PFR WEEK 3 DIGESTS

U.E. v. JADER

DOCTRINE: Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking

undue advantage of another, even thru the forms & technicalities of law,
together w/ the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious. Art. 19 was intended to expand the
concept of

torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs w/c is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law.

FACTS:

Respondent Romeo Jader sued petitioner UE for damages for the moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence.

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last
year, 1st semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in
Practical Court 1 where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He
filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof.
Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean
Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the
removals exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a
grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988,
3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared but the invitation had a footnote
that the list is tentative and still subject to the completion of requirements.
Jader attended the ceremony, he marched with his parents, was given a
symbolic diploma, took pictures, prepared a blowout celebration to which
was attended by neighbors, friends, and relatives, took a leave of absence
without pay from work, and enrolled at a pre-bar review class. Upon
learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not
able to take the bar exam.
In its answer, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led
Jader to believe that he completed the requirements for an LLB degree
when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.

ISSUE: Whether or not UE should be held liable for misleading a student

into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages

HELD: Yes

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and is held liable.

Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code states that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith and every
person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their

academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their

academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot
feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams
since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate.

Hence petitioner is liable for its failure to promptly inform respondent of the
result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course.

However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages

though Jader suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that
he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations
as what CA held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the
bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been
responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with
his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but
there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of
requirements which prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum
of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages
is DELETED.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM

vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,”

FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held
petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an
entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee
at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend
several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a
birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried
a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon
as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby
Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice
enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All
these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in
the manner claimed by the plaintiff. At the party she noticed Reyes at the
bar counter ordering a drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, she approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the
presence of Reyes who was uninvited. The waiter said that he saw Reyes
came in w/ the group of Dr. Filart. Lim inquired Dr Filart’s sister about
Reyes and the sister said the latter was not invited by Dr. Filart. Lim
requested the sister to tell Reyes to leave but the latter just lingered. The
same happened when one Capt. Batung asked Reyes to leave. When Lim
spotted Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as
there were no guest in the immediate vicinity. However, as Reyes was
already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. When Reyes went
to a corner and started to eat, Lim approached him and said in tagalog:
“You know you’re not supposed to be here but since you already helped
yourself to some food you might as well finish it and leave after" (alam
ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng
pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis
na kayo.) She then turned around trusting that Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a
big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.

Dr. Filart’s version: According to her, it was Reyes who volunteered to carry
the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to
take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Reyes to go down as he was not
properly dressed and was not invited. All the while, she thought that Reyes
already left the place. Then there was a commotion and she saw Reyes
shouting. She ignored Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the
celebrant to think that she invited him.

RTC Ruling: Dismissed the complaint. giving more credence to the

testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited.

CA Ruling: On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It found

more commanding of belief the testimony of Reyes that Lim ordered him to
leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. It likewise
ruled that the actuation of Lim in approaching several people to inquire into
the presence of Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for
as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should
have talked to Reyes in private.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.”

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and
21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in
order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

ISSUE: WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave
the party.

RULING: NO.
DOCTRINE: Art. 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts & social
grievances. Art. 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores & has the ff elements:
(1) There is an act w/c is legal; (2) but w/c is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order or public policy; & (3) it is done w/ intent to injure. A
common theme runs thru Articles 19 & 21, & that is, the act complained of
must be intentional. Bad judgment cannot amount to bad faith.

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that
she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are
virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.

Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –Considering the
closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to
leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.
It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other
guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the
party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.

Moreover, another problem with Reyes’s version of the story is that it is

unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.
Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses (Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva) proved
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. Lim, not having
abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be
held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.

**ISSUE 2: Won the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is applicable in the
case at bar.

RULING:
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-
crasher."The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury" ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.

NAVARRO-BANARIA v. BANARIA
FACTS: The action for damages of respondents stemmed from the alleged
bad faith, malice, and deliberate failure of Adelaida to keep her word and
honor her promise to bring Pascasio to his 90th birthday celebration. Such
special event was prepared by the respondents and the non-appearance of
Pascasio during the event allegedly caused loss and injury to the
respondents.Respondents alleged that the planning of the event started as
early as February 2003 or a year before the planned 90th birthday
celebration. Respondents were in continuous contact with Adelaida to
remind her of the upcoming event. Adelaida, for her part, confirmed
Pascasio’s attendance during the event although it coincides with the death
anniversary of Adelaida’s mother. However, much to the dismay of the
Banaria siblings as well as their guests, Pascasio was nowhere to be found
in his 90th birthday celebration. Respondents continuously called Adelaida
but they were not able to contact her.Marcelino, Pascasio’s brother, told the
other respondents that Pascasio and Adelaida were at theirresidence in
Quezon City. Respondents went to the said place to ask Adelaida her
reason why Pascasio was not able to attend the birthday celebration.
Adelaida reasoned that Pascasio did not want to go to the party. When
asked why Adelaida broke her commitment to bring Pascasio to the party,
Adelaida uttered the words, “I am the wife.”Thus, the Complaint for
Damages filed by respondents against Adelaida. In response, Adelaida
rebutted the allegations of the respondents by saying that she was not privy
to the respondents’ planned birthday celebration for Pascasio.The RTC
rendered its Decision, which ordered petitioner to pay the respondents’
travel expenses,actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
However, it was denied

