Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies

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Back to Basics: The Re-Securitization of Cyprus by

Turkey After Crans Montana

Hüseyin Ergüven & Nur Köprülü

To cite this article: Hüseyin Ergüven & Nur Köprülü (2023): Back to Basics: The Re-Securitization
of Cyprus by Turkey After Crans Montana, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, DOI:
10.1080/19448953.2023.2167341

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2023.2167341

Published online: 19 Jan 2023.

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JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2023.2167341

Back to Basics: The Re-Securitization of Cyprus by Turkey

After Crans Montana
Hüseyin Ergüven and Nur Köprülü

ABSTRACT
Utilizing the theory of securitization and security sectors of the
Copenhagen School, this article analyses the re-securitization pro­
cess of Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus after the collapse of the
peace talks at the Crans Montana Conference in 2017. The failure of
the negotiation process to reach a solution based on the UN
Parameters and the subsequent outbreak of the Arab Uprisings in
2011 along with the rivalry that arose over the exploration and
discovery of offshore gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean
have all contributed to the revival of Turkey’s traditional and ‘secur­
itized’ Cyprus policy. The discourse analysis reveals three types of
threat projections under the military and societal sectors and a case
of counter-securitization under the political sector.

Introduction
The Cyprus Question is considered to be one of the oldest unresolved conflicts in the
world. The most recent official effort to resolve the issue was convened in Crans
Montana, Switzerland, in July 2017, but ultimately the effort resulted in another failure
of comprehensive settlement regarding the Cyprus Question. The Cyprus Question
indisputably has formed a central pillar of Turkish foreign policy and has remained
a top issue of Turkey’s security agenda since the 1950s as a ‘national cause’ (milli dava),
being highly securitized by the ruling elite until the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -
Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002. With the rise of the AKP
government, there was a noticeable tendency towards removing Cyprus from the security
agenda. However, the subsequent power alternations in the Eastern Mediterranean, along
with the maritime boundary disputes resulting from the exploration and discovery of
offshore gas resources by the Eastern Mediterranean littoral states ultimately forced
Ankara to drastically reconsider its preferences in the region. Ankara has also been
challenged by the subsequent emergence of an anti-Turkey camp in the region. These
developments and the eventual collapse at the negotiation table in Crans Montana
culminated in the re-securitization of Turkey’s Cyprus policy.
This article utilizes the theory of securitization as devised by the Copenhagen School
and begins with a brief overview of this theoretical framework. This is followed by
a summary of the Cyprus Question and an analysis of Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy,
as well as patterns of securitizations between 1950 and 2002. The article then continues to

CONTACT Hüseyin Ergüven huseyinerguven@hotmail.com

© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

analyse how the AKP aimed to desecuritize this policy but was challenged by the dispute
in the Eastern Mediterranean over the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the Arab
Uprisings. Through discourse analysis, the article then outlines how Cyprus was re-
securitized under different security sectors after the failure of the Crans Montana
summit.

Securitization and security sectors

Securitization is a process of elevating an issue from the domain of politics to the domain
of security. In a nutshell, an actor poses an issue as an existential threat in relation to
a referent object, justifying emergency measures via a speech act to an audience—and
therefore elevating the issue to the domain of security.1 Referent objects are things that
are seen to be existentially threatened—in most cases the state or the nation—and the
securitizing actor, who must be in a strong position and have ‘social capital’, securitizes
issues by declaring a referent object existentially threatened. More importantly, the
process is neither objective nor subjective, but intersubjective among subjects. The
process is a negotiation between the securitizing actor and the audience and is completed
with the acceptance of the audience.2 On the other hand, the School defines desecuritiza­
tion as the antithesis of securitization and as ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency
mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’,3 though the
School is often criticized for a lack of attention to this reverse process.
The theory is profoundly inspired by the language theories of Austin and Derrida. The
School regards ‘security’ as a ‘speech act’; that is by saying ‘security’, something is done.
As a result, the study of securitization is carried out via discourse analysis:
Read, looking for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined here
a security.. . . A search for security arguments is carried out, and each finding is investigated
as to its context, the referent object, the threat, and—not least—its connection to other
sectors4

A further contribution of the Copenhagen School to the field was the introduction of the
five sectors of security—namely, the military, political, economic, societal and environ­
mental. The article will, in this regard, explore the pattern of securitizations within the
military sector covering external and internal military threats to state sovereignty and the
use of force against non-military threats, the political sector covering non-military
threats to state sovereignty, and the societal sector covering threats to identity such as
migration, and depopulation which includes policies of extermination.5

