely mention neuroscience. With this
in mind, we briefly review three areas of cognition
research: memory and planning, imitation and prosocial
behavior. Research in these areas is rapidly moving
towards a bottom-up view in which mechanisms are cen-
tral and species differences are less important.
Remembering the past and planning for the future
Remembering specific personal experiences has been con-
sidered a sign of autonoetic consciousness that is uniquely
Opinion
Box 1. Mirror neurons and the bottom-up approach
The mental life of animals is considered the result of their unique
way of perceiving and integrating different types of sensory
information into a single framework to form an internal representa-
tion. The merit of this cognitive approach has been in successfully
comparing the sensory channels of different organisms and their
psychophysical properties and in clarifying how the perceptual
world is built and represented in an organism. However, this model
of how organisms perceive the world rests on the idea that
perceptual and motor functions are anatomically segregated in the
brain. It also emphasizes the perceptual system as the core system
for the analysis and representation of the external world. The
discovery of neural mechanisms that combine action and percep-
tion, such as mirror neurons, has profoundly challenged this duality.
Mirror neurons were first found in the ventral premotor area F5
and subsequently in the inferior parietal lobe of macaques [27,28].
These neurons typically discharge both when a monkey performs a
motor act (e.g. grasping an object) and when it observes the same,
or a similar, act performed by an experimenter or another monkey.
The possibility of matching the visual description of a goal-directed
act with its cortical motor representation could allow extraction of
important information about another’s action, prompting the idea
that these neurons could be involved in action understanding.
Using brain imaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation tools,
several human studies demonstrated the presence of a mirror
system involving the homolog premotor and parietal cortical areas
[27], thus suggesting that this matching mechanism and its basic
properties are a general part of primate brain evolution. Beyond
coding the goal of motor acts, recent neurophysiology shows that
mirror neurons also enable a monkey to discriminate between
similar actions with different goals. It is possible that these neurons
infer another’s intentions, or why an individual does something [29].
human [30] and includes the anticipation of future needs
and drive states [31]. Other animals, it was claimed, use
stored information merely to react to present stimuli or
anticipate the immediate future.
Whereas autonoetic consciousness remains inaccessible
in nonhuman animals, other aspects of the above claim
have been challenged, starting with experiments on food-
caching birds. Western scrub jays seem to have precise
memories of past cashes, including the what, where and
when characteristic of episodic memory [32]. Since then,
human episodic memory has been dissected with more
sophisticated tools by neuroscientists. Increasing evidence
from neuroimaging and brain-damaged patients indicates
that remembering past events involves regions of the
hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus and prefrontal cor-
tex. Brain imaging shows that the same neural machinery
that serves the recollection of autobiographical events is
recruited to make plans, perhaps by piecing together
memories of past events to simulate the future. Thus,
episodic memory and planning rely on the same neural
structures [33].
In this light, it is not surprising that the same birds said
to possess episodic-like memory also seem capable of future
planning, as reflected in storing food in anticipation of a
future hunger state, as opposed to being affected by their
current state [34]. The capacity to give future states
priority over present preferences is also known for apes
[35] (but see Ref. [36]). Even rodents can show some of
these capacities. A recent neurophysiological study found
activity in a specific cell assembly of the rat hippocampus
during memory retrieval. The same assembly also predicts
future choices, suggesting that rats, like humans, use a
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.14 No.5
shared neural substrate for memory and action planning
[37]. Therefore, instead of viewing episodic memory and
future orientation as advanced language-mediated pro-
cesses limited to humans, they should be considered as
part of the general memory and action organization found
to varying degrees in a wide range of species [22,38].
Imitation
Even though the population-specific traditions of wild
primates are commonly attributed to social learning,
primate imitation has become controversial ever since
the classical definition of imitation as ‘doing an act from
seeing it done’ [39] was replaced by a top-down definition
requiring a subject to understand the intentional structure
of another’s actions, such as the other’s goal and specific
ways to achieve this goal [7,40]. Whereas apes and many
other animals clearly exhibit imitation according to the old
definition, the new definition has had the effect of exclud-
ing them (Box 2). Only humans have ‘true’ imitation, it was
claimed.
However, the majority of studies failing to find ape
imitation used human behavioral models. This is import-
ant in light of the increasing view of imitation in neuro-
science that places less emphasis on perceived
intentionality and more on the neural merging of percep-
tion and action as a result of body mapping between
individuals. Given that body mapping relies on bodily
correspondence and is probably enhanced by social close-
ness and identification, models of a different species than
one’s own are unlikely to be optimal. Negative results can
be explained by this species barrier [41]. Once the extra
effort had been made to train conspecific models, the issue
of ape imitation was quickly settled to the point that major
skeptics have come around to this view. Exposed to models
of their own species, chimpanzees reliably and faithfully
imitate tool use, foraging techniques and arbitrary action
sequences [42–44].
