PART 1 1A. 1.2. 13. 14, 15. 1.6. 17. 18. 1.9. 1.10. 'ECH 7 TLE TECHNICAL NEWSHEET 5/6/96 Airworthiness “AGGRO” Please add to the BGA’s 1996 Compendium, ASW 20- Elevator Control. Restricted by interference, berween boits in the centre section control system. When full flap and speed-brake deployed. Check for correction insertion of bolts to provide clearance, after disassembly. 14 Incorrect Assembly and Lacking of Aileron Controls. Alter rigging: Ailleron disconnected in flight. (Reported by Bristol & Glos G:C). Check carefully before you fly! can be eliminated by the installation of a plastic block. Service Information 6-1 copied herewith. KAGCR, Corroded and Worn Tailplane attachment fittings also loose bolts and severe corrosion. Reported by Colin Sanders. Inspect A.S.A.P. Libelle TINS 201-33 (TINS 3/4/96), Aileron Drive, If no cracks are found in the aileron operating levers, no further action is required, other than repeated inspections. (Request from Ian Busby). G,103 Series Twin Astirs Extention of Service Life beyond 3000 HRS. S.B. 315-45/2 supersedes 315/45/1, copied herewith, Astir Series - Extention of Service Life beyond 3000 HRS - S.B. 306/30/2 supersedes 306-30 is copied herewith. failed, resulting in forced landing. Coupling may have been of an unusual type without peripheral re-enforcing metal ring? May also apply to other Magneto installations. G.103_ Grob Acero Il, Speed brake jammed by Gel-Coat repairs at brake cut-outs, Check for adequate clearances after such repairs, (Reported by Derby & Lanes G.C)) G,103 Acero Twin 3 Rudder Pedal Assembly, Failure of Pedal Assembly Slide-Rod. Sketch from Lasham herewith.Lad 1.12. 1.13, 114. 115. 1.16, Ae 2.2. 2.3. Dick Stratton Chief Technical Officer G.103- Canopy Jettison & Emergency Exit, Placard introduced by Air Cadets arises from actual experience in a fatal collision accident. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED - COPY HEREWITH KA8 Speed Brake System Failure as indicated in attached sketch from Dukeries G.C. Control Connections. The S&G article by Bill Scuil in repeated herewith for NOTICE BOARD DISPLAY. CARBLICING has caused two SLMG accidents in recent months. The GASIL leaflet is circulated yet again! Cable Launching Strops must never be made from “ELASTIC” materials sich as Polyethylene rope. (Some clubs use shrouded winch cable from parachute to glider), Damage reported to the tailplane of a KA13 after cable failure at 1300ft. (Burn G.C. report). KAZ- Fracture of the Speed Brake Handle thr ivot hole, A well known failure. Similar failures reporved on KA8’s etc. - See sketch (Wold GC). GENERAL MATTERS CAA FORM 202NR (as illustrated) must be used for SLMG & Tug Renewal Submissions, (Please destroy pervious issue), SLMG Flight Tests must be recorded on the latest BGA Form (sample herewith) - approved by CAA. c. Sketch herewith from AAIB draws attention to a potentially costly failure on a Glider Tug!ho Service Bulletin 315-45/2 enon, e103 2, Antallation of an inepection hole in the root Tb, (4f Service Bulletin Mf 315-15 or TM 315-26 ‘re’ not perfozaed) All mesaurcmnants in eo 3, Rxchange of the elevator lever No.103-3523 Secording to Repair Intructions No.315~45/1. 