The Cyprus question and Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy

The Cyprus question in a nutshell
The internationalization of the Cyprus Question traces back to 1954 when it was brought
to the UN by Greece at the demand of Greek Cypriots as they sought integration with
Greece (Enosis). This was countered by demands from Turkish Cypriots for the partition
(Taksim) of the island along communal lines. In6 1960, the independent Republic of
Cyprus (RoC) was declared as a unitary state under the guarantorship of Turkey, Greece
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 3

and the United Kingdom, with both communities represented through a power-sharing
mechanism. Nonetheless, the start of inter-communal clashes in December 1963 resulted
in the de facto collapse of the common republic and segregation of the two communities.7
The collapse of the constitutional order via a coup d’état orchestrated by the Greek junta
on 15 July 1974 culminated in military interventions by Turkey on 20 July 1974 and
14 August 1974. The de facto separation of the two communities has been frozen in place
since then.8
The Greek Cypriot community unilaterally administers the internationally recognized
RoC; meanwhile, after years of different forms of administration, the Turkish Cypriot
community declared its own state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), in
November 1983. The TRNC is not internationally recognized, in light of UN Security
Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), except by Turkey. While the island
remains separated, efforts to resolve the Cyprus Question continue via intercommunal
negotiations based on a settlement as envisaged by the UN—known as the ‘UN
Parameters’—which formed over time through these negotiations.9

Turkey’s Cyprus policy before the AKP and patterns of securitizations (1950–2002)
Cyprus was not considered within the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) of Kemal Atatürk or
as a topic of foreign policy in Turkey until the mid-1950s. The10 annexation by the British
Empire of the island was formally recognized with the Treaty of Lausanne, and the
official policy was that Turkey would not have a claim on the island or intervene in the
affairs of its Western ally which would also at the time upset the Turkish-Greek balance.
Cyprus became an official subject of foreign policy upon the increasing demands of
Greece and Greek Cypriots for Enosis, and the subsequent internationalization of the
issue. As a response to these claims, Turkey’s aim to annexe Cyprus and then later
Taksim in the 1950s proved unattainable, resulting in the eventual declaration of the RoC
in 1960. Nonetheless, following the outbreak of intercommunal clashes in 1963,11 then-
Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü proposed his ‘Independent Cyprus’ thesis in 1964,
which suggested the formation of a federation as a means of settling the Cyprus Question.
Turkey’s12 Cyprus policy has since then and until the late 1990s (with a short interlude
for the TRNC’s independence in 1983) favoured the formation of a federal state in
Cyprus in accordance with the UN Parameters.13
Despite this official policy, the ruling elite has traditionally treated the Cyprus
Question as a national security issue. In the 1950s, there was a surge of public interest
in the so-called ‘Cyprus cause’ and the issue was securitized by the ruling elite under the
military and societal sectors. Under the former, Cyprus—which is of a strategic impor­
tance for Turkey due to its proximity (only 40 nautical miles away) – was portrayed as an
extension of Turkey or Anatolia, but at the same time as a source of an existential threat
of encirclement if it fell into enemy hands. Mufti contends that Turkish perception of
external threats were rooted in the experiences of World War I and the War of
Independence, as well as the scramble for Anatolia envisaged by the Sevres Treaty,
which triggered a fear of fragmentation and encirclement by Turkey’s enemies—this is
known as the ‘Sevres Syndrome’.14 As a case in point, Kaliber argues that Cyprus was
projected as Turkey’s ‘only access to the Eastern Mediterranean from the south’, and this
4 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

projection was carried out with a ‘securitizing language imbued with excessive
geopoliticism’.15
Moreover, there has been increasing concern over the destiny of the Turkish nation on
the island, as the referent object, which Turkish Cypriots were regarded as an extension
of. The threat was that under Greek rule, the Turkish nation on the island would be
treated poorly or would be annihilated. ‘Cyprus must not become a second Crete’ or
‘Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish’ were the popular slogans of the period. In
addition, it was during this period that Cyprus had started to be portrayed as the ‘national
cause’ (milli dava) or ‘national issue/concern’ (milli mesele) where the nascent homeland
(yavruvatan) was asking for protection from its motherland (anavatan) against Greece.16
As for the next two decades, the key turning point was the 1974 military intervention.
Under the military sector, the arrival of Turkish troops on the island may have reduced
Turkey’s fear of being encircled; this sense of security came at the cost of a new type of
threat: the potential to lose a strategic military outpost in the Eastern Mediterranean in
the event that the Cyprus Question would be settled and ‘the soil of the homeland’ would
be lost (vatan toprağı kaybedilecek). The securitizations under the societal sector were
also multiplied due to the Turkish ‘bloodshed’ during the military intervention and the
presence of martyrs of the Turkish nation on the island. Even though this was designated
a ‘Peace Operation’ (Barış Harekatı) and reportedly ‘peace arrived in 1974’ (Barış 1974’te
geldi), depopulation continued to be voiced as an existential threat to Turkish Cypriots
after the military intervention.17
In the 1980s, then-Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal tried to remove
Cyprus from the traditional security agenda, focusing on the economic benefits of
a prospective solution. He introduced new proposals such as reduction of the Turkish
armed forces in Cyprus or turning the northern side into an economic-free zone, and was
also active, contrary to his predecessors, in rejuvenating the negotiations on Cyprus.
Nonetheless,18 the repercussions of the 1980 coup d’état were enduring as the military
retained a powerful role in devising the foreign and security policies, and in particular the
policy on Cyprus, through the National Security Council. The19 military-bureaucratic
elite was treating the Cyprus Question as settled with the military intervention and was
successful in keeping the issue on the security domain.
During the 1990s, two major developments shaped Turkey’s Cyprus policy which had
become increasingly tenacious: the S-300 crisis with the RoC and the accession processes
of the RoC and Turkey to the EU. The grip of the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite on
foreign policy making was strengthened during this period. Under20 the military sector,
the purchase of S-300 missiles from Russia was projected as an external military threat for
the sovereignty of Turkey and the TRNC, along with frequent emphasis on the fear of
encirclement. Under the societal sector, the threat of annihilation of Turkish Cypriots
and the past sufferings were frequently emphasized in official statements and speeches.
Turkey began strengthening its ties with the TRNC through a series of joint declarations,
also making frequent recourse to threats of both political and military action. One21 of
the significant moves was deviation from support for the UN Parameters as the basis of
a settlement, as Turkey supported Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş’s proposals for
a confederation model, which called for ‘a mutually acceptable political solution based
on the sovereign equality of the two sides’, putting22 forward new parameters for a final
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 5