This leaves the question of whether ape imitation is
based on an actual understanding of the model’s inten-
tions. Even for human adults such understanding may not
be essential [45], so simpler processes are likely. Imitation
probably stems from internal or external mimicry of
observed motor movements through shared neural repres-
entations [27,46]. Externally visible mimicry in chimpan-
zees is suggested by co-action, in which observers place
their hand on the model’s hand or tool, thus gaining
kinesthetic feedback of the other’s actions [44], or by
observers that move an empty hand in precise synchrony
with a nut-cracking companion ‘consistent with a model of
imitation in which the imitator codes its observation of the
model immediately into a motoric representation’ [47].
This would also explain why chimpanzees readily learn
solutions to problems from each other but not from
repeated demonstrations of the same solutions in the
absence of a real-life companion [48]. Primate imitation
depends on inter-individual action coding and not on per-
ceived modifications of the physical environment.
Neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies in
humans have shown that the cortical areas active during
observation of another’s actions are homologous with those
containing mirror neurons in macaques [28,49]. These
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Opinion
Box 2. Do monkeys ape?
The role of mirror neurons in imitation is sometimes questioned
because these neurons were discovered in monkeys, which lack
imitation [52]. The latter statement is only true, however, if we
narrowly define imitation in terms of the understanding of another’s
intentions or of copying complex novel sequences. By any other
standard, monkeys do have imitative skills. In the wild, they show
socially learned cultural variation on a par with that of apes [53], and
in the laboratory they reliably copy a conspecific’s motor actions
[54,55]. The tendency to do as others do is spontaneous, because
monkeys require no rewards for it [56]. There is also evidence of
neonatal imitation in monkeys [57] (Figure I) and an ability to
recognize when they are being imitated [58]. In sum, if action coding
is the essence of imitation, as argued here, monkeys most certainly
qualify as imitators.
Figure I. Like human neonates, infant rhesus monkeys spontaneously mimic
the mouth movements of a human experimenter suggesting the early presence
of a neural mirroring system shared across species. Drawing by Frans de Waal
from Ref. [57].
neurons are usually tested in relation to existing behavior,
but can also mediate the acquisition of novel motor
sequences. Humans show activation of the same neural
areas of the mirror system during simple motor imitation,
as during imitation of novel behavior, thus suggesting that
copying of novel behavior recruits neural resources related
to the existing action repertoire [50].
Now that mirror neurons have also been found in birds,
it is assumed that the evolution of these neurons can be
traced back to the common ancestor of birds and mammals
[51]. Therefore, we should consider the theoretical possib-
ility that all imitation has a shared neural perception–
action foundation, from the vocal mimicry of birds to the
copying of foraging techniques by primates. This would
represent deep homology indeed.
Prosocial behavior and empathy
In the same way that the view of imitation went through a
phase in which some of its manifestations were considered
more true than others, research on prosocial behavior is
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Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.14 No.5
commonly presented as a quest for ‘true’ altruism, defined
as altruism without obvious advantages for the actor. From
this perspective, aid to offspring or kin hardly qualifies
(explained by kin selection) and any chance at reciproca-
tion by the beneficiary also disqualifies altruism as genu-
ine (explained by return benefits). But whereas these are
critical distinctions in relation to the evolution of behavior,
they hardly matter at the proximate level unless we
assume that actors know about inclusive fitness and future
returns. Thus far, there is no evidence that they do. Since
one cannot want what one does not know about, altruistic
motivations must stem from another source. Even animals
capable of learning the advantages of reciprocity can only
do so if they have a tendency to spontaneously help others
in the first place [59].
We must therefore assume an altruistic impulse inde-
pendent of incentives and long-term benefits. In one chim-
panzee study, the role of incentives was manipulated. The
apes spontaneously assisted humans and were also willing
to assist conspecifics, without altering their behavior de-
pendent on the availability of rewards [60]. Spontaneous
helping has also been experimentally demonstrated in
both marmosets [61] and capuchin monkeys [62,63]. In
both human and nonhuman primates altruistic behavior
correlates with socio-emotional connections between indi-
viduals, so the suggested motivational mechanism is
empathy [59] (Figure 1). Empathy leads to a stake in
another’s welfare, so that helping comes with an intrinsic
reward known in the human literature as the ‘warm glow’
effect. Humans report feeling good when they do good and
show activation of reward-related brain areas [64].
Empathy might be widespread in mammals. It is
thought to stem from an evolutionarily ancient percep-
tion–action mechanism, the most basic form of which is
state matching, also known as emotional contagion [65].