4, Exchange of the airbrake over-centre lever No, 103-4123/4124 and installation of inspection holes according to Repair Instructions No-315~45/2 |. Inspection according to the Inspection Record ‘Extension of Lige imo". |. Tha following inspections (visual inspection, tapping) must be performed: a. wing root external: wMiing/ fuselage attechnent fittings secure fn Janinace = wing connecting bolts: wear, corrosion, 7 Seformation b. spax_ stub: “Frain spar spigot I Spar pin fitting tight in laminate | mule Service nulletin substitutes Service Bulletin 315-45 dated October 11, 1991. Doth Repair Instractions No. 315-45/1 and SiS4s/2 fom atil) part of thie revised Servic Bulletin. | subsets concerned | urgency: Procedure: io_| ts / St [gh G 103 315-45/2 kxtension of service Life “Taw Asaas sim S/R s/mt WIN ASTI SIN ASTER TRAINER 103 twEw Tr 3000 - 3291 3000 = 3291 (with “r") ¢ 103a mwIN IT _ACRO @ 103¢ TWN ITT ACO G 103¢ PerN TIT siz s/t S/N: 36001 - 36024 1. Action 1 immediately 2, Before reaching a gorvice time of 3000 élight housst actions 2, 3+ 4 (only TWIN ASTIR and TAIN ASTIR TRAINER) 3. Before reaching 3000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 10000, 11000 fight hours:'action § 9000, 4. Before reaching 9500, 10500, Betion 6 1is00 #1ight nowess whe reculte of performed fatigue tests have shown, that tha service Life of GRP/CRP-sailplanes can be Increased to a maxinun of 12000 flight hours. ‘the airworthiness has to be dasonstrated for each Sailplane according to en established Tnspection Record. 1. The £ollowing revisions must be performed in the Maintenance Hanuals: rar qWIN_ASTIR TRAINER: WaB (german issue)? revision 6 MM (english issue): revision 4 G_103 awry xx_/¢ 103A gwmY TT ACROL ovieion 5 ‘as of S/i 33897: revision 6 ‘up to S/¥ 3078: revision 5 Mat for Tealy: G_1030 TIN TIT Was (german issue): revision 3 wf conglish issue}: revision 2 A dec. 1 SPoees 9a) ats mana.sayousoqano-e7-rouppse teuaen-ore—tagne Up) gsttieaiay sievesdpnt pow ospotanny saa ano by panei tdonsse wang Sm COTE TE] UE ey wsdoyg 738 £4 pouste s] POE f £2 ous BME oct hq posozdse von, Sey uraatine sovaies su Jo Teuyeys0 wmaseg ous Peaoxae WaT uoyaeoysyax0n/ss0uryaoMATY ‘rebeuey, wwewnty “4 weome iT est ‘te sequocsa ‘seteaa7K ‘eu oa u/s qyexDxFe puw ssexppe siy paenz0y pus sauno mow wig 03 ZT300s7p UOTIEMIOZET | PSGeet Ssed Arpuyy nox aey2 yee prnon an ‘zepTT | “Jovou anak pros envy nol suysusom ous UT JT °C *xoqaUATeAe 70 GYD O1 Ws Adoo w pte sxooqhot sueydzye oun uy peTTE eq asa (s woraoe) | “Passey'uorasedsur peretdnos ous wosavedsuy 2033y ° szox00deuy pestxowsne ue Aq yoog Sot oya uy porsTaze9 9q 03 ‘Sey puv doysitson woyaeiae pozyzoyane ue Aq Ino peysieD og ASmH GUOTIOR 94y Jo UOYIRI" Oyy -T ‘oat Ayzanrs 70 soquao oy pur -wibyom Aadua + (samo aubs15 30 Zequm ey3 on0u eseeTd) TepIO oseyoIng pOYUIE ‘ot Waza ZomaoesnUEH oifa Woxs PaETEIGO oq UL (g wovaoe) paooey uoraoedsur pue suoyyonmasur zyedou | | seuoyzoe 017g Jo uoTynanwa seazo payDD_D eq 02 | CPour Uy pue ¢ suoraoe 203 Xtuo) TePseIe OM rexrewan, reoueteq. vue auoTon sTersoamH T | exe | yeas | BS | enellit Blane =Service Bulletin ‘gros A 306-30/2 e102 yi | TH 306-18, TM 306-23 or sefomned) Ghis Service Bulletin substitutes the Service Bulletin 306-30 Gated September 9, 1992. ) ASTIR CS Jeans Sinernk sues Subject: Extension of sexvico Life concerned: ASTIR CS ASTIR CS77 ASTIR CS JEANS SMANDARD ASTIR TT cnus ASTIR IE STANDARD ASTIR IZ7 coun astm 121 cuus astrR 117 | pegency: slight hours: actions 2,3, ¢ Procedure: of performed fatigue tests have shown, ice lite of GRP/CR?-sailplanes can be Caution: The Inspection hole in front of the spar must act be cut ight hours. ie" yinat containing wozar beilagt tanks, Such wings” should fnapected through the water drain tube. cabeastreniecenate ee Actions: ‘The afzworthinegs has to be 4 ed for each saiiplane according to the oetablished Inspection Record. 