settlement of the Cyprus Question on the basis of ‘the acknowledgement of the existence
of two sovereign and equal states’.23

A brief interlocutory? AKP’s Cyprus policy between 2002 and 2017

Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy was transformed after the AKP’s 2002 electoral
victory. As the AKP, with its religious and conservative backbone, is a political descen­
dant of the Milli Görüş Hareketi (National Vision Movement) in Turkey, many were
surprised when the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan turned their eyes towards
the EU and showed eager willingness to resolve the Cyprus Question. In contrast to
previous administrations, the AKP acknowledged the nexus between potential accession
to the EU and settlement of the Cyprus Question. To24 this effect, Turkey’s new Cyprus
policy was norm-driven, disrupting the status quo and changing the prevalent discourse,
which had assigned the blame for non-settlement of the Cyprus Question to Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In other words, the new policy paradigm of Turkey
abandoned the ‘no solution is the solution in Cyprus’ and the ‘status quo in Cyprus is the
solution’ policies.25
In an attempt to de-securitize Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy, the AKP govern­
ment departed from the deeply rooted nationalist discourse, portrayed instead
a proactive and firm commitment to the UN Parameters for the comprehensive settle­
ment of the Cyprus Question when it was presented with the UN-sponsored
Comprehensive Plan (known as the Annan Plan) in November 2002. Erdoğan was
vocal about reversing the traditional policy, and overtly confronted the military elite
and the nationalist opposition, who in turn accused him of ‘selling the national cause’.
During26 the round of negotiations, the new administration followed its new approach of
‘being one step ahead’ of the RoC and Greece. In27 February 2004, Turkey accepted
Annan’s preconditions for the resumption of negotiations, and after the Bürgenstock
Summit in March 2004, the RoC rejected the last version of the Annan Plan, while
Turkey agreed to sign on to the plan.
With referenda held on both sides of the island on 24 April 2004, the Annan Plan was
accepted by Turkish Cypriots but rejected by a clear majority of Greek Cypriots. After the
referenda, Turkey focused its efforts on highlighting the ‘Yes’ vote of the Turkish
Cypriots, and called for an end to isolation and embargoes. More28 importantly, the
influence of the military on security and foreign policy making in general, and on Cyprus
in particular has been considerably curtailed and the AKP has replaced the military as the
(de)securitizing actor on Cyprus. Nonetheless, the catalytic force for the AKP in reshap­
ing its Cyprus policy soon faded away with the eventual stagnation of the accession
process to the EU as Turkey refused to officially recognize the RoC; this led to the
suspension of negotiations on 14 chapters by December 2009. Further,29 from Turkey’s
perspective, by achieving unilateral accession and acquiring an invaluable veto power, the
RoC was now in a position to dictate the terms of Turkey’s accession process, and to
shape EU policies on the Cyprus Question. This led to, as Kyris argues, the ‘internaliza­
tion’ of the Cyprus Question within the EU in the eyes of Turkey, which remained
outside the European club.30
The new policy paradigm of the AKP on Cyprus was not only damaged by deteriorat­
ing relations with the EU but also was beginning to be challenged by the changing
6 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean. With gas exploration and the power
alternations following the Arab Uprisings, the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean
has begun to transform drastically, which in the eyes of Turkey put Cyprus under
a different spotlight. Turkey objected to the unilateral efforts of the RoC to initiate the
exploration of hydrocarbon reserves in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the
delimitation agreements signed with Egypt and Lebanon in 2003 and January 2007,
respectively. The31 discovery of offshore natural gas fields in the Tamar and Leviathan
areas by Israel in 2009 and 2010 respectively further convinced the RoC and Israel to
make a deal on maritime delimitation in December 2010. This occurred during
a deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relationship over the Davos Crisis and the Mavi
Marmara incident. Ulusoy argues that Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s was
actually a temporary one which did not turn into a long-term strategic alliance and
collapsed with the developments over the last two decades. The32 discoveries of the
Aphrodite across the southern coast of Cyprus and the gigantic Zohr area off the coast of
Egypt then caused the rivalry over maritime delimitation among the littoral states to
escalate.
Many argued for the prospect of collaborative exploration to be a catalyst for
a regional peace, and33 an arrangement between Turkey, the RoC and Israel would be
a more feasible and profitable solution for the development and transportation of natural
gas. In34 constrast to this brief period of euphoria, tensions in the region began to
increase due to clashing interests and states’ claims in the region. Demiryol argues that
Turkey’s objections to deals by other littoral states has three sources:

First, instead of bilateral deals, Ankara advocates a multilateral approach to the delimitation
of continental shelves and EEZs to guarantee the sovereign rights of third parties. Second,
the Turkish government is concerned that the redrawing of Mediterranean maritime
borders at the expense of Turkey jeopardizes Turkey’s position in the Aegean Sea as well,
where Turkey and Greece have long quarrelled over the continental shelf. Third, and most
importantly, the Cyprus issue directly shapes Turkey’s perception. Ankara holds that
Cyprus’ natural resources belong to both communities on the island and insists that the
Greek Cypriots should not unilaterally demarcate its maritime borders until the Turkish
Cypriots are guaranteed to receive their share.35

On the basis of these objections, rather than focussing on the economic benefits of
cooperation, the key considerations of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean have been
national sovereignty and the sanctity and protection of its maritime boundaries. As
a countermove, Turkey and the TRNC signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement
in September 2011, and the TRNC consequently issued licences to the Turkish Petroleum
Corporation (TPAO) for blocs, some of which overlapped with the EEZ of the RoC.
Turkey36 claimed partial rights to 5 blocks, leading to Turkey and the TRNC to collec­
tively blockade the exploration efforts in 11 out of 13 blocs that were claimed by the
RoC.37
In addition to the perceived threats on its maritime boundaries, the regional power
calibration after the Arab Uprisings led to further challenges for Turkey in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Much scholarly literature has problematized the changing nature of
Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East. This38 was the ‘zero
problems with neighbours’ paradigm that significantly stimulated Turkey’s policy
towards the Middle East, as well as the Balkans. Thus, the new paradigm was aimed at
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 7

building closer economic, social and cultural ties with neighbouring countries, and
increasing the soft power actorness of Turkey in the region.
However, in line with the changing perception of Turkey’s vision towards its eastern
neighbours, the dynamics of the Middle East region also began to shift with the Arab
Uprisings. Despite the quite visible rapprochement with Damascus, Ankara took
a position against Bashar al-Assad and primarily in favour of regime change with the
onset of the Syrian uprisings, providing support to the Syrian opposition. In addition,
Turkey’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Egypt
would be an obstacle to Ankara’s efforts to deepen its ties with Egypt under the Al-Sisi
regime following the overthrow of the Ikhwan-led Morsi government. What is more, the
continuous tension and the deteriorating relations between Turkey and Israel/Egypt have
been cultivated into a strategic partnership of the RoC and Greece with Israel and Egypt,
who have taken proactive steps to enhance their cooperation in the military and energy
field. In light of these developments, it can be seen that Ankara’s ideational as well as
norm-driven ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy and its aspirations for a leadership
role in the region were strenuously challenged.
In the end, the new geopolitical equilibrium led to the alienation of Turkey in the
Eastern Mediterranean which in turn sharpened its threat perceptions in the region.
Within this framework, there has been an increase of nationalist discourse on the rights
of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. Dayıoğlu et al. argue that
Turkey opted to employ a rhetoric ‘premised upon the nationalist narrative drawing on
“security” and “kinship”’ with regard to the drilling activities in the Eastern
Mediterranean.39 Though some scholars argued that Turkey turned to traditional policies
by this time as Erdoğan made occasional calls for a two-state solution,40 the official
position of Turkey has never changed on the form of the settlement. Leading up to Crans
Montana, the AKP government pursued a multi-layered Cyprus policy; the first limb, as
the remnant of the ‘one step ahead’ and ‘zero problems with neighbours’ paradigms,
supported the settlement of the Cyprus Question within an internationally recognized
and UN-sanctioned framework, whereas the second limb began to perceive Cyprus in the
Eastern Mediterranean as a matter of national security, obstructing the prospect of
desecuritization of the matter.
Starting from 2015, there was a rekindled optimism with the Akıncı–Anastasiades
coupling as after a long time the leaders of both communities belonged to the pro-Annan
Plan camp. Turkey emphasized that there was a window of opportunity for a solution,
and41 continued its commitment to the talks in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in
2016. However,42 it was clear that by this time Turkey was at a crossroads in relation to
the settlement of the Cyprus Question. The cacophony surrounding TFP on the Cyprus
Question was building to a crescendo at Crans Montana.