Figure 1. Chimpanzees frequently react to another’s need or distress with directed
altruism. Here, a mother, having heard her son’s screams, stretches out a hand to
help him out of a tree. Recent experiments confirm that nonhuman primates care
about the welfare of others, both kin and nonkin. Photograph by Frans de Waal.
Opinion
This mechanism has been demonstrated in mice [66] and is
being studied through yawn contagion in humans and
other animals [67]. Like other forms of empathy, state
matching occurs most readily among bonded individuals
[66,68].
During observation of facial emotions, mirroring acti-
vation is present not only in human premotor areas, but
also in insular and cingulate cortices [69,70]. These areas
belong to neural circuits known for their involvement in
visceromotor sensations related to unpleasant and painful
stimuli. When we observe a facial expression, motorically
similar expressions are unconsciously triggered, which are
associated with corresponding emotions [71]. Thus, as with
imitation, basic empathy runs from body to body rather
than from mind to mind [72].
If empathy is indeed the main proximate mechanism of
so-called directed altruism (i.e. altruistic behavior in
response to another’s distress or need [59]), the cognitively
demanding assumption that acts of helping rest on cost–
benefit analyses needs to be replaced with a socio-
emotional perspective. Altruistic behavior unexplained
by the first framework (e.g. humans sending money to
distant victims of natural disasters) often does fit the
second, a mechanism that might have evolved in social
animals through individual selection rather than kin or
group selection [73].
Concluding remarks
If there is one general trend in the field of comparative
cognition, it is the rapid accumulation of evidence that
more and more organisms show signs of any given capacity.
In all areas discussed (i.e. episodic memory, planning,
imitation and prosocial behavior), initial claims that
humans, or at least hominoids, are special have had to
be revised when related capacities were discovered in
other, sometimes taxonomically quite distant, species.
De novo appearances of cognitive capacities are apparently
as unlikely as de novo anatomical features.
Rather than focus on the pinnacles of cognition, the
field of comparative cognition seems to be moving
towards a bottom-up perspective focused on the nuts
and bolts of cognition, including underlying neural mech-
anisms (see Box 3). Most mechanisms are evolutionarily
ancient, tying together phenomena such as bird song
learning and the cultural acquisition of tool use in
primates and the prosocial behavior of both humans
and other mammals. This does not mean that distinctions
between taxonomic groups are irrelevant or that there is
no point to finer-grained classifications. But it does
suggest that, instead of dividing imitation into one ‘true’
form and other forms – which apparently do not deserve
the name – the most fruitful approach would be to return
to the classical definition and include all forms of imita-
tion in a single framework. Various forms of imitation can
then be distinguished according to the function they serve
in the lives of animals, the stimuli that determine their
occurrence (i.e. body actions, perceived goals, changes
produced in the environment) and the underlying cogni-
tive processes as part of the even larger category of social
learning. The same applies to empathy, which ranges all
the way from automatic emotional activation in response
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.14 No.5
Box 3. Specific outstanding questions raised by the
bottom-up approach
 Homology: if distantly related species evolve similar cognitive
capacities to achieve similar ends (e.g. tool use in birds and
primates) does this automatically mean that they use different
neural mechanisms, or are their deep homologies in the neural
components of their respective capacities?
 Linking imitation and empathy: even though imitation and
empathy manifest themselves in quite different behavior, to what
degree do both rely on neural mechanisms of body mapping,
action coding and shared representation, and is this reflected in
correlations at the individual or species level between both
capacities?
 Mirror system: what is actually mirrored in the mirror system of
humans and other primates, actions, intentions or motor goals?
How do mirror neurons work in parallel or in conjunction with
cognitive systems committed to inferential reasoning?
 Inner templates: how does sensory and motor information
converge during development to allow increasingly precise
matching between the two? This is important in relation to early
mirroring, such as neonatal imitation, in which matching occurs
without visual experience. Are animals born with an internal
template of their bodies, both their own and others?
 Emotion recognition: a mirror-matching system concerning
visceromotor reactions seems to be present within the human
limbic system. Might this constitute an ancient mechanism – as
old as the mammals, if not the vertebrates – for the automatic
recognition of another’s emotional state?
to the behavior of others to perspective-taking that
becomes increasingly complex with increasing brain size.
The latter allows some species to gear their helping
behavior specifically to another’s situation and need.
The most advanced forms of imitation and empathy are
likely to encompass and build on more basic forms – and
hence remain connected to the core mechanism – so our
terminology should strive for conceptual unity rather
than drive wedges between types.
In every given domain, functional refinements have
evolved as adaptations to the ecology of a species, the study
of which is critical for an evolutionary cognitive science.
The most logical route for comparative cognition, however,
is to try to understand the basic processes and common
denominators first before exploring species-typical special-
izations.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Sara Shettleworth and two anonymous
reviewers for constructive comments that helped to strengthen the
manuscript.
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