43. Exchange of the levator lever No 1 according to Repair Instuetions Wo. fe 1. A revision of the Manuals w: performed during a new iseue of the Flight and Maintenance Manuals. | i tite ee ener —Tsrasin| osowmrsemeee voyaeo3y ya40o/sbouruazonsry aebeuen ssuassSpaf pe oSpormoms 3800 susesry “6 “Brgrgra | ano of Baqerrdvosow waeq ony uopaezeunss aut . | ADS Se: cH a pauTe ey POE || sear ssnensea yp avd Q%E s c4 pacontce vlog Sen'oqotran offses ena Jo Tvetoaa amare acd PEsoaa aT $661 toqusseq 9 ‘soTss30K ven 03 u/s ayexoxy0 pue 03 AtinesTp uorseuzoyuy syyy eaed ATpUTy ROL PTAA ouyqueom oy UT ounyétyer Tao pros amy nol 57 “EC suoyieatens 103 gous 02 ques Adoo & pue ‘YooaSot euvrdzye oa Uy pers oq 48K piooad uoyazedsur pesetduds eya uoyaoedsur zeasw °Z | ~soioeders peerage ofa 04 Sr | sam SRS ‘postiouyne ue Zq 3no posses oq 4anu SUOTSOe OWE “T smeceaoa | | (proooy voygoodeur 03 zogax) Aqtow pours reouerod | | -s0r0p oq genu!Ayzansb Jo xequoo ous pua 7uBTOR Madey pus auBTOM | Wa o0u ua wat Seyaue > suoT3onaysuE xyeday “9uy | nua. pue prooey woysoedsUT ‘ous everzoaen | sevard) zepig seu: ya woxy pouTeiao (¢ dorsor zo) TeHs9y | saeuruey wy 3u8y3 Bursary wyd rede ~ nobyde xeds uyou ~ | rqnas rede -< vorammiozep ‘yorsoxz02 ‘zeam :e3T0q Surypeuuos BUFA — Saeuruey UT emoes sSuyz37s quomyoesie abeyosny /burA — FTeuxoixe 4007 Bupa *e spauixoszad oq yen (Surddes suorrpedsuy yeneta) suoTaoadeiy DaymoT Toy Sys ~ + .ourg 8377 30 worsuopes. | puooex ueyaoedsur oys"e2 buypacoge woravodoul “9 | | C/of-90e -on suoTzonzasur zredou 03 Burpzosoe ope woTaoedsuy ue Jo UOTSETTEISUT “5 "792-906 “on suorsonxasur zyedeu OW 3 Buypzosoe pobuoysxe of 4eMm STeABT exqUOo—T2A0 sxeigye si ‘poutozxed you woesq sey y LOTIOe IT | *pammozed uead | | z/0e-908 | P uTIOT INE |oFAxg | zor | ‘gOxDClas 708 eho Test OT peone ASSY SHEALED AT THESE Porm Ts SLIDE Lod ao PEOAL AQT Trine woken BOVE ee “| SIOE VIECI SreteH OF Ff howT 2U00ER PEDSL MH OonT/ VE rIESy PEDALS OMAnTTED Fob CLARITY (Lash)séulg ‘Ygog Se ATR ETNA 3 juarxe ny sy oy eIpueY Ppsoodld Ou} yno |[Nd "yeJosIe OU) Jo Jes}o e9UO - apis idyo00 ey Jeno ino ejeq pue dn pueig- ssaey Jas aly eseo[ay - puey ye] oy} UY Yeroue OLY Jo Jea[9 pue dn Adoues ou Usnd ‘peo] Buds ysujeBe 3Yoeq e|puey pei TYBL ayy BUIPIOH - Aysnosueynw!s yoeg Any se[pueY pes Yjoq [Nd - WA CONV N sSol1g gOVDmo. mz, Deere O59 %ne anlirs Wao wooed Sok sorts &&) NEL : BI. 0%. 96 KS Baa. 30 BS, su, : Okra fay mada of Gam een on tule (ro Be corte 2b WwW A tre BH Brakes Qa, Wey Unk (anne) Sack mw teQanate sages) ow LAs eaten, eatin od ay wrt peventak ao Reltan et TACRadh TH THA CAROLS CAS aaSacks . vs Ss hss er alo a OPERATING LEVER eKabome wn, &. DETR OE ale ema Ke Geoxe Ley Ane . Reveeter By Suarouwns Soreme Sacsery (Qrvad rns.) an ky | K13 Kas A Bed. 28)8]93. 0 / —— Rut. oF FAILURE TROUGH | Leven aT Bencne Hece. IN FuiGHr | FAILURE lmbe@ MORMAK USE_ LEVER. Bhahe Com@ceTeLy OFE AT. —S_.AoisTe Secowd..CluvS KB_saspecrED.. And. Feud. Te. trav A. FOAL. Each... SraenNG: AT fom7 of FncToneé weeds #7 [13 17.596 AN WADesTicaL Position SUGGESTED THAT Leyes EMOVED ANY Inst. CLE mney EE_Amib chee risuy, -ANSALCTSD. Tas gh as.SERVICE « INFORMATION 6-1 D-€.400 Installation of the plastic block 6 RU 67. asim 6 Fw 64 | —~6 Ru 67 view fron the top view from the rear 1, Remove left cockpit side cover. 2. Roughen the seat shell in the area for block 6 RU 67 (see sketch) thoroughly with sandpaper. 3. Roughen the giue area of block 6 RU 67. 4. Glue block 6 RU 67 onto the seat shell. Therefore extend the landing gear and place a thin piece of ~~ cardboard between the landing gear control pushrod and the blook to ensure the free play of appr. 0.5 mm, Press the block to the seat shell and secure it for curing with tape or with ballast. Remove excessive glue material. Suitable glue materiel: Epoxyresin see repair manual or polyester resin both thickened with cotton flocks. 5. After curing. Function check of the landing gear control. 