Threats and beyond: re-securitization of Cyprus in the post-crans Montana era and
a case of counter-securitization
Following the failure of the Crans Montana summit, the distinct layers of the AKP’s
multi-layered vision on Cyprus converged on the national security layer and the new
policy fully departed from the norm-driven policy of the first decade of AKP rule. The
restoration of the security-oriented and nationalist policies of the 1990s was facilitated
8 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

concurrently with the escalation of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and with
domestic changes. Regime security concerns after the Gezi Park protests, the loss of
elections in June 2015, the collapse of the peace process with the Kurdish movement and
the subsequent rise in terrorist attacks, and the failed coup attempt in 2016 culminated in
an alliance of the AKP under the new presidential system with the ultra-nationalist
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or MHP) in the form of the
People’s Alliance (the Alliance). In examining this shift in discourse and the re-
securitization process, the speech acts of the prominent actors of the Alliance were
analysed which revealed three types of threats under different security sectors and
a case of counter-securitization under the political sector:

Threat 1: Fear of encirclement and loss of a strategic base

One of the central themes of the speech acts has been the fear of encirclement, accom­
panied by a discourse imbued with Turkey’s historical experiences. A striking example is
Erdoğan’s use of the analogy of Sword of Damocles from Cicero’s tale in projecting
Greece and the RoC as posing a looming catastrophic threat to Turkey. Turkey43
possesses the longest continuous coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean and has per­
ceived the deals by the littoral states as unfair and unacceptable ‘fait accomplis’. The
threat of being locked in the Aegean Sea by Greek claims has been a well-embedded
theme in the Turkish national security culture; the prospect of containment from both
the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean now revived these longstanding fears of
encirclement under the military sector. The adaptation of Sevresphobia to the fear of
‘entrapment in Antalya Bay’ and drawing a parallel between the Sevres Treaty and the
Sevilla Map—which depicts the delimitation of the continental shelf of Greece and the
RoC—was also voiced by Vice President Fuat Oktay:

There was a map drawn to Turkey 100 years ago, called Sevres. . . . Now, there is an attempt
of trying to draw a map in the seas that we have torn apart on our land, and the European
Union that is an instrument in this attempt. There is also Greece and the Greek Cypriot part
that they are using as a tool for this. . . . It is incomprehensible why the apocalypse breaks out
when Turkey explores its own resources with its own ships in the Eastern Mediterranean on
its continental shelf. Because it is about the [Sevilla] map. Do you know what the map says?
It says, ‘You will not even step into the sea’.44

As the quote shows, an accompanying theme was the growing disenchantment of Turkey
with the Western bloc and Turkey portrayed a tendency to act more autonomously in its
policies. For45 instance, the EU imposed restrictive measures on Turkey in
November 2019 due to its ‘illegal drilling activities’ in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Particularly after46 Crans Montana, the ‘internalization’ of the Cyprus Question by the
EU was articulated by Turkish officials with a harsher tone. Çavuşoğlu has been vocal in
his opinion that the EU was not being an ‘honest mediator’, instead being partial to the
Greek side and ignoring Turkish Cypriots. The regional47 dynamics have contributed to
the sense of encirclement and distrust as the formation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas
Forum (EMGF) and Turkey’s and the TRNC’s exclusion from the EMGF—with all
parties criticizing Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and perceiving
Turkey as an aggressive and expansionist power in the region—led to the further
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 9

isolation of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Along with providing military support
to the UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj
against General Haftar’s forces in Libya, Turkey concluded a maritime delimitation
agreement with GNA in November 2019. Revealing that the threat perception of
Turkey in the region is still shaped by Sevres Syndrome, Erdoğan called this move the
‘reversal of Sevres’.48
What is more, the security cooperation between the littoral states and global powers
has also increased over time. Therefore,49 the military presence in the TRNC has gained
more strategic importance in shaping Turkey’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Mehmetcik and Çelik draw attention to a structural change in Turkish Foreign Policy
over the last few years, expanding its military presence in the periphery and utilizing
coercive diplomacy to resolve disputes, hence resulting in the militarization of Turkish
Foreign Policy. As a showcase, in 2019, the TRNC approved the use of its airport in
Geçitkale (Lefkonikos) for unmanned aerial vehicles to assist Turkish drilling ships in the
Eastern Mediterranean. As50 one of the contested issues in the negotiations, the guaran­
torship of Turkey during this period was frequently emphasized.51 Turkey claimed that as
the guardian of both the Turkish nation on the island and the rights of Turkish Cypriots
on the natural reserves all over the island, the ‘zero troops, zero guarantees’ demand of
the RoC had to be rejected, as a red line in the negotiations and non-removal of troops
would also ensure the maintenance of the strategic base in the northern part of the island:
Pointing to the maps, Oktay stated that Greece’s thesis meant that a commercial ship from
Turkey, surrounded by seas on three sides, could not move to the open seas, ‘Can you
understand the Cyprus issue now? Can you understand why Cyprus is so important? For
France, for the EU, do you understand what Cyprus means to others and what Cyprus
means to us?’ he asked.52

Threat 2: Violation of sovereignty of Turkey and TRNC

With the advent of the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine, which envisages expan­
sion of Turkey’s territorial integrity into the sea, the protection of this new vatan has
become a central policy effort of Turkey and the exploration of the hydrocarbon reserves
by the drilling companies on behalf of the RoC, within the region where the claims of the
parties overlapped, has been regarded as a violation of sovereignty of Turkey. Even
though these are non-military threats to sovereignty, the military sector also includes
potential use of force to non-military threats. Turkey has constantly emphasized the
sanctity of the boundaries at sea and that any violation would be met with consequences.
Erdoğan’s following words referring to the drilling companies and to the RoC provide an
example of many similar speeches on the securitization within the military sector:
Their bravado is until they see our army, our ships and our planes. We remind you once
again that this is not about taking pictures secretly on secluded rocks, bringing drilling ships
to the region with invalid agreements. . . . Turkey is and will be in pursuit of her rights
deriving from history, agreements and international law. Whatever Afrin is for us, our rights
in the Aegean and Cyprus are the same.53