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil

Code

RULING:
DOCTRINE/PROVISION: Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties
must act with justice, give everyone hisdue, and observe honesty and good
faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as
the “abuse of right principle.” The legal consequence should anyone violate
this fundamental provision is found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

There is no question that as legal wife and guardian of Pascasio, who is

physically and mentally infirm, Adelaida has the principal and overriding
decision when it comes to the affairs of her husband including the
celebration of the latter’s 90th birthday. However, it must be noted
Adelaida’s right, as with any rights, cannot be exercised without limitation.
The exercise of this right must conform to the exacting standards of
conduct enunciated in Article 19. Adelaida was clearly remiss in this aspect.
Glaring is the fact that long before the scheduled date of Pascasio’s 90th
birthday celebration,
Adelaida was already informed about the event. As early as February 2003
or a year before the scheduled event, Adelaida was already reminded of
the event by the respondents to which she confirmed Pascasio’s
attendance. Even though Adelaida alleges that she was not privy to any
birthday celebration for Pascasio, the fact remains that she was
continuously informed and reminded about the scheduled event. All in all,
the foregoing shows that Adelaida intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to
the birthday celebration prepared by the respondents thus violating Article
19 of the Civil Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to observe
good faith in the exercise of her right as the wife of Pascasio caused loss
and injury on the part of the respondents, for which they must be
compensated by way of damages pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The correlation between the two provisions are showed in the case of GF
EQUITY, Inc. v. Valenzona, to wit:

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle

of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by lawas such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation.

Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would

be proper. While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended
as a mere declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human conduct”
expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where a
person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs
his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he
opens himself to liability.

The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are:

(1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Consequently, when Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper

under Article 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law.

GUEVARRA VS. BANACH

FACTS:
Banach, a German citizen, met Guevarra through a pastor. He
went on to court Guevarra, visiting her almost every day, giving
her gifts, and eventually telling her that he intended to marry her.
However, Banach did not tell Guevarra that he had still been married tohis
third wife then. Instead, he told her that he was a divorced man. He also
concealed his trueidentity and made Guevarra and her family believe that
his name was Roger Brawner.

Eventually, Guevarra submitted to Banach’s wooing as he offered

her a better life. Banach sent Guevarra P500,000.00 to buy a lot for
their conjugal home. Yet, Guevarra broke up with him after she found out
about his lies and deception.

Due to the breakup, Banach sued Guevarra and her parents for damages
before RTC anchored on the Human Relations provisions in the
Civil Code. He claimed that her acts amounted to fraud, or at the
very least, unjust enrichment. Likewise, he claimed moral damages for the
alleged “moral suffering, anguish, anxiety, and sleepless nights” he suffered
from her andp rayed for attorney’s fees for having been constrained to
litigate to protect his rights.

Guevarra, on the other hand, argued that the money Banach sent her was
a gift, the return of which was not actionable, and applying the law on
natural obligations.
RTC found Guevarra and her parents liable to Banach for actual damages
and also awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees.

CA similarly ordered Guevarra and her parents to return P500,000.00 to

Banach under the principle of unjust enrichment, but removed the award of
moral damages and attorney’s fees. It ruled that Banach’s actions were
tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did not have the purest intentions
in expressing his desire to marry Guevarra. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order to return the P500,000.00 is proper

RULING: No. The order to return the P500,000.00 is not proper.

A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as

it is not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good
customs. In any case, the party seeking to recover damages must have
acted in good faith.

The court, citing Wassmer v. Velez, allowed the recovery of damages as a

result of a canceled marriage. Preparations for the wedding had already
been made only to have the wedding canceled just two days before its
intended date. The award was not based on the breach of promise to
marry, but on Article 21 of NCC. It ruled that, while a breach of promise to
marry was not actionable unlike walking out of a wedding two days prior
after all had been prepared. The defendant’s act was deemed
“palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs”, for which the
award of damages was proper because the party who sought damages did
not perpetrate lies, fraud, or deception, which would have barred recovery.