6. Reinstall the cockpit side cover. DWE.4o00_ uwhrceBILL SCULL R cing the modein gider could hardly bo simpler. n the latest designs the controls con- ‘necl automatically; the slighty oldor gliders may hhave separate connections for alierone, taps ‘and alrorake, Even If one has to make contol ‘connections, rigging Seldom takes more than a ‘ew minutes which ig in marked contrast 10 the old, surtad glare, erhnaps this simply results inthe favre to ‘connect the control, In essence, rigging ihe ‘glider bacomes the Dl shouldn't but ia ‘Ona way to combal tis lackadaisical atifuce ofcourse to complete the rigging, walk away and than de a Dias i you hat just got the glider out ‘of the hangar. But we don't ned i be that pedantic do wa? But tho accidanis tell another story. Accidents ‘The aceideris show the potential probe: CONTROL CONNECTIONS From time to time there are incidents and accidents, some fatal, be- cause the pilot has falled to connect a contro! properly or, maybe, not atall. In this article Bill covers rigging, daily inspection, control checks and the policy, or philosophy, of whether to lock the control connec tions with some suitable device, He forces home his message with a | collection of grim panels showing what can happen when absolute care isn't taken The V-talied glider had been rigged thet day and already tlown once. On the sec: fond winch launch, at about 600%, the feft tallplane was sean to rotate through 90° ceausing the glider to pitch up and enter a spin from which recovery was not possi- ble. The locking pin was not correcty ine Stalled allowing the tallplane to move. “Afler @ shallow wineh launch the glider few unusually fast and tow along the ridge (which was working} with occasional puil- ‘ups before diving Into tres at the bottom of the ridge. The locking pin for the eleva {or was found on Ite siting and had not been fitted, The elevator was not con nected, ‘The tochnical aspect inthis caso was thatthe looking pin could be through she tatiplane wih- ‘out engaging the mounting/tive shatt. Not ex acly a fat-salo dasion. In thi accident the pot hhad no chance at all The pasitve chock fortis design would be to iry and pull each talipla hal of ie mounting fe eatabich thatthe pin was ‘actually locking itn place, Since a visual check Is vituaty impossible the importance ofthe pos Ive check is paramount. Insoma cases the lapse may not nave ser= ‘ous consequances, Ive talked to some very &x- perienced pilots. who have coped wih @ ‘isconnacted alleron and even continued with & cross-country light, However, the outcame can bo fata. ‘The glider had boon rigged on the day of the aeeldent and the eppropriete pre-ight checks carried out, Including a positive ‘check. On tako-oll the lot alloron connec tion in the fuselage became detached. The alleron vibrated and set up a wing oscilla: tion, The pllot abandonod the aerotow and turned to get back to the airfield. During the turn the glider spun and crashed into irees. Tis @ matte’ for spaculation as To whether, it tno plot hae net tumnad or turned more gently, hho could have controlled the glcer and ances Jna fold. The tragic thing abovt the accidents thal hare wae dotintoly a postive control check Itis also evident from bench tosts that if the [Hoteller eonnection had been proporly accom. bad then it would not have come off. We know that a partis! connection is ‘possible, Inegentally, he ghder was a Sid Crus andthere werent any locking pins. Nore on this pointater. tha elevator Is not connected tha outcome wilibe serous and sometimes fatal: 80 ‘Some pilots who make the same mistake get enough height to bale oul, even trom 3 winch Taunch, On aerctow there isthe risk of @ tow- plane upset but usually ne cer climbs steeply Before tho tug is airborne and either the glider pilot othe ug pliot releases. The gliders att fude when tstnkas tho round isa matter otluck Usually the