Reference to Afrin, where Turkey carried out a military operation, constitutes a strong
inclination to use force, and portrays the decisiveness of Turkey in countering these
10 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

threats. Moreover, the securitizing actors have all consistently emphasized that as the
guarantor country and the motherland, Turkey has the right to protect the rights of the
TRNC and Turkish Cypriots. The Blue Homeland doctrine also extends to the con­
tinental shelf of the TRNC—therefore projecting it as part of the vatan that must be
protected at all costs—as pointed out by Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar:
Our counterparties should know that we will never allow our legal and historical rights and
interests to be violated on our seas in the Blue Homeland, and that any project in the Aegean
and Mediterranean without Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has no
chance to survive.54

Threat 3: Depopulation of Turkish nation on the island

The last threat identified is the threat of the depopulation of the Turkish nation on the
island within the societal sector, on which the speech acts of the securitizing actors
featured common themes. Emphasis on the necessity of the presence of Turkish troops
on the island to protect the community and the Turkishness of the island has become more
prevalent through a nationalist discourse. Erdoğan’s remarks underline this attitude:
The Cyprus cause is a great cause. It is great in terms of its history, its conscience, its
struggle. It is the cause of a great nation that made history with its epic heroism in 1974. The
Cyprus cause belongs to the entire Turkish nation.55

The protection of Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots has again become a vital
consideration within the motherland—nascent homeland context: ‘We will never allow
the Turkish Cypriots to become minorities in a Greek Cypriot state’. The56 Eastern
Mediterranean dispute has indeed acted as a catalyst reinforcing the use of these
securitizing phrases. One of the prevalent phrases was the need to ‘protect the rights of
Turkish Cypriots’ on the natural resources all around the island as the ‘co-owners of the
island’. The rhetoric completely changed from the Annan Plan period, blaming the
‘Greek Cypriot mentality’ as the barrier to settling the Cyprus Question, via (re-)
constructing an uncompromising and maximalist ‘other’:
The mentality that demolished the Republic of Cyprus in 1963, rejected the Annan Plan in
2004 and left the table in Crans-Montana in 2017 has not changed a bit. The Greek Cypriots’
pipe dreams, still seeing themselves as the sole owner of the island and the Turkish Cypriots
as a minority, brought on the deadlock. The history and our bitter experiences during the
process have laid bare that the Greek Cypriot side has no such intention as to form
a partnership state.57

A novel attempt to reinforce this nationalist discourse was also the production of a drama
series on the state-owned television channel called Once Upon a Time in Cyprus, which
sought to portray the events of the Turkish Cypriot resistance between 1963 and 1974.58

A case of counter-securitization under the political sector: the sovereignty of the

TRNC
As this is a novel contribution to the literature, a brief theoretical background for this
type of securitization is necessary. The School argues that within the political sector
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 11

countries may enter into a cycle of securitization and counter-securitization in the case of
interventions; as one side argues that the intervention, as in 1974, is necessary on
humanitarian grounds, the other side argues that its sovereignty is violated. The59
School further contends that within the political sector, political threats may also be
made to the external recognition of the state and to its external legitimacy when the two
entities do not acknowledge each other’s existence, as with Israel and Palestine.
Adamides60 argues that in the RoC the subject of TRNC recognition has been routinely
securitized, since61 a prospective recognition of the TRNC by the international commu­
nity would lead to the solidification of the status quo. This article argues that after 2017,
Turkey counter-securitized this fear by constructing any prospective loss of the sover­
eignty of the TRNC as an existential threat to Turkey, by ‘uttering’ that the TRNC exists
and will exist in perpetuity. This discourse has partly been the product of the dependence
of Turkey’s arguments on the Eastern Mediterranean to the existence of the TRNC, and
the continental shelf delimitation agreement signed between the two states.
This type of counter-securitization could be observed plainly from the speech acts of
the actors. Proactive steps to ensure the survival of the TRNC have been taken such as the
proposal of two-state solution. Erdoğan frequently articulated Ankara’s changing policy
towards the Cyprus Question and emphasized that ‘new ideas were needed for a solution
on the long-divided island . . . [and the failure of the 2017 Crans-Montana Cyprus talks]
showed that a federation would not be viable . . . there were already two separate states in
Cyprus’. Turkey’s62 need for an ally in the Turkish Cypriot leadership who would
embrace the two-state solution policy has also become a priority due to the divergence
of views on the form of a prospective settlement between the then-incumbent President
Akıncı and the Turkish leadership which became public in the last months of 2018 when
Çavusoğlu visited Akıncı and relations deteriorated from that point onwards. The clear
beneficiary of this deterioration was the hawkish nationalist then-Prime Minister Ersin
Tatar, who has been vocal about the continuance of the existence and sovereignty of the
TRNC. Given the magnitude of the move, the last-minute joint press conference of
Erdoğan and Tatar on the opening of the beachfront of Varosha (or Maraş) was
interpreted as a clear indication that Tatar was Turkey’s preferred candidate in the
election. With63 Tatar’s election, the new policy was brought to the international scene
at the Geneva Conference held in April 2021, which was an informal five-plus-one
meeting for soul-searching. Tatar’s64 proposal for a two-state solution was fully sup­
ported by Turkey. Most65 recently, during his address to the UN General Assembly
Erdoğan urged the international community to officially recognize the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus ‘as soon as possible’.
The opening of Varosha—as part of the TRNC—was another proactive step to high­
light the sovereignty of the TRNC. Varosha was a very popular tourist destination before
1974, with luxurious coastal hotels and resorts which attracted tourists and celebrities
from all over the world. However, since 1974 it has had a special status, being under the
exclusive control of the military of Turkey and restricted from public access. The66
opening of the beachfront in Varosha in October 2020 was an assertive and a unilateral
action, aiming to disrupt the status quo; however, it attracted criticisms not only from the
RoC but also the international community, as the move was labelled as being against
international law. Oktay responded to these criticisms as follows:
12 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