In this case, the petitioner called off the engagement after she
had discovered respondent’s lies and deception, such acts suffice to
justify the wedding’s cancellation and reasons enough to conclude bad
faith.

Banach did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under NCC.
The unjust enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies if
the property is acquired without legal grounds. The respondent gave
Guevarra P500,000.00 as a gift to help her and her family with their
possible eviction from their home. The petitioner is correct that she cannot
be compelled to return the amount given to her as being a gift. The right to
marry is a fundamental human right. Marriage is a social institution that
creates a permanent bond between individuals, and the law grants them
rights and obligations unique to married couples. The choice of whether to
marry and necessarily, whom to marry is a personal decision that a
person makes for themself and must be made free from
external pressures, without any fear of legal retribution or liability, without
the pressures of a possible civil suit should a person realize that their
intended partner is not right for them. It is not within the courts’ competence
to reach too far into intimate relations and must, as much as possible,
refrain from meddling in these personal affairs.
Thus, the petition is granted. The award of actual damages
worth P500,000.00 is deleted.

QUISUMBING vs MERALCO

FACTS:

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a

house located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on
March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors were conducting a routine on the
spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house. Permission was
granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. It was found that the meter had been
tampered with and the information was relayed to the secretary who
conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors
brought the meter to their laboratory for further verifications. If proven that
the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect
the electric services.

The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the findings of the

laboratory. And unless they pay the amount of P178, 875.01 representing
the difference in the bill, their electric supply will be disconnected.

The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done

without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings,
social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and
plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD:

Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right

against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or
correction for public.

The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of

electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the
rights of the people. Meralco may immediately disconnect service in cases
of meter tampering, but it has to be personally witnessed and attested by
an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB
representative was present.

Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential
0f P193, 332. 96 while MERALCO was ordered to pay petitioners moral
and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees.

Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay
respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to
pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees.
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right
against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or
correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing
illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict
observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric
Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the
ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the
inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA

FACTS:

Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian medical
exchange student. He later courted her and proposed marriage. The
petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents.

The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. She
filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening
her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school
and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed
that he never proposed marriage, neither sought consent and approval of
Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his
apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and
reimbursements of actual expenses.

ISSUE:

Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause claim for
damages.

HELD:
Breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court
held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive
promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a

deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual
damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
WASSMER v. VELEZ
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the
necessary preparations for the wedding including making and sending
wedding invitations, buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other
wedding necessities.
On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he
will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to
said wedding.
And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon.
Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was
declared in default. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the
costs.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding
was because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held
civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is
no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong

in this case.

RULING:

TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO

FACTS:

On 24 February 1948 Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age in the 2 nd year

commerce student from University of San Carlos, Cebu City (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not happen
because because of Vicenta;s mother. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for
the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal it would provoke (t.s.n., vol.
III, pp. 1105-06).

The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register. Upon learning about the secret
marriage, Vicenta’s parents arranged for them to be married properly in a
church so as to validate their marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta
opposed to a second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter alleging
that Pastor and is having an amorous relationship with matchmaker Pacita
Noel. Vicenta continued to live with her parents and Pastor went back to
work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her husband’s welfare in her
letters, she was not as endearing and becomes less and less until they
became estranged.
The Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of
authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage.

The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Vicenta’s father, Mamerto
Escaño found out about disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita
Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.

Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for
non-prosecution because she never went to any of the set hearings.
Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing

Without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single and left for the United States. She filed for
divorce (1950) against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of “extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character” which the Nevada court granted even when
she was not yet an American citizen (1958).
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against Vicenta F. Escaño, her

parents Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections. He asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the divorce decree granted by the Nevada Court is valid
Whether or not the parents be held liable for the failure of the marriage

HELD:

1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent

and undissolved under the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second
marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which
Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in
not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any
justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree
of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which
constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of
adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by

credible evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s
animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the
suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of
one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy
motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to
seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955 and they separated in

1966. He contracted a second marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then
Narcisa went to Japan. While Narcisa was in Japan, he married Zenaida for
the second time in 1989.

Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered Salvador’s affair with Fe

Corazon Palto and his second marriage to Zenaida. The event was
followed by Salvador’s filing of an annulment case and the other hand,
Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.

In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa consented to his marriage

to Zenaida and that the bigamy case should be suspended since the
annulment case is prejudicial.

ISSUES:

Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for the bigamy case to
prosper?

HELD:

Annulment has no bearing upon determination of petitioner’s innocence or

guilt in bigamy. The only requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise by the Court. Salvador’s marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are
both subsisting, which makes him guilty of bigamy.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
considering that a crime is committed against the state. Bigamy is a public
offense which can be denounced by even a civic-spirited citizen who may
come to know of it.