plo is not injured, 0 thoro aront too many variations on the basicthome. While the mind may boggle at any- ‘one making such a mistake, falure to connect the contols happens with monotonous reguiat- ly. 80 what's your policy, or even philosophy, regarding he locking of control eonnections? A policy or philosophy itis elatvaly easy inthe context of club oid ers fo have a system which seams satisfactory. Mes! glrs ate Ke riage and ainough the pracice may include a posilve control check, {he station Is hypothetical ifthe gider was al= ready ged. 0 do you lock the L'Hotelir connections on your glider? No? You wouldnt make such a Stupid mistake, would you? Yet very expork- ‘enced poeple co. For example: The glider was rigged but no independent positive control checks were made 36 It ‘was not tobe flown. However, later in the {day the pllot decided to fly and on aero tow found there was no elevator control. ‘Attar considerable cliffeulty (having re- leased from tow at 2500!t) the plot jett!- ssoned the canopy and struggled out ofthe cockpit to make a sale parachute descent, ‘This was a combination of uck (hat the gldor towed salistatorily without elevator conte} and presence of mind in baling out, despite the oifi- calles. The message ‘Sothere araivee clear lessons o be learned. {Walk nay afer regina. Core back are goad. 2, Cann aut posiive control check 83. Ftlocking/salety pins to all connections. Locking L'Hotellier connectors I there is provision for locking @ connaction then why aol use It? 1 Is interesting that in Gormany locking L'Hoteller connections is mandatory, roquirad by an Airworthiness Drestve, ‘Some poopie wllarque that's lifeuttn cor tain gitar, tke the alerone on a Sta ‘was almost convinced that was untl | ‘a syndicate at Lasham. "No problem" they said, anditisn', Alright, you dtby feel but one must surly be reasturdty knowing alockng gins inplace, The method ‘So what are the prcbloms? To some extent the answer depends on the contiguration = hater the control un, including the connec- tion's straight or involves a change of ciection, For the insine control run, the simple plastic cis shown on he oppasita page Is goog option, Fig shan the opin the eonneet position, ‘The ball end can be insert in the socket. Fig? shows the cip retaled through 180°. In {Ns postion servos as an addtional lock, ‘This i 2 Glaser-Dirks design and available from the agent, as ao the other options. “The salty pin comes in mora than one form, Tho gimp D clips best attached by a cord to the body ofthe connector, thus avoiding drop- ping it. S00 Fig & fer the pin hanging tree and Figd withitinplace ts worth noting natin some ‘older gliders there may not be a hole drilled in the locking lever or wedge ofthe L'Hotelie. If you ae going ‘o medly the connectors on your ‘der then the locking hole shouldbe dled with the connector assembled, ie the ball in the socket, I you del he hole with I glsassembies then may not be possible to gota pin through the hole, which rather defeats the object of the ‘Rveration cn the locking arrangements with a clip which Is fastened to the boy of ihe SAILPLANE & GLIDINGFig, Fig 2, Fig, LeHotallier as in Fig 5. This arrangement helps to locate the in in te hole ‘The final option 's casignad by Klaus Wedekind. The locking sleeve is spring loaded: inas to be pushed back against tne sacing to ngage the ball and socket (Fig 8). Orca ro leased it covers the wed, thus mabifsing it (ig 7). The sleave will 01 spring back tre ba 's not propery engaged inthe socket. Other possibilities So far only wo possible “aur cases" have bean consiaoreé = fling to maka tha connee: Fig. tion ator partat ornaction. The Dl and the positive contol check guava against the former ‘and the locking