The Maraş region was declared a ‘Forbidden Zone’ in good faith within the framework of the
search for a solution . . . and was transferred to the TRNC Security Forces Command in
1990. Closed Maraş is TRNC territory and is currently a closed military zone within the
scope of the decision taken by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. [This decision] is made by
the TRNC Government, which is able to do so. I emphasize this point especially because
some circles have not yet acknowledged this fact.67

Moreover, there has been an incrementally increasing emphasis on the ‘realities of the
island’ meaning that the status quo after 1974 has now become the norm which must be
accepted, as Çavuşoğlu also underlines: ‘Turkey and [the TRNC] support the negotiation
of a “two-state solution”, which is in line with the realities of the island’. The existence of
the TRNC is justified due to the right of self-determination of the Turkish community of
the island. As Erdoğan states:
The attitude of the Greek Cypriots that does not recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus does not change the fact that there is a society and a state with its history, geography,
population, culture, political and economic rights.68

The question remains as to whether the threshold for this type of counter-securitization
has been passed. It could be argued that the issue is not securitized under the political
sector, and that it is merely a political issue. Oktay’s remarks must also be highlighted:
‘This is now the struggle for survival (beka), independence and the future of the Turkish
Cypriot people and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. The69 ‘survival’ of the
state or the nation (devletin bekası/milletin bekası) has become one of the recurring
themes during this period. The Alliance has frequently used these terms to rally the
electorate around the flag. Therefore, labelling an issue as a ‘struggle for survival; is
exactly the security speak we should be looking for within this sector—in the end,
security is about survival.

Audience
For the securitization process to be complete, ‘enough resonance’ must be gained from
the audience. Much70 academic ink has been spilled on the role of the audience—for
instance, Leonard and Kaunert draw attention to the lack of criteria ‘to identify who
exactly constitutes the audience in practice’. Several71 academics argued for the existence
of multiple and different kind of audiences, whereas72 Hansen argues that in non-
democratic countries, the relevant audience need not be the entire population but only
the power elite.73
For the case at hand, the analysis will be limited to the criteria set by the School.
Assuming that the electorate in Turkey is the relevant audience, there are certain
indicators that the acceptance of the audience may in fact be in place. Firstly, it is
presumed that the policies of the Alliance have already been accepted since they are
the authorized representatives of the electorate. Polls might also be utilized as indicators
to how the audience reacts to the issue at hand. A recent poll, carried out by Kadir Has
University in 2022, shows that the audience is aware of the securitizations of Cyprus since
the TRNC has been viewed respectively as ‘an indispensable kin-country’, ‘a strategic
base in the Mediterranean’ and a ‘babyland’ (yavruvatan). What74 is more, the main
opposition parties in Turkey, the CHP and the İyi Parti, not only do not object to the
 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 13

Alliance’s policies on Cyprus, but also support them as they regard the issue above the
domain of politics. CHP’s leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s comment is a testament to this effect:
‘Cyprus policy in Turkey is a national policy, there are no differences of opinion between
political parties’.75 As a result, we observe that on the basis of the last election, almost 90%
of the electorate supports the parties which regard Cyprus within the domain of security.
All in all, it would be appropriate to conclude that the policy on Cyprus gained enough
resonance with the audience and thus the process of re-securitization is complete.