device against both “The thed.case is when ine eannacton is prop erly mace but not locked. Apparenty the con- ‘ection can disengage under load. have novar been convinced about his untold about a pos: Itve contro chack on a 21 olavater ‘Seemingly when the contol coulis loaded the wedge mill move, Wile it may be ditfcut to achieve simiar loads in fight there is some evi dence fe suggest thai a disconnection under lead is possitla. Yet another good reason for Figs. Fig? using one cr other ofthe lacking methods Finally ‘Ara You convinced? If not then evidenily you're prepared to accept the,isk, however ure likely ha possibly of you making e mistake, This psychological state is krown as; “ivulner- abil’. On the cthar hand you might decge that Jacking the L'Hotelfr connections on your glider ‘sa gondidea. “There may be something behind he Luttanet Bundesartmeking the requirement io ockinern mandatory, aFinal overload region, mostly in shear, fatigue region Crack initiated at multi Note surface pitting corrosion i Pre Ga me and rough machining marksares > nme EAR REE eR 14.. CARBURETTOR ICING Aircraft type Cessna 152 Date December 1995, Engine type Lycoming 0-235 Lac ‘The aircraft was on a cross- {he icing ranges as shown inthe position is if the aircraft is fying country flight in Scotiand, the chart shown. in conditions which the chart proposed route being Edinourgh shows are conducive to carburet- Oban - Fort William - Perth - The pilot pointed out that various tor icing. Even then, the manual Edinburgh, The weather for the publications do actually discuss forthe aircraft and engines whole route was cloudless and the use of permanent selection _—_ should be consulted, because at a planned altitude of S000tt, dae the outside air temperature was % eae “15°C. The pilot selected ets carburettor heat, and left it on et eae throughout the entire fight, io Or although he di slightly reduce the mixture in order to make it slightly leaner. After some time, 0 the engine started running roughly with the rpm suddenly falling. ‘The aitcraft was unable © Dewpoint C to sustain height and despite pushing the mixture back to the fully rich setting and applying full io Power, the engine would only achieve 1500 rpm. Returning the carburettor heat to the cold * an position resulted in the engine a 8 test running down further, so the pilot quickly went back to the full fot postion and acuted come [Ey] stowsicng ary aor burst of power. They were able Moderate icing cruise power to land safely at Perth and since bslaimdies ebscuiidcsred no faults were found with the BEE serious icing -descont power engine, the conclusion was Lighticing -cuise or descent formation of carburettor ice. isowee CAA COMMENT: of carburettor heat inflight and many do not encourage this suggest that the mixture be Practice, Copies of Safety It seems likely that the continu» leaned slightly i this is done, Sense Leaflet 144, Piston ous use of carburettor heat Engine Icing, are available from caused the temperature in the Generally, the only occasion the GAA Printing and Publications veniturl of the carburettor torise carburettor heater should be let! Section at Cheltenham, address such that it was now in one of set continuously in the hot 8 on page 2 of this GASIL,S.A. MRS APPENDIX 6 B.G.A. FLIGHT TEST REPORT TYP Bosses B.G.A, INSP 267 FT PART? —M-G PERFORMANCE AND HANDLING (Weather)... Location. 7.1 Engine Ground Starting Max Static RPM, Idle RPM... sesnsnen 7 OillPress. Genialternator output... se Oil Tempe Carb Heat RPM Drop... At Full Power... 7.2 T.and Glimb Performance (Set 1013 mb, Record G/L Temp Record T/O Weight. smn CB, Abner va Fuel Load. Time | HEIGHT RPM tas. oWtemP | oMiN | 1 MIN 2 MIN 3MIN “4 MIN MIN Ol PRESS Mean RIC, Handling at T/0 and Climb. a Trim 7.3 Engine RPM at VE. Throttle Closed IAS, RPM, (handing at Vie) 7.4 — Eeathering/Unfeathering in Flight 7.6 — Restarting (2) Starter motorfunfeather...mmnen {b) Unfeather/dive to IAS... Height Loss... 7.6 Stalls - Clean and Gearlfaps down (Record IAS/BUFFET) 7.7 Stability Assessment (Engine-on/Engine-off) 7.8 Handling - Aitbrekes, flaps - Gear Down - (approach and tanding). 7.9 Acrobatic Manoeuvres and Spinning 7.40 Overshoot and Climb Out Tri.7.12 Landings - Power On 7.43 Ground Handling - (Taxi-ing, manoeuvring, brakes) 7.14 Gockpit Layout -Placerds. 7.15 General Remarks (Verification of Fight Manual) 7.46 | Post Flight Perfonnance Analysis” Measured Rate of Climb from 7.2 furnin Scheduled Rate of Climb from Manual for test altitude, weight and temperature Difference (Measured - Scheduled) fumin Performance result acceptable YESINO Other Flight Test Results acceptable YESINO Recorded defects Ae ccnnnene Signed for BGA... 7 Date. PPL Number... ee BGA Note To correct climb performance for temperatures varying fron ISA. 15°C - For temperatures above 15° subtract 4ft/min. For temperatures below 15° add 4ft/minCae BAM Yo LNR SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR THE RENEWAL OF A CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS een IN ACCORDANCE WITH BCAR A/B 3-4. afety Regulation Gr Safety Regulation Group DISTRIBUTION: White - CAA Pink - CAK Blue ~ Approved Organisation 1 AIRCRAFT DETAILS Registtation ype Serial No category Total hours flown since manufacture to 31 Decemoer prior to this renewal assoceted fight iles/andings* Type of Engines {ype of Propel APU Type: Te current Aircraft Weight and Centve of Gravity Schedule deted accurately reflects the present weight ofthe aircraft. Tre aircraft was lst weighed on Fight ManualPOHOwners Manual* amendment status report dated... . Aircraft tested to AFTS No: (ssue No: Date of Test The aircraft has been fight teste in accordance with the agreed Fleet Test Programme YESINO® 2__ COMPLIANCE STATEMENT | confirm thet compliance withthe folowing is properly entered and certified in the sircrat technical records- inothinessnoices,conenistse —( Lakest Tosuu ?) Bea iqq? Mandatory Aircraft Modifications ond inspections Summary, Contents and Check List of Pages, sue ka + FAA Summary of Airworthiness Diectves Large Aircrat/Small Airratt and Rotorcraft at biweekly listing No: Vedest Foreign Airworthiness Sectives Vols | and il- CAA Additional Aiwarthiness Diectives, Contents and List of Pages, sue: Th Foreign AimerthinessDtecivs Vo Contents and Check Ust ef Pages, sue J NS Scheduled Maintenance and Component iife Limits satisfactory: YESINO* Schedule rf. MS: All mocltications and repairs revealed during this inspection and carted oust since ast C of A renewal have been assessed ond are adequately ‘recorded and certified in the appropriste Log Books The last Maintenance Review is dated Radio equipment in accordance with ACOGENR YES/NO" 3. CERTIFICATION Ceritied that the appropriate requirements of BCAR, (for CAR use only) Section A/B Chapter A/D 3-4 have been complied wit and the particulars contained hare ae correct ‘The previous Cerificate of worthiness has been its recommended tat the Cerificate of inworthiness replaced by Certificate No be renewed for @petiod of 36, months, which Is effective as Follows: inthe folowing category: TaneanecatesaneBarrecoac Teaaspoct Category ceigo)aedal iat vetelipecel” DATE OF VALIDITY: Organisation Ben DATE OF EXPY: Company Approval: OAT (D370 T3 Signature (ete) Dete Signature Name in block capitals: te of sve Regional Office: ‘The folowing documents are attached ight Test ReaorUTight Manuel Status ReporWeight and C of G Schedule/Previcus C of A