Conclusion
Over the last two decades, the upshots of the Arab revolts which culminated in significant
power alternations in the region as well as the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves across
the Eastern Mediterranean have swiftly heightened tensions in the entire region. As
a matter of fact, the rivalry over Eastern Mediterranean gas has already gone beyond the
issue of littoral states’ ownership rights and thus given rise to new regional geopolitics.
The tensions have revolved around the right to sovereignty, as well as contested gas
exploration and the transit route of potential transportation. Therefore, the failure of the
Crans Montana summit could be considered as the necessary spark prompting the AKP-
MHP alliance to change course and provide a leverage in Cyprus.
In light of these developments, this article identified the shift of discourse of the Turkish
ruling elite and the re-securitization of Turkey’s Cyprus policy within different security
sectors. Within this context, dormant security concerns such as the fear of encirclement,
Sevresphobia, the threat of violation of sovereignty or the threat of depopulation on the
Turkish nation on the island were rejuvenated. What is more, the sovereignty of the TRNC
and its continuing existence has become a vital security consideration for Turkey. There are
signs of de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean region which can be seen in the pursuit of
normalizing ties between Tel Aviv and Ankara but at the same time, an escalation of tension
between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean and East Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the Cyprus
Question retains its centrality in terms of the delineation of the EEZs and as a pillar of the
controversy in the Eastern Mediterranean—and for now, as the securitized ‘national cause’ of
Turkey in the current structure.

Notes
[1] Ibid., pp.25–33.
[2] Buzan et. al., op cit., p.4.
[3] Buzan et. al., op cit., p.177.
[4] Buzan et. al., op cit., p.22–23.
[5] A. Heraclides, ‘The Cyprus Gordian Knot: An Intractable Ethnic Conflict’, Nationalism and
Ethnic Politics, 17(2), 2011, pp. 119–120.
[6] B. Özkan, ‘Making Cyprus a national cause in Turkey’s foreign policy, 1948–1965’,
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15(4), 2015, p.541.
[7] Ş. Kıralp, ‘Cyprus between Enosis, Partition and Independence: Domestic Politics,
Diplomacy and External Interventions (1967–74)’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies, 19(6), 2017, p.592.
[8] A. Gülen, ‘İnönü Hükümetleri’nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1961–1965)’, Ankara Üniversitesi Türk
İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, 50, 2012, p.420.
14 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

[9] A. Sözen, ‘The Cyprus Negotiations: From the 1963 Inter-Communal Negotiations to the
Annan Plan’ in A. Sözen (eds.), Reflection on the Cyprus Problem: Compilation of Recent
Academic Contributions, Cyprus Policy Center, 2007, p.1.
[10] M. Mufti, ‘Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy’, Middle East Journal, 52(1), 1998,
p.41; B. Sarı, ‘Culture of Insecurity and Production of Foreign Policy Crises: Turkey’s Sèvres
Syndrome and Syrian Support for the PKK during the 1998 October Crisis’, Journal of
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 24(1), 2022, pp.138–157.
[11] A. Kaliber, ‘Securing the Ground Through Securitized “Foreign” Policy’, Security Dialogue,
36(3), 2005, p.327; P. Tank, ‘”Re-solving” the Cyprus problem: Changing perceptions of
state and societal security’, European Security, 11(3), 2002, pp.146–164.
[12] Özkan, op. cit.; R. Bryant and M. Hatay, ‘Turkish Perceptions of Cyprus: 1948 to the
Present’. PRIO Cyprus Centre Report, 2015, Oslo/Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre.
[13] Özkan, op. cit.; ibid.
[14] E. Ertosun, ‘Change and Leadership in Foreign Policy: The Case of Turgut Ozal’s
Premiership in Turkey, 1983–1989’. Mediterranean Quarterly, 27(2), 2016, pp.47–66.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Kaliber, op. cit.
[17] S. Suvarierol, ‘The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European
Union’. Turkish Studies, 4(1), 2003, p.60.
[18] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey (MFA), ‘Statement by President Denktaş
in Response to the Call Made by Greek Cypriot Leader Clerides for Turkish Cypriot
Participation in EU Membership Talks, 14 March 1998’, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-
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[19] MFA, ‘Documents Given by President Denktaş to the UN Secretary-General During Their
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[20] B. Uluğ-Eryılmaz, ‘The myth of “Europeanization” of Turkish foreign policy: the Cyprus
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[21] A. Sözen, ‘A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges’, Turkish
Studies, 11(1), 2010, p.117.
[22] M. Hatay and R. Bryant, ‘From “National Cause” to “National Burden”: Turkish Cypriots
within Turkey’s Kinship and Diaspora Politics and Perceptions’ in M. Hatay and Z. Tziarras
(eds), Kinship and Diasporas in Turkish Foreign Policy: Examples from Europe, the Middle
East and Eastern Mediterranean, Report 10/2019, PRIO, 2019, p.77.
[23] Akşit, op. cit., p.177.
[24] A. A. Çelenk, ‘The Restructuring of Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and
Development Party’s Struggle for Power’, Turkish Studies, 8(3), 2007, p.353.
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 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 15

[31] T. Demiryol, ‘Between security and prosperity: Turkey and the prospect of energy coopera­
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[33] Özertem, op. cit., p.366.
[34] These academic debates around whether Turkey’s so-called shift of axis constituted a far-
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Ş. Kardaş, ‘Türk Dış Politikasında Eksen Kayması mı?’ [A Shift of Axis in Turkish Foreign
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Ethnopolitics, 20(4), 2021, p. 462.
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16 H. ERGÜVEN AND N. KÖPRÜLÜ

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 JOURNAL OF BALKAN AND NEAR EASTERN STUDIES 17

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Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
Hüseyin Ergüven http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0314-6737
Nur Köprülü http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6978-1891